Prioritising PPCR Investments in Mozambique: The Politics of ‘Country Ownership’ and ‘Stakeholder Participation’

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Abstract Mozambique is both one of the poorest countries and one with the highest level of vulnerability to multiple potential consequences of climate change, including drought, flood, sea level rise and increased frequency and severity of tropical cyclones – making it a natural candidate for inclusion in the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), which aims to help poorer countries to integrate climate change response into their national development processes. This article examines the process of prioritising investments under the PPCR in Mozambique, and asks to what extent this process has demonstrated the ‘country ownership’ and ‘broad participation’ which the PPCR claims to promote. It particularly focuses on the coastal cities component of the programme, and the question of whether the opposition-controlled port city of Beira should receive priority in PPCR investments.

1 Introduction
Mozambique is not only one of the world’s poorest countries, but also has a level of vulnerability to drought, flood, sea level rise and increased frequency and severity of tropical cyclones that makes it ‘one of the most exposed countries in the world to the cumulative effects of disaster risks and climate change’ (Environment Working Group 2009: 1). Mozambique has been included in the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), a flagship component of the Climate Investment Funds managed by the World Bank, whose declared aim is to help poor countries to make the strategic investments needed to deal with the challenge of climate change (see Seballos and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin). PPCR initiatives are designed to operate in two phases, with Phase 1 consisting of a 3–18-month period of preparatory work culminating in the preparation of a Strategic Program for Climate Resilience, and Phase 2 consisting of a period of up to five years in which this plan will be implemented through a mix of grant- and loan-funded investments (CIF 2009a). This article examines the process of prioritising investments under Phase 1 of the PPCR in Mozambique, which began in mid-2010. It asks to what extent this process has demonstrated the ‘country ownership’ and ‘broad participation’ that PPCR claims to promote, in the light of the tensions that exist between different actors’ technical, institutional and political priorities.

The tensions between the different actor’s priorities operate both within and between the global, national, subnational and local levels. Global–national tensions are shaped by the ‘contested sovereignty’ that is inseparable from Mozambique’s status as a heavily-aided country (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007). Although it has long been seen as a ‘donor darling’, relations have recently deteriorated between the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo) government and the international donors whose aid accounts for more than half of the national budget. A key point of tension has been the treatment of the opposition party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, MDM), during and after the 2009 national elections. The leader of the MDM, Daviz Simango,
is the mayor of Mozambique’s second largest city, Beira, which is home to a vibrant culture of political contestation that sets it apart from the rest of the country, and was a focal point of Mozambique’s long and bitter civil war of 1977–92.

With over half a million inhabitants living just a few feet above the level of the Indian Ocean, protected only by decaying sea defences, eroding dunes and a rapidly disappearing belt of mangroves, Beira is also one of the places in Mozambique that is most critically threatened by sea level rise and the increasing frequency and intensity of cyclones (INGC 2009). This should make it a natural candidate for inclusion in Mozambique’s PPCR. However, the decision to allocate several million dollars’ worth of international climate change finance to a city controlled by one of the most important opposition leaders was never going to be an easy one for the ruling Frelimo party, accustomed to exercising unquestioned control over the levers of political and economic power in Mozambique.

In this article, we analyse the political economy factors shaping the decision on whether or not to include Beira in Mozambique’s PPCR, in the context of an examination of the claims that the PPCR process ‘promotes a participatory approach for development of a broad-based strategy to achieving climate resilience at the national level in the medium and long-term’ (CIF 2010: 1). The official Climate Investment Funds guidance stresses the importance of government leadership of design missions ‘in order to ensure a country-driven process and its implementation as well as partnerships among the government, national stakeholders, and development partners’ (CIF 2009b: 4). However, there are obvious tensions between the spirit of a ‘country-driven process’ and the fact that the PPCR gives a key role to the multilateral development banks (MDBs) in managing the programme, a well as privileging their existing projects as targets for additional funding. There are also tensions between the spirit of ‘broad participation’ and the overriding goal of rapid disbursement of PPCR funds (see Seballos and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin).

In the specific context of Mozambique, we examine the role of institutional interests and party-political tensions in shaping the supposedly technical process of decision-making on where PPCR resources should be invested. In the light of this examination, we interrogate the extent to which ‘country ownership’ risks being conflated with ‘government control’, and ask whether the alternative of allowing the MDBs rather than the government to drive the process risks delivering even less transparency and legitimacy for PPCR investment decisions. In examining the latter aspect, we explore the experience of Mozambican civil society in engaging with PPCR, and ask whether the government and MDBs have adhered to the exhortation in the Climate Investment Funds guidance that they must conduct regular consultations with relevant stakeholders, identified in a stakeholder analysis, throughout the PPCR process to ensure broad ownership’ (CIF 2009a: 7). We conclude by reflecting on the lessons that analysis of the political economy of PPCR in Mozambique can provide for debates on ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ in emerging climate finance programmes.

2 Political and policy context for PPCR in Mozambique

For more than three decades, Mozambique has been ruled by one party: Frelimo. With power forged in the experience of the ten-year liberation struggle, sustainable external support and a principle of not sharing power (Machili 1995: 389), Frelimo has maintained a politically stable government. The party has won every national poll held since the start of multi-party elections in 1994. Mozambique is undergoing ‘decentralisation and de-concentration’ processes, with responsibilities increasingly delegated to both municipal authorities and districts, though only the former have elected local governments. Although opposition parties made some gains in the first rounds of the municipal elections (held in 1998 and 2003), in the November 2008 municipal elections, Frelimo won in 42 out of 43 municipalities. The only exception was Beira, where Mayor Simango ran as an independent candidate, defeating both Frelimo and the major opposition party, Renamo (of which he had previously been a member). Observers note that the Mayor of Beira represents a unique political phenomenon in Mozambique, as his victory in 2008 represented the first time in the last three decades that a candidate who did not come from a military background had defeated the two most well-established political parties, Frelimo and Renamo.
The policy environment for PPCR in Mozambique is favourable, as evidenced by a range of legislation and the country’s positive response to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process (DFID 2009). Government policies, strategies and other official documents such as laws and funding agreements suggest that there is growing awareness of climate change issues, and some effort to mainstream them not only into the core national development policies but also into local government programmes. Climate change is referred to in core policy documents, including both the current Five Year Government Plan (Plano Quinquenal do Governo, PQG 2010–2014) and its predecessor, as well as Mozambique’s 2006–2009 PRSP (Plano de Acção para Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, PARPA II).1

However, climate change is still perceived as a relatively ‘new’ issue, and policy is generally framed in the context of Disaster Risk Reduction, in which the country has already developed significant capacity. This is evident in key documents, such as the 2007 National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), the Institute of Disaster Management (Instituto Nacional de Gestão das Calamidades, INGC) Master Plan for 2006–2016 and the 2007/08 Government Strategy for post-flood resettlement. The INGC, the main government coordination unit for humanitarian response, is a key implementing agency for practical mitigation and adaptation interventions through its operational branch, the National Centre for Emergency Operations (Centro Nacional de Operações de Emergência, CENOE).

Despite the broadly favourable policy framework, a recent bilateral agency review concluded that climate change ‘is not yet fully integrated in policies’ (DFID 2009: 2). Mozambique’s climate change response is hampered by a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of different institutions and/or ministries that deal with the issue, with the Ministry for Planning and Development (Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento, MPD) and the Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Actions (Ministério para Coordenação de Acção Ambiental, MICOA) both tasked with a coordination function and key sector ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture and powerful agencies such as INGC also expected to play leading roles. The country’s international partners also contribute to the lack of clarity, with different donor cluster groups and multilateral agencies attempting to play management roles in the climate policy arena, engaging with different government partners and encouraging the formation of multiple ‘coordination centres’ within the country. Outside government the coordination problems are even more severe, as networking on climate change policy issues among civil society groups is virtually nonexistent.

3 ‘Country ownership’? Political tensions over the coastal cities component

Mozambique was not on the original list of pilot countries compiled by the expert group (Seballos and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin). According to key informants interviewed during the research, the country was included in the PPCR after vigorous lobbying – but this lobbying was carried out by bilateral aid agencies, not by the Government of Mozambique itself. Despite the emphasis on government leadership in the PPCR guidance, the mission in late 2009 that set in motion the preparation of Mozambique’s proposal was planned, designed and led by the MDBs, with support from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (see AfDB et al. 2009). This mission effectively determined the content of Mozambique’s Phase 1 proposal, which was actually drafted by World Bank personnel (see Government of Mozambique 2010).

The Government of Mozambique made it clear that it wished its inputs to be coordinated by the environment ministry (MICOA), but this was overruled by the international agencies driving the process (led by the World Bank). The reasons given were both practical and strategic. Practically, the World Bank had already established a management unit in the planning ministry (MPD) that was capable of fulfilling its fiduciary requirements and could therefore enable disbursements to begin more rapidly. Strategically, placing the project under the MPD would be more consistent with the overall aims of the PPCR, which seeks to ‘catalyze a transformational shift’ that can ‘strengthen capacities at the national levels to integrate climate resilience into development planning’ (GIF 2009a: 1). Given the government’s continued insistence that MICOA should lead, the PPCR Phase 1 proposal described the option for the MPD as: ‘a transition arrangement for Phase I only to allow for a rapid
signature and implementation of the grant’ and stated that ‘the strategic technical oversight role would be assumed by an inter-ministerial council co-chaired by MPD and MICOA’ (Government of Mozambique 2010: 14). However, the management plan made no mention of any efforts to develop an alternative implementation unit during the course of Phase 1. Thus, while the issue of which ministry would ultimately lead was left formally open, it was clearly established that the PPCR money itself would flow through the MDBs’ preferred channel.

The power of the MDB preferences is evident from the list of priorities identified in Mozambique’s PPCR Phase 1 proposal. These cover investments to support resilience in the face of drought in the Limpopo valley; flooding in the Zambezi valley and cyclones in one coastal city, as well as the ‘climate resilient budget and planning at central and local level’ that is supposed to be the programme’s main raison d’être, and work with the private sector (to be led by the World Bank’s private sector financing arm, the International Finance Corporation), described as ‘awareness, access to finance, demonstrational and pilot solutions, overall enabling environment’ (Government of Mozambique 2010: 11). It rapidly became clear during the case study research, that the Limpopo and Zambezi pilots had been chosen primarily because they were the locations of ongoing investments by the MDBs. This is entirely consistent with the guidance that ‘PPCR funded actions should, as an overall practice, not be free-standing and should be blended with MDB resources and/or other parallel and co-financing’ (CIF 2009a: 15). However, it is hard to see any evidence of ‘country ownership’ in this selection. These existing MDB projects had, of course, been agreed with the Government of Mozambique – but not as part of any nationally directed process designed to strengthen the country’s climate resilience. The Limpopo region is indeed vulnerable to drought and the Zambezi to flooding, but neither was identified in Mozambique’s NAPA as being the most critical area for either category of risk (MICOA 2007).

However, while the drought and flood resilience components of Mozambique’s PPCR Phase 1 proposal seem to reflect MDB priorities rather than national ones, the case of the coastal cities component is much less clear-cut. Mozambique’s NAPA includes protection against coastal erosion as a priority, but does not mention specific risks affecting urban areas in the coastal zone. However, the thorough study of climate-related disaster risks carried out by the INGC did include detailed consideration of the potential impacts on key cities, including Maputo and Beira (INGC 2009: 11–12).

Rather than an existing programme, the MDB interest in the case of the coastal cities component was to use PPCR resources to support a new one: in this case, a proposed World Bank urban infrastructure programme, which would have as its preferred focus the city of Beira. However, this interest came up against the reluctance of the Frelimo government to channel resources to a city that is seen as an opposition stronghold – however great its economic significance and however vulnerable it might be to climate change.

The Aide Memoire which records the conclusions of the initial PPCR Mission to Mozambique clearly proposed ‘climate resilient coastal, transport and urban infrastructure protection at Beira’ (ADB et al. 2009: 4). However, by the time Mozambique came to submit its Phase 1 proposal, the unequivocal option for Beira had metamorphosed into ‘climate resilient investments in one coastal city (Beira or other coastal city)’ (Government of Mozambique 2010: 11). The document’s detailed discussion of the proposed PPCR coastal cities component managed to combine redefining the choice of city as an open multi-option process with signalling a continued preference for Beira:

The PPCR phase 1 preparation grant would support development of climate resilience investment options and an investment plan for the preferred option, together with longer term resilience strategies for the city of Beira. Depending on government priorities other cities may also be selected.

(Government of Mozambique 2010: 37)

A senior Government of Mozambique representative interviewed during the fieldwork confirmed that Beira was the preferred option, and stated that it would end up receiving the PPCR investments. When asked why, in that case, the Phase 1 proposal did not simply make this clear instead of proposing that an expensive and time-consuming sequence of consultancies
and discussions would be undertaken before the preferred option was officially decided, he simply replied 'it is political' (key informant interview, Maputo, 15 July 2010). The government’s position of neither confirming nor denying that Beira will receive the funds can be interpreted as a warning to the MDBs that they should not take its acquiescence for granted when party-political issues are at stake. It is widely assumed that Mayor Simango enjoys the support of a significant proportion of the donor community, contributing to accusations that his party, the MDM, has been ‘more inclined to look abroad [for guidance] than to Mozambique’ (Chichava 2010: 14, our translation).

Significantly, however, the government chose to focus on the one PPCR component where the technical case for the identified investment priorities was strong, given the well-documented economic importance and climate vulnerability of Beira. For the drought and flood resilience components, the government ignored the lack of fit between the MDBs’ preferred pilot sites and the priority locations identified in its own climate analysis, including the NAPA. It seems that neither the Limpopo nor the Zambezi regions raises party-political issues in the same way that Beira under Mayor Simango does, and therefore that in these cases there was less incentive for the government to invoke the principle of ‘country ownership’.

4 ‘Broad participation’? Civil society engagement in PPCR Phase 1

The PPCR guidance states that Phase 1 should ‘ensure a socially inclusive process during consultations to provide inputs from a wide range of actors, such as NGOs and other civil society groups, specifically vulnerable groups, academe, and the private sector’ (CIF 2009a: 6). From the interviews carried out during fieldwork, it became evident that there was no sense among civil society organisations (CSOs) of having been engaged in the PPCR Phase 1 process. This was the case even among those interviewees whose organisations were listed in the PPCR documentation as having been consulted, one of whom insisted ‘we now know about PPCR because you are interviewing us and not because the government or the MDBs shared this with CSOs’ (interview, Maputo, 27 July 2010).

The lack of consultation was not regarded as surprising; interviewees stated that CSOs rarely have access to processes controlled by the government and MDBs, and the PPCR process was seen as just another illustrative example of this tendency. Where CSOs are invited to engage in consultative fora linked to such processes, they are often left feeling that their attendance is merely to make up the numbers or ‘provide signatures on an attendance list that legitimates the event’ (interview, Maputo, 13 July 2010). There is also a sense of participation fatigue, resulting from a perception that consultations are just a ‘populist’ process of legitimisation of official documents whereby people arrive to find that everything has been already decided. Where CSOs insist on going beyond this legitimation function, they are perceived by the government as a political opposition, and accused of seeking to undermine its plans or block development projects.

CSO interviewees questioned the lack of public consultation on the PPCR process, particularly on the selection criteria for pilot areas as well as the allocation of funds among these areas. However, they described their lack of effective voice in the PPCR Phase 1 process as inevitable, given the weight of the political or socioeconomic interests of the agencies leading the process (specifically for the Government of Mozambique in Beira, the country’s second most politically important city, the African Development Bank in the Limpopo basin and the World Bank in the Zambezi valley). They asserted that CSOs in Mozambique needed to learn how to engage with this reality, by understanding the interests involved on the side of the government and that of the MDBs.

Several interviewees raised the issue of the lack of coordination and clarity on the government side as an obstacle for effective engagement, with one stating that:

There is a crisis of leadership in the environment sector… it suffers from it. There is no clarity in this agenda; no clear sign of willingness on the part of the government, if they cannot do it, at least to support CSOs to address the problem; no government strategy of communication about the NAPA and other documents on climate change (interview, Maputo, 27 July 2010).

However, in individual interviews and workshop discussions in both Maputo and Beira, CSO representatives acknowledged that fragmentation
and lack of coordination are problems on the civil society side as well as that of the government, and that the difficulties they face in engaging with climate change policy issues are due to capacity constraints as well as government resistance. One outcome of the project workshops was a commitment from CSO representatives to try to develop civil society climate change policy platforms to engage with PPCR both at the national level and in Sofala Province, where Beira is located. However, developing effective and sustainable civil society networks has proved a challenge in Mozambique, a resource-scarce context where most incentives are for NGOs to compete for donor funding rather than collaborating over strategies for engagement with the government and other powerful actors.

The PPCR guidance emphasises ‘broad participation’, but it generally focuses on the role of such participation in promoting consent and buy-in to a predefined programme, rather than on its potential contribution to shaping the programme itself. However, it does state that ‘specific attention should be given to ensuring that women, youth, indigenous peoples, local communities and other vulnerable social groups are consulted and their views on solutions to climate risks are considered’ (CIF 2009a: 6–7). An example of such local ‘views on solutions to climate risks’ was provided by NGO representatives and community members interviewed during our research in Beira, who emphasised the importance of restoring the mangrove forests that play a vital role in stabilising the coastline, as well as in supporting coastal ecosystems and the livelihoods that depend on them.5

The PPCR is designed to make use of the technical studies that are currently under way in Beira (funded by the EU and the Japanese government, among others), but these focus overwhelmingly on the physical infrastructure of breakwaters and floodgates, which raises the risk that PPCR will adopt a bias towards heavy engineering solutions. While physical infrastructure investment is clearly necessary in Beira, and has lower transaction costs than would be the case with a dispersed programme of community-based restoration of mangroves and other coastal ecosystems, the former type of investment has other attractions, both for MDBs seeking to make fast and large-scale disbursements and for political elites who wish to control rent-seeking opportunities.

The Mayor of Beira stressed his awareness of the need for engineering interventions to be balanced by mangrove restoration (as well as tree-planting for dune stabilisation), but he did not mention any role for civil society in this process (Daviz Simango interview, Beira, 14 July 2010). Local NGOs and community groups have been developing innovative strategies to protect and restore the mangrove forests, but those interviewed said that the MDB and government actors driving the PPCR process had made no effort to draw on their experience, and no Beira-based CSOs were contacted when the PPCR mission team visited the city.

Although the PPCR Phase 1 proposal planned ‘a strategic environmental and social impact assessment (SESIA) of the overall planned program, including alternatives in the three pilot poles, with consultations at the local level [that will] include CSOs and community groups, local and provincial, public and private stakeholders’ (Government of Mozambique 2010: 13), MDB representatives interviewed during fieldwork stated that the SESIA was now to be a desk-based exercise. This withdrawal of even the limited consultation opportunities built into the proposal suggests that the PPCR Phase 1 process is not likely to provide opportunities for the supposed local beneficiaries of its investments and other actors with in-depth local knowledge to contribute to shaping the programme before the Phase 2 investment decisions are made. When this issue was raised at a project workshop, the World Bank representative leading on the Mozambique PPCR recognised that civil society engagement in the process had been very limited and said he would support efforts by bilateral donors to strengthen this engagement – but insisted that limited participation was an inevitable trade-off for the rapid disbursement on which many of those same donors had been insisting (Maputo workshop, 14 October 2010).

5 Conclusions
The experience of Phase 1 of Mozambique’s PPCR process suggests that the tendency for the interests of global development actors (particularly the MDBs) to drive this form of climate finance is powerful (see Seballos and Kreft; Tanner and Allouche, both in this IDS
Bulletin) but by no means uncontested. However, in Mozambique when contestation did arise it seemed to derive from a perception that party-political interests were at stake in the subnational allocation of PPCR investments, and not from dissatisfaction at the mismatch between MDB-identified priorities and those indicated by the country’s own adaptation planning processes.

While the disagreement over who should lead for the government on PPCR implementation (which involved institutional interests) was resolved by symbolic concessions that left the MDBs firmly in control of the decision on how and where resources should flow, the dispute over the inclusion of Beira (which involved party-political interests) remained unresolved. Beira’s economic importance (not least to the members of the Frelimo elite who own shares in its port and in the railway that links it with the coalfields) makes it highly unlikely that it will be excluded from the PPCR. Nevertheless, by in effect forcing the MDBs to recognise that it could exercise a veto over the choice of which coastal city would receive the investments – even if this flew in the face of its own climate risk assessments – the Government of Mozambique was able to assert a particular kind of country ownership.

On the face of it, the risk that party politics could trump technical decision-making provides a good reason for favouring an MDB-dominated process over country ownership, when the latter is conflated with (central) government control. However, the Mozambique case clearly shows how institutional interests can trump technical considerations in MDB decision-making – and that this tendency is reinforced by the PPCR’s emphasis on rapid disbursements and the channelling of resources towards existing or already-planned programmes, whether or not these are located in the highest-priority areas for climate resilience investment.

This same emphasis undermines the chances of an MDB-led process achieving legitimacy, since it shapes the lack of time and incentives for actually delivering on the PPCR’s commitment to ‘broad participation’. Without such participation, the MDBs will not be able to support the multi-stakeholder partnerships that PPCR is supposed to promote. Without opening the process up to inputs from those who have local knowledge and are supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of PPCR, the MDBs cannot sustain a claim to be ‘ensuring that women, youth, indigenous peoples, local communities and other vulnerable social groups are consulted and their views on solutions to climate risks are considered’ (CIF 2009a: 6–7). Ultimately, by driving a process that allows decisions on major climate resilience investments (including tens of millions of dollars in loans that the people of Mozambique will be expected to repay) to be taken without broad civil society engagement or even public awareness, the MDBs undermine the PPCR’s claim that it is ‘designed to catalyze a transformational shift’ in climate change policy and adaptation practice, and increase the risk that it will in fact end up reinforcing rather than transforming ‘business as usual’ (CIF 2009a: 1).

**Notes**

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1 At the time of writing, the successor to PARPA II (for the 2011–2014 period) was still being negotiated by the Government of Mozambique and international donors.

2 The African Development Bank is supporting irrigated agriculture around the Massingir Dam on a tributary of the Limpopo, and the World Bank is supporting ‘market-oriented smallholder development’ in the Zambezi valley.

3 The fieldwork for this case study took place in Maputo and Beira between July and October 2010.

4 This attitude was evident in the standoff between MICOA and environmental NGOs over pollution from the MOZAL aluminium works that took place during the case study period.

5 Beira’s critically vulnerable Praia Nova neighbourhood lost its mangroves during the civil war, when they were cut down by the military to prevent guerrillas from sheltering there, while mangrove forests on the city’s outskirts are rapidly being depleted by charcoal-burning.
References
MICoA (2007) National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), Maputo: Ministério para Coordenação de Acção Ambiental