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Abstract For significant periods Malawi's economy has performed as well or better than might have been expected given its geographical location and natural resource endowments. Underlying these promising episodes is a pattern of centralised, long-horizon rent management and technocratic integrity. This case study of ‘developmental patrimonialism’ found that the period 1965–79 was one of centralised, long-horizon rent management and a vertically disciplined technocracy, and the economy grew healthily; 1980–94, by contrast, was a period in which rent management drifted. Although it remained quite centralised, it became geared more to the short term, while the civil service began to deteriorate as it was politicised. These resulted in a comparatively directionless reform programme. The situation deteriorated still further under President Bakili Muluzi (1994–2004). This was a period of decentralised, short-horizon rent management and a further deterioration of the state bureaucracy. The economy entered a tailspin. A recovery was made during the first term of President Bingu wa Mutharika (2004–09), who reintroduced some aspects of long-horizon rent centralisation and promoted a more vertically disciplined technocracy.

1 Introduction

Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) research into business and politics in Africa shows that under certain conditions, neo-patrimonial governance can support strong economic performance (see Kelsall, this IDS Bulletin). This article provides support for that argument from the Malawi case study. It argues that although Malawian economic governance has never been without problems, for significant periods the country has performed as well or better than might have been expected, given its geographical location and natural resource endowments.

It finds that underlying these promising episodes is a pattern of centralised, long-horizon rent management. Rent management is centralised when there is a structure in place that allows a person or group at the apex of the state to determine the major rents that are created and to distribute them at will. It is long horizon when leaders have a vision that inspires them to create rents and discipline rent-seeking with a view to expanding income over the long term. Further, it finds that a crucial enabling factor for centralised, long-horizon rent management is appropriate norms governing relations between the political leadership and the economic technocracy. Two dimensions seem to be important. One is the degree to which the economic technocracy is subject in practice to vertical coordination, such that it receives and is responsive to policy directives emanating from the political leadership. The second dimension is what we propose to call technocratic integrity. Where there is technocratic integrity, technocrats are typically willing and able to provide robust, technically informed advice to leading politicians. If unwise or incoherent policies are adopted and implemented, it is only after the relevant technical objections have been considered and rejected by those in power. Where technocratic integrity is absent, for example because senior officials are systematically either afraid or badly equipped to provide the requisite advice, policy is likely to be bad more often and for a more complex set of reasons.

The article proceeds by outlining the main dimensions of rent management under different regimes in post-colonial Malawi. It argues that the period 1965–79 was one of centralised, long-
horizon rent management in which the economy grew healthily at a rate above the sub-Saharan average – a significant achievement given Malawi’s small size, poor natural resource base, and land-locked geography; 1980–94, by contrast, was a period in which rent management drifted. Although it remained quite centralised, it became geared more to the short term, and to the vagaries of an externally imposed structural adjustment programme: economic performance was poor. The situation deteriorated still further under the 1994–2004 regime of President Bakili Muluzi. This was a classic period of decentralised, short-horizon rent management, and the economy entered a tailspin. A recovery was made during the first term of President Bingu wa Mutharika (2004–09), who reintroduced some aspects of long-horizon rent centralisation.

2 Banda I (1965–79)

The post-independence period in Malawi witnessed a relentless centralisation of power under the autocratic personality of the country’s first President, H. Kamuzu Banda. A skilful set of manoeuvres transformed his status from Prime Minister to President-for-Life, placed him at the apex of an extensive party machinery, crushed and outlawed the political opposition, and put him in control of state systems from parastatals to the censorship board.

Power concentration, when combined with his own hard work and intelligence, allowed Banda to be directly involved or to oversee policymaking in every sector. His strategy has been called ‘state monopoly capitalism’, with a fusion of the state and business in his own person (Harrigan 2001: 37). Broadly speaking, economic rents were used to create a modern economic infrastructure, to stimulate commercial farming, and create an African business class. The government constructed roads, a railway, a university, and the new capital city, Lilongwe. Over 1m hectares of agricultural land in the customary sector were converted to leasehold ‘estates’ and provided to aspiring commercial farmers achikumbe (sing: achikumbe), who were licensed to grow tobacco, and who received extension services, credit and marketing support (Frankenberger et al. 2003; Kalonga Stambuli 2002; Ellis et al. 2003; Thomas 1975). Asians were barred from rural enterprises (Thomas 1975) and reorganised lending institutions provided credit to emerging African businessmen (Pryor 1990).

State bureaucrats, MPs and party functionaries topped the list of beneficiaries, although people not known to be ardent loyalists also acquired land and support for growing export crops. Banda offered to co-sign loans for some senior civil servants who did not have sufficient funds to acquire estates. Beneficiaries straddling the rural–urban divide moved profits from farming into urban real estate, retail trading and transportation. The most successful farmer-bureaucrat-businessmen went on to invest in small-scale secondary industries, like food processing. All were beholden to Banda and his Malawi Congress Party (Mhone 1992; Pryor 1990; Frankenberger et al. 2003; Ellis et al. 2003).

Banda himself was also a key beneficiary of state power. In 1961 he had formed Press Holdings, a company to run the party newspaper. After independence it expanded greatly, acquiring old expatriate estates (via government), tobacco interests, and many other operations including food processing, wholesaling and retailing, financial services, textiles and manufacturing, and distilling and bottling. Before its restructuring in the early 1980s, Press Holdings had interests in 17 subsidiary companies and 23 associated companies (Press Corporation Ltd 2008). For much of the period it contributed to national growth, paid hefty state taxes, and Banda sought to serve as a role model for other entrepreneurs. It was involved in every sector of the economy, especially estate agriculture, and held a majority shareholding in the two commercial banks that loaned to estate leaseholders. Senior staff moved between it and the public service, and strict oversight by Banda and others, which included dismissals and imprisonment of staff for theft, promoted a professional ethic.

The early years of Banda’s government were marked by rapid economic growth (5.9 per cent per annum between 1964 and 1979). Banda was ‘very successful in obtaining investable resources both from external and internal sources, particularly for the public sector’ (Pryor 1990: 47–8). Besides donor aid and some foreign investment (e.g. Lonrho, Carlsberg), investment finance was drawn from the public sector: parastatals’ profits averaged about 1 per cent of GDP (Pryor 1990: 50–1). Commercial estates, especially tobacco estates, forged ahead of subsistence agriculture, providing a return on investment that ranged between 22 per cent and
67 per cent in the 1970s (Pryor 1990). Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector increased its share of GDP from 7 per cent at independence to 13 per cent in 1980. Employment therein increased by a high, average rate of 6.8 per cent per year (Chipeta and Mkandawire 2008: 158). Moreover, the growth in real GDP per worker in the period 1960–79 was about 3 per cent per annum.

We see, then, that Banda used the power of the state to create economic rents that were productive, and to cement his own political domination. By contrast, less productive forms of rent-seeking – corruption, predation and theft – were not much tolerated. Banda stated that his ‘main business’ was the maintenance of a ‘stable government, an efficient, honest and incorruptible administration. People must come here when they have money to invest, get a licence without putting so many pounds in the pocket of a certain Minister first’ (Baker 2001: 162). Furthermore, those who worked directly with Banda assert that he was ‘not personally corrupt’.1 Bureaucrats working for the state, Malawi Congress Party (MCP) or Press who were accused of theft were dealt with swiftly. The result was a civil service that was relatively honest, hardworking and professional (Anders 2002, 2006).

Here, the strength of the technocracy emerges as an important part of the Malawian story. An enthusiastic Anglophile, Banda, inherited and adapted the British colonial model of public service to his own ends. Europeans remained in many principal secretary and other senior positions for several years after independence. They set the tone and standards for two decades: it was ‘a dedicated civil service that was clean, efficient and corruption-free’. Many of the ‘early crop of local talent’ were trained by British instructors at the Staff Training College (Institute of Public Administration) at Mpmema, Blantyre. Besides the law and other technical subjects, they were taught to ‘say “no”, without saying “no”… “it can be done sir, but you may want to consider …”’. Some of those who worked in the Reserve Bank were trained in the Bank of England first, while administrative officers were often young men who had been to universities outside Malawi, on scholarships. Those that did well were recognised and promoted through the ranks. In the early years, staff felt a career in the civil service was predictable and professionally rewarding.

Banda’s ministers were a different breed. MPs were men and women who were selected by senior party officials in the districts and recommended to Banda as candidates. Most were poorly educated, without much overseas experience or technical capacity. Banda patronised and frequently referred to them as ‘my boys’ (Williams 1978: 200–1). They ‘rarely had an input into policy’. Instead, Banda bounced ideas off his cadre of principal secretaries, whose skills and education meant he related to them more easily. Public servants were told: ‘the civil service is the civil service. Do not get near to any minister. No minister should influence you about what you can do’.


By the late 1970s the formidable centralisation that Banda had exercised over rent management was beginning to weaken. By this stage, the President was already in his 80s, and as his powers waned, those around him became more influential, including his nurse/mistress (Cecilia Kadzamira), a few other women and Kadzamira’s uncle, John Tembo. Prospective political successors’ attempts to win Banda’s favour gave rise to considerable political intrigue. The period was marked by a clear ‘mixing of politics and civil service’, with cliques vying for influence and public servants interacting directly with ministers and politicians, and by a culture of detentions and human rights abuse that kept many in line, but at the same time demoralised and frightened the public service.

In these conditions it was sometimes difficult for senior officials to engage constructively with the President over policy. By the late 1970s a combination of internal imbalances and external shocks had caused the economy to run into problems. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programme, which included a reform of Press Holdings, aimed to address them. However, issues like the need to dismember Press and restructure ADMARC, the state agricultural marketing organisation, were difficult to raise for fear that the President would get angry and react by firing staff. Thus, civil servants and politicians sometimes took their problems to ‘the women’ (members of the Women’s League) who would take them to Banda. Reportedly, civil servants also feared introducing World Bank and IMF officials to...
the President for fear of what he might say to them. Added to this, intra-governmental intrigues contributed to the delay in publication of the development plan DevPol II until the mid-1980s, signalling the loss of policy direction (Pryor 1990). Although reforms resulted in periodic growth, they were unable to bring Malawi back to its 1970s performance figures (Kaluwa et al. 1992).

The lesson here is that Banda’s power and manner of using it created fear in the civil service that in the good years underpinned efficiency and honesty, but undermined its effectiveness as his personal control waned and conditions became more difficult.

In addition, economic restructuring under the tutelage of the IMF and World Bank disrupted in significant ways the system for channelling rents that had worked, with limitations, under Banda I. The policy of reforming the estate sector to reduce subsidies and make it more competitive, together with the shift against import-substitution industrialisation, heralded a major change in the types of rent creation and distribution that could be encouraged. The structural adjustment programme, changes to Press Holdings and its relationship with the government reduced the amount of cash available to Banda to promote his loyalists. Other problems arose – the rising cost of transport and fuel and the impact this had on estates; reduced wages, especially in the civil service, etc. As the 1980s passed, those who had benefited during Banda’s first 15 years were being disappointed economically and began to champion regime change.

Political liberalisation brought to power Bakili Muluzi, a senior member of the Malawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry. For the first few years of his tenure, economic performance improved, but towards the end of the 1990s it rapidly deteriorated as the government faced the prospect of securing re-election.

The democratic transition set new parameters for managing political competition. Where Banda had control of parliament and the selection of MPs, Muluzi had to contend with opposition parties, multi-party elections, a minority government and coalition forming; and errant MPs who could possibly be bought by other parties’ leaders. To retain support, the President needed resources to distribute: he appointed (often unqualified) loyalists to parastatal boards for instance, increased the size of his cabinet to include more cronies, and oversaw the siphoning of funds from government coffers by senior party people for political and personal ends. Corruption spiralled out of control (Khembo 2004; Global Integrity Report 2007).

Misappropriation around procurement was the main source of illicit funding in the Muluzi years. It was not as centralised as under Banda, which is not to say that Muluzi did not have first-hand knowledge of at least some of his ministers’ deals. Money was illicitly earned and used to fund political careers, pay off supporters, hire United Democratic Front (UDF) youth to crush opponents, and to get rich. The Press Holdings empire was appropriated from Banda in a cynical and illegal use of parliament, which left a lasting imprint on Malawi’s political culture (van Donge 2002). Other scandals affected sugar distribution, education and, most tragically, the country’s grain reserves.

The UDF benefited from funds coming from people who were grateful to the regime for helping them with business. For instance, Petroda, a petrol company owned by a Tanzanian, was awarded a contract to build filling stations and to import petrol. All government vehicles were required to buy their petrol from Petroda stations. In return, one informant claimed, ‘Petroda helped the party so much’.

The centre’s inability to control rents in the way Banda had done is indicated by what happened when the party at one point allegedly talked about starting its own company – such as ruling parties in other countries have done. According to our informant, the UDF decided not to do so because its leaders felt they would not be able to control the funds coming into the company. It was reported that previously, some monies that were supposed to be paid by subordinates in the party never made it to the top. Muluzi and others feared, then, that they did not have the systems in place to manage such an operation. Instead, they used outsiders to win government contracts and then took kickbacks. Many such scams became public, though few were prosecuted while Muluzi ruled (Anti-Corruption Bureau 2003).
Policymaking also deteriorated in this period. Muluzi’s and many ministers’ relatively scant experience of government (e.g. Thompson n.d.) gave them little knowledge of how to manage the civil service. First, many senior staff were thought by the UDF to be MCP-loyalists and were dismissed and replaced by people who had little but allegiance to commend them. Moreover, wages and conditions had declined in the 1980s and the public service was restive. Discipline was further eroded by new laws that reportedly reduced senior officials’ willingness to ‘manage’ their staff.

A shift in priorities from governing to politicking was evident at the very top: according to one informant, before 1999 or so ‘the President and political leadership were able to listen to advice, respected the budget, and there were internally vibrant discussions’. After that, decision-making around development issues took second place and policy documents that were produced were not implemented. Staff at the most senior level were replaced by people who above all else, wanted a third term for Muluzi. Another UDF politician pushed the date of this shift in priorities back to 1998, claiming that the ‘Zomba mafia hi-jacked’ the President. Similarly, ministry-level bodies debated and set policy in the early years, but this gave way to politics after a while. Compounding the problem was Muluzi’s unwillingness to spend time studying the details laid out in policy documents, as the previous and later presidents did; he would read them through and just say ‘fine’. At the sector level the politicisation of appointments and resource allocations was evident by the mid-1990s, and conspicuous during the 1999 election campaign (Cammack 1998, 2000). The resulting political economic ‘free-for-all’ produced negative growth in what has come to be called the ‘lost decade’. GDP per capita remained around US$160 after the mid-1990s. National growth vacillated (it was +5 per cent in 1997 but −4 per cent in 2001) and the Human Development Index dropped (Government of Malawi 2006; IMF 1998, 2003; Frankenberger et al. 2003).

Mutharika (2004–09)

Having failed to secure a third term, Muluzi engineered the election of a successor, Bingu wa Mutharika. But Mutharika soon proved unwilling to accept the role of figurehead President. Within months of the 2004 elections, he broke with Muluzi and the UDF, creating his own party (DPP). Mutharika had a new, more growth-oriented development vision than Muluzi; government finances were stabilised; top levels of the polity and the old administration were targeted in an anti-corruption drive; and the President adopted a distinctly Banda-esque personal style. A key appointment was ex-IMF official Goodall Gondwe at the Ministry of Finance. Gondwe is generally credited with the much-improved financial performance of Mutharika’s first term, although Gondwe himself cites presidential direction as central to finance-policy formulation.

It took some months for President Mutharika to establish his own administration. He had done this by early 2005, but his ‘ungratefulness’ to Muluzi, his reliance on MPs and aides willing to ‘cross the floor’ and join the DPP, and his proclaimed ‘zero tolerance’ on corruption meant that for the next four years he was tormented politically. In response, he ignored the Constitution, his UDF vice president, the courts, the opposition-dominated parliament, often the public and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as donors. Democratic consolidation stalled and power was centralised in the President’s hands. Early on, civil servants noticed Mutharika was ‘more serious’, promoting discipline and ‘demanding accountability’. ‘That guy [Mutharika] has set things straight’, one explained. He is ‘an economist and he doesn’t fool around. He will hire someone and get rid of them if they are no good. He tells officials “don’t use money if it’s not in the budget”’. His style of working was reminiscent of Dr Banda’s but without ‘fear’ as a motivating factor. He reportedly worked hard and took time over details, studying policy memos, quizzing his senior staff, and debating policy with them. Self-confident officials feel able to say ‘no’ to the President and to present him with views that do not match his own. A second public officer confirmed that Mutharika takes a keen interest in government initiatives and ‘goes and looks over things himself’. He gives orders and follows through to ensure things get done right. ‘Everyone knows he knows’ what is going on and so staff are incentivised to perform.

His ‘zero tolerance’ of corruption meant political opponents being charged; a few went to prison. But he has also removed officials from his own
government who were accused of corruption (*Nyasa Times*, 2 December 2009). Now, his Auditor General regularly presents comprehensive reports detailing government losses in parliament, which has demonstrated a new standard of transparency and an attempt to root out the ‘allowance culture’ and corruption from the civil service. Nonetheless, both remain widespread.

One UDF politician outlined a pattern of how contracts were being awarded by people at the top of government. What happens, he said, is that contracts to companies are ‘not opened up’ to outsiders. Instead, people in and near government take an ‘active part’ in winning tenders. Also, tenders were being awarded to people who are ‘outside the procurement system’, i.e. who did not present or win bids openly. He also claimed that ‘front companies’ have been set up and friends of the President are being used to win contracts for fertiliser and other goods. He asserted that the local boss of the Portuguese Mota-Engil Company, doing road construction in Malawi, is close to government (see *Nyasa Times*, 11 August 2010) and is therefore winning all of the contracts that used to go to companies such as Group 5, which he said was favoured by the UDF. The inner circle of DPP are ‘skimming money from contracts’ for work done by Mota-Engil… There is a lot of rot’. He concluded by saying that Muluzi’s and Mutharika’s rent-giving differed: the UDF’s ‘way of working’ was with outside contractors. He admitted that Muluzi’s people received kickbacks from those winning contracts, but claimed that UDF senior members did not take part in doing the work contracted out. Now top officials in government take ‘an active part in all contracts’. How accurate these charges are requires additional research. But if what is rumoured about contracting is true, it appears that rents in Mutharika’s first term were more centrally and tightly controlled and more in line with the national development vision than in the Muluzi years.

Neo-patrimonial politics in Mutharika’s first term were quite different than in the Muluzi years. Especially important for growth were the renewed emphasis on civil service integrity, better fiscal policy due to the appointment of an experienced macroeconomist as Minister of Finance and Mutharika’s personal commitment to improving the state’s performance. He was dismissive of opposition politicians generally and therefore to all compromises that might have undermined his economic policies. In this respect, as well as in matters of style, Malawi witnessed a return to patterns established by Banda. Mutharika’s first term may best be described as a form of hard-budget clientelism in which elite political support was bought, partly by means of access to rents in the business sector, although not in a way that derailed the macro-economy. Winning political support by handing out cabinet posts and political appointments was evident as usual, and votes were harvested from a poverty-oriented agricultural strategy, and by supporting chiefs who brought constituents into line.

Economic performance undoubtedly improved in Mutharika’s first term. GDP growth rates went up, and there was an improvement in smallholder agriculture, ‘which was supported by the continuation of the input subsidy program and intensification of irrigation agricultural programs’ (Government of Malawi 2008). Inflation remained in single-digit figures in spite of higher international food and energy prices. Credit for this is given to the agricultural inputs scheme and the stability of the Kwacha. Interest rates were the lowest in a decade due to reductions in inflation. Income from exports climbed (due, the government said, to pricing policies of agricultural goods, and to the input programme). Reforms to improve budgeting, revenue collection and debt management were put in place. Particularly beneficial to the overall growth figure in 2008 was the ‘manufacturing; financial and insurance services; information and communication, and construction’ sub-sectors (Government of Malawi 2008). Growth was reported to be three times the African average in 2008 (Banda 2009).

Since the 2009 election the economy has faltered and stumbled from one crisis to another – the exit of cotton and tobacco buyers, shortages of foreign exchange, artificially high exchange rates and the emergence of a black market in currency, fuel shortages, and budget overruns, all resulting in donor threats to withhold aid. In March 2010, the Department for International Development (DFID) cut its aid budget to Malawi by £3 million in response to the President’s purchase of his own $13.3 million jet airplane (*Nyasa Times*, 10 March 2010). Economic trends now noticeable nationwide are undoubtedly related to the removal of Gondwe at the Ministry of Finance and his replacement with...
the more amenable Ken Kandodo (previously head of several Banda-family enterprises).

6 Conclusions

Our review of economic and political history in post-colonial Malawi has revealed a number of shifts in institutional configurations and economic performance, which relate directly to the propositions set out elsewhere in this IDS Bulletin (see Kelsall). Under the first regime of President Banda (1964–79), rents and rent-earning opportunities were directed largely to the productive sectors, with consequent improvements in infrastructure, fixed capital formation and worker productivity. On the whole, rent creation was centralised and geared to the long term, and a substantial proportion of those rents were productive rather than purely parasitic, with the expected effects on development performance. Rents also cemented political stability by providing income-earning opportunities for a regionally inclusive political elite. President Banda’s highly repressive, non-competitive political apparatus was in this and other respects inclusive in ways that contributed to stability. His domineering personality was moderated by a technocratic ethos, enabling a responsive and efficient civil service to be maintained. Thus, Banda’s first 15 years fit the model of developmental patrimonialism very well.

A combination of external shocks, natural constraints, and flaws internal to Banda’s development policy model meant that by the end of the 1970s, a period of restructuring was required. The evidence suggests that for the period 1979–94, Banda was losing the personal capacity to oversee the required changes, and that information and decision-making systems within government were breaking down. What is more, the continuing climate of political repression made it difficult to challenge the vision or performance of the leadership, making reform extremely challenging. Economic policy drifted as the politics of intrigue and a poorly conceived donor-driven structural adjustment programme carried the day.

After 1994, a combination of personal weaknesses and the forces of political competition overwhelmed Banda’s successor, Bakili Muluzi. Partly because of the new climate of political openness, Muluzi lacked the powers of repression Banda once possessed, and he focused on political pay-offs and self-enrichment instead. Rent creation and distribution were overwhelmingly directed to short-run, non-productive activities in a desperate attempt to retain political power; the developmental logic of previous years disappeared. Donors attempted to fill the void, but unsuccessfully (Booth et al. 2005).

During 2004–09, Bingu wa Mutharika did a reasonable job of balancing political and economic imperatives. He came to power indebted only to Muluzi and the UDF for his position. Once he broke with him, he broadened his room for manoeuvre. Manipulation and restriction of formal political institutions provided additional breathing space in which to build a clientelist base and popular development programme. Greater personal authority and a tighter grip over the civil service than Muluzi undoubtedly helped him stabilise the economy. The appointment of Goodall Gondwe to the Ministry of Finance facilitated better relations with donors and helped the macro-economy. Unfortunately, Gondwe’s demotion in 2009 has allowed Mutharika to pursue more populist economic goals, which has resulted in poorer performance. Corruption within government at the point of service delivery continues to frustrate the population.

One of the other themes which emerges quite clearly from the Malawi story is the importance of a strong technocracy to developmental patrimonialism (see Cammack et al. 2010). On the basis of our research, we believe that Banda’s first regime was a clear case of vertically disciplined technocracy, in which civil servants were strongly controlled and driven by the political leadership but nevertheless trained ‘to say “No” without saying “No”’ and to invite the leadership to sometimes consider more feasible alternatives. In Banda I, there seems to have been adequate technical restraint, even if this left in place some core weaknesses in the President’s vision of development. In the second period of Banda’s regime, however, the civil service began to deteriorate and political pressure meant that even very senior officials were too cowed to offer robust policy advice. The impact was softened, perhaps, by the fact that the leadership had by this stage lost some of its vision for development, with the latter being increasingly determined by external donors. The result was not white elephant projects, but rather a directionless and vacillating reform programme.

Bingu wa Mutharika's first term in power may also be characterised as a vertically disciplined technocracy. The President appears to have had a strong development vision, while leaving much of the detail to technocrats, especially at the Ministry of Finance.

Bakili Muluzi's period in office, on the other hand, at least from the late 1990s onwards, was characterised by a situation in which the leadership failed to provide a strong steer, technocrats were afraid to speak up, and many officials held their positions on the basis of factors other than merit (e.g. clientelism). The result was stasis, or the growth of anti-developmental opportunististic behaviour.

Overall, it is clear that the technocratic integrity and vertical discipline which existed during the Banda I regime and Mutharika's first term resulted in an environment which was most conducive to investment and growth.

**Notes**

* This analysis draws upon Cammack et al. 2010 and interviews conducted by Diana Cammack and Alaudin Osman in January and July 2010.

1 Banda, Tembo, Kadzamira and two others were charged with two counts of fraud in 1997, one of which was for using $5.6 million of government money to build Kamuzu Academy. The second was for withdrawing money from the Press Trust before it was removed from Tembo's control in the mid-1990s (ANC Daily News Briefing 1997).

2 The UDF was unable to win the majority of seats in the National Assembly and so Muluzi formed coalitions with other parties and recruited individual opposition politicians. Why this was so crucial appeared to have little to do with bills before parliament (as the parties seemed to share opinions about these – except about Press, see van Donge 2002) but more to do with who staffed committees and controlled funds.

3 'Malawi’s President Bingu wa Mutharika was awarded the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Agricola Medal in honour of his substantial contribution towards ‘transforming the country’s economy from a state of food deficit to a net exporter of maize’ (FAO, 28 November 2008).

**References**


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