How Best to Ensure Adivasis’ Land, Forest and Mineral Rights?

Felix Padel

Abstract Traditionally, Adivasis have lived for centuries in resource-rich regions, with a resulting high level of food security combined with in-built cultural restraints against taking too much from their environment. Increasingly rapid invasions and dispossessions of Adivasi lands and forests have seriously undermined their food security to the extent that as many as half their population are now living in a state of chronic malnourishment. A key reason is that the minerals under Adivasi lands, forests and mountains have become objects of primary desire for the world’s mining companies and metals traders.

1 Introduction

In many ways, Adivasi society is based on an ecological awareness in tune with long-term sustainability, worked out in extensive systems of ecological knowledge. ‘Deep Ecology’ is embedded into Adivasi consciousness, alongside the principle of sharing. Adivasi society is radically egalitarian and communist in the original sense of emphasising community-based land ownership. The 5th Schedule of India’s Constitution, along with many state laws, affirms the non-alienability of tribal land as an elementary right. Notoriously though, the loophole of excepting projects ‘in the national interest’ has opened the door to mass dispossession of Adivasi communities to make way for ‘development project’ dams, mines and factories, as well as national parks, and a great deal of indirect displacement due to rivers drying up, resource conflicts, etc.

As a result, Adivasis’ traditional food security, which was based on their rootedness to the land, has been severely undermined. An estimated 35–37 per cent of India’s adult population – and over 50 per cent of India’s Adivasis (an even higher proportion of Dalits) – have a body mass index (BMI) of 18.5 or less, indicating chronic malnourishment. This means that Adivasis as a whole are living on the edge of starvation, in what has been termed a state of undeclared famine (NNMB 2006)." Members of the Scheduled Tribes (STs) – which correspond (imperfectly) with those who identify as Adivasis – constitute a population estimated at about 86 million or 8.4 per cent of India’s population. Of these, 83.2 per cent are in the central belt of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat and Rajasthan, while over 10 million are in the North-Eastern states, where most of the tribal population do not call themselves ‘Adivasis’.

Out of the ST population, as many as 10–20 million Adivasis have been displaced by ‘development’ projects since Independence (Padel and Das 2011; Fernandes 2006).

One of the most painful aspects of displacement is the de-linking of people’s economy from an all-round embeddedness in ecology that guarantees their food security. Adivasis have witnessed thousands of their brethren being displaced with lavish promises that are almost never kept. They ask how displacing projects that lower people’s standard of living drastically can be termed ‘development’, and how the government can think of displacing more people, when so many thousands have not been rehabilitated at all?

In an Adivasi view, changes that are not guaranteed to benefit future generations cannot be called real development. Massive poverty exists in regions where mining has taken over the landscape (CSE 2008). But where tribal people still retain control over their environment and livelihood, the fact that monetary income...
may be small does not necessarily mean that the people are poor. In the words of an Adivasi facing displacement by the Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada river:

You take us to be poor, but we’re not. We live in harmony and co-operation with each other... We get good crops from Mother Earth... Clouds give us water... We produce many kinds of grains with our own efforts, and we don’t need money. We use seeds produced by us... In the spirit of Laha [communal labour] we produce a house in just one day... You people live in separate houses. You don’t bother about the joy or suffering of each other. But we live on the support of our kith and kin... How does such fellow-feeling prevail in our villages? For we help each other. We enjoy equal standing. We've been born in our village. Our Nara [umbilical cord] is buried here (Mahariya 2001).

Adivasis mostly live in resource-rich regions, and have basically safeguarded their environments and resources over centuries. Communities who still have access to the forest consequently tend to have a good and diverse diet. The trouble is, displacement immediately and completely undermines these people’s food security.

Other factors which threaten Adivasis’ food security severely now include: depletion of safe water sources (due to both dropping groundwater levels and to streams/rivers drying up or becoming badly polluted); the invasion of GM seed companies such as Monsanto and associated patterns of debt; and various ways in which common rights over land, forest and water, that have existed over centuries in India, are being eroded by creeping privatisation. For example, Pani Panchayats and Community Forest Management both started out as schemes for asserting community rights over resources, and have ended up becoming top-down schemes where rich people control resources (Sahu 2010a; Panda 2007, 2006).

Starvation deaths have been reported from many tribal areas, especially those where natural resources such as minerals are being exploited. In the remote regions of Odisha, where Utkal and Vedanta have been building alumina refineries and smelters, promises to provide ‘two square meals a day’ and end the threat of starvation deaths have actually achieved the opposite. Kashipur, Lanjigarh and Jharsaguda are among many areas where Adivasi communities remain on the edge of widespread starvation, due to a system of endemic exploitation that intensifies massively with the invasion of mining companies: the logic of the ‘resource curse’. The paradox throughout India’s mining areas is one of Rich Lands, Poor People (CSE 2008). Perhaps the root cause is that what mainstream society, from economists and engineers to politicians and most of the middle classes, conceive as ‘resources’, Adivasis understand as sources of life (Padel and Das 2010, chapter 16).

The Dongria Konds, in the Niyamgiri mountain range, have maintained a taboo on cutting forests on the mountain tops. They are one community whose preservation of their natural environment and attuning of economy to ecology is not in question. When their leader Lado Sikoka called Vedanta and other invading companies asurmane (demons) at the Belamba Public Hearing in Lanjigarh on 25 April 2009, this was a voice we rarely hear coming to the surface:

We won’t give up Niyamgiri for any price... Niyamgiri is not a pile of money... We won’t tolerate Niyamgiri being dug up. They have bought Niyamgiri from the government, but it doesn’t belong to the government, it belongs to Adivasis... How many lies they tell! We won’t fear them, even though it seems that the demons of mythology (asurmane) have returned (Dash 2009).

Just as Marshall Sahlins (1972) argued that Stone Age or hunter-gatherer societies, far from being impoverished and caught up in a struggle for existence, were the ‘original affluent society’, so anthropologists need to insist that traditional tribal ways of life are not ‘uneconomic’. Perhaps we should start talking about Adivasi Economics as an indigenous system, characterised by a subtle rhythm of work and leisure, including restraint in resource use. The subject also needs to encompass the vast shifts this system has undergone, as tribal lands have been invaded or taken over. Nowadays, the number of communities that still have control over their environment and economy has declined dramatically, due to the system of endemic exploitation that has eaten away at Adivasi land rights.
Various shifts can be discerned in *Adivasi* Economics during the twentieth century: hunting and gathering plays less importance as forests decline or these activities have been illegalised under forest laws introduced by the British; shifting cultivation, often on steep hill slopes, gives way in many places to permanent fields, permanently removing the forest; millet has often given way to rice as a less nutritious staple; many families have lost their lands and become dependent on wage labour and even where they retain their lands, many are now forced to migrate for wage labour; and a largely subsistence economy has given way to an increasing tendency to cultivate cash crops. Related to these shifts is that from a little-monetised economy to an economy defined by money. Many of these changes are associated with a decline in variety and nutritional value of the food crops cultivated.

For all these shifts, tribal areas are still generally among the country’s regions of greatest biodiversity. This is because *Adivasi* Economics is still firmly rooted in long-term symbiosis with the local ecology, enabling tribal communities to live amidst biodiversity, and profit from it in their mix of cultivation, gathering and hunting, without destroying it or even (until recently at least) depleting it.

2 Displacement and cultural genocide

*Adivasi* rootedness to the land exists through what is in effect an invisible umbilical cord. Displacement for these communities means a severing of this cord: a psychic death that few non-tribals have any conception of, since most families in mainstream society have had no roots on land they have worked, for some generations. This is the sense in which *Adivasis*, through invasions of their land by dam and mining projects, face a situation of genocide: every aspect of their social structure is severely disrupted, and people witness the death of the communities, cultural security and ecosystems that they and their ancestors had always carefully maintained.

*Adivasis* often say ‘we cannot eat money’ – a statement that may seem obscure or ridiculous to people in mainstream society for whom it’s an obvious truth that, without money, the poor can’t eat. The statement also contradicts the popular usage in Hindi for example – ‘*vah kitna paaise kha liya*’ (‘how much money he’s eaten’), denoting corruption. For the mainstream, a pile of money waiting to be tapped is precisely what the *Adivasi*’s traditional land of Niyamgiri is.

*Adivasis* see themselves as ‘flooded out by money’. For most of them, as they often say forcefully, ‘development projects’ therefore constitute the opposite of real development. ‘Development-induced Displacement’ is for them, usually, an absurd misnomer. A proper term for this kind of dispossession is ‘Investment-induced Displacement’ – also appropriate since, in many ways, capitalism is the arch enemy of ecologically minded societies. As an elder in a Kond village in Kandhamal once confronted my co-author, Samarendra Das: ‘Where are the saints in your society? In this village we are all saints. We make do with little, share what we have, and waste nothing!’

Displacement also, of course, leads to a massive drop in the standard of living for a majority of *Adivasi* oustees, and a regular betrayal of nearly everything they are promised. Sahu’s documentary film, *DAM-aged* (Sahu 2010b), records the testimony of tribal people displaced by the Upper Indravati reservoir in Odisha, where nothing they were promised has materialised, leaving them in desperate hunger – which reflects *Adivasis*’ situation as a whole, characterised by B.D. Sharma as an *Unbroken History of Broken Promises* (Sharma 2010).

Talk of ‘Tribal Development’ often adds insult to injury. As Sainath showed in *Everybody Likes a Good Drought* (1996), sums earmarked for tribal development schemes are prone to exceptional levels of corruption. ‘Development’ originally referred to an organic process of change, guided by an intrinsic force, as in a plant’s transition from seed to tree. Tribal Development Plans are rarely conceived and guided by *Adivasis* themselves: more often such plans are a mask for unasked-for, ruthlessly imposed changes, whose impact often amounts to genocide and ecocide.

For *Adivasis* in particular, displacement usually means Cultural Genocide (Padel and Das 2011, 2008), since losing their lands and villages destroys every aspect of their social structure: their economy and identity because their status as skilled, self-sufficient cultivators shifts to being defined as ‘unskilled labour’; their political structure because they lose control of their environment and are forced to become dependent
on corporate and government hierarchies; their kinship structure because the ties that made them a cohesive community are frayed in many ways; their religion because ‘even our gods are destroyed’ when their villages and ancestral sites are bulldozed; and their material culture because traditional village spatial arrangement gives way to ‘colonies’ of alien design.

The term ‘genocide’ was first used in 1944 to describe Nazis’ treatment of Jews. The classic case of genocide, however, is what happened to countless indigenous peoples throughout the USA and Australia. Examining this latter process, it is evident that there are two levels to what was killed: physical extermination, and the killing of cultures. Survivors from physical extermination were herded onto reservations and subjected to a policy of ‘de-tribalising’ or ‘forced assimilation’, which included separating children from their families and forbidding them to speak their own languages or practise their traditional cultures.

In popular usage now, ‘culture’ often just means ‘the pretty bits’, exemplified by tribal dances or handicrafts. But its original meaning, from the Latin cultus, refers to cultivation of the soil and cults of nature as well as the general traditions of society. In other words, political and economic systems are an integral part of culture, and what is special about tribal cultures – alongside their emphasis on long-term sustainability – is that these three meanings are still interlinked. This means that when tribal communities are displaced, indigenous systems of cultivation are erased, along with spiritual traditions linking to the ecology of fields and forests.

Publicised killings of Adivasis, such as the Maikanch police shooting that killed three Adivasis opposing the Utkal aluminium project in Kashipur on 16 December 2000, or the Kalinganagar shooting, when 14 Adivasi protestors against a Tata steel plant died on 2 January 2006, become symbolic of this genocide: the numbers killed may be small, but these events symbolise a wider, psychic annihilation of people’s cultures and links with their land.

3 In the name of ‘Sustainable Development’
A key problem is the depth of negative stereotypes that still overshadow attitudes towards Adivasis. At the heart of this is social evolutionism, the idea that tribal people represent a ‘primitive’ or ‘less advanced’ stage of development (Padel 2010, chapter 7). The concept of ‘development’ is defined in relation to ‘underdevelopment’, and an extremely rigid conception of social evolution along set stages, taking for granted a World Bank/IMF-sanctioned division of countries and regions into ‘developed’, ‘developing’ and ‘underdeveloped’. As Gustavo Esteva puts this, in The Development Dictionary (1992), the day that President Truman took office on 20 January 1949, he inaugurated the concept of ‘underdevelopment’ as a blueprint for the spread of the USA’s development paradigm and influence.

On that day, 2 billion people became underdeveloped... [The concept] took on an unsuspected colonizing virulence... Since then, development has connoted at least one thing: to escape from the undignified condition called underdevelopment (Esteva 1992: 6–7).

Darwin’s theory of evolution showed how thousands of species have developed, on multiple interrelated yet separate paths. By contrast, when this theory was applied to society by Marx, Engels and other theorists from the Left as well as the Right, they laid down a uniform model of set stages of development, that has been imposed rigidly worldwide, in a system that has increased exploitation and inequality. Can we move Beyond Developmentality (Deb 2009)?

As for ‘Tribal Development’, Sharma (1984) has questioned what this would really mean, and how it could be implemented, as well as The Web of Poverty (1989) that enmeshes the rural poor in a system of endemic exploitation. Funds and programmes for ‘tribal development’ are flawed by exceptionally high levels of corruption, essentially because projects are conceived in a manner that is irredeemably top-down. Projects that involve displacing Adivasis increasingly include a ‘Tribal Development Plan’. But it is an extreme misuse of language to call top-down models of imposed change ‘development’, especially when implementation is so systemically corrupt. ‘Develop’ is an intransitive verb, and as such, refers to an organic process of change, motivated indigenously rather than imposed.

When tribal communities are displaced, they undergo a process that is the polar opposite of
real development, especially because of a gulf between what is supposed to happen and what actually happens (Padel and Das 2011, 2008), which regularly includes violent repression, exposure to goondas (corporate thugs) and corruption, illegal liquor shops, and a rise in rapes and prostitution – for example, at least 500 sex workers are reported to be working in the Damanjodi area of Koraput, which is one of the poorest districts in India despite 30 years of ‘tribal development’ overseen by Nalco (Perry 2010; CSE 2008).

Mainstream society’s disconnect from displaced people operates at many levels. The neglect faced by displaced people represents a fundamental injustice, congruent with the historic racism and injustice towards tribal people recognised by the Supreme Court Judgement of 5 January 2011, in the case of a Bhil woman beaten and paraded naked in Maharashtra. This Judgement affirms Adivasis’ status as indigenous people. India has not officially recognised Adivasis as ‘indigenous’, partly because it may seem invidious to term 92 per cent of India’s population as ‘old immigrants’ (as in the Supreme Court Judgement). This non-recognition also has the effect of making it difficult to apply UN legislation protecting the land rights and so on of indigenous people in India.

The issue of indigeneity has been taken up vociferously by organisations such as BAMCEF (Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation), who promote the term Mulnivasis to cover STs, Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs).

Among Adivasis, those whose rights are apparently best protected are 73 groups still classified as Primitive Tribal Groups (PTGs). However, the social evolutionism implicit in the word ‘primitive’ here (Ministry of Tribal Affairs 2002) begs the question: are these highly distinctive traditional cultures really being protected from invasion of their lands, or is there an agenda of ‘hastening their development’ through massive, mainstream development projects? Events on the ground suggest the latter.

In the case of the Dongria Kondh, the PTG who made international news for their resistance to Vedanta’s planned bauxite mine on Niyamgiri’s summit, their administration is managed through the Dongria Kondh Development Agency, which has overseen an extensive road-building programme funded through the Prime Minister’s Sadak Yojana into the heart of the Niyamgiri range, in line with Vedanta’s mining plans.

Similarly with the Paudi Bhuiyas, a PTG who live around Khandadhara, the mountain whose iron ore Posco and other companies seek permission to mine. Both these PTGs (and others, such as Korwa and Baiga in Chhattisgarh) face all-out invasion of their mountain territory, and cultural genocide, in apparently blatant contradiction to the state’s constitutional duty to maintain a special level of protection for them. Many Paudi Bhuiya communities have been displaced from the rich forest that they preserved in the Khandadhara range, on the grounds that their practice of shifting cultivation damages forest. They have been resettled in colonies in the plains where they live in destitution, with a scarcity of water, since mining above Khandadhara’s spectacular waterfall has already expanded rapidly and reduced the flow of water, in preparation for Posco. The Orissa Mining Corporation (OMC) has leased the Kurmita mine there to an entity called the Kalinga Commercial Corporation (KCC), that is already selling huge quantities of iron and manganese ore to China and ‘a certain Korean company’.4

‘Primitive’ is basically a hangover from anthropology’s primitive, colonial phase. Defining Adivasi society and economy as ‘primitive’, ‘backward’ or ‘underdeveloped’ implies a programme of ‘civilising’ or ‘developing’ them.

Tribal societies, in other words, are highly developed – some of the PTGs especially so. Uproot them from their niche in an ecosystem, and centuries of development are effectively undone.

Food security is often therefore undermined through the very projects termed as ‘development’, or even ‘Sustainable Development’, a concept used in CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) schemes by companies such as Vedanta and Tata (Padel and Das 2010, chapter 19), and also in projects such as ‘Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development’, funded by mining companies, which produced the concept of ‘Sustainable Mining’ – questioned in Rich Lands, Poor People: Is Sustainable Mining Possible? (CSE 2008).
The ‘three pillars’ of Sustainable Development, as defined by the *Brundtland Report* and the UN World Summit (2005) are: economy, society and environment. This formulation essentially puts the terms the wrong way around, allowing a mining project to be termed ‘sustainable’ if it can make a profit for the next few years. If healthy ecosystems are the basis for life on earth, shouldn’t environment come first? And shouldn’t society come next? Human society existed long before ‘economy’ was defined as a separate domain, and long before ‘markets’. For example, the first senior administrator of the Konds, the Hon. G.E. Russell of the Madras Government, promoted markets among them in 1837 on the principle that introduced ‘wants’ would gradually become ‘necessities of life’, giving government the surest means of controlling them, undermining their annoying tradition of independence (Padel 2010: 178–9).

Real sustainability is the essence of tribal societies – obviously, these are societies that have sustained over hundreds of years without destroying their natural environment, living in balance with it. If one looks at *Advisi* knowledge systems, it is not just that they incorporate vast bodies of ‘ethno-botanical’ information about plant use, they also retain very strong values about not taking too much, or too early in the season (Ramnath 2004; Padel 1998).

**4 Rule of law**

As is often said, India has some of the best environmental and human rights legislation of any country, but implementation is often poor. One problem is that many laws seem to contradict each other, or contain self-contradictory clauses. This is particularly evident in the Forest Rights Act (FRA), which has been rightly celebrated as a milestone, granting *Advisi* and other forest-dwellers their natural rights, long promised and overdue. There is no doubt the Act has proved a stopgap measure for movements opposing dozens of destructive displacement projects, that cannot go ahead until forest rights have been settled – in Niyamgiri, the Posco area, villages in the Polavaram submergence zone, to name but a few. One problem with the Act, however, is that it marginalises community rights claims compared to individual rights. Applications for community rights are harder to make and few have been granted. Granting individual rights to forest plots may prove to undermine the essence of tribal culture as well as the future of forests (Ramnath 2008; Sharma 2006). Processing community claims over forest is probably the best way to ensure tribal communities’ long-term food security.

India’s recent legislation assuring rights to food and work are exemplary and progressive, if often problematic in implementation. Binayak Sen and many in the Right to Food campaign have brought focus to serious shortcomings in drafts of the National Food Security Bill, where the subsidy for food going to large numbers of people living on the edge of starvation is much too small – minuscule compared to major subsidies going to industry in the form of tax breaks, electricity prices, etc.

Similarly with the *Panchayats* (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) (PESA) Act, 1996: an outstanding attempt to bring functioning grassroots democracy to tribal areas, vitiated by State Government’s failure to bring in appropriate complementary legislation. The Samata Judgement (1997), that reaffirmed the inalienability of *Advisi* land rights, has faced a similar poor application by State Governments (Padel and Das 2010: chapter 10).

Like the Food Security Bill, a new Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, presently under parliamentary consideration, has been the focus of considerable lobbying by various factions. There has been pressure for some time to replace the notorious Land Acquisition Act of 1894, and coupling this with R&R seems logical. The devil is in the detail, however, and it has become clear that the need to give communities the right to veto land acquisition conflicts with accelerating demands for land ‘for public purpose’ by big corporations. For example, insistence on communities’ Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) before their land is acquired continues to be debated. It is all too evident that Environmental Impact Assessments have often been full of false and biased data, while public hearings, required under the Environment Protection Act, are regularly manipulated, and falsely reported as ‘Consent’, even when entire communities have spoken out against a project (CSE 2011, 2008). A moratorium on new land acquisition is required until a way of calculating and compensating social, economic and environmental costs is in place.

The Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation (MMDR) Bill has been similarly delayed. Clauses offering 26 per cent benefit-
sharing with affected communities have been strongly resisted by mining companies, and the Bill defines the role of government as essentially that of facilitator for mining companies, with emphasis on reducing the hurdles for clearing projects, despite the accelerating rates of forest depletion, and displacement of communities. The Bill does nothing to address the huge social costs of mining projects and the structural violence surrounding mines and metal factories throughout the country. It does not require mining companies to disclose crucial information, or to audit their environmental and social impacts. Mining companies’ CSR schemes, in India as worldwide, emerge as an attempt to avoid proper regulation (Fauset 2006). Even if 26 per cent of profits is designated for local people, if it comes in the form of CSR, will they actually receive it and have control over how it is spent?6

In November 2006, the Prime Minister, chairing a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, announced an Integrated Action Plan (IAP) to spend an extra Rs 25–30 crore per year in each Maoist-affected district, in order to implement proper development works so as to counteract the alienation of tribal people from the state, widely seen as a cause of support for Maoists increasing among the tribal population. Significantly, Home Minister Chidambaram at first linked these funds to State Governments implementing the PESA and Forest Rights Acts, as an aim for the 12th Five Year Plan (2011–16):

The plan envisages focus on improving governance in the Naxal-affected districts, through effective implementation of the Recognition of Forest Rights Act, 2006 and the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), 1996.7

As presently formulated (April 2012), however, the IAP offers ‘development’ as an incentive away from the Maoists in nearly 100 districts. Unfortunately, applying PESA has become delinked from the extra funds, and decision-making is vested with the traditional triumvirate of top-down, non-democratic authority, instead of the Gram Sabha – Collector/District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, and Divisional Forest Officer. When conventional ‘development’ projects have become the main means of Adivasi dispossession, how can this plan attract Adivasis or bring peace to the Maoist-affected areas?8

What is most conspicuously lacking in these areas is the rule of law. Often the biggest transgressions appear to be corporate takeovers of Adivasi lands and fake public hearings, and numerous atrocities and false arrests by security forces. If government servants and corporations they support do not observe the rule of law, this undermines the system as a whole. In many ways, strict enforcement of the rule of law over corporate and government transgressors would ensure real development, simply by short-circuiting the system of endemic exploitation and dispossession that exists in Adivasi areas as the root cause of increasing food insecurity.

The rule of law sorely needed in tribal areas includes an enhanced public scrutiny of how natural resources are allocated to mining companies, and a far stronger regulation of mines and metal factories, with proper safeguards for affected communities. Too often, a police force supposed to be serving the people appears to be serving the big corporations, aiding a mass dispossession of people from their land that threatens a major crisis in food security.

‘Development’? As Gandhi said when asked what he thought of Western ‘civilisation’: ‘That would be a very good idea’. When equality before the law becomes a reality, and Adivasis or Dalits can go freely to the courts and expect justice, even when perpetrators are government servants or corporate executives, then real development is guaranteed, since the law would turn against the exploiters. If humans are to survive, we may need to turn our back on capitalist models of growth, and relearn from Adivasis the art of living sustainably, without over-exploiting nature, sharing what we have on a far more equal basis.

This was expressed beautifully in the ‘Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth’ or ‘Rights of Nature’, set in motion at an indigenous people’s conference in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in April 2010, in counterpoint to the spectacular failure of the Copenhagen climate conference to achieve any solid agreement on worldwide restraint in greenhouse gas emissions (Economic and Political Weekly 2012). Indigenous knowledge systems need to be seen as highly developed, and at the forefront of a basic ecological understanding – that everyone’s food security depends on preserving healthy ecosystems.
Notes

2 The ST population of these states is as follows: over 12 million in Madhya Pradesh, over 8 million in Maharashtra and Odisha, over 7 million in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Jharkhand, over 6 million in Chhattisgarh, over 5 million in Andhra Pradesh, over 4 million in West Bengal, and over 3 million in Karnataka. A substantial but unknown proportion have been displaced in each of these states. According to Walter Fernandes’ calculations (2006), a quarter to one sixth of the tribal population has been displaced.

3 Interviews with Adivasis in Das and Das 2005.

4 Pratap and Das (2008), KCC website at http://kcc.co.in/business.html (accessed March 2012), and a visit to Paudi Bhuiya resettlement villages in March 2012.

5 See the article on Binayak Sen referred to in Note 1, and Padel and Das (2010, chapter 11).


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