UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN HISTORICAL SCIENCE

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On The Theme: 'Southern African Responses to Imperialism',


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(The Views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute).
'The fashion for modes of production swept through African studies like a bush fire which seems now to have burnt itself out. One can only breathe a sigh of relief at the disappearance of much of the jargon of the 1970's, but it is time to decide what should be saved'.

Introduction

This paper has its origins in a generalized feeling of dissatisfaction and impatience with current and conventional theories about 'political developmental' trends in Southern Africa. It is an early, perhaps premature statement of a series of arguments which are being developed into a forthcoming collective book.

The veritable implosion of empirically grounded monographs in the last ten or so years, has made the task of producing a synthetic account of Southern African development simultaneously more pressing and more arduous. Indeed one trans-African reviewer, has cynically underscored this point when he wrote:

'.... Cross-national quantitative research in Africa is possible only for those who copy down their figures from United Nations or World Bank handbooks, in happy ignorance of what they mean or how they were collected'.

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+ Based on a section of a current project of ZIDS WORKING RESEARCH GROUP (i) on 'The Historic Value and Price of Production of Labour Power in Zimbabwe Since 1890: Political Economy Handbooks Series', forthcoming


2. ZIDS WORKING RESEARCH GROUP (i) 'The Historic Value and Price of Production of Labour Power in Zimbabwe Since 1890'.

Simple explanatory models or metaphors have become increasingly hard to sustain, and have given rise to much phrase mongering on multi-disciplinary concepts of the various 'regional crises' currently affecting Africa. In the late 1970's, the accepted historiography of the Southern African region was opened up to serious and widespread revisionist attack. Difficulty has also been enhanced because many if not most scientists in the region now accept the need to develop a theory of change in Southern Africa which is historically grounded, and with the capability to not merely describe, but to explain the large-scale social transformations, that are being dramatised by events in Azania. My concern in this paper is with the methodological issues involved in the formulation of an adequate and strategic theory of Southern African development, rather than with establishing novel facts.

I do not propose to go into details of the unrestrained controversies on Southern African historiography. There is obviously considerable academic historiographical controversy over many of the events or moments alluded to in the paper, and in such cases I have made my own judgement, about where, on balance the evidence points. This is of course a tentative and provisional matter, and future research, or sources which still as yet have to see the light of day, may well necessitate a reformulation of even scrapping of some of the humble propositions advanced below. The methodological points that constitute the core of this article are however a largely separate issue and must stand or fall on their own merits.

4. see for a succinct review of this development, Harrison M Wright, The burden of the present : liberal-radical controversy over Southern African history (Cape Town, Printpak (Cape) Ltd, South Africa, 1977)
The countries of Southern Africa have a rich, colourful and complex history. So rich, colourful, and complex has this history been that many scholars have attempted to find the easy way out by concentrating on national case studies, so that in the event of a liberated South Africa, joining the SADCC group it would be hoped in the long run to have 10 (ten) solid and substantive developmental case histories of the region. At the present conjuncture, despite what may be termed national 'empiricism' or national exceptionalism the common feature of the republics and kingdoms, that provides a semblance of unity is the infrastructural dependence on the republic of South Africa, which is correctly cast in many analyses as a sub-imperialist power, that under-girds the accumulation of imperialist capital in the region. This therefore means that both for the enemy and their regional antagonists, there will continue to be powerful pressures in the direction of producing coherent and integrated accounts of the pattern of Southern African history as a whole.

This paper will attempt to survey some of the major approaches to this task, by treating the region as an historical unit: some of the methodological and empirical criticisms which arise will be considered. The chronological assemblage point will be on the period since the end of the Second World War, when imperialism underwent both a qualitative and a quantitative transformation in the Southern African region.

This paper hopes to pose a series of revolutionary rather than normal or conventional questions a propos the concrete elusive search for historic paradigms in the search of the working people of Southern Africa for strategies for economic and social liberation from the...
grasping tentacles of LEVIATHAN, on the sacred grounds of that part of the sub-continent, understood by Zimbabwean freedom fighters as AZANIA. (5)

1. **RACISM: JUST ANOTHER SIX-LETTER WORD OR A SUBJECTIVE REDUCTION OF THE LABOUR MARKET?**

"At a political level, the right of all children to education was one of the fundamental demands of the liberation struggle. The leadership of the nationalist movement had themselves experienced the frustration of the colonial education system and know only too well the importance of the right to education. In the 1970's the angry responses of many students to the colonial system was to reject its ethos and structures and enrol in the school of the liberation struggle". (6) 

a. **Understanding the Conflated Institutional Impact of Race and The Capitalist Mode of Production on the Valuation of African Labour Power:**

The choice of the period since 1945 has not been determined by the availability of primary historic sources for a substantive national case study on Zimbabwe of some of the problematics alluded to above. A review of some of the conventional literature on the region is essential, not only from the formal academic assemblage point of

5. For a very useful discussion of the fundamental differences between normal science and revolutionary science see:


acknowledging the existence of known and printed prolegomena on the Southern African region.

But even if we decide and agree that the mode of production is the primary historical unit that must be weighed and analysed, as Mafeje warned in his 1976 note in RAPE (now re-christened ROAPE), we will still be far away from explaining concrete social and economic behaviour, and the only articulation of modes of production that will emerge in practice, will be dictionary searches for some of the historical principles of the Vernacular abstract vocabularies of the region's proletariat. (7)

In the absence of an or the orthodox Marxism in the region, we should therefore not be too easily scared away from conducting basic social research by the charge from certain commoditized professorial mercantilists that we are being essentialist in attempting to understand the real rather than relative value of the price of production of labour power in the region. Louis Masuko has underlined the pressing need to focus on the dynamics of labour power:

"Cost-minimisation and thus increased profits at the end of the day underly the essence of labour use in agriculture. Therefore the answer to the question 'who organises and controls labour power' will clear the air as to the relationship and mutual conditioning between labour productivity and labour intensity. Labour intensity is the degree of physical and mental energy consumption in the process of production. It therefore constitutes an important factor in increasing labour productivity, and hence can enhance or detract from strategic abstraction of what is required to

either improve the conditions necessary for the social production of labour power, or to remove obstacles to the reproduction of such socially defined labour power". (8)

In view of this, the adoption of a post 1945 chronology becomes even more necessary for establishing what we consider the essential categories of Southern African historical materialism. Some of these essential categories we contend have been concealed beneath the undergrowth of what for a long time now, has been accepted as the main stream radical political and economical thought in the region (sometimes this mainstream "radical political economy" has even been paraded as POLITICAL ECONOMY).

It is now an accepted and self-evident fact, that in the Southern African region, consumption items such as beverages, books, newspapers, cigarettes, shoes and gramaphones had by 1945 already entered many black household budgets as socially necessary consumption needs. But the exact moment for such entry is not worthy of historical research and if the matter is indeed pursued to its ad-infinitum absurdities, this can only result in much mystification and obsecration of the 'market', and failure to relate to the historical and structural elements of price and value, in the general reproduction of socially necessary labour power in the region. Even the illiterate and innumerate individuals in Southern African society, full well understand what their basic human needs are; what is therefore necessary is to scientifically determine the basic elements

of socially necessary labour power in the region, as a minimalist scientific programme for the social transformation of Southern Africa, not necessarily in the way designed by the Western powers, in the various SADCC consultancy project files.

It is no longer adequate for regional social scientists to extensively describe basic needs using the so-called value-free paradigms of capitalist social technology, outside a specified political framework that has to be rooted in the universal principles of historical materialism. This therefore means that 'political' debates in Southern Africa should now go beyond or transcend the ethnic arithmetical exercises of liberal cum pluralist-functionalist social science. In a similar vein, it is thus incumbent on us to decompose the conflated institutional impact of race and the capitalist mode of production, not so much of the social world established by Capitalism in the region, but in the social world created by the region's proletarian forces.

Pursuing such a line of analysis will assist in making clear, the 'dynamics' or 'stakes' involved in the projected political transformation of the present population of the Republic of South Africa. In the latter, attempts to introduce 'internal reforms' of apartheid have floundered, and it can only be a moot question whether in 1987, international efforts to reform apartheid will succeed, and usher in a bourgeois democratic revolution, wherein market forces will rule the roost over the very primeval and pre-historic phenomenon of the apartheid-state. Much of the main stream historiography, as we shall demonstrate below has been focused on this futile task of aligning the 'internal reform' policies of the
South African 'boer' oligarchy, with the rather belated internationalised attempts to reform the capitalist-mode of production in the Southern African region at large. Sanctions, it is often repeated, (though not in the same language) will not work because the political reproduction of the conditions for the supply of labour power will have to take into account the consumption (cultural) needs of the entire population, by guaranteeing the 'free' operation of market forces in the region. But that is not the essential reason, why sustained consideration of the concept of labour power is constantly avoided in most discussions about South Africa. Rather, as we will suggest below, this is so, because a considered reflection on the political reproduction of the conditions of the supply of labour power will not yield any simple solutions which expatriate expertise can easily transform into technical slogans. Market fideism, in its varying forms and even when garbed in Marxian jargon and armed with dialectical phrases, has thus far failed to get round the fact that labour power is not produced and reproduced as a commodity under capitalist conditions of production.

b. Beyond the Colligation of Political and Economic Facts

'Interaction exists in international life just as it does in the internal life of peoples; it is quite natural and unquestionably inevitable; nevertheless by itself it explains nothing. In order to understand inter-action, one must ascertain the attributes of the interacting forces, and these attributes cannot find their ultimate explanation in the fact of inter-action, however much they may change thanks to that fact'.

Over the last decade or so there has grown a doctrine of inter-

actionism'. Thus long before the Black revolt of June 1976, Professor Adam drew the attention of Western academics to the melting pot of Southern Africa:

"In the present World system of economic relations (sic), the Southern African complex has significance for Western nations as a rapidly expanding trading market and as a so-called peripheral centre of mineral exploitation. Moreover, with the abundance of relatively cheap labour in a developed infrastructure of transport, communications, water supplies and education, profits for private investments in an advancing secondary industry are among the highest in the world".(10)

At the time of publication of Modernizing Racial Domination, despite the very obvious typographical error in the above paragraph, the study was welcomed by many a progressive scholar in the region, who had by then understood that just the moral condemnation of apartheid could not in itself constitute an agenda for intellectual praxis. In the empirical observation cited above Professor Adam posed many strategic questions, which however with the passage of moments in the region, he has not been able to provide answers to. This is because Adam assumed the cheapness of black labour power, and in his inability to explain social transitions from quantity into quality, he forgot that this very cheapness of black labour power has to be examined, and fitted into a principled explanatory frame of reference. Adam, thus never bothered to explore the question, whether indeed there had been a general transition from the absolute exploitation to the relative exploitation of labour power in the region. This was because it seems that Professor Adam's attempt to fuse analytical social and economic conceptual categories did not

go beyond the notion of the 'revolution of rising expectations'. He has therefore been unable to explain why analysts before him, going right back to the first issue of the South African Journal of Economics had for long stressed industrialization, "as the safest guarantee for the quick abolition of race separation:

"Rapid industrialization and concomitant growth in urbanization and increased education appear to favour and even require a non-racial society. Yet the more the different segments of the population have adjusted to this common industrial culture, the more the ruling group has emphasized and legalised ethnic distinctions at every level of social organisation, and in every sphere of life chances". (11)

These were indeed important empirical observations for even 1971, although Heribert Adam, then failed to conceive of forms of de-racialised Fascism, and throughout the book he insists that relatively speaking, the South African state is not in the strictly formal sense the same creature or Leviathan, as the Nazi state in Inter-war or post-Weimar Germany. He however came close to a rejection of the liberal trajectories on the interaction of the political and the economic in post-Sharpeville South Africa:

"... deracialization will not be the automatic outcome of changes in the occupational structure, but will have to emanate from pressures originating in the political realm". (12)

Fourteen years later, however, it seems Professor Adam has not made any progress and in fact has regressed further into complex Hegelian undergrowths, and is now to be heard of writing about the need for

11. Ibid, page 7
12. Ibid, page 82
blacks in South Africa to adopt a strategy of 'economic ethnicity', which he sees as having been the saviour of the lost white tribe of Africa - the Afrikaners:

"In the Boer war at the turn of the century, Afrikaners were defeated and decimated. In the country as a whole, they were outnumbered approximately 10:1 compared with cheaper black labour, streaming into the new industrial centres, they were at a competitive disadvantage and not much better educated than blacks". (13)

Using this very a-historical analogue, underpinned by spurious reference to and phrase mongering around the term "economic ethnicity" and a structural assumption that black labour power is perennially cheap, it is hardly surprising that in his most recent prognosis we read the following clever, but meaningless Shibboleth*

"For most blacks today, cultural heritage is gradually being replaced by what may be referred to as economic ethnicity. The massive dislocation and economic insecurity of both township dwellers and the rural population have made traditional customs increasingly obsolete. The uniform exploitation of African workers at the bottom of the pay scale and labour hierarchy promises to become the binding grievance that bridges black cultural heterogeneity and substitutes for the cultural vacuum. In this sense, economic ethnicity is identical with class complaints. Because of the vast numbers of black workers and the economic squeeze in advanced capitalism, material co-optation of the black working class faces much greater obstacles now than was the case with poor whites previously. With few cultural lures to camouflage continuous relative


* Shibboleth = 1. The Hebrew word used by Jephtah as a test-word by which to distinguish the fleeing Ephraimites (who could not pronounce the 'sh') from his own men the Gileadites (Judges xii 4-6)

2. A word used as a test for detecting foreigners, or persons from another district by their pronunciation see The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
deprivation, the black hope lies in economic solidarity, not linguistic advancement.(14)

The reason why Professor Adam gets away with such neo-fascist empirical observations is to be found in the dynamics of the whole gamut of "interactionist" mechanistic social science literature in the region, that has been underpinned by the undervaluation of labour power by those social forces that have acted as the supportive structures for the control of the collective regional means of production. It will thus be clear that many a travelling professorial merchant, while expressing abhorrence at the system of apartheid, is an active contributor to the historic struggles of capital in the region, to minimise the social costs for the production and reproduction of Black labour power. Cultural relativism in the (African) social sciences, has thus been caught up in a thick morass of technical and market fideism whose only end product will be the production of more and more apologia for imperialism in the region.


'Even if there were a handful of Darwin-reading, joint-stock banking, steam-engine driving, pedagogical ve'eranians in Cape Town - and this has to be taken on trust- there were certainly none in Griqualand or on the Witwatersrand until very much later. Houghton's Europeans ..... are a means of explaining the present, by tying up the past, conferring heroic qualities upon the dead in order to explain anomalies among the living'. (15)

14. Ibid page 75
Objective and honest accounts of the real rather than the relative historical effects of the interaction between the 'economy' (in the general sense of market forces) and the realm of the political, are increasingly showing that the issues that have to be understood about the Southern African problem, go beyond borrowing notions of 'economic ethnicity' from the melting pot of North American social science literature. The uniqueness of the situation is being repeatedly pointed out:

"More than any other state in the contemporary world, South Africa's international situation and its domestic politics are inextricably linked. The dynamics of this linkage have shaped and driven the most important of Pretoria's policies with respect to both South Africa's internal socio-political arrangements and its foreign relations.(16)

It has also been demonstrated in great detail how since World War II, the 'state' in South Africa, has been challenged by a fundamental contradiction between its international and domestic requirements, but of course there is nothing unique about that and to a greater or lesser extent, many post-colonial states in Africa face a similar challenge. Thus concerning the celebrated problematic of the 'post-colonial state', and its role in regulating economic life and other life chances, conceptually speaking there are not many differences between the apartheid state and Africa North of the Limpopo:

"Internationally, South Africa requires access to markets for the export of its minerals and, increasingly, for its manufactured goods, as well as the opportunity to import vital capital technology and producer goods. These are

prerequisites for the health, growth and development of its modern industrial economy"(17)

What then is really new about the specific state apparatus in colonial Azania? There now exists world wide consensus, that this state apparatus has to be smashed by all necessary means, if a holocaust that makes Auschwitz look like child's play is to be avoided. At the purely conceptual level, however, and if this administrative machinery of apartheid has to be decomposed, into its main conjunctural moments, a fundamental cognition has to be acknowledged that apartheid is a social product of global monopoly capitalism. It is even possible for one to maintain and sustain the maximalist academic position, that the apartheid state machinery in-so far as the administrative logic of the 'normal' post-colonial state in Africa, are the same creature, without even trying to sound 'ultra-leftist'. This position can be sustained inspite and despite of exquisite capital labour input-output ratios models, that are supposed to underpin the reform of institutional mismanagement in Africa, from Cape to Cairo under the sponsorship of the World Bank and the 'kind' tutelage of the International Monetary Fund.

Indeed, there can be nothing new under the African sun about all this, if we remember that both the apartheid state and its ideological superstructures, have been nurtured on the basis of a particular state or even constellation of world productive forces: on the basis of this state of the productive forces, there has come into being or existence certain relations of production and consumption

17. Ibid
in colonial Azania, which while at the moment might be antagonistic to the global project for capitalist reform, by the year 2000 A.D., are not in fundamental contradiction to the fundamental mission of finance capital, or even capital's general social ethos. It is indeed unfortunate that capitalist relations of production that have developed in the whole 400 year old drama for capitalist accumulation, should appear and sound so obscene because they have been materially translated into Afrikaans. But fortune has nothing to do with the fact that these relations of production have received their ideal, and naked expression in the legal and constitutional notions of the colonial South African state bureaucracy, which in themselves constitute an interesting compendium of both the written and unwritten general laws of capitalist accumulation.

It is however unfortunate that there has been little if any change in world capitalist-opinion making structures; true, the International Liberal Congress, has expressed its utter abhorrence at the evil system of apartheid, but even those social reformist ideologues, sworn to curing the social effects of capitalist imperialism, still shy away from conceptually tackling and destroying the basic roots and foundations of the whole historic bloc of apartheid. The preoccupation has been with 'appearances', as Price nicely puts it:

"Since the defeat of Nazism, there has been general agreement in the international community on the odiousness of a political system based upon racial classification and stratification". (18)

18. Ibid
Price goes on to trace the 'interactions' between internal unrest and movements or moments of international capitalist investment in colonial Azania. He makes some interesting findings from the secondary sources he uses, and we would crave the indulgence of the reader to paraphrase them seriatim:

(i) Between 1946 and 1959 there were only two years when South Africa was not a net importer of capital. After Sharpeville, there came into being a 'crisis': in 1960 and early 1961, the capital loss was estimated to be somewhere in the region of 12 million Rand per month, creating a balance of payments 'crisis' more than any experienced at the height of the Great Depression in the Union of South Africa in 1932.

(ii) After the election of Richard Nixon, and the tilt of U.S. foreign policy towards the Republic of South Africa, coupled with the withdrawal of U.S. support for 'condemnatory resolutions' at the U.N.; the trend in (i) was reversed. Price dates this new movement of capital to 1965 (Thus while the U.N. was agreeing to impose mandatory sanctions on the rebel regime that ruled the roost under Ian Smith, in colonial Zimbabwe in colonial Azania, the capital drought was relieved and capital began to flow into South Africa again). This flow of investment was sustained at very high levels and by the first half of the 1970's averaged the tidy sum of 700 million Rand a year.

(iii) In the winter of 1976, in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising there was a replay of the post-Sharpeville situation: with the Democrats back at the helm in the U.S., there was a net

(iv) In 1982, when it seemed that peace had come to stay in the Republic of South Africa, South Africa according to IM.F. statistics once again experienced a positive net inflow of direct foreign investment, despite the 'world recession', thus ending six years of continuous negative foreign investment flows.

(v) With the return of 'unrest', and even more serious social disorganisation, a more persistent capital drought has afflicted South African capital markets. And after 9 September 1985, which was when Ronald Reagan announced limited economic sanctions which concerned the sale of Kruger Rands in the U.S., the South African economy has found itself virtually shut out of the international capital markets. (19)

Price does not therefore hold out much hope for the present regime resolving 'the fundamental security contradiction facing white ruled South Africa', in attempting to make capitalist exploitation less obscene. 'He however baulks from tackling these fundamental contradictions and instead reduces them to a question of the 'ironies of history':

"One of the greatest ironies of contemporary South African history is that separate development policy-apartheid's political cornerstone- was developed as a means to avoid international pressure for an end to white rule. Separate development involved the ultimate partition of South African territory so as to create nine independent African states, along with white South Africa. All black South Africans were assigned citizenship in one of these new homelands by

the government, using a loose set of criteria based on ethnic ties, family history and the like. (Emphasis Added)

However, if one were to seriously reflect on the historiography of Western Monopoly Capitalism, there is nothing ironical or even accidental about this phenomenon. These very loose categories of 'ethnic ties', 'family history' etc, provided the legitimation for the creation of modern Western European nation states, from the ashes of the 'feudal' world of the Holy Roman Empire, and were again revived by the Western powers after World War II, when the former colonial powers created nation-states in Africa, while they were themselves moving towards greater continental unity. (cf The Treaty of Rome)

Nevertheless Price makes some very important observations concerning the implications of the 'new' international division of industrial labour power, for the Republic of South Africa's potential sanctions busting strategems:

"In addition to the conventional sanction busting techniques deceptive labelling, and illicit and sub-rosa trade; this involves finding non-traditional foreign suppliers who are because of self interest or politics, less likely to comply with a sanctions campaign than South Africa's traditional Western trading partners. In this respect, South Africa's circumstances have been fortuitously enhanced by the economic achievements of the newly industrialised countries (NICS) of which South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil are the most significant - have a strong export orientation and need to capture markets at the expense of firms from the older industrial countries. They are likely to find the South African market, if it is abandoned by established suppliers, an attractive opportunity. The domestic politics of the NICS is (sic) also less sensitive than that of the Western democracies to South African domestic affairs, and so there are likely to be few constraints on their taking advantage of market opportunities created

20. Ibid
by disinvestment, sanctions, and embargoes. Trade statistics indicate that South Africa has already begun to re-orient its trade toward these non-traditional sources". (21)

If indeed Blacks in South Africa were to heed Professor Adam's admonition to revert to or to re-invent economic ethnicity, then the various scenarios for functional political and economical interaction in a de-racialized Second Republic of South Africa, would indeed seem to be pregnant with meaning. Unfortunately however, the real as opposed to a relative materialist assessment of the contemporary situational conundrums in the region, would indicate that such scenarios especially when they have attempted to conflate the 'ethnic dispositions of the African petty-bourgeoisie, with the goings on in the real world, are based on wishful thinking.

Rather than pursuing some of these interesting but stale thought patterns, a more challenging problematic would be to explore further the political economy of this alignment in the international division of industrial resources, keeping in mind that it does not necessarily coincide with the international division of labour power, and will not do so given the continued existence of the capitalist mode of production. What then are the political conditions or technology that would be able to sustain a reasonable return of profit to international finance capital in a future de-racialized Second Republic of South Africa, The answering of such a question, would be indeed a tall order for any one scholar, no matter how multidisciplinary.

21. Ibid.
G. Kay has thrown much light on the uniqueness of the Non-European NIC's, in the following empirical observations:

"The innovatory feature of this industrialisation is that it is the first occasion on which methods of production associated with relative surplus value in the advanced countries have been transferred into the 'underdeveloped world' where the political and social conditions of life are geared to the production of absolute 'surplus value'.(22)

In lieu of a conclusion: 'Whither Historical Science in the Struggle Against Imperialism in Southern Africa?

'For the historian there are no banal things. Like the scientist the historian does not take anything for granted. He has to see objects not as they appear to the daily user, but as the inventor saw them when they first took shape. He needs the unworn eyes of contemporaries, to whom they appeared marvelous or frightening. At the same time, he has to establish their constellations before and after and thus establish their meaning'.(23)

Great expectations about the use of scientific research in the Southern African region, have varied from the near euphoric or to the downright cynical. Despite and inspite of such a situation, it is still necessary for the region's scientists, both natural and social to bring about a strategic conflation of both physical and social technologies, that can be brought to bear on the very basic collective need to uproot imperialism from the whole region.

There is therefore the need for basic research into the very processes that facilitate or hinder the generation, systematization, and transmission of knowledge. These would range from the under-


standing of cognitive and non-cognitive determinants of scientific creativity in order to increase scientific productivity in general; there is also the need to understand the socio-cultural matrix in which social knowledge has been accumulated and disseminated in the region.

But all this cannot begin before certain micro-institutional tendencies are uprooted from the socio-cultural matrix of African intellectuals. One important such micro-chip, is the tendency to regard talk of methodology as the nemesis of the policy sciences. Social scientists in the region can engage in struggle with imperialism by searching for a collective assemblage point from which Southern African scholars can criticize social institutions or practices, or whole ways of life in a non-question-begging manner. There is therefore no need for scholars to find a diplomatic point of view, that is neutral to all the raging intellectual controversies of the region - which task would be an impossibility at any rate. What is urgently required is a labour-power value based paradigm, which can produce a common method of inquiry and at the same time or simultaneously undermine nihilism and certain forms of relativism - in particular the so-called, ethnic or tribal factor.