Addressing and Mitigating Violence

Whose Security? Building Inclusive and Secure Societies in an Unequal and Insecure World

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The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing processes. This material has been developed under the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme.

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[In which the cartographer explains himself...]
My job is to imagine the widening
of the unfamiliar and also
the widening ache of it;
to anticipate the ironic
question: how did we find
ourselves here? My job is
to untangle the tangled.

In which the rastaman disagrees
The rastaman has another reasoning.
He says – now that man’s job is never straight-
forward or easy. Him job is to make thin and crushable
all that is big and real as ourselves; is to make flat
all that is high and rolling; is to make invisible and wutliss
plenty things that poor people cyaa do without...

... And then again
the mapmaker’s job is to make visible
all things that shoulda never exist in the first place
like the conquest of pirates, like borders,
like the viral spread of governments...
The Cartographer Tries to Map a Way to Zion by Kei Miller (2014: 16–17)

_____________________________________________________________________
A storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence
that the angel [of history] can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels
him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him
piles skywards. This storm is what we call progress...
Illuminations by Walter Benjamin (1973: 259–60)

_____________________________________________________________________
The end of all Political associations is the Preservation of the Natural and
Imprescriptible Rights of Man; and these rights are Liberty, Property, Security, and
Resistance to Oppression.
Article Two of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens by the National Assembly of
France (1789), in Thomas Paine’s 1791 translation (2015: 68–9)
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**Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CIGI</td>
<td>Centre for International Governance Innovation</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil–Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>HiCN</td>
<td>Households in Conflict Network</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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Summary

Development researchers, governance specialists, security and international relations analysts are cartographers of the modern world. Their job is to untangle the tangled, yet in doing so they all too often make flat all that is high and rolling. This paper considers one particular piece of map-making: the interface between security and development. It tries to render visible some of the bumps, joins and turnings which lie beneath the maps.

It starts by arguing for a historical perspective. The theory and practice of security is like that of development issued from the historical transformations which gave rise to the post-Second World War world order. Since the end of the Cold War they have increasingly intertwined and security has been mainstreamed into development. Yet neither security nor development has fully extricated itself from the violent and extractive relationships which developed in the colonial period and continue in many respects to this day.

The paper then explores the ensuing contradictions which lie at the heart of the security–development nexus. On the one hand, security is a process of political ordering. Even more than development, it intermeshes with established power structures, property relations and inequalities. On the other hand, it is founded upon the claim that states and other forms of public order make citizens safe from violence and insecurity. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but.

The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are the touchstone by which to evaluate security. Most people fall back upon their social identities – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to respond to insecurity and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these identities are written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed to establish hierarchies of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is inclusive is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels.

Those who live in conditions of poverty and insecurity mostly do not make sharp distinctions among the causes of their misery, be they violence, displacement, ill health, starvation or environmental degradation. Whilst they experience insecurity and deprivation locally, they are at risk as well from global and national shocks and stresses. Multilevel empirical analysis of the missing links in the causal chains that bind different forms of risk and link local with wider insecurities is a high priority but immensely challenging.

The security–development nexus is not only historically contingent, but is also being torn apart by the gathering winds of change. Global balances of profit and power are shifting as new poles of global economic growth and political influence emerge. Powerful market forces drive the privatisation of the military and security sector, as well as feeding the markets in drugs and other illegal commodities, which create powerful incentives for political as well as criminal violence. Rapid technological changes, notably in information technologies, are transforming the worlds of war as well as work, and translate into struggles to control communication and shape political discourse. The framework of political authority is loosening, called in question by new forms of subaltern politics, not just in ‘fragile’ states, with greatly varying consequences, some violent, others more peaceful.

How more inclusive and secure societies can emerge in this fluid and contested environment, and how they can meet the immense challenges of the twenty-first century are the questions posed in the final section of this paper. Four central challenges stand out.
First, there are the immense problems of collective action, when the interests, ways of working and networks of major development and security actors tug them in diverging directions. Second, there are the difficulties of working simultaneously with the grain of history and with the winds of change. Third, there is a pressing need for democratic alternatives to the existing theory and practice of security and of development. Finally, there is the struggle to ensure that the voices of poor and vulnerable people are heard in an unequal world; that their agency counts for something; and that they can begin to bring to account those most responsible for their insecurity.
1 Are security, economic development and human freedom indivisible?

Figure 1.1 The virtuous triangle: security, development, human freedom

The winds, which open blue skies, also bring cloud, rain and thunder as they propel the angel of history irresistibly into the future, gazing helplessly back at the wreckage piling up behind.¹ This paper starts by scrutinising one specific corner of blue sky, the ‘indivisibility of security, economic development and human freedom’ delineated by the United Nations (UN) report A More Secure World (UN 2004: 9) and portrayed in Figure 1.1. This vision is enshrined in numerous UN reports and by the World Bank’s comprehensive World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (World Bank 2011). It is the rationale for the development industry’s embrace of security as an important if controversial part of its mandate and for recent proposals that security should be included amongst the Sustainable Development Goals.

A chasm seems to divide this benign triangle and the unholy chaos of political violence, maldevelopment and oppressive governance still present in many regions of the developing world. International interventions supposed to stabilise insecure regions and countries, like Afghanistan, Libya or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), have faltered or engendered even more insecurity. The international principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’² has proved unenforceable or even damaging in situations of complex political violence like Darfur, Somalia, Libya or Syria. Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals has been compromised by harsh austerity programmes, which have worsened inequalities and become a source of insecurity in their own right. Democratisation has not necessarily fostered inclusion; and in some cases like Pakistan, Kenya or Egypt, it has given rise to political violence. Even apparently established democracies, like Sri Lanka and India, have

¹ See Benjamin’s memorable image in the epigraph on page 1.
violated rights and waged war against excluded minorities, all in the name of national security.

These engagements with the complex security and development problems of the developing world have often taken place under the discursive cover of international security and of humanitarian principles, which are often deeply disconnected to the day-to-day lives of most people. Yet the meaning of security has to a large extent been taken for granted. There has been too little scrutiny of the concept itself and too little reflection on what it can and cannot be used to justify. Such scrutiny is all the more necessary because it is an essentially contested concept with multiple discursive registers. Who talks security? Whose security? From what risks or threats? The responses to these questions remain to be elucidated.

1.1 The backstory: capitalism, war and democracy

The juxtaposition of security with property on the one hand and resistance to oppression on the other, in Thomas Paine’s rendition of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens puts its finger on important synergies and tensions, which we shall return to later. The state-centred or ‘realist’ account of security only entered the vocabulary of state practice and became a distinct area of academic inquiry in the mid-twentieth century. However, it carries heavy historical baggage, which dates back to the establishment of the modern Westphalian state system. Its intellectual forefathers include Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz and Weber, all of whom saw political power, military force and the control of violence as the essence of statecraft and of what we now term national and international security.

But even for these thinkers the authority of the state was not necessarily absolute. According to Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), political order is made and remade around the social bonds between the state and its citizens. The Leviathan commands the unconditional loyalty of citizens only because it offers protection from the violent anarchy of the state of nature. If it does not protect citizens, they can in principle defect. And although Weber defined the state in terms of its monopoly of legitimate physical force within a given territory, legitimacy and political authority rather than force per se was Weber’s principal concern.

Indeed, political authority and, by extension, security, are Janus-faced. Security can be viewed as a process of political ordering, structured in large measure around the control of violence. But at the same time it can be regarded as an entitlement to protection from direct and structural violence, as well as other existential threats such as epidemics, starvation and climate change. In its modern incarnation such an entitlement inheres not just in citizenship but also in the rights and capabilities of human beings, i.e. in ‘human security’ as well as ‘citizen security’.

The deep tensions between these two visions of security have played out over the centuries in different historically constituted political orders. There have been multiple securities, imagined and contested by diverse political and social actors in different times and places. Each of these has been blown here and there by the shifting winds of history. Each has been embedded in wider global configurations of power, social representation and capital accumulation.

3 For an insightful discussion which, like this paper, interrogates what security means to poor and vulnerable people, see Booth (2005).
4 See the quotation from Paine (1791) in the epigraph at the beginning of this paper on page 1.
5 If not prevented from doing so by the Leviathan’s ability to coerce them into staying! This is one of several ambiguities in Hobbes’s analysis.
6 There is an ongoing debate between those who limit human security just to freedom from violence and the fear of violence and those who conceptualise it more widely.
It was during the extended nineteenth century that the Westphalian state system reached its apogee in Europe, including the consolidation of political order within territorial states and the stabilisation of fragile balances of power among states. Recent historical analyses view this era as the forging ground in which mutually reinforcing relationships were established between the taming of violence, the making of strong but inclusive states and sustained economic and technological progress (Bates 2001; North, Wallis and Weingast 2012; Pinker 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

It was also in this era that massive inequalities started to open up between the developed and developing worlds. These inequalities too have often been explained in terms of the different historical paths taken by national societies, which did or did not establish the institutional conditions for social order and economic progress, including the rule of law, ‘perpetually lived organisations’ (like joint stock companies or standing armies), ‘open-access orders’ (North et al. 2012) and ‘inclusive political and economic institutions’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

This historical meta-narrative is convincing up to a point. Yet it places a retrospective gloss on the violent and extractive relationships with the colonial world upon which Western states built their trade, financed their investments, fought their wars and became global powers. It tends to obscure an altogether grimmer story of war, political upheaval, imperial expansion and economic dislocation, which was equally much associated with the birth of the modern world.

Tilly has argued that the rise of liberal democracy itself was linked not only to economic progress but also to military expansion and the industrialisation of war (Tilly 1985a, 1985b, 1990). Political elites in Europe were held to account by the middle classes, who paid the taxes that financed their military ventures. At the same time they were obliged to concede rights, including the franchise, to the mass of citizens whom they conscripted into mass armies or (in the case of women) employed in war production. Democratisation in its turn became associated with profound changes in the way states and national communities were imagined: on the one hand, through the lenses of officially sponsored state nationalisms; and on the other, through the political mobilisation of previously submerged ethnic and religious identities.

This heady interaction between the creative destruction wrought by capital accumulation, militarism, industrialised war, imperialism, nationalism and liberal democracy (summarised in Figure 1.2) brought on the catastrophes of the First and Second World Wars. The framework of global liberal governance that emerged from this troubled historical matrix in the 1940s was specifically designed to prevent recurrence of the deadly combination of economic dislocations, extreme nationalism and military adventurism that had led to the two World Wars. Its three pillars comprised world peace and security (under the UN Charter), human freedom (under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and a liberal market economy (through the Bretton Woods institutions).

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7 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw an interesting comparison between colonial societies, which became over-dependent upon the extraction of rents, and those that did not, including notably the United States.

8 Considered in a more critical tradition of historical scholarship, including the work of Hobsbawm (1989, 1995), and Mazower (2012) amongst others.

But how these principles translated into practice was quite another matter, for the post-war settlement also reconfigured the structures of empire and brought them in line with the informal dominion exercised increasingly by the United States.\textsuperscript{10} The UN Charter itself institutionalised the old principles of great power politics within the Security Council and its permanent members – thus undercutting the principle of equal sovereignty among nation states, which had paved the way for the dissolution of colonial empires and national independence. National sovereignty in turn was potentially and actually in conflict with the individual rights and freedoms proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – a tension, which has resurfaced in recent controversies over the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P).

Right from the beginning, this framework was co-opted and enfeebled by the structures of power and profit from which it had emerged after the Second World War. It is questionable whether it ever provided an authoritative enough framework for collective action to manage global problems, a question that is returned to in Section 3. Not only were there flaws in the UN system itself, but the latter was undermined by superpower rivalry. The Cold War brought in new forms of balance of power politics, structured around the ideological divide and military competition between the Western and communist blocs. To be sure, the Cold War ushered in a ‘long peace’, based on mutual recognition that nuclear competition risked becoming a negative sum game. The benefits of this uneasy peace, however, were largely concentrated within the strategic and economic heartlands of Europe and North America.

Elsewhere, the unfinished business of the dissolution of empires and of national liberation continued and generated struggles over the political and economic spoils of independence. These struggles fast became entangled with superpower rivalries. Major wars broke out or continued in China, Korea, Greece, Vietnam, Algeria and other countries. The number of

\textsuperscript{10} On the post-war settlement see Mazower (2013) and Judt (2010).
The massive costs in terms of human misery and development opportunities foregone were largely ignored by donors and the Bretton Woods institutions as being beyond their mandates; and received relatively little attention in the development literature of the time.

The international development community found it convenient to turn a blind eye because the major powers of both blocs were deeply involved: either being direct protagonists themselves (as in Korea, Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan); or waging war by proxy, delivering arms, training and military assistance to national governments or rebel forces (as in the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Central America). Development aid tended to be instrumentalised as a tool of foreign policy, as with the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, where it was coordinated with counterinsurgency. In Eastern Europe too there was a simmering state of structural violence, in which dissent was crushed and nationalisms held in check by a carefully orchestrated combination of surveillance and brute force. In sum, the history of many countries in both the developing South and the communist East was written according to a Cold War script, with devastating consequences for their development, national sovereignty and political freedoms.

Yet the political, military and economic terrain of the Cold War was neither homogeneous nor uncontested. The political construct of a Third World had a distinct impact on the international relations of development, although attempts to create alternative models to the capitalism of the West and the state socialism of the East were ultimately cast aside, not least due to the rise of new paradigms of market-driven growth within the former Third World itself.

The massive deployment of military force by superpowers did not assure military, still less political, victory in ‘asymmetric warfare’ against armed insurgents, especially where the governments, which intervening powers supported, lacked popular legitimacy. This was just as true of the wars waged or sponsored by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, as of those involving Western powers in Algeria, South-East Asia or Southern Africa. Not even counterinsurgency programmes, designed to win hearts and minds by a judicious combination of force and development, could be sure of regaining the political and military advantage. Less noticed was the capacity of even the most craven and corrupt client regimes to extract aid, head off reform and ensure their survival by playing off international patrons against each other: President Mobutu in Zaire was the supreme example.

What then did the security and development architecture of the Cold War protect and whom did it benefit? To start with, at least it provided the stability in the industrial heartlands essential for the rapid expansion of trade and investment initiating an apparent golden age of capitalism. Global corporations could not only expand worldwide, but also become footloose, detaching their operations and profits from oversight by national governments. At the same time, the wealth they created and the stability on which it depended were unequally distributed between and inside nations. The welfare state and development assistance were meant to spread the risks of economic progress, protecting working people and developing countries from the dislocations that had sown havoc in the inter-war period. Yet before the end of the Cold War this framework of protection was already under challenge from an

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11 This increase did not, however, reflect any increase in the number of wars being initiated. Rather, it was because more wars were being started than were being brought to a conclusion over the whole Cold War period. Nor was there a consistent trend in casualties, which tended to peak during the most destructive conflicts (like Korea, Vietnam, etc.).

12 Whether and how far they were proxy wars varies from case to case. Almost all had local as well as international roots; but were sustained by deadly mixtures of internal violence and external support.

13 Two of the most promising examples of attempts to create alternative models of democracy and of development were in Sandinista Nicaragua and Ujamaa-era Tanzania. They were swept aside in both cases through a mixture of external pressures and their own contradictions: see Luckham (1998).
increasingly confident private sector and the extension of free market principles to an ever wider range of transactions, including the aid business.

However, security was not based solely on military force or balances of power. It was also deeply hegemonic, depending on soft power and competing claims to legitimacy. Here the West had inbuilt advantages, which became greater as the Cold War continued. The framework for global governance under the UN Charter and the Bretton Woods institutions was already couched in the liberal language of the Enlightenment. Capitalism, unlike socialism, was pre-programmed to innovate and to expand trade and investment globally, in the process transforming economies and social structures wherever it penetrated. It gained a decisive edge in cultural production, the mass media and new electronic and information technologies, which also intertwined with the military sector. The communist bloc, whose power and influence in the developing world depended heavily upon military aid and the transfer of arms, found it ever harder to compete. All the more as it could not both invest in its costly military–industrial complex and deliver the consumer goods, which were the coinage of satisfaction and legitimacy in the West.

The end of the Cold War is commonly (and to an extent rightly) seen as a critical juncture at which the tectonic plates of global order shifted and opened new spaces for change. Yet it can also be seen as part of a longer-term progression, which gathered momentum before the eruptions of 1989 and continued long afterwards. The momentum for change came from below as much as from above. The great civil society upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were the high point. But they had been preceded by the popular demonstrations and uprisings which had initiated democratisation in Latin America and parts of Asia. The aftershocks continued in Africa and in the Middle East right through to the so-called Arab Springs. More momentous perhaps than even these political upheavals were the economic changes being wrought within the newly industrialising countries of Asia and Latin America, which even before the Cold War was over began transmitting themselves across the former East–West divide – above all, in China.

But the impact of these transformations was highly uneven. On the one hand, they left the imperium of the United States and the Western alliance system relatively intact, in spite of the rise of new poles of economic growth and political influence in East Asia and elsewhere. The military–industrial complexes of the Western powers were indeed reinvigorated through technological innovation and new military doctrines justifying the deployment of hi-tech weapons (the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs). At the same time, capitalism expanded its global reach into former communist as well as developing countries, dismantled many of the regulatory barriers which had curbed its excesses, as well as rolling back the protective framework of the welfare state in the industrial countries and increasingly rewriting development according to a free-market or neoliberal script.

A process of creative (and sometimes not so creative) destruction was unleashed in the former communist bloc and in swathes of the developing world. The impacts of political and economic liberalisation were most tangible in Eastern Europe, where they were reinforced by realignment into the Western alliance system and the European Union (EU). Even so there were intense and sometimes violent struggles to fill the political spaces vacated by dismantled communist regimes, especially in former Yugoslavia and around the fringes of the former Soviet Union, as in Bosnia, Chechnya, Georgia and now Ukraine. Military regimes withdrew or were displaced in many places in the developing world, especially Latin America, South-East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. In some cases they gave way to gradually consolidating democracies. In others new forms of autocracy or illiberal governance were concocted in democratic drag. And in others again democratisation ushered in a transition

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For early and highly prescient analyses see the contributions to White and Wade (1984), as well as White (1993) on China.
not to democracy, but to state fragility and sustained political violence. These upheavals not only unsettled international security, they had tangible impacts, many of them destructive, upon the everyday lives of masses of people.

1.2 The international agenda for peace, security and development

The above was the contested terrain in which the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published An Agenda for Peace (1992), aiming to carve out a more active role for the United Nations in peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention. This was accompanied by a key discursive shift from the language of state and international security to that of human and citizen security.\(^\text{15}\) In principle, human security prioritised the individuals and communities who were secured rather than the agendas of the international bodies, states and security apparatuses charged with delivering security to them. It readily connected to poverty alleviation and to the Millennium Development Goals, which became the centrepiece of development analysis and practice. It also drew support from an expanding research literature, which characterised violent conflict as development in reverse, and explored its multiple linkages to other causes of human misery, including poverty, inequality, famine, disease and environmental stresses (see Collier et al. 2003; Collier 2004 and Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003).

The UN’s An Agenda for Peace and a series of UN initiatives that followed did indeed pave the way for significant changes in the policy and practice of peacebuilding. There were increases in both UN and non-UN peace support operations – more or less threefold compared with the Cold War era. Their mandates extended well beyond traditional peacekeeping tasks, involving more robust terms of engagement along with extensive cooperation with civilian humanitarian and development agencies. Preventive diplomacy was boosted, including many more mediation and peace missions, which involved not just the UN but also regional and sub-regional organisations like the Organization of American States, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, African Union, South African Development Community and Economic Community of West African States.

Moreover, donor agencies such as the Department for International Development (DFID) and international development bodies like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank began to take a much more active interest in questions of peace and security. A range of new policy instruments were added to the donor arsenal, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and access to justice programmes, becoming collectively a major growth industry in their own right. Military establishments upgraded their capacity to undertake ‘out of area’ and peace enforcement operations – and at the same time incorporated development concerns in their Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and counterinsurgency (COIN) programmes. The stabilisation of ‘fragile’ states, post-conflict state-building and support for ‘inclusive enough’ political coalitions and durable ‘political settlements’ have become ever more pressing concerns to the donor community (see Marquette and Beswick 2011; DFID 2010; OECD 2008; CCOE 2012; UNDPKO 2012). The World Bank’s 2011 report on conflict, security and development brought many of these themes together and marked the final arrival of security at the centre of the theory and practice of development.

Peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention have been underpinned by a growing body of analysis of the ‘new’, ‘networked’ or ‘asymmetric’ wars that brought insecurity, poverty,

\(^{15}\) Although there was already a growing academic and policy literature on non-state forms of security, the UNDP (1994) played an especially crucial role in systematising the concept and introducing it into international development thinking. See also Ogata and Sen (2003) Jolly and Basu Ray (2007) and Kaldor (2007).
famine and disease in their wake. How far these wars are really ‘new’, how much they differ from previous wars, whether they have brought significant increases in violence and whether their human and developmental costs have been any greater than the armed conflicts of the Cold War era, have all been disputed. Recent studies indeed suggest that – despite a peak in violent conflicts immediately after the end of the Cold War – the long run trend has been a decline both in the number of wars and in overall casualties despite some short-term and regional variations. But in some ways such debates about whether the burden of violent conflict was increasing or decreasing have been beside the point. What mattered was that conflict and insecurity – together with their human and development costs – were put firmly in the policy frame of the major donors, international agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), thus according them the priority they arguably deserved all along. Some indeed have argued that the overall decline in violent conflicts since the end of the Cold War is evidence that the UN’s An Agenda for Peace and the embrace of security concerns by the development community have on balance worked, despite all the setbacks and controversy along the way.

But this optimistic picture is still not easy to square with the evidence on the ground. Deadly conflicts continue in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Somalia and new ones have sprung up in Syria, Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. It is arguable in some of these cases that enforced or negotiated peace itself has proved almost as deadly as war. International peacebuilding has brought an end to open conflict but perpetuated structural violence in countries like Kosovo, Timor Leste and the DRC. In the latter, the largest UN peacekeeping operation has stabilised a rotten regime at the centre, but been unable to prevent simmering violence in the country’s Eastern periphery. Even in countries like Mozambique, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone or Nepal, where peacebuilding has ‘worked’ there are still not enough tangible benefits in terms of better governance and development to be sure that peace is durable over the longer run. At the same time, new tides of political and criminal violence have been sweeping into countries previously considered stable, like Mexico or Kenya.

In sum, there seems to be something of a disjuncture between the goals of international engagement and the messy politics of how they translate into practice – or often don’t. This disjuncture raises fundamental questions about the entire security and development enterprise itself. For the latter tends to externalise the sources of insecurity by framing them in terms primarily of violent conflict and state fragility in the developing South and post-communist East. In so doing it tends to deal with symptoms more than causes, including the fundamental global and national inequalities, which make people insecure. Not enough attention is devoted to global drivers of insecurity and how these impact on poor countries and vulnerable people: for instance, through international marketplaces for high value commodities and weapons; through international military interventions and shifting rivalries among existing and rising powers; through regime and militant violence spreading mass displacement of people within and across national boundaries; through imposed adjustment to economic shocks; or through climate change, famine and epidemics. Such neglect is hardly surprising. Directly confronting the global sources of insecurity is not only enormously complex; it is fraught with enormous political difficulty, since it almost invariably involves challenges to the major global centres of power and profit.

16 On ‘new wars’ see Kaldor (1999), Duffield (2001) and Munkler (2005), although they each offer rather different analytical takes.
1.3 Two ‘regimes of truth’: liberal peace or securitisation?

Figure 1.3 depicts how critical analysts have reframed the security–development–human freedom nexus. It offers a pointed contrast to the international community’s more benign triangle summarised in Figure 1.1. In the critical view, the ‘securitisation’ of development, harnesses development policy and practice to the security interests of global powers, as well as to those of elites in developing countries themselves. The mutually reinforcing relationship between security, development and freedom adds up to little more than poor relief (delivered in the form of humanitarian and development assistance) and riot control (via the stabilisation of fragile states). The international ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) those who are exposed to extreme violence (often by their own governments) simply lends legitimacy to international military interventions. These interventions impose double punishment on the poor, who bear the main burden of these interventions and of sanctions imposed on their governments. Promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights in practice is flawed by double standards – being subordinated to alternative international agendas, including the wars on terror and drugs. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding can sometimes establish a temporary peace. But this peace is seldom durable, and can all too easily segue into peace enforcement and counterinsurgency.

**Figure 1.3** The securitisation of development

These two contrasting narratives are spelt out further in Table 1.1. Although they have divergent implications for the policy and practice of development, neither can claim a monopoly of truth. Instead, how they interrelate to each other is much more interesting, as will be argued below.

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20 The most influential statement of this argument remains Duffield (2001), although there is now a substantial critical literature in this vein.
21 The phrase ‘poor relief and riot control’ originates from Cox (1996) and has been used by Duffield (2001) among others to characterise the security–development nexus.
Table 1.1 Two narratives of international engagement: liberal peace or securitisation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal peace</th>
<th>Securitisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security, development and human freedom</td>
<td>Poor relief and riot control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)²²</td>
<td>Double standards: ‘the right to punish’²³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian intervention</td>
<td>Hegemonic ‘new humanitarianism’²⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratisation, good governance</td>
<td>Democracy promotion by force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights, human security</td>
<td>Privatisation, property rights, corporate security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding, statebuilding, stabilisation, political settlements</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency; wars on terror and drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism (UN, NATO, EU)</td>
<td>Coalitions of the willing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Put simply, the issue is how to prevent the otherwise worthy enterprises of development and peacebuilding from degenerating into poor relief and riot control. How can peacebuilders navigate the contested political terrain of peace and security at the same time as confronting the inequalities in wealth and power that security institutions are designed to protect? Exactly when and how are development and security policies and programmes mutually reinforcing? When instead do aid programmes merely feed a few hungry mouths and stabilisation programmes merely uphold corrupt and repressive regimes? How is it possible to ensure that humanitarian interventions are not co-opted by the major international players and do not expose vulnerable people to further cycles of violence? How can it be ensured that humanitarian and development programmes are kept sufficiently separate from security initiatives during situations of acute conflict, so that they do not degenerate just into counterinsurgency?

The two narratives of international engagement are underpinned by two quite distinct approaches to the analysis of security and development, also summarised schematically in Table 1.2. The mainstream accounts, which predominate in the policy literature, are backed up by extensive cross-national research (Collier et al. 2003; Stewart 2008; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007). By and large they regard people and groups who engage in violence as rational actors responding to material opportunities and incentives.²⁵ Development and material progress themselves are seen as the most powerful form of conflict prevention. State fragility is regarded as both a cause and an outcome of blocked development. It is also a major source of political violence. Conversely, security and public order are considered to be key prerequisites of development. Recent research and policy analysis has focused both on stabilisation programmes aimed at re-imposing security and on political settlements aimed at establishing institutions and creating durable forms of political order (Stabilisation Unit 2014; Wilder 2010; Muggah and Jutsonke 2011; Hills 2011). Stabilisation shares some common ground with counterinsurgency, including the use of development programmes to ‘win hearts and minds’, and thus implicitly with the security agendas of international bodies and global powers.

A more critical stream of analysis²⁶ (summarised on the right-hand side of Table 1.2) tends to see violent conflict as inherent in the development enterprise itself, arising from the accumulation strategies pursued by political and economic elites and their corporate allies

²³ Mamdani (2010).
²⁴ Duffield (2001).
²⁵ For critiques of the methodological assumptions of this research see Cramer (2002) and Cramer and Goodhand (2011).
and international backers. It also tends to draw upon a somewhat different pool of research findings, much of it in the form of detailed case studies and ethnographies, in contrast to the large-n cross-national statistical studies often favoured by the mainstream. It harks back to a significant earlier tradition of analysis on structural violence (Galtung 1969), especially when focusing on vertical and horizontal inequalities as major determinants of conflict. It is not state fragility alone that is identified as the main source of insecurity, but also the state itself, especially when its security policies are repressive; its development programmes are top-down and extractive; and its structures are unresponsive to the needs of the poor and marginalised. In this perspective security and stability are not prioritised as ends in themselves. The focus is rather upon tackling the inequalities in wealth and power that lie at the root of conflicts. Instead of counting on international actors and national elites to change things, more emphasis is placed on the struggles and agency of those most exposed to poverty and violence (which will be returned to in more detail in Sections 5.3 and 5.4).

Table 1.2  The development–security nexus: synergistic or contradictory?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development as conflict prevention</th>
<th>‘A violence called development’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developmentisation of security</td>
<td>Securitisation of development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict is development in reverse</td>
<td>Conflict is a mode of accumulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict destroys social capital</td>
<td>Conflict is a potential site of innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence stems from economic incentives</td>
<td>Violence is structural and linked to inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War economies distort formal economies</td>
<td>War can revitalise informal economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence is increasingly identity-based</td>
<td>Violent encounters with modernity polarise identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State fragility is a major source of insecurity and violent conflict</td>
<td>‘Seeing like a state’ is itself a source of mal-development, inequality and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security and public order are preconditions for development</td>
<td>National security consolidates the grip of military, political and economic elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilisation and statebuilding</td>
<td>Subaltern resistance and unruly politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation encourages both development and security</td>
<td>Globalisation has a backlash; including networked, asymmetric wars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 See also Scott (1987, 1992) and Watts (2013).
2 Transforming the theory and practice of security

2.1 The two faces of security

Security is a highly necessary but also deeply problematic and contested concept. In principle, it is both a global and a national public good. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in its name are supposed to ensure the safety and welfare of citizens and human beings in a world of multiple challenges and threats. There is a tendency to slide from global, to national, to citizen and human security and back again, without much serious reflection on how they interconnect and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear enough understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong.

There is a central tension between the two narratives of security referred to earlier and spelt out in more detail in Table 2.1. On the one hand, security can be seen (on the supply side) as a process of political and social ordering, territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. Much like official or donor-driven development,\textsuperscript{28} it is a public good delivered in principle by states. Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative non-state or 'hybrid' networks of violence and protection (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009; Mac Ginty 2010; Luckham and Kirk 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. It largely protects socially embedded power, established property relations and social privilege – and thus reinforces global, national and local inequalities.

On the other hand, security can be seen (on the demand side and in the vernacular) as an entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to protection from violence, abuses of rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is used here rather than the interlinked conceptions of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development (viz. Table 1.1) by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses,\textsuperscript{29} and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states, even if the critique applies less to the concepts themselves than to how and by whom they have been deployed. Human and citizen security have tended to be tucked away in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and indeed intervention forces. ‘Security in the vernacular’ places greater stress on the understanding and agency of those who are secured. Furthermore, it highlights the transformative potential of security as an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by citizen groups, activists and social movements seeking redress for insecurity, exclusion and injustice.

\textsuperscript{28} Viz. the critiques made from varying political and methodological stances of development as ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott 1998), as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1990) and as the ‘tyranny of experts’ (Easterly 2014).

\textsuperscript{29} See Duffield and Wadell (2004), who share a certain amount of ground with the critiques made by more mainstream analyses such as Paris (2001) of human security as being too widely defined to be a useful concept. Jolly and Basu Ray (2007) provide a strong defence of the concept and its relevance to development concerns.
### Table 2.1 The two faces of security: a necessary but highly contested concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supply side</th>
<th>Demand side</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Seeing like a state’. Security as a process of political and social ordering maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of power</td>
<td>‘Security in the vernacular’. Security as an entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to protection from violence and other existential risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political power, legitimate violence and public authority are of the essence, globally as well as nationally</td>
<td>Security intertwines with other entitlements, including freedom from hunger and disease, protection from environmental hazards, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security is territorially bounded within states, regions, urban spaces, local communities</td>
<td>Security is ontological and tied to the construction of identities and of imagined communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable and accountable state and local institutions, notably security and justice institutions</td>
<td>Rights, legitimacy and consent are central; the state is the problem as much as the solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Seeing like a corporation’; stabilising existing distributions of power and prosperity</td>
<td>Transformation of conditions creating insecurity, including bad governance and social exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality, including unequal security, tends to be inherent</td>
<td>Social and political inclusion, in terms of gender, class, faiths, minorities, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both states and the international community have a ‘responsibility to protect’: but how and to whom are they accountable?</td>
<td>Who speaks security and to whom? The voices and the agency of the poor, vulnerable, marginalised and oppressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action is essential yet politically contested and problematic, not least globally</td>
<td>Security from below. Subaltern politics, social movements and civil society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).\(^{33}\) It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens (even in established democracies); or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.\(^{34}\)

The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, it is perfectly possible that such

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30 See Scott (1998) and Ferguson (1990) on how state policies and programmes tend to diminish popular participation.
31 As one often finds when claiming originality for a concept (Luckham and Kirk 2013a), searches made in the course of this paper came across other authors who have used the same term: see Bubandt (2005) and Jarvis and Lister (2013).
32 See Ferguson (2005) on ‘seeing like an oil company’.
33 Tanzania’s disastrous villagisation policy is one of Scott’s (1998) most telling examples.
34 Ferguson (2005) argues that there is an inherent tension between corporate security and seeing like a state, in that the protection of corporations in enclave or rentier economies is not only compatible with weak statehood, but may actively contribute to the latter. See also the extensive literature on resource-rich rentier states, for instance Kaldor, Karl and Said’s (2007) analysis of oil wars.
local-level insecurities may persist or even be aggravated even when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable or a locality is considered to be secure.

Neither of these two faces of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract (Leonard 2013; Leonard and Samantar 2011). That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they should be. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of social order, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both affairs of governance and vital concerns for everyone who lives under the leaky umbrella of political authority. Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law and effective and accountable security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects conditions of citizen security. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but also because citizens and their representatives have to remain vigilant to ensure their rights are not ignored, or even worse, violated by those who are supposed to protect them.

In principle, the gap between security demand and security supply is mediated in the political marketplaces of democracy. But political marketplaces are highly imperfect, even in the so-called advanced democracies, and democratic accountability hardly ever extends beyond national boundaries. International agencies and donors promote security sector reform programmes in post-conflict and transitional countries precisely in order to plug their democratic control deficits (Cawthra and Luckham 2003). But this tends to be a task of Sisyphus in political marketplaces where the currencies of power are patronage, corruption and outright violence (De Waal 2009), which both suborn and bypass the state and its formal security institutions. Moreover, it is not as if donors themselves are in any way accountable to those they are supposed to be delivering from poverty and violence. The democratic deficits of donor agencies along with international institutions, global corporations, major powers, peacekeepers and even international NGOs are vast, even if seldom sufficiently discussed.³⁵

2.2 The challenges of rethinking security in the vernacular

How does security appear when turned on its head and looked at from the viewpoint of the people who are secured, including those who find themselves beyond the vanishing point of officially delivered security?³⁶ The World Bank’s Voices of the Poor study identified personal safety and security as amongst the most pressing concerns of poor people themselves.³⁷ However, by pre-framing its questions around standardised categories (like ‘social exclusion’, ‘gender’ and indeed ‘security’) it tended to undermine its own premise that people living in conditions of poverty are the true experts in poverty (Participate 2012: 4–6; Blattman and Miguel 2010). ‘Security in the vernacular’ in contrast underscores that those who are vulnerable and insecure are not just social categories but people, groups and communities who respond to, cope with and challenge the social conditions which make them vulnerable and insecure.

Such an approach harmonises with recent shifts in analysis away from a narrow focus on the causation of civil wars, on the motivations of rebels and on the impacts on aggregate indicators of economic performance towards a more complex multi-causal, multi-level story.³⁸

³⁵ See Autesserre (2014). Certain international NGOs, however, have been more open to critical reflection upon their mandates and relationships to the constituencies they serve than other international actors.
³⁶ Vanishing points, according to Nordstrom (2010: 163) ‘are the points where the normative (what should be) intersects with reality (what actually is)’. These vanishing points are defined by those who have the discursive power to do so, rendering large numbers of people (especially women) invisible as far as the state institutions and formal economies are concerned.
³⁷ See Narayan et al. (1996: 2), where ‘security is lacking in the sense of both protection and peace of mind’ is identified as one of the most important concerns of poor people.
³⁸ As pioneered in the work of scholars like Kalyvas (2006), Cramer (2007) and Wood (2003). The Households in Conflict Network (HCN) has assembled a wide range of studies of different local-level forms of violence: see
This broader approach recognises significant differences among forms of violence. And it focuses on how a wide range of people and groups engage in, are affected by and respond to these many violences, which in addition to civil wars include (Schultze-Kraft 2014; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014; Ruteere et al. 2013; Gupte and Bogati 2014; Gupte, te Lintelo and Barnett 2014; Oosterhoff, Mills and Osterom 2014):

- Globally and regionally networked violence, linked to transnational ideologies, notably Islamic militancy (ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, etc.).
- Transnational criminal violence linked to commerce in drugs and other high value goods, networking around states and reconfiguring established power relations (Central America, parts of West Africa, Afghanistan, etc.).
- Organised one-sided state violence targeted against citizens, especially dissenters and minorities (Chechnya, Zimbabwe and in an extreme form North Korea; as well as Syria and Libya prior to the current upheavals).
- Violence arising out of everyday encounters with both formal law enforcers (military, police) and informal authorities (traditional leaders, urban bosses, drug lords).
- Violence subcontracted to paramilitaries, militias, mercenaries, etc. in unsecured borderlands (Sudan, Pakistan, Colombia, etc.).
- Natural resource violence linked to youth exclusion, rent-seeking and crime (Niger Delta, Sierra Leone, DRC, Colombia).
- Violence linked to ethnic cleansing, forced migration and human trafficking, as in the Balkans and currently in South-East Asia and the Mediterranean.
- Agrarian revolts and peasant uprisings (Nepal, Peru, Zimbabwe and Mozambique).
- Violence in urban spaces, linked to exclusion, lack of services, crime, failures of policing (Mumbai, Nairobi, Cape Town).
- Recurring cycles of electoral and political violence (Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan).
- Vigilantism and similar forms of community-based or religious enforcement.
- Gender-based, domestic and homophobic violence, often linked to and reinforcing a range of other exclusions.
- Structural or silent violence (Galtung 1969 and Watts 2013)39 – including the marginalisation from power and wealth of those who lack access to the means of violence.

Not all these forms of violence fit within accepted definitions of civil war or even violent conflict. Some are networked across national and regional boundaries. Some are mutually interconnecting, as in the case of the multiple links between gender-based violence and other forms of violence. Local-level vigilantism and other community mechanisms for policing behaviour and punishing transgressions can sometimes create an enabling environment for far wider political and inter-communal violence, as in the Central African Republic (Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi 2015) and North-East Nigeria. Conversely, protracted state repression and violence targeted against citizens may create the conditions in which armed revolt and civil war ultimately become more likely, as in Syria and Libya.

Ordinary people in these violent contexts experience, perceive and talk about security in ways that differ, sometimes radically, both from the dominant state security narratives, and indeed from universal conceptions of human and citizen security. Among the Acholi, for instance, piny maber (‘good surroundings’) has its own particular resonances of time and

www.hicn.org/wordpress/?page_id=28. The majority of these have concentrated on their impacts upon development and poverty, rather than on the perceptions, resilience and agency of poor and vulnerable people — although more recent work has focused on the latter as well: viz. Justino (2015).

39 The concept of structural violence (like the more capacious versions of human security) has been criticised for conceptual overstretch – aggregating a wide range of socioeconomic inequalities that may or may not be related to direct, physical violence, under a single conceptual umbrella. Yet it can usefully be narrowed down in the way suggested above – to forms of exclusion kept in place by the established structures of power, wealth, violence and, indeed, security.
place in the context of the violence in Northern Uganda.\textsuperscript{40} In Egypt the words \textit{arən} and \textit{amaan} are both used to denote security. The latter in particular includes notions of personal safety, which extend beyond conventional definitions of security. A recent study by Tadros (2015) found it was used to cover at least nine different forms of (in)security, amongst them security from state retribution and violence; absence of identity-based exclusion and discrimination; (among women) freedom from sexual harassment; everyday safety from criminal and terrorist violence; and hopes for the future including improved relationships among the country’s different faith communities. Absence of law and order, with the state described as ‘\textit{al dawla mekhala’a}’ (‘disjointed like a piece of broken furniture’) during the upheavals of recent years, was a central fear expressed by many of those interviewed.

In a multi-country study of local-level peacebuilding, Justino, Mitchell and Müller (forthcoming) found that definitions of ‘peace’ varied significantly between most men and most women. The majority of the participants in this study – women in particular – perceived peace beyond physical security, to encompass economic security, the absence of violence and tensions within the household and immediate social circles, and the ability to avoid local confrontations. Women defined peace around household concerns, with the most common requirements for ‘peace’ centred around the fulfilment of basic human rights: access to education, access to food, access to livelihood opportunities and the reduction of conflicts with spouses (including domestic violence) and within the family. Men’s definitions of peace often mentioned similar dimensions, but their priorities were more broadly defined, associating peace with community security, political stability at the regional and national level, and with infrastructure and livelihood development opportunities (in particular for younger men). This definition offered by male respondents is in line with common understandings of peace in international and national interventions around peacebuilding processes. The definitions put forward by women refer more to daily tangible welfare outcomes.

Security is a central concern even for those who find themselves beyond the reach of the state and its security and justice agencies, seen as remote from their day-to-day concerns, or who actively avoid state agencies because they are seen as an oppressive presence. This is well captured in the language used by marginalised women labourers and sex-workers in South Kivu when they said ‘\textit{hawatuoni siisi wafupi}’, that they (big men, powerful people), don’t “see” us short people (the impoverished marginalised populations)’ (Kelly, King-Close and Perks 2014: 8).

The security landscape of ‘short people’ tends to be inhabited not only by agents of state security, but also by powerful employers of their labour and many other actors. Some of these actors operate beyond the margins of state authority or indeed are violently opposed to it: warlords, religious militants, guerrillas, paramilitaries, mafias, vigilantes, traditional authorities, secret societies, community protection bodies and many others (Baker 2010; Hellweg 2009; Fanthorpe 2005; Jackson 2013). In sum, security along with justice and public authority is often negotiated outside the state rather than within it,\textsuperscript{41} and is characterised by various forms of hybrid security provision in which state and non-state security providers interact or indeed are hard to tell apart.\textsuperscript{42} This is the day-to-day reality, which great numbers of people have to live with, often at some cost to their own personal safety, rights and welfare.

Indeed there is a veritable cacophony of vernaculars, strung together by many shared threads of history and webs of identity. A major challenge for researchers and policymakers

\textsuperscript{40} As contrasted with the \textit{piry marac} (‘bad surroundings’) of war and displacement according to Finnstrom (2008: 10–11).

\textsuperscript{41} On negotiated state authority in African conflict situations see Hagmann and Péclard (2010).

\textsuperscript{42} Boege \textit{et al.} (2009), Mac Ginty (2010), Luckham and Kirk (2013b), Bagayoko and Luckham (forthcoming) and Meagher (2012), who in particular stresses the potentially violent and repressive dimensions of non-state security provision.
 alike is how to listen and respond to the great variety of ways people navigate the terrains of war and violence and conceive their own security (Vigh 2006; Luckham and Kirk 2013a: 17–19). They can now draw upon a much larger and more diverse array of empirical research than was available two or three decades ago (Burns 2012; Justino, Leavy and Valli 2009; Chambers 2007; Nyamnjoh 2006). First of all there is a substantial pool of studies based upon participant observation and action research on how vulnerable people and groups are affected by and respond to violence-induced insecurity, impoverishment, disease and displacement (Leavy and Howard 2013; Justino et al. 2012a; McGee 2014). This is backed up by several quantitative studies including time series analyses based on livelihood and household surveys detailing how conflict and political violence affect the everyday lives of local people and communities. In addition, a range of in-depth ethnographic studies and local histories detail how particular groups navigate the terrains of war and peace: including studies of child soldiers, urban youths, women combatants, ‘bush wives’ and camp-followers; of refugees, displaced people and marginalised communities; of residents in urban neighbourhoods coping with gangs, drug dealing and ethnic or religious violence; of rebels, irregulars and ex-combatants; of vigilantes and informal, non-state policing and justice bodies.

Making sense of these diverse streams of research poses multiple challenges. First, the difficulty of triangulating findings from studies, which take different methodological routes, are of varying rigour and are linked to different analytical and policy concerns (Chambers 2007; McGee and Pearce 2009; Luckham and Kirk 2013b: 17–20). Moreover, vernacular narratives themselves are replete with their own biases, elisions and erasures. The growing number of studies of ex-combatants, rebels and other direct participants in violence provides valuable insights into why (mostly) men rebel and how they can be demobilised. Yet it privileges their viewpoint and may divert post-conflict funding from those in local communities who have not engaged in violence. The narratives of those who are most marginalised – for example, submerged minorities, victims of sexual violence, and women carers who have assumed the burdens of looking after the injured, sick, elderly and displaced (Justino et al. 2012b; McKay and Mazurana 2004) – tend to be harder to trace, all the more when silenced by violence itself.

One must also reckon with the political and social biases of popular framings of security. Repressive national security policies or mano duro policing methods sometimes enjoy wide popular support, especially in conditions of political upheaval as in Egypt, or criminal violence as in a number of countries in Latin America. Popular policing of religious morality and lifestyle, be it by Islamist hisba (Berridge 2013; Adamu 2008) or charismatic churches, often fits within a context of state-approved curbs on the rights of women and intolerance of ‘deviant’ sexuality. Popular prejudices and religious bigotry intertwine in assaults on the bodies, homes and livelihoods of minorities like the Yezidi in Iraq, Hazara in Afghanistan, or Rohingya in Myanmar. Deep-rooted conceptions of popular justice based on exemplary punishment of offenders can transform vigilantism into political violence when social order breaks down, as in the Central African Republic (Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi 2015).

All this reinforces the case for better-informed, more realistic analyses of how ordinary people understand security, which take account of its multiple and frequently contradictory meanings. It is important to probe behind dominant understandings to uncover what Scott (1992) calls the ‘hidden transcripts’ of those most vulnerable to poverty, exploitation and

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43 Challenging the assumption that large-scale or rigorous large-n research is not possible in conflict-affected or insecure environments. See Justino et al. (2009); Justino (2015); Justino, Leone and Salardi (2013); Justino, Bruck and Verwimp (2013); Urdal and Hoelscher (2009).


45 As the study by Tadros (2015) already cited suggests.
violence. Often they have a better grasp of their own situation than is commonly supposed. A case in point is the sex-workers and other women working in and around artisanal mines in South Kivu referred to above, who formed the Association of Free Women, which helped them to gain access to health care, to withstand financial shocks and to receive social support from their peers (Kelly, King-Close and Perks 2014). Some marginalised groups, such as disenfranchised urban and rural youths in Nigeria, have channelled their energies into more explicitly ‘insurgent constructions’ (within ethnic militias, area boy associations, Yandaba, secret societies, cult groups and the like), which challenge yet often eventually come to reflect a corrupt public realm (Gore and Pratten 2003). (Boko Haram, issuing from similar disenfranchisement, may be a significant exception in making a sustained, highly visible and very violent challenge to the entire edifice of public and indeed religious authority in North-East Nigeria).

Local knowledge is at the core of security in the vernacular. National and international policymakers ignore it at their peril. As Abramowitz has argued in regard to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, deep local understanding is needed for a whole range of reasons: to improve baseline data, including counting of the dead; to draw on actionable local ideas, for example about burial methods or reducing the risks of bodily contact; to tap local initiatives and capabilities; and to render visible the invisible power relations constraining or in alternatively facilitating collective action to contain the outbreak. Similar reasoning applies to security and justice provision, where questions of local ownership and community-led initiatives are at the forefront of policymaking, but for the most part remain unimplemented without much better understanding of local contexts.

By itself, however, vernacular understanding is not enough. Whilst the dramas of insecurity and violence play out at grass roots, they are shaped to a significant extent by hierarchies of power, by political marketplaces and by economic transactions extending far beyond the local level. To be sure, those who face immiseration and insecurity in their own day-to-day lives may be well aware that their situation hangs on events and social forces far beyond their reach. All the more in a world in which the new media extend far and wide: to the legendary ‘Arab street’; to urban youths and social activists; to local elites and disaffected young people in small towns and remote villages; and indeed to the religious militants, armed insurgents and criminal elements exploiting the vulnerability of such groups.

Yet rarely do those most at risk have access to the information and analytical tools that could make empirical or indeed political sense of these remote determinants of their insecurities. Their access to information and ability to mobilise for change is mediated by many gatekeepers – international media organisations; national and local elites, intelligence and propaganda apparatuses, the rumour mills of populist politicians and media outlets, the sermons and public pronouncements of clerics, imams and religious militants, the blogs and social media postings of social activists or, alternatively, those who advocate terror and exemplary violence. Very few of these are reliable interlocutors; mostly they frame insecurity through their own particular political frames; and seldom are they in any way accountable.

There is a wide gap between this shared understanding that local, national and global insecurities somehow interconnect and our capacity to explain and communicate the variety of ways they do so. Not much of the research on the macro-level determinants of insecurity, such as natural resource dependence, poor governance, horizontal inequalities, or the commerce in small arms and drugs, spells out their impacts on the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable people, still less touches upon the latter’s own perceptions of their insecurity.

46 Abramowitz 2015. However, she puts this forward as an argument for making better use of anthropological knowledge, rather than as a more specific case for bringing to bear the vernacular understandings of insecure people themselves. See also a more comprehensive analysis by Wilkinson and Leach (2015), which links the Ebola outbreak to issues of governance and structural violence.
And, conversely, not much of the micro-level research on how people are affected by and respond to insecurity traces the causal connections and lines of accountability back up to the national, still less global and regional levels.

In the gaps in between these levels of explanation it is easy for what Autesserre (2012) calls ‘dangerous narratives’ to flourish. On the one hand, these include causal stories that elevate one particular global determinant of insecurity, like conflicts over natural resources over others that may be more directly relevant to particular national and local circumstances. On the other hand, they encompass narratives, which privilege the plight of one particular set of local-level victims, for instance those experiencing sexual violence, over the determinants of the violence from which all suffer. Her point is not that either of these narratives is necessarily wrong. Rather it is that they tend to be given priority by international analysts and policymakers without serious enough empirical interrogation of how they play out in particular national and local contexts and who is most at risk.

Filling these gaps raises serious methodological as well as policy issues. A multi-level approach is essential yet difficult, as it presents serious methodological as well as policy problems. It is notoriously difficult to shift register between different geographical and analytical scales. Vernacular understandings can only take us so far. In principle, the gaps could be filled by research, which makes a point of following the causal trail from local-level conflicts and insecurities to their wider national, regional and global determinants. But at some point these causal trails tend to run out or to become over-determined by the multiplicity of potential explanatory factors at each level.

Relatively few studies in the existing research literature seriously attempt to spell out the empirical connections between local and national sources of conflict and security. Even fewer try to investigate the local–global or local–national–global interconnections. There is an apparent drought of participatory or ethnographic research linking insecurity in ordinary people’s lives to the global changes which shape it. A handful of studies, however, link local histories of conflict and insecurity to their national and global historical settings (Chauveau and Richards 2008; Vlassenroot and Kleipe 2013; North et al. 2012; Besley and Persson 2011). Chauveau and Richards (2008), for instance, trace back divergent motivations of fighters in the civil wars in two specific regions in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone to varying trajectories of agrarian change during the colonial and post-colonial periods, which in one case involved reliance upon migrant labour and in the other case created an excluded agrarian underclass (see also Cramer and Richards 2011).

But until more empirical research becomes available, the best one can do is to make rough and ready reality checks, drawing upon what we know about the vernacular understandings and life situations of vulnerable and exploited people. For instance (to draw on examples already discussed), what would need to change nationally and globally as well as locally to better protect women who service the needs of men in Congolese mining villages; or Coptic Christians who face day-to-day threats to their personal safety; or members of the Hazara minority in Afghanistan who are at risk from sectarian and political violence? How can members of local communities impoverished or endangered by extractive industries, corporate support for paramilitaries or drug-based violence identify and insist on some accountability from the global architects as well as the local perpetrators of their insecurity? Are security sector reform programmes in fragile or post-conflict countries like DRC, Sierra Leone or Nepal designed so as to tangibly improve citizens’ day-to-day security, rather than merely financing the lifestyles of donor agencies and security elites? Do humanitarian

interventions undertaken under the banner of the ‘responsibility to protect’ actually protect
the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable people in countries such as Afghanistan or Libya – or
do they make them even more insecure? In principle, the answers to such questions should
be evidence-based. But even where the evidence is incomplete or the links in local-to-
national-to-global causal chains cannot easily be traced, the questions are well worth posing.

2.3 Identity-based violence, hierarchies of citizenship and the
politics of inclusion

Recent events in the Arab world, the Horn of Africa, the West African Sahel and elsewhere
reinforce the importance of insecurities associated with what is termed identity-based
conflict. According to the ‘new wars’ narrative, the mobilisation of ethnic, religious and
sectarian identities can be seen as a response to the global dislocations outlined in Section
1.1 (Kaldor 1999; Munkler 2005). People and groups fall back on their identities when their
own cultural understandings of the world begin to fail them; when they are challenged by
acute uncertainties about their safety and livelihoods; when states are unable to provide
public goods including security; and when secular ideologies, including development itself,
come under challenge.

Persuasive as these arguments might seem, they are broad brush and still lack firm empirical
support. We need much better understanding of how identities are negotiated at multiple
levels (of gender, age, clan, tribe, caste, sect, faith, ethnicity, class, race and nation); of how
they form the basis for ‘imagined communities’; of how they are deployed as political
resources; and of how they become markers of security and signifiers for violence.

Identities are jointly constructed as conceptual frames through which people construct their
social selves and navigate their personal worlds and as discourses through which power is
imagined and communicated. This duality governs how identities are mobilised for politics
and violence. It also makes identities junction points at which vernacular and state-centred
understandings of security both intersect and clash.

On the one hand, identities are central to people’s sense of selfhood, bodily integrity,
wellbeing and safety. They provide grammatical constructions through which people imagine
their social worlds, articulate their fears, demarcate their security and respond to and
sometimes organise for violence. On the other hand, identities are called upon by the
powerful; they are written into the structures of nation states; and they form the basis for
horizontal inequalities and establish hierarchies of citizenship. This duality is fundamental
to an understanding of identity-based violence. Rather than being in any simple sense a
‘cause’ of insecurity and violence in their own right, identities are fluid, socially constructed at
multiple levels and open to manipulation, especially in conditions of rapid change and
insecurity.

Gender straddles both of these aspects of identity, of which it is a central building block. As
described earlier, most women’s security priorities tend to be distinct from those of most
men. Concerns over bodily integrity and personal safety from sexual harassment and sexual
violence crop up again and again in research studies in many different national contexts.
More is at issue than sexual violence itself. Sexual violence diminishes the shared sense of
citizenship, and connects to a range of other exclusions, for instance inequalities in women’s

49 See also the critique by Kalyvas (2001).
50 The analysis here draws both on Anderson (2006) and Enloe (1980). The latter provides a penetrating analysis of how
governments and national security elites deploy ‘ethnic state security cognitive maps’ constructing identities as tools of national
security.
51 On horizontal inequalities see Stewart (2008); Brown and Langer (2010); Ostby (2007).
52 Although it is not just a concern for women, as studies of male rape and sexual violence against members of LGBT
communities have shown – Boesten (2014); Garcia-Moreno (2010).
access to land and other forms of property, inheritance rights, legal remedies, freedom of movement and political participation. It also tends to be especially prevalent when women and others begin to challenge the unwritten rules of society, for instance in times of political upheaval and war (Nordstrom 2010: 168–9).

Gendered exclusions can also themselves function as markers of other cultural and political identities – being part of what is used to distinguish one particular religious faith, sect, ethnic group, caste or clan from others. Conversely, studies of sexual assault in war situations and in protest spaces describe how it is used as an instrument of intimidation and control (see Baaz and Stern 2009; Banwell 2014; Trenholm et al. 2013; Cummings 2011; Tonnessen 2014; Branche and Virgili 2013 and Marks 2014) – to diminish, degrade and dehumanise not just women, but the nations, communities and faiths to which they belong.

The use of sexual violence to intimidate and control is linked as well to the social construction of masculinity and its use to consolidate hierarchies of power and security. Nowhere is this more so than in military and security institutions themselves. These institutions tend to be the most highly gendered institutions of the state, in terms of their recruitment patterns, their bonding rituals, tolerance of sexual abuse and reinforcement of divisions of labour in which women are assigned marginalised support roles. A still enduring historical legacy of the forging of states through centuries of war-making has been the masculinisation of the entire fabric of state power and thus of state security. This masculinisation still profoundly shapes how state-delivered development as well as state-delivered security is thought about and practised, especially in a world in which violence and its control remain key concerns of state and international policy.

The relationships between masculinities, power and violence are by no means confined to states and their military and security institutions. Insurgent groups like Da’esh (ISIS) have recruited women and solicited their support for exclusive ideologies in which women’s subordination to the goals of Islamism and other struggles are openly pursued. By and large the literature on ‘non-state’ armed bodies suggests that they tend to be just as much focused around the violent appropriation of power, just as heavily gendered and if anything more prone to gender-based violence than their formal counterparts (Wood 2006; Weinstein 2006). All the more so, it seems, when these armed groups fight under the flag of religion or ethnic identity. It was once thought that armed liberation struggles were in contrast less prone to patriarchy, and indeed sometimes opened spaces for women’s participation. However, these spaces have tended to be transitory, as analyses of the re-marginalisation of women in post-revolutionary situations like Eritrea have shown (Sørensen 1998). Moreover, post-conflict periods have often been marred by harsh legacies of increased domestic violence, further contributing to women’s re-marginalisation (Date-Bah 2003; Calderon, Gafaro and Ibanez 2011).

All the same, ethnic, religious, sectarian and other identities along with the ideologies assembled around them are not just conjured into being by opportunistic politicians, false prophets and war-mongers. They matter enormously to great numbers of people. If they did not matter, they would not translate into the currency of political power and could not be used to mobilise people into violence. Moreover, violence itself tends to solidify identities, translating people’s own ways of navigating their social worlds into fear and hatred of others. In Bosnia, Lebanon, Syria, Rwanda, Somalia and many other countries, intertwined

53 On the deployment of sexual violence in protest contexts see Oosterhoff, Mills and Oosterom (2014) and Tadros (2015).
54 The work of Enloe (2000, 2007) (see also Cohn 1993, 2003) has been especially insightful in calling attention to the interconnections between globalisation, militarism, masculinities and the gendered construction of security.
55 The literature on identity-based conflict is extensive. A useful brief introduction to the issues is McLean Hilker (2009); see also Luckham, Moncrieffe and Harris (2006). Stewart (2009) compares ethnicity and religion as sources of mobilisation for politics and conflict. A comprehensive quantitative analysis of interconnections between inequality, identities and violent conflicts is to be found in Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013).
communities, faiths, sects and clans, which have lived together, cooperated and sometimes intermarried, have found themselves cast into mutually reinforcing cycles of acute violence and insecurity.

At the same time, identities are woven into the ways state power is asserted, the ways nations are imagined and the ways hierarchies of security and citizenship are formed within and between states. In the modern world citizenship is in principle inclusive, being constructed around equal rights and common security. In practice citizenship may involve various forms of state-sanctioned exclusion: against migrants and refugees; against faith groups who do not fully subscribe to secular conceptions of citizenship; against minorities like Rohingya in Burma, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Hazara in Afghanistan, Tibetans in China and Sunni Muslims in Iraq, who are seen as less fully citizens and less deserving of the protection of the state than members of ethnic, linguistic or religious majorities.

Enloe has analysed how political and security elites in colonial states and in their post-colonial successors have deployed ethnic and religious identities: to ensure the loyalty of their security apparatuses; to establish which citizens and groups can be trusted; and to demarcate those who are seen as potential threats.\textsuperscript{56} Ethnic profiling by the police, for example, is widespread even in relatively democratic and inclusive societies. Many authoritarian regimes hardwire exclusionary policies and practices into the framework of the state itself. Latent identity conflicts remain suppressed until the regimes begin to fracture, bringing the entire framework of public authority into question, as in Syria, Libya, ex-Yugoslavia or early 1990s Somalia. Nevertheless, identity politics, hierarchies of citizenship and exclusionary security policies are also present in many democracies, such as Malaysia, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, becoming especially oppressive when combined with majoritarian politics, which has a built-in tendency to discount the rights and aspirations of minorities.\textsuperscript{57}

It is not states on their own that establish hierarchies of unequal citizenship and security. These hierarchies also tend to be historically rooted in long-term horizontal inequalities (Nyamnjoh 2006; Brown and Langer 2010). They often have active champions rooted deep in civil society, be they Buddhist monks, Islamic clerics or militant secularists refusing to respect differences. Hierarchies and webs of identity extend down to the most local level. They tend to be embedded in traditional structures and in hybrid forms of security provision, like customary courts, non-state policing, vigilantes and community protection bodies, which tend to be better at protecting the rights of local elites than minorities or migrant ‘strangers’ (Bagayoko and Luckham forthcoming). Governments and ruling elites subcontract violence to ethnic, regional and sectarian militias when they face local rebellion and their own security forces are insufficient or fail as in Sudan or Iraq – with notably divisive and violent consequences.\textsuperscript{58}

How people experience violence and insecurity is thus shaped by constantly evolving patterns of social differentiation, including gender, age, class, locality, religion, ethnicity, race, etc. – and by the ways that these are transformed by violence itself. Multiple intersecting identities influence how people and groups perceive, cope with and mitigate their insecurity. The reality is that the benefits of security and the burdens of insecurity tend to be unequally shared. Those who feel most marginalised tend to lack the quality and substance of citizenship, as well as being most exposed to violence.

These intersections between multiple identities, exclusion and violence are explored by a growing body of empirical research (Tadros 2012a, 2012b; Oosterom 2014; Oosterom and Lloyd 2014; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014): for instance, on the interactions between religious

\textsuperscript{56} Enloe (1980) remains just as pertinent now on the ethnic politics of states and their security bureaucracies as it was in 1980.

\textsuperscript{57} As analysed by Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003); and Luckham (2011).

\textsuperscript{58} In Iraq the replacement of the fractured army by Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi Shia militias is bound to make the campaign against Da’esh even more divisive and likely to alienate Sunnis.
identity and age in Egypt; on the everyday experience of sexual and other violence by women belonging to marginalised ethnicities in South Sudan; on Zimbabwean youths who are disproportionately both the targets and perpetrators of political violence; and on ethnic groups that have found themselves marginalised in Kenya’s post-colonial political settlement, being exposed to ongoing violence over cattle and land, as well as deprived of public services including state protection and responsiveness to violent incidents.

Identities tend also to be woven into how state power is contested by subaltern groups. Decentralised webs of solidarity work across and around the formal structures of the state, and can be drawn upon to challenge it in times of crisis. They can also connect local pockets of dissent to wider national and indeed global networks. Links between diasporas and local communities have sustained many an insurgency. But they have also been used to broker peace, to channel remittances and to finance local development activities in unstable environments. Armed movements and sectarian or ethnic militias, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Houthi militias in Yemen, Da'esh in Iraq and Syria, shifting coalitions of Tuareg and Islamist fighters in Mali and the Sahel, or until recently the LTTE in Sri Lanka, have drawn upon them to mobilise support, define the targets of their violence and assert control over people and territory.

Identities can also become the sociopolitical frame for transnationally or regionally networked violence. Much indeed has been made of the globalised networks, which link militants to terrorism, international crime and other international security threats. Religion, for instance Salafist versions of Islam, has spun the ideological threads that are stitching militant networks together. Religion in general (and not just political Islam) is arguably unique amongst markers of identity in its claims to universality – making it easier for militants to forge alliances across regions and continents and to challenge secular conceptions of citizenship in a variety of different national contexts.\(^\text{59}\) It tends to be all the more powerful because it can inflect other grievances and provide a language through which conceptions of violated social justice can be translated into calls for political action and be used to justify violence.

Yet one must be highly cautious about elevating the ideological constructs of particular militant groups into wider threats that have any serious global traction. Too much attention has been paid to the dramatisation of extreme violence in the social media to intimidate and recruit. Stereotypes flourish and Muslims in particular find themselves demonised.\(^\text{60}\) Moreover, the propaganda of the violent deed is as much practised by states, including global powers, as it is by terrorists.\(^\text{61}\)

Much of the militant violence is sectarian and has been directed against states, which themselves pursue deeply sectarian agendas as well, as in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Above all, one should not forget that the main victims of militant violence are not the citizens of Western states, but the civilian populations that extremists target and the minority groups, whose history and peoples they seek to obliterate\(^\text{62}\) like the Yezidi in Iraq, Hazara in Afghanistan or Sufis and Christians in Pakistan and parts of the Middle East.

Hence sober assessment is required of the historical situations in which trans-national networks arise and of what if anything holds them together. The alliances proclaimed by

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\(^\text{59}\) On the differences between ethnic and religious identities as the basis for political and conflict mobilisation see Stewart (2009).

\(^\text{60}\) Mamdani (2004) provides an especially powerful statement of the case that Muslims are being unfairly demonised for violence. Moreover, Christian militias in the Balkans and Lebanon and Buddhist monks and militants in Sri Lanka and Burma have been deeply involved in identity-based violence – although their transnational links are perhaps less extensive than those of some Muslim militants.

\(^\text{61}\) Viz. the dramaturgy of drone strikes against Bin Laden and other terrorists, as well as bombings of Da'esh-controlled areas in Syria. Both of the Gulf Wars and the intervention in Afghanistan were as much media as military campaigns.

\(^\text{62}\) Not to speak of the large numbers of civilians who have been made victims of deliberately targeted killings, abductions and rape.
jihadis and other militants across regions and continents tend to run far ahead of any real capacity for joint operations. Flows of money, militants and weapons help to spread the fires of insurrection across whole regions, like the borderlands between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, swathes of the Middle East and the Sahel. Yet the alliances stitched together among militant groups tend to be loose and riven by factional rivalries. Indeed these groups tend to thrive only when they can draw upon local histories, local grievances and local sources of power and support. Moreover, the violence is often sectarian or is directed against national and local structures of power, including the established structures of mainstream Islam.

The recent Islamist rebellion in Mali and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria are cases in point.\(^63\) They both fit within longer-term historical cycles of rural rebellion, Islamic jihad and contestation of political authority – as well articulating more recent discontents arising from youth unemployment and marginalisation. They feed on established patterns of cross-border migration, smuggling and commerce. In the Malian case these cross-border collaborations are shaped as well by the elaborate social networks and clan structures of Touareg pastoralists. There are also links to organised crime, including the trans-national trades in tobacco and latterly narcotic drugs across the Sahara. In both countries government responses to the rebellions have been badly organised, unduly repressive and casually negligent of the safety and welfare of the civilians caught up in the violence – fitting into longer established patterns of state violence, corruption and neglect. Rebel violence in its turn has torn apart local support networks, clan structures and social institutions – ultimately also undermining the rebels’ own legitimacy and public support.

What then can be done to create a politics of inclusion to overcome the patterns of exclusion that identity-based conflicts arise from and reinforce? In principle, security should be organised as a positive sum game so as to overcome rather than reinforce security dilemmas in which one group’s cohesion and safety becomes another’s exclusion and insecurity. But precisely how and through what processes is the issue in societies characterised by profound inequalities and hierarchies of citizenship, in which identities are woven deep into the existing structures of power and wealth and have been hardened in the furnace of violence itself.

The World Development Report 2011 proposes that security should be built around ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ (among elites, but also between elites and citizens) factored into political settlements. But it is not up to international bodies to forge these coalitions, nor even to offer prescriptive advice about how to create a politics of inclusion. A substantial but largely inconclusive literature inquires how democratic constitutions can be designed so as to channel identity politics into democratic competition rather than violent conflict.\(^64\) All too often, however, such attempts at constitutional engineering come to grief, either because they are co-opted around the centralising projects of ruling elites (like Ethiopia’s experiment in ethnic federalism), or because they remain hopelessly at variance with realities of ethnic or sectarian politics on the ground.

The problems of creating more inclusive imagined national communities have tended to be especially tricky where previous projects of secular nation-building have degenerated into fig leaves for despotism or come unstitched under the pressure of new and more divisive and violent forms of political mobilisation, as in the Balkans and the Middle East. There are very few truly convincing national exemplars of what a politics of inclusion based on recognition of past wrongs and respect for diversity could look like, although countries like South Africa, Somaliland or Bolivia (each with their own distinct problems and legacies of social division and violence) come close. Yet the achievements of even these countries are open to challenge, are reversible, and remain in need of constant democratic vigilance.


\(^{64}\) For an analysis see Luckham et al. (2003).
3 Shifting cartographies of risk: multilayered, interconnecting insecurities

As we have seen, those who speak security ‘in the vernacular’ face many kinds of insecurity. Their insecurity intertwines with many other forms of human suffering and social exclusion. They do not necessarily make sharp distinctions between their hunger, their exposure to disease, their displacement from their homes and their everyday experiences of violence. Nor always do those responsible for their insecurity insist on such distinctions; sometimes indeed the reverse, as with the criminal mafias who extract profits from their control of security in urban slums and rural peripheries; or the religious militants who use extreme force to obstruct polio vaccinations or block women’s education in Pakistan or North-East Nigeria.

Although the main focus of this paper is upon freedom from violence and from the fear of violence, it situates this within a wider consideration of the links to other dimensions of human security. Nevertheless, taking an expansive approach has its dangers (see Paris 2001 and Christie 2010). It can lead to a lack of clarity by mixing a smorgasbord of global problems on the same analytical dish. It hazards the securitisation of other forms of risk, by opening the door to the reframing of global poverty, pandemics, climate change and so forth through the lenses of national and international security policy. But such dangers are best avoided by spelling out, rather than obscuring, the interconnections, and by opening them to empirical analysis.

Table 3.1 presents a schematic landscape of different forms of insecurity and risk, as well as the different levels, from the local to the global, at which they tend to be most pressing. The starting point for this paper’s interrogation of security in the vernacular has been the violations and insecurities at the local level having the most tangible impacts on people’s day-to-day lives and these are summarised at the bottom of the table. Yet these local insecurities are determined in part by remote processes and events at national, regional and global levels, which local people (and indeed many development practitioners) scarcely understand and have little ability to control. At the same time, even apparently local as well as national insecurities can have major global reverberations: as with local-level Islamist violence in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel; or the political and military upheavals which propel large numbers of Africans and Middle Easterners to seek refuge across the Mediterranean; or the worldwide panic aroused by the Ebola epidemic.

It is not the job of this paper to scrutinise links between, say, unregulated capitalism, fossil fuel extraction and climate change, or to offer speculations about how desertification and water loss might lead to resource wars – however ripe these may be for further investigation. What it does point to, however, is the need to integrate a broad spectrum of global, regional and national risks into the analysis of violence and insecurity, even at the most local level. It could be that global economic shocks and donor-imposed austerity programmes are more important determinants of insecurity than political violence, international interventions, regional rivalries or state fragility. Conversely, countries and societies, whose economic and social infrastructures have been torn apart by war are more likely to be vulnerable to economic shocks. In sum, there are complex interactions among economic, security and sustainability risks, which vary from situation to situation.

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65 A robust defence of an expansive approach to human security is provided by Jolly and Basu Ray (2007).
66 For varying takes on the links between climate change, resource depletion and (in)security see Homer Dixon (1994); the critique by Fairhead (2001), Schubert et al. (2008) and Seide and Lind (2013).
Table 3.1 The complex landscape of risk and (in)security

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<th>Economic dislocations</th>
<th>Sustainability risks</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Insecurity ‘blowback’ to North</td>
<td>Brunt of adjustments imposed on poorest countries and people</td>
<td>Mass population displacements, refugees, migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional conflict complexes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Unravelling political settlements</td>
<td>Weak states unable to manage dependent, ‘adjusted’ economies</td>
<td>‘Complex humanitarian emergencies’</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Contested monopolies of violence</td>
<td>Growing vertical and horizontal inequalities</td>
<td>Weak states unable to respond to emergencies or create safety nets</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Violent, ungoverned borderlands</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and individual</td>
<td>Proliferation of non-state armed groups</td>
<td>Uneven impacts of development</td>
<td>Famine, epidemics, child mortality, displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender, identity-based, agrarian, urban, criminal, vigilante, etc. violations</td>
<td>Inequality, poverty, uncertain livelihoods</td>
<td>Uneven distribution of risks between rich and poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been a tendency to label economic dislocations and sustainability risks as ‘security threats’ in their own right, which demand the urgent attention of security decision-makers in the UN and elsewhere. There has also been a propensity to scale up essentially local or regional threats, like those of Islamic militancy in the Sahel, the Arabian Peninsula or the Afghanistan–Pakistan borderlands, to build cases for international military action. Problems are often labelled as clear and present threats to security rather than longer-term problems demanding concerted action by a wide range of stakeholders, so as to rescue them from the deep silos of interminable international negotiations or the pits of national inertia. But securitising them in these ways tends to harness them still further to the interests and
security priorities of major international players, including powerful governments and corporations – not to speak of aggravating rather than solving the underlying problems.\(^6\)

Furthermore, risks tend to be politically and socially constructed. They often reflect and reproduce current distributions of power, of bureaucratic authority and of knowledge, none more so than security threats. The discourse of threats evokes a narrow narrative of violent contestation, in which the bodies of citizens become as one with the body politic of the state. This allows powerful actors and institutions to close down analysis and policy around particular framings of risk, especially those which emphasise the maintenance of stability and control.\(^6\) Yet most risks (including security risks) are complex, fluid and far from homogeneous in their time horizons, stochastic distributions, and what or who is most at risk. Slow-burning risks with a high likelihood of ultimately disastrous outcomes, like climate change, differ from tail-end (or Black Swan) risks with less probable yet catastrophic outcomes, such as nuclear accidents or the sudden disintegration of apparently stable authoritarian regimes. In either case, standard policy templates don’t always fit and may quickly be rendered irrelevant by changing realities on the ground.

Moreover, the fundamental question remains: whose risks exactly are they? According to the prevailing state-focused (or supply-side) discourse considered earlier, it is states and the systems of order protected by states, which must be protected. According to the demand side or vernacular conception of security, which is the starting point of this paper (and is represented in the bottom section of Table 3.1), it is ordinary people who should be protected, but seldom are. It is upon them that the burden of risk tends to be greatest and most oppressive. It is their culturally shaped perceptions of risk which count.\(^9\) It is upon their resilience and agency that coping strategies depend. And it is they who can begin to challenge the dominant framings of security and initiate and support demands for change.

\(^6\) On the pitfalls of the securitisation of health, for instance, see Elbe (2010) and de Waal et al. (2014) on the interconnections between health and violence in Darfur.

\(^6\) See Leach, Scoones and Stirling (2010) where this case is persuasively argued in regard to the management of risks like epidemics, food security, water shortages and climate change. Much the same reasoning would apply to the dominant framings of security.

\(^9\) On the importance of culture in the framing of risks see IFRC (2014).
4 Catching the winds of change

In Sections 1.1 and 1.2 it was argued that the development–security–human freedom nexus is the product of a particular historical era, being organically linked to Western hegemony and free-market capitalism. Not only is that nexus historically contingent and riddled with contradictions, it is being pulled apart by the gathering winds of change, as summarised in Figure 4.1.

These winds of change will be difficult to navigate without better comprehension, however approximate, of where they are coming from, how they are shifting, and what risks and opportunities they open. Both the security and the development landscapes are likely to be reconfigured through the emergence of new centres of capital accumulation, economic growth and political power, including the BRICS or ‘rising powers’ (Gu and McCluskey 2015; Xiaoyun and Carey 2014; Allouche and Lind 2014). This imminent shift towards a more plural and decentred world order poses immense potential policy challenges. Whether and how it can break the deadlock maintained up to now by major powers and corporate interests is still unresolved. If the impasse is eventually breached, spaces might open for the renegotiation of a wide range of global issues, like environmental sustainability and systemic inequalities as well as the dominant security architecture.

Figure 4.1 Catching the winds of change as they shift

4.1 Global shifts in profit, force and power

The emergence of new growth poles and of the rising powers potentially challenges the entire business model around which the current global security marketplace is constructed. The demise of American hegemony has long been predicted, even if the predictions have often been over-egged. Yet there are signs that the supposedly unipolar world order that emerged after the end of the Cold War is beginning to crack, not least in the security domain. The US and NATO’s still massive advantages in military force no longer assure unchallenged strategic preponderance, notably when confronting asymmetric challenges in the South. There is a widening gap between their military capabilities and their ability to determine
events on the ground, as events in places like Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya have shown. Even so, the US in particular and the West in general dispose of a vast repertoire of other forms of influence, including the ability to marshal information and bend the international legal framework, which to a considerable extent offset their strategic weaknesses.

These global shifts pose serious problems, but also potentially open significant opportunities to transform an international security framework, which has remained disproportionately weighted in favour of the US and its allies. The major powers are becoming more cautious about launching large-scale military interventions, especially those which put boots on the ground (although there is less caution when it comes to air strikes and drones targeting militants and terrorists). There is a discernible trend towards international support for regional and South–South initiatives on regional peacekeeping, human rights and security sector governance. It is arguable that the West’s security, counter-terrorist and anti-drug agendas are merely being subcontracted to regional partners; and that some of these regional partners, like Saudi Arabia, are pursuing their own particular hegemonic agendas. Even so, regionalisation can arguably begin to establish the infrastructure and capacities for more coordinated regionally and locally driven peacebuilding.

Yet a more plural world order will not necessarily protect the limited peacebuilding achievements of the UN or tangibly increase the security of those at most risk from poverty and violence. The response of rising powers and many G7+ countries to the UN’s embrace of the Responsibility to Protect, of stabilisation and of security sector reform (SSR) initiatives and of proposals to adopt security amongst the Sustainable Development Goals, has been sceptical at best and in some cases downright hostile. The scepticism, especially about Western-promoted reform agendas, is in many respects well founded, paralleling the concerns raised by critics of liberal peace discussed in Section 1.3. But there is a risk it could also blight regional and national peacebuilding initiatives and undermine the efforts of citizens themselves to hold governments and their security agencies accountable for abuses of power and violations of human rights. Not least because the governments and elites of rising powers tend to defend their own national and corporate interests, to shut their ears to external criticism and to be wary of empowering their own citizens. For all these reasons change cannot be entrusted just to states, and it is only if they face concerted pressures from reform constituencies both within and across their national boundaries that they are likely to take the initiative.

4.2 Privatisation and criminalisation of security

The marketplaces for security and protection have always been highly political. At the same time they are shaped by global market forces – increasingly so indeed in times of recession and austerity. This marketisation of security provision is occurring in a multiplicity of ways and reshapes how and for whose benefit security is delivered. Sales of weapons and military services continue to be jointly driven by foreign policy and by defence industry profits; but these profits are increasingly the dominant consideration. There has been large-scale expansion in private security companies globally and in the developing world. Privatisations have been occurring of policing, prisons and probation services in many national contexts. Natural resource corporations, media outlets and humanitarian agencies operating in insecure political environments have been contracting out their protection to private security firms, local militias and state security agencies. Consultancy firms (some with little previous experience of security matters) have been assuming responsibility for security sector and

70 And also in favour of Russia, which is less hesitant both about putting boots on the ground of its neighbours and about providing military support to despotic allies like Syria.
71 There is a substantial body of research and analysis on the privatisation of security provision: see Avant (2005), Abrahamsen and Williams (2007), Isima (2009), Nordstrom (2004) and Singer (2008).
justice reform programmes. Military contractors have been assuming core security and stabilisation functions in support of intervening powers in fractured states. And the governments of many such states have themselves been contracting out security provision, including the day-to-day business of repression in their troubled peripheries, to mercenaries, paramilitaries and ethnic militias.

Almost invariably, as Avant (2005: 255) argues, private financing and delivery of security services redistributes power over force. Even if there are efficiency gains (and these are highly disputed), there tend to be significant long-term political costs. The privatisation of security tends to blur lines of responsibility; to undermine support for multilateral institutions; to reduce the need to work through political processes; and to weaken democratic accountability.

Moreover, security has been privatised in a context in which criminal enterprise is becoming a major, if hidden, sector of the global economy in its own right – although its scale and penetration are exceedingly hard to estimate. Some refer to it as the dark side of globalisation and of neoliberalism; although others are more sceptical both about its scale and about its relationships to wider globalisation. Although international crime tends to be characterised by extremely high profit margins and very powerful incentive systems, these derive to a considerable extent from the collision between market forces and state or international regulation: bans imposed on narcotics, conflict diamonds, bunkered oil, plundered timber, counterfeit medicines, pirated brands, stolen patents, illegally shipped small arms and light weapons and so forth. The criminal networks formed to exploit these economic niches reinforce the broader tendency of both power and profit to work around and across the state rather than through and in support of it.

Criminalisation has direct and indirect impacts on the shifting security landscape. It has become a major driver of violence, social dislocation and exclusion in its own right. Casualty levels and population displacements in countries like Mexico and Colombia approach and sometimes exceed those in war zones (Human Security Report Project 2013; World Bank 2011; Schultzze-Kraft 2014). Moreover, as the World Bank (2011: chapter 7) observes, it is a major external source of stress upon fragile and conflict-torn states. Or more accurately, it is internalised by these states themselves and becomes part of the way they function. It often fits into and reinforces existing patterns of rent-seeking and corruption. The distinction between licit and illicit appropriation of rents is difficult to make: why is the bunkering of stolen oil in Nigeria criminal and the vast web of state patronage fed by oil revenues not criminal? Criminal activities can also eat into the fabric of civil society, be it in the Niger Delta or Brazilian favelas. And they may intersect with other forms of networked violence as with the complex interface between various forms of illicit economic activity and Islamist networks in Afghanistan or Sahelian West Africa.

The privatisation and criminalisation of security are not of course the same things, nor do they necessarily reinforce each other. Both, however, take place at the interface between market forces and state and international regulation. As potential sources of change and innovation, however, they tend to be deeply problematic, and can impose heavy burdens on those whose lives they make more insecure. To the extent that they loosen the framework of formal state authority, they may arguably open spaces for non-state or hybrid forms of non-state security provision, which may better meet the needs of local people. More often,
however, they increase everyday violence, offer protection only to those best able to pay for it, and enable elites to enlist enfeebled and corrupted state security apparatuses as partners in their own predatory activities.

4.3 New frontiers of technology and information

Technologies are fast transforming the worlds of work and of consumption in ways that are hard to predict and are likely to be accompanied by major social and political dislocations. These will surely pose major security challenges, as well as shaping how ordinary people understand and respond to these challenges. More broadly, there is a constant struggle to appropriate knowledge and information and the new forms of power-knowledge they bring into being as technological frontiers continue to shift.

The new technologies are already having impacts upon the security domain, shifting the margins of military advantage, and rewriting global inequalities in military power. On the one hand, smart, high precision weapons systems brought in by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs are introducing new forms of remote control warfare, which rely less on boots on the ground and assure the strategic preponderance of states enjoying comparative advantages in high technology. On the other hand, miniaturised technologies, portable weapons systems (like hand-held anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles) and new media fit well into the asymmetric strategies of insurgents and militants, enabling relatively small numbers of men with few inhibitions about inflicting civilian casualties to disrupt conventional security forces and control territory.

Just as significant are the struggles to control information and shape discourse. Recent disclosures by Snowden, Assange and others reveal the vastly increased capacity of states and corporations to hoover up, store and process information about citizens and to place ‘extremists’, dissidents and indeed legitimate protestors under surveillance— and in the case of corporations to exploit market niches and protect commercial confidentiality. But at the same time, new information technologies and the social media are expanding and globalising the capacity for networked information sharing and resistance to authority. State security bureaucracies, especially but not only those in authoritarian systems, block websites, shut off access to social media, hack into communications and build their capacities for cyber warfare. Citizens, dissidents and hacktivists do what they can to evade, work around and subvert them. The use of citizen journalism and the social media to monitor security agencies, document human rights abuses and oppose violence will be returned to in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.

The struggle is not just about information but also over symbols, images and discourses: who gets to define security and how they represent themselves in the mass media; how violence is portrayed in popular culture and the social media; who uses the dramaturgy of lethal force, be it to legitimise international interventions (‘shock and awe’), or to recruit fighters and intimidate opponents during an armed insurgency (exemplary executions, ISIS style). It is also about the ability to construct and popularise counter-narratives of the kind discussed below.

4.4 New forms of subaltern and unruly politics

Disenchantment with politics is widespread and is loosening public authority in many different political systems, both authoritarian and democratic. This loosening of public authority is most evident in so-called ‘fragile states’ – although the nature and extent of their fragility is...
much debated (see DFID 2010; OECD 2008; Brock et al. 2012; Boege et al. 2009; Call 2008; Hagmann and Pécklard 2010) – but is certainly not confined to them.

New forms of subaltern politics have been sweeping in and shaking the foundations of regimes and entire systems of governance – including national security states previously thought to be impregnable like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. They have been accelerated by novel forms of citizen action and of political mobilisation, facilitated by new information technologies and social media (SMS, Facebook, Twitter and so on). In recent years these popular protests have mostly failed to bring about democratic changes comparable, say, to those achieved previously in Southern Europe, Latin America, the communist systems of Eastern Europe and South Africa. Yet this does not mean they could not do so.

The opening of previously closed political arenas has failed to realise its emancipatory potential in part because it has simultaneously unleashed new and often vicious struggles to occupy these arenas by groups with little serious interest in democratic participation, except on their own terms. Civil society is not always a safe space and has sometimes been fought over violently, for instance by religious or ethnic militants, criminal interests or grasping political entrepreneurs. Lethal force has been deployed by militants and by despotic states alike in order to demobilise dissent. Populist appeals and religious ideologies have been invoked to drown out more democratic voices, most obviously but by no means only in the Arab world.

Challenges from below have also set off counter-revolutions by national security elites to suborn democracy or indeed to re-occupy the state with apparently widespread popular support as in Egypt in 2013. Even genuinely democratic systems like Brazil, India, South Africa and more arguably Nigeria, face a different kind of struggle – to democratise democracy or at the very least to keep it half alive in the face of political recession, the inroads of the market, the decline of the public sphere and shrinking spaces for democratic politics.

In all of these contexts it is important to keep open channels of information and debate and to understand how best to tap into the energies of the new forms of politics. How this is done will vary: be it by expanding spaces for information-sharing and debate in existing liberal (and indeed illiberal) democracies; or by strategising participation and the use of information when the ground begins to shift under the feet of authoritarian regimes but there are risks of reversal; or by bringing hidden transcripts and excluded voices to the light of day when despots or armed militants trample on the rights of minorities, women, dissidents and ordinary citizens.

\[80\] This is to inadequately summarise highly complex and contradictory historical processes. The underlying point is that even the most widely supported popular uprisings like Egypt’s (Tadros 2013, 2014) create political junctures that are open to manipulation or capture.

\[81\] On the relationship between democratic institutions and democratic politics and how both relate to conflict see Luckham et al. (2003); Luckham (2011).
5  Towards more inclusive, democratic and secure societies

5.1  Building cases for collective action
This paper has tried to untangle the complex and fast changing dimensions of security and what they imply for ordinary people, especially those made insecure or left behind by global shifts and national traumas. What then can be concluded for the creation of more democratic, inclusive and secure societies, able to face up to the challenges of security and development in the twenty-first century? The argument developed above is that the gathering winds of change both open spaces for change and at the same time close them, posing fresh challenges to be overcome. The emergence of new poles of power and prosperity in the developing world have been reducing poverty and opening spaces in which to challenge Northern predominance; but have also tended to throw up new geographies of inequality and insecurity. Privatisation, including that of security, has unlocked opportunities for some, but excluded many more others. Technological innovation has created new possibilities for communication and information-sharing but also new forms of appropriation and surveillance. New forms of subaltern politics have sometimes reinvigorated ailing democratic institutions; but have also been diverted into new forms of exclusion and populist violence.

Collective action to minimise the insecurities facing all humankind is essential in a world of rapid and complexly interdependent changes. But it remains a huge conundrum. Market forces and national interest have been eating away at existing structures of international collaboration, state regulation and democratic accountability. Existing international and regional institutions and their peacebuilding functions are scandalously under-resourced. It is not difficult to identify priorities such as the Sustainable Development Goals, human security benchmarks, slowing climate change, stemming the flood of refugees, or ending humanitarian crises, like those in Syria and Yemen. But it has proved far more difficult to agree on realistic strategies to deal with any of these challenges. The basic issue is how to transmute the vested interests, which block their resolution, into cooperation around shared objectives – and so convert zero sum into positive sum games from which all could benefit.

Behind this are still deeper questions about the place in all this of global, national and local publics, of democratic politics and of exclusion and inclusion. Who determines that some issues not others are global and national priorities? How can a balance be achieved between the interests and priorities of developed and developing countries, as well as those more and less at risk? What say do global publics and national electorates have in shaping change agendas? Where is the voice of those most at risk – for instance, the citizens of small island states and tropical regions threatened by climate change, or minorities and refugees caught up in the maelstrom of violence in the Middle East?

A central concern running through all these issues is how to create more democratic and inclusive societies in which people can claim greater control of their security – in a world in which the forces of power and profit continue to be stacked against them. The main challenges for research, analysis and policy are spelt out in Figure 5.1.
One pressing challenge is to generate strategies for peace and democratic change, which can reshape the grain of history as well as respond to it – building on but moving beyond the short-term tactics of mitigation and of coping. These strategies would have to be forward-looking enough to anticipate the winds of change as they gust forward. At the same time, they would have to be robust enough to confront the established hierarchies of power and wealth, which spread insecurity and poverty, globally, nationally and locally.

Another challenge is how to develop democratic strategies for security so as to transcend the deep tensions between democracy and security, including but not confined to state-delivered security. This is the central issue, which tends to face efforts to build peace and to transform ailing or repressive security structures in so-called ‘fragile’ and conflict-affected states. Yet it is also a more general issue, which affects all states and political communities, in a world in which security remains both essential and deeply problematic.

A further challenge is to transform security from below by directly addressing the deep inequalities and exclusions inherent both in security and in development. These inequalities need to be openly acknowledged and tackled head on in both analysis and policy. It is hard to see how this can be done without seeking credible democratic mandates from the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’. The journey from the streets and villages in which most people live to the pinnacles of the UN, Davos, the EU, DFID and (dare one say it) IDS and back again is bound to be vertiginous. But it is essential that it should be undertaken in order to negotiate priorities and policies, which they can understand, benefit from and influence in their own right.

5.2 Working with and reshaping the grain of history
Development policies and programmes tend to work according to short time frames, and security interventions to even shorter ones. In crisis situations immediate priority tends to be given to quick impact projects and to rapid stabilisation of insecure situations. Even longer-term policy interventions like state-building, the demobilisation of ex-combatants or security sector and justice reforms, tend to march along constrained schedules determined by funding and accountability requirements. Not much attention is given to what historians term the *longue durée* – how patterns of capital accumulation, resource extraction and inequality
generate insecurities over long periods of time.\textsuperscript{82} how political change and social ordering takes place, how social identities crystallise and disintegrate, how bargains are made and unmade between citizens and those responsible for their security.

A longer-run view would necessarily reposition both analysis and policy. It would entail historical analysis of how cycles of conflict play out over the long term and tie in with national and local pathways of accumulation and development. It would have to face up to the possibility that violence and insecurity are not simply externalities, but are inherent in development, state-making and state-breaking. It would require attentiveness to the ways peacebuilding blueprints, human rights frameworks, security reforms and development programmes, etc. might build upon as well as transform national and local histories. It would also counsel caution about their potentially unexpected or perverse consequences: for instance, their failure to help those who were supposed to be assisted; or their reinforcement of long-established inequalities and patterns of violence.

History is what differentiates state-building (a managed, temporally bounded activity) from state-formation (the historically evolving negotiation and renegotiation of political authority). Democracy emerges both from the slow accretion of democratic institutions and from democratic politics and popular struggles.\textsuperscript{83} Recent analyses of political settlements and of negotiated states (see Schultze-Kraft and Hinkle 2014; Tadros 2014; Di John and Putzel 2009; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014) emphasise the historically constructed and contingent nature of political authority and, likewise, democracy.\textsuperscript{84} Political settlements – particularly democratic settlements – emerge from struggles, sometimes violent, not just to control the state, but also to shape the rules of the political game (i.e. the rules of rule).

These struggles tend to revolve around the ongoing tensions between stability, security and change. History is replete with Black Swan moments, or tail risks, when unlikely but catastrophic events occur and the unthinkable becomes the new normal.\textsuperscript{85} Seemingly ‘stable’ political settlements (like those in previous and some current regimes in the Arab world) may turn out to be surprisingly fragile. Peace agreements and democratic elections ‘ending’ violent conflicts may simply usher in new forms of insecurity.

Rigorous historically informed analysis is needed of the ruptures which tip countries and localities into cycles of violence. It is even more essential to understand the critical conjunctures which can enable them to break free from these cycles. Too often historical opportunities opened at such critical junctures are missed. Or they are grasped by those, who happen to be in control of the means of force. Or they merely open the way to renewed cycles of violence and insecurity. Thus it is important to be attentive to varying historical pathways and to identify the spaces they open for democratic change – but also to anticipate how and by whom these spaces for change may be closed down. Five such critical junctures seem especially worthy of attention, although this is an incomplete list:

\textsuperscript{82} See the case made for a historical perspective on agrarian change as a source of political violence by Cramer and Richards (2011).

\textsuperscript{83} On the interplay between democratic institutions and democratic politics and the relationship both to development and to the management of conflict see Luckham et al. (2003).

\textsuperscript{84} However, in partial contrast to these authors much of the literature on political settlements tends to prioritise the creation of political order over the establishment of democracy. This is understandable given the well-known shortcomings of democracy-promotion. But it ignores the real potential of democratic legitimacy and accountability both in their own right and as sources of stable and legitimate political authority.

\textsuperscript{85} See Taleb and Treverton (2015), who contrast the inability of highly centralised political systems like those of Syria, Libya and potentially Saudi Arabia to respond to political shocks with the greater resilience shown by more divided countries like Lebanon.
Ruptures in 'strong' authoritarian regimes challenged by popular protests and/or armed rebellion. The key issue here tends to be who seizes the political moment and how. Outcomes have varied enormously even in the same region – like post-communist Eastern Europe or in post-Arab Spring Middle East\textsuperscript{86} – ranging from civil war to varieties of authoritarian restoration to viable democratic transitions.

Political transitions forged after successful armed uprisings against repressive ancien régimes, including in some cases those previously propped up with external support (like Vietnam, Ethiopia, Eritrea and pre-genocide Rwanda). These uprisings open spaces for change, but also bring to power militarised groups, some in the Leninist mould, who tend to be resistant to democratic changes they are unable to stagemanage.

Political settlements brokered through negotiated peace agreements, which end mutually hurting stalemates (as in El Salvador, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Nepal and potentially Colombia), and create spaces for democratic politics that are hard for any one party or group to monopolise.

The creation of pockets of peace within conditions of durable disorder (like in Somalia, DRC, Haiti and South Sudan) which can eventually become starting points for democratic alternatives to violence, as in the case of Somaliland.

Shifts in political balances within existing competitive or partially competitive democratic systems (like the recent opposition electoral victories in Sri Lanka and Nigeria), which could (but may not) reinvigorate ailing democratic institutions, and help contain violence.

In none of these critical conjunctures are outcomes completely predetermined: each may just as easily lead to renewed violence as to peace. In none of them is democracy assured and even where it comes into being, can fall into disrepair unless invigorated through ongoing democratic politics. Political outcomes vary, sometimes radically. The divergences derive in part from different national histories; but they also flow from the strategic choices or non-choices made by the key protagonists in each national situation. What seems often to make a difference is the capacity of major change coalitions both to mobilise popular support at key moments of change, and to construct durable local as well as national power bases and social alliances. In this respect, countries with long histories of violent conflict like post-apartheid South Africa, Colombia or Nepal may even paradoxically enjoy a measure of comparative advantage, in that there are longer-established forms of non-violent as well as violent political action, upon which they can draw.

5.3 Democratic strategies towards security

There are deep tensions between democracy and security provision in all states, not just those affected by despotic rule and violent conflict\textsuperscript{87}. The tensions tend to revolve around the use of the mantle of security to justify state coercion, to protect vested interests rather than citizens, and to impose secrecy, restrict information and stifle debate. Hence democratic strategies towards military and security establishments are vital\textsuperscript{88} to ease democratic and war-to-peace transitions; to protect against regression to military or authoritarian governance; and to ensure democratic accountability, even in functioning democracies. These strategies require good empirical understanding of how and for whom security institutions function, as well as the political contexts in which they operate. Democratic strategies are if anything even more essential in conditions of acute ongoing political violence, where they tend to face

\textsuperscript{86} As analysed in the Egyptian case by Tadros (2012a, 2012b and 2014).

\textsuperscript{87} Discussed in Luckham (2011) and Pearce, McGee and Wheeler (2011).

\textsuperscript{88} Stepam (1988: Preface and chapter 1) made a convincing case for democratic strategies towards military and security establishments during Latin America’s democratic transitions. Recent events in Burma, Egypt, Thailand and elsewhere suggest that the need for democratic strategies is just as relevant now as it was then. See also Cawthra and Luckham (2003).
the additional and even more formidable task of taming non-state as well as state armed formations.

Much international effort has gone into rebuilding and reforming the security and justice institutions of fragile and conflict-affected states: including peacebuilding and stabilisation initiatives; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); and security sector reform (SSR). Yet these initiatives have seldom added up to credible democratic strategies with solid roots in locally driven democrtisation. Only in a few cases have they tangibly increased the accountability of security institutions. All too infrequently have they made these institutions more responsive to the rights and day-to-day needs of those they are supposed to protect.

This must raise serious doubts about the engagement of development agencies and NGOs in security policies and programmes. Do they in reality contribute towards durable peacebuilding and citizen security? Or is the sum total of their efforts a collective failure to address underlying insecurities, failed statebuilding and indeed a further securitisation of development?

To answer these questions, development analysts and practitioners call for evidence-based policymaking. They can draw upon a substantial pool of empirical analysis on peacebuilding successes and failures, much larger than what was available at the end of the Cold War. Yet in practice they continue to ignore historical lessons, to generate large quantities of what Cramer and Goodhand (2011) call policy-based evidence, and thus to repeat many of the same mistakes.

Much of the problem is political in that those with whom development practitioners engage usually have their own political interests and bureaucratic agendas at stake. It is one thing to accept in principle the need to work with the grain of imperfect political settlements; to operate in political marketplaces in which aid itself becomes a commodity and source of patronage; and to engage with the traditional and non-state bodies, which deliver security and justice in hybrid political orders (Bagayoko and Luckham forthcoming). It is quite another to be sucked into Faustian bargains with extractive political elites, warlords, ethnic or religious militias in politically charged and violent policy environments. All too often, stabilisation efforts and security reform programmes end up politically compromised, in effect reaffirming the national and local power relations at the root of insecurity and violence. And all too often the costs of this compromised and unequal security are imposed on poor and vulnerable people.

Moreover, the lack of accountability and transparency extends to the policy interventions of the international community itself. Even where there are shared goals, there may be little agreement on how to get there, including clashing political and economic interests; complex problems of coordinating bureaucracies with divergent priorities and ways of doing things; as well as issues over both how and to whom they are accountable. The difficulties tend to be even more intractable when not even goals are shared: as with the current international policy disarray over Palestine and over the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Yemen, which have inextricably become entangled with the divergent security concerns of the major international players.

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89 There is now a large policy literature on security policies and programmes in fragile and post-conflict countries. Nevertheless, there is still too little empirical analysis of how these programmes play out in practice. On the ways SSR programmes do and do not get ‘lost in translation’ see Hills (2010, 2011), Bryden and Olonisakin (2010) and Sedra (2010). On the contested politics and practice of stabilisation and its links to counterinsurgency see Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah (2010), which introduces penetrating case studies of stabilisation in a special issue of Disasters.

90 For good critiques see Selby (2013) and Richmond (2014). There are, however many more such critiques than analyses of when and how peacebuilding has succeeded.
It may be possible to guard against these dilemmas by being more reflexive and self-critical, so as to avoid the more obvious dangers of donor hubris, mission creep and perverse outcomes. A good starting point could be the simple recognition that peaceful transitions from violence and despotic rule should not be and indeed cannot be stage-managed by outsiders.

Yet all this still begs the question of how best to assist those who have serious commitment to creating a viable peace and to building inclusive, responsive and accountable security institutions. Development agencies and international NGOs, which fund or engage with critical voices and counter-elites, as well as with government insiders, risk satisfying neither. They often also face accusations of political interference. More serious is the possible danger to the welfare and safety of those with whom they cooperate (for instance, women’s groups in countries like Afghanistan or Pakistan or externally funded civil society organisations in countries like Egypt, Ethiopia or Rwanda). That does not of course mean they should shirk their responsibilities towards those who are critical of or targeted by violent elites and dysfunctional political authorities. It does, however, require more alertness to the possibility that their interventions may do more harm than good to those they are supposed to assist.91

5.4 Transforming security from below92

A thread which runs through the analysis in this paper is that although security is a public good globally, nationally and locally, it also tends to protect dominant state interests and established property relations. In consequence, its costs and its benefits are unequally distributed. There is an inherent tendency (shared in common with economic development) to discount the welfare and safety of those who are impoverished, marginalised and insecure and therefore least able to stand up for their rights as citizens and as human beings.

The fundamental challenge is how to democratisethe dominant discourse and practice of security according to which states and the international community protect and citizens are protected – and to do so without at the same time leaving large numbers of people unprotected, excluded and insecure. It has much in common with the challenge of transforming development from a discipline and policy practice, which treats poor people as the beneficiaries of development, to one which regards them as agents of change – with the crucial addition that power relations are even more central in the determination of security than they are in the practice of development.

A vernacular or citizen perspective ought to be the departure point for security analysis and policy, rather than treating security as simply the end-product of a well-protected and well-policied state. Due regard should be paid to the vernacular understandings of all those who are ‘secured’, especially those who are marginalised and vulnerable, to ensure that security and justice institutions be legitimate in their eyes and responsive to their needs. A citizen-centred approach would both empower local-level policing and justice institutions and ensure they are accountable to those they serve. It would also recognise the role of informal or hybrid forms of security provision – whilst recognising and seeking to control the ways they tend to entrench social inequalities and gender biases.93 All this would fit into broader strategies to decentralise the day-to-day business of governance and to strengthen local institutions – though once again recognising the limits of decentralisation and its tendency sometimes to create new, decentralised and sometimes violent struggles over power and resources.94

91 ‘Do No Harm’ (Anderson 1999) is a well-recognised principle of humanitarian aid, and is if anything even more relevant to security assistance. Yet it is difficult to apply consistently and tends to be more honoured in its breach than in its observance.
93 See the discussion of security in the vernacular in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 and also Bagayoko and Luckham (forthcoming).
94 See Scott-Villiers et al. (2014) for an analysis of how decentralisation shifted the locus of political patronage and violence from the national to the local level in Marsabit County, Kenya.
But this would all be window-dressing unless it could be combined with serious efforts to address persistent inequalities in access to security provision and other public goods. In turn this would necessitate tackling the agrarian exploitation, urban neglect and hierarchies of identity deepening these inequalities and generating endemic insecurity and violence. To be sure, it is important to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants, to make security institutions more accountable and to explore the potential of non-state security and justice institutions, etc. But none of these measures are likely to succeed without at the same time tackling youth marginalisation and unemployment, inequities in the distribution of land and other resources, entrenched gender discriminations and violence, the mal-distribution of resource revenues and the corrosive impacts of political patronage, corruption and violence.

None of this is likely to occur unless citizens themselves can mobilise for change and can influence or indeed supersede the bargains among elites, which in large measure determine the allocation of power, resources and security. We know from research as well as development practice that citizens have more agency than they are often given credit for (for examples see McGee 2014; McGee and Flórez López 2015 forthcoming; Oosterom 2014; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). A good deal of this is what Moser and Horn (2011) call coping agency, including the extraordinary capacity of ordinary people to adjust their lives to the direst circumstances and to navigate the chaos and violence around them. But too sharp a distinction should not be drawn between coping and transformative agency. Safe spaces created to protect young people from intimidation can also be used to educate them as citizens and prevent them from being recruited into violence. Small gestures of defiance, such as the refusal of women from clashing ethnic groups to cut off contact with each other, can help to build confidence and begin to reverse cycles of fear and mistrust. Citizen-led development initiatives, for instance to ensure clean water supplies in marginalised urban areas, can also bring attention to the political violence, corruption and corporate relationships which create barriers to the provision of these and other public goods.

The fundamental challenge, however, is how to consolidate and expand such weapons of the weak so that they can compel the attention of the strong and pose credible alternatives to violence. A handful of studies illustrate the wider transformative potential of citizen action, for instance Somaliland’s decentralised peace process; and the forms of citizen cooperation kept alive during the civil war in Mozambique, which preserved local services in desperate conditions, maintained networks of cooperation, consolidated resistance to violence and contributed to the ultimate success of peace negotiations. The main achievement in each case was a negotiated and popularly endorsed end to war; although in both countries doubts have surfaced over the sustainability, equity and development gains of the subsequent peace.

Like sustainable peace, inclusive and democratically accountable security is an ongoing struggle not an end-state. It is in part a struggle over information and analysis, so as to render more visible the invisible relationships which glue together systems of exploitation, power and violence, locally, nationally and globally. In a globalising world this also means exploiting the full potential of social media and mass communication, whilst remaining wary of their pitfalls and limitations. It requires recognition of the possibilities opened up by the diverse forms of subaltern politics, some of them potentially violent: crowd sourcing, mass protests, popular movements, citizen uprisings, etc.

95 See also Vigh (2006) on social navigation.
96 As with youth groups studied by Oosterom and Lloyd (2014) in Zimbabwe.
97 As in Marsabit County, Kenya: Scott-Villiers et al. (2014: 18–20).
At the same time, the potential of more routine, everyday forms of democratic politics cannot be neglected. Citizens should not have to wait for great transformative events to sweep them along; not least because such events are themselves the products of history and of human agency. However, they should be prepared to make good use of historical opportunities when they arise – and struggle as best they can to ensure the spaces that are opened for change are not meanwhile occupied by the greedy, the strong, the fanatical and the violent.
References


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