FROM VIOLENCE TO RECONSTRUCTION: The making, disintegration and remaking of an apartheid city

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INTRODUCTION

The apartheid city was created as a response to the urban crises of the 1940s. In order to protect and enhance the interests of its white constituency the National Party government drew on past policies of racial segregation and spatial management to restructure and entrench more deeply the racial city form. The processes of urbanisation were blocked and racial groups channelled into clearly defined spatial zones within the city or, in the case of illegal entrants, removed from the cities to rural homes or resettlement camps in the homelands.

This created a framework for a period of economic expansion and political stability in which the racial and class antagonisms built into the social structure were held together by a highly repressive regime. The apartheid system accelerated class mobility amongst whites and to a lesser extent coloured and Indian urban residents whilst thwarting similar processes amongst Africans. The concentration of socio-economic resources in the white suburbs and extrusion of black city dwellers to the badly resourced urban periphery had produced a particular racial and class map of the city by the early 1970s. However the racial city form became increasingly unworkable from the late 1970s due to its economic inefficiency, and politically unmanageable as a result of growing political mobilisation against apartheid.

The accelerating processes of rapid urbanisation and class differentiation from the 1980s frayed the tight fabric of the apartheid city and spilled over its constraining boundaries. New social and economic forces in urban life emerged as Africans began to struggle for access to the core areas of the city, or for increased resources to make urban life on the metropolitan margins more amenable. This had differential effects on the various urban communities. The white suburbs, by and large, have maintained their social stability and political power. While some black families have been absorbed into the white suburban
areas, white urban interests, for the most part, have been able to displace demands for urban resources away from the centres of urban power. This deflection has confined the struggles of the excluded majority to the constricting socio-economic boundaries of the urban periphery. These marginalised areas, with their inadequate resources, have been wholly unable to cater for the urban requirements of their populations. The containment of the struggles within the marginalised peripheries has build up immense political pressure within them, unleashing intermittent violent explosions¹.

It is becoming increasingly clear that resolution of the conflict within the black residential areas cannot be secured without the developmental needs of those areas being addressed within peace and reconstruction pacts. It is also becoming clear that the problems of the black residential areas - the need for housing, resources, infrastructure, better communications and other resources - cannot be solved by development plans and processes which restrict themselves to the black areas alone. What is needed is re-examination of the whole city. It is only through a re-conceptualisation of the apartheid city as a whole that a durable and large scale solution can be worked out to deal with conflict in the black residential areas.

Out of all the metropolitan areas in South Africa we feel that many of the connections between the apartheid city form, violence and reconstruction can best be investigated and illustrated in the context of the Durban Functional Region (DFR). In its racial planning Durban combined the policies both of residential and territorial apartheid because of its particular geographical location close to the KwaZulu homeland. Furthermore, the disintegration of apartheid controls occurred in the DFR well before the other metropolitan areas. Durban differs from the other cities in that informal urban settlement on a massive scale is a fait accompli and the development task is to address the consequences. Other cities have the advantage, on the basis of this experience, of being
able to anticipate and plan for settlement and may thus benefit from the store of experience gained in the DFR.

The paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 describes how the city came to be structured racially from the 1940s to the 1980s. Section 2 shows how the nature and spread of the violence in the 1980s related to the racial structuring of the city, rapid urbanisation, social differentiation and the emergence of localised power centres in the black residential areas. Section 3 poses the alternatives now facing the city - continuing down the path of exclusion and confrontation with the prospect that the violence will spread from the black residential peripheries to the white core city areas, or peaceful negotiations over a new, more inclusive, city form. Finally, section 4 examines alternative conceptions of the spatial restructuring of the Durban Functional Region.

**APARTHEID SPATIAL PLANNING: 1940s - 1980s**

**The growth of Cato Manor, removals and township construction: 1940s-1960s**

Durban in the 1940s exhibited many of the problems faced by the city today, namely, extensive squatting, social upheaval, and violence. With the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, the concerns of many of the white residents and city officials of Durban were to coincide with the aim of the Nationalist Government to rid the inner cities of Africans, Indians and Coloureds (Davies, 1991; McCarthy, 1988).

Industrial expansion and the relaxation of influx control during, and immediately after, World War II led to rapid urbanisation in all of South Africa's major cities. African people came to the cities to find jobs in the context of rapidly expanding employment brought on by war-time demand for industrial products and post-
war industrial growth (Maylam, 1982). Influx control throughout South Africa had been relaxed in the proclaimed urban areas, although residential controls still prevented Africans from moving into the city itself, except under strict supervision within the hostels or in domestic quarters in white suburbs (Hindson, 1987).

Most African migrants who came to Durban ended up settling in Cato Manor, a large squatter area initially outside the municipal boundaries of the city (see map 1). Here they could find relatively cheap accommodation as tenants or sub-tenants on Indian owned land or on vacant ground. Cato Manor provided an accessible and relatively cheap base for Africans close to employment in the city, and grew rapidly from a population of 2 500 in 1936 to reach a peak of approximately 120 000 by 1958 (Townsend, 1991; and Davies, 1991).

The area was feared by white residents of Durban as a centre of illicit liquor brewing and consumption, vice, disease and violence. The concentration of large numbers of impoverished blacks in close proximity to the suburbs, as well as Afro/Asian conflict and clashes between squatters and the police and military, aroused white fears about personal safety, crime, health, and economic competition (Maylam, 1982). The concerns of whites fed into nationalist government thinking on urban segregation and bantustan policy (Maharaj, 1992; McCarthy, 1988).

Through the various Urban Areas and Group Areas acts the National Party government intensified influx control, embarked on mass forced removals, enforced stricter residential controls on blacks, and subsequently enforced residential segregation. Although for a brief period the possibility of Cato Manor being developed as an African residential area was mooted (Nuttall, 1989), the introduction of Group Areas legislation in Durban in 1958 (Davies, 1991) together with the concerns of city officials regarding the health and safety of white residents, ultimately resulted in the removal of Africans and Indians from Cato Manor.
MAP 1

**URBAN STUDIES UNIT**
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University of Durban-Westville

**DURBAN 50s**
Pre Cato Manor Removals
- Indian/Coloured Areas
- White Areas
- African Township
- Cato Manor Squatters

Sources: Inkatha Institute, 1986 and Davies, 1992.
By the mid 1960s virtually all squatters had been removed and this left a large tract of open land to the west of Durban. Only a handful of Indian families were able to cling to their homes and remain in the area through the coming decades.

Massive housing programmes were initiated to the south and north of Durban to house those removed from Cato Manor and other inner city areas. Africans were resettled in KwaMashu and, to a lesser extent, Umlazi, while Indians were mainly sent to Chatsworth (see map 2). The state provided low cost housing and these areas absorbed large numbers of African and Indian families. In contradistinction to the grievances felt by the richer landowning Indian sector of Cato Manor, many of the poorer Indian tenants responded with mixed emotions; they received their first homes, but as a consequence of forced removal. Only the smaller African townships of Lamontville and Chesterville, which were under municipal control, and a few middle income Indian areas such as Overport and Clare Estate were to escape banishment to the city's far periphery.

By the end of the 1960s the state-funded housing programme in most African areas had essentially drawn to a close. Many Africans who had lived in Cato Manor, however, were unable to acquire housing in the new townships, due to illegality, an inability to pay rents and other reasons. It is estimated that some 30 000 Africans 'disappeared' during the removals (Maasdorp and Humphries, 1975). Many of these people took advantage of African and/or Indian freehold land in areas like Inanda and Clermont, where they rented rooms from landlords or erected their own dwellings. Others sought the permission of chiefs and indunas in areas abutting the townships.

The removals from Cato Manor and other parts of the city entrenched the racial city form. Whites retained the core city areas, Indians were largely rehoused in Chatsworth which lay between the white and African residential areas in the south of
Durban, and Africans were relegated to dormitory suburbs on the far peripheries of the city - KwaMashu in the north and Umlazi in the south.

Underlying this racial structure was also a class and income structure. Whites, in the core city areas, comprised a protected skilled working class, middle income professional and managerial classes. Over the 1960s the Indian population in the inner periphery (Chatsworth) occupied an intermediate income group, comprising mainly semi-skilled and skilled workers and lower middle income semi-professionals. Africans, on the outer peripheries (KwaMashu and Umlazi) were at the bottom of the income structure, and comprised mainly the unskilled, semi-skilled and unemployed workers (Hindson and Crankshaw, 1993). The spatial and income profile of the city was thus the reverse of many western cities with their decaying centres and affluent suburban peripheries.

**Township construction and the re-emergence of squatting: 1960s-1980s**

The short term viability of urban apartheid was based on the exclusion of Indians and Africans from the centres of economic and political power in the cities, the minimisation of social and infrastructural expenditure in the new townships, low wages, and the creation of a differentiated workforce, with some urban Africans having minimal access to urban residential rights whilst the majority were prohibited from permanently settling in the urban areas.

Although extremely repressive, urban apartheid was a highly effective system in the short term, both as a mechanism of urban political control and, for a time, in securing an economically subservient workforce. The 1960s was a decade of political stability and rapid economic expansion. However, during the 1970s the underlying contradictions, costs and inefficiencies of the
This coincides with the beginning of a new stage of urbanisation and apartheid spatial planning. The 1970s saw the state grant greater powers to the bantustans either in the form of independence or of self government. This impacted on the process of urbanisation in a number of important ways. In the country as a whole, a form of deconcentrated urban settlement occurred on the fringes of the bantustans abutting the metropolitan areas through the settlement of large numbers of workers, who commuted daily to work, in the core city areas. Deconcentrated urbanisation extended urban sprawl, reinforced the racial geography of the city, and added to the high costs of infrastructural expenditure and services in black residential areas.

The proximity of KwaZulu to Durban made it possible for the state to achieve the objectives of residential and territorial apartheid simultaneously in this city. With the granting of self-governing status to KwaZulu the vast majority of Durban's African people were converted into cross-border commuters. The exceptions were people living in the long-established townships of Chesterville, Lamontville and Clermont, which had been established initially as labour supply outposts beyond the municipal boundaries of Durban and Pinetown, and were difficult to move due to the costs involved and the threat of resistance.

The most obvious signs of the failure of territorial apartheid appeared in the early 1970s. By this time most new housing development in the townships had ceased, and pressure on existing housing stock increased through natural population growth as well as illegal immigration into the formal townships. During the 1970s township people, particularly the young who were unable to obtain houses, began moving out of the townships onto adjacent land where they joined migrants from the rural areas to form squatter camps (see map 3). The hilly terrain and subtropical vegetation of Durban, as well as the reluctance of
tribal authorities to apply influx control in their areas, enabled squatting to go unnoticed by officialdom and the white public for a time. It took the form of slow, and sometimes clandestine, densification within the freehold and tribal areas as well as on mission and state land near the peripheral black townships, and thus, at first, posed only a remote threat to white residential concerns.

The proximity of tribal and freehold land to the African townships of Durban meant that influx control was far more difficult to apply than in many other metropolitan areas of South Africa. For the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board the problems of maintaining influx and residential controls increased when KwaZulu gained self-governing status in 1974 (Mare and Hamilton, 1987), because the tribal authorities had neither the means nor the incentives to enforce a system of control devised and administered by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in the 1960s (Hindson, 1987). The tribal labour bureaux, designed as a system of efflux control in the late 1960s, had always been ineffective, and were entirely unsuited to the exercise of influx control in rapidly urbanising tribal areas on the metropolitan peripheries.

**Rapid urbanisation and residential differentiation: the 1980s and early 1990s**

By contrast to the 1970s when squatting was semi-clandestine and relatively slow, the 1980s witnessed the mushrooming of open squatting, at times involving land invasions, in and around the black townships on the metropolitan periphery. Estimation of the size and growth of the African population in the DFR are notoriously unreliable. The official statistics on urbanisation in the DFR are not reliable, and it is necessary to turn to estimates based on the work of local researchers. The best available source on the numbers of Africans living in formal and informal housing is that
given by May and Stavrou for the period 1980 to 1987 (Appendix 1). According to their calculations, between 1980 and 1985 the total African population increased at an annual average rate of 5.9 percent, while the numbers in informal housing grew at 9 percent per annum. Between 1985 and 1987 the total African population grew at 11.1 percent and the informal at 19.7 percent per annum. By 1987 the informally housed African population comprised 50 percent of the total African population, having increased from an estimated 37 percent in 1980.

Added to the steady weakening of influx controls that had been going on since the early 1970s, a number of factors came together to open the flood gates. Severe drought in the late 1970s drove large numbers of people out of neighbouring rural areas towards the cities in search of work. From the early 1980s a series of confrontations occurred between youth and residents' organisations on the one hand, and township authorities on the other, which led to a weakening of township administration and hence the capacity to control settlement.

The immediate precipitating factor was the attempt by the authorities to devolve housing and influx control powers to unpopular black local authorities, while at the same time increasing rents and public transport fares. This abortive application of the recommendations of the Riekert Commission (Riekert Commission, 1979) sparked off major rent and bus boycotts in the early 1980s; actions that marked the beginning of extensive and prolonged political violence in the DFR (Byerley, 1989; Reintges, 1986; Torr 1985).

The ensuing weakening, and in some cases collapse, of black local authorities meant that control could no longer be exercised over land and housing allocation and hence the pace and form of urbanisation. Open land occupations and invasions replaced clandestine squatting, first on vacant land near the townships and then, in the late 1980s, within the townships themselves
(Townsend, 1991). At a national level, these developments were recognised and given further impetus by the formal abolition of influx control in 1986. A further stage of squatting began in the late 1980s as squatter settlements sprang up in inner city areas such as Kennedy Road, Clare Estate and, most notably, within Cato Manor itself. The common thread in these developments was the growing incapacity of local authorities to exercise controls over African squatting in the face of a mounting challenge to their legitimacy, both through struggles mounted in the Durban area over squatter settlement and the continued application of the Group Areas Act, and at the national level through the growing opposition to white rule, and a state reform strategy which coupled modifications of apartheid with liberal reforms.

A second major social development in the 1980s was the growth of middle income suburbs in the black residential areas on the periphery. Whereas classic apartheid attempted to suppress class divisions within the African population, the urban reform strategy pursued by the government in the 1980s sought to foster class divisions within urban black residential areas (Morris and Hindson, 1992). In the past the primary line of social demarcation within the black urban areas was between temporary migrants in the hostels and permanent residents in formal township houses (Hindson, 1987). During the 1980s, however, two new residential groupings emerged. The established townships were flanked on the one hand by new housing schemes for lower middle income semi-professional and better off working class families, and on the other hand by mushrooming squatter settlements dominated by unskilled, marginal and unemployed people.

To illustrate this, a survey of social differentiation in three adjacent residential areas on the southern side of Umlazi, undertaken by the authors in 1992 and 1993, suggests that a process of sifting out of income groups has been taking place in the black residential areas. The established townships lost some middle income individuals and families to the new housing
estates, and many of the youth, poor and destitute to the neighbouring squatter areas. Mean monthly household income in Emafezini, a new housing estate which comprises mainly semi-professionals and better paid working class families, was R2371. This compares with an average household income of R1697 in U Section of Umlazi, part of an established township with a majority of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The mean household income of Malukazi, a neighbouring squatter area, made up mainly of the unskilled and unemployed, was only R486. When compared to other black residential areas, the average household income of townships and middle income housing areas is similar, but the figure for Malukazi is very low. This is due to the extremely impoverished nature of this particular area, partly because of protracted violence.

The effects of these developments was to produce a three way class residential division within the black areas of the DFR, comprising an emerging middle income group with the means to move to the newly constructed private housing estates; the established working class in the old townships under pressure to move up or down the social ladder; and the new poor crowded into impoverished shack areas in and around the old townships. It should be noted that not all the residents of squatter areas are equally impoverished. The limited provision of African housing from the early 1970s meant that many employed township residents moved into shack areas in order to escape overcrowding in township houses, and that a section of these people were employed and earned relatively high incomes.

The appearance of huge squatter areas on the periphery of the Durban metropolitan area marked a clear break with territorial apartheid, but it also had the effect of powerfully reinforcing residential apartheid and hence the racial geography of the city. Although the reform strategy of the 1980s accepted the permanence of Africans in the city and, from the mid 1980s, the reality and desirability of African urbanisation, the continued
application of residential controls under the Group Areas Act as well as private property rights ensured that impoverished blacks were confined to the urban peripheries.

The growth in numbers of people in confined spaces on the black urban peripheries greatly increased the scarcity of residential resources such as land, housing and services and thus heightened competition for these resources. Untrammelled competition for basic resources in the context of the collapse of local government, the reduction of state assistance for housing and transport, and a shrinking resource base for residential life created ideal conditions for communal mobilisation around access to, and control over, these resources. The mobilisation of residential communities to defend or extend control over land and other basic resources was a major factor that fed into political mobilisation and conflict in the DFR especially from the mid 1980s.

VIOLENCE AND THE BREAKUP OF APARTHEID

Prior to the 1980s political violence exhibited two main characteristics: it tended to be perpetrated by the state against individuals falling foul of the myriad of urban apartheid regulations; and it took the form of criminalising such transgressions (Hindson, 1987).

Violence in the 1980s emerged in the context of the crumbling of territorial apartheid, rapid unplanned urbanisation, the bankruptcy of township administration, and abortive attempts to introduce economic liberalisation within the framework of residential apartheid.

The inherited racial city structure, coupled with the disintegration of the apartheid controls on the periphery, displaced and confined urban conflict to the margins of the metropolitan area. A battle by
blacks against exclusion from the political and economic power centres of the city - a struggle for greater access to, and control over, the resources of the wider society and economy - was deflected and turned into a fight over the shrinking resources allocated to blacks on the urban perimeters (Morris and Hindson, 1992).

Both the content and method of implementation of the reforms introduced from the late 1970s tended to intensify rather than to reduce social dislocation and the potential for conflict. Piecemeal liberalisation opened opportunities for some and gave vent to aspirations long suppressed under apartheid, but this occurred in a context in which not all the major sources of grievance were being dealt with. Economic and political concessions were yielded to the new middle strata of the black population, including a relatively privileged working class, while excluding or marginalising the impoverished and dispossessed. The majority of blacks, even those who benefitted from reform, continued to feel the effects of remaining racial controls, of an increasingly harsh economic environment and of exclusion from national political processes.

During the 1980s the economic costs of residential and territorial apartheid escalated; social divisions sharpened in the black residential areas and were less amenable to simple repressive and undifferentiated mechanisms of control; economic and political repression was increasingly and openly challenged; and competition for access to the urban resources necessary for social and economic life intensified.

The apartheid institutions which previously managed conflict through control over the black residential areas began to disintegrate and increasingly lost their effectiveness. This made space for a political struggle for hegemony within the black residential areas; a struggle that was integrally tied up with the capacity of competing and conflicting parties to capture, control, and distribute resources within these areas. The struggle for
hegemony was greatly intensified with the rise of Inkatha-linked warlords and ANC-linked civic and youth organisations (Morris and Hindson, 1992; Morris, 1992).

**Violence in the early 1980s**

Since 1980, township violence in the Durban area has moved through three overlapping stages (Byerley, 1992a). In the first stage, the early 1980s, it was concentrated in the core area townships, notably Chesterville and Lamontville, and predominantly took the form of a confrontation between residents on the one hand and community councillors, township administration, police and army on the other. This may be termed 'state-people' violence.

In the early 1980s conflict centred mainly on Chesterville and Lamontville, two townships within the core city area that had always been outside the control of KwaZulu. The tension focused around education, transport, rent and labour. It was also exacerbated by the threatened incorporation of the Port Natal Administration Board controlled townships - Lamontville, Chesterville, Clermont and others - into KwaZulu (Byerley, 1989). Residents from these areas joined together to form the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) which spearheaded the campaign against rent increases and later against incorporation into KwaZulu (Reintges, 1986; Torr 1985).

The formation of JORAC and the subsequent repression levelled against it marks the beginning of a long period of instability and violence in black residential areas, but the specific form of this first stage of violence was significantly different to later developments. In 1983 Chesterville and Lamontville became virtual war zones following the assassination of JORAC founder member and former town councillor Harrison Dube (Reintges, 1986; Byerley 1989; Mshengu, 1992). In reaction youth took to the streets; councillors' homes were targeted for attack;
administration buildings, cars, buses and police vehicles were stoned and burnt; and sporadic street battles were fought between the youth and the police (Byerley, 1980; 1992). A virtual siege of Lamontville resulted with the setting up of permanent police road blocks at entrances to the township.

The attempt by the KwaZulu authorities to follow through the logic of the 1970s stress on territorial apartheid and incorporate the core city townships into KwaZulu greatly fuelled the conflict. Ignoring the build up of pressure for the dismantling of urban apartheid and the acceptance of the permanence of Africans in the urban areas, the KwaZulu authorities, in collaboration with the central state, sought to incorporate all the Port Natal Administration Board townships (Lamontville, Chesterville and Clermont) into KwaZulu.

This provoked deep antagonism from these communities. Violence continued sporadically throughout 1983 and most of 1984 but began to take on a new focus. Clashes between United Democratic Front (UDF) supporting youth and Inkatha supporters became common, and unionised workers began to be drawn into the conflict. At its inauguration in late 1985, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) openly declared its hostility towards Inkatha, thereby fanning the flames of confrontation. Inkatha supporters reacted towards township youth linked to the UDF and against COSATU affiliated workers. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha came increasingly to be seen as the puppets of the apartheid state. At this time the South African Police began to move away from the front lines of the conflict to give way to the KwaZulu Police, a force recently set up under the control of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.

The result of these developments was that the UDF and COSATU lined up against Inkatha, the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), and the KwaZulu and South African Police
(SAP), with a consequent escalation of violence.

**Violence from the mid 1980s**

In the second stage, from the mid 1980s, the violence shifted towards the urban periphery and became increasingly internecine.

The number of people who died from violence in the Durban Functional Region between 1986 and 1992 has been estimated as 3228 (See Appendix 2). The proportion of deaths due to violence in the core urban areas (Durban Central) remained low compared to the periphery, 9 percent of total deaths in 1986 and 5 percent in 1992. Within the peripheries the locus of violence shifted from the formal townships to the squatter shanty towns, increasing from 30 percent in 1985 to 70 percent in 1992.

Violence occurred within the black residential areas along different lines in different places - squatter communities against other squatter communities, township-squatter conflict, hostel-township and hostel-squatter conflicts, and finally, cases of intra-township conflict.

In the established townships on the metropolitan periphery, such as KwaMashu and Umlazi, black opposition, which began as an organised resistance to bus fare and rent increases in the early 1980s, was increasingly propelled into political and internecine violence.

The murder of the civil rights lawyer Victoria Mxenge in 1985 marked the beginning of the second stage. Reports of street battles between Inkatha and UDF supporters, and between police and community abound (Sitas, 1986; Hughes, 1987; Byerley, 1989; Gwala 1985). The government's response was to extend to Natal the State of Emergency then in force in most of the country. The draconian measures employed under the emergency resulted in the virtual removal (through detention, death, or going into hiding) of
The removal of leadership promoted the spread of lawlessness within the townships and shantytowns, and the youth constituency came to the fore in the ensuing conflict. Clashes between UDF supporting youth and Inkatha supporters increased. Black councillors and policemen were regularly attacked because they were seen to be instruments of the apartheid state.

This period of violence saw UDF supporting youth, joined at times by criminal elements, coming to dominance in most of the formal townships. The result was that Inkatha leaders and their supporters were expelled from large parts of the townships. They were, however, to re-emerge in the squatter settlements on the margins of the townships, where they teamed up with local 'shack-cum-warlords' who had effective control over the shantytowns.

From the mid 1980s onwards the violence shifted geographically to the squatter periphery and became increasingly introverted. Political mobilisation and conflict frequently coincided with the division between squatters and township dwellers. The UDF, and later the ANC, developed their bases largely in the established townships, especially amongst the youth, while Inkatha retreated into the squatter areas where its political fortunes were tied to the warlords.

Prior to the mid 1980s there tended to be relative harmony between township people and squatters. There was a sharing of resources, such as taps, schools, and other facilities. But, with the growing resistance to the state and local councillors, and with the expulsion of many Inkatha supporters from the formal townships, and of ANC youth from some squatter areas, urban turbulence shifted its focus. It turned from a state-people violence into a conflict that was essentially and increasingly inter-communal.
One important line of division was between townships and the new squatter areas as, for example, between Ntuzuma and Lindelani near Inanda. However, conflict was also intense within townships and squatter areas and at times between different ethnic groups, notably between Zulus and Pondos in Malukazi and Number 5 near Umlazi (Byerley, 1989; 1992b). A further feature was the superimposition of political allegiance over social and material differences.

Squatters were mobilised by warlords to fight for access to resources in neighbouring townships, and township youth organised military style units to defend their areas and counter attack squatter areas. Local power struggles developed over land, housing, services and business rights. One of the principal reasons why the violence has been so deep rooted is that political allegiance to Inkatha and the UDF/ANC tended at this time to coincide with residential location and differential access to urban resources.

In this period the South African security forces sought to remove themselves from the direct line of fire and present themselves as playing a more impartial policing role. From 1987, with the establishment of the KwaZulu police force, the South African Police could move a step back from immediate involvement in the violence with KwaZulu. However, they continued to support Inkatha in hidden ways including clandestine funding, training of hit squads, and direct covert operations against the UDF/ANC and their supporters. As the violence shifted to the urban peripheries and hence deeper into KwaZulu, so the KwaZulu Police came more to the fore as an extension of Inkatha.

From the mid 1980s Inkatha was gradually squeezed out of the formal townships. It regrouped and reorganised itself mainly amongst the marginalised squatters on the urban periphery. This resulted in numerous protracted and bitter conflicts between township people and squatters.
In areas under ANC control attempts to discipline the 'criminal elements' in the youth structures led in some cases to splits in the youth camp into comrades and comtsotis (gangsters), and in others to some youth re-joining Inkatha. From the late 1980s further ground was gained by ANC supporters. Large sections of the squatter periphery of Durban were 'won' by ANC-aligned comrades, and Inkatha retreated into fortress-like pockets of ground such as Lindelani and Mshayazafa in Inanda, and also into parts of Malukazi near Umlazi.

Although areas came to be defined as 'ANC' or 'IFP' the reality of political allegiance is more complex. In many instances residents feel compelled to show allegiance to the group that is dominant at any particular point in time.

**Violence in the early 1990s**

In the third stage (1990s) mass confrontations gave way to more atomised, targeted and clandestine killing, although internecine clashes continued. In this latter stage, two other processes increasingly manifested themselves: a drift into criminality and internecine violence within black residential areas between opposing factions of the same political organisation.

Although it is inherently difficult to be sure of the extent to which the killings in the early 1990s are co-ordinated by a political 'third force', our own study of violence in the Durban Functional Region suggests that there is a range of individuals and groupings involved in the violence spanning the political spectrum from extreme left to right, rather than a single 'third force'.

These clandestine forces include elements amongst the disaffected black youth; some returning Mkonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres who find themselves without jobs or other means of support; some of those previously employed within the covert repressive structures.
of the state; elements in the security forces who continue with covert operations, either within or outside of state structures; Inkatha hitmen; elements of the KZP; alienated whites seeking a home amongst the far right political parties; and other extremist whites who feel they have been 'sold out' by recent moves towards political liberalisation.

THE CHALLENGE TO THE RACIAL CITY

We have seen that internecine conflict in the second half of the 1980s can be explained in part in terms of the racial structuring of the city and the capacity of the white urban constituencies and the state to displace conflict and its consequences on to the black residential areas.

The ability of the state to continue in this role began to weaken by the end of the 1980s. Violence became increasingly widespread and in some areas endemic. The economic costs of violence in terms of life and property destroyed, mounting security costs and costs to the economy through disruption of production, absenteeism and worker debilitation continued to increase while the incentive to invest by local and international finance declined.

The state was confronted with widening opposition from within key sectors of white South Africa such as business, as well as an increasingly effective international campaign of economic, cultural and other forms of isolation.

While the extra-parliamentary movement was significantly curbed by the State of Emergency, neither the UDF nor COSATU - the two organisations that led open internal opposition during this period - were ever fully silenced, and both continued to place pressure on the state through various forms of protest and other action.
Within South African cities it became increasingly difficult to contain the violence physically, and although white residential areas continued to escape the direct effects of township conflict, robbery and violence became much more frequent and difficult to prevent in the inner city and white suburban areas.

Opposition to the maintenance of racial residential segregation also came from two very different groups seeking to escape the violence on the urban peripheries and to take up opportunities in the core city areas. The late 1980s witnessed the first flow of squatters from periphery to core as pockets of squatters occupied land, in some instances in areas left vacant by apartheid removals. In the climate of growing political instability local authorities became increasingly reluctant to remove these groups, despite the continued existence of apartheid and anti-squatter laws.

The second major pressure for racial integration of core city areas was from middle and upper income black groups seeking housing near to places of work and in the more secure white suburban or inner city flatland areas. Well before the abandonment of the Group Areas Act in 1992 incremental deracialisation, known as 'greying', had begun to take place, especially in flatland areas and in a number of lower income white suburbs near the inner city.

By the end of the 1980s, the white state and those interests historically represented by it had to face the stark choice of attempting to maintain racial controls under the Group Areas Act against mounting opposition from within and outside South Africa, or attempting to negotiate a process of deracialisation and spatial integration of the city.

Following the unbanning of political organisations and the growing acceptance of negotiation as a route to transformation, negotiation forums have been established both nationally and within several cities and towns, and it is within these that the possibility of a peaceful negotiated reconstruction of the cities is
now being debated.

PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DURBAN FUNCTIONAL REGION

This paper has argued that the roots of violence lie in deep structural divisions and antagonisms produced by racial policy, spatial fragmentation, and the confinement of the poor to the metropolitan peripheries.

It follows that lasting peace of a kind that does not rely on further state repression will require a fundamental racial, spatial, and economic integration of the city. This cannot be achieved without threatening interests that are vested in the present spatial geography of the city. It is thus critical that a process is established whereby reconstruction is undertaken with the involvement of all the major interests which can contribute constructively to the reconstruction of the city, or which can derail that process.

This final section examines a number of approaches to the reconstruction of the DFR, and argues for the establishment of a metropolitan wide negotiation and development process to reconstruct and develop the DFR. It identifies some of the basic principles that are being put forward to guide the process of urban reconstruction, and argues that care needs to be taken to ensure that the process of deracialisation of the city does not take a form in which racial discrimination is replaced by an equally conflictual spatial and social division. Until recently there have been three major approaches to reconstruction and development within the DFR: continuing interventions within the framework of the official neo-apartheid policy of deconcentration; peace and reconstruction pacts in violence torn communities; and core city initiatives. We examine each of these in turn.
Urban deconcentration

From the mid 1980s the central state officially abandoned influx controls in the urban areas, but it replaced them with the policy of residential and industrial deconcentration and a battery of controls such as the anti-squatter laws to back the new policy. African urbanisation was accepted, but would take place in newly laid out sites on the urban peripheries to which Africans would be channelled from squatter areas and overcrowded townships (President's Council, 1985).

This strategy met with growing resistance. Squatters have proved unwilling to be moved from their areas, and the state has found it difficult to access new residential land for the poor. Where land has been set aside for site and service development, for example to the west of Kingsburgh and Umhlanga, conservative white local authorities and residents have joined black community leaders in resisting plans for low cost residential development, obviously for very different reasons.

A further difficulty with many state funded and private housing development projects in the 1980s is that they met with fierce resistance from communities not consulted in the planning or implementation stages. Where attempts were made to introduce development in violence torn communities or in areas with latent inter-communal divisions, official projects often provoked or accentuated conflict. In many areas around the periphery of Durban new formal residential development has all but come to a standstill in the early 1990s.

The obvious criticism of the deconcentration policy is that it further accentuates the spatial character of the city, namely city sprawl, fragmentation and the restriction of the poor to the periphery. However, urban expansion will inevitably push the city boundaries further out into the peripheries, and sites which may at present be unsuitable for development, may become viable as city
spread proceeds over the longer term.

**Investment in violence torn communities**

The second approach to urban reconstruction and development emerged within violence torn communities on the black residential peripheries. It was found in these areas that, to put an end to violence, it was first necessary to tackle the problem of political rivalry and security force partiality; i.e. to achieve agreement over the rules of political contestation and security force conduct. Only once this step has been taken does it become possible to tackle the underlying problems of social division, poverty, the lack of adequate housing, unemployment and other basic social and economic problems in the area.

An entire approach beginning with mediation, the formation of social compacts around development projects and the project cycle has emerged from the experience of violence torn communities and has been set out in a number of reports and papers (Byerley and Hindson, 1992; Appleton, Hindson and Swilling, 1993; Hindson and Byerley, 1993).

Inevitably the focus in any local area will be on the development needs of that area and this may be to the neglect of social, spatial and economic consideration in the city as a whole. Business, union, youth, civic and political organisations involved in peace and reconstruction pacts have tended to be highly localised, at least until the formation of the National Peace Accord in 1992.

The focus of investment activities in violence torn areas may have a powerful symbolic appeal, but may not correspond with the wider interests of urban reconstruction. It may, for example, re-enforce the racial structure of the city and may not make the best use of opportunities for spatial and economic integration. In addition, many violence torn communities are poorly located with respect to transport routes and access to employment, and other
urban opportunities dealing with these issues require a more integrated approach than that allowed for in local peace and reconstruction agreements.

It is thus essential to examine the needs of local communities within the context of city-wide or metropolitan reconstruction, and, while supporting and encouraging local initiative, to ensure that local projects are compatible with negotiated reconstruction and development at the metropolitan or city level.

Core city development

A third major thrust has been in the area of core city development initiatives and projects. Many of these were initiated under the umbrella of Operation Jumpstart, an embryonic alliance of business, local government and inner city civic interests formed in the late 1980s.

Operation Jumpstart achieved a degree of consensus on two basic ideas: that the city should be opened to all races, and that vacant inner city spaces such as Cato Manor should be developed for residential and commercial purposes on a mixed race, mixed income basis. Operation Jumpstart was also concerned with a number of major inner city commercial projects including the proposed Point Road and Esplanade developments.

A major focus of debate since the early 1990s has been on the redevelopment of Cato Manor. The Cato Manor Development Forum, a body with wide representation from metropolitan and Natal regional interests, has achieved consensus on basic principles and a broad plan for the redevelopment of the whole area.

These core city initiatives have had a powerful symbolic effect and, if sustained, will undoubtedly impact heavily on the future economic, social and political development of the core city area.
However, an important weakness is that they have not had strong representation from communities on the metropolitan peripheries. A danger in present core city initiatives is that they may ultimately leave out of account the problems and needs of the vast majority of people on the metropolitan peripheries.

This could lead to the restructuring of the city into two socially and spatially polarised parts: a multi-racial and relatively affluent core city and a black, impoverished periphery.

**CONCLUSION**

It is clear that the DFR is at the cross roads. There is immense potential for revitalisation of the city economically and for social and political re-integration. But there is also the very real danger that competition and conflict over the city and its future could degenerate further into confrontation, not only on the periphery but within the core city areas themselves.

To avoid these dangers it is necessary to ensure that the reconstruction and development process goes beyond localised investment projects in violence torn areas and spans more than just the relatively affluent core city business, civic and local government interests. What is needed is a process of negotiation which involves all sections of the metropolitan communities, from the CBD to the far peripheries, around a set of principles and, ultimately, a set of plans for the reconstruction of the DFR.

For these negotiations to be meaningful it is necessary to ensure that marginalised communities, in particular, have the capacity to participate effectively. Thus effort and resources will need to be deployed into the organisation and capacity building process, particularly in the black residential areas.

There is already considerable agreement, both in Durban and in
other South African cities, around basic principles of urban reconstruction and development. These include the need to fix the urban edge, increase densities and promote compactness within the present city boundaries, increase the access especially of the poor to employment opportunities and urban resources through increased and redesigned public transport systems, promote mixed land use and the integration of residential and commercial areas, and upgrade and improve services within black residential townships and squatter areas. Despite this growing consensus around broad principles, there is considerable room for debate, disagreement and conflict over concrete proposals for their implementation.

Essentially what is at stake is the basic path of change envisaged for the Durban Functional Region. With the collapse of apartheid controls and institutions of neo-liberal reforms in the 1980s the city has already moved far down the road towards a new form of social inclusion and exclusion. The barriers between middle income whites, Indians and colouresds have quite rapidly fallen away and considerable integration at an economic and social level has taken place. More recently this has been followed by the dropping of the Group Areas Act and growing residential deracialisation amongst these groups.

However, this process of racial integration within the core city areas has gone ahead in a context where the vast majority of Africans of all income groups and social classes remain trapped in the peripheries in shanty towns, townships and new, increasingly defensive, middle income housing estates.

The questions that now confront the city are whether it can shift off this path and meet the challenge of re-integrating all race and class groups across the spatial divide between core and periphery.
## APPENDIX 1

**AFRICAN POPULATION ESTIMATES BY SETTLEMENT TYPE AND SUB REGION: DURBAN FUNCTIONAL REGION 1980-1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>221 580</td>
<td>270 500</td>
<td>293 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>226 370</td>
<td>315 500</td>
<td>538 500</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>447 950</td>
<td>586 000</td>
<td>831 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>307 300</td>
<td>375 400</td>
<td>403 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>105 900</td>
<td>152 300</td>
<td>186 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>413 200</td>
<td>527 700</td>
<td>590 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>145 550</td>
<td>172 800</td>
<td>195 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>105 200</td>
<td>208 600</td>
<td>243 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>250 750</td>
<td>381 400</td>
<td>439 100</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hostels</td>
<td>39 450</td>
<td>42 000</td>
<td>42 900</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>66 150</td>
<td>71 000</td>
<td>72 800</td>
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<td>1 566 100</td>
<td>1 933 900</td>
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*Source: May and Stavrou, 1989: 19; 47-8*
## APPENDIX 2

### TOTAL DEATHS RESULTING FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE DURBAN FUNCTIONAL REGION, 1986-1992

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<tr>
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<td>5%</td>
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### TOTAL

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<td>63%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
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### TOTAL

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<th>51</th>
<th>188</th>
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<th>290</th>
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<td>Proportion of total</td>
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<td>37%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>70%</td>
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### GRAND TOTAL

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>139</th>
<th>374</th>
<th>515</th>
<th>804</th>
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<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<td>30%</td>
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</table>

Source: A Louw, Project on Violence Statistics, Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal.

FROM VIOLENCE TO RECONSTRUCTION 33
NOTES

1 The questions addressed in this paper flow from an earlier paper in which we asked why "... in a society where whites historically have dominated and oppressed blacks, often violently, black people are killing each other rather than whites" (Morris and Hindson, 1992a). Our concern here is to examine more closely the question of internecine violence in the 1980s and how it arose out of the racial geography of the apartheid city.

2 The little housing that was constructed comprised mainly privately built homes catering for an emerging African middle income group within the townships.

3 This process of densification also included 'doubling up' in hostels and domestic quarters.

4 Estimates of the informally housed population on the periphery over the period are: 38 000 in 1965; 150 000 in 1969; and 275 000 by 1973 (Maasdorp and Humphries, 1975).

5 Although some examples of squatting within the inner city were evident in the early to mid-1980s, it is in the late 1980s and 1990s that this has become increasingly open rather than clandestine.

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