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South African Racial Policy

N. J. J. Olivier

INTRODUCTION

It is an almost impossible assignment to treat, in a single paper, in a competent and satisfactory manner, so difficult and complex a subject as South Africa's racial policy; and the magnitude of the assignment is only matched by what could perhaps justifiably be called the unforgiveable presumptuousness on the part of a person who makes the attempt. I must therefore ask for your indulgence and tolerant understanding for the many examples of incompleteness — the many gaps, in time and in substance — that will undoubtedly be evident in this presentation.

One of the self-evident truths that should be stressed in a discussion of this nature is that we, all of us and each of us, are first and foremost, the continuation of, and an overlapping element in, the long line of genetic physical procession of generation upon generation. What we are, genetically, is no function of our will or our wish, and this holds for all of mankind, the Whites and the Blacks alike. The incontrovertible inference from this seems to be that it is entirely irrational — leaving aside moral judgments — that any human being should be penalised, or privileged, in his capacity as a citizen because of the fact of his birth, falling, as it does, outside the domain not only of his personal choice or his ability to change it, but also of the entire human race to effect any change in our fundamental genetic make-up. Of course, we could always use the deus ex machina formula of declaring by statute ourselves to be something else than we really are; but this would be the final admission of our irrationality, the ultimate expression of escapism from truth and reality.

In like sense — but with important provisos — our mental make-up, in terms of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, is nothing else but a precipitate of the heritage transferred from generation to generation as an essential part of the process of socialization which applies to all human societies and individuals. Not only what we are genetically, but also what we believe, how we judge, the framework of our reference, the concepts of good and bad, of better and worse, of more acceptable or less — these we derive as part of the social heritage of the society in which we grow up and live and in which, for most human beings, we must ultimately find fulfillment of our material, spiritual and other needs and aspirations. The important proviso, of course, is that whereas there is nought we can do to change our genetic structure, our social heritage is, or can be made, subject to conscious (or even unconscious) change; norms, values, beliefs, attitudes can change, do change: how this is effected, in any fundamental kind of way, is mostly a function of a complex set of factors operating within and upon the society and the human individual.
The policy followed in any given society, be it in the field of politics, economics, social issues or racial matters, is a reflection of the attitudes, beliefs, and norms prevailing in that society, as part of the social heritage derived from previous generations. It stands to reason that such policy could only be fully comprehended if it is then seen in the perspective of historical events and forces and experiences that moulded these attitudes, norms and perceptions. There is of course, the temptation to make the psycho-historical mistake of interpreting history in terms of contemporary norms and insights; there is an even greater risk of interpreting history in such a way that it fits into our preconceived ideas, stereotypes or prejudices, and provides justification for these.

This *ex post facto* treatment of history as a means of strengthening and lending justification for contemporary attitudes and policies, is not limited to our generation and to our problems. Apparently mankind has not learned yet that a knowledge of history helps us to understand — and is essential to effect such understanding — why a given situation is what and how it is, but that it cannot *per se* provide rational justification for its continued existence or maintenance. South Africa's racial policy can then only be understood in terms of historical perspectives; indeed it would be more correct to talk about its *policies*, in view of the fact that, in historical perspective, in terms of geographical differences, and in view of the multi-racial character of the society, it would be difficult to describe all this as reflected in a single consistent and single-minded policy. It would take us too far afield if we were to attempt to analyse fully the various historical factors that brought about the formation of those attitudes in white South Africans that led to the formulation and implementation of South African racial policy. The following, however, seem to be some of the more salient points:

**Historical Background**

1. When the Dutch settled at the Cape in 1652 there was a relative absence of racial or colour consciousness. A distinction was made between Christians and Non-Christians; and, generally speaking, persons of colour who had been baptized and accepted into the Church were accepted as equals and shared equally with white Christians what rights and privileges were accorded to the community. In the first few decades baptismal acceptance into the Church entitled slave children to their freedom at the attainment of a certain age since it was considered contrary to the Word of God for one Christian to hold another in bondage. The result, one hesitates to say, predictably, was that fewer and fewer slave-owners were able or willing to allow their slaves and their slaves' children to be taught and baptized in the Church, until eventually, it was decided that winning souls for Christ was more important than freeing people out of bondage; it was no longer considered necessary that baptism and teaching should automatically lead to release out of slavery. Economic considerations, and not for the first, and certainly not for the last time, proved stronger than religious or moral principles.

It is also understandable that during these decades, there was no prohibition of marriage between Christians and Christians, be they White or Coloured, and intermarriages between white colonists and the freed children of mixed descent of the slave population were a fairly common occurrence. Regard must be had to the fact that because of the relative scarcity of womenfolk, the self evident exploitative nature of the institution of slavery and the geographical nature of the settlement, extramarital intercourse between slave women and colonists, soldiers and sailors took place on a quite extensive scale. There is even a recorded marriage, with the full blessing of the authorities between a baptized Hottentot girl and a well-known colonist, as Dr. Davenport describes. Attempts were subsequently made to limit or prohibit mixed marriages and extramarital miscegenation, with doubtful success. By the middle of the eighteenth century, as a result of the increasing colour consciousness, a degree of social stigmatization seems to have accompanied such marriages and miscegenation.

2. An important formative factor in the emerging racial attitudes was undoubtedly the increasing economic competition between the colonists, spearheaded by the Free Burghers in 1657, and the Hottentots, and subsequently the Bushmen and the Bantu, in the form of intense, and often bitter, rivalry for land. It is, perhaps, understandable that the Hottentots, the aboriginal inhabitants of the Western Cape when
the Dutch came, looked askance at the introduction of a permanent farming element of foreigners in a country they regarded as their own. It is equally understandable that, with the growth of the white population and the increasing need for agricultural products, particularly cattle, economic pressures forced the white colonists to expand, in a relatively slow but irreversible movement, despite desperate attempts by these aboriginal peoples to prevent it, to the point where more than 80 per cent of the total land mass of what is now the Republic of South Africa came into their ownership and subject to their economic domain. The rest was either de facto occupied by Bantu, often set aside as reservations by the white governments, or regarded as crown land.

The distribution of land between White and African, a matter of major ideological and practical importance, was historically determined in this fashion. That this was achieved, more often than not, as a result of the superior military ability of the Whites, had the further effect that the African peoples had no option but to accept this distribution and to look to the politically dominant white group for such changes as the latter may deem advisable or expedient. As far as the Hottentots and Bushmen were concerned, they eventually became unimportant in this respect, either because they were assimilated into the growing coloured population at the Cape, or were decimated by epidemics, particularly smallpox, or departed to other areas of greater tranquility, or were exterminated. The imposition of white control and the distribution of land effectively prevented further expansion by the African peoples; this in turn resulted in increasing numbers of these people entering the labour market as agricultural labourers and domestic servants, and, in the developing economy of South Africa, as labourers in the mines and in secondary and tertiary industry.

3. Although there was every intention on the part of the authorities to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the Hottentot and, subsequently, African tribes, the forces of economic and other pressures made this impossible. Within eight years after the beginning of the settlement at the Cape, war broke out between the colonists and the Hottentots, and for many years thereafter there was a greater or lesser degree of tension with some or other of the Hottentot peoples. The fact that the Bushmen were regarded as being sub-human and therefore fit only to be hunted, and the constant warring between the colonists and the roving Bushmen, who seemed to have developed (either through greed or by way of retaliation) a particular inclination to deprive the colonists of their cattle, constitute some of the less attractive aspects of this period of South African history. On a far larger scale, over a far longer period, with a far greater loss of life and property, the conflict between Whites and Africans dominated the South African scene for the greater part of the nineteenth century, resulting in the eventual undisputed imposition of white control and government, the subjection of these people to white political authority and domination, and the creation of a new political order in which political power was vested, for all practical purposes, exclusively in the hands of Whites.

Except on a severely limited scale in the Cape Colony, there was no sharing of political power between White and African. The steps taken during this century to give Africans some indirect voice — through the system of elected white representatives — in the South African parliament, were eventually terminated in terms of the policy of separate development, which provides inter alia for the constitutional development of the so-called Bantu Homelands. Also the limited voting and other political rights that the Non-Whites (Coloureds and Indians) possessed in the Cape Province (the result, basically, of the fundamentally egalitarian policy followed by the British Government in respect of the Cape Province and Natal in the middle of the nineteenth century) were removed, and the Coloured Peoples' Representative Council instituted as a substitute. In similar fashion (although perhaps with a greater degree of subterfuge) the Indians in Natal were deprived in 1896 of the degree of political participation they had enjoyed up to that time. The existing Indian Council is, at present, a wholly nominated body with purely advisory functions. The imposition of white political supremacy has, structurally and in fact, made the possession and exercise of political and legislative sovereignty the exclusive monopoly of the Whites, with the possible exception of the Bantu in their Homelands.

4. At a very early stage of the settlement at the Cape slaves were introduced and at certain
times the slave population actually outnumbered the colonists. Although initially a relatively liberal policy was followed in respect of emancipation for example, the psychological effect was to equate menial labour with colour, and generally to strengthen the self-perceived role of the white man as an overseer and supervisor. Manual labour on the whole was regarded as being unsuitable for Whites; it brought about and reinforced a social and economic stratification in which the Whites were regarded as superiors and Non-Whites as inferiors. And while slavery tended to strengthen the Whites' feelings of self-evident superiority, it seemed also to have psychologically conditioned many of the slave population and its descendants to an acceptance of inferiority as reflecting a natural order of things.

As is understandable, this stratification was immensely strengthened and extended in the subsequent economic development of South Africa in which the white man's role was that of entrepreneur, the provider of capital, the repository of know-how and the sole possessor of skills, while the Non-White was relegated to the unskilled and semi-skilled work of manual labourers. And where, under particular circumstances, the employment of Non-Whites posed a threat to the Whites, or where Whites were compelled to compete with Non-Whites for the same jobs, the dominant political power of the Whites could always be used, and was so used on occasion, to protect the interests of the white worker or to discriminate in his favour.

5. As mentioned above, initially what difference was made between people depended upon the question whether they were Christians or not. In the changing pattern of attitudes and norms in the formative years of this country, as a result of a complex number of social and psychological factors, Christianity not only lost its place as main determinant of a man's place in society and as an instrument of social stratification, but became positively identified with the white group's culture and way of life. Being white became identified with being a Christian and with being civilized, in the western meaning of the term. Black (or Non-Whiteness) became identified not only with heathenism (paganism) but also with barbarism and cruelty. The Bible in truth became the main, and very often the only, source of learning, and solace, in the ever-expanding movement away from the urban settlements. Under these circumstances, these pioneers, relatively divorced from influences from abroad, and even from the comparatively few urban centres, equated to an increasing extent their own pioneering struggle with that of the Israelites of the Old Testament; and they came to see themselves as God's chosen people, depending upon and trusting in God for their survival against the countless dark forces threatening their very existence, and seeing themselves as entrusted by the Almighty with the task of bringing Enlightenment and civilization to this continent.

In the deepest moments of their despair, as on the Eastern Front, at Blauwkrants, Weenen, Bloodriver and on other similar occasions, they turned to the only source of comfort and succour they knew, but always convinced that God would only help them if they were prepared to help themselves. The Bible in the one hand and the gun in the other became inseparable partners in the struggle for survival and existence. So strong was this feeling of identification, that they resented the meddling attempts by overseas philanthropists and missionaries to make common cause with the non-white peoples of the land. The Philips, Reads and Van der Kemps became the detestable symbols of assimilation and egalitarianism, incapable and unwilling to understand the Whites, ever active in besmirching their good name and destroying the healthy relationships between White and Non-White. As a result, at least to some of these pioneers, Christianizing and educating the black barbarians would amount to accepting them as their social equals, and for a long time this section felt uneasy about the missionary work undertaken by some of their Churches. In actual fact, the missionary work undertaken by some of these Churches in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent, was of tremendous significance and impact. It has not always been their fault that they failed to realise that the Brotherhood in Christ is fundamentally incompatible with compulsory separation and discrimination, within the Church at least, and also, as many others would maintain, in a State which professes obedience to the will of God. Perhaps the English Churches in South Africa have less excuse to offer.

6. As the last, and probably the most important, factor in the historical growth of race
and colour consciousness in South Africa, attention should be drawn to the emergence and development of this powerful, surging, irresistible force of Afrikaner nationalism. Considering the course of events in South Africa, it seems as if there were compelling forces of such intensity and magnitude at work that the development of Afrikaner nationalism became an inescapable outcome. The two Wars of Independence, and particularly the war of 1899-1902, brought about, to a far greater extent than anything else before, a sense of nationhood, the awareness of a common language, a common culture, a common heritage and a common future, and also a common realization that what form their future took, would have to be determined by themselves, and nobody else. For a long time there was great bitterness in the hearts of these people, brought about by their defeat, impoverishment, humiliation and the destruction of their families and of their land; and there are some people in South Africa who would maintain that the most vital aspect in South Africa’s political life today is still the unsolved problem of English-Afrikaner relations.

But, over and above the bitterness, Afrikaner nationalism arose as a positive force, not only to redress the wrongs of the past, but through the medium of Afrikaner consciousness and Afrikaner power (to use the terminology of today) to create a society that will allow for the full expression of Afrikaner identity in all conceivable fields. And because this Afrikaner movement succeeded, for various reasons, in gaining the support of the majority of Afrikaners, it became possible for them to gain control of the Government of the country (as happened in 1948 and ever since) and in this way to provide for the fulfilment of Afrikaner hopes, aspirations and ideals, and also to implement those policies which would accord with their general attitudes, beliefs and convictions. The race policy followed in South Africa particularly since 1948 must be seen in this light. The fundamental question of this last quarter of this century seems to be simply whether Afrikaner nationalism is going to remain the positive and binding force it has developed into over the last three-quarters of a century; and if so, whether it will be able to accommodate the growing black consciousness and black power seeking, as the Afrikaner did, for expression of black hopes and aspirations in a society and in a country shared by both.

I have just said that Afrikaner nationalism, once it achieved political power, wanted to create a society that would, as nearly as is possible, correspond with its basic beliefs and attitudes, even if some of those beliefs might be ill-founded, and some of the attitudes rest upon misjudgments, stereotypes and prejudices. This must not be seen as an attempt to ascribe qualities of backwardness or ignorance to the Afrikaner, as if he is the lone exception in a modern world clinging to outmoded ideas and principles. The Afrikaner does not claim to have a monopoly of prejudice. What I do wish to state, however, is that the policy followed in South Africa in this century and particularly since 1948, is basically an expression of the attitudes that developed over the last three centuries. I have tried to indicate the historical processes that led to the formation of some of those.

MODERN RACE POLICY

Let us now try to distinguish some of the basic elements in the policy. Obviously, it will be impossible for me to discuss this in detail, and we will have to confine ourselves, once again, to the more salient features. The basic distinctions that could be made in the situation before and after 1948 could be summarized as follows:

I. Although prior to 1948 there were certain fields in which formal discrimination and compulsory separation were practised, this was not done in pursuance of an ideology which aimed at regulating the entire area of human contact in South Africa. The policy of apartheid, as conceived during the 1940s and as applied by the National Party after it came into power in 1948, was an attempt to enforce separation between White and Non-White (and in certain areas between the various Non-White groups and even sometimes between the sub-groups within one of these groups) in as far as such separation was practically possible. Some of the measures taken were obviously simply a continuation of previous policy. There is hardly an area of public life that was left untouched by this ideology of separation. In order to effect this separation it is essential to know to what group a person belongs: the instrument created for this purpose was the Population Registration Act, providing for the classification of each and every South African in one
of the following categories: White, Bantu and Coloured. Provision is made for the subdivision of the Bantu group into its various major tribal groupings, and for the subdivision of the Coloured group into seven subgroups (Cape Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian, Other Asian, Other Coloured). These sub-divisions do have practical significance in that an Indian, for example, is not allowed to occupy land in a "Group Area" set aside for Coloureds.

For the purposes of our discussion we will however, confine ourselves mainly to the application of separation as between Whites and the other two Non-White Groups (the Bantu and the Coloureds.) In terms of the Group Areas Act, compulsory residential separation is enforced, and large numbers of people have been moved to their own "Group Areas", in which the occupation and ownership of property is restricted to members of the group for which the group area has been proclaimed. In the case of Africans, pre-1948 legislation had already provided for their separation into separate African townships, although the Group Areas Act did affect them in some ways. But the Act particularly affected Coloureds and Asians, many thousands of whom were compelled to move into other areas. The Act, however, does not only regulate the creation of separate Group Areas; in conjunction with the Act on the Provision of Separate Amenities and other Acts it regulates the use of and access to countless public facilities, such as trains, buses, taxis, beaches, government and municipal offices, railway stations, cinemas, theatres, cafes, restaurants and hotels, entrances, parks, benches, courts, trade unions, other associations, sports grounds, hospitals, schools, universities, lifts in buildings, and toilet facilities. Sometimes some of these forms of separation are referred to as 'petty apartheid'. There is no legal compulsion upon the Government, or other authorities, to provide these separate facilities on a basis of equality. These measures of separation have been justified generally by the formulators of the policy on the grounds that separation of the groups will lessen the area of conflict and is essential to bring about harmonious relationships. It follows almost automatically that in such a scheme of things, extra-marital intercourse and marriages between White and Non-White would be outlawed.

II. As is almost inevitable in a situation where the Whites are in exclusive political control, differentiation between White and Non-White (and sometimes within Non-White groups) would be a matter of common occurrence, sometimes amounting to factual discrimination. In the provision of funds, for example, it is to be expected that the Government of the day should first and foremost consider the interests of those people who have the power to vote them in or out of office. In the provision of social services, it has thus far been an almost axiomatic principle that less is being spent on the Non-Whites than on the Whites. An equitable distribution of the wealth and other resources of the country as between the various groups is probably impossible as long as Non-Whites are not represented in those bodies making the relevant decisions.

III. In the general labour field the traditional policy (leaving aside, for the time being, the policy of decentralization of industry) has been to protect the interest of the white workers against possible competition by Non-Whites. The Colour Bar has operated effectively, until fairly recently, to keep Non-Whites (particularly Blacks) out of skilled work; the so-called civilized labour policy discriminated against Non-Whites even when they were doing the same kind of work as Whites. Blacks are not allowed to become members of recognized trade unions, and are thus excluded from participation in the machinery provided by the Industrial Conciliation Act. Alternative machinery, on a totally different basis, has been provided for African workers in terms of the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act. However, the Wage Act stipulates that the Wage Board, which lays down minimum wages for unskilled workers, may not discriminate in its determination on the basis of colour. Legal provision has been made for the separation of existing trade unions along colour lines. The Job Reservation clause of the Industrial Conciliation Act provides that employment in certain jobs may be restricted to members of a particular group; in general this had been applied to the benefit of the white workers. The facilities for training for Non-Whites compare unfavourably with those available for Whites. The general principle has been stated that this Government will not allow a Non-White to occupy a position of superiority vis-a-vis a white worker, that is no white worker
will be placed in a position where he has to receive instructions from a Non-White. The effect of the labour policy has been to make it impossible for private enterprise to employ Non-Whites in skilled categories traditionally manned by Whites; although shortage of skilled labour is gradually bringing about a change of attitude on the part of the Government employers and white workers.

In government service, and in the public service generally, the employment pattern is almost exclusively white (barring manual labour, and jobs such as messengers), except in those branches of the public service created specially for the Non-White groups, in the Bantu Homelands, and in fields such as Coloured, Indian, and African education.

IV. In the political field, the general policy, as I have indicated above, has had the effect of eliminating all Non-White participation in the various legislative institutions, both central and local. Participation in these bodies was always relatively minimal, except in the Cape Colony, where great dissatisfaction was caused by the removal of the Africans in 1936 and the other Non-Whites in 1956 from the common voters' roll, and the eventual removal of their limited indirect representation from Parliament and the Cape Provincial Council. Provision has now also been made for removal of Non-Whites in the Cape Province from the municipal voters' roll in terms of the Government's policy of Separate Development.

SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

The philosophical basis of the policy of Separate Development is that the population of South Africa consists, not of a single nation, but of a number of nations each having identifiable and separate interests and aspirations; and that there is a duty upon the Government to give recognition to this fact of multi-nationalism, and to provide the machinery and the opportunities for each of these various national groups to develop according to its own wishes and along its own cultural lines; that it is a fallacy to assume that there is a single common society or nation in South Africa; or that such a common society will ever come about: that the white national group (including all Whites in South Africa) will never surrender its right of political self-determination, or share political rights with Non-Whites (considering especially the disparity in numbers) in such a way that it may lose control of its own political destiny; that, in order to avoid discrimination, and to provide opportunities for political self-expression, the only way is to develop political institutions for the various Non-White groups, these institutions eventually exercising full control over the separate and separable interests of the group concerned.

For this purpose, the Non-Whites are seen as consisting of a Coloured Group, an Indian Group, and about eight separate Black African Groups each having its own Homeland or area of traditional occupation. The goal of this policy is to lead each of these African Homelands to constitutional independence, if it so desires. To this end, provision has been made for the creation of legislative institutions in each of these regions and for a government service to undertake the administration of such services as may be transferred to the Homeland governments. These institutions have limited legislative capacity at the moment, but the Prime Minister has made it clear that the Government is willing to assist these Homeland Governments to achieve full constitutional independence when they so desire. In this way avenues of political expression and decision-making are created in a way that will avoid conflict and confrontation between White and Black and will lead to the eventual elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.

If this policy is to achieve its objective, it is in terms of government policy essential that these Homelands should be seen by the Africans as the areas in which they will be able to exercise full political rights, in which employment opportunities will be available to increasing numbers of them, and in which a growing percentage of them will be permanently domiciled. Official policy, therefore, is based on the following principles amongst others:

1. The settlement, on a permanent family basis, of Africans outside the Homeland should be discouraged, and steps should be taken to decrease the numbers already residing in the so-called 'white' area. For this purpose control over the movement and residence of Africans has to be maintained and rigidly enforced.

2. Africans living permanently outside these Homelands are politically integrated into the political structure of the Homelands; that is Xhosas living in the urban areas, for example, have the right to vote for members of the Transkei Legislative Assembly. In this way the
national unity of the particular African people is strengthened and any African, wherever he lives, is recognized as belonging to a particular national entity and has to find the satisfaction for his political aspirations through his national group. For this reason policy should aim at promoting the sense of belonging and identification; this is done by various means, such as the 'National' character of the African universities, the policy pursued for the last decade that all new secondary and high schools should be erected only in the Homelands, the application of the ethnic principle in urban townships, and the liaison machinery between urban Africans and Homeland leaders.

3. Further economic development of South Africa should be geared towards this objective. A positive policy of decentralization should be followed, with the emphasis on development of industries in the so-called Border Areas, enabling Africans to reside permanently in the Homelands, and to commute, on a daily or weekly basis, to their places of employment. To this end Government policy, by way of a variety of enticements and privileges, aims to lure industrialists to move existing factories, extensions and new undertakings to those areas; and restrictions mostly through the Physical Planning Act, are placed (in terms of the employment of African workers) on existing industries in the non-border areas. Special machinery has been created for economic development within the Homelands, such as the Bantu Investment Corporation, and the Xhosa Development Corporation; and private (white) industrialists are encouraged to locate their industries within these Areas, but acting as agents of the Bantu Investment Corporation in keeping with the official policy adopted some fifteen years ago and still lingering on, that private white capital and initiative should not be allowed in these Homelands. Assistance is given to Bantu entrepreneurs, and special and continuous attempts are under way to improve agriculture, health, social and educational services.

4. In pursuance of the ideological basis of the policy of separate development, the present urban African population is regarded as residing in the urban areas on a temporary basis, to be removed to the Homelands when the economic and social development there has reached a stage that would enable these people to be absorbed in these areas without major difficulty or dislocation. Urban Africans are, consequently, not entitled to rights that would recognise their residence in the urban areas as being permanent, such as ownership of land, long lease of land, trading rights, local government, educational and training facilities, welfare and other institutions.

5. The Government has recognized that it is impossible to talk of eventual independence for the Homelands as long as they are geographically fragmented as they are today; the Transkei is the notable exception, but even so the Transkei government has made it clear that they will not ask for, or accept, independence unless some of its territorial demands are met. Government policy aims at achieving a substantial degree of 'consolidation' of each of these Homelands, but many people doubt whether in terms of these plans, some of these Homelands will ever be viable from a political or geographical point of view.

There are many people, in South Africa and elsewhere, who doubt whether this policy could really be implemented, at least to the point of independence, and who feel that the Whites in South Africa will not be prepared to make the financial, geographical and ideological sacrifices that are prerequisites for the successful implementation of the policy. There is no doubt, in my own mind, that the Government is sincere in its attitude. I am not convinced that the Government, or the Whites of South Africa, have a clear picture of all the steps that will have to be taken to implement the policy to its logical conclusion, and of all the implications of independence when it is granted. There are certain nebulous ideas of forming a kind of confederation of Southern African States under those circumstances or a kind of commonwealth of Southern African nations, but this is not part of accepted Government thinking.

The Coloured and the Indian groups have no traditional separate 'Homelands' of their own, although a few misguided voices have been advocating, during the last few years, a creation of such a separate Homeland for the Coloureds. This has been rejected by the Government. The policy of Separate Development as far as the Coloureds are concerned consists, at the moment, mainly of the following:

(i) A Coloured Peoples' Representative Council, with an executive authority, having certain defined legislative powers to deal
with a number of subjects specifically affecting the Coloured group. This Council has 40 elected and 20 nominated members; great dissatisfaction was caused when, after the last election, the Government used its nominating powers to give the minority elected party a majority in the Council. A special department of Coloured Administration has been created to deal with those aspects transferred to the Council, such as education, social welfare, and community development. And also a Department of Coloured Relations to serve as liaison between the Council and the Government and other government agencies.

(ii) Separate residential areas for Coloureds have been created under the Group Areas Act. Provision has been made for the institution of a Coloured Management Board which will have some local government powers in respect of their townships, and which will have to co-operate with the adjoining white municipality. Whenever such Management Boards are instituted Coloureds lose the right to vote for members of the white municipal council.

(iii) The South African government, through Parliament, allocates funds to the Coloured Peoples' Representative Council and the Department of Coloured Administration for the execution of the functions transferred to those bodies.

(iv) Special measures have been taken to assist Coloured entrepreneurs in these coloured townships to develop their own business, and in general, to develop some of the natural resources in the rural areas. Such assistance is rendered through The Coloured Development Corporation.

The position of the Indian group approximates to that of the Coloured except that the present Indian Council is a purely advisory body, although the system of an entirely nominated membership is to be changed.

CONCLUSION

As indicated, the official policy is based on the concept of the multi-national character of the population structure of South Africa; it seems that this concept is being used, to an increasing extent, to get away from some forms of racial discrimination and separation. Multiracialism as a concept remains in official thinking, so it seems, as unacceptable as ever; multi-nationalism, it is maintained, simply gives recognition to the realities of the South African situation, and within the framework of this concept it is possible for White and Non-White to mix and to co-operate in joint action and endeavour. So far the new approach has brought about quite fundamental changes in the traditional South African sports policy, and also in other respects. It is my assumption that within the framework of this rather scientifically nebulous but practically very useful concept major changes in a number of fields will be effected in the foreseeable future.

In concluding this brief survey of a complex subject, I would like to give my own views on certain aspects of what I have described.

I believe that the policy of compulsory separation and discrimination on the basis of colour or race, is untenable; it is degrading and humiliating to the people affected and an affront to human dignity. A radical change is essential if South Africa is to have continued peace and prosperity. It is also obvious, to me in any case, that a much more ambitious and energetic programme for the constitutional, economic and social development of the Homelands would have to be pursued if the policy is to achieve some of its stated objectives. It is also clear that the Homelands policy does not cater adequately for the needs and aspirations of the permanently urbanized African population. A fundamental change of policy is required, based on the principle that those Africans form an integral and inseparable part of the population structure of the so-called white area. There seems to be little doubt in the minds of most thinking people that the present policy framework as applied to the Coloured and Indian groups is inadequate, and that, since these groups do not have their own Homelands, other machinery will have to be created for their full participation in our political life.

It is essential that there should be a sharing of the decision making process by all those who are citizens of South Africa; how this is to be achieved is a problem of major magnitude, but there are at least various possibilities that merit investigation and consideration. One thing is clear: South Africa can no longer be described as a static community. Major changes are under way, brought about by a number of factors: South Africa's economic development and the economic inter-dependence of all its people; the relative scarcity of white
labour, and the compelling need, for the sake of the economy and in the interests of all, to make better use of South Africa's available manpower resources; the growing concern felt in many circles in South Africa about the less satisfactory aspects of present policy, and the realization that the primary aim of policy should be to create a situation wherein the peoples of this country can look to a future of relative peace and co-operation and absence of destructive conflict and confrontation; the increasing and genuine consultation between the government and the leaders of the various non-white groups; the pressure from Afrikaner intellectuals; the new power structure created by government policy itself, whereby the expression of their feelings and frustrations, their ambitions and demands by non-white leaders can now take place through the established and accepted institutionalized channels; the emergence of Black Power and Black Consciousness and other influences, some of them not so obvious. There is no doubt that the Whites, and particularly the Afrikaners, are facing the greatest challenge of their entire history. This is equally true of the other population groups. I personally believe that commonsense and goodwill will prevail, difficult as the road may be. We all have too much to lose, and an immeasurable amount to gain.

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