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PEASANT PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF GRAIN CROPS IN ZIMBABWE 1890-1986: An Overview

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by

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"The bourgeois and reactionary parties greatly wonder why everywhere among socialists the peasant question has now suddenly been placed upon the order of the day. What they should be wondering at by rights, is that this has not been done long ago... the peasant is a very essential factor of the population, production and political power." F. Engels. THE PEASANT QUESTION IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

INTRODUCTION

The underdevelopment of the African Peasantry has remained a grey area in the history of Zimbabwe, writing in 1974, Ian Phimister observed:

"A full scale study of the African Peasantry in Southern Rhodesia is, perhaps one of the more urgent tasks awaiting those concerned with the social sciences. Land and Labour policies in the territory are receiving considerable attention from historians economists and others but both would take on richer meanings in the context of a detailed analytical examination of the African peasantry."

Historians have been content with mentioning the plight of the African peasantry only in passing. Those works that have looked at the predicament of the African peasantry have restricted their attention to brief periods of this important subject.

The aim of this paper therefore is to try and contribute towards the study of the underdevelopment of the peasantry by looking at Peasant Production and Marketing of grain crops in Zimbabwe from 1390 - 1986. An analysis of peasant production methods entails a look at the production methods immediately after settler occupation and the impact of the changes introduced by the colonial authorities after 1926. It is the submission of this paper that African resistance to these changes (including those brought by the Land Husbandry Act 1951) came more as a result of hostility and suspicion towards the white sector. This, therefore, invalidates the stereotype Eurocentric
argument that Africans failed to learn from their white neighbours more modern methods of farming and that they were indolent and inherently lazy. On this issue, the main thrust of the paper is that contrary to settler views that African agriculture was "unscientific and wasteful", given the land at their disposal prior to European occupation their agricultural techniques were both viable and scientific. Indeed, closely related to production trends and methods are pieces of Legislation affecting land which set in motion an imbalance between the means of production and the Africans obligation both to himself and to the state, finally increasing his responsiveness to wage-employment in the European sector. Without available land for all, "one of the corner-stones of tribal life had been wrenched away", since the holding of land is the entrance ticket into the peasantry.

It is the author's view that marketing of produce is as essential as production. In as far as marketing is concerned, the African peasantry enjoyed a period of success from 1890 - 1904. Prior to 1904, European farming was insignificant and it was during this period that the African peasantry produced and supplied the bulk of foodstuffs required by the mines, towns and needs of the Europeans. Land expropriation and the emergence of white capitalist agriculture reduced the marketable surplus of the peasantry and brought competition against African produce respectively. As far as peasant produce is concerned, there was no organised marketing system from 1890 up to 1950. The first attempt at organised marketing of Agricultural produce, the Maize Control Act of 1930, introduced chaos and suffering to the African peasantry. Indeed, it marked an important watershed in the underdevelopment of the African peasantry in Zimbabwe through lowering the value of his produce so as to prop up white settler Agriculture. In fact, it was meant to benefit the whites. As far as the small grains are concerned, even the Maize Control Act did not attempt to "organize" marketing these because they were considered as African grains. The establishment of the Grain Marketing Board in 1950 introduced an element of "order and fairness" in the marketing of African grains. However, the pricing and marketing of the small grains has remained an imponderable up to the present moment.

In broad terms the in our analysis of the Marketing of peasant produce we will divide the period under review into three phases viz;
I. "Free Marketing" system prior to 1930
2. Organized chaos of the Maize Control Board system.

As this is only an overview of the subject, the full paper will cover in great depth the evolution, development and impact of the Grain Marketing Board.

The post-colonial state marketing arrangements will be assessed to ascertain whether there has been change or continuity in this sphere.

The paper will also look at the overall policy of the state towards African agriculture during the period under review. At all times, the state held the future of the African peasantry in its hands, and at all times it sought to bring its weight and muscle on peasant produce for the benefit of white agriculture. By and large, African agriculture from 1890 up to the late 1960s was dictated and determined by events which occurred in the white agricultural sector.

THE PEASANCY : AN ANALYTICAL DEFINITION

The terms "peasant" and peasantry have been used for the description and analysis of types of rural society with relevance to a wide range of geographical settings and historical periods. Of late attempts have been made in which peasants have been differentiated from primitive agriculturalists on the one hand and from "farmers" or "agricultural entrepreneurs" on the other. This paper contends that a peasant is "a rural cultivator enjoying access to a specific portion of land the fruits of which he can dispose of as if he owned the land, and who by the use of family labour, seeks to satisfy the consumption needs of his family and to meet the demands rising from his involvement in a wider economic system". This definition G. Bundy argues focuses attention both upon the relationship between the cultivator and the land he farms, his crops and upon the relationship between the cultivator and the holders of economic and political power outside his own social stratum, the transfer of surplus in rents, taxes and unequal exchange.
Of necessity then a sudden disturbance of the above equilibrium threatens the survival of the peasants. The land available and the family labour must be enough to sustain his needs and to meet his obligations towards the state. The emergency of white capitalist agriculture threatened these two productive forces. Land alienation and expropriation and capitalists demands on the peasant society brought numerous hardships on the African peasantry. Indeed extra-obstacles were put in the peasants effort to market the little surplus that he had as from 1930, hence sometimes he was unable to pay his taxes.

It is safe to view both the creation of the African peasantry, as well as the creation of the peasant differentiation among the peasantry as being "primarily the result of the interaction between an international capitalist economic system and traditional socio-economic systems, within the context of territorially defined colonial political system". Indeed, any definition of the "peasant" must not aggregate together uncritically all peasants under a monolithic category, for the peasants may also be differentiated internally in terms of certain structurally significant variables. Moreover, position in the hierarchy of peasant subgroups is, to a large extent, defined by the amount of land held.

Peasant stratification in Zimbabwe became more pronounced after the 1920s due to the creation of the African Purchase Areas. A certain sector of the peasantry mostly those who had been in white employment were able to purchase land ranging from 300 to 6700 acres. These soon become the privileged few able to produce a lot of surplus as opposed to the majority of their counterparts who had access to between 6-10 acres. Relatively speaking, from 1942 the African Land owners were able to deliver to the Maize Control Board on comparatively better terms than their counterparts. Since they had more resources at their disposal they were able to buy produce from the lower subgroups and market it as if it was theirs. Indeed some were able to register as trader-producers thereby taking part in the exploitation of their fellow Africans. Their grievances and interests took a different turn owing to the wider base of resources that they had.
Both subgroups were however under threat from capitalism. It is important to note that the creator of the peasantry, capitalism, with the passage of time has sometimes posed a threat to its existence or brought it to an end altogether. Also important is the fact that from the 1930s the peasant that is being discussed here has become increasing proletarianized. This is to say that at one time the individual is both a worker and a peasant by virtue of his having access to a piece of land in the countryside while he is employed in the capitalist sector. The majority of the Zimbabwean peasantry falls into this category of "worker-peasants.

PEASANT PRODUCTION

There has been a lot of controversy surrounding the agricultural production techniques used by the Africans at the time of European occupation. A view which was widely held by both settlers and administrators was aptly expressed by Emery Delmont Alvord the Agriculturist for Natives from 1926 when he stated that these were "extravagant", "wasteful" "primitive and "destructive" tillage methods. One must hasten to say that this shifting cultivation was not as primitive and unscientific as settlers believed. On this issue E. Punt comments, "if one looks at the agricultural prospects prior to the arrival of the white settlers in 1890, taking into consideration erratic rainfall and the nature of the soil in conjunction with population, land ratios and the needs of the people" becomes clear that the nature of African production methods is largely inaccurate.

Responding to questions from the 1944 Native Production and Trade Commission, L.T. Tracey, the Director of the Farmers Co-op, remarked,

"I do not think we Europeans know such a tremendous lot about sub-tropical farming. We have made tremendous mistakes. The growing of an errant crop like maize is none too good for the land. The mixed crop was very much better; you had maize or millet growing together with prostrate crops, the nyemba, semi-prostrate crops like repoko and the cow-peas. All those things helped preserve the soil... I have considerable respect for native agriculture as it was practiced before the whites came here. It did stand the test of time."
Asked by the Commission for his views on African agricultural methods, D.E. McLoughlin, the Chief Agriculturalist, remarked: "I should say that it is a better system than the one adopted by Europeans. The tendency to depart from the old native system of agriculture and adopt European systems does tend to encourage erosion."

Such views were diametrically opposed to those held by people like Alvord and others. In M. Yudelmans' words, "The methods of cultivation used at the time Europeans moved into the area were remote from those evolved by Jethro Tull, the father of the European Agricultural Revolution. Because there was no use for intensive land use, low yielding extensive methods of production were employed." Perhaps the mistake made by Alvord is that he and others looked at African Agriculture more out of context. They assessed African production methods within the new environmental stress that had been created by land expropriation. As available evidence indicates, Africans were concerned with the productivity of the land and conservation of the fertility of the crops hence the burning of branches each time a new piece of land was used and the cultivation of crops that would go a long way towards reducing soil erosion.

Looked at more critically, the introduction of the plough into African Agriculture in general and Alvord's "Gospel of the Plough" left an indelible mark in African Agriculture. This factor, coupled with land alienation and the mere fact that Africans were assigned marginally productive land accounts for rapid soil erosion and hence a decrease in African yields which set in the 1940s.

It must be stated here that prior to 1900, Africans were producing for their own consumption but whenever surplus was available this found a market among the neighbours (those who had failed to produce enough for their subsistence). They were producing mainly the small grains - munga, rapoko, sorghum, groundnuts and some maize. While the small grains were considered as traditional crops, maize was by and large a crop that was popularized by the white settlers. There was a reversal of the situation when maize and not the small grains was produced in abundance both as a staple crop and a cash crop. Indeed, the African responded enthusiastically and satisfactorily to the requirements of a cash economy that had elevated
the status of maize inside a decade. However, all this was to be reversed again when settler agriculture gained prominence after 1902.

Perhaps the greatest stumbling block to the peasants' ability to produce a surplus which was so vital for his survival was the artificial shortage of land created by land alienation. This greatly undermined the peasants' ability to produce more and have surplus to market so as to pay his tax and meet his own needs.

By 1902, the African people had been expropriated from more than three-quarters of all land available in the country. This expropriation did not have an immediate impact on the peasants since they were still allowed to remain on "their ancestral lands upon payment of rent or commitment to supply labour services." Soon however, (1908-1910) the high rentals, dipping fees and hard and fast labour clauses on European land occasioned a widespread movement of Africans into the less fertile lands of the Reserves. As a result, the proportion of the African population residing on Reserves rose from 54% in 1909 to 59% in 1914 and 64% in 1922.

Falling average yields in African agriculture were the result of this forced exodus into the reserves.

A natural reaction on the part of the peasants was to engage in productive investment in the form of buying ploughs. This was meant to bring as much more land under cultivation as possible under these unfavourable conditions. While in 1900 no African owned a plough, in 1910 ploughs were owned by some 3,400 Africans. By 1920 the number of peasants who owned ploughs increased to 16,000. In 1931, this figure went up to 53,500 and reached the 133,000 mark in 1945. All these trends, overcrowding in marginally productive lands, distance of Reserves from lines of communication had a great impact on the Africans' ability to produce a marketable surplus as became clear in the early 1940s. Soon the authorities were to realise that the areas that had been set aside for the African's had deteriorated to alarming margins and something needed to be done. However, the remedy resorted to was not meant to immediately transform peasant agriculture but aimed at making sure that the peasants were able to produce enough for their sustenance and did not become a burden to the state.
As the Native Production and Trade Commissioner learnt in 1944, up to the appointment of Alvord as Agriculturist for Natives in 1926, "there was no organised system in vogue for the purpose of directing Native Agriculture." Indeed, from 1890 to 1926, it was the absence of the state from Peasant Agriculture which tended to stand out. There was no separate agricultural organisation within the Department of Native Affairs and general supervision of African agriculture lay with the Native Commissioners of each district who did little or nothing to improve African Agriculture. Suffice to say that by and large after the Second Rand had failed to materialise the state focused its attention on the provision of land to settlers at the easiest of terms. Indeed, while it might be argued that the BSA Co. government avoided direct intervention in the fields of production and provision of price supports or assisting in marketing, the Department of Agriculture did focus its attention on offering extension services and conducting research which benefited the white settlers.

The roots of the African Agricultural Policy which was to be implemented by E.D. Alvord as from 1926 can be traced to as early as 1910, when the Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Committee recommended:

1. The establishment by Government of Central Institutes in Reserves, where teaching may be given by expert instructors, not only in regard to the proper methods of tillage, but also in the treatment and rotation of crops and all other branches of Agriculture. Instruction would also be given in the management and breeding of livestock.

2. The immediate establishment by Government of a central training institute for native teachers.

In Alvord's own words, "These recommendations were ignored by the Administration and no action was taken until 10 years later, in 1920, when the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council adopted recommendation (I) and authorised the establishment of two central institutes." It was only then that the Department of Native Development was created headed by H.S. Keigwin, who located the first of the two industrial training schools in Domboshawa and Tsholotsha.
The Responsible Government which came into power in 1923 showed some concern to African Agriculture and decided to adopt "Alvord's scheme" which he had put into practice at Mt Selinda Mission. This scheme which Alvord claimed was to "influence millions and affect the economic development of a whole nation" hinged on agricultural demonstration work carried out by "demonstrators of his own black skin and kinky wool".

This programme, however, faced problems from its very inception. Apart from being undercapitalised, it faced opposition from white farmers, missionaries administrators and all these were exacerbated by the fact that for a long time relations with the Native Affairs Department were not that smooth. In addition there was no communication between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Native Development.

Agricultural demonstrators began their training in 1924 but it is important to note that E.D. Alvord, the brain behind the scheme discovered one year before their completion at Domboshawa and Tsholotsho "that the school(s) had no agricultural status and had, deviated considerably from the original sound lines on which it was established". The demonstrators-in-training had to remain on for an additional year of training. It is safe to argue that even with this added year bearing in mind that their instruction was not up to what Alvord wanted there was a lot to be desired from this first batch of demonstrators. Be that as it may they were sent out to teach the peasants modern methods of farming. From an initial figure of 12 demonstrators in 1926 this figure increased to 64 in 1937. By 1943 they had risen to 81 and in 1947 they had gone up to 105. It will be obvious from these figures that given the vast land mass these demonstrators were far from being adequate, hence their impact was to be limited to a large extent. E.D. Alvord owned up to the short comings of his department by saying "We have influenced 5% of the population of the Reserves in better methods of tillage".

DEMONSTRATORS AND PEASANT REACTION

Having been compelled to move into the Reserves, the Africans viewed this demonstration as yet another government ploy to get at their...
valuable land. The demonstrators, they strongly believed, had been sent by the government to come and ascertain how valuable their land was so that it could be expropriated. However, there was an added dimension to this. They did not see the use of adopting improved agricultural techniques so long as they still were far away from markets and when the prices of their produce were still very low. All in all, there was no viable market for their produce. The above reasons explain the failure to adopt these new methods as fast as the authorities would have wanted. The argument that the peasants were lazy and conservative in outlook falls to the pieces then because there was nothing beyond their capacities in this demonstration work.

It must be pointed out that adopting these new methods entailed a lot of work from the peasant family unit. In addition to this, it also depended to a large extent on the availability of manure or extra labour to make compost manure. All these were strains which were absorbed by the family which most of the time centred on the mother and children since the father was away for some part of the year employed as a wage labourer. All these facts did not seem to cross the minds of those critics of the peasant attitude to agricultural change. However, things would have been a lot better if the effort put in producing crops was to be realised in higher prices for their grains. The peasants did concede that where they had followed demonstration methods the average yield per acre did increase considerable but the major stumbling block was the price offered for the produce and the lack of a market. One gets a very clear picture from the following: "Those who will not follow the demonstrators ideas, are not they lazy people?...... There may be some like that, but most of them are willing to follow the demonstrator, but are being discourage by the prices given." 31

Reacting to the question why they demanded high prices for their produce Kamdeya replied,

"What we want a good price for is because nowadays mealies we are planting in the proper way and it is too much work to do and then when we have done it in that way and sell it the mealies of the Europeans fetch a bigger price than ours and it makes us go back" 32
Thus the peasants were able to see that there was no benefit to be got from engaging in a scheme which did not solve their problems of racial price and marketing problems. These institutionalised hindrances had to be removed first for them to enthusiastically adopt these modern methods. As mentioned above, the African peasants were suspicious of the intentions of the demonstrators when the later persuaded them to reduce their acreage. Charles Mzilingeli, the Chairman of the Native Labour Party (1944), summed up the peasant attitude to demonstration work in these words, "...there is little suspicion on the part of some Africans. Their idea of demonstrators is to crowd them in a little space and compel them to produce so many crops in a space which is not big enough, as they think." This scheme was viewed as a trick to reduce their important means of production, the land. If it proved successful then more of their land would be taken away as happened during the time of occupation, and the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. They had to make sure that this plot failed by not participating at all or participating only to that level which supported their important cash needs.

All in all the Alvord scheme was a half hearted programme whose full benefits were not supposed to be enjoyed by the peasants. Its inherent defect lay in that it exposed the discriminatory attitude of the state and its unwillingness to intervene in the peasants' interests. Its downfall, however, was the fact that it was under-capitalised, hence understaffed and could not usher in the grandiose scheme of an agricultural revolution in the rural areas. The peasants did not trust its intentions hence its mediocre success.

Initially the scheme was aimed at the peasants in Missions and the Reserves but later spread to the African Purchase Areas and the irrigation schemes. Irrigation yet another policy that had to be implemented by Alvord met with a lot of resistance from the peasants. By and large, the policy of getting the peasants onto irrigation plots was a difficult exercise indeed. However, this scheme was able to get off the ground and became an integral aspect of peasant production as from 1931 up to the present day. The paper will also look at the roll and impact of these irrigation schemes to peasant production.
MARKETING

(a) Pre-control Period 1890 -1930

Analysing the underdevelopment of the peasantry in Zimbabwe, Ian Phimister, has identified three broad economic sectors during the early days of occupation. These are:

1. That sector or regions specializing in production for export mines, capitalist farms and company owned plantations
2. a sector supplying the export-producing regions with food and services and
3. a third category which consisted of "peripheral regions which either supplied migrant labour or stagnated in near isolation from the territorial economy."

Up to the time when a deliberate policy to encourage settler agriculture was adopted in 1908, this second sector was in the hands of peasant producers. The structural underdevelopment of the peasants can be said to have had its genesis in 1908. The peasantry responded well to the favourable market opportunities made available by the mining industry. Indeed, like in South Africa as outlined by C. Bundy the peasantry in Zimbabwe did experience an early period of prosperity which was increasingly undermined as from roughly 1908. From this period onwards, white capitalist agriculture was to receive more attention from the state, and had a negative impact on the market for African grain produce. Before occupation, the Africans were producing mainly rapoko, sorghum, munga groundnuts and some maize but soon moved to the production of maize as part of their response to the demands of the market.

The peasants increased the production of their grain crops in response to demands for labourers' rations in the mines. Indeed, "the cornering of this market by capitalist agriculture was central to the subsequent underdevelopment" of the African peasantry. In most instances, these rations were inadequate and the labourers turned to the peasants to supplement their rations, thereby widening the market available for peasant produce. Small grains (munga, rapoko and sorghum) found a ready market in the brewing of beer in the mine compounds. Selling to neighbours and to migrant labourers also realised high prices for peasant produce.
During this early period, market forces militated against the establishment of capitalist agriculture. The market was relatively small and the prices were low and were determined mostly by African produce. Owing to all these factors, the settlers chose "the more profitable opportunities offered by trading, transport work, and various occupations connected with mining construction, commerce and speculation rather than farming." 36

Peasants and Traders

With the Rumours of vast mineral resources and great farming possibilities, there were many commercial companies that were floated for the purpose of supplying the inhabitants with their needs. It was during this period that small individual traders also appeared. These had "little or no capital at their disposal, but were either backed up by the merchant companies already established or else were financed from outside sources." 37 According to P.F. Hone, these traders opened stores near African villages and worked either for the large commercial companies, receiving a salary and commission on sales, or they entered into the venture on their own initiative, often doing business with one firm which advanced them a considerable quantity of goods on credit. The fact that they were undercapitalized was to manifest itself vividly in their relations with the peasants. They sought to make a lot of money in the shortest possible time. The trading was one both of buying and selling though few cash transactions were affected.

The traders stock consisted of "cheap white or coloured calicos (called limbo) salt and beads" and the Africans paid for these commodities "with grain either whole or hand-ground into meal." 38 Indeed from 1890 - 1930, the bulk of marketing of peasant produce remained firmly under the control of traders, leaving only the private market of the mines and farmers directly in the hands of the peasant producers. The trader always preferred to pay for the grain with the goods in his store rather than with cash, and to receive grain instead of cash in payment of the goods he sold, thereby gaining a double profit. However, sometimes it went further than this as the peasant was forced to buy the grain at exorbitant prices during times of a bad season. This system of not paying cash for peasant grains went on until 1930 when the Maize Control Act made it compulsory for the Traders to pay cash for any maize.
bought from peasants. The peasant still had to barter in order to market his small grains. Phimister has rightly observed that the refusal to pay cash for African produce served another purpose in the colonial political economy: this meant that peasants were forced into wage labour in order to obtain cash to satisfy certain of their needs and tax obligations to the Government. 39

By and large even this market provided by the traders was small and undeveloped. The traders in most times were not willing to trade in small grains. They argued that these small grains had no market outside the African areas. This had the negative impact of making peasants produce only enough for their needs.

The barter system in vogue during this period meant that the peasants were sometimes forced to buy goods of inferior quality. This was very true during the war years when it became difficult to import most of this "Kaffir truck" into the country. While the price for maize had risen during this period Africans had to face the prospect of accepting poor quality goods in exchange for the produce.

The limited nature of the outlets for peasant produce and the abuse of the barter system contributed a lot to the underdevelopment of the African peasant. Sometimes maize had to rot because the traders were not willing to buy. 40 Since the peasant was compelled to leave the store with goods and clothing, this meant that his ability to invest or to purchase cattle and other stock was severely restricted. Furthermore, this system tended to restrict the peasants' willingness to produce a marketable surplus since he was bound sooner or later to be satisfied with the goods and clothes for himself and the family. Commenting on this, the NC for Marandellas noted "... the accumulation of too much in the way of goods is of no good use to the Native and furthermore it stops the circulation of money." 41

The peasants however, were not passive subjects in this whole game, but one must hasten to add that under these conditions of low level of development there was a limit to which they could resist. They were very selective when it came to choosing the trader with whom they dealt. They went to the trader with the largest selection of goods or one who offered relatively better prices. In most cases, this
freedom to choose ones trading partner was not even there. These traders were few and far between. Being selective sometimes meant walking long distances for the producers to find an outlet for their grains. Confronting the trader on reporting his malpractices to the NC often earned the producer a banishment from the store, as evidenced by the following: "when I complain to the NC the storeman, who is on the Reserve says ... I will not see you in my store again. And therefore if I am chased away from that store I have no where to buy my goods or sell whatever I have." All in all then the producers were at the total mercy of the trader who changed prices as he wished.

The economic slump of 1921-23 and the low prices in commodities that followed thereafter reaching their lowest in 1929-30 were rubbed on to the peasants by the traders. The natural reaction from the peasants was to put more land under cultivation so as to be able to survive. They had no alternative but to part with their produce at the lowest going prices. The Chief Native Commissioner, writing to the Premier in 1929, rightly observed, "the Natives are increasing their maize production to the advantage of the middle-men perhaps more than to their own advantage." Thus, relations between the peasant and the trader always reached their lowest ebb during time of economic difficulties. This situation was not made any better by the emergence of the wealthy peasants who became traders in their own right. They exploited their fellow Africans perhaps they were the worst exploiters owing to the fact that they were very undercapitalized a fact which was also reflected in the stock that they had. Generally the peasant preferred to deal more with the European and African traders than with the Jews or the Indian. Evidence points to the fact that the Indian was the worst kind of trader.

The "Trader system" was one which sought to suck as much as possible from the Africans in terms of produce and gave back nothing in return. There were very few options open to the peasant owing to remoteness from markets and transport problems. Ian Phismister argues that it would seem in may respects that traders represented institutionalized "raiding" of the peasant produced surplus for the ultimate benefit of the capitalist sector. However, one of the victims of the system put it more aptly thus: "The result is this..."
that the storeman has highly improved his living conditions while the producer (African) remains poor in every branch of life."\(^{45}\)

The worst forms of this system and hence increased hardships on the peasant were to come to focus after the enactment of the Maize Control Act in 1931 which established the Maize Control Board.

**MAIZE CONTROL PERIOD 1931 – 1950**

White Capitalist Agriculture entered the 1930s facing great difficulties. Consequent upon the collapse of cotton, and tobacco cultivation, many white farmers in desperation moved into large scale maize production for economic survival. Politically, the white farming sector had entrenched itself in Zimbabwe and it used this lever to call for government intervention in the production and marketing of agricultural produce. Meanwhile the slump and the effect of the traders in rural areas had had their toll on the peasant producers. To solve their problems, the peasants, using the plough had cut more land under cultivation. In these difficult times the settlers were quick in blaming all their economic ills on the peasants. The peasant became a scapegoat in actual fact the world slump in commodity prices had caused the prevailing situation.

It was with these problems in mind that the Fort Victoria Farmers Association, wrote to the Minister of Agriculture in 1930 stating that we:

"...would like to impress upon you the critical condition of the maize industry in this country, now accentuated by the precarious state of the overseas market. There is yet time to strengthen the situation and avoid calamity and disaster which overtook one of Rhodesia's other primary industries. I am directed to suggest most emphatically that the government at the forthcoming session move boldly towards introducing legislation for the control of the maize industry on lines recommended by the Maize Association and the Farmers Co-operation"\(^{46}\)

Numerous other letters in a similar tone were to pour in from all the producer co-operatives and farmers associations in the country. All these strongly worded suggestions culminated in the passing of the Control Act 1931 which established the Maize Control Board in the same year. The Board which was an offshoot of co-operative practice came into being with the major aim of marketing producers' maize to best advantage under conditions of surplus production.
The submission of this paper is that the Maize Control Act of 1931 was meant to rescue the white farming community from the effects of the recession. An artificially high price would be created in the home market so as to enable the farmers to dispose of their surplus on the international market at whatever going price. The local market would compensate for the losses incurred in the export market. It was also meant to cushion the small producer, who was now suffering because of overproduction by the big producers. As a temporary measure the Act was supposed to last for about three years within which period the farmer was expected to cut down on maize production and engage in broadly based farming. The settlers argued that after all they had created the present market hence the Africans had no claim over this market. In essence, the peasant was to be sacrificed in this scheme of saving the white farmer.

Perhaps at this juncture one would like to make a comment on arguments presented by J.W. Barber and G. Arrighi on this issue. By and large, these have seen the Act as having been designed to introduce market Separation. Its broad objectives have also been seen as the exclusion of the peasant producer from the highly valued local market. This paper will argue that none of the above arguments helps in our understanding of the intentions of the Maize Control Act. Market segregation which has been highlighted by some historians was only there in theory. The following comment from C.F. Keyter sums up the hidden intentions of the Act, "Heavy emphasis on excluding African produce from the "domestic market" merely succeeded in obscuring the true motive behind maize control: to utilize the African productive sector for the benefit of the European sector."

E. Punt has tended to see the Act, especially the 1934 Act, as being the first Act directly seeking to control African marketing and production. She goes on to say that "in the absence of maize control, Africans might have realised prices even lower than those guaranteed by the Board." This paper argues that in reality very few Africans ever received the prices guaranteed by the Board. Further, the Maize Control Act with all its Amendments was only a strategy of syphoning African surplus to bolster the white settler economy. Indeed, the fact that African areas were so remote that
they were not served by communication lines meant that they were not in direct contact with the Board and had to deal with former traders who had been elevated to the status of trader-producers. In the Acts of 1931 and 1933, the provisions for the marketing of African maize were dealt with only indirectly in the section which defined "Trader-producers" and their obligations as follows:

a) only registered producers were permitted to acquire maize from Africans (other than an African acquiring maize for his own use.

b) All maize acquired by trader-producers had to be surrendered to the Board.

In 1931, all the trader-producers were Europeans most of whom bought the peasant grain for resale to nearby consumers, such as miners, missions, schools and outlying Government stations. It will be readily noticed that by so doing, the act had cut off the peasant producer from his traditional markets and the middleman was to gain from this.

As mentioned above, the Act was meant to bolster the small producer. By definition, the peasant producer fell within this category but he was not to benefit anything from the Act. Mr Jobling, the Minister of Agriculture from 1934, and E.R. Jackling, the Chairman of the Maize Control Board (1931-1948), argued that the African needed very little assistance even though his status was that of a small producer. The less well off European producer was allowed more in the export pool distribution as from 1934. Jackling argued that the Africans could not be put in the same category with the European producer. Even though the peasant was a "small man", he was not entitled to a similar pool distribution because of his low standard of living and the fact that it was cheap for him to produce maize on land that he had not bought using family labour. All these racial overtones were simply meant to obscure the real intentions behind the Maize Control Act.

The Board was to deal specifically in maize and not the "native grains", rapoko, munge and groundnuts. A Control therefore had the negative impact of discouraging the production of the small grains on a large scale. If these were produced in large quantities the market was not available outside the Co-operative Societies who bought these grains from time to time. The Act had the effect of elevating maize from
being a subsistence crop to being a cash crop in rural areas. This is a very fundamental aspect of the underdevelopment of the peasantry in Zimbabwe.

**THE TRADER PRODUCER AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF THE PEASANT**

Throughout the control period, the Trader-producer remained the main outlet for peasant produce in the rural areas. However, as from 1931 the farmer-consommer miners and ranchers began featuring as an alternative outlet for peasant produce. From 1931, the farmer-producers were able to purchase African maize on "cross entry terms". That is, they bought maize from the peasants on a cheap price on condition that they paid 1/6d a bag to the Board, "This being regarded as the contribution of the native maize to the burden of export". This system was in line with assisting the white farmer and the settler economy during these difficult times. As will be noticed, the peasant producer when selling to these "concession cases" was not able to realise the full value of his produce, he did not even get the price prescribed by the Board. The trader-producer on the other hand was able to purchase African produce cheaply, by paying the Board the stipulated 1/6d and then resell to the Africans on exorbitant prices. In most cases after selling a bag of maize for 4/6d "instances were noted where Africans were asked to pay as much as 25s to 27s a bag for No.1 meal".

These practices went on unchecked during the period under discussion. They were to reach their climax during the war years 1939-1945. Trader producers always bought peasant grain as class "D" maize, but in most instances it was a superior grade. "The bulk of the Native traded maize fell into class "D", "D1", but it is interesting to note that 29,440 bags received a superior classification". The peasant never benefited from this belated realisation of the good quality of his produce.

The trader-producer contributed to the underdevelopment of the peasant in the following ways. Although it had become a law that they should pay cash for any maize delivered to them, they still preferred paying the Africans using cheap but overvalued goods and clothes which were of inferior quality especially during the Second World War. Commenting on this malpractice a peasant producer in the
Makoni reserve had this to say "... they take mealies, and they say: All-right I will give you 8s for your bag of maize, but I am not going to give you the cash, you must buy goods". This practice was the rule rather than the expection. There is evidence to support the view that the state intervened to stop barter only when this was in its interests. When the collection of taxes was threatened by the barter system the Native Commissioners swiftly moved in to temporarily restore normality in the trade.

During the war it had become a common practice for trader - producer to use beaten out paraffin tins for measuring peasant produce. The measure that they used to buy in before the war "has been beaten out and enlarged to the extent of holding about one and a half times what it held before the war." It is important to note that the 1944 Committee went out to prove the validity of these claims and discovered the following:-

"At the first store, an Examination was made of the tin used for buying native maize and other products. It was a beaten out tin and filled level at the top weighed 37lbs. The weight of the tin was approximately 21lbs. A test was made with an ordinary paraffin tin filled level with the top and the weight was 33 lbs. It was estimated that the additional maize to keep the beaten out tin was about 31 lbs."

When one notes that it took six of these tins to fill a bag of maize the magnitude of the surplus expropriate from peasants becomes clear. Sometimes it went beyond this when this beaten out tin was placed in a box to collect any excess from the overflow and the peasant had no claim over this.

The farmer - producers who offered relatively better prices sometimes refused to buy peasant produce. The trader - producers were very selective when it came to buying the small grains. The market for these small grains was very limited hence Africans cut back on the production of these products. William Nicolle a former NC had this to say on the difficult faced in marketing small grains: "Small grains have given difficulty .... traders have told me that in a good season nyauiti and in some cases kafir-corn has been very hard to buy because there is no market for it." This obviously had a negative effect.
on peasant agriculture. To an extent the lack of markets for these
grains meant that the peasants continued as subsistence producers. No
efforts were made to effect changes in the small grains owing to the
limited markets. Also, it was not uncommon for maize to rot while in
the custody of the peasants because of the underdeveloped market faci-
lities.

Peasant reaction to the constraints imposed by control was two fold.
Some increased acreage and production so as to be able to market
substantial amounts to finance some of their needs. This is most
true with those who were closer to markets. Those who were in remote
districts chose to produce only enough for their needs for the
markets were not to be found and prices were low. However, generally,
Africans produced more maize especially from 1936-1940 and the impact
of this was to be felt by Europeans.

Under the 1934 Act, the European grower was given a fixed quota
participation in the proceeds of the Local Sales Pool, based on
the quantity he marketed in previous years. The participation of
the trader who delivered peasant produce, on the other hand, was
"calculated each year as a percentage of the quantity he delivers
during the year," so that an increase of deliveries gave him an
increased quota participation. In these circumstances, the great
increase of peasant production for sale and the consequent greater
claim on the Local Pool affected the quantity by which the quota
participation of the European growers adjusted under the terms of
Section 21 of the Act. The 1938 Maize Control Board report noted, "In
the year under review this quota adjustment amounted to only 23,380
bags, had native grown maize had no greater participation than in
the preceding year, the adjustment would have been in respect of
57,870 bags." The immediate reaction of the white farmers was to
apply for a quota adjustment on the basis of increased production
over the years.

The most important reaction however which had a reflection on
peasant producers was their demand that the peasant produce be
marketed by a separate body. For the first time, the peasant threat
had become a reality. It was also during this time that African
Farmers Associations were demanding the establishment of Central
markets where they could be able to sell to the government directly without going through the trader. 65 The well to do peasants wanted the Indian Jewish and European traders out of the rural areas so that they could get into their shoes. They were not so much disgruntled about the malpractices of these traders but they thought they had a right to take their places. It was the only avenue open to them for improving their status. This is one instance where peasant stratification revealed itself in different interests voiced by the sub-groups.

Jackling, who was also head of the Marketing Department, opposed these moves to set up a separate body for marketing produce arguing that this would make the collection of levies from peasants difficult. It would also make it impossible for the peasants to contribute to the Export Pool. However, all these arguments resulted in the creation of a Native Production and Marketing Branch of the Division of Native Affairs in January 1948, and a Native Production and Marketing Council in April of the same year.

With the evidence above this paper argues that the Maize Control Act failed dismally to organize marketing of African produce, and it was not its intention to deal with the small grains. It only facilitated the siphoning of peasant surplus from the peasant economy for the benefit of the White Farming Sector. The authorities were aware that there was great need to bring about orderly marketing of African produce. Indeed, the trader-producer system was "tantamount to theft by fraud." The traders would not have survived if the trade in grain was taken away especially if barter had been completely done away with.

From 1941, it increasingly became obvious that the functions of the Board needed to be changed in the face of increasing demand for maize and other crops which was not matched by supply. The Board had become more and more an agent of the Government in ways not contemplated at its formation. While the original Act was largely concerned with problems of disposal, the emphasis had shifted to problems of supply. It was partly for this reason and partly because of the need to extend control and orderly marketing facilities to crops allied to the maize crop that legislation to widen the scope of the Board's activities was contemplated.
The Grain Marketing Act came into operation with effect from 3rd November, 1950, at which date the Grain Marketing Board was established. The colony was experiencing acute problems of maize supplies to satisfy ever rising home consumption. Indeed, from 1941 the Colony had relied on heavy imports to meet home demand for maize. It began to be recognized that other grains might play a much more important part in meeting the colony's over-all grain requirements. The policy of price stabilization was put forward as one of the best means of stimulating production of these grains and the new Act was drafted with the intention of providing price and market stability for these additional products.

The Act was drafted so as to enable the control of grain marketing to be fitted into an over-all scheme for the stabilization of agricultural commodity prices on a more permanent basis. The emphasis was not on the extension of control but on the extension of the best means of providing for "the implementation of the price policy now subscribed to both by Government and the Agricultural Industry", and means were sought to give adequate safeguards with the minimum of control.

The most important changes in the New Act were:

1. the scope of the Act was widened to include small grains (rapoko, munga, sorghum, beans and groundnuts (1951)

2. the pooling system was finally abolished and the Board's operations could no longer affect the level of producer prices directly.

3. The board was given powers to divest any controlled product (i.e. to enable it to be marketed freely, without control) under the circumstances in which the Board felt that it could do so without prejudice to the aims of control.

4. The Board was also given powers by which it could allow direct consumers to buy a controlled commodity without becoming subject to the requirements of control. This emanated from the realisation that in some cases direct sale by producer to consumer is cheaper and more expeditious than sale through an intermediary.
5. Although the Board could now in effect free marketing of any of its commodities, the Act provided that it must at all times accept at the prescribed price any such commodity offered to it by a producer.

As will be indicated below, all these new provisions were to present the Board with a good crop of problems, especially related to the marketing of small grains and groundnuts. In most cases the decision to divest one or more of these small grains presented the Board with numerous problems. It must be noted however, that for the first time, owing to its increased contacts with peasants, the Board was in a better position to influence African Agriculture and Rural Development in general.

Under the 1950 Act, Peasant producers had the choice between the following three methods of surrendering their controlled grains to the Grain Marketing Board:

i) direct to Grain Marketing Board depots;
ii) through co-operative societies;
iii) through buying agents.

Under the marketing system in operation prior to 1960, peasant producers growing products on land owned or leased by them, not within "African Reserves", delivered such products directly to the Board and received the prescribed producer prices, less the prescribed levy. There is evidence, however, to support the view that the majority of the maize marketed by these producers was bought from the peasants in the nearby reserves. This means that these, of necessity, offered the producers in the rural areas prices lower than the boards prescribed prices. Since there was no system of monitoring this practice there is no knowing how low these prices were or how they varied from place to place.

In 1960, however, the Board decided to extend this facility of direct deliveries to all African producers whether they owned land or not. Under this scheme, all Africans participating were required to register with the Board and to provide particulars as to identification and addresses provided.
In so doing, they avoided the prescribed deductions of the equalised transport costs and buying agents margin and become responsible for these services themselves. They were thus placed virtually on a par with European producers both as to registration and in the method of payment by cheque instead of cash. In practice, however, not so many peasant producers were able to deliver direct to the Board. The distance from the line of rail or the nearest depot tended to discourage the peasant producers from delivering direct to the Board. By and large, the Board displayed some hesitancy in establishing additional depots in the rural areas. The main arguments for not establishing depots in rural areas was that this would raise the Boards operating costs and would be faced by opposition from the white farming community.

From 1956 onwards, peasant producers began forming co-operative marketing societies. By the end of 1958, 12 societies had been formed among landowners in the "Native Purchase Areas." These societies accepted grain from members graded and bagged it and delivered to the Boards depot using hired transport. The 1958 GMB Act exempted the African co-operative societies from the compulsory handling and transport deductions faced by peasant producers in the rural areas. Organized peasant producers were henceforth going to enjoy the full benefits of orderly marking in the colony. All these measures were introduced after the realisation that the peasant producer was of fundamental importance in the colony's grain production. All conditions conducive to increased peasant production and deliveries to the Board were being introduced.

**Marketing Control of the Small Grains**

As mentioned above, control of the small grains was originally introduced during 1950 and became effective for the Intake Year 1951/52. The main basis for the extension of control can be summarised as follows:

a) "Acceptability of the proposition that Sorghum. and mungo were substitutes when utilized for stockfeed purposes.

b) The need to encourage production of these substitute crops in areas unsuited for maize production.

c) Safeguarding the collection of Native Department Levies."
It must be noted that up to the late 1960s, almost the entire production of the three small grains (sorghum, munga and rapoko) was in the hands of African producers. Indeed, these grains were to play an important role with munga being used only as an animal feed; rapoko almost entirely for malting purposes and kaffir corn used for both stockfeed and malting purposes.

It may be argued that the original Act (1950) immediately secured the objective of increasing production both of maize and the three small grains. Very substantial increases during the initial two years can probably be attributed to the popularity of the system of control then introduced and the favourable prices offered for the small grains. After 1953, overall African production of the three small grains levelled out subject only to a rise and fall in accordance with seasonal climatic conditions. Linked to these seasonal variations in the marketing of the small grains has been the Boards' prices which have tended to encourage production and hence surplus. Also the Boards policy, at different times, of divesting or decontrolling these small grains has had a fundamental impact on the amount that is grown and delivered to the Board. Suffice to say that the small grains over the years have proved to be very sensitive to control or the absence of it and to the price structure prevailing there in.

Deliveries of small grains to the Board formed a very small fraction of the total production and these have fluctuated strictly in accordance with the maize price relationship. Owing to these fluctuations which themselves would have been good reasons for strengthening control the Board decided to do away with control of munga and rapoko in 1963. This meant therefore that the only controlled grains were to be maize sorghum and groundnuts.

However, throughout the period of control direct deliveries of small grains to the Board by peasant producers remained at a low level. The principal reasons for the lack of response of small grain producers to the opportunity for direct marketing can be said to have been that:

a) small grain production was considerably less than maize production and the individual producers marketed surplus was proportionately less;

b) small grains are relatively more important in the drier areas of the Country in which crop production is less reliable than in the higher rainfall maize areas.
the small grain production areas are in general further from the line of rail than the maize production areas with the result that the cost of direct deliveries tend to be more than the buying agent charges.

Owing to the problems outlined above the farmer trader-producer, the buying agents still played a prominent role in the marketing of peasant produce during this time. The Board employed delaying tactics in getting rid of these buying agents in the rural areas who continued to exploit the peasant producers. The buying agents could be eliminated in three ways, viz:

1) through the establishment of a Board Rural Marketing Service in the rural areas in competition with all other agents.
2) The establishment of a monopolistic Board Rural Marketing Service or
3) The establishment of Board receiving depots away from the line of rail at which producer prices would be based on line of rail prices less the cost of transport.

Although the obvious advantages to be gained by any one of the above to both the Board and the peasant producer the authorities argued that eliminating the buying agent would bring untold suffering to these agents. A GMB confidential paper trying to solve this problem remarked:

"But for the fact that rural marketing has developed on quite different lines in this country and that the livelihood of many people is based on the present system, to say nothing of not inconsiderable capital investment in marketing facilities, management would have no hesitation in recommending the adoption of a monopolistic primary marketing service operated by the Board." 75

This mood of hesitating to establish a viable primary marketing scheme in rural areas in fear of "political consequences" of uprooting the buying agents continued right into the late 1970s. It is important to note that this same paper was to highlight the malpractices of these buying agents which it sought to protect. In 1964 there were 1,440 buying agents registered with the Board and in the vast majority of cases, their grain buying activities were subsidiary to their business as store keepers. The paper noted, "most of these have the worst of resources; their knowledge of grading and their ability to keep records is suspect." 76 Although buying agents were required by law to pay cash on delivery for grain, this requirement was frequently ignored and barter practiced on a wide scale. The memorandum lamented "the present buying agent system is grossly inefficient and the theory that competition between one and another will result in maximum returns to the producer
is not borne out in practice.\textsuperscript{77} The producer was being exploited by these buying agents and not getting full value for his produce. Also the buying agency system affected the quality of the produce when it finally reached the GMB depots.\textsuperscript{78}

By and large, the Primary Marketing Scheme in operation in the rural areas up till the late 1970s needed to be changed to accommodate the interests of the peasant producers. The two most important ingredients necessary to bring about increased production of high quality crops namely, a satisfactory reward for their efforts and a convenient outlet for their produce had not yet been achieved. The buying agency system and not the peasant producer still benefited from the peasant produce. The GMB failed to make any concerted effort to bring its operations closer to the peasant producer.

\textbf{The Post Colonial State. A summary of observations.}

Grain Marketing entered a new phase with the attainment of independence in 1980. One thing that has been obvious is the way the Board has widened the scope of its activities by establishing receiving depots away from the line-of-rail and closer to the peasants. This means that to a large number of peasants it is now possible to market one's produce without incurring a lot of costs in terms of carting produce to the depots. Yet another favourable development is the establishment of collection points especially during years of good harvests so as to ease the transport burden on the peasants.\textsuperscript{79} The decision to establish both depots and collection points has been determined by two factors, the distance of an area from a line of communication (rail or road) and the amount of marketable produce within this area.

Owing to these determining factors, it has been observed that Matabeleland has been without the collection points and the depots. This has introduced yet another evil element in the marketing of peasant produce. In this part of country like elsewhere very few peasants have their transport to move their produce to the only depot in Bulawayo. Transport companies have capitalized on this by carting peasant produce at exorbitant fees. Obviously this has resulted in a marked decrease in the value of the peasants produce because a lot of money has to go to the transporters.
The Boards' policy of establishing depots away from the line-of-rail and the collection points have drastically reduced the role of the middleman in the marketing of peasant produce. More than ever before a large majority of the peasants are now delivering directly to the depots or the collection points there by realising the full value of their produce.

However, the delays in receiving one's cash after delivering to the Boards' depots and the collection point has made it impossible to completely eliminate the middleman who have continued to exploit the peasants as observed in Karoi. Owing to these delays those peasants who have very little to sell and with urgent cash needs have opted to deliver their produce to the middlemen at prices far below what the Board has prescribed. This means that the poor peasants in the rural areas and those far away from the receiving depots continue to be exploited by the middleman. The Board, however, has continued its policy of "approved buyers" who continue to service the remote areas by virtue of the fact that they have transport and ready cash at their disposal. The approved buyers pay cash on the spot, less transport and handling costs. It is important to note that since 1986 the Board has been gradually trying to introduce the system of paying producers' cash when they deliver their produce.

The government policy of extending financial support and extension services to the peasant producers has gone a long way towards increased marketable surplus from the peasants since independence. It is the authors view that contrary to widely held views the peasants have displayed willingness to utilize the extension services provided by the Government. This fact must not be viewed in isolation. Indeed it must be assessed side by side with improved marketing facilities for peasants and increased returns for their produce.

CONCLUSION

From 1890 to roughly 1904, the peasantry in Zimbabwe experienced a period of prosperity. Prices of agricultural produce fell considerably from 1904 and this fact was made worse by the negative role of the traders in the rural areas. One must add that this was the period when the state gave a blind eye to African Agriculture. It is the authors submission that the traders were an integral aspect of the colonial
system and that they facilitated the exploitation and underdevelopment of the peasantry in the rural areas. This period of exploitation and underdevelopment reached its zenith in the period of the depression and the Second World War. During this period the traders did everything in their power to appropriate the surplus produce from the peasants.

It is the authors' view that the delay to introduce orderly marketing of grains especially the small grains explains our present predicament of lopsided development in peasant Agriculture. The neglect of the small grains by the Colonial state also explains the negative attitude that the peasants have towards these crops. Indeed, a clearly defined policy on the marketing of small grains needs to be mapped out with a view to providing an incentive to the peasant producer to move into these crops.

The absence of a far reaching land reform programme since independence has meant the continued reliance on white capitalist agriculture to fulfill the needs of this country. One wants to believe that meaningful land distribution would go a long way towards increasing peasant participation in agriculture. In addition to land reform the peasant needs financial support and the provision of agricultural extension services. By and large there is an urgent need for our policy makers to realise that the future of agriculture lies in the hands of the peasant and not capitalist agriculture.
FOOTNOTES


3. The Grain Crops that this paper will look at are Maize and the Small Grains (munga, Sorghum and Rapoko) and Groundnuts.


7. S. Saul and R Woods Ibid p.105

8. C. Bundy op cit p.370

9. ZBJ1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission, B. Hassel NC Mtoko June 1944.

10. S. Saul and R Woods op cit p.106

10a Trader- Producers - these were people who registered with the maize co control Board so as to be able to buy maize from peasant producers and then sell to the Board. They did not have to be producers as such. They could resell the maize bought from the peasants.

11. ZBJ1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission June 1944, E.D. Alvord

12.

13. E. Punt The Development of African Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia with particular reference to Interwar Years N.A. Thesis p.11


15. ZBJ1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission June 1944 D.E., McLaughlin.

16. N. Yudelman Africans on the Land


18. Ibid p.202

20. E. Alvord, *The Development of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure in Southern Rhodesia* p.3


22. ZBJ1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission E D Alvord

23. E. Alvord, *op cit* p.5

24. Ibid

25. Ibid p.6


27. Ibid

28. ZBJ1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission E D Alvord

29. Ibid

30. ZBJ1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission June 1944 Amon (member of Wedza Native Council)

31. ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission June 1944 Rev. Timoti Kanyowa.

32. ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission Kamdeya (Member of Wedza Native Council)

33. ZBJ 1/1/2 Native Production and Trade Commission Charles Mzingeli.

34. I Phimister *op cit* p. 217

35. Ibid p.222

36. G. Arrighi *op cit* p.196

37. P F Hone, *Southern Rhodesia* p.309

38. Ibid p.311

39. I Phimister *op cit* p.224

40. ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission June 1944 C J Bissitt

41. ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission C C Meredity Acting NC Marandellas

42. ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission Andrew Midzi Agric. Demonstrator Chiweshe Reserve.

43. S482/701/39 Memo from CNC to Secretary to Premier 16/12/1929

44. I Phimister *op cit* p.222

45. ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission Andrew Midzi,
Memorandum on the pricing and marketing of maize and small grains in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Grain Marketing Board, p.31

Evidence for submission to the Commission of Enquiry into the pricing and marketing of maize and small grains in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, p.12


Ibid

A Buying Agent is defined as any person authorised by the Board to acquire a controlled product by purchase for delivery to the Board, in practice such buying is restricted to African products.

Grain Marketing Board Memorandum on "primary marketing to the Secretary of Agriculture" 20/10/64

Grain Marketing Board Paper No.122/64 on "Primary Marketing" 10/11/64

Ibid

Ibid

Buying Agent's handling of groundnuts greatly affected the quality of the product delivered to the Board.

* This is what one might call a "flying visit" on a subject that is huge by virtue of its width and depth. To be able to come up with this overview the author has consulted the following documents among others:

1. Maize Control Board, Annual Reports 1931 - 1950 (inclusive)

2. Grain Marketing Board Annual Reports 1950-1985. 5 Reports 1977-1981 covering part of the UDI period are not in the archives having been declared confidential material. I have been able to locate 3 of these reports.


4. Grain Marketing Board, Memorandum on the pricing and marketing of maize and small grains in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, 1962.


6. Evidence for submission to the Commission of Enquiry into the pricing and marketing of maize and small grains in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, October, 1962.


9. General Correspondence on Production and Marketing of African produce, (About 15 files)

10. Interviews

A number of interviews have been carried out in Karoi, Chegutu, Matsheche Communal Lands, Gwanda, Mzingwane, Esigodini and Mbabesi. A lot more are on the drawing board.

Without doubt a considerable amount of work still has to be carried out at the National Archives and Ministry of Agriculture Central Library.