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THE EDUCATION SYSTEM, WAGE AND SALARY
STRUCTURES, AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION:

LESOTHO AS A CASE STUDY,

CIRCA 1975.

BY

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INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES

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"The Education System, Wage and Salary Structures, and Income
Distribution: Lesotho as a Case Study, Circa 1975."

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"The Education System, Wage and Salary Structures, and Income Distribution: Lesotho as a Case Study, Circa 1975."

Introduction

Philip Foster opened a recent paper with the statement: "Few would disagree with the observation that the schools and universities of sub-Saharan Africa are perhaps the most important contemporary mechanism of stratification and redistribution on the continent."¹ There are, of course, very serious disputes about the nature of the interaction between the education system and the broad social and political structure, and the role that formal schooling plays in the reproduction and evolution of social classes. Many would argue that a focus on the education system is superficial, since the education system only reflects the policy of the groups controlling the State apparatus, and that an understanding of "stratification and redistribution" can only be achieved through a political economy analysis of the state in class terms.² These disputes are important, since they concern our understanding of the 'deep' structures of society and the underlying, as opposed to surface, mechanisms generating social structure. Nevertheless, it is useful to understand in detail the nature of the role formal education structures play in terms of stratification and redistribution in narrower senses, such as the purely economic. Very few such detailed case studies exist, although most observers have general notions of the probable qualitative results of the interaction.³ These qualitative expectations are that, on an intra-generational basis, the education system in sub-Saharan Africa has a disequalizing effect on income distribution.

This qualitative expectation is based on the interaction of three observations: (1) that public expenditures on schooling per student-year

escalate rapidly as students move up through the system, so that typically in sub-Saharan Africa a university student benefits from about 100 times as much public subsidy as a primary school student⁴, (2) that enrollment ratios fall rapidly as one moves up the system, so that secondary enrollments are typically only 10 to 11% of primary, and tertiary enrollments only 2 to 5% of secondary⁵, and (3) the rate of return to investment in education, although it tends to fall as one moves up through the system, does not fall nearly fast enough to offset the greater per-student subsidy.⁶

If one adds a fourth observation, namely that the children of the better off are typically overrepresented at the higher levels of the educational system, one obtains a basis for two further qualitative results, namely that the educational system does not display ex-post equality of opportunity, and is serving to reproduce inequalities from one generation to the next. This last observation may or may not involve, in a strict sense, intergenerational disequalizing, depending on the incidence of the tax system generating the revenues used for public expenditure on education, and the criterion used to define inequality of benefit and cost incidence.⁷

This paper attempts to spell out in detail the mechanisms of this general process in a particular country, namely Lesotho in the mid 1970's. Lesotho provides a useful case-study because of the unusually extreme nature of the labor market side of the process. For a mixture of historic, political, and geographic reasons, one can make very strong assumptions about the relationships between formal educational attainments and labor incomes with considerable confidence. In what follows, data will be presented on three elements in the mechanism we are discussing: (1) the nature of the labor

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market and the links between educational attainments and initial wage or salary levels; (2) the cost and enrollment structures of the formal educational system; and (3) the socio-economic origins of university students compared to the population as a whole. After presenting these data, their implications for income distribution will be discussed, together with some suggestions about possible policy changes.

Labor in Lesotho

As in most less developed countries (lde's), the labor situation in Lesotho is difficult to describe in precise quantitative terms since, apart from data shortages, most domestic economic activity is organized in informal enterprises, often coinciding with households, and considerable ambiguity consequently surrounds the labor force status of many individuals (particularly rural females, the young, and the aged). Only a relatively small minority of the total population aged 15-64 years are employed for wages on a regular basis within Lesotho -approximately 4 to 5% in the mid 1970s. This proportion is, however, not unusually low for East and Central Africa -in 1968 the ratio of number employed for wages to total population was 2.8% in Tanzania and 3.5% in Uganda.⁸ On the other hand, Lesotho is very unusual in that an extremely high proportion of the male labor force is normally absent from the country in employment in the Republic of South Africa (RSA). For complex institutional and historic reasons, all estimates of the numbers of migrant workers from Lesotho in RSA should be treated with considerable caution, but Table I includes the "best-guess" estimates available.⁹ The bulk of the migrants are male, relatively uneducated, and work in the gold, coal, diamond, and other mines of RSA. Both male and female migrants work, often on

a seasonal basis, in relatively unskilled jobs in agriculture in RSA. Many of the female migrants also work in domestic service in RSA. However, some migrants from Lesotho, both male and female, are found in all sectors of the RSA economy. Quantitatively, the skill-mix and educational background of migrants outside mining are essentially unknown, but it is clear that in some sectors, e.g. the construction trades, migrants often include skilled workers.

Within Lesotho, the growth of full-time, regular wage employment has been relatively slow in the 1970's and much slower than the growth of the labor force. In the mid 1970's about 15,000 more people reached age 15 each year than reached age 65, whereas regular wage employment in the modern sector in Lesotho increased by only between 2,000 and 3,000 a year, with about half the increase in Government itself (including teaching in Government). Nevertheless, Lesotho was still suffering from a severe skill shortage, with many expatriates still employed and large numbers of vacant posts in government at levels requiring technical training or higher education.

The result of this situation is that we can be relatively confident of the expected income of new entrants to the labor force on the basis of their educational qualifications. Initial placement in the public service depended on educational qualifications only, and the initial salary levels are shown in Table 2. For comparison, cash wages for novice underground mineworkers in the second half of 1975 in RSA were R57.20 a month, with the surface minimum R36.40 a month¹⁰; by 1978 these rates had increased to R76.70 and R50.70 respectively.¹¹ Average cash wages of African mineworkers in RSA were

considerably higher, at R79 and R126 monthly in 1975 and August 1978 respectively.

There were no educational qualifications for migrant mine work in RSA, only physical ones. Admittedly, minework in unpleasant, physically demanding and dangerous, involves separation from families, and requires life under the apartheid South African regime. Nevertheless, remembering that mine employment involves free board, lodging, and medical care in addition to cash wages, if we focus on pecuniary returns only the implications are striking. In 1975, even a novice mineworker on the surface could earn the Lesotho minimum wage in 9.9 months, while an underground novice could earn the starting salary of a recruit with JC (Junior Certificate-three years of Secondary School) to the Lesotho public service in 10.9 months. The average migrant mineworker in 1975, if he spent the whole year in RSA, could earn 42% more than the starting salary of the highest entry level COSC (Cambridge Overseas School Certificate-High School Graduate) recruit to the Lesotho public service! In 1978, the picture was not much different; a surface novice could earn the Lesotho minimum in 11.8 months, an underground novice could earn the JC entry salary in 9.7 months, and despite the large increase in COSC entry salaries, the average mineworker in a full year had earnings only some 11% lower than the top entry rate for COSC in the Lesotho public service.

The implications of these comparisons are worth exploring in detail. In pecuniary terms, so long as migration to minework in RSA was available, there was no positive pecuniary return to investment in education below the tertiary level. This poses problems for government policy toward education. For some time, it has been evident that the demand from RSA for labor from Lesotho may

be reduced below the numbers willing to go, and in recent years there have at times been severe restrictions on recruitment. As insurance against a fall in demand, and for the long run, it is clearly desirable that the Lesotho educational system provide students with skills that increase their earning capacity in economic activity within Lesotho. But currently, the populace essentially has no incentive to encourage this; from the point of view of the student, in solely pecuniary terms the educational system provides no payoff unless the student reaches the university level. Table 3 shows how long the odds are -about 500 to 1. The education system can be compared to a lottery with a big payoff if you win. In these circumstances, why support changes (away from a traditional academic curriculum) which may hurt your already small chances of that big payoff, if the advantages of the changes are perceived as non-pecuniary and uncertain? Admittedly, there are other, complex, historical, political, and institutional reasons why the curriculum remains academic and top-down influenced, but it is significant that in economic terms, the private returns to progress through the system are essentially zero unless one reaches the tertiary level. It is also true, as we shall see, that the process of progression through the system is not a random lottery, but one biased in favor of the children of the better-off. Nevertheless, in these circumstances there is no economic motivation for the public to press for change in the curriculum, and one can understand the widespread feeling in Lesotho that independence has produced few benefits for the population except for the university-educated elite.

The Education System

Table 3 spells out the rapidly declining enrolment ratios as a cohort moved through the formal education system in Lesotho in the 60's and 70's. This section will briefly flesh out the structure of the educational system, and provide some additional information on the costs of that system.

Formal education was introduced to Lesotho by Christian missions over a century ago. The system is still dominated by various church groups, although now most teachers' salaries are paid by government. The location and number of schools has been affected by competition between denominations, with the result that there are often several schools serving geographic areas that could well be served by fewer, larger schools. In 1977 there were believed to be around 1,056 primary schools, serving the first seven years of schooling (not all schools offer the full seven years), and 63 secondary schools. Many secondary schools only offer the three year Junior Certificate course (Forms A through C); the fourth and fifth years (Forms D and E), leading to the COSC examination (the entry requirement for higher education) are available to only about one third of the pupils who reach Form C. 98% of primary schools, and 85% of secondary schools, are controlled by religious groups.

Schools are frequently poorly-equipped and staffed. Average class size in primary schools in 1977 was over 50, and 31% of teachers were unqualified. In 1975, the accommodation for primary pupils permitted 32% to sit at desks, 26% to sit on benches, and 1% to sit on chairs, with about 41% sitting on the floor. 7% of classes were being held outdoors, and fully 30% of the classroom buildings were judged beyond repair or in need of major repairs. In many schools, up to 80% of pupils have no learning materials (books, etc.)

whatsoever. Secondary schools are somewhat better in terms of average class size and physical facilities, but the proportion of unqualified teachers is similar. In 1977 there were some 152 expatriate teachers at this level, over 20% of the total, and expatriates dominated mathematics and science teaching at the secondary level.

Two peculiarities of education in Lesotho are that females outnumber males among students at most levels, and that enrollment ratios at primary entering level (standard 1) have persistently exceeded 100% for several years. The explanation of the first peculiarity is usually alleged to be connected with the sexual division of labor in Lesotho and consequent differences in opportunity costs of school attendance. Care of livestock is a male task; the absence of large numbers of adult males in RSA implies a strong demand for young herdboys (usually estimated at about 60,000 on average). Boys as young as 6 or 7 years old will occasionally be encountered herding livestock, although usually close to home or assisting a teenager. Herdboys are paid (traditionally in kind - lambs, kids, or calves - occasionally now in cash) and the nucleus of a personal herd can be obtained by adulthood by the enterprising herdboys.

The excess enrollment in Standard 1 is partly explained by repeating, and under- and over-age admission. However, it has persisted so long that it is probable that it is also connected with population flows to and from RSA.¹² Because of opposition to so-called "Bantu education" in RSA, and for other social, political, and educational reasons, some Sesotho-speaking residents of RSA enroll their children in schools in Lesotho rather than in RSA (usually

via relatives in Lesotho with whom the children stay). No quantitative evidence on the number of such pupils exists and given the frequent ambiguities concerning citizenship and place of permanent residence of individual Basotho in Southern Africa, such data are probably uncollectable. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests, however, that there are significant numbers of students with closer family ties in RSA than within Lesotho at all levels of the primary and secondary education system.

Primary schooling in Lesotho is officially tuition-free, since 1974. The unit cost to government in the late 1970's was about R20 per year. However, in practice all primary schools continue to demand payments from pupils for attendance, for such purposes as registration, supplies, building maintenance, etc. These charges vary with school and standard, but most fall in the range R3 to R14 per year. At secondary level, an explicit tuition fee is still charged (R40 a year, officially, in 1977), and the other charges are much higher, averaging perhaps R75 per year with a wide range. Only a minority of secondary students, essentially those from urban families, can live at home (the population is about 90% rural); the majority must either board (at an additional fee, around R45 to R100 a year in 1975) or take lodgings with relatives or strangers.

At university level, virtually all students are on government bursaries which cover all costs and provide a stipend. Until 1977, these bursaries were gifts to the students, the only obligation carried by the student being to work for government (at normal pay scales) for a number of years if a post was offered. Since 1977, the bursary has been converted into a loan, partially

remitted if the student performs well and/or works within the country for five years after graduation.¹³ Average costs per student-year to government for the three levels of formal academic education in 1977 were about R20 at the primary level, R95 at the secondary level, and R2,290 at the university.

There is also a National Teacher Training College and a number of technical training institutes, some with histories dating back to the nineteenth century, and provision for vocational training in some secondary schools. Neither teacher training nor technical and vocational training will be addressed here. The major problem with respect to skilled manual workers is not training capacity, but domestic wage levels compared to those in RSA. Perhaps three quarters of those who have received technical training in Lesotho in the 1960's and 1970's actually work in RSA rather than Lesotho.¹⁴

National University of Lesotho Students

The data in this section are drawn from the results of a survey administered by the author to all first-year students at the National University of Lesotho (NUL) in early 1976.¹⁵ Tables 4 through 8 give some information on the socio-economic origins of these students.¹⁶

In the case of most characteristics, it is not possible to give a detailed comparison with the relevant segments of the population as a whole, since such detailed data are not available for the country as a whole. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that the students at the university are not a representative group, although they do come from a broad range of backgrounds.

Consider first Table 4, which summarizes the responses to questions requesting identification of the major (most important) occupation and

economic activity" of students' fathers and mothers. A few salient points stand out. Over a quarter of students' fathers are either civil servants or teachers, and fully half have non-agricultural occupations within Lesotho. Of the male labor force as a whole, probably less than 10% have non-agricultural occupations within Lesotho. Close to 22% of students' fathers work in RSA; given the age-group of fathers, this may not be much different from the relevant comparison group. But as many students' fathers are migrants not in mining as are mineworkers; this is strikingly different from the usual beliefs about the industrial distribution of migrants, which suggest only about 20% to 30% of migrants are not mineworkers.¹⁷

However, it would be consistent with students' fathers being drawn disproportionately from the more educated strata of the population, since the more educated and skilled are more likely to have non-mining jobs in RSA. Table 5 gives some information on educational attainments of students' parents, compared to persons aged 30-49 at the time of the 1966 Census.¹⁸

As might be anticipated, the children of the more educated have a much better chance of reaching university than the children of the less educated. This is dramatized by the "disparity ratios" or "selectivity indices" shown in columns 5 and 6. These show, for example, that persons whose mothers attained matriculation are present at the university in 75 times the numbers that they are in the population as a whole, whereas persons with fathers with no schooling at all are present at the university in only one fifth the numbers they are in the population as a whole. To put it another way, a child whose father had a university degree was over 200 times more likely to get to

university than one whose father had no schooling; and a child whose mother had a university degree was over 500 times more likely to get to the university than one whose mother had no schooling.¹⁹

Table 6 compares the data on paternal education and selectivity indices for NUL students with those available from the literature on some other African countries. Unfortunately, most of these refer to secondary school students. Nevertheless, it is very striking to note that no other study has reported as strong underrepresentation of those whose fathers have no formal schooling as these data show for Lesotho, and that if the NUL data are recalculated to give comparability with the Ahmadu Bello data, fully 56% of the NUL students' fathers had some post primary education, compared to only 14.2% at Ahmadu Bello; the selectivity index for the NUL students in this category is not calculable from available data, but is probably higher than the Ahmadu Bello figure of "at least fifteen". The NUL data seem to be consistent with the conclusions of Clignet and Foster, and O'Connell and Beckett, that "father's education has a still heavier impact on the chances that a child will reach high educational levels than father's occupation or income."²⁰

No comparative data on mother's education levels are available. The NUL selectivity indices, which appear to show much more influence of mother's education than of father's, probably largely reflect the well-known "marrying-up" phenomenon, i.e. it is likely that most mothers do not have more education than fathers. However, the data unfortunately do not permit an explicit check on whether this interpretation is correct.

Tables 7 and 8 give some information to compare those student families which were engaged in agricultural activity with the rural population as a whole. 65% of students claimed to be from rural areas, compared to over 90% of the population as a whole. Table 7 shows that the rural students' parents were much more likely to be engaged in cash crop production than the rural population as a whole, and Table 8 shows that students were drawn disproportionately from the households with larger cattle holdings (cattle are the main form of rural wealth). Together, these two tables strongly suggest that children of both urban and rural elites are overrepresented among university students.

The questionnaire also requested students to estimate their parents' joint total monthly cash income, after taxes. Only 36% hazarded a response, and the responses are probably neither reliable nor an unbiased sample. For what it is worth, the implied mean monthly household cash income was over R165, whereas estimates of mean monthly household total income for the same period for the country as a whole range from R60 to about R90. Over 25% of students responding reported family incomes of over R200 a month, whereas in the country as a whole probably less than 1% of all households had such incomes.²¹

Unfortunately, as noted above, sufficient information does not exist on income distribution and the incidence of taxation in Lesotho to come to any firm conclusions about the overall effects of the education system on income distribution. However, some strong indications are given by two observations. The first is that the bulk of the Lesotho government's recurrent revenue is

derived from the Southern African Customs Union Agreement.²² The nature of that agreement makes it virtually impossible to measure the incidence of indirect taxation, but it is surely not progressive. The direct personal taxation system, which accounts for less than 10% of tax revenue, is only mildly progressive. Hence it is reasonable to assume that tax incidence in Lesotho, across income classes, is at best only mildly progressive; it could well be proportional or even regressive.

Second, it is possible to roughly estimate the prospective rate of return to university education on the basis of government salary scales, tax schedules, and scholarship/bursary-loan practices. In 1975, using 1975 salaries and practices, the prospective private rate of return to a university degree exceeded 50%; in 1978, using 1978 salaries and assuming a full-cost bursary is repaid in full, the prospective private rate of return was still about 8% (the social rate of return, assuming salaries reflect productivities, was still about 20% in 1978).²³

Since the pecuniary private rate of return to primary education, JC and COSC, assuming the opportunity cost is migrant mine work, was zero or negative it is strongly suggested that the education system, in conjunction with the labor market, is disequalizing distributionally in that it only provides pecuniary benefits to those who reach and complete University, and these students come disproportionately from the higher socio-economic strata.

Conclusions

Briefly, we should note some aspects of the causes of this situation which might be amenable to meliorating policy moves. The most obvious one is the

financing system used at high school level. As noted, the private costs of high school education are quite high, of the order of R100 to R150 or more a year out-of-pocket plus substantial foregone earnings, at least for males. Table 9 summarizes the sources of finance for high school costs for NUL students. Although this table only gives the proportion of students identifying each source as used, not any indication of the quantitative contributions to total costs from each source, Table 9 together with other information makes clear that families are the most important sources of finance for students in high school. No information is available on the socio-economic composition of those completing primary school compared to those completing high school, but obviously the cost of high school will be a much greater barrier to low income families than to high income families. It would appear, therefore, that one step which would improve the equity of the situation would be to extend the loan-bursary scheme to the high school level, as suggested by the JASPA report.²⁴ The only problem with this idea is that the current prospective pecuniary private return to secondary education for males is essentially zero, assuming the possibility of migration to work in RSA continues.²⁵ Given the observation that this possibility appears to be contracting relatively rapidly as the employers in RSA reduce their foreign labor components and attempt to stabilize the composition of their migrant work forces (via "re-engagement certificates," etc.),²⁶ this suggests that attention has to be focused more directly on the interactions between formal education, economic productivity, and wage and salary policies. Some meliorative policy steps could be taken in terms of a more equitable geographic distribution of facilities and resources in secondary education,

but in the peculiar circumstances of Lesotho it seems doubtful that a meliorative set of policies will have much impact on the basic disequalizing process, and is quite likely to introduce further distortions (e.g. the loan bursary scheme extended to high school level would increase the demand for high school places, but if the graduates cannot find remunerative domestic employment, the loans may be uncollectable). What kind of policy could prevent a disequalizing effect from formal education in the Lesotho context is unclear, but it is very probable it would require radical change rather than meliorative policy. Of course, government may not in fact be interested even in meliorative policy. The establishment of an elite private secondary school, Machabeng, attended by the children of government ministers among others of the elite, and intended presumably to improve its pupils chances of entry to tertiary education, suggests that the groups controlling the state may not be interested in reducing inequality of opportunity. Disequalization via the education system is likely to continue as long as educational credentials remain the major determinant of access to local jobs and initial incomes from employment. As has been argued elsewhere, it is likely that increasing inequality of incomes within Lesotho is unavoidable without major changes in the wider Southern African economy, because of the highly dependent nature of Lesotho's relationship with RSA.²⁷

TABLE 1

Probable Labor-Force Status of Working-age Population, Lesotho, 1976
(Thousands of persons)

	Age 10-64			Age 15-64		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
<u>De Jure</u> Population	409	418	807	314	340	654
Less in South Africa	129	24	153	129	24	153
Less in School	59	84	143	18	35	54
Less disabled and females economically inactive	11	25	36	10	30	40
Less employed for wages	21	14	35	18	12	30
Less employed in handicrafts and informal sector	12	13	25	12	13	25
Available for work as self-employed or unpaid family workers etc.	157 ¹	258	415	127 ¹	225	352

Source: ILO, JASPA, Options for a Dependent Economy (Addis Ababa: ILO, 1978), Tables 2.3, 2.6, based on the 1976 Population Census and other estimates.

1. This includes probably about 30,000 mine workers 'resting' between contracts in South Africa.

Table 2

Initial Salary Levels, New Entrants to Lesotho Public Service

Qualification	Rand Per Annum	
	Clerical Grades	Technical Grades
	1975	
Unskilled (no Qualifications)		360
Junior Certificate or GCE*	624	672
COSC 3rd Class	672	720
COSC 2nd or 1st Class	864	912
Bachelor's degree		2892

*"It is only when candidates who hold COSC are not available that applicants with only JC can be considered for appointment."

Source: Personal Communication from N.S. Bereng, Chief Personnel Officer, Cabinet (Personnel), Government of Lesotho, 10 October 1975.

	1978	
Unskilled (no qualification)		600
J.C.		744
COSC, J.C. + 2 years Technical Training		1704*
University Graduate (Bachelor's degree)		3840

*Highest possible entry level.

One rand = U.S. \$1.15 in late 1975 and throughout 1978.

Source: ILO, JASPA, Options for a Dependent Economy (Addis Ababa: ILO, JASPA, 1978), Table 7.7.

Table 3

The Education Pyramid for the Cohort Entering School in 1965

	Year	Number	As % of Previous Level	As % of 1965 Standard 1
Enrollment, Standard 1 (Primary)	1965	52,000		
Enrollment, Standard 7	1971	10,990	21	21
Passes from Standard 7	1971	6,370	58	12
Enrollment, Form A (Secondary)	1972	4,572	72	9
Enrollment, Form C	1974	3,330	73	6
Passes Form C (JC)	1974	2,169	65	4
Enrollment, Form D	1975	1,137	52	2
Enrollment, Form E	1976	1,113	98	2
Passes from Form E (COSC)	1976	340	31	0.7
Enrollment, University year 1	1977	89	26	0.2

Note: School year is calendar year; University academic year starts in August; repeaters are included.

Source: ILO, JASPA Options for a Dependent Economy (Addis Ababa: ILO, JASPA, 1978), Table 7.2

Table 4
Occupational Distribution of Parents of NUL Citizen
First-year Students, 1975-76

	Fathers	Mothers
Self-employed farmer	19.1	0
Teacher	14.5	2.7
Civil Servant	11.8	1.8
Professional or Managerial	3.6	0.9
Nurse	0	8.0
Employee, Private Sector	8.2	5.3
Self-employed	9.1	10.6
Mine Worker in RSA	10.9	0
Other Employee in RSA	10.9	1.8
Housewife	0	64.6
Retired, Sick, Disabled	6.4	3.5
Other	5.5	0.9

Source: Student questionnaire

Table 5
 Educational Attainments and Selectivity Indices, NUL
 Student Parents and Comparison Group

Highest Level of Education	1 Fathers %	2 Mothers %	3 Male Comp. Group %	4 Female Comp. Group %	5 Male Index 1/3	6 Female Index 2/4
No School at all	9.2	3.8	45.3	21.5	0.20	0.18
Junior Certifi- cate	19.3	11.3	2.0	0.4	9.65	22.25
Matriculation	8.3	7.5	0.6	0.1	13.33	75.00
University Degree	8.3	1.9	0.2	0.02	41.5	95.00

Comparison groups are the de facto males and females aged 30-49 in 1966, from the 1966 Census Report.

Totals do not add to 100% since several levels of education are omitted because of non-comparability between the questionnaire data classes and the Census data classes.

Table 6

Comparison of Selectivity Indices for Some African Student Populations, Based on Paternal Education

Educational Level	Lesotho, NUL, 1976		Ghana, Secondary Schools, 1961		Kenya, Form IV, 1961	
	% of Fathers	Selectivity Index	% Fathers	Index	% Fathers	Index
No Formal Education	9.2	0.20	27.6	0.4	30.5	0.4
Junior Certificate	19.3	9.65	29.8	2.5))
Matriculation	8.3	13.83	11.8	8.4)	3.7
University Degree	8.3	41.5	5.3	17.7	0.6	6.0

Educational Level	Kenya, Form IV, 1968		Northern Nigeria Ahmadu Bello Univ. 1970/71		Ivory Coast Secondary Schools, Early 60's	
	% Fathers	Index	% Fathers	Index	% Fathers	Index
No Formal Education	34.4	0.5	35.1	0.41	69.1	
Junior Certificate))))))
Matriculation) 7.1	7.1))))
University Degree) 1.0	10.0)	14.2	15.0	10.7

[Notes and Sources on next page]

Table 6 continued

Comparison of Selectivity Indices for Some African Student Populations, Based on Paternal Education

Note: the selectivity index used in each source has been retained; the comparison groups differ somewhat from source to source.

Sources: Ghana: Philip T. Foster, "Secondary Schooling and Social Mobility in a West African Nation," Sociology of Education 37:2 (Winter 1963): 160. JC has been equated to "Middle School" and Matriculation to "Secondary School"

Kenya: Jerry Olson, "Secondary Schools and Elites in Kenya: A Comparative Study of Students in 1961 and 1968," Comparative Education Review 16:1 (1972): 31. JC and Matric have been equated to 9-11 years of school, university degree to 13 or more years of school.

Northern Nigeria: James O'Connell and Paul A. Beckett, "Social Characteristics of an elite-in-focus: the case of Nigerian University Students" British Journal of Sociology 26:3 (1975): 324-325. JC, Matric, and university degree have been equated to their "above primary," and the selectivity index recalculated from the discussion in the text.

Ivory Coast: from R. P. Clignet and P. Foster, The Fortunate Few: A Study of Secondary Schools and Students in the Ivory Coast (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), as quoted (and adapted) in O'Connell and Beckett.

Table 7

Crops reported grown by parents of students compared to crops reported grown on all landholdings in the 1970 Agricultural Census.

	% of Students Reporting Parents Growing, 1975	% of All Landholdings Growing, 1970
Maize	88.9%	65.5%
Sorghum	40.3%	50.7%
Wheat	33.3%	39.5%
Peas	33.3%	12.4%
Beans	76.4%	9.95%
Lucerne	4.2%	-
Potatoes	32.4%	4.1%

(Beans, peas and potatoes were the three most important cash crops in the 1970's)

Source: Student questionnaire; %'s are of students whose parents held land (68.5% of all students; landlessness among student families seems high -- in general, only about 15% of all Lesotho households are usually estimated to be landless - but may be explained by the high proportion - 35% - of students claiming urban residence).

Table 8

Size Distribution of Cattle-Holdings by Parents
Reported by NUL Students

No. of Cattle	No. of Reports	% of Reports	% of Cattle Reported	% of Cattle, 1970 Agric. Census, in Same Size-Class of Holding
1-5	29	52	16	30
6-10	13	23	22	32
11-20	9	16	28	23
21 or more	5	9	34	15

Source: Student Questionnaire.

Table 9

Sources of Finance for High School, NUL 1st Year Students 1975/76

Parents	91%
Brothers and Sisters	11.6%
Uncle and Aunt	6.3%
Own Earnings/ Savings	11.6%
Church	9.8%
Government of Lesotho	9.5%
Save the Children Fund	8.2%
Others	6.3%

Note: Total adds to more than 100% since students were told to answer for all who helped.

Source: Student questionnaire.

FOOTNOTES

1. Philip Foster, "Education and Social Inequalities in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies 18:2 (June, 1980): 201
2. For a thoughtful exploration of alternative theories of the state in Africa, see Jack Parson, "Toward a Theory of the Peripheral State? Observations from Africa" (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meetings, April 1980, Chicago; Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University, Black American Studies, mimeo). See also Samir Amin, "The Class Structure of the Contemporary Imperialist System", Monthly Review 31:8 (January, 1980): 9-26.
3. Probably the most detailed and complete study (of Kenya) is Gary S., Fields, "Higher Education and Income Distribution in a Less Developed Country," Oxford Economic Papers 27:2 (July 1975): 243-259
4. The calculated average ratio for sub-Saharan Africa in 1976 was actually 100.5. World Bank, World Development Report, 1980 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1980) : 46
5. David G. Davian, "Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Equity and the Development of Human Resources: Regional Perspectives, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 406 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, July 1980): 33
6. Typical calculations for African countries suggest social rates of return to university education about half those to primary education; private returns are often much higher. Of course, all such calculations are necessarily at best approximate, because of the heroic assumptions required to produce them.
7. For discussion, see Fields (1975): 245-246
8. Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Manpower and Employment in Botswana (Gaborone: Government Printer, 1973): 1-2
9. For a discussion, see J. H. Cobbe, "Planning in Lesotho," in R.A. Obudho and S. S. El-Shakhs, (eds), Development of Urban Systems in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1979): 303-322.
10. SAIRR, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1977 (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1978): 260.
11. Ibid. 1978.: 213.

12. M. Ward, "Primary School Enrollment in Lesotho," Education in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 9:1, (January 1975): 44-50.
13. 50% of the loan is forgiven if the student works in the public sector in Lesotho for five years; 35% if he or she works in the private sector in Lesotho for five years; and 10% can be forgiven for outstanding performance. The repayment provisions in the case of students not choosing to work in Lesotho sounded, at the introduction of the scheme, likely to be unenforceable, but no information is available as yet on its administration in practice. See JASPA, Options for a Dependent Economy: Development, employment and Equity Problems in Lesotho (Addis Ababa: ILO, 1978), pp. 221-222.
14. JASPA, op. cit., p 215. For discussion on this point, see J. Cobbe, "Wage Policy Problems in the Small Peripheral Countries of Southern Africa, 1967-76," Journal of Southern African Affairs 2:4, (October 1977): 441-463.
15. 153 usable completed questionnaires were obtained, representing about 60% of the total population. More detail is found in J. Cobbe, "A Socio-Economic Profile of First Year Students at NUI 1975/76," (Roma, Italy: Department of Economics, NUI; mimeo, 6 May 1975).
The data in tables 4 through 9 refer to only those students who identified themselves as Lesotho citizens. About 25% of first-year students responding to the questionnaire were non-citizens (mostly South Africans and Batswanas); their characteristics differed quite substantially from those of citizens, and their responses are excluded from this paper.
17. J. Cobbe, "Emigration and Development in Southern Africa," International Migration Review, forthcoming.
18. Mean age of students in 1976 was 24 years, with none under 18 and 27.8% over 25; the median age was 22 years. Clearly some parents were probably over 40 years in 1966, and perhaps some under 30. Educational attainments, predictably, become more unequal as age increases, so extension of the age group for the comparison group would make the ratios more extreme.
19. This is, of course, solely an ex-post, descriptive, statement, and should not be interpreted as a predictive one.
20. James O'Connell and Paul A. Beckett, "Social Characteristics of an elite in formation: the case of Nigerian University students," British Journal of Sociology 26:1 (1975): 228.
21. Based on JASPA, op. cit. Technical Paper 4, "Income Distribution," and IARD, World Tables: The Second Edition (Washington, D.C.: IARD, 1980)

22. See J. Cobbe, "Integration Among Unequals: The Southern African Custom Union and Development," World Development 8:4 (April 1980): 329-336, references therein.
23. Psacharopoulos reports social rates of return to higher education in eleven developing countries ranging from 8% to 23%, with an average of 14.9%. G. Psacharopoulos, "Higher Education in Developing Countries: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 440, November 1980): 52.
24. JASPA, op. cit., p. 221-222, where it is also suggested that the scheme be extended to all teacher, technical, and vocational training as well.
25. The situation for females is less clear. It may well be that for female there is a positive pecuniary return to secondary education, especially in conjunction with vocational or professional training (nursing, typist secretary etc.) for which it is a prerequisite. This may give another economic reason for the high female enrollment rates. Unfortunately, direct data on this point is not immediately available.
26. See Merle Lipton, "Men of Two Worlds: Migrant Labour in South Africa." Optima 29:2/3 (November 1980): 72-202.
27. See J. Cobbe, "Integration Among Unequals"; and J. V. K. Lenta, "Has Capitalism Underdeveloped the Labour Reserves of Africa?", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 42:3 (1980): 157-201.



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