URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA AND TANZANIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 232

January 1976

Views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Institute for Development Studies or of the University of Nairobi.
Urban housing, land allocation and planning policy is compared for Kenya and Tanzania for the post-independence decade. In both countries, performance has fallen short of policy goals, especially in terms of the inability to shift development from the centre and the difficulty in effecting programmes for the lower income groups. Still, policy in Tanzania, while more innovative, and more focused on the needs of lower income groups, has been beset by more severe bureaucratic problems of implementation than has been the case in Kenya. The two countries' policies represent opposite dilemmas in the tension between equity and performance, these policy divergences are related more broadly to different elite political attitudes and structures, and to different patterns of urban income distribution.
INTRODUCTION

Over the past ten years, African governments have wrestled with the problems of designing and implementing comprehensive rural development policies. In an overwhelmingly rural continent with, for most areas, only a recent history of urbanization, an emphasis on the priority of rural over urban development is understandable. But if African cities are for the most part young, and small by world standards, they are also growing faster than cities in any other major world region. This rapid growth, superimposed on a meagre resource base, will put increasing pressure on planners to devise solutions for the adequate and equitable distribution of urban services. The solutions that emerge, however, will be heavily conditioned by two sets of factors: the immediate demands of urban growth, and the wider political/administrative and social context within which policy-making takes place. In an effort to explain more clearly how these factors operate in contemporary Africa, this paper will compare urban policy in Kenya and Tanzania from Independence until the end of 1973. Emphasis will be placed on land allocation, housing and planning policies which most affect lower income groups in the two countries.

URBAN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN KENYA

Policy

In the first few years after Independence, Kenya did little to define an overall urban development policy. The value of private buildings constructed in the main towns - a sensitive indicator of economic growth - fell precipitously from £1,082,000 in 1959 to £1,628,000 in 1963, and did not begin to rise appreciably again until 1967. (22) At the same time the urban population was swelling. From 1948 to 1962, census figures showed an average urban rate of growth of 6.3% per annum. Taking the African population of the two largest towns, Nairobi and Mombasa, growth rates were 6.9% and 7.1% respectively (18, p.23) compared with an African growth rate of 2.8% for the whole country (18, p.82). Between the 1962 and 1969 censuses, the African population in Nairobi and Mombasa grew at a compound annual rate of 15.2% and 7.6% (12, p.49); the increase in growth for Nairobi was especially high. These growth rates, in combination with the decline in private building, put tremendous pressure on the Government to deal with housing in a more aggressive manner.
The Government's first response was to call in the experts. A United Nations report published in May, 1965 defined the extent of the housing problem and suggested some solutions. As to the extent of the problem, the UN mission found the country was experiencing "a serious housing problem", especially among the African population. In comparison with housing for other races, African housing was a poorer quality and overcrowding was "extreme" (2). Machinery to deal with these shortages fell into two categories: regulatory and developmental. On the regulatory side, in 1967 new Rent Tribunals were set up in the main towns, with powers to control rents in unfurnished dwellings with a "standard rent" of shs. 800/- or less. In theory these Tribunals (under a revamped Rent Control Act) should have been able to regulate all rents in lower- and middle-income housing throughout the country. The developmental response, following a suggestion by the UN mission, was to establish in the same year a National Housing Corporation (NHC) with powers to undertake directly housing projects throughout Kenya as well as to make loans to local authorities who would build themselves. The NHC was to be a more vigorous descendent of the former Central Housing Board, which needed "to have a new image in playing a role which is in keeping with the spirit of the new, independent Kenya." (16, col. 773) The Development Plan 1970-1974, recognizing "an imperative need to accelerate the creation of inexpensive urban housing for the low income groups," (14, p.507) went on to stipulate that all Government funds given to the NHC would be for houses costing £1200 or less. (14, p.508) Even at this figure, only 17% of all urban households could afford more expensive housing. (14, p.508) As a gesture to the very lowest income groups, however, the Plan also specified that 33% of the NHC funds allocated would have to be spent on "canned service" schemes rather than on conventional housing. Such schemes would provide planned alternatives to the "large and expanding illegal squatter areas near the urban centres." (14, p.519) In all these efforts, the central government called for closer coordination with local governments (both rural and urban), which "must ... be brought into the national development effort, to assist in the formation and implementation of economic and social plans." (14, p.179) Finally, in addition to planning for the physical growth of Nairobi and Mombasa, the Plan proposed to take "positive steps ... to decentralize future urban growth" for seven other towns designated as "major growth centres". (14, p.186) After the publication of the Plan, no new major urban policy decisions were announced during the period under review.

1. Census figures prepared for the Mission showed that in 1962, 70% of African urban households occupied a single living room, and 49% of households had three or more persons to the room.
Performance

In the first decade of Kenya's Independence, two main biases appear in the implementation of urban policy: a disproportionate extension of services and benefits to middle and upper income groups, and an emphasis on prestige development in Nairobi.

Table I: National Housing Corporation, Kenya. Units completed and cost, 1969 - 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Site and Service Units, Number</th>
<th>Cost £'000</th>
<th>Conventional Units, number</th>
<th>Cost £'000</th>
<th>Total Cost £'000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>2644</td>
<td>2648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2171</td>
<td>2442</td>
<td>2481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>1737</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>2215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>2498</td>
<td>4425</td>
<td>4696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3782</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>8286</td>
<td>11,413</td>
<td>12,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The construction programme of the NHC illustrates the first bias very clearly. As Table I shows, the NHC spent a total of £11,413,000 on 8,286 conventional housing units from 1969 to 1972, for an overall average cost per unit of £1,377. Thus, as the Plan period was getting underway, the average cost of public housing completed was already higher than the maximum cost permitted to the NHC in the Plan document itself. Official income figures for 1968 showed that only about 15% of all urban household heads would be able to purchase or rent housing at this cost. (14, p.508)

There is another factor which further narrows the group to whom these benefits accrue. Because rents in Kenya's towns are out of all proportion to the value of dwellings rented, tenant-purchase houses are seen as an especially lucrative investment. The allocation committees of the municipal councils are the focus of intense political pressures, with the result that strict adherence to "waiting list" and "points" procedures has often been dispensed with. This pattern was duly noted by the National Assembly's Public Accounts Committee in its report on county and municipal councils:
Another disturbing feature in some of the Councils is that .....
the operation of and dealings in Tenant-Purchase Schemes
and building plots have left much to be desired. Plots appear
to have been allocated to persons who have then sold or
transferred them to other people within one year of allotment,
contrary to the terms and conditions of allotment. More
than one dwelling-housing plot under different housing
schemes appear to have been allocated to councillors and
other prominent persons who have in several cases failed
to repay their loans regularly. (20, p.5)

Conventional housing, of course, is not the whole story. As we
have seen above the Plan clearly recognized that, because of costs, those
in the lowest income groups could not afford the payments on conventionally
built houses or flats. The alternative suggested was sites and services schemes,
in which plots and services are provided by the authorities, and people are
expected to build their own houses to minimal standards. This approach is
strongly favoured by the World Bank (See, for example, 58, pp.64-65.) and the
United Nations Centre for Housing, Building and Planning. Not surprisingly,
the Government has dragged its feet in this area: out of a total of £12,040,000
spent in 1969 - 1972 on all forms of public housing, only £627,000, or 5% - as
compared with the Plan target of 33% - was spent on sites and services. The
NHC claimed recently that such schemes could not work in large towns like
Nairobi because "the participants had full-time jobs in the city and could
spare insufficient time to work on the houses themselves." (17, p.20) A pattern
that appears to be common all over the country is for many lower income plot
allottees to sell their interest in the site to wealthier people who then
develop the plots by hiring labour, recouping their capital very quickly in
high rents. (See, for example 11, p.85) In addition, it is not uncommon for
councillors, council officials and influential national politicians to secure
plots in these schemes (often allocated to their relatives) which they in turn
develop at a profit. In drafting a recent proposal to the World Bank for a
large sites and services project loan, officers of the Nairobi City Council's
Planning Department found that one of their most difficult tasks was to set
up a procedure for the allocation of plots that would be both administratively
efficient and insulated from political pressures.2

These biases in the implementation of public housing programmes are
not compensated for in other directions. Although in principle the Rent
Control Machinery applies to all unfurnished dwellings renting for Shs. 300/-
per month and less (or furnished dwellings up to Shs. 1100/- per month), it is

1. The solution arrived at is detailed in (30).
not very effective in helping the poor. In squatter areas like Mathare Valley in Nairobi, there have been physical threats against rent control officials. The rent control machinery has further difficulty in reaching lower income groups because of complicated procedures, charges, and the advisability for a tenant to hire a lawyer to effectively present his case before the Rent Tribunal. As for approved housing constructed by the private sector, which is approximately equal in value to all housing built on the Government (15, p.20), the bulk of this is higher-cost housing beyond the reach of both the Rent Restriction Act and lower income groups.

The typical response to this kind of urban policy all over the developing world has been "squatting" in various forms. Kenya is no exception to this rule. In 1971, a comprehensive report estimated that one-third of Nairobi's population was living in "uncontrolled and illegal housing". (7,p.4) The largest single area was Mathare Valley, where it was estimated that approximately 53,000 people were living in 1972. (See 27, p.8; also partly summarized in 3.) In Mombasa, Kenya's second largest town, it is more difficult for the authorities to control residential building since much residential land (in contrast to Nairobi) is in private freehold tenure. In 1969, a detailed study estimated that 31% of all residential land was occupied by "unplanned temporary" housing (24, p.4) and that 47% of the population of the town (or some 116,000 of a population of 247,073) lived in such housing. (24, Appendix A; Section 13)

Urban officials in Kenya have tried to regulate squatting in two main ways. The first is through application of municipal by-laws, which require that all plans for building within municipal or city boundaries be submitted to the local council for approval. Until 1968 these building standards, inherited from the colonial period, demanded buildings that cost much more than lower income groups could afford. After 1968, however, a new set of building (Grade II) by-laws could be applied by local authorities to areas they designated, thus permitting much cheaper housing under planned conditions. Still, most new squatter housing is beneath even these standards. Effective controls through by-laws depend essentially on three factors: a vigilant building

3. This is my interpretation of an interview with the Administrative Officer, Rent Restriction Tribunal, Nairobi, 22 November, 1973. For criticisms of the Tribunal, see (9) and (8) pp.289-90.

4. The study cites a figure of 143,333 persons living in various categories of illegal housing. The estimate is probably based on work done in 1969. In that year, the official census showed Nairobi with a total population of 609,286, of which 421,078 were Africans. Since virtually all "squatters" are Africans, this represents 28% of the total population, or 34% of the African population.
inspectorate with cooperation from the police and Administration; an adequately staffed town planning agency; and the political will to demolish structures when they do not meet established standards or planning requirements.

During the colonial period in Nairobi, the Government systematically demolished squatter areas within the city boundaries, in many cases not even attempting to provide alternative accommodation for those who lost their homes. During the Emergency, from 1952 to 1960, these operations were often tied to the political objectives of screening possible "subversive" elements (mainly Kikuyu, Embu and Meru people) and controlling immigration to the city. When the Emergency Regulations were lifted in early 1960, the flood of Kikuyu migration from areas neighbouring the city swamped the Administration. Thousands of Africans began to trade without licences and to build wherever they could find land. After the new central government consolidated its power in the mid-sixties, there were several large demolitions and "clean-up" campaigns aimed at ridding the central city of squatters. In 1970, the year following the last National Assembly elections, the City Council of Nairobi, together with the Administration and Police, mounted a massive "City Clean-up Campaign" extending over several months. According to a carefully mapped strategy which covered all major squatter areas in the city except Kibera and Mathare Valley, Council askaris and police arrived at dawn to surprise the people before they left for work, finishing their demolition before lunch. Although there was public criticism of this campaign (to which the Council is sensitive) the Cabinet supported it (East African Standard, 21 November, 1970) and President Kenyatta later told a Council delegation he did not want Nairobi to turn into a "shanty-town". (29, pp.2497-98) Since then, the City Council has regularly demolished "shanties" along the road reserves and on State and City Council land. There is no evidence that the Central Government's recent decision "that slum housing ought not to be demolished unless there is some positive and overriding developmental reasons for doing so" (21, p.46) has had any effect on the Council's demolition policy.

In spite of the policy of regular demolition, two main areas of sub-standard housing have been left alone: Dagoretti and Mathare. Dagoretti, a peri-urban area that was formerly part of Kiambu District, is represented in

5. Kibera is an old settlement in the southern part of the City, where Sudanese ex-soldiers were given grants of land by the army after World War 1.
Parliament by the influential Minister for Foreign Affairs. After Dagoretti was brought into the City in 1964, the people resisted the application of City building by-laws on the grounds that the land was freehold and the by-laws were inappropriate in this semi-rural area. The City has applied Grade II by-laws to Dagoretti and planning control is gradually being extended over the area. Mathare, on the other hand, was subject to periodic demolitions until 1971 when the whole string of villages was "improved" with roads, street-lighting, water and sanitary facilities, following an outbreak of cholera elsewhere in Nairobi. Although there are still occasional crackdowns on the brewing of illegal liquor (chang'aa) in the valley, the City does not demolish unless it is called in by the Administration when new structures are built. As a result of these policies, the growth of illegal housing in Nairobi has been contained, if by no means completely controlled. But with few services being extended to existing squatter areas, the effect of this containment is that more and more overcrowding takes place in increasingly unhealthy conditions.

The second dimension of urban policy bias in Kenya is the disproportionate share taken by Nairobi in physical development. While, as we have seen, the 1970-74 Development Plan sought to spread development more evenly among other urban "growth centres", this has not happened. In fact the statistics presented in Table II show the reverse trend. From 1967 through 1971, Nairobi increased its share of the value of new private construction in urban areas from 78.3% of the total to 88.7%; while Mombasa's share declined from 14.7% to 9.8% and that of the "other main towns" from 7.0% to only 1.5%. Although similar statistics are not available for public building, they would probably show the same trend; in any case, public building in Kenya's urban areas represented only 15% of all building in 1971. (23, p.124)

Table II: Completion of buildings for private ownership in main towns, 1967 - 1971, in K£ '000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nairobi Value</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mombasa Value</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Other main towns Value</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,145</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4,017</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,631</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>5,568</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5,867</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7,095</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8,241</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>10,007</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>10,808</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A reflection of Nairobi's disproportionate share in national urban development is the slow rate of growth of trade and employment in other towns. In the case of Kisumu, Kenya's fourth largest city, the recent Africanisation of the central business district has caused such a fall in trade that a local reporter for a major newspaper referred to it as a "a dying town". Nairobi's share in total earnings, as shown in Table III, is considerably larger than its share of the total population in the main towns. Moreover, Nairobi's share of total earnings went up from 70.0% to 71.5% between 1968 and 1971, while the share of almost every other "growth centre" fell or remained the same during this period. Meanwhile, Nairobi develops as a centre of international business and tourism, its most recent new building the Kenyatta Conference Centre, which cost the Government £4 million to build. When Kenya celebrated her 10th anniversary of Independence in December, 1973, Nairobi's imposing skyline was prominently displayed in newsreels and on television as a symbol of the country's progress.

Table III: Reported earnings in main towns of Kenya compared with population in 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>1969 Population</th>
<th>1968 Total Earnings (K£'000)</th>
<th>1969 Total (%)</th>
<th>1968 Total (%</th>
<th>1966 Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>509,286</td>
<td>72,053</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>88,160</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>247,073</td>
<td>18,542</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20,844</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakuru</td>
<td>47,151</td>
<td>4,091</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4,555</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisumu</td>
<td>32,431</td>
<td>3,521</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3,819</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thika</td>
<td>18,387</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eldoret</td>
<td>14,186</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyari</td>
<td>10,004</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakamega</td>
<td>6,244</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embu</td>
<td>3,228</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>892,700</td>
<td>104,395</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>123,310</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (23) p.223; and (19) p.2.

URBAN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN TANZANIA

Policy

Like Kenya, Tanzania had, until the late sixties, a patchwork of policies to deal with her growing urban problems. As in many other African countries, private construction in mainland Tanzania fell off sharply at Independence; although it was more than offset by Government investment, as Table IV shows, it never regained its former level.
Table IV: Value of urban building in mainland Tanzania, 1960 - 1969 (T£'000)\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government (^b)</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>4380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other towns</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3970</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3040</td>
<td>2885</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td>3505</td>
<td>2740</td>
<td>6405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Residential and non-residential buildings lumped together.
\(^b\)Excludes buildings erected by National Housing Corporation.

Source: (55) p.137.

Meanwhile, the African population was growing rapidly. While the African population of Dar es Salaam had grown at an average rate of 9% per annum from 1948 to 1957 (40), this rate shot up to 14% between the 1957 and 1967 censuses. (50, p.164) High rates of growth, especially for the African (and predominantly lower income) population, were also notable for a number of other smaller towns. (51, pp.13-14)

Until the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania pursued two main strategies to alleviate the pressure for housing and urban community services: a building strategy and a land control strategy. The building strategy began with the formation of the National Housing Corporation in 1962. The Corporation was given a very broad mandate "for the provision of houses and other buildings in Tanganyika by means of financial assistance and otherwise". (44) After taking over 4,389 low-cost houses (1,690 in Dar es Salaam and 2,699 in other towns) that had been built by the colonial government and administered by local authorities, the Corporation made "a heroic attempt to seriously cope with the housing problem."\(^7\) The first major programme, concentrating in Dar es Salaam on the initiative of President Nyerere, involved clearing some of the old "slums" on the periphery of the central business district (in Magomeni especially) and replacing them with new, single storey houses which were rented out to the previous house-owners. During the first Plan period, from 1964 to 1969, about 70% of the 5,705 "low-cost" houses built by the corporation

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7. A useful review of urban development policy in mainland Tanzania is contained in a Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development publication. (47)

8. The phrase is taken from (1) p.186.
came under the Dar es Salaam slum clearance scheme. Although just what constitutes a "low-cost" house has never been clearly defined either for or by the NHC, almost all of the Corporation's efforts have focused on this category of housing. During the First Plan period, the Corporation received some £3.47 million from the Government, and was able to raise an additional £970,000 from the Federal Republic of Germany, which also gave technical aid to the Corporation. The total, £4.44 million, was only about 25% of the targeted figure in the Plan, most of the shortfall resulting from the NHC's failure to attract more overseas capital.

The second major approach to urban development throughout the sixties was the control and allocation of land through the Lands Division. Under a series of Acts beginning in 1963, all freehold land was converted to Government leasehold, previous owners obliged to pay rent to the Government, and development conditions laid down for the use of all urban land. In practice, the development conditions are agreed between the Town Planning Division and the Lands Division. The zoning policy of the Colonial Government which divided residential urban land into low-, medium- and high-density areas was continued, but the emphasis in plot allocation and the provision of services was shifted from the low-density (i.e. former European) areas to the high-density (low-income African) areas. In recent years, the Lands Division has prepared for allocation to the public some 6 - 7,000 plots per year, most of them in high density urban areas. The bulk of the high-density plots are given out with year-to-year rights of occupancy. This allows the occupant, upon payment of a "premium" down and an annual land rent, to build a "temporary structure" using traditional materials for building. For more permanent tenure in high-density areas, the occupier must pay a higher premium and land rent and satisfy higher development conditions, involving in turn significantly higher building expenses. Before any new urban area is laid out for such development, it is the practice in Tanzania to fully compensate the people living in the area - whether or not they have legal claims - for the value of their crops and buildings. Only after the area has been compensated and cleared for surveying can it be developed. At this point the funds and responsibility for the services that must be laid in (water, roads, sewers or septic tanks, community facilities, etc.) are shared among a number of different Government divisions and parastatal organisations.

9. For an evaluation of this scheme, see (10).
10. This legislation is discussed in detail in (47) pp.14-17 and (13).
With the advent of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, proclaiming the primacy of socialist rural development, new emphases began to appear in Tanzania's urban policy. The Second Five Year Plan, 1969-1974 (54) announced three new directions. First, moves were to be taken to decentralize certain government functions, and to locate new industries, where possible, away from Dar es Salaam. Eight towns around the country were selected for "concentrated urban development" over the Plan period. Second, in order to minimize resources devoted to urban development and to maximize the spread of benefits to all classes of urban dwellers, the NHC was to increase its rate of house construction and at the same time to limit itself to houses in the cost range of from £300 to £550 per unit. (54, p.191) Medium cost houses would be financed either privately or through the Permanent Housing Finance Corporation (PHFC), which lent at commercial rates of interest. For the bottom end of the income scale, the NHC and the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (formed in 1968 to unite most of the urban specialist divisions) were to develop a programme for the provision of some 5,000 site and service plots per year. The plots were to be equipped with water, drainage and foundations. The Plan projected that the public sector would provide from 35,000 to 40,000 houses and housing sites over the five year period. For reasons which we shall discuss in the next section, nothing close to this figure was achieved.

The next major urban policy initiative came in April, 1971 with the Government's announcement that it was taking over all rental buildings with a value of £5,000 and over. An Office of the Registrar of Buildings was created to administer the 2,900 buildings acquired, whose estimated value was about £32.5 million. (47, p.54) While the acquisitions were justified as a logical outcome of the country's socialism, most of those who lost their houses and buildings were members of the Asian community. In any case, compensation was promised, landlords were permitted to continue to occupy flats where they had been living, and tenants in acquired premises simply sent their monthly rent cheques to the Registrar of Buildings rather than the former landlord. Arrangements whereby the owners would be compensated were announced in 1973. (Daily News, 14 February 1973).

But the problem of wealthy urban landlords was just the tip of the iceberg. Already, interministerial discussions had begun in June, 1970 over the whole question of the rents paid by lower income groups. While the Rent Restriction Act of 1971 applied to all buildings valued at shs.100,000/- or renting for shs. 833/- per month or more. Lists of the buildings and their owners were published in the newspapers. Because of mistakes, or successful applications to an appeals tribunal, about 300 of the original total had been returned to their original owners by 1973.

11. These towns were Tanga, Arusha/Moshi, Mwanza, Mtanda, Mbeya, Morogoro, Dodoma and Tabora. (See 54, p.181)
12. The Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971 applied to all buildings valued at shs.100,000/- or renting for shs. 833/- per month or more. Lists of the buildings and their owners were published in the newspapers. Because of mistakes, or successful applications to an appeals tribunal, about 300 of the original total had been returned to their original owners by 1973.
While the Second Plan considered that "the absolute achievement of the National Housing Corporation had been very considerable" it had to admit that the net addition to the housing stock of less than 400 units per year "just touched the fringe of the housing problem." (54, p.189) But even when slum clearance was halted in the late sixties, the Corporation found it increasingly difficult to obtain funds. While the NHC does some building for other parastatals and has also built for the middle-income market through loans from the PHFC (now the Tanzania Housing Bank), the bulk of its work is in low-cost housing, financed directly by no-interest Treasury grants. These grants have diminished considerably in the last few years, as shown in Table V.

Table V: Tanzania central government development grants to National Housing Corporation for low-cost housing, 1964/5 to 1973/4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grant (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964/5</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>350,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>622,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This diminution in funds for the NHC is a reflection of a number of factors: (A) Treasury's dissatisfaction over poor financial controls and rent collection; (B) the corporation's failure to keep costs low enough (in 1973 the average low-cost house cost £920, compared with the Second Plan ceiling of £550 per house); and (C) new development priorities which have reduced the funds available for urban areas since the Second Plan was accepted. With regard to (C), specific mention should be made of the TANU Biennial Conference in 1971 which emphasized the need to develop water, health and educational facilities in the rural areas. Against a targeted figure of 2,000 houses per year, the NHC was able to build only 138 low-cost units throughout the country in 1972/73 or about 7% of its original goal.

In terms of numbers of plots produced, the surveyed plot allocation programme of the Lands Division has been much more successful. Thus, in 1971 the Division issued 7,305 new short-term rights of occupancy in urban areas,
and in 1972 the figure was 6,331. This was still far too small to cope with demand, though; for Dar es Salaam alone, the waiting list for high-density plots stood at 15,000 at the end of 1972. In spite of direct Presidential pressure to speed up allocation, the procedure remained cumbersome and expensive. A lot of money must be paid to compensate squatters and other interests before land can be cleared for surveying; and once surveyed plots are made available, services (such as roads, water, schools) are rarely ready for the plot allottees, with the result that little controlled building takes place and squatters often move back to the land.

Similar to the plot allocation programme but with higher standards of services provided was the sites and services programme. While the Second Five Year Plan called for 5,000 serviced sites per year, by the end of the Plan's third year only 795 had been made available, all of them in a single area of Dar es Salaam. A recent evaluation succinctly describes the problem:

An experimental project was initiated in 1970 at Kijitonyama in Dar es Salaam. Concrete slabs for 795 foundations were provided by NHC along with some 60 core houses. Average cost of slabs and core houses at shs. 2,350/- plus high standards of infrastructure (approximately shs. 7,000/- per plot) put the project beyond the reach of most low income families. The Government was therefore obliged to heavily subsidize the project in order that low income families could be settled on the plots and still repay loans for building materials. (48, p.9)

The Sites and Services Directorate in the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development has applied to the World Bank for a loan to cover a 5-year programme of 18,250 plots in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Mbeya, but it will be some time before this initiative materializes.

In the face of inadequate public programmes to meet their needs, lower income groups have had little alternative to large-scale squatting. For Dar es Salaam, a comprehensive delineation of squatter areas was carried out for 1969, showing some 14,720 squatter houses within the statutory planning area (which goes somewhat beyond the statutory boundaries of the City). Using similar methods, another count was carried out for 1972, in this case showing some 27,981 squatter houses in the same area - an average compound yearly increase of 24% over three years. (39, p.7) Assuming only a 4% annual

16. Delineation and counting was done with 1969 air photographs of the City. Since squatter houses in Dar es Salaam are almost invariably of a certain type, and are sited in areas without regular road access, it is simple to locate and count them using photo blow-ups. Details of the exercise are contained in (25).
growth in the non-squatter areas during this period, and on the basis of a small survey of the population density of squatter areas, it was estimated that in 1972 about 4.4% of the total population of greater Dar es Salaam lived in squatter areas. In the light of public recognition that the successful implementation of the 1968 Dar es Salaam Master Plan would "hinge to a large extent on the degree of control exercised over squatters," the efficacy of planning in the capital city must be seriously questioned. But as long as low-cost NHC building, plot allocations and the sites and services programme do not provide for the net migration to the city, squatting will offer both a necessary and a rational response to the accommodation problem. This is not entirely a bad thing - rents in squatter houses are lower than in conventional houses, and squatter areas are often conveniently located for places of work - but facilities in these areas are genuinely poor and the environment is often very unhealthy, especially in the rainy seasons. Removal of major squatting areas is politically impossible in Tanzania, and to improve them by putting in roads, water and drainage is a costly and laborious exercise.

When the Acquisition of Buildings Bill was rushed through Parliament in April 1971, the Minister observed that, while the Government had already nationalized big industries, banks, insurance companies and wholesale and retail trade,

the opportunity still remains for exploiters to get high rents on large buildings in the cities. This strategy enhances privilege especially in urban areas. This new revolutionary law, if passed by Parliament, will wipe away this opportunity and overthrow privilege and exploitation. (46 col.23)\(^1\)

It was not entirely a coincidence that most of these buildings were owned by Asians; the Asian community still controls the private commercial sector in Tanzania. Although the Act was not manifestly racist, the acquisitions resulted in many thousands of Asian families leaving the country and a great fall in private building. Most private construction firms were wiped out, since they had invested their profits in buildings and were using rents for working capital. While no new housing was created, it will be some time before this drop in construction capacity is redressed.

As for the new income-based rental policy announced by the Government in early 1973, it is worth noting that it only applied to civil servants and parastatal employees living in Government, parastatal or NHC housing.

17. The passage is translated from the original Kiswahili.
Totally unaffected by the measure are almost all lower-income urban workers, and the bulk of middle-income clerks and administrators who have to find their own housing, often in the squatter areas. Meanwhile, these middle- and upper-income civil servants who came under the new regulations tended to feel they were unfair, since while prices were steadily rising their incomes were not, and the new rents generally meant higher payments.

A final aspect of Tanzanian urban policy that can be evaluated is the strategy of deconcentration outside of Dar es Salaam. As far as I have been able to learn, no administrative machinery was ever set up to influence the siting of new industries to the eight "growth towns". Thus, of the approximately thirty major new industries set up in the two years after the inception of the urban decentralization plan, only ten went outside Dar es Salaam, and seven of these ten went to Arusha/Moshi. "Therefore only 3 of the 30 industries were shared by the 7 least industrialized growth towns." (42, p.103) The deconcentration of administrative functions has been more successful. Under the new Regional Development Directors appointed in 1972, significant town planning, surveying and land allocation functions are now undertaken in the Regions. While there is a critical shortage of staff at this level, the situation is improving, and for the financial year 1973/74, annual budgets were drawn up by the Regions themselves in cooperation with the Prime Minister's Office. The decision to move the capital to Dodoma will certainly give an impetus to the decentralization effort.

KENYA AND TANZANIA: URBAN POLICY COMPARED

As the foregoing analysis of urban policy and performance has illustrated, there are some broad similarities but also some crucial differences between the two neighbouring countries. While the similarities illustrate approaches and problems shared by many other African countries, the differences stem largely from divergent social and political parameters to the policy process. After a brief discussion of two main areas of convergence, we will discuss the general context of the policy divergencies.

Convergence

Growth of the Centre: In both countries, as we have seen, a disproportionate amount of industrial development has been sited in the capital city, despite official intentions to the contrary. Thus in 1970 Dar es Salaam had 46.0% of the total recorded urban employment in Tanzania, up from 44.2% the previous year. (56, p.37) In 1971, Nairobi had 55.0% of all enumerated in the main towns, up from 53.8% a year earlier. (23, p.216) The most recent
statistics thus show that the employment share of the largest cities is growing. But employment dominance is clearly linked to population, a factor which is almost impossible for governments to influence by deliberate policy. According to the most recent census returns, Dar es Salaam in 1967 had 45.2% of the total urban population in towns over 10,000 in Tanzania, while Nairobi had 54.9% of Kenya's urban population. Given exceptionally high growth rates in the two cities, there is no reason to assume these proportions are declining.

Weakness of Policies Aimed at Lower Income Groups: Both Kenya and Tanzania have officially committed the bulk of public housing funds to low income groups. But in both countries (though to a much greater extent in Kenya) the efforts of the National Housing Corporations have been biased in favour of middle-income groups for conventional housing. Substantial sites and services programmes have failed to materialize. The Housing Corporations in these two countries are among the most dynamic in Africa, but their failure to provide adequately for low income groups is consistent with experience elsewhere on the continent. If Kenya has made some important changes in the direction of relaxing municipal by-laws to permit lower-standard development (Tanzania has not yet amended its 1956 building code.), the overall effect of regulatory action - at least in Nairobi - is to preclude low-income groups from conventional, permanent housing, and to heavily bias the provision of services to authorized rather than unauthorized areas. In both countries urban squatter populations have been growing more rapidly than the population in the authorized, planned areas.

Divergence

Beneath these broad similarities, a close comparison of urban policy in Kenya and Tanzania shows some extremely important differences. In general, Tanzanian urban policy in recent years has been more innovative than urban policy in Kenya, and the total effect of policy in Tanzania has been to direct attention toward a significantly lower income level of the population than is the case in Kenya. The first point deals with the content of policy, while the second deals with its impact.

Urban policy has been more innovative in Tanzania in terms of the large number of major decisions taken in recent years to alter the distribution of benefits to major groups both within urban areas and rural areas. These

18. For Ghana, see (9) and for Western Nigeria see (34). The kinds of corruption and mismanagement brought out in these West African case studies do not, however, appear to apply to Kenya and Tanzania.
decisions have been detailed in the section 'Urban Policy and Performance in Tanzania' above, but the most important among them include the active development of a national sites and services programme through the establishment of a Sites and Services Directorate, the de facto recognition of existing squatter settlements and the intention to gradually improve services to them, a new civil servant rental policy related to income, the establishment of the new Tanzania Housing Bank, and the decision to move the capital away from Dar es Salaam to one of the least developed regions of the country. With one exception, policy in Kenya has tended to consolidate earlier decisions and urban patterns and no new institutions have been created. The important exception was the passing of the Local Government Adoptive (Grade II) Bylaws in 1968. What looked like another major exception was the central government's decision to allocate, beginning in 1968, 50% of the GPT collections from Nairobi and Mombasa for redistribution to poorer local authorities. But there is no evidence that Treasury actually used the funds for this purpose, and in any case the remissions were stopped in 1971, GPT being abolished altogether in 1974.

Policy innovation, however, is meaningless in the absence of effective implementation. While Tanzania has pushed very far to draw out the urban policy implications of an ideology which stresses rural socialist development, it has paid less attention to strengthening the bureaucratic machinery necessary to carry out the new policies. It is true that local government in Tanzania has a much shorter history than in Kenya; but local authorities in Tanzania have been much weaker as well.\(^\text{19}\) For example, urban and district councils in Tanzania employed 28,971 in 1968, as against 63,100 in Kenya in the same year. (See 55, p.174 and 23, p.211) At the end of 1973, the Dar es Salaam City Council was officially disbanded, its functions being taken over by the Dar es Salaam Regional Development Director, and below him three district development committees each covering a part of the greater Dar es Salaam area. It is too early to evaluate how this arrangement will work in practice, but well before this decision was taken the City Council had shown itself to be a relatively ineffective organization. In relation to Kenya cities, the expenditures of the Dar es Salaam City Council have been modest. In 1969, for example, for an estimated population of 316,453, the Council spent £1,525 million. (55, op.152-153) This amounted to an expenditure of Shs. 96/- per person. In the same year the Nairobi City Council spent Shs 354/- per person (3.7 times as much) and the Mombasa Municipal Council spent Shs 162/- per person (1.7 times as much).

\(^{19}\) An excellent analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of local government in Tanzania is contained in (35).
While there have been challenges to their autonomy, municipal councils in Kenya, during the period under review, were much stronger institutions and undertook significantly more functions on their own than their counterparts in Tanzania.

This weakness of local councils in Tanzania, and in particular the Dar es Salaam Council, has meant that various central government departments have been responsible for carrying out almost all the more recent urban policy decisions. The Dar es Salaam City Council had, for example, only one professional town planner on its staff in 1973. This meant that virtually all the detailed planning for the capital city was done in the offices of the Town Planning Division of the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development. In 1971 the Division had only six professional staff with responsibility for the whole country. (47, p.30) By contrast, the Government Town Planning Department in Kenya had 14 professional staff in 1971, while the Town Planning Office of the Nairobi City Council had in addition at least half that number. Kenya has its own problems of coordinating urban development, but these problems are less intractable because of the relatively higher level of professional capacity, and because a great deal of the planning and phasing of programmes is worked out within the major councils. In Tanzania, where very little project planning takes place within, or uses the services of the urban councils, inter- and intra-ministerial conflicts can have a much more serious impact. In Kenya, the stability and continuity of Government institutions tends to be seen as an end in itself; in Tanzania, institutional structures are often changed to achieve consistency with evolving development goals.

While it is valid to characterize Tanzania's overriding objective as "socialist rural development", it is not so easy to pithily summarize Kenya's development goals in a simple shorthand phrase. Side by side with a framework of rather extensive controls over and government participation in certain sectors of the economy (e.g. agriculture and tourism), there is a vigorous private sector bounded only by the injunction that it Africanize its personnel as rapidly as possible. These differing development emphases lead to a different bias in urban policy, despite common problems of performance. In Tanzania, the bulk of Government activity and development funds for the urban areas are intended to benefit "workers" or "lower income groups"; at the same time, care is taken that co-operative, socialist activities are promoted and that the gap between urban workers and rural peasants does not widen. 20 In Kenya, where we

20. For an important analysis of the income gap between urban and rural areas, see the Turner Report (52); the report was discussed at length in Parliament. (45, cols. 2581-2666) For a concise statement of Government policy on incomes and the rural-urban balance, see (54) pp.205-207.
have seen how some programmes at least ostensibly aim at the lower income groups, other programmes - notably the building of municipal markets, loan support for the Africanization of trade, numerous housing estates built with public funds, the lending policies of the commercial banks - tend to benefit mainly those with property or capital.

These differences in urban policy are related to a number of more general independent differences between the two countries. Foremost among these are political structures and attitudes, and income distribution. We will discuss each of these factors in turn.

Political Structures and Attitudes: The first important variable here is political party organization. The single party in Tanzania, TANU, is a mass organization, from the local ten-house cell leaders covering all the urban and most of the rural areas, to an ongoing national headquarters and executive structure. Technical economic decisions are first passed by the Economic Committee of the Cabinet after extensive scrutiny by the civil service, but the National Executive Committee of the party meets regularly with the President and most, if not all important decisions are taken with its sanction. While the party has been concerned about its role in implementing development policy its importance in setting general policy goals is unquestioned. In Kenya, the ruling party, KANU, has played virtually no role in any major recent policy decision. Party headquarters amount to little more than a few offices; at district level party branches play essentially a nomination role at election time. Thus, while the continued vitality of the mass party in Tanzania obliges policy makers to take the needs of the poorest areas and lowest income groups into consideration, the same kind of institutional pressure does not exist in Kenya. This does not mean that there is no concern for the needs of these groups in Kenya; far from it. But in most squatter communities in Nairobi, the people seem to feel that they have little influence over the vagaries of the political process; in Tanzania, on the other hand, TANU is effectively organized in all squat communities and the people in these areas have effectively insulated themselves against Government demolition and restrictions by using their party representatives. The evidence suggests that the influence of individual MP's in protecting low-income communities in Kenya

21. For example, paragraph 11 of the TANU Guidelines, 1971 stated, "The responsibility of the Party is to lead the masses, and their various institutions, in the effort to safeguard national independence and to advance the liberation of the African. The duty of a socialist party is to guide all activities of the masses. The Government, parastatals, national organisations, etc., are instruments for implementing the Party's policies. Our short history of independence reveals problems that may arise when a party does not guide its instruments. The time has now come for the Party to take the reins and lead all the people's activities." The Guidelines are translated into English in (28).
The degree to which lower-income urban needs are or are not effectively articulated through the political machinery is partly a reflection of the attitudes and interests of the political-administrative elite. The prevailing attitude toward urban development in Tanzania was well expressed in the 1967 Arusha Declaration, first written in draft by President Nyerere and published in amended form by the TANU National Executive Committee:

"...We must not forget that people who live in towns can possibly become the exploiters of those who live in the rural areas. All our big hospitals are in towns and they benefit only a small section of the people of Tanzania. Yet if we have built them with loans from outside Tanzania, it is the overseas sale of the peasants' produce which provides the foreign exchange for repayment. Those who do not get the benefit of the hospitals thus carry the major responsibility for paying for them. Tarmac roads, too, are mostly found in towns and are of especial value to the motor-car owners. Yet if we have built these roads with loans, it is again the farmer who produces the goods which will pay for them. What is more, the foreign exchange with which the car was bought also came from the sale of the farmers' produce. Again, electric lights, water pipes, hotels and other aspects of modern development are mostly found in towns. Most of them have been built with loans and most of them do not benefit the farmer directly, although they will be paid for by the foreign exchange earned by the sale of his produce. We should always bear this in mind." (31, pp. 242-243)

Later in the same document, a leadership code was proposed whereby TANU leaders and higher Government officials were prohibited from owning shares or directorships in any private company, receiving more than a single salary, or owning houses for rent. (31, p.249) This leadership code has on the whole been successfully enforced. In effect, the code separates the interests of party and Government officials from specifically urban-based enterprise, since there is no restriction on a leader developing his rural farm, so long as he is not "associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism." This anti-urban bias is in turn partially a reflection of the fact that few, if any, of the top political leaders of the country represent towns or areas adjacent to the capital. If TANU's development as an effective nationalist party out of associations that were essentially rural-based and "the resentment of country people against outside interference" (5, p.22) is a valid interpretation for the pre-Independence period, the government that TANU formed later has been no less rural in its predispositions.

22. This conclusion emerges from a case study of the demolition of a squatter village in Mombasa. See (36) Chapter 7.
Kenya political leaders have been less explicit on the rural-urban development distinction. Besides a formal commitment to rural development in the Second Five Year Plan, there is President Kenyatta's frequent "back to the land" exhortation with the related implication that urban areas are breeding grounds of immorality and crime. In 1972 a speech by the President was reported as follows:

Vagrants and idlers in Nairobi and other towns throughout Kenya were yesterday reminded by President Kenyatta of his call to "go back to the land" to help the farming community continue developing the country.... "Our country has no place for lazy and idle people!", he said.... "Those who believe in hanging around Nairobi and other towns must heed my call of 'go back to the land'. It is only when we have got rid of vagrants and idlers that we can eradicate robbery and thefts," the President said. (East African Standard, 28 September, 1972)

Later the same year, in justifying the demolition of some shanties along the Nairobi River, the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner:

... said shanties were harbouring hundreds of criminals. Many of them are often responsible for pick-pocketing incidents and night-time robberies, he alleged.

The PC warned that the law would not tolerate such activities and war had been declared to deal with such culprits, he said. The shanty dwellers were unwanted as the structures they had were illegal and a danger to the peaceful and law-abiding citizens of the city.

Mr. Mburu said all those living in the shanties had their homes, and even land, back in the reserves but did not wish to stay there. "The Government, therefore, has no alternative but to take them back to their homes," he said. (Daily Nation, 1 December, 1972)

Persistence of these attitudes toward squatters and the urban unemployed notwithstanding, the Government has maintained its financial support for urban development. Funds advanced to Kenya's National Housing Corporation have been significantly greater than to its Tanzania counterpart: in 1972, for example, the Kenya Government loaned the NHC £1.793 million (17, p.37) for the financial year 1972/73. Tanzania's NHC received only £125,000, or about 7% of the Kenya total. At the same time, as we have seen, urban local authorities in Kenya have spent at a much higher level than in Tanzania. These differences cannot be explained in terms of different overall levels of expenditure by the two Governments, since in recent years total recurrent and development expenditures in the two countries have been roughly equal. Even the slightly higher level of urbanization in Kenya does not account for the differences. Of course, a lot more income is generated in Kenya's cities because of the wealth of the Asian and expatriate communities living there, particularly in Nairobi, but this in
itself does not explain why the Government of Kenya has spent so much more on public housing and other services which benefit the African community. A major reason, I would submit, is political. Unlike the Tanzanian example, many influential Cabinet Ministers (including the President himself) come from areas in Central Province within commuting distance of Nairobi. Not only have many of their constituents migrated to Nairobi for work, maintaining their plots (shambas) and continuing to contribute to family up-keep and self-help projects in their home areas, but many senior politicians themselves have become heavily involved in urban land and businesses. This urban involvement, at a somewhat lower level, applies also to civil servants in both central and local Government, though it appears to be more prevalent among Kikuyu who are the majority ethnic group in Nairobi and the main group in the adjacent Central Province. Politicians and high-level administrators have invested in land, buildings and businesses in other Kenya towns as well, though to a much lesser extent than in Nairobi. When this involvement is not direct it may take place through relatives. Government support for a relatively high level of urban services, and in particular for the prestige development of Nairobi, is unlikely to diminish so long as these interests are congruent.

Income Distribution: A second, and complementary dimension which helps to account for the greater ideological thrust toward lower-income benefits in Tanzania is related to class structure. Without getting into a detailed discussion of the attributes of class in urban African society, suffice it to say that any analysis in depth must take as a starting point the known data on income distribution. While it is not easy to achieve perfect comparability, some survey data fortunately exist for the main urban areas in both countries. These are presented in Tables VI and VII. The data for Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (Shs. / Month)</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Totals</td>
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</table>

Source: (12) p. 346, Table 53.

23. For a brilliant analysis of urban-rural ties that applies particularly to Central Province, see (26).
24. An excellent recent collection of articles on class in Africa is contained in (4).
is based on a household survey in 1968-69 and includes all main forms of cash
and non-cash income.\(^{25}\)

The data for Tanzania, on the other hand, is based on a random survey
of individuals in 1971, and does not include non-cash income. Admittedly,

Table VII: Individuals' total cash income by income class for Dar es Salaam,
Tanga, Mwanza and Arusha, 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (Shs. / Month)</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
<th>% Cumulative %</th>
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<td>0 - 199</td>
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<tr>
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<td>500 - 799</td>
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<td>750 - 999</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 - 1499</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 1500</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2140</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's computation of data supplied by R. Sabot and M. Blenefeld.

These data are not perfectly comparable. The Kenya table refers to households
and includes non-cash income; the Tanzania data refers to all income-earning
individuals and is derived from a survey carried out two years later. The time
difference, however, is an advantage to comparison, since the greater income
earned by households in the Kenya sample would be to some extent cancelled by
natural increases in individual incomes over two years in Tanzania.

For all the problems implicit in such a comparison, the two samples
show a striking difference in income distribution. The bulk of the Tanzanian
sample (59.2%) was earning less than shs. 300/- per month, while only 24.2% of
the Kenyan sample was in this income class. At the other extreme, only 8.5% of

\(^{25}\) The ILO report, (12), relies heavily on this survey, but notes "there
was serious bias in the sample...The major biases arose through omitting most
of the urban shanty areas from the sample frame and through excluding European
and Asian households from the sample, thereby also excluding many African house-
hold servants, many of whom earn less than 200 shs. a month." (pp. 75-76). In
a more recent synthesis of a number of social surveys in Nairobi, however, the
Nairobi Urban Study group has produced an income distribution table for Nairobi
in 1972 that shows a much lower proportion of urban households in the below shs
300/- per month class, and a much higher proportion in the highest income category.
Even if all of these samples are biased, which is difficult to demonstrate, they
still represent an income distribution pattern which policy makers must presume to
exist.
the Tanzanian urban workers earned shs. 1,000/- per month or more, in contrast to 27.8% of the Kenyan households sampled. In spite of the difficulty of comparing the two samples as precisely as we would like, the differences are so great that two conclusions are inescapable: a much higher proportion of Tanzanian workers receive low incomes; and a much lower proportion of Tanzanians receive relatively high incomes. These differences in urban income distribution are an important parameter on urban development programmes in the two countries. On the one hand, the greater proportion of middle and upper-income earners in Kenya (and again, especially Nairobi) puts considerable pressure on both local and central government to provide higher standard urban services and facilities. On the other hand, in the Tanzanian urban environment any policy which does not at least attempt to benefit lower income groups will alienate the Government from the overwhelming majority of the population. Quite apart from elite interests and political structure, some of the differences in urban policy in the two countries are undoubtedly a reflection of contrasting urban class structures.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have compared urban policy and performance for the post-Independence period ending in 1973. The picture that emerges is of substantially differing approaches to policy in Kenya and Tanzania, differences which are in turn related to broader systemic factors such as overall political goals, political structures and income distribution. If this is not surprising, in view of what we already know about the differences between the political systems of the two countries, there are nevertheless some general points to be drawn from this type of comparison.

First, it is obviously not sufficient to characterize a country's policies in a particular area as, say, "progressive" or "consolidative" without taking account of the quality of implementation. If a country is poor, and its bureaucratic resources are limited, to put too much pressure on the bureaucracy to effect change is in the end to invite stagnation and a situation whereby only those with access to the bureaucracy and its agencies will get what they need. Unless performance is improved, this is a danger that always lurks beyond policy innovation in Tanzania. For regimes where policy change has not been radical, and where bureaucratic capacity has been developed to more adequate

26. For an extensive treatment of upper-income biases in the housing programme of the Nairobi City Council, see (57).
levels, the problem for policy-makers may be to cope with demands from all sections of urban society and not merely to meet targets or to maintain services in a formal sense. In a rapidly urbanizing society where the bulk of the new migrants are in lower-income groups, Kenya's urban bureaucracy will increasingly have to come to terms with the problem of equity.

The second point concerns political constraints. Urban political systems in Africa, with one or two exceptions, are notoriously weak in the sense that contact between most of the population and governing institutions and bureaucratic agencies is poorly articulated. Tanzania is somewhat of an exception to this pattern with the result that urban policy is constrained to focus on lower income groups; at the same time, the programmes that have resulted are very costly and difficult to carry out, especially in a country committed to rural development. In Kenya, where the bureaucracy clearly does not operate under the same political constraints, policy has been less innovative but performance more consistent over time. The two countries, then, represent opposite urban policy dilemmas in the interplay between the twin needs for equity and performance.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


