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Selected Papers presented to a
Workshop on Research Priorities in Southern Africa
held at the
Institute of Southern African Studies
National University of Lesotho
Roma, Lesotho
23rd to 27th November, 1981.

Edited by

MICHAEL MALEFETSANE SEFA LI

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Preface

The first regional workshop on “Research Priorities in Southern Africa” was held at the National University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho, from the 23rd-27th November, 1981. The idea of the workshop had grown as an integral part of the establishment and development of the Institute of Southern African Studies at the National University of Lesotho and was closely linked with the completion of a consultative mission to the Institute funded by the Free University of Amsterdam and NUFFIC (Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation). The terms of reference of this mission were to advise the newly-established institute on how to identify its research priorities.

Scholars and researchers from the region of Southern Africa were invited to discuss and identify collectively research priorities and to work out jointly strategies for research coordination and cooperation in the region – an issue of topical importance for future socio-economic development of the SADCC-member states. It was also the intention of the organizers and sponsors of the workshop that its results would assist the National University of Lesotho to identify and establish research priorities that its young Institute of Southern African Studies should pursue. The workshop was organized by the Institute of Southern African Studies and sponsored by the International Development Research Centre, the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation, the Lesotho National Development Corporation and the National University of Lesotho.

This publication represents a collection of selected papers from the workshop, edited within the Institute of Southern African Studies with the assistance of an Editorial Board including Roma-based academics. This volume represents a multi-disciplinary collection of papers on research and development by scholars who have been working on a wide spectrum of the problematics of the region of southern Africa. Some of the papers are already finished products of years of hard research work, while others are still raw material for ongoing research endeavours. Authors of the papers come from varying ideological backgrounds and the papers themselves are marked by a pluralism of theoretical frameworks which accounts for the absence of analytical unity in the publication. ISAS has decided to publish the results of the workshop not only in the interest of disseminating scientific knowledge and promoting academic exchange and discussion within the research community of the region, but also in the hope that they will be found to be of practical interest to planners and officials concerned with the problems of planning and executing the development strategies of the SADCC member states in their struggle for economic liberation and regional cooperation.

This publication is divided into six parts. The introductory part starts with a statement that serves to acquaint the reader with the research scenario of Southern Africa, the background to the Roma Workshop. Also included in the Introduction are some of the proceedings of the opening session of the workshop: the Welcome Address by the Head of State of the Kingdom of Lesotho and the
Keynote Paper of the Director of ISAS. The second part deals with the regional setting for research in southern Africa with special emphasis on the SADCC strategy of economic liberation and regional cooperation. The third part focuses on the case studies, the priorities and state of research in individual SADCC-member states with an interdisciplinary scope and coverage. The fourth part discusses the crucial question of the role of the research institute in a developing country with examples from selected southern African countries. The fifth part focuses on the information network and systems which are so crucial for the collection and dissemination of research material and findings. It is in this part that a strong case is made for coordinated research among the SADCC-member states. The concluding sixth part features the “Roma Declaration on Research and Development in southern Africa”—the single most important outcome of the Workshop. While not pretending to be a comprehensive catalogue of research priorities in Southern Africa, the Roma Declaration does come out with concrete proposals for a research agenda and exchange of research information in the region of Southern Africa.

The Workshop on Research Priorities in Southern Africa as well as this publication were made possible by the generosity of the sponsors; by the cooperation of the organizers and participants of the workshop; and by the contributors and the Editorial Board of this volume. I would like on behalf of the Institute of Southern African Studies and the National University of Lesotho to express our deep gratitude for their assistance and cooperation. ISAS is particularly grateful to the International Development Research Centre who did not only shoulder the main financial burden of the workshop but also provided the funds for the publication of this volume. Among the participants of the workshop, I must single out for special gratitude, His Majesty the King and Chancellor of the National University of Lesotho, Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II; the Former Honourable Minister of Education, Sports and Culture and the present Vice-Chancellor of NUL Mr. B. A. Tlelese; and the Former Senior Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Cabinet, Mr. J. R. L. Kotsokoane. Their notable contributions to the work of the Workshop include respectively the stimulating Welcome address, the Closing Address and the Opening Address.

The Institute of Southern African Studies at the National University of Lesotho is most happy to offer this as its first publication in the Institute of Southern African Studies “Southern African Development Series”. We are convinced that the publication of these papers constitutes an important contribution towards the promoting of development oriented and policy related research in the liberated zones of Southern Africa.

It is regretted that owing to financial constraints, which have made it impossible to appoint a person with specific publications responsibilities within ISAS, there have been severe delays in the production of this book. The main burden of copy editing and proof reading has been shared by four individuals. I should like to thank James Cobbe, Tom Lynn, Brenda Meakins and David Ambrose, who have successively assumed responsibility at different stages of the production of this book.

Michael Sepali
June 1982

Director, Institute of Southern African Studies
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1

The research Scenario in Southern Africa

MICHAEL SEFALI AND JAMES COBBE

Institute of Southern Africa Studies, National University of Lesotho

Southern Africa will be taken to mean the member states of the South Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), plus Namibia and the Republic of South Africa. The focus of this volume, and of the workshop from which it originates, is development research in the nine SADCC member states.

For historical, political and geographical reasons the tasks facing development research workers in the region – and the difficulties – are rather different from those in most Third World countries. The most striking reasons for these differences are, of course, the domination – economically and otherwise – of the region by the Republic of South Africa, the abhorrent racist nature of that country’s polity and society, and the strong desire of the SADCC member states to reduce their dependence, particularly on South Africa, in a coordinated and planned way. But these are not the only reasons for differences, nor necessarily the most important sources of difficulties for researchers.

As a glance at Table 1 of Appendix C immediately shows, most of the SADCC countries are both small in population and poor in terms of average income, but often large in terms of land area (for SADCC as a whole, the population density is about 11.5 per sq. km. and, for low income countries as a whole, 67 persons per sq. km; South Africa’s population density is about 23 persons per sq. km.). This has implications with respect to distances between population centres, and difficulties and costs of communication and travel. Researchers are rarely solitary scholars; in general they require criticism and discussion, and interaction with their peers, if they are to produce good work. But this is rarely possible between centres because of the distances and costs involved, and the slowness and unreliability of the mails.

Unfortunately, it is often difficult within centres as well. In the social sciences in Southern Africa, almost all worthwhile research is conducted by workers based in universities or university-affiliated research institutes. A good deal of social science related work is also done in government or by consultants contracted to governments or aid agencies, but much of this is at best quasi-research and also unavailable to the public (frequently including the university-based research community). However, education in particular was severely neglected by the colonial powers in this region, and most universities, reflecting the small, largely poor, populations they serve, are small and relatively new. As a result, in many cases establishments in most social science disciplines are small, e.g. four posts in Economics at the University of Zi-
mbabwe in 1981, teaching loads and administrative duties are heavy, some posts are held by expatriates, and there is a weak research tradition. Pressures of other work, differences of ideological perspective or methodological approach, differences of subdisciplinary training and interest, and other factors often imply that a research worker cannot find a single colleague in his own institution who is both willing and able to critique his work and discuss it usefully. Officials in government are often either unwilling, or unable because of the pressure of other work, to give serious attention to the research activities of their university colleagues.

Furthermore, as some of the papers below show, the information infrastructure in the region is poorly developed from the point of view of serving the needs of active researchers. The end result is a tendency to isolation, parochialism, outdatedness, and often a lamentable ignorance of similar work being attempted (or already having been done) elsewhere in the region (and sometimes even within the same country).

Much of what has been said in the preceding three paragraphs could be said with some validity of all developing countries. However, it is doubtful whether there is any geographical region in the world where these problems are as acute in a geographically distinct group of countries as they are in Southern Africa. And then to them must be added the pressures and difficulties that flow from the proximity of South Africa and the structure of the region.

The nature of the South African state and its dominance of the region adds a whole extra dimension to the problems of development research in the region. It is not just that an awareness of South Africa, of race and of political implications, colours all work. Not only that the desire to reduce dependence on South Africa is more than a political goal, but in addition a deeply held personae conviction of most individual researchers that not only influences their choice of research topics, but also at times gently shades their conclusions. Beyond these obvious complications are more subtle and yet far-reaching implications South African proximity and dominance.

Two such implications can be made explicit. First, as Table 1 shows, South Africa is a considerably richer society than any of the SADCC states, in crude GNP per capita terms, over five times so compared to the SADCC average. Furthermore, and more disturbing, since 1960, again on average, South African economic growth has been substantially faster, in terms again of growth rates of crude GNP per capita, than that of SADCC. Consciously or subconsciously, this gives enormous urgency to the task of development in SADCC, the task that research workers are told – and usually fervently believe – their research should serve. For the South African system is abhorrent: it is therefore unacceptable that it should deliver not only a higher material standard of living, but a more rapidly growing one. The desire to demonstrate that the SADCC member states can deliver not only a more equitable and just society, but also one which affords its members an adequate and improving standard of living, is a very strong one. The pressure on researchers to help to bring this to reality is extremely strong, and often stronger from sources internal to the individual than from external ones.
Second, there is the set of issues that result from South African activity in the social sciences and other development-related fields. There are more universities in the Republic of South Africa than in SADCC, mostly larger, with bigger staffs, better libraries and computer services, better research support, and older research traditions. A large quantity of research work is done in the Republic of South Africa, and it circulates through most of the region. Some of this work is of direct relevance to concerns of researchers in SADCC states, more is of indirect interest because it concerns South Africa itself. Some of this work starts from value premises, ideological approaches, and assumptions with which social scientists elsewhere in the region can agree, much more of it does not, but reflects the preoccupations and prejudices of the racist South African state. How to respond to this flood of South African material creates a real dilemma. There are real problems here, and how the development research community in the SADCC states should relate to, and interact with, its counterpart in South Africa remains a largely unanswered question.

The stand that the Institute of Southern African Studies has taken on this question is as follows: the Institute will not enter into any formal relationship with universities or research institutes in the Republic of South Africa which it judges to be either close to the South African government, pro-apartheid, or direct products of the apartheid system such as the Bantustan Universities. However, ISAS stands ready to cooperate with progressive organizations and individual scholars with a proven commitment to non-racist policies. Further, as the agreed summary statement of the workshop participants, the Roma Declaration (reprinted in the Conclusion to this volume) emphasises, one of the major tasks of the community in the SADCC states must be to develop a strong alternative perspective on Southern African development, and thus weaken the existing South African stranglehold on research information and intellectual ideas. The dominance of the Republic of South Africa in the region extends to some extent beyond simple economics, and it is as vital to offer from within the region a different view of the world as to reduce economic dependence.

This, then is some of the background and context of the Workshop on Research Priorities in Southern Africa held at the Institute of Southern African Studies, Roma, Lesotho, November 23–27, 1981. What follows is a selection of papers presented at that Workshop, revised by their authors and edited by the editors of this volume. These papers are admittedly a mixed bag. They range from broad theoretical overviews to quite narrow, topic-specific reports. The coverage is not by any means comprehensive, and many of the papers bear more of the hallmarks of work in progress or working papers than of polished, finished pieces of work. However, taken as a whole, the papers do reflect considered thoughts of a fairly representative group of researchers on important aspects of development research in the region. It is in the firm conviction that this volume has something of value to say, both to our fellow research workers in the region who did not attend the workshop, and to those interested in South Africa outside the region, that we offer this publication.
CHAPTER 2

Towards Research Focusing on the Basic Aspects of Human Life: Welcome Address

HIS MAJESTY KING MOSHOESHOE II
Chancellor of the National University of Lesotho
and King of Lesotho

Introduction

All of us in the developing world live in an age of conflicts, of changes, and sometimes revolution – ideological, political, social, economic, racial, and even moral. People of all ages and all cultures are questioning not only the old, but also the current values of their own societies. The questions involved are the same as those we are going to ask ourselves over the next few days and, similarly, they are aimed – through a careful assessment of priorities – at the achievement of a more just, a more human, and a more humane way of life for each individual, which will fulfil his basic human needs – those of loving, of being loved, of being of value to his community, and of having the opportunity of expressing his frustrations as well as his satisfactions, in his own right. And yet at the same time as we see this genuine quest for justice, we see also – a result of ill conceived priorities and inadequately researched strategies and objectives all over the world – unnecessary bloodshed, needless and senseless rivalry, and many other examples of man’s inhumanity to man.

Research and its beneficiaries

I am speaking to you, not as a scientific researcher, like yourselves, but as one of your very interested consumers, who looks to you for information, knowing that you are in the information business, whether it is seeking for facts or establishing theories. The user of research looks to it, not only for information based on the scientific collection of evidence, but also for the interpretation of that evidence, which in turn, will suggest certain action. This is because, in the 20th century, science has come to be seen as interpretive, involving human explanation, as well as collected facts.

Among your most important consumers are the policy makers and the decision makers, who are also hungry, or ought to be hungry, for information. They look to research, not as academics often do – namely to improve the theoretical model – but to see if the theory has been confirmed to such an extent as to give confidence to it, and also as a basis for action. There is another very impor-
tant group of consumers, the general public—the man and woman, in the villages, in the towns to whose benefit research is, or ought to be, directed, and who, in the end, will validate or invalidate research findings, and whose beliefs and customs must be considered of great relevance to any research aimed at their welfare. Of course, research is only one influence on current beliefs and practices, but it is one of tremendous relevance and importance for creating change. It is, then, the responsibility of the researcher to disseminate his work to the customer in such a way as to transform the unrecognised into the obvious.

The scientific community has, perhaps, neglected simplification, and even somewhat despised popularisation. To change this situation should be an important challenge. The involvement and participation of all of our peoples, in their own future and in defining their own needs, is going to be a crucial factor in the quest for solutions to our enormous problems.

The need for reorientation of research, especially in Southern Africa

The context of your Workshop is the region of Southern Africa, an area we all know to be beset by economic, social and political problems of immense magnitude, and of increasing urgency if we are to avoid the destructiveness of political and social instability. Be in no doubt there has never been a more urgent need for your particular discipline, and for your active participation in the problems of Southern Africa, than this moment in time. Indeed, the whole world today needs scientific knowledge, more than ever before, in order to be ready to face the many problems of today and of tomorrow. However, in order to meet these needs, particularly in the context of Southern Africa, in order to satisfy the needs that are so fundamental to the survival of the human species in general, and fundamental also to human justice in particular, research and innovation will need some degree of reorientation. The main motivation and reason for research is, surely, or ought to be, its continual endeavour to improve the human condition. If we in Southern Africa are to avoid the total disillusionment, exasperation, and hostility of our peoples—very many of whom are still living below standards acceptable to any rational human being in the world for a reasonable quality of life—we shall all have to act quickly to promote that change for the better, to build up the kind of societies in which what is produced is determined by need of the majority, rather than by the artificially created demands and profit calculation of a few individuals; the kind of societies in which decisions are made consciously by the people as a whole, who control democratically what is produced, how it is produced, and how it is distributed; and in which the full and free development of individuals, and of their capacity to control their own lives, becomes possible. It is interesting to note, by way of illustration, that even in the well known Brandt Report there is an admission—referring of course to a specific case of reforestation—that "Experience in China has shown that the combination of a strong political commitment at the top, with broad public participation and shared benefits at the bottom, can provide a basis for rapid reforestation."
A case for relevant applied research as a priority

Any remarks that may follow, are based on the belief that research, that is, research that is relevant to our most urgent needs, has a vital part to play in the quest for solutions to the many and urgent problems facing us. It hardly needs stating, therefore, that the priority would be to promote research into the areas which will meet the need to satisfy the basic needs and basic rights of those who continue to live under all forms of deprivation, and in abject poverty.

The tragic failure of the recent development decades have made it abundantly clear that the conventional development theories, and the conventional technology of the developed world, have been powerless to alleviate those forms of deprivation and poverty. Indeed, that same conventional, sophisticated, and capital intensive technology has led to a new kind of colonialism, making the Third World more dependent than ever. All the models given to us (and these have been many!) were based on western models of development, which in turn, were based, to a considerable extent, on either bilateral or multinational capitalism. The crucial agency for the models we were given was a developed middle class, who, through private capital accumulation, were to be the prime movers in stimulating a new economic progress, which in turn, would reach out to everyone; a middle class elite would develop, and be the necessary link between the State and capital accumulation. But, not only does it seem that, even in the west, these models are now being questioned, and there seems to be a new thinking and a need for new models, but in Africa, and other poor regions of the world, that process of "filtering down" of benefits has failed, primarily because the international links of capitalism, formed over a very long period of time, were already too strong and too monopolistic for any new African State to break into, and so no real transfer of wealth or technology, ever took place. A middle class did, however, emerge, but it did not have the resources to develop the industrialisation needed. There has been no industrial revolution in Africa. There is some evidence to suggest that what has happened is an actual falling, in real terms, of living standards for many, and a widening gap between those who have and those who have not – both within nations and between nations, as well as the weakening of those political structures inherited from these same models. As the gap between people within nations increases, so does political instability, leaving both those who have and those who have not with increasing tension; and time is running out.

We now need to rethink with the help of research and other scientific disciplines, we urgently need to produce a new synthesis, which will unite all of our people – whether they are among those who have, or those who have not; we need a unity which will enable us all to act to create a new social justice, based on our own culture, finding our own salvation from our own roots; and then to link our findings, and our knowledge, to the current international movement for a new economic and political order, as a basis for a more peaceful and a more equitable global society. That thinking requires the total involvement of governments and peoples. It needs the conscious choice, of only those goals which are achievable, and of the most urgent needs of the majority of the people. It must
choose to find an acceptable formula for a fair distribution of resources, wealth and services. All this requires a clearly defined, action-oriented, research programme whose results will enable, not only the policy makers, but even the general public, to determine their priorities and their objectives. It has been reasoned that progress in science and technology can make available to man the tools by means of which poverty, destitution and ignorance can be banished from the face of the earth. But despite all this, the numbers of people living below acceptable standards, and the gap between the rich and poor, seems to be increasing every year in the developing world. The main problem is not only that the rich countries produce something close to 94 per cent of the world's science and technology, but rather that this science and technology – imported from the rich countries – takes a painfully long time to adjust to the demands of a “new order” so vital to the survival of the developing world, and the urgency of this adjustment can never be overstressed. Some statistics indicate that the world currently spends US $ 225 000 million per year on military purposes, as against US $ 125 000 million on education, and US $ 60 000 million on public health. The question for every citizen should, therefore, be how long can such a situation be tolerated, where half of the world's scientific and technical manpower, as well as enormous financial resources, are being used up by military research and development, while millions of people exist in a state of social deprivation, misery and abject poverty and some even die from the effect of malnutrition and preventable diseases?

We all know that the world's total resources – material and intellectual – are sufficient, potentially, to provide for the basic needs, for food, shelter, and health, for all of the world's population. What is missing is the willingness, and the impartial resolve, to overcome the persistent political, social and economic problems that prevent a genuine attempt to find solutions. Vested interests remain enshrined in neocolonialism, and as a result, tensions increase, and threaten peace within nations and between nations. There is an urgent need for a long range scholarly analysis of global alternatives in order to identify the real problems, and the real obstacles, before they become insoluble by peaceful means.

The challenge to Southern African research

However, we cannot sit still here in Southern Africa, and wait for someone else to provide us with the answers, or even to suggest what sort of questions to ask. There cannot be a single solution applied internationally, because the very nature of man's basic human needs is perceived differently in different countries and in different regions, according to their own cultural and customary values and ways of life. The solutions appropriate to one region may be quite unsuitable to another region which has a different sociocultural, economic and ecological setting. Most of us in Africa know this only too well, having watched western models fail – often because of a total lack of understanding of African culture, history and customs, as well as other physical and psychological conditions. Peter Townsend, for example, has described, in his book *Poverty in the United King-*
dom, how those in any society are poor if they are unable to participate in the activities, and do not have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged and approved of, in the societies to which they belong. What is involved, then—in our quest and wish to satisfy the basic human needs of our peoples—essentially concerns two fundamental resources, land and people, in their entirety, in any country or region. I stress ‘entirety’ because of the need to appreciate that development is not just about a project area, but is about a total national territory, or a total regional and cultural entirety. A new society’s rules and laws—which imply new disciplines, new attitudes, and new behaviour—cannot be introduced into our societies if they only apply to a minority who can always evade them by moving back into the antecedent social structures. We must build our foundations for the future by beginning from our own values, which are understood by our people, and we must build from there. The basic needs of many of our villages, where most of our people live are still for pure drinking water, for adequate sanitation, and for other primary services. We must not forget that; and that perhaps is a reflection on advanced international science. The land and the people, are two important resources which some poor countries have in abundance. What is missing, in our search for basic needs satisfaction, is not so much investment capital, but the ability to mobilize our societies, as a whole, so as to make full use of our capital resources. The total mobilisation of all of our people is thus a critical factor in the construction of any new social framework. Most of our people live on, and off, the land, and the importance of mobilising the land resource, as part of construction or reconstruction, need not be emphasised here. Such a goal must involve the use of traditional systems of organisation, in a modernising context, in such a way as to be comprehensible to the vast majority of the population. This basic requirement represents an essential part of self-reliance development, and the important point here is that what is transformed must be of the society, part of its tradition, which, though being transformed, still remains traditional—not alien to it. Where this involves ideas, values, technologies, for other people and other cultures, these can become part of the traditional resources of our people, if they are adapted imaginatively. This, in turn, will release the latent productive capabilities of our own people. But, for this, we need a strong awareness of our own history and its relationship to our conscious present. In spite of a statement once made by a very distinguished Regius Professor of History, at Oxford, that there is no African history before the arrival of European colonisation, we know that the precolonial African history is of direct relevance to our present; and indeed further research into that precolonial history is of the utmost importance to us in understanding our present more deeply. We need to trace that history, both before, during, and after colonisation, and relate it to our present need for new solutions.

We need, then, to develop our own national and regional scientific capability, so that it can be brought to bear on our own problems of meeting the basic human needs of our people. In current western development literature, there is growing criticism related to the role of all élites in developing countries—whether acade-
mic élites or otherwise. Teresa Hayter, in her recent publication — *The Creation of World Poverty* — says that in every country in the developing world, there are forces which are rebelling against the empty promises of political independence, demanding genuine independence, and real economic progress; which are increasingly aware that, just as they were robbed, in the past, by their colonial rulers, so now they are being robbed by an alliance between these old colonial rulers, some new neocolonial ones, and their own ruling classes. The élites are accused, therefore, of an unwillingness to face and even a lack of interest in facing, the problems of poverty; they are accused, further, of an unwillingness to forego even a few of their privileges in order to make scarce resources available for a massive attack on the problems of poverty, from which poverty the élites do not suffer. Again, Donald K. Kowet, in his book — *Land, Labour Migration, and Politics in Southern Africa* — says “Experience has shown that the élite, once entrenched in their economic positions will not surrender their interests of their own free will”.

Whatever the justice or injustice of these accusations may be, we must continually question ourselves about our own responsibilities and liabilities, which indeed come with privilege, and are an essential part of it. Are we always, each one of us, sufficiently aware of the urgency of the problems of poverty to be ready to play our rightful role, whether or not we are called upon to do so? Are we sufficiently aware of the eventual results of the continuing poverty and social injustice, within our own countries and region? Can we really allow the worst of these injustices to continue — the results of some of which are irreversible physiological and psychological damage, such as malnutrition in early childhood? These are some of the questions we must all remember to ask ourselves, even though they may, often, be obscured by our own daily lives, and often seem too overwhelming for individual action.

**Obstacles to relevant applied research**

However, a certain dichotomy may arise here; on the one hand, when discussing basic human needs, academics and others often agree that the meeting of basic human needs is an urgent priority; on the other hand, basic research is often defined as research at the frontiers of knowledge, aimed at an understanding, in depth, of phenomena, whether physical, social or biological. Sometimes, prestigious research can seem remote, and perhaps unrelated to action directly aimed at providing those human needs. If there seems to be a gap between, on the one side, prestigious research, and, on the other, research about the definition and the meeting of those defined basic needs, it would seem to be one of our priorities to close that gap.

In more relatively closed societies, such élitism is not tolerated and attempts are made to close such a gap by government demanding that all academics devote a fraction of their time to socially relevant work. In our own, more open societies, many of our academics are trained overseas, in the rich countries, and they still tend to look to that outside world, in research, for recognition and ap-
probation. Overseas funding agencies frequently lay down conditions more relevant to their own development experiences, than to ours, using their own measurements and methods applicable to their own situation.

Our scientific community, in Southern Africa, has yet to evolve its own internal standards of relevance and excellence, by which it can recognise work of merit. This does not, in any way, involve a drop in standards – as is so frequently predicted by the outside world when we, in the Third World, wish to convert recognised methods and standards to direct relevance to our own needs – but would merely involve a localisation of those same standards elsewhere.

Governments too have been slow to recognise the strength represented by a local scientific infrastructure, and the role such can play in basic needs problems. Better communication between governments and research bodies is needed – communication where each can express their anxieties concerning the role of the other, and such subjects as the need to preserve academic freedom could be expressed, on the one side, whilst the need for academic relevance may be stressed by government, on the other, and so on.

**Proposed course of action**

Do we then need, in Southern Africa, a central, coordination body, which could represent worldwide acceptable standards of scientific capacity, and which would recognise work on merit, as well as provide a central data bank? Such a centre would generate expertise, and also the confidence which comes from doing research in relevant and highly important areas of local concern, under local conditions. This is not to say that the international pool of knowledge should not be used to help solve local problems; on the contrary, sharing of knowledge is as important as sharing material resources. It would mean that not only do we draw on the knowledge of others, in different parts of the world, but that we also contribute to that international pool of knowledge, and bring to it a new dimension and understanding. I am sure that most development theorists in the world would welcome such a contribution and such a quest for alternative approaches, aimed at the production of a new theoretical apparatus. As social scientists, you must perpetually remind the world – and indeed all of us – of the urgency of the need to abolish all forms of injustices, whether social, economic or political, and all their evils. In the United Kingdom, for example, it was people like Booth, Rowntree, the Webbs and Beveridge, who continually reminded and put before their leaders the urgent need to find solutions to the social injustices of that period and indeed it is people like Peter Townsend who continue to remind them today about the ever present new and old injustices that exist even in the western world in our time. There must be no comfortable academic ghetto in the context of development studies; development involves us all, worldwide, regionally and nationally, towards whatever the most urgent needs are, wherever they are.
Research serving basic human needs: general

Research, serving basic human needs, would appear to involve three different categories.

The first is that aimed at a better understanding and formulation of what basic human needs are, in the context of our culture, customs and values, and this involves a multidisciplinary approach. The very term “basic human needs” has suffered from a considerable degree of “wear and tear”, and indeed it has often been misused. We need to go out to where injustices – for example, poverty – are, namely in the villages, in the urban slums, and more importantly, in the general body politic. We need to discuss the problems of definition with the people most affected, in such a manner as to preserve their dignity, to genuinely involve them in their own problems, and to help them to find solutions based on their own self-reliance and recognized needs.

Secondly, there is research aimed at providing the “tools” which can be used to study how those national and regional needs, now defined, can best be met, with the resources available, and within the cultural framework in which they exist.

Thirdly, there is research, whose results can lead to direct action, in order to satisfy those needs. And here again the researcher may have to be prepared to adapt his own behaviour to that of the requirements of the situation. There may well be a need, during a research project, to bring some matter to the urgent attention of an administrator, or a Minister; and if necessary, to sit on the Ministry doorstep until that need has received due attention! It may mean uncovering the unpopular, or becoming regarded as a nuisance. The decision maker, who may well be snowed under with all kinds of pressures, may even make research difficult, but it does not necessarily mean that he does not want to know, or that, when aware of the situation, he will not act; on the contrary, he may be grateful that he was badgered, even if he did not enjoy the badgering at that moment in time; and, even if he is not grateful, it still needs doing. The joy of your research is that each piece of evidence, however modest or apparently obvious, is new, and may be very influential and important.

Under this heading would come research, for example, into appropriate technology in agriculture and, indeed, even in medicine. To take care of the health of all of our peoples, we cannot wait for the time when there are enough fully qualified doctors, many of whom would probably be trained overseas, in rich countries. But, as is generally known, the common ailments, from which the vast population suffers, most of the time, can be dealt with by those whose medical training does not involve the extensive theory of eight years or more that modern medical training requires. Heart transplants might, but they are not, so far, considered as common ailments among the masses! Without the commitment China had, to its total population, during its early and recent development strategy, it would not have “conceived” that romantic and most appealing of its officials – the barefoot doctor! The traditional health care methods, though they need modernisation, may well have a place in the hierarchy of health care. The same applies to traditional technology. The need to ensure that every-
one is gainfully employed in work, meaningful to self, and to the community, requires the effort to keep some of the traditional labour intensive technologies alive - not perhaps for ever, but as a stage towards a phased obsolescence. This needs a conscious assessment of traditional technologies which could possibly provide for the fuller utilisation of environmental resources. This does not involve a rejection of advanced technology; it merely provides a balance on the way to transformation, without losing touch with our own authentic resources.

There will be no end to injustices, like poverty for example, unless there is a definite shift in emphasis, from goods, to people. Schumacher put this well, I think, when he said:

"The stark fact is that poverty is primarily a matter of two million villages, and thus a problem of two thousand million villagers. The solution will not be found in the cities of the poor countries, . . . The gift of material goods makes people dependent, but the gift of knowledge makes them free. Give a man a fish and you are helping him a little, and for a short time; teach him to fish, and he can help himself all his life; teach him to make his own fishing tackle, and you have helped him to become, not only self-supporting, but also self-reliant and independent."

This philosophy is now more vital than ever to developing countries, and leads us to ask ourselves about educational needs research. Of course, we need well-educated people for every sphere of activity; but what about education for self-reliance? We need skilled craftsmen, skilled agricultural workers, just as much as university graduates; and, in fact we shall soon discover that we need the skilled citizen more than the Arts degree graduate! We need to avoid the over valuation of traditional academic training against that of agricultural skills and craftsmanship, both in status and rewards.

**Research serving basic human needs: Southern Africa**

In addition to all these areas of research, for us, in Southern Africa, we have to add serious and urgent research on the effects of migratory labour, not only in economic terms, or political terms but more essentially, in social terms, and in terms of village development. In a very interesting research publication in 1978, Donald K. Kowet of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, has this to say.

"The contribution of migrants' earnings, to the households and to general development, in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, is very limited . . . In the case of Lesotho, which had the largest contingent of migrant labour force and, thus, received the largest share of the deferred payment, the total income was of little significance as far as development of the country was concerned."

Kowet refers to what Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out, that the movements of labour, capital, goods and services, do not, by themselves, counteract the natural tendency to regional inequality and that, by themselves, migration, capital movements and trade, are rather the media through which the cumulative process
evolves, that is, upwards in the lucky regions, and downwards in the unlucky ones. He, Kowet, concluded by saying, 

“Thus, the underdevelopment of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, must be seen in the context of the economic and political interaction of the region as a whole, which was established by a deliberate destruction of the land-based economies of the three countries, and their replacement by the labour reserve economy.”

Here, the consequences of migratory labour, for the role and status of women in village development, is a crucial issue. The contribution and role of women, in these circumstances, has been vastly underestimated and often even ignored by development planners who still address most development planning facilities mostly to men. The needs, and status, of women are two of the central issues in countries where some women are the main economic providers for their families, and where vast numbers of men leave their country and their neighbourhood, to seek work elsewhere. Michael Pallis, in his translation of Slaves of Slaves, recently published in the context of South America, says “Up till now, women have been recognised as wives, mother, daughters, and even as consumers. What women, today, are demanding, is to be recognised without qualifying adjectives.” But he concedes that, in each country, the strategy and organisation of the women’s liberation movement will necessarily depend on the existing socioeconomic structure, on the size and influence of the political organisations, and, he exhorts that this latter aspect be a crucial area of study and research.

Another priority, for Southern Africa, must, of course, be regional cooperation, in order to reduce dependence on any one developed country; and this involves, not only a political unity of purpose, but also careful research into the best method of sharing resources, and developing trade, on a regional basis. We must, all of us, work, together—researchers, academics, politicians, employers, workers, and each of our people—to use all our resources—to solve our problems. All the social questions that science is called upon to answer, need to be analysed in collaboration with all the relevant disciplines which have a side open to science. The policy maker, the decision maker, cannot do without all these contributions, and, if he tries to do without them, he weakens his credibility, he reduces opportunities of acceptability and success, and he increases chances of failure.

Conclusion

The scientific community can, with imagination, creativity and innovation, and by shifting its research priorities, make a fundamental contribution to the attainment of the satisfaction of basic human needs, and thereby towards the establishment of a new and more equitable global society. Any relevant research system should be taken seriously by those involved in the social, economic and political spheres, and should participate in the acceleration of national and regional developments, taking firm root among the real problems of their region, and operating according to the “felt-needs” of that region. A large percentage of
research into these “need areas” ought to be done at our own regional level, by ourselves. The minimum human needs – for food, shelter, clothing, education, health, meaningful work, and so on – represent an area of urgent social action. The area must be based on carefully researched findings, and not merely on compassionate or humanitarian grounds. Neglect of these needs will lead to national and international strife for the poor and the rich, and satisfaction of these needs is the minimum prerequisite for the restoration of human dignity to a large majority of the world’s population, and, in the last resort, for giving the only true meaning to the word “democracy”.

Finally, may I remind you once more, of the growing cynicism that accuses most of us of talking too much, to no purpose, or real action. I am quite sure that this Workshop will not only “talk” together, to some purpose, but will also produce some concrete plan of action, together with a follow-up, to ensure that the action takes place as soon as is humanly possible. The population of our region is predicted to increase rapidly before the year 2000; the questions of providing food and employment, under these circumstances, have not yet been adequately faced, and I have a feeling that we are still relatively unprepared. Research into how best to meet this reality is vital to us here, and indeed to many other regions in the world. Such research involves analytical techniques because it involves the manipulation of many parameters, and implies links with the rest of the world. It would seem all too obvious, therefore, that the urgent research subjects are those of the social, economic, and the political spheres; priorities need to be formulated, and reformulated, in such a way as not to lose sight of the fundamental orientation of man towards the basic aspects of human life; and this orientation is surely the only tolerable one if we are to avoid national and international calamities. There are a good many indications, less well documented, perhaps – hence the urgent need for research – that the situation of the very poor, especially in rural areas in most underdeveloped countries, is becoming more and more unequal. Perhaps I might end by referring to an apt statement made by President Kennedy, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Alliance for Progress: “Those who possess wealth and power, in poor nations, must accept their own responsibilities. They must lead the fight for those basic reforms which alone can preserve the fabric of their societies. Those who make peaceful revolution impossible, will make violent revolution inevitable.”

KHOTSO! PULA! NALA!
CHAPTER 3

Research, Technology and Development in Southern Africa: Keynote Paper

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Introduction

The scientific and technological revolution has become one of the most important factors that direct the development of social production in the modern world. It is manifested in constantly changing equipment, technologies and organisation of the development of the productive forces.

However, in this epoch of scientific and technological progress, when men and spacecraft have reached the Moon, the developing countries, which account for 70 per cent of the world population, create only 0.5 per cent of new technology. Accordingly, one of the most important development tasks of the Third World, and more particularly the African-ruled states of Southern Africa today, is the overcoming of the scientific technological lag inherited from their colonial past and the building of a viable technological basis for their post colonial socioeconomic development. Hence, scientific and technological research has come to occupy an increasingly important, if not crucial, role in the strategy of the African-ruled states of Southern Africa, in order to overcome their technological and economic dependence on their white-ruled neighbour and to achieve socioeconomic development and regional cooperation on an equal and mutually advantageous basis.

What then should be the goals and direction of scientific research for development? What are the tasks necessary to build an independent technological basis for socioeconomic development? What are the guidelines for coordinated research development within the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) strategy for economic liberation and regional cooperation? These are but a few of the many urgent problems which have faced and are facing scientific researchers, scholars, planners and policy-makers in the African-ruled states of Southern Africa since the achievement of their political independence.
The struggle for liberation and development in Southern Africa

The classical colonial system is nearing complete collapse in Africa and Southern Africa. The liberated zones of the African independence movements have irreversibly reached the banks of the Caledon, Cunene, Maputo and Limpopo. This tremendous advance of the liberation movement in Southern Africa, the result of the heroism of the African peoples themselves and the international solidarity of the world anticolonial forces, has ushered in a new strategic situation in Southern Africa, opening real possibilities for fundamental change in the Southern African situation as a whole, along the path of liberation, development and social progress.

The achievement of political independence by the African-ruled states of Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe is a historical victory of the peoples of Southern Africa in their struggle for the reconquest of their political sovereignty, their worthy contribution to the world’s liberatory process. However, the achievement of political independence alone does not mean an automatic end of colonial domination and underdevelopment. Through the system of neocolonialism, the former colonial powers strive to retain old structures, economic exploitation and political influence adapted to the new conditions of state sovereignty of the developing countries.

In Southern Africa, the process of the consolidation of political independence and moves to overcome the colonial legacy of underdevelopment are complicated by the extreme economic dependence of the African-ruled states of the region on the regional “subimperialist” power, the Republic of South Africa. This economic dependency is the result of the integrationist processes which started with the colonisation of Southern Africa by the first batch of European settlers in the Cape in the 17th century, and has continued up to the present century through the instrumentality initially of merchant and, subsequently, of monopoly capital.

In varying degrees, and to a lesser extent in the case of Tanzania and Angola, the independent states of Southern Africa maintain economic relations characterised by dependency on the Republic of South Africa and there is glaring disparity of wealth between the former and the latter. (See the statistical tables in Appendix C).

The pattern of communication in this subcontinent is such that the majority of the African-ruled states are dependent on Southern Africa transport and routes for outlets to the outside world. South Africa’s neighbours still, to a very large extent, rely on foreign trade relations with South Africa not only for the import of manufactured goods and export of their raw materials, but also for their food supply. About half a million migrant workers from the independent states still rely on the South African labour market for their livelihood, however unreliable it has proved to be. Not only do Lesotho and Swaziland belong to a monetary agreement dominated by the Republic of South Africa, but the latter has of late stepped up its capital exports as a result of which South African capital
occupies key positions in the economies of most of the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa.

Since the achievement of political independence the African-ruled states of Southern Africa have adopted divergent national strategies for development. Some have followed the capitalist road of development and others have opted for socialism as the path of their sociopolitical orientation. What will be the final choice of social system in each of the nine majority-ruled states of Southern Africa is a decision that is the sovereign right of the people of the individual countries concerned. However, almost all of these countries, of course in varying degrees, are faced with a common regional problem of underdevelopment and dependency, and the common task of the attainment of economic development and liberation.

Even before the whole of Southern Africa is fully liberated, the African-ruled states of the region are already grappling with the enormous tasks of socioeconomic development. In the narrow sense of the word, development has meant the growth of social production as a result of the growth of the productive forces. However, and in a broad sense, by development we do not just understand quantitative growth of the structures of production but a qualitative leap forward in the relations of production. The law of dialectics teaches that development is the struggle of opposites and this struggle of opposites is the source of development. In our sociopolitical context, development means the substitution of the socioeconomic structures of neocolonialism by those of an independent national economy, the building of politically, economically, culturally and technologically independent societies in Southern Africa. The increased participation by all citizens in the management of the affairs of their country, and the unhindered enjoyment by all citizens of their civil, political and socioeconomic rights are also an essential aspect of development. No country can justly claim to be fully independent or developing if within its borders the people are not the ultimate repositories of national sovereignty and political power.

It was against this background that on the 1st April, 1980 Heads of State and Representatives of the nine majority-ruled states of Southern Africa met in Lusaka, Zambia in an historic economic summit and adopted the now famous Lusaka Manifesto, embodying the regional SADCC strategy of reducing dependency on South Africa and promoting regional cooperation in the struggle for economic liberation. "Our urgent task now," says the Declaration, "is to include economic liberation in our programmes and priorities. In the interest of the people of our countries, it is necessary to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa, to overcome the imposed economic fragmentation and to co-ordinate our efforts toward regional and national economic development. This will be as great for Namibia as it is for all the independent states of the region.""1

In accordance with the directive of the First Summit held in Lusaka, a Ministerial Meeting took place in Salisbury on the 11th September, 1980. The Meeting devoted itself to the discussion of proposals for the permanent institutional arrangements for the Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC) and to a review of preparations for the Summit held in Maputo from the 26th to the 27th November, 1980. At this meeting, member states met with representatives of donor governments and international development agencies to seek their support for the Lusaka Programme for Economic Liberation. Specific projects were presented and approved for implementation by SADCC.

Another Ministerial Meeting of SADCC was held in November, 1981, in Blantyre, Malawi. In addition to representatives of the nine African-rulled independent states of Southern Africa, present at the meeting were representatives of twenty-three donor nations and agencies. Having reviewed development progress over the year since the establishment of SADCC, it decided on the establishment of a permanent Secretariat for SADCC in Gaborone, the capital of the Republic of Botswana.

The strategy for economic liberation, development and regional cooperation in Southern Africa has three clearly delineated directions. The first direction is the reduction of economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa; the second is the development of regional cooperation and the forging of links of “equitable regional integration” among the majority-rulled states of the subcontinent; and the third is concerted action to secure international cooperation for the implementation of regional development projects. Of course the states of the region also recognise the crucial importance of mobilising regional resources for carrying into effect the strategy of economic liberation.

Priority areas of regional cooperation were identified at the meeting in Maputo in approximately the following order: transport and communications, agricultural development and food self-sufficiency, manpower development, industrial development and coordination, establishment of a development fund, and energy conservation.

It is imperative, if the strategy of economic liberation and development in Southern Africa is to succeed that, firstly the African-rulled states of the region should have a similar conception of the nature and character of their economic dependency on the Republic of South Africa; secondly, that they demonstrate an unflinching commitment to the programme of reducing dependency and promoting regional cooperation among themselves; thirdly, these states should cultivate a common and coordinated stand in resisting the destabilization policies of their racist neighbour, the Republic of South Africa.

The last strongholds of colonialism on the African Continent are still found in the racist Republic of South Africa and racist-occupied Namibia. Apartheid is a system of economic exploitation, political oppression and racial discrimination against the black majority by the white minority. Led by their respective liberation movements, the peoples of South Africa and Namibia are waging determined liberation struggles to overthrow the system of racist colonialism and apartheid, and to build non-racial and democratic societies in their countries. Until South Africa is African-rulled, the liberation process of Southern Africa is not only incomplete, but the danger of decolonisation remains a real threat. Complete decolonisation of Southern Africa entails the liberation of South Africa and Namibia and, above all, the radical transformation of the South
African postcolonial societies, the dismantling of the socioeconomic as well as political structures of neocolonialism, and advance along the path of democracy and social progress.

**Priority tasks for research in the development process**

Economic dependency on the Republic of South Africa may be the primary but it is by no means the only obstacle to development in the African-ruled states of Southern Africa. The weak scientific and technological basis inherited from the colonial past is still another major constraint on the development process. As a result, the developing countries are subjected to one of the worst forms of dependency on the developed countries, technological dependency. This type of dependence is aggravated by the “brain drain” policy of some developed countries, as a result of which, graduates of the Third World countries are induced to remain in the countries of their training instead of being encouraged to return to their countries to serve their people.

In these circumstances, what is the role of science in the development process of Southern Africa? Undoubtedly the cardinal task of scientific research is to build a scientific and technological base for the socioeconomic development of the liberation zone of Southern Africa. Science must be an active agent of change and development in Southern Africa. There is no question of science for the sake of science. This approach is the practical calling of policy-related and development-oriented scientific research in contemporary Southern Africa, not merely to interpret the region but to take an active part in its revolutionary transformation for the good of its peoples.

Scientific research differs from formal research in that the latter is for its own sake while the former is directed at the application in the practice of historically conditioned development and change. Scientific research should analyse in an objective manner the fundamental problems of life; it should be able to combine research with training. For scientific research there is no “Chinese Wall” between research and training, since it is unthinkable that researchers could contribute towards meeting the urgent manpower needs of the developing countries meaningfully if they divorced themselves from teaching and manpower training. Above all, scientific research includes applied research. The criteria of development-oriented research lie in the application of its results in the productive sphere, in the socioeconomic development of society.

Scientific research of course is impossible without a scientific methodology of analysis, a methodology that seeks the internal connections of natural and social phenomena in constant development and change. The scientific method of enquiry moves from superficial appearance of things to their deeper essences, from their outward forms to the real content.

Applied research will undoubtedly be influenced by the regional environment and by the current geopolitical situation in its choice of priorities. The need to lessen dependence on South Africa, to accelerate development and alleviate poverty, will undoubtedly weigh heavily on the choice of priority areas.
of research in the region of Southern Africa whether it is in the field of social sciences, natural sciences or technical sciences.

The SADCC strategy of economic liberation and regional cooperation in Southern Africa is making urgent demands on applied research in the field of the social sciences. In this connection, economic research is expected to play a leading role. Substantial material has already been accumulated by progressive researchers of the region, exposing the exploitation of cheap black labour as the basis of South Africa's economic might; but in contemporary Southern Africa, the primary task of economic research is to provide the analytical tools and instruments for economic growth development, to substantiate scientifically the strategy of economic dependency on the Republic of South Africa, and to provide guidelines for regional economic cooperation among the African-ruled states of the region.

A problem of interdisciplinary scope and of topical interest for economic and legal researchers and policy-makers in Lesotho, for instance, is the landlocked nature of the country and its implications with respect to the right of transit of goods to and from the socialist countries (which, as is well known, have no dealings with South Africa). Research findings in this area would be of immense value in the elaboration of the strategy of diversification of Lesotho's international economic relations despite its unique geographic predicament.

Historical studies should not just be a narration of deeds of "great men" with the role of the masses neglected, nor should they confine themselves to mere rewriting of the history of the resistance of the peoples of Southern Africa to colonial conquest. That is the beginning but not the end of historical research enquiry.

In the present revolutionary situation of Southern Africa, political science research should be directed at the vindication of the politics of liberation, and at the exposure of neocolonial solutions to the problems of transfer of power in Southern Africa in the form of Bantustanization or the "constellation of states" scheme.

Deeper analysis should be carried out of the divergent political systems of the postcolonial state in Southern Africa, their class basis and functions; of the political system of apartheid, racist reformism and above all the new and dangerous phenomenon, the destabilization policies of the Republic of South Africa in relation to the African-ruled neighbouring states of the region. Still unresolved in political science research is the question of the racist Republic of South Africa as a "sub-imperialist power".

Socioeconomic development in Southern Africa is unthinkable without increased application of the latest findings of natural and technical science research as well as innovations. For example, within the framework of the SADCC strategy for an improved food balance in the region, biological science is called upon to direct its research at the general task of providing the scientific knowledge necessary for introduction of new varieties of grain with increased yields and for the rearing of new breeds of cattle by crossing different breeds.

In this connection, technical sciences are called upon to contribute towards the development of new appropriate technological equipment for indus-
trial and agricultural development. Increased demands are being made for scientific and technological ground work for optimum utilization of energy, for the enlargement of the raw material basis, for providing the technological data necessary for better town planning and good quality construction, preservation of buildings of historical value and for the improvement of transport and communications.

Medical research should be directed at probing the reasons for illness and disease, and the conditions which are propitious for them, and at equipping the medical practitioner with a better scientific knowledge of the treatments required, including prophylactic measures and follow-up treatment. Medical research should form part of the overall strategy of successful health policies, to promote preventive rather than curative public health systems, to improve water supply and sanitation in the urban and rural areas. Pedagogical research also forms part of the overall strategy of development-oriented and policy-related research in the region of Southern Africa. Educational research must be aimed at the transformation of school education, at educating and promoting love for science and interest in technology and production; the colonial legacy of literary bias in education must be overcome. The task of educational research in the institutions of higher learning is to provide scientific foundations for the patriotic education of young people and the improvement of the content of education according to the requirements of material and cultural development of the postcolonial societies of the region. Educational research is also called upon to address itself to the serious problem of the “brain drain” in developing countries; to explore the training strategies that would ensure an optimal link between education and production and as well ensure productive employment of middle and high level manpower trained in the Third World itself or abroad.

The contents of course at universities should have a close relationship between the teaching of theoretical and methodological fundamentals and the acquiring of specialized knowledge. The students should become acquainted with the fundamental laws which govern nature, society and human thought and they should also acquire a sound theoretical knowledge which can be used in practice. They should be able to work independently on new tasks and problems which arise in the field of their specializations, to find new methods of solving problems, to turn the results of their own research into practice. According to their abilities, students should be given the opportunities to study and do research at the same time.

The priority tasks of scientific research in the region require cooperation among researchers, close team work between representatives from the natural, technical and social sciences. This cooperation which is essential for research results to be applied effectively in the practice of socioeconomic development will require a closer analytical unity of researchers in the region. It means above all a radical transformation of the intellectual life of Southern African researchers, a move towards scientific comprehension of the general laws governing nature, society and thought, a mastery of scientific methodologies or research. This is the only road to link natural and social science research in the socioeconomic development of African-ruled Southern Africa.
Imperatives for technological development in the Third World

In conventional "technology literature" devoted to the problems of developing countries it is common to find a consensus to the effect that, in a bid to overcome their technological backwardness, the Third World countries are faced with the choice of either transfer of technology from the developed countries or development of their indigenous technology.

And yet at times arguments have been advanced against importation of technology from the developed countries on the grounds that it is inappropriate and costly. The "inappropriateness" of imported technology is usually confined to its capital intensity, high costs and sophistication. According to Cooper, "the technologies which are transferred from advanced countries are generally capital intensive, whereas the factor endowment patterns (or crudely, the relative availabilities of capital and labour) in under-developed countries, require labour-intensive techniques if there is to be full employment of resources. The transfer of the wrong kind (i.e. capital-intensive) technology is seen at least as a proximate cause of unemployment and maldistribution of income in under-developed countries."²

Loehr and Powelson list five of the major costs of technology transfer: costs to use patents, licences, and trade marks; payment for technical experts to provide information in preinvestment and operations stages; payments for imports of capital with "embodied" techniques; hidden costs levied by multinational corporations through overpricing of imports or underpricing of exports from subsidiary to parent; and finally, profit remittances by multinational corporations.³

General agreement having been reached that technology imported from the developed countries is inappropriate to the needs of the developing countries, it is accordingly suggested that the latter should develop technologies appropriate to their situation of abundant labour supply. The appropriateness of the proposed technology is seen in its labour-intensity and simplicity. In short, the criteria of appropriateness in the Third World is seen as minimal mechanisation and employment of additional workers in material production.

In real life, however the choice before the Third World is not simply between importation of foreign technology or development of its own. Basic principles of scientific and technological progress worked out in the Capitalist West and Socialist East may be found to be of worldwide significance irrespective of the social system or stage of economic development. The crucial thing for the developing countries is that they should urgently choose the most efficient technicoeconomic solutions and provide for optimum proportions in reproduction.

Developing countries need "complex approaches to the selection of technical instruments and methods for solving these problems and for the establishment of priorities with regard to the particular spheres within which specific achievements of science and technology should be applied in each period of time."⁴ For the choice of the optimal technicoeconomic instruments for development, the developing countries cannot rely on the operation of the spontaneous
“marked” regulator of reproduction. The important thing here is planning: planning in order to achieve scientific and technological progress; to carry out correct allocation of resources at various stages of research; as well as development of production by the state planning provided it watches over the interest of the majority of the population and national development and not just the propertied classes, is the surest way to solving the problems of economic and technological underdevelopment; and of reducing international dependency and inequalities in the distribution of incomes and wealth among various classes in each country.

In their struggle for technological independence, the developing countries cannot afford to ignore achievements of science and technology which should be applied creatively to their efforts at building an independent technological capacity.

Also commendable are the international efforts directed at assisting the developing countries to build their independent technological capacity. Three years have passed since the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) was held in Vienna. With the creation of the Interim Fund, hopes are still high that financial assistance will be available to help the developing countries to mobilize their scientific potential for development.

Towards coordinated research in the region of Southern Africa

The liberated countries of Southern Africa are not only bound together by common cultural traits and an historical past of colonial conquest, nor simply by the common liberation struggle against colonial rule, but much more importantly by an identical situation in contemporary Southern Africa which is characterized by their continuing economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa despite their political independence. As a result, these countries, in varying degrees, are vulnerable to economic and political pressures applied by their racist neighbour.

It is especially this common sociopolitical status quo of dependence in the regional balance of forces that lies at the basis of the SADCC strategy of economic liberation and regional cooperation in Southern Africa. In turn, this strategy serves as the logical foundation of common research priorities in the most critical areas: reducing of economic dependency on the Republic of South Africa, the consolidation of the gains for political independence, and above all the elaboration and implementation of programmes of regional cooperation for development in the region of Southern Africa.

In almost all African-ruled states of Southern Africa, research institutes have emerged and viable research traditions have been established in the post-colonial period. In fact, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference attaches great importance to the establishment and development of centres for Southern Africa, studies in the region. In this spirit the Salisbury communiqué of the SADCC Ministerial Meeting welcomed “the establishment of Southern African Studies Centres in Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland,
Zambia and Zimbabwe “and urged that universities without such centres cooperate with them in the development of their own teaching and research, including seeking to arrange secondment of staff to these centres’ faculties.” Without in any way minimizing the importance of national focus for research in any of the research centres of the nine independent states of Southern Africa, the SADCC strategy imposes additional and critical obligations for coordinated research for regional development in Southern Africa. No serious Southern African researcher can feign unawareness of this calling.

The question may be asked why, then, if substantial progress has been made in individual countries and institutes is there a need for coordinated research? The general case for coordinated research in the region is embodied in the Lusaka Manifesto of the nine SADCC members for reduced dependency and regional cooperation for development. Here it suffices to list the main potential advantages to be derived from such coordinated research.

Firstly, coordinated research would avoid duplication of efforts and parallelism in research activities; secondly, it would facilitate exchange of scientific information among research institutes and researchers in the region; thirdly, it would provide for economy of meagre resources available for research in terms of manpower and funding; fourthly, coordinated research would provide a framework for periodic and collective prioritization of critical research areas in the region; fifthly, the application of the principles of division of labour within the framework of collective research would enhance the quality of research results; sixthly and finally, coordinated research would provide a framework for planned research in the region on a medium-term and long-term basis.

The logical step towards coordinated research in Southern Africa would be the establishment of an institutional mechanism that could take the form of a Southern African Research Institutes Coordination Council. The terms of reference of such a council would be strictly that of a coordinator of research activities within the SADCC strategy of regional cooperation. Such a Research Council would not strive to supplant the individual national or regional research centres; it would not have ambitions of research centralisation, but mere research coordination in the region of Southern Africa. This regional Research Council would strive to maximize all the commonly-acknowledged advantages of research coordination for the benefit of the researchers, institutes and all African-ruled states of Southern Africa. One of the possible additional functions of such a council would be to assume a possible funding role under SADCC auspices.

Conclusion

This paper has not attempted to lay down the guidelines for discussion at the workshop. Neither has it pretended to unfold a comprehensive picture of the research priorities in the region of Southern Africa. This enormous task has been left for the collective wisdom of the scholars and researchers participating in the workshop.
This paper has merely set out to state the position of the Institute of Southern African Studies on a number of critical problems of scientific interest in the region of Southern Africa. It has highlighted scientific and technological backwardness as one of the major constraints to accelerated development in the African-ruled countries of Southern Africa.

REFERENCES

PART TWO

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER 4

Towards Coordinated Research to Facilitate Regional Integration

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The research problem

Scholars in the social sciences throughout Southern Africa have been gathering data and sifting information for years. Much of their work has contributed significantly to knowledge about the particular constraints and resources in their own countries. The difficulty remains, however, that their research efforts have not, to date, contributed as effectively as they might have to the struggle for liberation or coordinated development policies capable of contributing to improved living standards for the masses of the people on a regional, as opposed to a national, level.

Extensive evidence suggests that if the Southern African states could coordinate their development efforts, they could, over the next several decades, transform their economies into a unified modern industrialized region capable of fulfilling all the needs and aspirations of its inhabitants. In a first stage, of course, regional unity would have to be achieved by ending the current dependence on and domination by the South Africans’ military industrial build-up, fostered by transnational corporate investment. In a second stage, when South Africa itself has become liberated, planned integration of South Africa’s more advanced industrial capacity into overall, mutually beneficial arrangements could qualitatively accelerate regional development.

The advantage of regional integration in the first stage, despite the uneven levels of development characteristic of the region, would be qualitatively greater than those available to the individual countries alone. Together, they would enjoy an enlarged regional market and a collective resource base which would enable them to undertake large industrial projects that, alone, the individual states could not even consider. For landlocked Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, regional integration holds their only realistic hope of reducing their dependence on South Africa and benefitting from the growth of a modern industrial economy.

The total population of the region, excluding South Africa, is over 50 million, over fifty times that of several of the independent countries taken alone. The available regional market, even given low per capita incomes, exceeds US $15 000 million, many times that of any single member state. The investible
surpluses available for investment in new industries, at about 25 per cent of the regional product, total about $3 750 million. This would provide sufficient capital to ensure that the countries together could, over a 20 year period, plan to build new integrated key industries, which alone the individual states could never hope to construct.

Over time, the possibilities arising from regional integration, despite the exclusion of South Africa, would be far greater. If the governments cooperated to invest available surpluses to build infrastructure and industries throughout the region, both the market and the surpluses would expand at a rapid rate. At the end of the 20 year period, say from 1980 to 2000, assuming a plausible annual growth rate of about 6 per cent a year, the total annual regional market could reach almost US $50 000 million. The accumulated investible surplus over these 20 years could total US $150 000 million. Of course this sum represents the total surplus for the entire 20 year period, generated in increasing annual amounts; about a tenth - US $12 000 million would be generated in the 20th year. This growth of the regional investible surplus could finance an expanding range of new industries, linked to and stimulating the use of the region’s resources, to increase productive employment opportunities and raise living standards in every participating state. Realization of these perspectives would require careful physical and financial planning.

Such planning will require extensive, interdisciplinary research in the coming years. Numerous political, economic and social obstacles appear likely to thwart realization of the possibilities of such regional coordination. Already, in the few short years of independence, national political economies have emerged, with existing investment and national interest groups, some of which seem bent on advantaging themselves through maintenance of the status quo. Political, ethnic and social factors may militate against the desired regional coordination. Researchers from many disciplines will need to work together to formulate parallel, coordinated research programmes in priority areas to provide background data and information to enable national and regional policy makers to design effective plans for the mobilization of regional resources to build a modern regional industrial state.

Two major factors, in the past, appear to have hindered the needed type of coordinated research effort. First, a wide variety of research institutions have emerged in the newly independent nations of Southern Africa. Some devote their efforts primarily to research. Others are engaged in the preparation of teaching materials and teaching. To date, however, most have focused primarily on gathering data and information relating to national development issues, each focusing on the particular problems of the individual country in which they are located. As a result, many cyclostyled papers and a number of articles focus on individual country experiences relating to such topics of regional concern as cooperatives and rural development; the status of women; industrialization and state corporations; monetary and fiscal policies. But researchers in each Southern African state have been conducting their research in isolation, providing separate fragments of data, despite the fact that all the nations confront similar problems. They have made few efforts to conduct comparative analyses on a
regional basis, or to gather essential information in a way which could facilitate the formulation and implementation of policies directed to the attainment of regional integration.

Secondly, the political economic context, within which each research institution in the region operates, varies. In more or less avowedly democratic state capitalist countries, researchers tend to function in a rather conventional western style: each works on his or her own project, gathers information, perhaps reports to a larger group or a conference for comment and criticism, and publishes the results, often in internationally known journals in developed countries.

Sometimes, an interdisciplinary group of researchers tackles a problem jointly, each taking an aspect for analysis and bringing the results together to present an overall picture. Occasionally, the various papers are compiled for publication in a book centred on the national political economy.

In socialist-oriented countries, some researchers work more collectively to identify the nature of the problematic, to formulate working hypotheses, and to gather essential evidence to test them. Not only the methods of work, but the nature of the problematic differs in these countries. In Mozambique, for example the state – partly because of the mass exodus of the Portuguese settlers – has acquired outright control over significant sectors of the means of production. The problematic now centres on how to overcome the lack of skills and managerial capacity, to reorganize and socialize the labour process, to increase productivity in all sectors of the political economy. The shortage of personnel forces researchers to act as teachers in the process of conducting their research: their students, who come from ministries and enterprises on a part-time or full-time basis, need to learn, not simply abstract theories, but how to put them into practice, and use them as guides in gathering evidence, testing and evaluating them in order to formulate more effective policies. Research, guided by theory, in this way of necessity becomes a form of practice, a means of overcoming constraints and finding solutions to real life problems. The requirements of this kind of research leave little time to participate in conferences or coordinated research activities not directly relevant to agreed national or regional development priorities.

This paper aims, first, to suggest a methodology for identifying priority research areas on which researchers, throughout the region, regardless of possible ideological differences, may collaborate to carry out research to help realize regional integration perspectives; second, to outline a suggested agenda of research priorities relating to the struggle for liberation and integration through coordinating research activities on a regional scale.

**Proposed methodology for coordinated regional research**

Typically, questions related to regional integration confront researchers in the form of already-formulated proposals for solution, ends to be achieved, like: Southern Africa needs a regional transport network, a regional energy grid, a
regional industrial strategy. Researchers face the task of transforming these into researchable hypotheses. They need to push back behind these stated goals, to examine the nature of the constraints and resources suggested by the explanations underpinning them. This will enable them to identify more explicitly the range of concrete recommendations for ways to overcome the obstacles that block their attainment.

The problem-solving approach\(^2\) offers a methodology by which researchers, regardless of the possible theoretical and practical disagreements they may have at the outset, can work fruitfully together in this exercise. It differs qualitatively from the conventional positivistic ends-means approach which claims the choice of the end to be attained should be left to the politicians; the researchers should limit their work to the allegedly value-free task of finding technical means of achieving it. From years of struggling with data and tools of research, social scientists have come to realize that means are never value-free; they inevitably help to shape and are in turn influenced by the goals chosen in the course of struggle for social change and development.

The problem-solving approach recognizes this reality. It proposes that researchers work together with those affected by their research to:

(a) identify the nature and scope of the problem, what some term the problematic;
(b) formulate alternative hypotheses drawn from the range of larger theories to explain the causes of the problem,
(c) rigorously test the hypotheses to determine which coincide most completely with the available evidence;
(d) formulate that proposal for solution which logically appears most likely to overcome the causes of the problem thus identified; and
(e) monitor the outcome of the solution attempted, and if necessary, revise the theory so that it leads to better explanations and more effective proposals for solutions.

Researchers, regardless of differing perspectives, drawing on the skills of differing disciplines, can use the problem-solving approach, to work together to explain and find solutions to the underlying problem confronting the peoples of Southern Africa. Most would agree that the overwhelming problem of the region is the poverty of the vast majority of the region’s inhabitants. The dimensions of the problem might be pictured as in figure 1.

The diagram depicts the fact that the majority of the population — peasants, unemployed and most wage earners — struggle to survive at very low real levels of life. A small minority, 5 per cent or 10 per cent receives 50–75 per cent of the cash income retained in most Southern African countries; typically, these are top government officials, financiers, managers and supervisors in the so called ‘modern’ sector, and the largest farmers.
Monthly Income (US $)

Unemployed or underemployed, perhaps 20-30% of the adult population

Peasants

5-10% receive 50-75% of cash income (mainly top government officials, businessmen, large farmers).

Half the wage bill goes to 10% of the wage earners: most wage earners get less than the poverty datum line.

Majority of population consists of peasants, partly living on subsistence farming, some (mostly men) migrating for wage jobs. An unknown number of the population, perhaps 20 to 30%, are unemployed or underemployed.

Figure 1

This is the problem to be explained: why does the majority of the population of the region live in poverty? Once the people of the region really understand the causes of this problem, they can join together to carry on the necessary struggle to overcome them.

A first approximation of an explanation of the problem of poverty in the region may be derived by trying to portray its dimensions more fully. Clearly, the problematic emerges as an integral feature of a regional and international system. This, too, may be pictured relatively simply (Figure 2).

The high income minority is associated with the ownership of the mines, farms and factories in the narrow modern enclave, geared to the export of raw materials and the import of machinery, equipment, and manufactured parts and materials. The majority of the male African population migrates to participate
in a low paid labour force, leaving women, children and old folk to till the land with age-old tools. Profits, interest, dividends, etc. flow to the owners of foreign firms which control the critical sectors, the commanding heights of the ‘modern’ enclave: basic industries, foreign and wholesale trade, the banks and financial institutions.

Various larger theories provide the frameworks for the formulation of alternative hypotheses to explain the causes of any problem. In the case of poverty in Southern Africa, neoclassical economic theories (and associated theories in other social sciences) suggest that it is to be explained largely by the lack of capital due to the population’s own traditional attitudes and institutions; the inhabitants do not readily adopt capitalist entrepreneurial attitudes. They fail to save, fear to take risks. As McClellan argues, they lack N-achievement. In recent years, an added explanation relates to their alleged insistence on bearing too many children, leading to overpopulation which thwarts viable economic growth.

Marxist-Leninist theory, in contrast, suggests that the causes of poverty depicted in the model lie in the historical imposition of the colonial capitalist system. This has given transnational corporations, collaborating with settler capitalists, control over the major means of production in the ‘modern’ export-oriented enclave. The colonial state systematically imposed a whole set of institutions to deprive the majority of the African population of access to the major means of production: they were pushed off the best land, denied equal access to marketing and credit facilities, and taxed to earn cash incomes. The men were thus forced to earn cash to pay the taxes by accepting wage employment at wages
below those socially necessary to reproduce the next generation of labour power; (the colonialists rationalized these wages by arguing that the wives and children were self-supporting despite the reality of overcrowded, infertile reserves). The colonially-protected corporations drained away a major share of the surplus value created by exploitation of the workers.

Over the years, and particularly in the decades since World War II, transnational corporate investments built South Africa's apartheid-ridden economy into a subcentre which has continued to dominate the region even since the neighbouring countries have attained independence. Transnational corporations established their regional headquarters and major regional manufacturing capacity in the industrial centres of South Africa. The neighbouring economies emerged as monocultures producing crude mineral and agricultural materials for sale to transnational corporate factories in South Africa, and beyond. Transnational factories in South Africa shipped their surplus manufactured goods to meet the needs of the narrow high income groups throughout the region, undermining preexisting handicrafts production and national efforts to build modern consumer goods industries. Inherited institutional structures continue to press national commercial agriculture to focus on profitable exports. The continuing migration of peasant labour in search of cash employment contributes to the persistent neglect of food farming. And the industrial and trading transnationals, in close collaboration with a handful of foreign-owned banks, continue to drain the domestically generated surplus value to their home countries.

In short, Marxist theory holds that yesterday's colonial capitalism and today's neo-colonial policies systematically fostered lopsided, uneven development throughout the region, based on the ongoing exploitation of the African peasants and workers.

The role of researchers is to gather evidence to test the full range of hypotheses offered by alternative theories as explanations of the problem posed. Each theory, in a sense, provides a map, suggesting the main outlines of investigation, the kinds of constraints and resources—physical, economic, political and social—that must be examined testing the hypotheses suggested. That hypothesis, or set of hypotheses, which appears most consistent with the available data leads logically to suggestions as to the range of proposals for solutions most likely to succeed in overcoming the causes of the problem identified. Policy makers, in other words, may draw on information provided by researchers in selecting those proposals to problems which follow logically from those explanations which appear most consistent with the evidence gathered.

If, for example, the causes of poverty in Southern Africa could really be shown to lie in the failure of the region's inhabitants to adopt N-achievement attitudes and institutions, then policy makers should create appropriate institutions and schools to inculcate them with more appropriate behaviour as capitalist entrepreneurs. If, on the other hand, the evidence reveals that the causes lie in the exploitation of the majority through the historically-imposed colonial capitalist system, then the solution would logically lie in the transition to socialist ownership of the means of production to implement planned national and
regional development. In honestly confronting the alternative proposed explanations with data, then, researchers should assist policy makers to formulate and implement policies which are likely to succeed.

Regardless of which proposed solution or set of solutions is initially introduced, researchers should play a further role in monitoring and evaluating the consequences of the new pattern of resource allocation or institutional change introduced. That is, the implementation of specific proposals frequently creates a new set of problems which must be critically analyzed and explained. If they can be adequately explained within the context of a particular theory, then, to that extent, the theory itself has been further indicated as a guide to action. If they cannot be adequately explained, then the theory must either be revised or abandoned in favour of one which provides better explanations. In either case, the process should contribute to more successful formulation and implementation of policies in Southern Africa. Researchers should work together with policy makers in this problem-solving process. They must devise participatory methods of research to work with those affected to identify the nature of the difficulties confronting the poor; the range of possible explanations offered by alternative theories; the gathering of relevant evidence to test or attempt to falsify the theories utilized; and the systematic evaluation of solutions offered in light of the new evidence introduced as a consequence of their implementation.

Already a significant amount of research has been done in some of the areas suggested by alternative theories in an attempt to explain poverty in Southern Africa, particularly those urged by conventional western theories. In others, primarily those suggested by socialist theories, new evidence is required. The model presented above reveals the way colonialism carved out the boundaries of Southern Africa, without regard to geographical, economic, ethnic or political realities, to create economically small states dependent upon and exploited through the South African regional subcentre. In this context, it suggests the need to explore in depth a number of key areas, critically evaluating the range of explanations and solutions offered by alternative theories:

(a) the inherited pattern of agricultural development and associated stratification and class structures: land tenures and the organization of agricultural production, marketing, credit, farm inputs, and extension education;

(b) the structure of industrial development and its impact on domestic class formation and ties with international finance capital; the extent to which it is linked with the use of local resources, the kinds of technology used, and whether it produces goods to meet the needs of the high income group or to raise the levels of consumption and productivity of the masses of the working population;

(c) the nature and scope of trading institutions, their role in fostering nationalist petty bourgeois elements as opposed to international trading interests; and the extent to which they have tended to thwart, rather than stimulate, integrated national and intra-regional trade;

(d) the structure of banking and financial institutions which play the ma-
jor role in influencing the pattern of accumulation and reinvestment of capital in all aspects of the narrow modern enclave economy; and their links with foreign, as opposed to domestic class interests.

Researchers have already compiled a considerable amount of data relating to these key areas in individual countries. They need now to critically and systematically evaluate them, as well as gather additional information. The results of the research relating to the individual SADCC member nations should be shared and critically evaluated to weigh the validity of explanations and solutions, not only for particular states, but for other countries as well as for regional integration. In this way, coordinated research efforts will help build a foundation for the formulation and implementation of broader long-term development strategies to liberate and transform the entire region, providing increasingly productive employment opportunities and higher living standards for all the regional inhabitants.

A suggested research agenda relating to regional integration

Analysis of the constraints and resources inherited by the independent states of Southern Africa suggests a number of proposals for interdisciplinary research which could substantially help to advance regional integration. These include two kinds of proposals for analysis, (a) of possibilities for new patterns of resource allocation, which would probably, in the first instance, call on the research capacities of engineers and scientists, along with economists; and (b) needed institutional changes, which would undoubtedly require the additional skills of political scientists and legal experts, and perhaps others. Some of the proposals are for immediate research; others are for research that may be required over a longer time span.

Some resource allocation issues for research

The Heads of State in SADCC have rightly agreed on the immediate necessity of joint efforts to improve the region's basic infrastructure, particularly in the field of transport and energy. Improved transport links and adequate energy supplies are obvious prerequisites for implementation of plans to improve specialization and exchange and increase productivity in agriculture and industry.

Over time, however, researchers need to gather information on all aspects of the necessary industrial strategy that will facilitate realization of a balanced, integrated, industrialized region over the next half century.

National and regional planners need to examine in depth the distorted, inherited structure of industries in each country, and how they foster the disarticulation of the regional economy. Second, they need to consider the potential of each country's known resources for creating basic regional pole-of-growth industries which might help to achieve more rapid growth of an increasingly integrated and balanced regional industrial structure. On this basis, they need to
coordinate their national plans to redirect existing industries and create new ones to ensure the spread of productivity and rising living standards in all sectors of the regional economy.

The need for institutional changes

Implementation of the proposed type of long-term regional industrial strategy would require regional cooperation involving major changes in the inherited political-economic institutions which currently enable South African and allied transnational corporations to shape the economic development perspectives of most of the separate states. As SADCC documents suggest, and experience in Africa and elsewhere proves, the common market pattern of integration, widely advocated by conventional western wisdom, would be incapable of achieving the desired coordinated, balanced regional development. Here, then, is a priority area of research for political scientists, legally-trained personnel, and economists. They need to work together to identify and evaluate the alternative techniques for implementing regional decisions without sacrificing national options.

Blueprints of the institutional arrangements necessary to implement the next steps in coordination among member states can only be drawn up following careful, detailed research. In developing the needed institutions, experiences elsewhere, for instance in the Andean Pact in Latin America or the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) among the socialist states of eastern Europe, should be studied. Even in the short run, simply expanding the exchange of relevant information would help improve coordination among the countries. This is particularly true in the case of trade and infrastructure, as well as tax and other financial policies. Even in the case of industry, knowledge of developments in neighbouring countries would facilitate coordinated national and regional planning.

SADCC member states need to join together to achieve formal, if flexible, institutional arrangements to ensure joint state control of the commanding heights of the region – the banks and financial institutions, foreign trade and basic industries – to implement a planned regional transformation over the next twenty years.

Within this context, projects could be devised and carried out on a bilateral or multilateral level. Individual projects would contribute most to the economies of individual countries if they formed part of their national plans at the same time that they were incorporated into the regional development strategy. The types of arrangement used to achieve this clearly have to be both binding and flexible, shaped to maximize interstate cooperation on each project, given political and economic constraints.

As the participating states introduce the necessary institutional changes to begin to implement self-reliant regional development plans, they contribute to weakening the South African subcentre and liberating the people of that country. On the one hand, as they build up their own economies, they can strike
better bargains with transnational corporations, as well as other third world and socialist firms, to acquire needed capital, manpower training and technology. On the other hand, as they begin to cut off South Africa’s source of low cost labour and raw materials, limit the market for South African-based manufacturing industries, and end the drain of investible surpluses to South Africa, they undermine the features which attracted transnational corporations to invest in that economy. In this context, the South African liberation forces will be able to accelerate the pace of their efforts to free their own people.

Once South Africa is liberated its restructured economy will be integrated into a second stage of Southern African regional development. Given South Africa’s already extensive industrial growth, it undoubtedly will contribute significantly to accelerating regional industrial transformation. Self-evidently the manifold political, social, economic, and even technological aspects of this transformation will require on-going interdisciplinary research at every stage. The research agenda outlined above is merely the beginning.

Institutionalization of coordinated research

Despite possible differences in their approaches and the varying national political economic contexts in which they work, researchers from the various institutions throughout the region, using a problem-oriented approach, can cooperate together on a research agenda of the kind outlined here. As they exchange information and data, and discuss their differing methodologies, they can learn much from each other.

First, by working together, they will acquire a more cohesive understanding of the possibilities and problems of regional development. They will bring the results of their separate national researchers together, for comparison and joint evaluation. Thus they will shape a more penetrating analysis of the regional development possibilities and problems. They will simultaneously build the foundation of information and analysis needed to contribute to the ongoing struggle for regional liberation and development.

Second, through a systematic evaluation of the institutional changes the different countries introduce in critical sectors, they will be able to shed light on the bilateral and multilateral approaches that seem most likely to work in the formulation and implementation of programmes for coordinated regional development.

Third, they will obtain new ideas and suggestions for how to improve the research exercise itself. Researchers in all SADCC countries should work together to develop many channels to facilitate increased, mutually beneficial exchanges relating to the methodologies and research results they use. First, the results of research on the national topics—documents, papers, books—should be systematically exchanged. A quarterly review could publish the more finished papers prepared in every SADCC country. Second, regular meetings could be held annually to compare and evaluate the results of research findings relating to priority areas. These might take place at the time of the annual Southern
African Universities Social Science Conference. Third, just as teams of researchers from Mozambique and Zimbabwe have begun to work together to analyze the critical, mutually significant problem of shifting Zimbabwean trade routes away from South Africa, so cooperative teams from other countries might begin to work together on bilateral projects. For example, researchers from Zimbabwe and Botswana might examine the possibility of utilizing Selebi-Phikwe sulphur in the production of fertilizers. Or researchers from Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Swapo might study, not only the cost-benefit aspects, but also the necessary institutional changes which would be needed to refine the region’s copper in Zambia’s copper refinery and to develop further manufacturing facilities to process copper end-products to meet the needs of the region.

In addition to focusing attention on the development of these and other channels for exchanging research results, regional researchers should ensure that university students in every SADCC country have access to the information gathered throughout the region. They should, in this way, help students, future planners and policy makers, to think, not simply in national terms, but in terms of regional potentials. Furthermore, students, themselves, together with their teachers, should engage in practical research relating to the issues of regional cooperation. By studying the evidence, and critically evaluating alternative theories in light of their implications for regional development, they may gradually learn to consider national development, not in isolation nor merely in relation to dependence on South Africa, but in the context of the possibilities for regional liberation and transformation.

Summary and conclusions

Too often, researchers in Southern Africa have focused their research on national issues, unrelated to the possibilities of attaining regional integration. Yet, as long as the individual balkanized countries of the region seek to resolve their development problems in isolation, their efforts will be hampered by their small economic size and South African domination. If they could unite on a regional basis, they could contribute far more effectively to the on-going struggle for regional liberation and development. Researchers could play a significant role in helping to realize this goal by working to gather essential information as to the possibilities of coordinated policies for planned regional industrial development and the necessary institutional changes required to implement it.

The problem-solving approach offers a methodology which will enable researchers throughout the region, regardless of possible differences in ideologies and research techniques, to work together to formulate and test alternative explanations and proposals for solutions to overcome the obstacles thwarting greater regional coordination. This approach suggests the necessity of conducting interdisciplinary research related to several critical areas of the regional political economy, focusing on distorted patterns of agricultural and industrial development and the associated class structures; and the role of national and transnational trading, banking and financial institutions in fostering them.
In the immediate future, research teams from research centres throughout the region could concentrate on analyzing the possibilities of creating and strengthening regional infrastructure, especially trade networks and energy, to reduce dependence on South Africa, and open up new possibilities for regionally coordinated productive activities. In the longer run, cooperating on a bilateral and/or multilateral basis, they could focus their efforts on the resource allocation potential and institutional changes needed, particularly relating to the national and regional commanding heights, to carry through an industrial transformation of the entire region.

Implementation of the resulting research agenda would require close co-ordination of research work being done throughout the region. In this process, researchers within varying contexts and using different approaches can learn from each other and assist policy makers to acquire information about objective conditions which shape the possibilities for regional coordination; and the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to achieving it. To ensure that the needed degree of coordinated research takes place, and that the participants maximize the research and policy benefits obtained from it, they should explore every possible channel of greater cooperation and communication: bilateral and multilateral research teams working on projects of mutual concern; systematic circulation of research results, including a regional research publication; and regular annual meetings to discuss research results, if possible with relevant policy makers.

It is vital that university students be involved in this regional research coordination exercise. This will help to ensure that as future policy makers they learn to think in regional, rather than narrow national terms. It will also provide them with the necessary information as to alternative approaches, so that they can contribute to shaping the necessary regional perspectives and institutions designed to spread increasingly productive employment opportunities and rising living standards throughout the region.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The UN Economic Commission for Africa has conducted many studies on specific aspects of these possibilities. SADCC nations have begun to bring some of this data together. Part III of A. SEIDMAN and N. MAEGETLA, Outposts of monopoly capital in Southern Africa (Connecticut and London, 1980) summarises some of that evidence and its possible implications for ending dependence on South Africa and transforming the regional economy.

2. The problem-solving approach here advocated draws on many diverse strands of philosophical endeavour, from John Dewey's to Karl Marx's, all of which despite their differences emphasize the importance of using theory as a guide to identify and explain real problems; testing these explanations against the evidence of experience, and implementing the solu-
tions which logically followed from those most consistent with that evidence.


CHAPTER 5

Restructuring the Southern African Region: Research Support for the (SADCC) Strategy

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Research priorities in a SADCC perspective

The Southern African region is currently characterised by a fierce struggle to establish two opposing forms of regional groupings – the South African inspired Constellation of South African States (CONSAS), and the grouping of nine states in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). These groupings are based on conflicting requirements and perspectives for the future of Southern Africa.

The colonisation of Southern Africa transformed the region into an integrated regional economic system whose centre lay in South Africa. Under colonial domination, the Southern African region became a vast labour reservoir for South African mines and industry. Trade links and transport networks were set up under South African domination to suck the wealth of the region into imperialist and South African hands. All the people of the region were subjected to intense exploitation and oppression – their independence shattered, their cultures eroded and their land stolen.

Today, 20 years after the first SADCC state achieved its independence, all the countries of the region remain locked in numerous ways to South African capitalism, subject to intense political and economic blackmail, and in some cases direct military intervention. Whatever the numerous political, ideological and economic differences between the SADCC states, in all cases the daily lives of their people and the future prospects of their development strategies are structured and shackled by the octopus-grip of South African interests on the economies of the region.

This domination provides the basis for the united front of the SADCC States as they struggle to develop an alternative to break this dependence. This struggle does not occur in a vacuum. It takes place in the context of ongoing attempts by the apartheid regime to tighten its hold over Southern African economies. The development of both CONSAS and SADCC must be seen in the terms of an on going struggle.
The development of CONSAS strategy

In the period from 1975 to 1980, the South African apartheid state was confronted with a changing balance of forces and new situations both in Southern Africa as a whole, and internally. The successful conclusion of anti-colonial struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe effectively destroyed the zone of buffer states surrounding South Africa. Both in Namibia and South Africa itself, the liberation struggle has escalated dramatically at all levels.

In response to these developments, the South African regime has elaborated a complex regional strategy under the concept of the Constellation of Southern African States. CONSAS must be seen partly within the historical context of South African's regional policy particularly since World War II but also as an integral part of apartheid's Total Strategy, as elaborated by the Botha Government.

The establishment of a Constellation of States is Point 8 of Prime Minister Botha's 12 Point Plan which laid out the Total Strategy programme. Its essential objectives were also outlined in the 1977 Defence White Paper in which the regime first spoke of the necessity to muster political, economic and psychological as well as military resources in the "process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of the state's authority in a conflict situation."

On regional policy the White Paper outlined a two-pronged approach. This was a strategy of using both carrot and stick. Thus it spoke, in Paragraph 22, Article f, of "the maintenance of a sound balance of military power in relation to neighbouring states and other states in Southern Africa"; while Point f set out as an objective the "creation of friendly relationships and political and economic cooperation with the states of Southern Africa." Paragraph 10 of the same White Paper listed 14 "areas of action" to be mobilised as part of the total strategy; of particular relevance to the regional sphere is the specification of "economic action" and "action in relation to transport, distribution and telecommunications services."

CONSAS is designed to tighten the stranglehold of the South African ruling class on all classes within the various states of the region through the attainment of three specific objectives:

(a) the elaboration of 'economic development' programmes which tie these states into an ever stronger economic dependence on South African capitalism and so provide a via media for the export of excess capital from South Africa;

(b) the cementing of formal economic and political alliances between specific classes in the various states, and the South African ruling class;

(c) reduction of support in the region for the liberation struggle.

Changed tactics for CONSAS

What distinguishes CONSAS from other South African policy offensives is not the fundamental objectives sought, but the context within which South
Africa is seeking to achieve those objectives. As before South Africa still attempts to create a community of black ruled allied states grouped around it. But the changed balance of forces in the region has obliged it to employ new means to achieve this objective. Basically the tactics used in the earlier Verwoerd and Vorster-eras secret diplomatic contacts and bribery and influence of 'key decision makers'—have now been recognised as too crude, too fragile and too unreliable a basis for building regional alliances.

The CONSAS strategy by contrast is based on a much more subtle approach. Instead of concentrating on influencing a particular 'decision maker', the CONSAS strategy seeks to influence the objective conditions within which decisions are made. More particularly, the strategy aims to build up a series of economic relations, sufficiently favourable to, at least, the rulers of target African states to persuade them that they have common interests with South Africa.

The target states: "inner" and "wider" Constellation?

The Constellation strategy has been from the outset a regional strategy, aiming at a special relationship between South Africa and neighbouring independent states. In their initial formulations, apartheid strategies envisaged a grouping of states with a total population of 40 millions living, "south of the horizontal line of the Zambezi". More specifically, they envisaged including in this grouping Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (already members of the Southern African Customs Union), plus Zimbabwe, Namibia and possibly Malawi. Later formulations spoke even more ambitiously of a grouping embracing South Africa and 11 states "stretching to the equator". These were to include, in addition to those already mentioned, Zambia and Zaire, and "under other Governments", possibly Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. The proposed regional grouping is generally referred to, in the jargon of the apartheid strategists, as the "wider" or "broader" Constellation.

However there is also what the apartheid strategists refer to as the "inner" Constellation. This is the term they use to describe a restructuring of relations between "white" South Africa and the so-called "independent" Bantustans. In this respect, then, the Constellation strategy is an aspect of domestic policy. It is a thinly disguised mechanism through which the central South African state can assert its dominance over what it claims are sovereign independent territories. It is, in fact, a tacit admission by apartheid strategists of the essential unity of the South African social formation, despite the formal independence of the Bantustans.

Constellation balance sheet

The external Constellation strategy has to date been a dismal failure from South Africa's point of view. It has failed to incorporate any of its independent target states in any aspect of the Constellation machinery.
This failure can be traced to two major factors. First, the defeat of Muzorewa in the Zimbabwean independence elections, by the Patriotic Front parties ZANU (PF) and PF (ZAPU). This means that instead of Zimbabwe becoming a key element of the Constellation, it became instead a leading member of the Front Line States alliance.

The second factor was the action of the Front Line States in proposing and establishing an alternative regional grouping, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and (this is crucial) the inclusion in it of all the independent states of the region.

The immediate effect of the failure of the Constellation Strategy as a regional policy has been that the machinery of the Constellation established to date has been confined to the so-called “inner Constellation”. Another more important effect is that, with its CONSAS policy now effectively stalled, the apartheid regime is adopting the now openly aggressive tactics of outright economic sabotage and various forms of military action against many of the SADCC States.

**SADCC — The strategy of the nine**

It is in the context of, and in direct response to, the South African ruling class CONSAS offensive that the SADCC strategy has to be seen. SADCC has defined as its principal strategic objective, a “reduction of external dependence and, in particular, dependence on the Republic of South Africa.”

This formidable task of breaking dependence can only be appreciated when it is realised to what degree the states of the region are currently tied to South Africa economically, most particularly in the spheres of trade, transport and migrant labour. Some of the consequences for the economies of the countries of the region of their subordination to South Africa can be seen in the data reproduced in the Statistical Tables in Appendix C at the end of this volume.

Six of the countries of the region remained dependent in the mid-1970s on the South African market for supplies of imported materials. Three of the countries (the BLS countries), tied to South Africa through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), received fully 80 per cent of their imports from South Africa. The neighbouring countries are also dependent on South Africa’s transport network. Fully half the exports to and imports from countries, not destined finally for South Africa, pass through South African ports, and to this should of course be added the exports to and imports from South Africa consigned on South African transport services. Finally, there are migrant labour flows to South Africa. Although there has been a sharp reduction in the number of “foreign” workers employed in the South African mining industry, corresponding to the Chamber of Mines’ “internalisation” policy, nonetheless a number equivalent to 20 per cent of the domestic wage labour force of 5 countries continues to be employed as migrant workers on the South African mines alone.
SADCC research strategy

Keeping the nine together in an anti-South African alliance will therefore be a continuing struggle, dependent above all on the capacity of the alternative strategy actually to provide a real material alternative to increasing links with South Africa. It is in this context that the SADCC strategy has to be analysed, and the role of research assessed.

The SADCC alternative strategy calls for a complex process of restructuring at three levels:
(a) restructuring the economies of the nine countries;
(b) restructuring relations between the nine states;
(c) restructuring relations between the SADCC states and the world economy.

SADCC documents treat these areas only in very general terms.

The SADCC states are a heterogeneous grouping. Clearly there will be differences between them both on the extent and implications of each of these recommended forms of restructuring, as well as on the relationship between them. Given these different emphases and implications, the questions then pose themselves: what is the role of research committed to liberation in the region, and where lie the priorities of such research?

In our view, the answer to this question must be based on two assumptions. Firstly, whatever the conflicting emphases and implications of these three types of restructuring, the achievement of the aim of SADCC can only occur through a process of political struggle, both internally, regionally and internationally. In other words, these forms of restructuring do not have purely technical or economic solutions. Whatever the implications of the extent of the restructuring the SADCC strategy calls for a transformation of social and economic relations within each of the states within Southern Africa as a whole, and internationally. This is a question of transforming political relations. So first then, the question of research priorities must be posed within the context of these political struggles.

The second assumption is that research priorities in each SADCC country will be dictated by domestic priorities, and the interpretation given to the question of the extent and implications of each of the three forms of restructuring. This means that it does not seem either desirable or possible to establish a centralised, coordinated research programme involving all countries in parallel research on identical issues. This in no way rules out cooperation and collaboration between researchers in the various SADCC countries, but rather establishes a realistic range of investigation around both that which is common and that which is specific to these countries.

In our view, then, the overall task of research within a SADCC perspective is to deepen our understanding of the implications of, and the political struggle required to realise, each of the three processes of restructuring envisioned by SADCC. Research should begin here: with an investigation of the meaning of each of these forms of restructuring in each SADCC state, and identifica-
tion of the common priorities which arise out of such restructuring – rooted in the concrete conditions of each state.

But we can be more precise than this. The unifying force in SADCC is the domination of each country by South African interests. The restructuring process is geared to ending this domination – to severing the existing links which chain the SADCC states into dependence on South Africa. Thus, it seems to us, in all SADCC states an essential starting point of SADCC research must be to develop a clear analysis of all aspects of the existing links with and dependence on South Africa.

The task implies far more than the collection of up-to-date statistics and information on capital, labour, trade and transport flows. The links binding the SADCC states to South Africa are neither purely physical – roads, bridges, ports, communications lines and so on – nor purely economic. They go beyond even the direct interests of South African capital in the region and South African control over the use of strategic resources. More fundamentally, these existing economic links rest on sets of social relations and alliances, on a nexus of interest which cuts across national boundaries. Within each of the SADCC states there exist social classes whose interests are served by existing links with South Africa. To a varying degree within the nine states, these classes possess the capacity, social position and the will to obstruct the restructuring of internal, regional and international linkages envisaged by SADCC.

We would suggest then that a SADCC research strategy should begin with a detailed investigation of precisely these interests which maintain existing links, and locate them within the political and resource allocation processes within each state. Beginning research at this level will achieve a number of significant objectives; it will

(a) clarify the real political obstacles confronting the successful implementation of the SADCC alternative;

(b) delimit the potential range of options involved at all three levels of restructuring;

(c) lay the basis for concrete cooperation between states where this emerges out of such enquiry, and thus provide the basis for effective joint action.

We should like to illustrate this approach with a concrete problem currently faced by two SADCC countries, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. SADCC strategy gives clear priority to improving transport flows between these two countries. Prior to the 1976 imposition of sanctions by Mozambique against the Smith regime in Rhodesia, Mozambique’s ports and railways carried over 60 per cent of Zimbabwe’s external trade. In the period from 1976 to 1980 this fell. With Zimbabwean independence, priority is again given to routing Zimbabwean trade through Mozambique. The projected percentage for 1981–82 is 28 per cent. Achieving traffic-flows approaching the pre-1976 level is not, however, simply a question of a ministerial decision coupled with investment in improving port and railway facilities.

More fundamentally, it requires detailed knowledge of the range of economic and political interests blocking a clear governmental decision, together with
an understanding of the political processes which enable these interests to do so. On Mozambique’s part, what is needed is a study of the conditions necessary for the most efficient use of available capacity and infrastructure: for instance, of how the Port of Maputo, which is the key port for the sub-continent, serving not only Mozambique but also Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia and thus handling a high volume of international transit traffic, is organized to cope with its traffic. Thus the Mozambican project will research problems of use of the labour force and the organization of the work process; and problems of coordination and management of the ports with the railway system of the country. The Mozambican side of the joint project is also concerned with assessment of railway politics in Southern Africa as a whole in the approaching period, but rather than attempt a general evaluation of competing railway strategies and routing politics as a whole, it will concentrate on those aspects of regional transport policy as they directly affect the Mozambican ports, especially Maputo. In other words, this part of the Mozambican project would seek to identify existing ports’ users, traffic demand and cargo handling, and would try to project those factors, both economic and political, which would constrain or enlarge growth capacity in the medium term.

This then points to a common research problem. The developing Mozambique-Zimbabwe research cooperation, though still in its initial phase, arises directly out of domestic needs and struggles. It will focus on aspects of the politics of control over transport between the two countries. As such it will give a clearer picture of the possibilities and problem of restructuring.

Thus we suggest that what is needed in the first phase of SADCC research is not broad position papers on issues which affect the entire region, but rather very specific information on the kinds of problems the SADCC strategy confronts in particular countries or areas of reconstruction. We feel that a strategy for research which begins at this level will provide a realistic basis for concrete and project orientated research collaboration between institutions, and will provide a practical basis for developing research on a regional level and scale. Out of our practice should come the basis for further unity, both through a growing conception of research problems, and from research-influenced decisions taken by the member states of SADCC.
CHAPTER 6

Critical Research Areas in Southern Africa

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Introduction

It is assumed in this paper that the objective should not be to suggest research areas to individual countries, but rather to suggest research areas which are of interest to more than one country in the region, and where some form of cooperation or comparative research would be of value. These are not of course truly separate categories. For example, coordinated national studies on central banks and monetary arrangements can form the basis both for a comparative study and for subsequent national research. It seems clear that a research institute such as ISAS will be able to play a valuable role, not just in bringing together existing research and making it available to member countries, but in organising research into areas which are of common interest. In doing this, ISAS will not necessarily need the resources to sponsor research itself; it will sometimes be enough to bring together people working in the same field — before, during or after the research, or preferably all three — or to identify people who already have information but have lacked the stimulus to make it more widely available.

The list of topics that follows is inevitably rather idiosyncratic, since there is in principle no limit to the subjects which could be researched and no obvious way of deciding on priorities. The author has, however, consulted colleagues in the Southern African Cluster at IDS, Sussex; and has tried to suggest some reasons for the chosen topics, so that there are some preliminary grounds on which to start a debate. Each topic is treated extremely briefly.

1. The costs and benefits — economic, political and social — of different strategies towards the White South

There are now more than 15 years of comparative experience of different strategies towards the White South and it should be possible to attempt some assessment of the costs and benefits of policies on, among other things: trade — in goods of course, but also services and electricity; finance (including SACU); transport (including use of transit routes, direct flights, border closures, access for nationals of South Africa and preindependence Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe); migrant labour; investment; technical assistance — official and
private sector; hosting of liberation movements – political and military; use of facilities in the South (mainly for expatriates), e.g. schooling, health and holidays.

Possible questions to be addressed and hypotheses to be investigated could include:

(a) the political cost, domestic and international, of accommodation to the White South eventually forces governments to change strategy.

(b) the economic cost (at least in the short run) of unilateral action to move away from dependence on the White South eventually forces governments to reopen links, or to pursue very slow and limited disengagement which over time is increasingly open to interpretation as accommodationism, and so to lose face in the process so that the original political gains are wholly lost.

(c) a regionally agreed policy on one or more of the above areas would be less expensive and more effective than unilateral action, and would enable other links to be maintained where economically profitable, at lower political cost.

(d) what would be the cost of economic sanctions against South Africa for other Southern African states, and what actions and resource transfers could be or would be necessary to enable them to cope?

2. Role of governments as economic institutions

In all the countries of the region, governments have of course had economic development as one of their main objectives; but they also have direct experience which would therefore be useful and interesting to compare, in performing roles which have also been, at some time, performed by private sector institutions, for example: government ownership of productive assets, by takeover (of existing assets), as sole entrepreneur (by establishment), and as partner with domestic or foreign private capital (by potential takeover or establishment); government as financial intermediary, by taxing mineral (and other) profits and on-lending to parastatals and private sector, by borrowing, domestically and from abroad, for on-lending, by making temporary or longer term use of migrant worker remittances, and by acting as prime lender to small-scale farms and businesses (directly or through government-owned financial institutions); government as provider of ‘productive services’ to the private sector, e.g. research and extension services, marketing (supply of inputs, purchase of outputs), veterinary services, and technical assistance to small businesses and cooperatives.

Possible hypotheses for investigation might include:

(a) governments are relatively efficient in spending money on infrastructure and social services, moderately efficient in financing parastatals, relatively inefficient in financing small-scale private sector activity – efficiency being defined not only in terms of output, but also in comparison with indirect assistance (for example tax exemptions) and to include efficiency in improving income and asset distribution, for example, as well as growth of output.
government ownership of productive assets has often been more successful in achieving political objectives than in achieving economic or social objectives, and, when successful in economic terms, has had limited social impact; or government ownership of productive assets results in misallocation of capital and malign distortion of the price system, in terms of the government's own stated economic objectives (a highly provocative hypothesis which could well be disproved by research, but I am thinking of such areas as underpricing and excessive growth of, for example, electricity generation where electricity is used mainly by the more privileged urban population – at the expense of rural development).

government provision of 'productive services' reinforces rather than improves the existing maldistribution of wealth, at least among citizens even where the opposite was the government's stated intention.

government's role as financial intermediary is of greater value in changing the terms of foreign finance to make it more appropriate for domestic borrowers, and in providing finance to borrowers neglected by foreign-owned domestic institutions, but is comparatively less valuable where domestically-owned and managed financial institutions exist.

3. Comparative experience in the use of financial and monetary policy

There is quite a wide range of experience in the region of financial and monetary policy to be seen as part of general macroeconomic policy. Financial and monetary policy could be broadly interpreted to include exchange rate policy, exchange controls, external debt management, management of donor agency relations, relations with the IMF, etc. Unusually for the modern world, the region also contains three countries without a fully independent monetary system (Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland). This suggests several cooperative research projects or perhaps a series of workshops or seminars to discuss and compare existing experience, for example with respect to:

(a) gains (and losses) from monetary independence and their possible applicability to Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, deriving from: exchange rate policy (how to peg, whether to change the pegged rate, the real effects of doing nothing, the timing of changes, income distribution effects of changes); interest rate policy (its lack of use, its possible irrelevance); exchange control policy (contrasts between intention and reality, its potential for creating corruption, techniques for making it more effective); and management of domestic credit.

(b) changes in external debt management techniques, e.g. dealing with variable interest rate debt, the effect of floating of major currencies, access to eurodollar markets, and the importance of enlarged and lengthened IMF terms.

(c) money (credit) supply regulation and allocation, including such
aspects as attempts to achieve a target increase in currency, a target increase in domestic credit, and limits on lending to government and/or other sectors.

(d) the change from one to many donors since Independence, and techniques for reducing the costs of meeting donor requirements, e.g. matching projects and donors, the role of fungibility, experience with the EDF and EIB under the Lomé conventions, and OPEC sources.

(e) relations with the IMF, including experience of conditionality, alternatives to IMF credit, development of alternatives to the IMF model, and making best use of IMF technical assistance.

4. The role of subsidies

All governments in the region subsidise something, usually a lot of things: credit to small farmers, food prices, government loans to parastatals, government equity on which dividends are not paid, agricultural inputs, electricity, low-cost housing, high-cost housing and, in a rather different category, health, education, water, etc. Sometimes the subsidy is hidden, for example, electricity prices which cover current costs but not the opportunity cost of capital; sometimes it is open as in consumer maize prices in Zambia. It would be interesting, then, to try to identify and list subsidies in a number of countries and then to ask such questions as:

(a) who is being subsidised (incidence) and on what justification?
(b) could the objective be achieved more efficiently by some other method?
(c) are other, more underprivileged groups being excluded from the benefits of the subsidy?
(d) has the subsidy achieved its original stated objective (higher output, more equal income or asset distribution, higher savings, etc.)?
(e) is changing or removing the subsidy technically, politically or socially feasible?
(f) which subsidies have arisen by accident because costs were misprojected?
(g) what progress – if any – has been made to contain or to eliminate subsidies?

One hypothesis that could be investigated would be that some subsidies are both theoretically and practically justifiable in a poorly working price system in countries with large inequalities of income, assets and opportunity; but because subsidies are not often identified and considered as a group, still less compared across national boundaries, and because subsidies are often introduced as ad hoc responses to particular historical situations, comparative research would probably reveal a number of ways in which subsidy policy could plausibly be improved.
5. Outdated or inappropriate theories and the collection of the wrong statistics

It is almost a truism that official statistics reflect the last generation’s theories (social, political and economic). This is often not the fault of the statistics office, which is manned by statisticians and not by economists, for example. In addition, many statistics reflect not national priorities but the priorities of international agencies. In Southern Africa, the problem is compounded by the fact that even up-to-date theories developed elsewhere may not be at all appropriate to Southern African conditions. The English-speaking countries of the region have a common heritage in the form of various ways of collecting and presenting official statistics in most cases unchanged since pre-Independence (and in some cases even using the same typeface). The same may be true of Angola and Mozambique. Examples of statistics that answer the wrong questions, or only the least important right questions, include: bank lending by amount to each sector, but not by ownership (domestic/foreign, incorporated/unincorporated, or by size) nor by number of loans; national income by wages and salaries and profits, but not by citizen/non-citizen or by size category of income; external official debt by total amount outstanding (if at all) but not by annual debt service or by currency of denomination.

Some of the right statistics exist, but buried deep in obscure official publications rather than prominently displayed in the Monthly Digest of Statistics. Some changes have also been made in some countries. Some statistics are produced because they are thrown up cheaply by other government activities (e.g. the licensing of companies) and more relevant information is not so easily available.

A useful research project might be for a number of people to identify their favourite proposed improvements in official statistics, with the obligation to give detailed theoretical and practical justifications and to choose improvements that could be easily implemented using already existing information or by using resources released by dropping unwanted statistics.

6. Impact of Lomé conventions

The conventions include most Southern African countries but not Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. There is scope therefore for some comparisons of the impact of Lomé on members and non-members, concerning: changes in trade flows, and the significance of access to EEC markets for manufactured goods; stabilisation of export earnings under Stabex and Sysmin; whether EEC aid is increased in total by Lomé membership, above what it would otherwise have been; whether aid in bilateral rather than multilateral form would have been disbursed more quickly, or more (or less) effectively; whether EIB will mainly subsidise the private sector, and to what effect.
7. Costs and benefits of large-scale mining

There is some evidence that the mineral exporters (excluding oil exporters) in Africa have not done well consistently according to some indicators – e.g. per capita real growth, income distribution, external indebtedness, open unemployment. It is easy to suggest hypotheses as to why this might be so. But is it true within Southern Africa? What role has the existence of large mines really played?

Obviously mineral exporters are not going to stop exporting minerals, and non-mineral exporters will not stop looking for minerals or choose not to export any viable mineral deposits they may find. But one can ask whether mineral exporters have something to learn from the other countries (or from each other), and whether there are built-in traps for unwary mineral exporters that can be predicted, and therefore avoided by existing and future mineral exporters, including Namibia on its independence.

Some hypotheses that could be investigated might include:
(a) large-scale mining creates urban bias and neglect of agriculture.
(b) mining exports lead to over expansion of the public sector when mineral prices are high, expansion which cannot be sustained when mineral prices fall.
(c) mining exports create a bias to an exchange rate which even if right for mining is wrong for everything else.
(d) the absence of mineral exports either leaves economies free of the effects in (a), (b) and (c), or subjects them to significantly milder effects.
(e) mineral sectors create a heavier dependence on foreign personnel and expertise relative to the size of the economy than do agricultural ones.
(f) relative to other productive sectors (except petroleum), minerals allow capture of a higher proportion of gross output by the government, albeit this is partly offset by higher infrastructural investment costs needed to facilitate mining, processing and transport.

8. Education: educated unemployed and dependence on expatriates

One may suggest that it might be true for some or all countries that the education system is producing too many unemployed graduates at each stage (standards 4 and 7, Form 2 or 3 and 5 or 6) whose education has not helped them (either through wrong curriculum or poor teaching) for what they will in fact be doing; and that the system is not producing enough skilled people (perhaps especially at middle level) so that reliance on expatriates (or misuse of high level personnel to do middle level jobs) remains excessive and expensive. Further, one could investigate whether anything can be done to reduce the cost of expatriates, e.g. by recruiting from cheaper sources (India, Mauritius, the Philippines). Some member countries have relevant experience in this area. A related question is whether it is more economically efficient:
(a) to have an open door policy regarding expatriate workers: unconstrained issue of work permits and residence permits, generous provision
of expatriate infrastructure (housing, health, education, entertainment), freedom to use South Africa, generous exchange controls – in the hope of having lower labour turnover, a more contented workforce; or
(b) the opposite, in order to hasten localisation and force the country to become self-reliant.

Some hypotheses that could be investigated are:
(a) an open door policy leads to unlimited demands on government expenditure, political problems because of conspicuous consumption by expatriates, and a permanent infrastructure of inequality from the houses and institutions they leave behind, as well as tending to deter or defer promotion of qualified citizens to their full level of acquired competence;
(b) the opposite does not create any more local skilled people but does put some of them in jobs above their level of competence and does create high turnover of dissatisfied (and therefore inefficient) expatriates drawn from a much smaller pool (because fewer are willing to come) at a higher price (to offset the other barriers).

It would also be desirable to investigate what can be done to increase the local supply of skilled labour at primary level, secondary level and tertiary level, and in vocational and on-the-job training. Related hypotheses include: a greater concentration of educational resources on those most likely to emerge successfully at the highest educational levels would increase the supply of skilled manpower; early localisation targets were wrong because education and training systems were allowed to develop too much under the guidance of professional educators and with too little guidance from planners on manpower needs, imbalances and demands; and incomes policies prevent the labour market from securing the right supplies of skilled manpower.

9. Institutional choice in agricultural production

A great deal of research has of course been done on agriculture in each country; but no comparative study has been done on the relative success of different institutional forms, namely, small-scale owner-managed farms; state farms; plantations, both foreign and locally owned; production cooperatives; and large-scale owner-managed farms (subdivided into African and European). Success could be measured in different (and competing) ways, such as: output growth; marketed output growth; employment creation; degree of exploitation of both participants and those excluded; creation of taxable capacity; creation of reinvestible surplus; and creation of skills.

10. Rural development policy

There is some evidence that many of the region's rural development problems relate to pricing, marketing, storage and availability of consumer goods
to rural people rather than to the technical problems of production. It should be possible to compare, across countries and across products within countries, the effectiveness, in terms of output and rural/urban relative incomes, of different government policies (or lack of them), such as: state-set prices administered by parastatals; state-set prices applied to private traders; wholly private price determination and procurement; and private versus parastatal versus cooperative transport/marketing/retailing/storage. A hypothesis to consider is: government intervention in pricing and service provision in rural areas has not achieved the aims stated in the enabling legislation, but has created some benefits (mainly for the better off) and some costs (mainly for the worse off).

11. Coping with disasters

There is extensive and varied experience in the region of the cost of disasters such as flood, drought, inflows of refugees, etc. Research might explore whether it is cheaper and more effective to: react after the event; plan for events that are certain to occur but at unknown intervals; or rely on external assistance (UNHCR, World Food Programme, etc.).

12. Industrialisation and regional policy

There is much talk at official level of new regional trading arrangements, and considerable historical experience of customs unions, free trade areas and their break-up (usually at short notice) as well as the opposite, namely sanctions or deliberate reduction of trading links at some level short of total sanctions. There have also been trading preferences external to the region--Commonwealth, Portuguese colonial,--EEC/ACP (mentioned in 6 above). Research might usefully investigate the hypotheses that trading arrangements are substantially irrelevant to rapid growth of industrial output (witness Zimbabwe which industrialised rapidly both as a member of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and as the target of sanctions); and that the availability of capital and skills, whether as a package as in foreign direct investment or purchased separately, is the prime determinant of industrial growth, since low cost products will find a market irrespective of formal trading agreements.

13. Teaching material

There is a need, in all the countries of the region, for the publication of two types of volume, for use mainly, though not exclusively, in the teaching of undergraduates and other higher education students. The two are, first, volumes of original papers on selected topics, drawing mainly on existing expertise and so not requiring lengthy and expensive original research; and second, volumes of selected readings of existing material, much of which is contained in official
reports and other documents, which are extremely difficult to get hold of and anyway rather too long for students and others to read quickly.

The Institute would perform a very valuable function if it could promote a series of volumes on the lines of, for example, *Essays on agricultural policy in Southern Africa* and *Selected readings on fiscal policy in Southern Africa*.

Such undertakings could be relatively cheap in terms of direct cost. However, their usefulness would be much greater if the cost of publication could be subsidised so that the volumes would be relatively cheap to buy. Cheap books reach a much wider audience.

**Conclusion**

No doubt any number of other topics could be suggested. The above have not, to the author's knowledge, been extensively written about in the Southern African context, and they are of potential interest to most or all of the countries in the region. Large gaps remain; but a comprehensive list would not in fact be a list of priorities, and by sticking his neck out the author hopes to stimulate some comment.

**NOTES AND REFERENCES**

The paper presented at the Workshop had three lengthy appendices: (1) a list of research in the U.K. related to Southern Africa, extracted from *Development studies: Register of research in the United Kingdom, 1979–80*. (2) a list of research undertaken or ongoing at the IDS, Sussex, too recent to be included in (1). (3) a list of IDS-member publications on the region from *IDS Bulletin*, 11 (4) Sept. 1980.

The appendices have been omitted, and Mr. Harvey's paper has been edited by ISAS.
CHAPTER 7

Research on Foreign Capital and Development in Southern Africa

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Introduction

National and regional strategy in Southern African countries, whether at the political, social or economic levels is, not surprisingly, conditioned to a large extent by the proximity of South Africa. The latter's economic, military, and to some extent political power (by way of the covert sympathy and support of some Western countries) are powerful factors that cannot be ignored in planning a country's or the region's development.

If this applies at the official policy level, it is equally true that the structure and content of research cannot be set in a context which pretends that South Africa does not exist. This may seem too obvious to need stating, but it is a way of forcing us to inspect our often unconscious assumptions about the influence of South Africa's presence on future regional development.

The problematic for Southern African countries has much in common with that for ex-colonial countries the world over, but with the added ingredient of the presence of a state in the region prepared to use superior economic and military power more blatantly, and with less concern for international opinion, than the dominant powers in other regions.

The influence of South Africa on the region will not be passive: South Africa will be an actor. The realignment of economic and political links will not be on our terms only, with South Africa (or certain national classes inclined to support it) bowing gracefully out. During 1981 Zimbabwe suffered from what was clearly economic sabotage, with South Africa having decided that a stable and prosperous Zimbabwe was not in her interests. A trade agreement was to be terminated on South Africa's timetable; a series of official and semi-official trade embargoes slowed Zimbabwe's imports and exports through South Africa; locomotives on loan were withdrawn; bridges and the pipeline to Zimbabwe through Mozambique were blown up by paramilitary forces consisting of South African and ex-Rhodesian SAS personnel, disguised (ever more thinly) as MNR rebels. And the latter actions were only a foretaste for Zimbabwe of what may be to come: already Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Zambia
have suffered actual aggression, and sabotage activities inside Zimbabwe (for example the blowing up of the ammunition dump) have already begun.

But there may be another dimension, even more sinister, and in the medium run more ominous. To take the example of Zimbabwe again, since independence it has had a booming economy, with industrial output growing at 15 per cent in 1980 and 13.5 per cent in the first half of 1981. Yet the difficulties in moving exports, caused almost entirely by South African action, are losing the country an estimated five to seven million US dollars per week, or almost a third of its earnings. In the first half of 1981 exports were almost unchanged in money terms as compared with the first half of 1980 (due to the lower mineral prices, especially gold and the beginnings of the transport difficulties) while imports had risen 30 per cent in money terms due to the needs of reconstruction etc, and imported inflation. With the worsening of the transport situation in the second half of this year and the prospect of a massive balance of payments deficit for the year as a whole, the already tight import-control system had to be tightened further. Here, if ever, there is a classic case for special loans to be made available to tide a country over short term problems caused by factors outside its economy. Zimbabwe has a sound economy, with excellent export prospects in maize, cotton, sugar, coffee, five major minerals and a number of manufactured products including steel; traditionally it has a positive balance on visible trade, and according to the IMF last year, was ‘underborrowed’ by international standards; a large number of new locomotives are due to arrive and rail routes and port facilities in Mozambique are being rapidly improved; the pipeline is due to open soon despite its recent sabotage.

Yet the widely reported conditions being imposed on a loan by the IMF are similar to its standard ‘stabilisation’ measures required from countries in balance of payments difficulties, that is cutbacks in government expenditure to reduce the government deficit (despite the barely six-month old ZIMCORD (Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development) programme for which foreign funding of about US $1.5 billion has been promised), reductions in subsidies, higher interest rates (with no exceptions for small farmers), ‘liberalisation’ of trade and so forth. Aside from the fact that the latter would be certain to worsen the balance of payments problem that the loan is required to mitigate, and that such policies, even on the IMF’s own admission have a very poor success rate, the conditions have nothing to do in Zimbabwe’s case with the cause of the imbalance which is external and should be short-lived in absence of further sabotage. There are really only two persuasive rationales for IMF pressure under these circumstances, both of them dishonourable: (1) Zimbabwe should recognise the ‘realities’ of its situation with regard to the constraints imposed externally, reduce economic activity, scale-down reconstruction and social programmes and ‘stabilise’ at a lower level consistent with its circumstances. In other words the IMF is prepared to reinforce at the economic level South Africa’s military and economic attempts to avoid having a prosperous neighbour that would be an example to her black population and would become, inside the SADCC, an alternative economic pole; (2) The IMF is concerned to impose orthodox free-market policies on a state with an avowed socia-
list policy and aspirations, and which has inherited a battery of instruments of state intervention designed to give self-reliance in a largely hostile world during the UDI period, but which could be used to promote socialist self-reliance in a largely hostile capitalist environment. In other words the IMF (led by the USA and UK) is intervening politically to back up the antisocialist constraints imposed by the Lancaster House Agreement and Constitution (themselves in large part the result of successful military collusion against the front-line states by the British government and the Smith/Muzorewa regime). If the experience of other countries in similar situations is any guide, military and economic pressure will be used to create an impression of government mismanagement and a situation in which the much-raised expectations of the mass of the people will not be able to be met. Reluctant meeting of some of the IMF’s early demands will produce a worsening of the economic situation, followed by further demands for complete adoption of ‘stabilisation’ programmes. Ultimately the government will either capitulate, abandoning even the rhetoric of socialism and becoming repressive towards its former supporters, or it will, too late, because of the much-raised payments situation, reject IMF prescriptions, and probably fall politically (as in the case of the Manley Government in Jamaica).

I have made this diversion into Zimbabwe’s present situation, not just because it is topical (other countries in the region have faced such pressures, including Zambia and Tanzania, the latter currently being under pressure to cut government expenditure including a clean-water programme); but because we can expect both South African and IMF pressure to be constant ingredients in the future of the whole region. These are factors for consideration not only by governments, but also part of the problematic that researchers must face. However because of the intrinsic uncertainty of any predictions about the future there seems little alternative but to adopt a scenario approach, spelling out the main features of each which are likely to influence or be part of the problem for which we seek solutions. Failure to do this almost certainly means that we adopt an implicit scenario, which may either be unrealistic and therefore leads to an inadequate specification of the problem so that derived solutions fail; or it may mean that we unconsciously adopt an ideologically determined scenario, part of the propaganda of the dominant ideology, which even if rejected at the theoretical level may nevertheless impose constraints, ruling out a range of options that fall outside orthodox expectations as ‘unrealistic’.

Southern African scenarios

The first scenario that we might consider is that individual countries, or even the whole region, might follow the type of strategy pursued by Malawi. In this case there would be relatively little military disruption of their economies (although the South African liberation movements would not of course capitulate, and would make use of neighbouring territories against the will of both South Africa and the erstwhile front-line states so that South Africa would still use some ‘stick’ to keep its dependent states in line, along with its ‘carrot’ of aid
and trade). But there can hardly be any doubt that dependency and underdevelopment would worsen in such circumstances, with the whole region becoming increasingly subordinate to South Africa until such time as the latter were liberated. Having registered this theoretical possibility (it is after all what the South African regime and significant powers in the West would like to see), there seems little point here in elaborating the economic consequences of what would be a politically incredible betrayal of the South African people.

A different, but hardly more likely scenario also cannot be quite ruled out: that, under Western pressure, the South African regime liberalises and makes an early accommodation with the leaders of the liberation movements before they have become too radicalised by the experience of war. Under such circumstances, we can envisage a very conservative South African regime rather like that of Muzorewa in ‘Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’ but with the probable acquiescence of the SADCC countries (a variant would have a continuing liberation struggle against the collaborators with the support of only the more radical neighbouring states). South Africa would then assume a dominating role in the economic integration and self-reliance of the whole subcontinent; this would probably be a form of development with a very dependent relationship to Europe and America and with many features similar to those in Latin America.

By far the most likely outcome, it seems to me, is one fairly commonly expected, but whose economic consequences for the neighbouring states have hardly been analysed at all. This is that the liberation struggle will continue to escalate, eventually becoming a full-scale civil war inside South Africa, and spilling over into most of the neighbouring states. Given that the majority of these states will be supporting the war of liberation morally, the South African regime will make a decreasing distinction between countries offering only moral support and those with a full commitment to the military struggle. Any state not positively making life difficult for guerrillas and refugees will be punished to try to bring about its neutrality, or the downfall of its government. That is, the present invasion of Angola, sabotage of infrastructure, assassination attempts on leaders and so forth will become increasingly generalised and intense. Indeed the precedent that seems appropriate could well be not Southern Rhodesia’s actions against Zambia and Mozambique or even South Africa’s against Angola, but the United States’s against North Vietnam. If this scenario is followed, many economic policies and investment strategies being followed in Southern African countries could well be vitiated, with large investments now being purchased at the expense of current living standards and social services being extremely vulnerable to sabotage or even bombing. At the extreme, it should not be forgotten that South Africa now has a nuclear capability.

Such a scenario certainly must appear unthinkable to most people living in the front-line states. And there is little evidence that any contingency planning is going on to enable survival, economically or politically, should such developments occur. Given the immediate real problems of most countries, and lack of resources or political allies prepared to back up policies which foresee such eventualities, this is hardly surprising. But wishful thinking will not make the likelihood evaporate. If, as I fear, the chances of this outcome begin to look ever
more likely, detailed and urgent research at both the political and economic levels should be begun with the highest priority.

In very broad outline this must include increasing solidarity at the political level between the SADCC countries in face of the common enemy. There must be military coordination, so that threats or acts of aggression against a weak state, or remote areas of even relatively strong states, can be met with the most appropriate defence (for example Zimbabwean protection for the Cabora Bassa dam and its installations, to say nothing of transport connections and pipelines in border areas). There must be rethinking of SADCC strategies for a war-time context, designed to decrease regional vulnerability to particular acts of sabotage, cutting of communications, or even loss of territory. For example in the industrial field, the concentration of industries in the Harare and Bulawayo areas of Zimbabwe or the Maputo region of Mozambique must be seen as risky. Orthodox economic advice based on comparative advantage will in many cases recommend establishment of many new industries in such areas, and despite common policies of promoting decentralisation (not just to other urban areas but wherever possible into genuine rural areas or their 'growth points') the narrow economic arguments will be very hard to resist. Indeed the arguments will apply not just to Harare and Bulawayo in the Zimbabwean context but to a large extent to Zimbabwe in the regional context. It is not just that Bulawayo and Maputo are uncomfortably near to South Africa (this factor is of reduced significance when South Africa has the capability to bomb Dar-es-Salaam), but that they and a limited number of other urban centres have much too high a concentration of vital facilities and services in both local and regional terms. The model that ought to be increasingly applied (or that for which contingency planning should be carried out) is that of North Vietnam, which in the face of saturation bombing by the US, dispersed its industry into the countryside where it was much less vulnerable. Certainly future industry could relatively cheaply be decentralised even if present costs (and risks) do not seem to justify so extreme an action for existing industries. Another lesson that could be learned from North Vietnam would be in the field of popular defence against invasion and sabotage, and popular involvement in the rapid repair of bridges, railway lines etc. (these were often repaired well enough to carry light traffic in a matter of days in North Vietnam).

Having set out this scenario and what it might imply in terms of policy adaptation (and consequent research needs), and having castigated the shortsightedness or wishful thinking that refuses to confront it, I am now going to plead guilty to the same faults and return to another scenario which, although I am reluctantly persuaded it is rather less likely than the pessimistic one, is more amenable to immediate discussion, and has more familiar consequences for the type of research that I (and most of us) have hitherto been engaged in. I hope at any rate that having confronted the unthinkable we will keep it not too far to the back of our minds, ready to be advanced if needed, whilst looking at a more optimistic scenario.

The more optimistic scenario possibly corresponds approximately to the implicit vision of the future of many politicians in the region: the South African
struggle will be largely confined within the borders of that country. The South African regime will be so preoccupied with internal problems that it will have little incentive to do more across its borders than to strike at guerrilla base camps in the front-line states, without finding any advantage in economic sabotage of the countries themselves. After some ten years South Africa will gain its independence and be integrated once again into the Southern African region. Meanwhile the other states will have become much more developed and integrated as a region, having greatly reduced their dependence on South Africa through the SADCC.

So in this perspective it makes sense to look at the nine SADCC countries (ten adding Namibia) or the twenty or so PTA countries, as a unit, disengaging itself from South Africa, and seeking regional self-reliance. We may then ask what is the problematic faced by these countries, (after wishing away the South African threat) and how should we go about solving the problems? The generalised answer to this is poverty; lack of industry; low productivity in agriculture; dependence; external control of resources; and so forth, which may be summarised by the concept of underdevelopment (the consequence of a process). Development, through breaking the bonds of exploitation and dependency, is then the solution.

**Industrialisation**

This is much too vague and general, of course, and in attempting to be more precise, I want to focus on the question of industrialisation. (Clearly a complete specification of the problem would include consideration of the present inadequacies in agriculture, mining, distribution, transport, energy supply, finance, defence, education, health, and other services.) The problem so far as industry is concerned is that it is too small. This is the fundamental point, almost too obvious to need emphasis, and transcending such questions as its ownership, structure of output, type of technology employed and so forth, although such factors may help to explain why it is too small.

Let us for a moment try to imagine a future Southern Africa which has become a developed country, (although for convenience, with the present population of about 60 million, comparable with Britain, France or Germany). This country would have a per capita income (at 1981 prices) of say US $5 000 instead of US $300, and instead of US $20 billion its GDP would be US $300 billion (or double if we accept that population will have doubled). Now I am not claiming that precisely this should be aimed at over twenty years (it would require impossibly high growth rates). But if we accept the target for our grandchildren and their contemporaries in say fifty years time (given modern scientific capability as well as the example of a number of mainly East European countries since the Second World War, this is in fact a fairly modest target requiring sustained growth rates of about 7 per cent) we should ask what will have to have happened in the meantime?

For one thing, steel production will have increased from not much over a
million tonnes per year to some 25 or 30 million tonnes; for another, energy consumption will have risen from a rate of some 200 watts per person to about 5 kilowatts or from an equivalent installed electricity capacity of under 10 000 MW to about 300 000 MW (the same as 150 Cabora Bassas or over 200 Wankie Phase 2s). Similar examples could be given for other basic requirements of modern industry already produced in the area: cement, fertilisers, building materials, and so forth. And, in addition, whole new industries at present non-existent or rudimentary, would have to be established on a large scale: aluminium, petrochemicals and synthetic textiles, and so forth. In addition there would be a need for comparable expansions in food processing, wood and metal-working, rubber, glass and plastics industries, and high-technology industries making machineries, vehicles and electrical and electronic equipment. All this can be said because something like this is true of any developed country of 60 million or so people, despite varying product mixes when the detail is considered, or despite differences in the proportion of the national income accounted for by trade. If we cannot be quite so sweeping in saying that the ratio of foreign trade to national income will have greatly declined, this will certainly be true if we concern ourselves with exports of primary commodities and imports of consumer goods.

By now I think I have laboured the point sufficiently for it to be clear what the next questions must be if we are to pursue the argument. If we want to get from here to there how is the investment to be found? Where is the technology to be obtained? How are we to train enough people to run the industries? Where are the industries to be sited so as to provide their services most efficiently. And perhaps most important, what is the order in which the necessary investments will be most efficiently made? The answer to these questions will require many person-years of detailed research and planning so I am not going to attempt answers other than in principle or by way of a simple example or two. But the planning will need extensive cooperation, integrating many small problem analyses and solutions into larger ones. In particular I am thinking of the need to integrate plans for particular industries into sub-sectoral plans, the latter into sectoral plans, these into national plans, and national plans into regional plans. Equally important will be the need to integrate short-term economic planning medium term (five year) plans and the latter into a fifty-year plan. In summary, we might think of an input-output table, most of whose entries are vacant or with derisory figures; our problem is how to fill out these entries to approximate the situation in a developed country.

To take a specific example: the only integrated iron and steel complex in the region is in Zimbabwe. ZISCO produces about a million tonnes of iron and steel a year from local iron ore, coal, limestone and oxygen (a by-product from fertiliser production). Comparative advantage might well suggest that this be expanded gradually to say 25 million tonnes so as to supply the whole region, and indeed there are single steel plants in China and other parts of the world which work extremely efficiently at this sort of capacity. Clearly another approach would be to establish 24 more 'Ziscos' at growth points throughout the region so as to promote regional linkages, reduce transport costs, reduce
regional disparities and reduce diseconomies of scale caused by overcrowding and pollution in industrial areas. Almost certainly the best solution would be somewhere between these two extremes with the precise mix being determined by a range of political, social and geological as well as economic factors. Because of the size of the region, the British solution, concentrating over 20 million tonnes of iron and steel production in only two or three sites would probably not be optimal, given the costs of transporting such a bulky commodity long distances, especially in the absence of water-borne transport in much of the region. But this would depend on the geographic distribution of good quality iron ores and coal.

Of course there would have to be much refinement of the planning to add to the bare bones of such an analysis, concerned with the phasing of investments, their linkages with other parts of the economy, their effect on employment, their relation to availability of investment capital and their impact on the balance of payments. In addition the question of technological change needs to be considered. This is not to state that Southern Africa necessarily must have the most up-to-date technology (for that would restrict job creation in the transitional stages), but it is worth remarking that the almost linear relationship between iron and steel consumption and per capita income seems to flatten off at higher income levels, and in more recently developed countries there is evidence that aluminium, cement and plastics play much of the role performed by iron in older industrialisations. So it would be sensible to consider the possibility that only say 15 million tonnes per annum of iron and steel would be necessary and rather more aluminium. Such considerations are important and require long-term industrial planning to be kept as flexible as possible.

We must now make our analysis more specific and come down to some immediate research needs. To begin to lay the foundations for a future developed Southern Africa we need to know in some detail a number of things, and I want to focus on: the structure of existing industry and related economic activities in the whole region; the types and sources of technology available in the region and how far a local technological capability has developed; and the ownership of existing industry. All these, and especially the last are vital, for it is out of the existing base that future investment will be generated and future skills developed.

**Structure**

As well as being too small, present industry even in the most advanced case of Zimbabwe, is distorted towards production of goods for a minority, luxury market or the servicing of an export sector (agricultural and mineral commodities), and it is critically dependent on imports for both machinery and spare parts and many intermediate inputs. In part (but only in part) this is what one would expect of economies at an early stage of development, but, firstly, the mainly foreign provenance and ownership of much of the capital has distorted industries towards importing even where local resources are waiting to be exploited; secondly, it has favoured inappropriately capital-intensive
techniques where plentiful labour might have been profitably employed; and, thirdly, some recent experiences of planned economic development have shown the efficiency of concentrating initially on heavy goods and capital goods industries. Present studies on the structure and linkages of Zimbabwean and other industries need to be generalised to the region as a whole so as to lay a firm data base for future planning.

Technology

The technology employed by most of Southern African industry was developed in the industrialised world for rather different circumstances, greater abundance of capital and relatively less labour. It is vital that the region develops and spreads its own science and technology capability as soon as possible so as to reduce a dependence on developed powers that is not only expensive, but also inhibiting towards autonomous development. The relatively advanced state of technology in Zimbabwe could be a catalyst for the whole region.

It seems appropriate here to make a few comments about what should be understood by ‘autonomy in making technological decisions’, and ‘local, indigenous technological capacity’. Although it is possible to conceive of a spectrum ranging from countries in which all technological decisions are made by outsiders through to those in which all are made by locals, there are almost certainly no examples of these extremes. Even in the most advanced countries there is either a degree of surrender to outsiders, represented either by direct foreign investment (European and foreign firms bring certain specialised technologies into the USA, for example), or through various forms of licensing (the USSR makes use of Western technology through such means).

Clearly what is important is not that reliance must sometimes be placed on outside technology, but that either there is national control involved in the choice and use to which it is put or that local technology and economic power is so dominant that minor examples of foreign determination of directions of technological change do not become significantly inconsistent with national objectives.

In the case of developing countries, although there may be institutions for national control of major decisions in the economic field, or even, as in the case of Zimbabwe, significant capability across a broad range of industry for adapting and renewing technology, autonomy is very much reduced. The reason for this is that although in principle the State or its agents can choose the most appropriate amongst available technologies, they can rarely be as fully informed as the owners of the technology who, through deceptive presentation of their case, may frequently succeed in selling the less suitable option.

In many cases the technology will only come as part of a direct investment package in which the importing country may be obliged to accept a number of constraints as to the use to which the technology is put. This may arise either because the owners of the technology are not prepared to ‘depackage’ it or because the importing country does not have the capability to do this.

An UNCTAD paper distinguishes direct transfers of technology in which
a national enterprise can import the technology-embodying factors. It can “buy the requisite technology elements from different sources abroad (like suppliers of machinery and other capital goods, foreign technicians, etc.) and put them together to organise industrial production and distribution” and indirect transfers “which involve some trade-off with respect to the control of the enterprise.” Direct investment by multinationals is the classic example. It is unique in providing from a single source various elements of technology in a package combined with other critical industrial inputs like capital and managerial skills required for production and distribution, and is characterised by the high degree of control of the enterprise exercised by the technology supplier. A second less indirect method of transfer is through licensing or similar types of contractual arrangements with foreign enterprises; in these cases the degree of foreign control of the enterprise depends, inter alia, upon the terms and conditions negotiated in the formal contract.

“All these are not, however, mutually exclusive methods; in fact, technology transfer normally takes place as a combination of them. Thus, a foreign subsidiary in a developing country may have a formal contractual arrangement with its parent company for technology. Or the foreign enterprise supplying the technology through a contractual arrangement may have minority ownership or management interest in the technology-importing enterprise. The underlying factor, however, that distinguishes one from another is the degree of packaging and thus the degree of control exercised by the foreign-technology supplier over the technology recipient.”

The UNCTAD report distinguishes five broad categories of limitations on access to and use of foreign technology (a) tied purchases of inputs; (b) restrictions on exports; (c) requirements of certain guarantees; (d) restrictions on competition in the domestic market; and (e) constraints limiting the dynamic effects of the transfer. One way of unpackaging foreign technology is to insist on ‘fade-out’ arrangements between the foreign supplier and some domestic enterprise.

Finally, in considering the meaning of “local, indigenous technological capacity”, we should make the obvious distinction between people and machines. A country, for historical reasons, may have technologically capable people but few machines or factories (for instance, Germany or Japan after the Second World War). Or it may have a number of machines with few people capable of running them (to some extent Mozambique’s situation after the Portuguese exodus, and potentially the situation in Zimbabwe, though to a lesser extent). Looking in more detail at the case of Zimbabwe, the situation is complicated by the fact that most of the local technologically qualified people are of settler origin, a large proportion of whom do not wish to consider themselves as ‘indigenous’ despite the Government’s willingness so to consider them. There is, therefore, a continuing risk that over-rapid emigration of such people may seriously reduce the local technological capacity.

Zimbabwe’s particular situation in these respects is conditioned by a number of factors, including its relatively advanced development (in 1980 per capita income was Z$419 or US$582, manufacturing industry accounting for
25.8 per cent and mining 8.6 per cent of GDP); the presence of a large settler population of uncertain allegiance, but controlling a small though significant proportion of industrial capital; and the degree of self-reliance forced on the economy through 14 years of economic sanctions.

To consider the last point first, shortage of foreign exchange forced a large number of less essential consumer goods industries to make do without new foreign technology for long periods. Essential industries, in particular basic metals (ferrous and non-ferrous), metal products, textiles and slaughtering and processing of meat (that is, intermediate and capital goods or major export earners) received the lion's share of investment; the five listed received 52 per cent of total manufacturing investment between 1967 and 1976 with the balance being shared amongst 29 other industrial subsectors. 4

The consequence is that whereas the iron and steel industry is highly competitive on the world market, and meat processing facilities amongst the best in the world (Zimbabwean beef is the cheapest in the world), many other industries are operating with out-dated and inefficient plant. The process of keeping machinery running far beyond its usual lifetime has undoubtedly contributed to the development of technological capability, which in some industries has resulted in a research and development capability producing some innovations and many appropriate adaptations to local conditions.

The question now posed is: to what extent will the capability survive (and spread from the white to the black population) (a) in the event of a significant exodus of settlers, and (b) in the context of retooling to enable industries to close the gap between present technology and the newest world technology? In other words it is possible that hard-won technical skills will be made redundant if significant recourse is had to newer technologies involving microelectronics, automated systems and more capital-intensive technologies generally.

Another factor concerns the dominance of the economy by foreign capital, which owns about 70 per cent of productive capacity and which has indigenised its management staff to a high degree, but not, as in other countries, to make use of the majority population, but almost exclusively using whites. 5 On the one hand, this means that there is less control over industrial policy and technology either for black Zimbabweans or the Government than in many countries (one official stated that the Government at present has less control over industrial development than the UDI regime despite accusations of unwarranted interference); on the other, it means that some (white) Zimbabweans are nearer positions of real power in foreign companies than is usually allowed to be the case by the parent TNC.

A schematic division of the institutions of Zimbabwe industry would then include at least six types of enterprises, in which the extent of autonomy in technological matters would vary widely:

(a) TNCs with firm foreign control of ownership and technology;
(b) semi-indigenised TNCs, quoted on the local Stock Exchange, though with 40–70 per cent or more of the shares held by the foreign parent, sometimes with local partners, and usually with local management;
(c) locally owned and controlled companies, sometimes with widespread
share-holdings in the white population (though with minority institutional and foreign holdings — a major example being TA Holdings), but more often, being private family companies, some of which are of considerable size, for example the Thomas Meikle Trust;

(d) the Industrial Development Corporation, a parastatal established by the former regime holding mainly minority shares in industrial companies. It is still dominated by white businessmen, has very restrictive terms of reference, and is due to be absorbed into the Zimbabwe Development Corporation;

(e) businesses owned by black Zimbabweans, at present very small-scale except for a few in retail trade and transport enterprises;

(f) state-owned enterprises, including the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation (49 per cent owned) and State and Municipal Corporations in services (electricity, water, transport, etc.).

Although the ability to take technological decisions in accordance with local interests or to decide to draw on local skills and resources varies widely between these categories, in none of them, except possibly the presently insignificant case (e), can it be guaranteed that indigenous expertise is strong enough to prevent the adoption of policies inconsistent with fundamental government objectives (towards, for example, rural development, reducing income disparities, etc.) or the acceptance of inappropriate advice from externally based consultants whose dominant interests lie in developed countries.

Nevertheless Zimbabwe clearly has a greater capability than many developing countries to depackage foreign technology and, therefore, in future, need be much less reliant on direct foreign investment bringing in a whole package (including many unwelcome components) with the desired technology. This factor is probably of equal or greater importance than the ability to initiate a hypothetical purely local technology.

Detailed industry by industry investigation of the state of existing technological capacity, and the institutions for inculcating such skills needs to be carried out not only for Zimbabwe but also for the other SADCC countries, along the lines of the East African Technology Policy Study due to begin in 1982.

**Foreign ownership of industry and some of its consequences**

Finally we come to what I regard as the crucial issue, for it encompasses both the structure of industry, and technology issues, and also critically affects the availability of future investment and therefore the expansion of industry. This is the question of the ownership and control of industry. As mentioned, foreign-owned industry has tended to produce a distorted pattern of output and to ignore local resources in favour of imports. The first characteristic is not deliberate: private industry necessarily responds to existing income distribution and effective demand, which is why many countries in the region have (despite officially espousing the merits of private enterprise) established state productive
enterprises—in Zimbabwe's case the iron and steel, and cotton manufacturing industries—in addition to infrastructure.

But foreign ownership, even if controlled and guided to avoid these deficiencies (which is unlikely to be successful), invariably means a drain on potentially investible surpluses, both through 'normal' flows of profits and dividends, and also through transfer pricing and related foreign exchange abuses. For very poor countries at the start of their development there may be no alternative (both for reasons of lack of capital and lack of technology) but to accept foreign capital; and for more advanced countries a minority of investments from abroad, connected with needed specific technologies, is acceptable, expensive as this form of borrowing is. But for relatively advanced countries like Zimbabwe, and potentially therefore SADCC, it makes little sense to rely primarily on new investment from abroad when local surpluses can be mobilised and technology developed. This is because of the inhibiting effects on local enterprise that a climate of permanent subordination to foreign preeminence generates, the restrictive business practices employed in both the domestic and export markets, and also because of the great cost (usually in investment foregone) of this course.

We may again take Zimbabwe as example. Zimbabwe has some 70 per cent of its productive capital owned and ultimately controlled abroad; the proportion probably reaches 90 per cent in some other countries of the region. As a consequence, published outflows of dividends and profits are now running at about Z$100 million a year, or 15 per cent of total investment. Unthinking responses to this observation are to call for more foreign investment inflows so as to make the foreign investment account positive. This of course is analogous to borrowing to repay old debts (except foreign investment debts are never finally repaid, which is one reason why such reliance is so unwise, aside from the high comparative cost). But it is intrinsically unlikely to work in any case, given the instability of foreign investment flows and their susceptibility to political considerations (amongst which possible South African-derived troubles must now be weighing heavily).

There is evidence that one of the most serious and rapidly growing threats to development is transfer pricing and related abuses. It is commonly believed that companies making new investments in poor countries get their capital back within one to two years. Except in special cases like tax havens, this is rarely through declared profits, but more through price manipulation. Alternatively they may have invested much less capital than stated—supplying overpriced second-hand machinery to their subsidiary, or merely leasing it, borrowing from local banks or a tax haven.

Companies engaged in international trade may resort to manipulation of the prices they charge for a variety of reasons, of which the most significant (at any rate for our present concerns) are to minimise taxation and to evade foreign exchange control regulations. These two reasons often go together, although the consequences of a particular action are not always coincidental, with for example, some abuses losing a country foreign exchange but not tax revenue.

The most familiar form of transfer pricing involves a transnational corporation parent company overcharging its subsidiary for the latter’s imports or
underpaying it for its exports. It is however important to remark at once that in principle the ownership relation between the two companies involved need not be 100 per cent, or even majority, or even exist at all. In Zambia the copper companies after partial nationalisation were 51 per cent state-owned, but the minority foreign partners through their experience, their key position in holding management contracts, and their possession of overseas subsidiaries, were able to transfer large sums abroad without the state’s knowledge. Management contracts in the absence of any equity holding, licensing agreements, or simply ad hoc arrangements between two otherwise unconnected trading partners, may all be used in a similar way, but are often overlooked because of the greater difficulty in proving that an abuse has occurred.

Estimates of the extent of transfer pricing have been made in a number of specific studies. Both the Colombian and Greek monitoring units have made estimates of losses (later recoveries) running at about US$80m per year, the UK Inland Revenue recovered £20m in 1976 alone after investigating foreign owned TNCs; and the US Internal Revenue Service recovered US$662m for a two-year period after making adjustments to correct for transfer pricing and related abuses. The SGS which charges client countries 1 per cent of the import bill for imports surveyed (typically amounting to US$4–10m annually), claims to save between three and six times as much on imports alone. There is an order of magnitude estimate suggesting that the average level of over invoicing of imports into developing countries is 7.5 per cent – 12.5 per cent and that exports are on average under invoiced by a rather larger percentage. If these figures hold for Zimbabwe, it is plain that the country could be losing as much as US$100m annually on both exports and imports.

Despite the range of evidence listed above, it is always difficult to establish that pricing abuses have taken place; most of the proven cases involve fairly simple, often primary, commodities for which a world market price to use as a reference point can fairly easily be found. But a large proportion of trade involves intermediate products or highly differentiated final manufactured products for which no markets exist. In these cases there may be no obtainable reference point, unless access is gained to a company’s accounts with a view to making cost-plus calculations. In intermediate cases a price may be known within 5 or 10 per cent, but divergences of this order cannot easily be challenged. In this connection it is instructive to recall that the ILO mission to Kenya estimated that transfer pricing at about 5 per cent, a level which would usually go undetected, would have the effect of doubling the effective level of profit outflow from the country. Finally, should the denials of TNCs still carry weight, the existence of a range of work by financial analysts, tax consultants and business school professors, advising on why and how to shift funds through a variety of intrafirm resource channels testifies to the presence of a demand for such advice and the profits to be earned.

Other foreign exchange abuses include a range of practices in the field of invisible trade: (1) leasing may be used instead of selling capital equipment to subsidiaries, with often uncontrolled rental payment ensuing; (2) timing of payments, involving leads or lags in sums due (dependent on differential interest
rates), or capitalisation of a stream of services (possibly fictitious, like rights to ‘know-how’); (3) purchasing commissions and other costs of exchange which are of dubious applicability in intrasfirm transactions, but form a major part of the claimed savings by the SGS (repatriable part only, i.e. commissions payable in the host country – those payable in the country of the parent company are presumably a direct foreign exchange cost); (4) other price elements, such as freight charges, insurance charges (particularly where the TNC has a captive freight or insurance company) discounts and premia; (5) licence fees and royalties, a major device for expatriation of profits (once again it is doubtful how appropriate such charges are when made inside a firm, certainly they are used little if at all between subsidiaries and parents in the same country); (6) wage and expenses manipulations, in which subsidiaries enter secret agreements with expatriate workers to overpay them, with repayment of some of the excess in the parent country; (7) head office expenses and management fees, which may represent real services provided to subsidiaries, but the pricing of these is problematic, and payments commonly relate to the desire to repatriate profits rather than to services rendered. This by no means exhausts the list of devices that have been observed, and most authorities admit that they expect to discover new strategems in the future. Related abuses such as over- and under-supply, and falsification of invoices are more obviously fraudulent, but seem to be fairly common.

**Controlling transfer pricing**

Three major methods may be distinguished: (1) *Reclaiming the market by account.* In this approach, commonly used by taxation authorities, an attempt is made to determine what prices would have been had they arisen from ‘arms length’ transactions in a perfect market. This approach suffers from informational problems, and so data may be very hard to come by; and conceptual problems where no market exists, where there is monopoly power, or where the marginal costs of production of a service (e.g. dissemination of information) are close to zero. (2) *Through antimonopoly legislation,* so as to restore competition and remove market imperfections. Although this method may have some relevance to developed countries, it is clearly of little interest to small developing countries, in which monopolistic conditions are widespread and inevitable. (3) *The bargaining approach,* which observes that the problem largely arises from the disproportionate power of TNCs, but abandons the attempt to control this through some concept of a model of perfect competition with the state playing the role of a neutral referee, preferring instead to mobilise the state's own power as an active participant in the process of bargaining. If the state is weak, it may have to accept that the costs of transfer pricing are simply part of the bargain implicit in allowing foreign investment; if it is strong (possibly through regional cooperation, as in the Andean Pact countries, or potentially for the SADCC countries), certain flows like royalty payments may simply be disallowed and companies taxed to a level just short of causing them to divest.
These exist in all countries, but usually with the avoidance of foreign exchange losses as only a secondary concern. Thus taxation departments are interested in reallocating companies’ accounts if transfer pricing may have resulted in a loss of taxable income, but will not be interested in equally important cases where foreign exchange losses are incurred without any avoidance of tax liabilities. Customs and excise departments have no interest in uncovering over-invoicing of imports, and are unlikely even to check where the tariff rate is zero. Central Banks are most directly concerned, although even they do not always see the problem as central.

We are most concerned here with organisations which have been set up solely to deal with the phenomenon of transfer pricing. Probably first to start effective operation was INCOMEX in Colombia which gathers information on prices and technical matters relating to both imports and exports, and examines customs declarations. It has wide powers to impose sanctions, halt payments etc., and exchanges information with other government departments. It employed about thirty people at an approximate cost of US$200 000 in 1978, and estimated savings of foreign exchange are about US$80m per annum. In Greece, EPETEE was a high level committee of administrators from three government ministries which established a technical unit of nine people with scientific, engineering and economics backgrounds to investigate transfer pricing. This did not have such wide powers, but cost only about US$100 000 per annum, and uncovered transfer pricing abuses worth US$80m in two years. As with INCOMEX part of the cost was incurred in obtaining the services of overseas consultants. SITET in Zambia is a special unit set up to investigate exchange control contraventions, and operates more in the police tradition than the other examples, having police powers of search. Costs for the eight staff (economists and ex-policemen) were K300 000 in 1977, and receipts from fines alone exceeded K3m. These were often settlements out of court to avoid prosecution.

The successful operation of such monitoring units depends not merely on adequate financing (and the evidence from the above and similar cases suggests that net returns would increase during several-fold expansions) but also on changes in laws on confidentiality. Monitoring units to be efficient must have access to records not only in customs and excise departments, but also in taxation departments and central banks. Commonly, at the present time, these three sets of institutions are required to maintain confidentiality even from each other, which is one reason why transfer pricing and other foreign exchange contraventions are so difficult to prove. Such rules of confidentiality are appropriate in ‘private law’ in which weak individuals require protection from a powerful state. But the legal fiction which entitles a TNC to the same protection as an individual when in informational terms, and sometimes even in economic terms, it is much more powerful than the state of a developing country, needs to be abolished. A ‘public law’ would enable governments to bargain on more nearly equal terms with TNCs. The ability to obtain data on transfer pricing could be used either to reclaim the market by account or to strengthen the state’s hand in bargaining.
Of equal importance would be to make it possible for governments to place the burden of proof of the reasonableness of prices onto companies. Such in effect is what taxation authorities commonly do in assessing income or reallocating costs and profit: if the assessment is too high, this has to be demonstrated.

The presence of harmful structural effects, balance of payments losses and investment losses when a country is dominated by foreign capital, probably explains why the stock of foreign capital is negatively correlated with the growth rate. Such dominance must be removed: our future developed Southern Africa (if it is to be like other developed countries) will have at most 20–25 per cent of its productive capital stock owned abroad, and probably less. The way to get there must be by way of drawing increasingly on local capability and finance, wherever they exist in the region, and by phasing out a large part of foreign ownership through planned cooperative divestment.

Detailed research therefore needs to be done on the structure and ownership of industry throughout the region, pinpointing sectors where there is regional capability and experience, analysing in detail present linkages in inputs and markets inside and outside the region. Particular attention must of course be paid to South African firms, for they might be engaged in serious transfer pricing or other foreign exchange abuses; they might be agents of South African economic warfare in the future, or other forms of economic pressure; on the other hand they might have to be used as hostages in the event of a South African invasion.

Such data after coordination will be a valuable, not to say essential, base for planning. The next stages will be to consider both the phasing and siting of new investments to fill in gaps in the structure and expand inadequate industries, and to come to agreements with dominant foreign industries to divest. I have argued elsewhere how this might be carried out, and clearly much more detailed research still needs to be done on the tactics, phasing, financing etc., of this. But, in broad outline, an agreement would be drawn up to pay a company compensation at a future date (or over a future period) conditional on it having met a number of conditions, which would amount to it leaving an efficiently functioning enterprise in the hands of trained locals. Independent assessors would be the arbiters as to whether such conditions had been met; failure would result in reductions or confiscation (in the case of transfer pricing, sabotage etc.). Governments would be in a much stronger position than in normal nationalisations with prior agreed unconditional compensation, and regional coordination should strengthen their hands further.

Conclusion

Research must be related to realistic assessment of likely political developments in the region; it must also include ‘contingency research’ in case the less likely (or less thinkable) developments occur. In the most tractable case it is needed into (a) the structure and ownership of industry in the region; (b) the extent to which transfer pricing and related abuses operate and are draining
away investible surpluses; (c) the best cooperative methods for controlling such abuses on regional bases; (d) detailed approaches to reduce the proportion of foreign ownership of productive industry and maximise retained profits for reinvestment; (e) regional industrial planning, sector by sector, paying attention to intersectoral linkages, regional considerations, and decentralisation generally; (f) demonstrating to individual countries that long term benefits to them may often mean a degree of short run self-denial in favour of more backwards areas. Finally the direction and relevance of the research should be continually reassessed in face of what will probably be a worsening security situation because of the development of the liberation struggle in South Africa.

Postscript, December 1984. The above paper was written over three years ago, before South Africa's second invasion of Angola, its murderous raids on Maputo and Maseru, and before the Nkomati Accord. These events fit the pattern foreseen in the third ('most likely' scenario above, although the sheer weight of South Africa's destabilization has in fact begun to shift the policies of both invaded and threatened countries towards those of the fist ('Malawi') scenario. SADCC countries, like most researchers, may have underestimated both the difficulties of co-ordinating opposition and of the price that may have to be paid in terms of modifying economic policies so as to reduce vulnerability.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. T. Reischmann, 'The Fund's conditional assistance and the problem of adjustment, 1973–75', Finance and Development, Dec. 1978, pp. 38–41. Thomas states that "of the 21 programs under review, only seven are considered successful, and even then only with some qualifications." The criteria related to balance of payments, economic growth and inflation, which generally worsened on full implementation of the IMF programmes.


3. UNCTAD, Major issues arising from the transfer of technology to developing countries (Geneva, 1974) (TD/B/AC.11/10/Rev 1).


7. Other reasons include: to disguise profit information from competitors or the workforce, to compensate losses of other subsidiaries, to finance invest-


9. See below.


PART THREE

PRIORITIES AND THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN THE SADCC MEMBER STATES

Section A

Social Sciences
CHAPTER 8


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Introduction

This paper considers the way to approach and establish research priorities in a neo-colonial economy with the aim of enhancing a dynamic and a self-sustaining economy. For this reason, the essence and role of research may be analysed and correctly understood if one takes as a point of departure the nature of the economic structure of a society and its inherent objective laws of development.

The identification of the laws of development will ultimately provide us with strategies for development to suit the economic, social and political circumstances of different countries or groups of people. Such strategies should consistently fight for economic, political, social and cultural liberation from the capitalist system of domination and exploitation. This is imperative if both equality and freedom in their wider dimensions are to be gained and retained within a national economy.

The above approach sees development as a process of liberation, pursued and conceived not in narrow economic terms, but in broader terms. That is, it is seen as a process of change that affects not only the economic structure of a society but also its cultural, social and political life (Aziz, 1981). Research should thus enhance understanding of this broader approach to development and investigate ways and means of promoting it.

The national environment approach

The devising and implementation of development strategies are the responsibility of national economies, of course. These need to be supplemented by an international approach, which will be discussed later, if success is to be achieved.

The national approach necessarily calls for effecting structural changes within the national economy. It needs to be recalled that the spread of capitalist relations of production to the world as a whole, in different forms, also implies the spread of the corresponding ideas, ideology, culture, education etc. This is, at one and the same time, a factor in the domination of the mode of capitalist
production and in its perpetuation. The economic dependence of the underdeveloped countries on the capitalist countries means that the national economy is made to serve the interests of capital and not those of the masses in the exploited countries. If the underdeveloped countries are striving to achieve meaningful development, which is man-centred, structural changes are a precondition. To talk about ending poverty, diseases and hunger in the underdeveloped countries without these changes becomes utopian.

But in order to conceive the need for the changes it is also inevitable to have an appropriate ideological orientation and clarity. Bourgeois ideology supported by bourgeois economic theories for income distribution and employment accompanied by econometric models have failed to solve the social, economic and political problems of the underdeveloped countries. Instead, they have perpetuated both misery and domination. The poor who have no access to assets and no resources to invest therefore remain poor or become relatively poorer. The bourgeois ideology thus becomes an ideology of obscuring the realities of what is happening in the underdeveloped countries.

On the other hand we have the socialist ideology which aims at exposing the manipulations and tactics used by the capitalist countries in exploiting the masses of the poor countries and devising ways and means for liberating the exploited. Unless the development process in the latter countries is guided by the ideology of liberation (socialism) we cannot expect structural changes to occur. At least we can expect the perpetuation of capitalist exploitation in alliance with the national bourgeois.

The purpose of research should thus be that of charting out priorities which are in conformity with a country's desire for national independence, of satisfying the basic needs of its peoples and of establishing international cooperation based on mutual interests.

The definition of a national research policy which is in line with the true economic development of each country also enables a just solution to be found for a number of very important social and political problems (Yachir, 1980).

Research policy objectives

The preceding section discussed the premises, the need, and the framework for establishing research priorities. This section discusses research policy and the institutions for carrying out the policy.

The research policy at institutional levels should aim at achieving the following objectives:

(a) research tasks should be an integral component of the country's wider research programme in the field of economic analysis.

(b) research should be problem-oriented and should try to reconcile the doers' and the users' needs and points of view. In other words research
should not disregard the practical applications of its results and should be inspired by implementation needs.

c) to facilitate the task of a choice and priority order of research targets, research planning should be integrated or coordinated with the country’s general development planning.

d) research in a country should put stress on the improvement of the ability to accelerate overall economic and social development, without resorting to a reduction in real wages especially at the lower end of the income distribution.

The above objectives tend to focus on the need to have a ‘system’ approach to research, i.e. interrelated research projects concerned with problems of the functioning and development of the national economy and aimed at the identification of the barriers to growth, restraining an ability to accelerate overall development (Jedruszeck, 1978).

An underdeveloped economy research activity faces two critical problems: one, that of lack of adequate data and research information; and two, the resistance by doers to the application of research findings. Perhaps a third problem could be that of lack of skilled manpower to undertake research projects. Despite these problems, the focus of research should be developmental, and should also try to overcome these problems through education and training and politicisation.

The implementation of research policy requires an adequate and conducive environment for the designing, carrying out and analysis of research projects. Central to this environment is the establishment of research institutions. These institutions should be manned by people of the required skills and with proper ideological and educational backgrounds. In our epoch, research and research institutions, as part of the whole educational system, are dominated by and are instruments of imperialism. Transnational corporations have their hold on African Universities, on the training of research cadres, on research grants and on the building and maintenance of research institutions (Gwassa, 1978). These institutions should be revolutionized so as to cater for the specific economic and political needs of the underdeveloped countries.

Unless the character and the content of these institutions change, they will be nothing more than capitalist institutions transplanted in the third world. The changes should thus aim at the creation of genuine third world institutions addressed to the problems of development arising from the objective conditions of these countries.

The need for planning and coordination of research projects among the institutions and within sectors cannot be overemphasised. No meaningful results can be expected from research projects which are left to chance. Planning and coordination are thus essential in the rationalisation of institutional activities and in ensuring efficient and symmetrical relationships between micro-macro economic development on the one hand and efficient coordination of sectoral activities on the other.

The planning system should be as flexible as possible so as to make it vulnerable to self-appraisal, taking stock of successes and failures of past actions as
a guide to future actions in terms of strategies and tactics. It is only through planning and coordination that duplication of effort and wastage of resources can be avoided. But these principles should embrace and guide all the activities in the national economy.

Some areas of research priority

Colonialism and neo-colonialism, a system of exploitation, failed to develop productive forces both in industry and agriculture, so that productivity in these sectors is still very low. As a matter of urgency these sectors are of priority as far as research is concerned.

In the underdeveloped countries, industry (manufacturing) is very marginally developed, accounting for less than 15 per cent of GDP. At the same time the sector suffers from a lack of both mass consumption and producer goods industries. This makes the sector weak and very much dependent on capitalist countries for raw materials, spare parts and machinery and equipment. The new industries which exist in these countries produce luxury consumption goods, and are concentrated, in terms of location, in urban areas, consequently leading to differentiation between rural and urban areas. The latter areas have better social facilities than the former.

The implication of the above industrial strategy, which is of a neo-colonial nature, has been that the fruits of industrialisation have become a prerogative of the ruling class and of international capital. The masses of people do not have free access to them. Research should aim at identification and rectification of this asymmetry: first by establishing the necessity and importance of having a balanced industrial strategy, a strategy which is geared towards meeting local needs; second by promoting diversified and dispersed industries which can be found both in rural and urban areas; and third by promoting utilisation of local inputs: human and material resources.

Agriculture in many underdeveloped economies is an occupation which accommodates the majority of the populace. In Tanzania, 85 per cent of the population depend on this sector. Paradoxically, it is very much underdeveloped as far as the level of productive forces is concerned, implying that productivity is very low. It also implies that the standard of living in rural areas is very low. The mere fact that for a long time this sector has been neglected means that it should be a priority area for research. Research should aim at increasing productivity of the sector so as to raise the overall standard of living of the people.

The efforts to raise productivity should focus on the export and food sectors. An increase in exports means more foreign exchange for purchase of inputs to both industry and agriculture. But it is meaningless to promote export crops without simultaneously increasing the production of food. A country can easily undermine its development strategy and independence if it cannot feed itself. Apart from increasing output of food and of cash crops, it is equally necessary to produce enough for use as inputs to the industries.
Productivity promotion in the above two sectors requires the improvement and establishment of the necessary infrastructure: communication systems, storage, credit facilities, marketing and distribution systems, incentive systems, electricity etc. These should be developed adequately if the results of the increased productivity are to be realised.

We have deliberately emphasised the issue of productivity because growth in labour productivity is a vital factor in economic and social progress. The productivity of labour and, in particular, the rate of increase in this is a good criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of production and management methods and of the economic levers affecting production (Abalkin, 1973).

The international environment approach

The more far reaching the national effort toward development, the more constrained it is by the present international linkages in trade and technology, communications and culture, money and finance (IFDA, 1980). Research into these areas must identify and explore ways and means to convince the developed countries, either by dialogue or by force, to reorient their policies in favour of a cooperative system supporting genuine local and national development both in the South and in the North.

In the context of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), the achievement of a mutually beneficial economic system demands improvements in four major areas:

(a) larger flows of resources through mechanisms that are automatic and free from year to year of fluctuations and political influence;
(b) changes in the world marketing system to ensure the underdeveloped countries have a reasonable share of increased international liquidity;
(c) a growing share for underdeveloped countries of world trade in agricultural and manufactured products;
(d) careful adaptation of science and technology to the needs of the underdeveloped countries and their new priorities in favour of self-reliant and grassroot approaches to development.

The above improvements will not take place, however, without democratisation of the international institutions entrusted with the flow of external resources. This will require amending the articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in accordance with the needs of the South and so ensuring the effective and equitable participation of the South in the decision-making process.

The whole issue of the flow of resources from North to South in the form of aid demands a new approach. Aid, an arm of foreign policy, tends to tie the economy more closely into the system of the donor and given the fact that three-quarters of all aid, bilateral and multilateral, comes from the capitalist countries, aid acquires a capitalist character. Because of this character, aid has facilitated a continuing and growing presence in the underdeveloped countries of the old colonial powers and this acts as a lubricant for neocolonialism (Arnold, 1979).
On appraisal of the effect of aid on a country's economy, we contend that this obscures the realities of the problems of the recipient. Its approach is survival rather than development, which is evident from the fashions of aid: rural poor, human rights, urban poverty, etc.

As far as the international environment is concerned, research and research institutes should strive to identify areas of weakness and strength of the Group of 77 and try to enhance its bargaining power. Again research should pave the way as to how the improvements in the international system could be approached and how to go about achieving them. Moreover, research should also aim at making aid more effective through securing more aid from the socialist countries.

**The regional environment approach**

The effects of colonialism and neo-colonialism were those of promoting cooperation between the colonies and neo-colonies and the capitalist countries, while at the same time, promoting less cooperation among the former two categories. The regional approach thus aims at exploring, fostering and encouraging more cooperation among the underdeveloped countries.

This approach becomes even more appropriate and urgent given the stubbornness of the developed countries towards the concept of NIEO. The demands for NIEO have received a lot of resistance from the developed countries. This was expected since the demands do challenge the existing structures which have guaranteed global economic domination by the rich and so long as this domination is a factor of the world capitalist system, any attempt to undermine it would face strong opposition from the North.

Voices of resistance have already been heard from the North. The USA has shown resistance to any formula which seems even remotely to threaten its privileged position, dominating such nerve centres of financial power as the IMF and the World Bank (Peiris, 1980). The North as a group sees the proposals of the Group of 77 as unrealistic. They argue that the problems facing the South are not structural, and could be solved by appropriate development strategies. But these strategies are nothing more but empty slogans: “Assault on Poverty”, “Basic Human Needs”, “Human Development”, etc. These snazzy development strategies tend to dilute the content of NIEO and to frustrate the initiatives and the struggles of the poor.

If the North-South dialogue is stuck, what then are the options available to the South? The obvious answer is the unity of the South. Of course, this should go hand in hand with the South demonstrating that the existing economic order will no longer be tolerated. The unity of the South should fight to achieve two important goals: one, a new international economic order through collective bargaining power; and two, exploiting more fully the links that exist between the economies of the underdeveloped countries (Editorial, *South*, 1981).

It must be admitted that the underdeveloped countries are not homogeneous. They vary in their social and economic organisation and their political regimes. Some are socialist, some are laying the foundation for socialism, while
others are dominated by the capitalist mode. The implication of this diversity is that the strategies for development are equally diversified. The ultimate consequence is that the concept of consensus in some instances means an empty shell. However, the effectiveness of unity in conditioning and in speeding up the liberation of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe are experiences which are still fresh in our minds, a demonstration of the power of unity.

On the issue of economic cooperation among the South in complementing each other’s resources, a real option is open to the South. There are sectors which will benefit substantially from such moves. The Southern African states have realised the importance of this approach through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). More countries should be encouraged to pool their resources.

Within the context of the regional approach therefore, research should focus on how to strengthen and enforce unity within the South and on how to bridge the divisions existing between them. Research should also identify the premises for setting up economic cooperation which is mutually beneficial to the participating countries. But, to start with, research has to identify the sectors which could be developed and promoted through economic cooperation. It is only through this approach that a coherent mechanism for planning and implementing regional projects can be realised.

Conclusion

In this paper we analysed the way to approach and to set research priorities for a country seeking for national liberation—economic, political and cultural—from the world’s capitalist system. The analysis has been general and the suggestions have also been broad to allow for the setting of specific research programmes and actions which are in line with the specific social, political and cultural environment found in different countries. However, in order for research to contribute significantly to development, structural changes have to be injected into the colonial and neo-colonial economies.

We did emphasise the need for an all around approach to research; an approach covering national, international and regional environments. It is imperative that this approach also be simultaneous, that is, each of these environments should be analysed in relation to each other. This is necessary in identification of the factors which constrain or promote development of the national economy within the global economy.

We further emphasised the need for both planning and coordination of research projects in order to rationalise, develop and improve the productive forces in all sectors of the economy. We also contend that the same mechanism of planning and coordination is necessary for enhancing more cooperation within the underdeveloped countries.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

CHAPTER 9

Social Science as a Factor in National Development: Major Issues and Prospects in Southern Africa

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Introduction

An examination of the way in which colonial relations have influenced the post-colonial period in Africa presents the social scientist and indeed the historian with a number of pertinent problems of definition, of method and of interpretation. In the specific circumstances of Southern Africa the problems are seriously compounded by the dominating position of apartheid-South Africa.

Admittedly, the forces of colonial domination and exploitation were by no means unified and as a matter of fact, capable of acting in concert. In spite of this observed colonial diversity, there is a common element in the morbid realities of Africa. The phenomenon was recently described in the following words:

For all its vast natural resources and the praiseworthy efforts of its government and people, Africa, in particular, is unable to point to any significant growth rate or satisfactory index of general well-being. The problem of under-employment and unemployment is more and more serious. The use of resources is well below its potential. The state of Intra-African cooperation is a far cry from the decisions and hopes that were clearly enunciated by the higher authorities of the countries concerned. (Report of the Secretary General on Development and Economic Integration in Africa, OAU Document CM/Declaration I (XXXIII), Monrovia July 1979).

Colonialism in Africa, and indeed elsewhere, was pervasive and brought about the remoulding of the totality of society: institutions, political life, the economy, education and culture, collective behaviour, etc. The principal objective of the colonial remoulding of society was to condition the domestic production forces in such a manner that they satisfied the sociopolitical, military and economic needs of the metropole. By the same token, any effective decolonization process should aim to remould the post-colonial society so as to domesticate its production forces and hence the dynamics of development.

This brief paper focuses on the problem of development in the context of Southern Africa, the nature of social science knowledge and the relationship between such social science knowledge and development in the subregion. The analysis will conclude with some policy implications at both national and subregional levels.
Problems of development

In recent years, knowledge about what the colonial past represented for the newly independent states in Africa has fundamentally changed our understanding of development. The economic growth strategies of the 1950s and 1960s, which aimed at substituting domestic production for imports and the all-out export industries, have gradually yielded ground to more balanced conceptions of development. It is now accepted that the test for development cannot solely be the rate of annual increase in the economic output of a society, but rather than the test should be how well the particular society uses its available resources (both human and natural) to improve the living conditions of all its members. The most critical task is how to define a development path which will be materially operational with respect to the basic needs and aspirations of the deprived majority of the populace.

A radical shift in conceptualization of the development problem will invariably necessitate a corresponding institutional framework and policy measures, which will lead to the domestication of the structures and process of development. Such a transforming process will help to eliminate the dichotomy of the so-called traditional and modern sectors at the national level and, by the same token, create a more solid foundation for international cooperation within the Southern African sub-region. The domestication process will enhance the creation of domestically based technology and thus the generation of changes in the patterns of production, consumption, etc. The crucial challenge in this process is political will and direction.

Conventionally, the definition of the problem of development has tended to be under the heavy hand of an ideology which functions by moulding individuals as particular subjects and placing them in the structure, while at the same time concealing from them their role as agents of the structure (Althusser, 1969). From this position the problem of development was defined to ignore the contradictions of society, the dominant interest of the ruling classes and the ramifications of dependent economies at the international and subregional levels. Our position (which is not a novelty) is that the problem of development in any society unfolds in more complicated terms, and with more varied results than initially understood, during the early years of concerted international assault on the widespread structures and processes of underdevelopment. We now turn to the general issue of scientific knowledge with special reference to the nature of social knowledge.

Nature of social science knowledge

It is generally accepted that both the natural sciences and the social sciences have played an important role in man's struggle to produce material, as well as social, wealth to meet his expanding needs. It appears, however, that social science knowledge tends to be viewed generally as an academic commodity with little or no practical importance in the process of national development. Indeed, social scientists are falsely viewed as radicals and revolutionaries constituting...
a very undesirable and disturbing element in society. Against this background, policy makers see natural science knowledge and technology as the main sources of both material and social wealth.

The position taken in this paper is that social facts (which include science and technology) are artificial and essentially conservative products of the status quo, designed and arranged precisely to convince the observer of their legitimacy. For instance, the apoliticism of the mass of the population in most African societies makes the activities of the state appear not as concrete political decisions between alternative courses of action but as technical solutions to agreed problems. The increased role of natural science and technology in modern society has also intensified the belief that the processes of development are singularly determined by the impersonal forces of science rather than also by the political and economic decisions of men. It is against this background that Lord Blackett wrote on economic development.

Unless the political and social structure of the country is such as to put economic growth on high priority, neither education, nor management skills, nor capital, nor science and technology, nor all together, will raise the living standards of the mass of the population. (Blackett, 1969 : 14).

In essence, bourgeois social science knowledge which dominates research, teaching and policy decisions within the Southern African subregion is ideological in the sense that it aims to justify the status quo and to reconcile people to the working of capitalism. Therefore the first task of social science knowledge is to penetrate and expose such social deceptions and give new insights into the dynamics of societal transformation: the class nature of the particular societies; the exploitable mechanisms; the basic problems of development, and identifying their causes – isolating factors that can be controlled in order to satisfy the material and social needs of the society as a whole. The complexity of the dynamics of social change calls for more than simple innovation in the natural sciences and technology. After all, if science and technology directly affect the living conditions of human beings, it is imperative that they respond to the needs of a given society. It is in this context that social science knowledge becomes a crucial factor.

Basically, this brief paper purports to provoke thoughts on the integrative and instrumental aspects of knowledge (natural science and social science knowledge). The two groups of sciences are seen as necessary complements, deserving equal attention from policy makers.

From the theoretical point of view, social science knowledge cannot consist of neutral, objective propositions about the structures and processes of society. The role of the social scientist should therefore transcend the fatalistic stance of Max Weber whose sole interest was for the social scientist to apply a method which is value-free; the social scientist must be a chronicler and analyst but not a revolutionary (Weber, 1949). In this sense, the collection of data becomes the end-goal of scientific activity and the emphasis falls on the interpretation, and not on the changing, of the world. This stance denies ‘science’ the critical and important function of striving to integrate theory and practice. This position sadly
ignores the simple fact that all knowledge springs from the economic, political, ideological and philosophical structure of society. Science is itself thus an aspect of knowledge which is socially determined.

**Relationship between social science knowledge and development**

Much of the modern world has been decisively shaped by scientific knowledge which, has, in turn, been fashioned by the requirements and constraints of society. Such scientific knowledge has not been an exogenous agent, acting one-dimensionally upon a society and transforming it.

In the specific neocolonialist setting of Southern Africa, we must proceed from the basic assumption that capitalism has had some unique achievements to its credit – culturally and materially – through its release of individual creativity and organised operations in production. As the Communist Manifesto puts it:

> The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of society”.

Characteristically, the Southern African states lack not only scientific knowledge (natural and social) and technological expertise but more seriously the personnel and institutions for generating such scientific knowledge. It is, however, becoming more and more clear that the lack of scientific and technological knowledge is in a way less critical compared with the socio-political and economic structure which bears the heavy hands of colonial and imperialist exploitation in the subregion. The situation is compounded by the many domestic contradictions and constraints associated with perverse capitalist development. Thus the effectiveness of scientific knowledge in the sense of its generation and application is circumscribed by external and internal factors.

The challenge for social scientists in the subregion is to focus on the nature of capitalist exchange processes and the circulation of commodities within the national economies. The approach must of necessity have class perspective in order to understand the individualistic focus of capitalist development which is essentially delusory. The social scientist is himself part of this delusion. But the vast amounts of scarce resources invested by society in his training and education give to him a special privilege and duty to emancipate himself from the bourgeois delusion and go beyond the interpretation of the world in various ways and face the real task of changing the world.

Individually and collectively, social scientists in the subregion should direct their activities (teaching and research) towards problem-and policy-oriented goals which will “revolutionalize the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with the whole relations of society”. In other words, the knowledge that is generated by the social scientist must be closely linked to the solution of the practical social, political and economic problems of society. As students and teachers of social science, we must say with Yang Cheng-Fang:

> We do not study social science for its own sake. On the contrary, we are studying social science for the expressed purpose of making the world a better place to live in. (Y. Cheng-Fang, 1980 : 567).
In the concerted effort of relating theory to practice, it must be noted that the integrative aspect of scientific development has been generally characterised by two distinct but interrelated processes: specialization and diversification on the one hand and integration on the other hand. This integrative tendency stems from the synthetic reflex of man's relationship to nature and his fellow man (Riveron, 1979). The very nature of the organisation of natural science and technological knowledge forms a kind of social activity which, in turn, can be viewed as a productive force. Within the general system of division of labour, scientific knowledge generates technical and organisational relations and performs a social function linked with the production of material and social wealth. In this sense, an understanding of the fundamentals of the social sciences by the natural scientist and indeed by the technician becomes a compelling necessity. As the McLuhanite *obiter dictum* cautions, "anyone who thinks that technology and science are neutral is a numbskull idiot".

It is important to reiterate that natural science knowledge and technical knowledge can only acquire concrete meaning within the context of a historical social system. In other words, for any accumulated technical and scientific knowledge to be turned into a direct productive force in a given society, it is absolutely crucial that a corresponding new knowledge about the social relations has been created and generally accepted. History abounds with examples in which technical and scientific innovations have been realised only because social science knowledge paved the way for the sensitization of the populace to the new dynamics. Thus, no amount of foreign capital and aid, of technological transfer, of technical assistance, etc. will result in any lasting societal development until corresponding incentive mechanisms and consciousness have been established through social activities.

It is against this background, that one would like to see a coordinating social science institutional framework within the SADCC by way of making teaching and research relevant to the developmental issues of individual countries and of the subregion as a whole. Such an institutional framework should be for the generation and dissemination of social science knowledge.

Associated with the task of disseminating knowledge is the hegemonic role of the intellectual vis-à-vis the class nature of the state with its bureaucracy. In this relationship (which is characterized by suspicion and, at times, open animosity), the policy maker dictates the rules of the game and also acts as the arbiter. We are of the opinion that the policy maker needs the social scientist as much as the social scientist needs the policy maker. The real challenge is for both to find a meaningful relationship which enhances their effectiveness in society.

Rethinking policies and positions

The most pertinent question that poses itself is: in order to integrate theory and practice in the acquisition and application of social science knowledge what should the social scientist do? On his part, the social scientist must proceed from actual conditions and particularities (without condoning them) in the course of
studying them to resolve them. This is the only criterion for testing the tenets of any science. It defines the correct relationship between theory and practice and, in turn, helps people to emancipate their minds (Y. Cheng-Fang, 1980: 568).

By the same token, the hegemony of the intellectual must be replaced with a vigorous interaction between himself and not only the policy maker but more importantly the masses. This will foster a genuine dialogical and participatory approach to thinking about the issues of social transformation. One must not forget to observe the following caution:

We were learning ourselves however slowly. You came with your science that you developed with your money and power, and its dazzling light blinded us. Can you throw the light not on our face but on the road so that we can see it better and walk ourselves, holding your hand occasionally. (Rahman, 1979: 197).

It must be emphasized that the crucial task of social science teaching and research is to focus on consciousness-raising which implies an appropriate change in the nature of class struggle. A. Rahman has in this context forcefully argued that:

The domination of the masses by the élite may not be ended until the masses own not only the means of production but also the means of thinking. The gap between those who have the social power over thinking—a very important form of capital—and those who have not, has reached dimensions no less formidable than the gap in access to economic assets (Rahman, 1979: 197).

The demand we are making of the social scientist is that his teaching and research should focus on the elevation of “consciousness to a higher level of awareness of structural and contextual dimensions” (Himmelstrand, 1980: 323). People deserve to be given their own voices.

The complementary nature of the activities of the social scientist (indeed any scientist) and of the policy maker makes it imperative for the latter not only to tolerate the former’s research results but more especially to involve his expertise in the decision making process. There is no convincing basis for the age-old dichotomy academics/policy makers, theoretical men/practical men. As a matter of fact, this is one aspect of the legacy of colonial and imperialist exploitation. The division has served to intensify the dependency of our societies whilst fostering the interest of few local élites and their external mentors.

As a point of departure, policy makers have the duty to create and support basic institutions for the generation and dissemination of social science data which will form the basis of enlightened decisions. Such institutions should enable both parties (intellectuals of various disciplines and policy makers) to determine research priorities within the context of national and subregional development. At the subregional level one may recommend the establishment of a Social Science Policy Committee (SSPC) within the framework of SADCC. The composition of this committee should encompass individuals (researchers/academics and policy makers) of high standing in their fields. The Committee should focus on such issues as:
(a) consolidation of existing social science data and generation of new knowledge;
(b) development of teaching material relevant to the subregion;
(c) establishment of a roster of social scientists with the sole purpose of making use of such people as consultants and thus reducing the undesirable dependence on foreign consultants; and
(d) publication of a Southern African Social Science Journal
Success in these fields will greatly facilitate the role of social science knowledge in the processes of both national and subregional transformation.

Conclusion

In the present world where societal and individual needs are collective in nature and form, any attempt to define the role of science as an abstract and value-free entity will certainly lead to ideological hypocrisy. History teaches that even the methodology adopted by the advanced sciences during the Industrial Revolution was a by-product of the Weltanschaung of the ascendant bourgeoisie (Mannheim, 1936: 165-9). The single task is therefore to recognise the instrumental role of science and especially social science whose focus of analysis is the interface between man and his environment as well as between him and his fellow men. The results of social science research and teaching should be linked directly to the solution of practical sociopolitical and economic problems of the Southern African subregion.

From the theoretical perspective, therefore, the task is to disentangle complex practical problems of societies in Southern Africa (and by the same token problems of real human beings), offering an analytical framework which fosters effective transformation of structures and processes to render these societies better places to live. From the practical point of view, existing data of the real world has its own compulsion which can be made to enrich theoretical concepts and frames of reference when rightly understood and applied.

The logical implication is that there is an urgent need for practical men to improve their capability to cope with difficult issues of society by enlisting the cooperation and expertise of those with theoretical knowledge. Similarly, theoretical men should have open ears for those people in charge of practical problems and also make their knowledge relevant to such practical problems. Any attempt to apply theory mechanically without full recognition of the historical moments of time and space is most likely to cause more harm than good. The task of studying the world in order to transform it has always been compounded by all kinds of constraints ranging from military and police repressions to limitations of more or less effective reformist struggle (Himmelstrand, 1980: 244). This phenomenon must itself be the subject-matter of action-oriented social science research.

It was Robert Kennedy who once wrote:
"Our future may lie beyond our vision, but it is not completely beyond our control".
G. Jones, *The Role of Science and Technology in Developing Countries* (London, 1971).
A. Rahman, “A Policy-Oriented Note on the All-India Convention of People’s Science Movement” in K. P. Kannan (ed.), *Towards a People’s Science Movement*, (Kerala, 1979.)
CHAPTER 10

Priority Economic Research Areas for Development in Lesotho

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It will be assumed that it is not necessary to dwell at length on the economic situation of Lesotho. It is, however, necessary to briefly review the more salient facts, and to offer a summary and interpretation of recent trends. These will account for sections one and two that follow. Against this background, in sections three and four possible areas for economic research in Lesotho are suggested. Section three will deal with basically micro economic oriented topics, section four with more macro economic topics. This paper is both tentative, intended to stimulate discussion and thought, and personal. The choice of topics to suggest as priority ones has been the author’s.

1. Basic setting

Lesotho’s history and geography are well known and do not need to be repeated in detail here (see Cobbe, 1981; Lye and Murray, 1980; and references therein). The salient facts are that after developing a prosperous agricultural economy in the 1870s based largely on adoption of the plough and the export of grain to consuming areas elsewhere in Southern Africa, Lesotho became transformed into probably the most extreme labour reserve economy that has independent status. In outline, the story is simple. Much of the best arable land was lost to the Orange Free State; Lesotho was poorly served by the modern transport and marketing arrangements in Southern Africa; the colonial authorities viewed the territory as a labour reserve and did nothing to develop its infrastructure or promote its agricultural or industrial development; and the combination of population growth, land erosion, land shortage, and the uncertainties of rain-fed agriculture in a semi-arid environment quickly led to more and more households becoming dependent on labour migration to South Africa for their very subsistence needs. By the time of the Pim report in the 1930s, already it was estimated that over half the adult males were absent at work in South Africa at any one time.

This process of transformation into a labour-reserve economy was accelerated and accompanied by almost total integration in economic terms into the wider South African economy. The Customs Union (Cobbe, 1981 and references therein) dates from 1910, the monetary integration formalised in the Rand Mo-
netary Area (Collings, 1978) from even earlier. Commerce and finance in Lesotho developed largely on the basis of branches of large South African concerns (e.g. Frasers, Barclays Bank, Standard Bank).

The end result of this process has been a very distorted economic structure in Lesotho, to some extent exacerbated by the large increase in real mine wages in 1972-75. Tables 1, 2 and 3 give some indication of the extent of this structural distortion. In 1979-80, the latest year for which tentative national income accounts estimates have been published, manufacturing and handicrafts accounted for less than 5 per cent of total domestic output. According to World Bank data, in the late 1970s, only four other low-income countries – Angola, Guinea, Gambia, and Uganda – had manufacturing accounting for less than 5 per cent of GDP. Services accounted for about half of domestic output, and the only clearly dynamic sector in recent years is building and construction (largely reflecting foreign aid). As early as 1960, private consumption expenditure alone exceeded Lesotho’s total domestic output; by 1979-80 total expenditure in Lesotho was almost double domestic output.

### TABLE 1

Lesotho: Structure of Production


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1967-68</th>
<th>1972-73</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Handicrafts</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and Water</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and Construction</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and Retail Trade</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communication</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Real Estate, Business Services</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit Services</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Personal Services</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Sector</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Sector</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Sector</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank/UNDP Team, 1981: Table 2, p. 15
### TABLE 2

**Lesotho: Structure of Demand**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1972-73</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Consumption</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Consumption</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Capital Formation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 3

**Lesotho: Summary Extended National Accounts 1979-80**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Millions of Maloti</th>
<th>% of GDP Market Prices</th>
<th>% of GNP Market Prices</th>
<th>% of Total Resources Market Prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Gross Domestic Product), Factor cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor cost</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, Market Prices</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Earnings</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Resources</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded Exports</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded Imports</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Saving</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Capital Formation</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Union Revenue</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary Agreement Revenue</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Revenue</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Government Revenue</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Government Recurrent</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure of which General Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Services of which Agriculture</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Capital Expenditure</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Rounding errors and omission of some minor items imply components of aggregates will not always sum to the aggregate.


These statistics reflect the labour reserve nature of the Lesotho economy. Over 90 per cent of households are rural, and agriculture still provides about a
third of total output, and yet on average even for rural households agriculture is a subsidiary source of income to migrant earnings, and a secondary activity; on average, rural households are reported to derive 80 per cent of income from off-farm sources (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981a: 158).

Although government estimates the potential labour force in 1980 at about 611,000 persons, domestic employment in the formal sector amounts to only around 40,000, at least 25 per cent of whom are employed by government itself (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981a: 75 and 83). In 1981, about 100,000 Basotho were employed on mines, members of the South African Chamber of Mines, with probably roughly 25,000 to 30,000 more in other mines and a further 25,000 to 30,000 in other sectors of the South African economy, (Cobbe, 1981: Table 1; Martiny, 1981; and Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981a: 75 and 77). This implies that about 125,000 males and about 285,000 females are dependent on agriculture and/or informal sector activities within Lesotho for income and employment. Very few of them are able to earn sufficient income from such activities to keep themselves above the poverty line: the poverty datum line in 1980 was estimated at about M1000 per annum for an average household, whereas the average household income for households without access to migrant earnings in 1980 was less than M400. For comparison, average household annual income for households with migrant remittances was estimated at about M1 500 in 1980 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981a: 20).

2. Recent trends

Lesotho’s economy is extraordinarily dependent on forces outside the control of government – notably the weather, the South African government and economy, and the mining employers. Recent trends will be discussed under three heads: Lesotho government policy, development internal to Lesotho and development elsewhere in Southern Africa.

Lesotho government policy

Despite changes in detail and emphasis, it is possible to argue that there has been considerable continuity in Lesotho government development policy since independence in 1966. Rhetorical priority is given to lessening dependence on South Africa; in practice, the major emphasis has been on the development of physical, institutional, and social infrastructure required to permit the emergence of a national economy (as opposed to various fragments integrated into parts of the South African economy). This has been accompanied by an opportunistic willingness to encourage almost any aid-financed or foreign private investment initiative that might generate jobs domestically.

The overall result of government policy is often regarded as disappointing, because critics usually focus on the issue of most concern within the country, namely job creation. Domestic employment has grown only slowly; however, it is dubious whether any alternative policy which accepted the continued insti-
tutional integration into the Southern Africa economy (Customs Union, etc.) could in fact have done any better with respect to employment. In agriculture, results have also been disappointing: here policy may be faulty, but there are formidable difficulties facing agricultural development in Lesotho at present.

In other respects, the Lesotho government’s record in the fifteen years since independence is better than often realised. The most striking success indicator is the increase in investment spending (see Table 3). In real terms, gross capital formation increased more than five times between 1967–68 and 1979–80, going from barely 10 per cent of GDP to around 30 per cent of a GDP that had doubled in real terms. Much of this has gone into construction, reflecting real progress in laying the foundations for the physical infrastructure needs of the country. Similarly, expenditure on education has been consistently very high, and much has been done in terms of institutional development and strengthening the administrative machinery. Although the efficiency of the education system, new institutions, the government administrative machinery, and some investment projects can all be questioned, there can be no doubt that progress has been made.

Agriculture, however, is a somewhat different story. The record of development efforts and their relative failure is described well elsewhere (e.g. Huisman and Sterkenburg, 1981). It is likely that the major problem is that under present circumstances the returns from farming activities for the vast majority of rural households are derisory compared to the returns from migration (Cobbe, 1982). A possible response in part to this, and also to continuing (and often ill-informed) criticism of the land tenure system from outside observers, has been the 1979 Land Act. When fully implemented, this Act will apparently freeze existing usufructuary rights, provide for a form of primogeniture (preventing further fragmentation of land holding), and permit easier and more secure transfers of use rights in return for cash or kind payments. This may permit consolidation of holdings thereby making it possible for some households to earn an adequate living from farming, thus promoting greater attention to best-practice farming techniques and higher agricultural productivity; it is certain, however, to increase the number of households with no access to land.

Internal developments

A number of developments within Lesotho, not wholly or directly attributable to government policy, are noteworthy. The first is demographic. Population continues to grow at a fairly rapid rate, estimated at 2.3 per cent per annum on the basis of the 1976 census (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981a: 3). In addition, the population distribution within the country is changing rapidly. Maseru and its surrounding areas, and the other lowland towns, are gaining population (from a very low base) extremely rapidly. At the same time, the rural population is changing its distribution, with the mountains losing population.

The second development concerns the growth of education, and hence the educational standard of the labour force, which has been more permitted by government rather than a result of deliberate policy. As Table 4 shows, although
total primary school enrolment has grown relatively slowly, the growth of numbers at the University, in secondary schools, passing the primary school leaving exam, and completing the full primary course have all grown explosively since independence – by factors of four, five, or more in twelve or thirteen years. This has implications both for the quality of the education system – the pass rate at COSC has fallen from around 70 per cent at independence to under 30 per cent in 1977, 1978 and 1979 and under 25 per cent in 1981 – and for the labour market. Well over 12 000 young persons a year now pass the primary school leaving examination, whereas the rate of job creation in the domestic formal sector rarely reaches 2 000 in a good year. This interacts with external forces (see next section) to create a potentially very dangerous prospect of rapidly growing youth unemployment.

**TABLE 4**

**Lesotho: Education Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Output</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th></th>
<th>1972</th>
<th></th>
<th>1979</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>as % of 1</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>as % of 1</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>as % of 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>6. Passes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>as % of 1</td>
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The third internal development is the presumed rapid growth of the informal sector of the economy. Unfortunately, there is extremely little reliable data on what has elsewhere been called the “unenumerated sector”. However, it is evident that Basotho-operated enterprises in some sectors, notably transport, retail trade, and catering have proliferated rapidly and many appear to be flourishing. An indirect indication for the transport sector, for example, is given by vehicle registration statistics.

In the two years from 1976 to 1978, the numbers of privately registered kombies (almost invariably used as taxis) in the country increased 49 per cent; privately registered vans (LDV’s, bakkies) over 28 per cent; privately registered trucks 48 per cent; and privately registered buses 31 per cent. Since almost all of these vehicles must have been used commercially, either formally or infor-
mally, these substantial growth rates indicate fairly rapid growth in the transport and commerce sectors in those years (derived from Kingdom of Lesotho, 1979: Tables E. 1-1 and E. 1-2, 54–55, and Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980: Table E. 1, 91). However, it is interesting to note that there may have been over-investment in those two years, the first two after the full effect of the increase in real mine wages were felt. In 1979, the number of privately registered combies actually fell by 16 per cent, while the numbers of vans, trucks, and buses were unchanged or fell very slightly (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981b: Tables F. 1, 2, 3, 127–129, in conjunction with above sources). Hence it is possible, that at least in the transport sector, growth has been very uneven and faltering, spurts of rapid growth being followed by virtual stagnation. There is no reliable evidence of time trends in the informal sector as a whole.

**External forces**

The most important external influence on Lesotho’s economy is the South African economy, particularly demand for Basotho labour. Significant changes have taken place in the demand from the South African Chamber of Mines for Basotho labour in recent years. For reasons connected with growing mechanisation on the mines (and therefore greater skills in the Black labour force, and hence, a desired greater continuity of employment), the perceived unreliability of migrant labour supplies from other supplying countries (notably Malawi and Mozambique), the Black unemployment crisis within South Africa, and South African government policies, the mines have changed their policies as they affect Lesotho in the following ways:

(a) real wages grew greatly between 1972 and 1975; since then increases have been very slow, but some greater skill differentials have been introduced;

(b) by bonuses for quick return, and frequently only accepting workers with valid re-engagement certificates, the mines have successfully attempted to professionalise migrant mine work. In the words of a TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa, formerly MLO/WENELA) official, miners “used to live at home and visit the mines; now they live at the mines and visit their homes” (Martiny, 1981);

(c) total mine demand for Basotho workers, having grown in the 1970s as numbers from Malawi and Mozambique fell, appears to have stabilised at about 100 000 on Chamber of Mines (TEBA) mines, 25 000 on other mines. It is considered likely to fall in future by many observers (Cobbe, 1981 and references therein).

These policies have changed the impact of the migrant labour system quite markedly. In 1981, of those entering new contracts with TEBA, 70 per cent have valid reengagement certificates, 25 per cent have previous work experience on the mines, and only 5 per cent are novices. It is reported that none of the other recruitment agencies in Lesotho are accepting any novices (Martiny, 1981). The average length of contract for Basotho has been extended from nine months in 1976 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981a: 81) to seventeen months in 1981 (Martiny, 1981). The implication is that currently only about 3 500 novices a year from
Lesotho can expect to find employment as migrant workers. If total demand for Basotho mine workers does start to fall – and some observers suggest it will, at about 3 to 5 per cent per annum in the 1980s (Eckert and Wykstra, 1979) – or more returned migrants exercise their reengagement certificates, even this small number of opportunities to join the migrant labour force will disappear. The implication is that for the future, Lesotho cannot count on new entrants to the labour force being able to join the formalised migrant labour system, which means that somehow they must earn a living within Lesotho. The only qualification to this statement is that those with skills in short supply in South Africa, or desperate enough to take the least desirable jobs (e.g. domestic service – micro surveys and the census consistently show around 3 to 10 per cent of the female labour force absent in South Africa, mostly in domestic service, most presumably illegal by South African law) will continue to be able to work in South Africa at some personal risk.

The other side to this change has been the increase in real earnings of mineworkers. In late 1981, underground workers’ average pay was M250 per month, and surface workers’ average pay was M170 per month (Martiny, 1981). By Lesotho standards, this is more than sufficient to maintain a household above the Poverty Datum Line, estimated at over M1 000 per year in 1980 for an average household (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981: 20) – perhaps M1 200 in 1982. The question then becomes how the incomes of migrants are used, and what opportunities exist for channelling them into productive investment within Lesotho.

3. Microeconomic topics for research

The division into micro and macro is going to be rough and not fully in accord with standard economic practice. Under micro, there are a host of possible topics, but the ones singled out for attention all fall under the two general headings foreshadowed above, although in several cases there is overlap. These are income-generating activities, especially for new entrants to the labour force, and the harnessing of migrant earnings for development purposes.

Income generation

Frequently, discussion in Lesotho focuses on employment-creation and the problem of youth unemployment in particular. This is probably misleading. Available data suggest that in 1980, of a total potential labour force of 611 000, only 40 000 (about 6.5 per cent) had formal employment within the country (compared to about 25 per cent working in South Africa). Formal employment is largely an urban phenomenon. The labour force is growing at about 15 000 persons net a year. But this is also misleading; census age data are unreliable, but it appears that the numbers of persons reaching age 15 in each year 1980 to 1985 will average over 29 000 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981b: 20). Few of the 14 000 a year arbitrarily regarded as leaving the labour force will actually be retiring from jobs – at most, perhaps 1 000 of them. Thus in fact there will be around
29,000 young people a year entering the labour force, of whom not more than 6,000 to 7,000 can realistically expect to get either a formal sector wage job in Lesotho or employment as a novice mineworker in South Africa. In other words, if present trends continue, some 22,000 young people a year will enter the labour force without the expectation of a job. It is obviously inconceivable that the formal sector within Lesotho could absorb them all: it would imply employment growth of over 50 per cent a year initially, whereas actual growth of employment seems to have been not more than 8 per cent a year in the late 70s (ILO, 1979).

This does not mean that employment creation does not deserve attention; of course it does. But the majority of new entrants to the labour force for at least the next few years will not get ‘jobs’ as usually understood, i.e. regular employment for wages. Rather they will have to provide for themselves in other ways by self-employment, by casual work, or as family workers. Preferably, most of them will do this in rural areas, since if they all move to towns the rate of urbanisation will be very fast and this has serious cost implications with respect to urban infrastructure.

However, the fact must be faced that at this time very little is known about the rural economy of Lesotho and its ability to provide income for people. It is known that standard agricultural practices for households with average assets generate a very meagre income, well below the Poverty Datum Line. It is known that increasing numbers of households have, and will have, no access to fields. We also know that there is a good deal of farm-related (vegetables, poultry, pigs, food processing) and non-farm activity (beer brewing and sale, construction, firewood collection, sewing, knitting, tailoring, handicrafts, trade and transport) that goes on in rural areas for which little reliable data exists. For example, for lack of data, the National Income accounts omit estimates of production of fresh vegetables and crops other than maize, wheat, peas, beans, sorghum, and fruit (World Bank/UNDP Team 1981, A. 7).

A considerable amount of data does exist in the form of surveys conducted by agricultural/rural development projects (e.g. Thaba Bosiu, Thaba Tseka, BASP; and Winch, 1981). However, in most cases the main focus of this data collection was agricultural, and information on non-farm activities, or non-cash income, was either not collected or has not been analysed. A few detailed micro studies exist, (e.g. Gay, 1981), but the data in these sources were generally collected from a social anthropology point of view and are often incomplete from an economics point of view.

In order to investigate how new entrants to the labour force are to be absorbed into rural areas without becoming destitute or dependent on transfers, which seems to be the most urgent task facing Lesotho, the first priority for economic research must be to improve understanding of the rural economy. Information is needed on income in kind as well as income in cash; on all transactions at the village level, whether cash, barter, or exchange of services; and on actual village-level expenditure patterns. There is also a need to identify both current activities engaged in to provide income (other than the well-studied field crop production and major livestock keeping), and possible new ones. It would also seem useful, to study existing activities in depth to discover if profitability could be increased.
Expenditure data are needed because it is at least plausible that some expenditure currently directed to imports might be redirected to rural industries producing import-substitutes. But such possibilities cannot be investigated without detailed knowledge of actual rural expenditure patterns. On a nationwide scale, such data can only be collected by government, and the proposal that the Bureau of Statistics should conduct a National Household Budget and Food Consumption Survey (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981: 97) deserves high priority. Micro surveys of selected areas, especially if they combined the collection of detailed expenditure data with income data, could however give some useful pointers.

There should also be some scope for investigation of possible import substitution industry of an urban kind. This requires detailed examination of disaggregated import data, and comparison with information on industrial structure in Southern Africa. South African Census of Industry data should be compared with Lesotho import data to try to discover products for which Lesotho’s annual imports are of similar volume to the annual output of existing plants in South Africa. Such products can then be candidates for more detailed investigation of the feasibility of import substitution.

Other microeconomic topics that probably warrant research are transport and energy costs, and possible ways to reduce them; ‘appropriate technology’, meaning the most socially profitable way to do things in Lesotho’s environment especially with respect to building and civil engineering construction, the production of wage goods, and agriculture; and investigations of the economic efficiency of the educational system and ways that it might be improved.

Much of this connects with the second major topic suggested above, namely how to mobilize migrant earnings for development purposes. There are basically two issues here. The first concerns the possibilities of diverting more consumption expenditure to domestic production rather than imports, which is largely a question of supply of domestic alternatives given the inability to use fiscal measures because of the Customs Union. The second concerns increasing the proportion of migrant earnings that are devoted to investment rather than consumption.

Migrant earnings can be devoted to investment in two ways. One is via financial intermediation, the other by direct investment by households. A good deal has already been done to encourage migrants to hold savings accounts. However, there is certainly scope for research on the attitudes of migrants towards deferred pay schemes and financial intermediation, and an investigation of what kinds of changes – at what cost – might increase the sums held in savings accounts in Lesotho’s financial institutions. It would also be useful, now that most migrant mine-workers must be regarded as long term career professionals, to investigate attitudes towards, and the feasibility of, a self-financed pension or provident fund scheme for migrants.

With respect to direct self-financed investments by households, this is very largely a question of discovering, publicising, and facilitating activities, other than traditional agricultural ones, that are profitable in Lesotho’s rural areas. Profitable activities are very likely to call forth investment in Lesotho.
4. Macroeconomic topics for research

Under this heading, three possible research areas will be discussed, not all of which are clearly macroeconomic as usually understood, but are grouped here because they all involve questions at the level of the national economy. They are: (a) the influence of South Africa's economy on Lesotho; (b) income distribution issues within Lesotho; and (c) costs of improving basic fuel and food security in Lesotho.

Influence of South Africa

It is clear that Lesotho's economy is strongly influenced by developments in the South African economy. To a lesser extent, the same is true of several other neighbouring countries, notably Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. There are two major kinds of influence. The first is a truly macroeconomic one, the way in which macroeconomic conditions in South Africa influence the economies of its neighbours. An obvious example of such influence is prices and inflation; but there are also less obvious connections through monetary conditions and interest rates; through demand for labour other than mine-workers and effects on wage and salary levels; through tax policy; and through demand for service and commodity exports from the neighbouring countries. The second kind of influence is more micro or sector-specific: influences on neighbouring territories that have their origin in developments in particular sectors or industries in South Africa rather than the general macroeconomic conditions there, e.g. tourism developments within the Republic (see e.g. Crush and Wellings, 1981), construction industry developments affecting wages and supply conditions of particular categories of labour, developments in mining and implications for migrant labour, etc.

A substantial amount of material on the macroeconomics of South Africa is readily available, from the government of South Africa itself, from university and private research bodies in South Africa, from the financial press, and from the publications of financial institutions there. What is somewhat surprising is that, as far as this writer knows, nobody at present tries to collate, summarise and analyse this material in terms of its implications for South Africa's neighbours. Probably this is done to some extent by the appropriate government and banking authorities in the neighbouring countries, but this must involve substantial duplication of effort and the results are not available for public information, comment or discussion.

The resources required to monitor developments in the South African economy and interpret their implications for neighbouring states need not be large. A worthwhile effort could probably be performed by a single professional economist with clerical support and access to university economists and students for assistance of various kinds. It would seem worthwhile to investigate the possibilities of establishing a Unit to monitor South Africa's economy and the implications for the neighbouring countries. Such a Unit could issue, say, a monthly newsletter and occasional in-depth reports on specific topics. Given that the impact in Lesotho is probably bigger than elsewhere, and that
Lesotho is also well-placed to obtain South African materials. Lesotho and specifically ISAS might be a logical location for such a Unit. However, the work of such a Unit should be of interest to the other countries named above as well, and possibly a proposal for such a Unit might attract external funding, at least initially, as for example a regional project under UNDP.

**Income distribution**

The former complacency over Lesotho's income distribution (e.g. Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976; IBRD, 1975) has been replaced by concern over its inequality, the prevalence of poverty, and the probability that conditions will deteriorate (Marres and van der Wiel, 1975; ILO, 1979; Murray, 1980; Cobbe, 1981). Government rhetoric still stresses the desire for social justice and a fair distribution of wealth and income (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1981). There are considerable difficulties facing government in attempts to influence distribution, but some possibilities exist (ILO, 1979). Much scope for useful research on the mechanisms that generate inequality in Lesotho, and the possibilities for modifying them, also exists. Obvious candidates for research include the education system and its finance; the wage and salary structure and fringe benefits; land tenure and livestock holdings; the distribution and financing of government services; and the tax structure.

**Fuel and food security**

Lesotho is dependent on South Africa for almost all its energy requirements, and for a substantial portion of its food consumption. In present circumstances internationally, this must give cause for concern. There are a variety of conceivable ways by which both fuel and food security could be improved, in the short, medium, and long term. For example, there is storage and a range of different storage options; changes in energy mix and usage; changes in the agricultural sector. It would seem to be worthwhile to investigate some of these alternatives with a view to preparing cost estimates of the various policy options available, together with assessments of the degree to which each would reduce the risks involved and the time frames involved.

5. **Envoi**

The above discussion has, as noted initially, been personal, but it is hoped, not overly idiosyncratic. There is very clearly a great deal of useful economic research that can be done in Lesotho. Other individuals would no doubt add some topics and omit others. What the above has lacked is any explicit discussion of the basis on which priorities should be established among research topics. The final paragraphs will very briefly discuss this issue.

If priorities are to be established in a coherent fashion, some fairly explicit
criteria must be agreed upon. The biggest obstacle to this is that establishing criteria can be approached from a wide variety of viewpoints, and it is very unlikely that any of them can be fully detached from individual opinion and judgements. Some of the approaches that might be considered include: what best supports the declared policy of government; what best serves the felt and/or perceived (by whom?) needs of the mass of the population, or the poorest among the population, or the most influential among the population; what best serves the institutional interests of the institutions carrying out the research; what best serves the predilections and interests of the individual researchers carrying out the research.

It is likely in practice that criteria for establishing priorities will to a large extent remain unstated, and reflect a mixture of all the approaches above. All have some valid arguments in favour of their being taken into account: government frequently is the ultimate source or controller of resources for research; the interests of the people of the country, including both those able to wield influence and those most disadvantaged, should not be ignored; if institutions neglect their own interests and development wholly, they may wither and die; and if the interests of individual researchers are consistently overlooked, motivation may be poor and little worthwhile work done.

Nevertheless, it is desirable to try to establish explicit criteria upon which to base decisions about priorities. In a country like Lesotho where so many individuals suffer the acute deprivations of material poverty, and most others are insecure and face the possibility of being reduced to that level, a strong case can be made for relating the criteria to the probability of research improving the material conditions of significant numbers of persons. Judgements by individuals are still required, but attempts to relate judgements to agreed criteria are likely to improve the deliberations preceding decisions.

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CHAPTER 11
Social Accounting Methods and Development Planning with special Reference to Swaziland

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Introduction

Swaziland's developmental objectives include, among others, higher production growth, higher employment rate, more equitable income distribution and higher self-reliance. From rough estimates, it would seem that over the period since independence in 1968 there has been a movement away from, rather than towards, the attainment of these objectives.

For instance, whereas from 1968 to 1973 overall production rose by an annual average rate of 12.0 per cent, it rose by an annual average rate of 7.1 per cent from 1974 to 1978. Current estimates indicate that overall production rose, at best, by an annual average rate of 3 per cent from 1979 to 1980. Thus, growth in economy-wide production has tended to decelerate over the post-independence period. From 1968 to 1978 per capita income in the urban sector grew at an annual average rate of 4.5 per cent whilst in the communally owned component of agriculture, it grew at an annual average rate of 0.2 per cent. To the extent that the communally owned component of agriculture contains over 70 per cent of the total population, sectoral income distribution has tended to become more, rather than less, unequal - notwithstanding the usual conceptual and practical problems surrounding the measurement of per capita income. At the same time, the urban unemployment rate has tended to rise over the post independence period. For instance, it rose from an annual average rate of 29.2 per cent from 1968 to 1973 to 30.8 per cent from 1974 to 1978. This would tend to adversely affect income distribution within the urban sector. Finally, whereas the current account of the balance of payments was in surplus from 1968 to 1975, it was in deficit from 1976 to 1978. This has adverse implications for the attainment of self-reliance.

There are numerous reasons for the economy tending to move away from, rather than towards, the attainment of higher production growth, higher employment rate, more equitable income distribution and higher self-reliance. One of the major reasons is less than adequate planning on the part of the public sector. Left to itself, the economy cannot be expected to move automatically towards the achievement of government social objectives. There has to be the right kind of environment provided by the public sector. Such an environment
can be provided under appropriate central planning. This should be obvious to anyone familiar with the literature on "market failure".

Although central planning in Swaziland has improved over the years since the end of World War II (i.e., when the first development plan was published), it is still largely ad hoc and piecemeal in approach as distinct from being comprehensive and well coordinated. It is the primary intention of this paper to indicate how planning in Swaziland can be improved beyond what it is at the moment. One of the techniques which could be used for improving development planning is referred to in the literature as "social accounting methods". These methods form the focus of this paper. Their application to development planning in Swaziland is considered as a priority area for research.

The rest of this paper is divided into three sections. The following section describes and evaluates the central planning procedure which has been followed in Swaziland since the end of World War II up to today. The third section describes the essence of social accounting methods and how they could improve development planning in Swaziland.

Swaziland’s central planning in historical perspective

Long range central planning in Swaziland can be traced back to the end of World War II when a ten-year development plan covering 1946 to 1956 was formulated by the colonial administration. This plan contained a list of projects (mainly of an infrastructural nature) which were to be financed predominantly by allocations out of the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Fund. However, as a result of a two-thirds reduction in the amount originally expected from this Fund, the plan had to be altered. What emerged was a severely pruned down list of projects which formed the eight-year plan pertaining to the period 1948–1956.

The period from 1956 to 1968 (i.e., the year of independence) had three development plans pertaining to the periods 1956–1960, 1960–1963 and 1963–1966. Each of these plans was essentially a collection of public projects financed from a mixture of sources – chief of which were external grants-in-aid and locally raised taxes.

A sophisticated (and perhaps generous) reading of all the development plans covering the period 1946–1966 indicates some concern by the colonial administration about the issues of production, employment, income distribution and balance of payments. However, this concern was largely of a general qualitative nature. For instance, public spending of an infrastructural nature was expected to raise production growth in both the rural and urban sectors. The increase in production growth was expected to be accompanied by increases in the employment rate and trade surplus. At the same time, public spending on rural development was expected to have a favourable impact not only on sectoral income distribution but also economy-wide production, employment and trade surplus.

The post-independence period has seen the publication of three develop-
ment plans pertaining to the periods 1968–1972, 1973–1977 and 1978–1982. Although these plans represent an improvement over the preindependence plans, they still fall short of comprehensive and integrated treatment of the economy. They are still compiled on the basis of a predominantly piecemeal approach, without any systematic check on internal consistency and without any systematic investigation of the likely quantitative impact of the plan on the whole economy. Furthermore, there is no systematic assessment of alternative policy options available to government.

To give a flavour of the current planning procedure in Swaziland, we shall briefly describe the process leading to the publication of a development plan. We can categorize the procedure into three stages. At the first stage, the planning section of the Department of Economic Planning and Statistics (the Central Planning Office) translates into operational form the major government social objectives. The main sources used for this exercise are cabinet papers and public utterances of senior government officials.

At the second stage, the Central Planning Office requests government ministries and departments to submit projects they intend to embark on over a given period of time, usually five years. In principle, these projects should be fully evaluated by the ministries and departments concerned, so that only those projects found to be socially profitable (in the context of government social objectives) are submitted. It is also at this stage that the Central Planning Office collects data relevant for making public revenue projections. Such data include projections for production and employment in the private sector.

At the third stage, the Central Planning Office scrutinizes the lists of projects submitted by government ministries and departments. This scrutiny is designed to weed out those projects which are of low priority given government developmental objectives, local resources and accessible foreign resources. Those projects which survive this scrutiny make it to the development plan. It is also at this stage that a decision is made on the method of financing the projects. In other words, a final decision on the mix of local public savings, local borrowing and foreign borrowing is made at this stage. On the basis of the production and employment data for various private industrial classifications (collected at the second stage), together with projected public spending and its associated employment, the Central Planning Office then makes projections of output and employment growth over the plan period. These projections are included in the published development plan.

There are two major observations we can make on the planning procedure outlined above. First, all the projections mentioned are done on a piecemeal basis. They are based largely on past sectoral trends without, at times, taking into account the likely impact of planned projects. Whilst such projections may turn out to be more accurate than those generated within the framework of a more sophisticated, more comprehensive, more integrated and internally consistent model, a strong case against the planning procedure currently followed in Swaziland can be made on conventional theoretical principles.

In particular, the piecemeal approach as currently pursued does not explicitly incorporate crucial interrelations within the economy and, thereby,
neglects important repercussions from whatever stimulus is imparted. Furthermore, it does not enable a systematic investigation of the likely impact of feasible alternative policy options available to government. For example, it is impossible systematically to investigate quantitatively the likely impact on various sectors of the economy if the sectoral allocation of public spending and tax-burden were altered, or if wages for civil servants were raised by a certain margin, or if the export price for sugar (Swaziland’s major export commodity) were to fall, or if monetary and trade policies were altered. Such an investigation would, on the other hand, be possible through the medium of social accounting methods.

A second observation to make is that none of the development plans published so far explicitly deal with the Tibiyo and Tisuka Funds. These are important national Funds whose activities have significant implications for overall production, employment, income distribution and balance of payments. It is possible explicitly to deal with these Funds in the framework of social accounting methods.

Social accounting methods

It is apparent from the discussion above that the planning procedure currently followed in Swaziland needs improvement. We submit that social accounting methods provide one avenue for such improvement. These methods hinge on a matrix (known as a social accounting matrix) which portrays the various components of the economy in a comprehensive and integrated form.

The social accounting approach to analyzing an economy dates back to, at least, the seventeenth century (see King, 1696; rep. 1936) 8. Over the years it has been refined to such an extent that it now underlies the national accounts systems of most countries today, as recommended in the United Nations’ System of National Accounts 9. The framework suitable for development planning consists of a rearrangement and extension of the United Nations’ System of National Accounts. The rearrangement is designed explicitly to handle the receipt of factor incomes and their disbursement through various institutions, whilst the extension is designed to divide the household sector into a number of groups depending on the focus of government policy. The resulting framework is a social accounting matrix which is essentially a combination of a disaggregated national accounts matrix and an inter-industry table.

The exact size of the matrix for the country in question will depend on a number of factors. These include the focus of analysis, desired disaggregation of economic entities, and availability of information, time and money. Whatever the size of the matrix, there are two fundamental rules for understanding it. First, an entry along a row indicates a receipt whilst an entry along a column indicates an expenditure. Second, the matrix is square (i.e., for every row there is a corresponding column) and it is complete if the corresponding row and column totals are identical.

A social accounting matrix pertaining to Swaziland was constructed for the year 1971/72 by a team comprising economists and statisticians from the Uni-
versity of Warwick and the Ministry of Overseas Development in England. Much of the data used were already available in various government agencies. Thus, there was no need to launch special data-collection surveys. This is important because it means most of the data required are already being routinely collected. However, the 1971/72 matrix has not been used for development planning; nor has there been any other matrix constructed for Swaziland subsequent to this first effort.

It is this paper's contention that the use of a social accounting matrix would improve development planning in Swaziland. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that Botswana has used the coefficients of such a matrix in compiling its current development plan. Using the matrix essentially involves computing various coefficients and then conducting experiments by changing what are considered to be exogenous factors. It is through such experiments that the appropriate policy stance by government can be delineated. A happy byproduct in the construction of a social accounting matrix is that data inconsistencies and inaccuracies are indicated. Appropriate steps can then be taken to improve data-collection in the indicated areas.

Conclusion

This paper proceeded from the premise that one of the major reasons for the tendency of the Swaziland economy to move away from, rather than towards, the attainment of government social objectives was inadequate central planning. This inadequacy became apparent from the discussion of long range planning in Swaziland between 1946 and today. This planning has been largely ad hoc and piecemeal in approach.

Most of the weaknesses of the current planning procedure can be obviated through the application of social accounting methods. Among other things, this would result in an optimal, comprehensive, well integrated and internally consistent development plan. We may, therefore, conclude that the application of social accounting methods to development planning is a priority area for research in Swaziland.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

3. Figures calculated from estimates in Matsebula, op. cit.
4. Figures calculated from estimates in Matsebula, op. cit. In this case, "urban unemployed labour" comprises all economically active labour out-
the urban formal sector. To the extent that Swaziland's urban informal sector is small by African standards (see ILO, *Reducing Dependence: A strategy for Productive Employment and Development in Swaziland*, (Addis Ababa: JASPA, ECA, 1979 second parenthesis), most of the "urban unemployed labour" is openly unemployed.

5. Other than the plan, see *Annual Reports on Swaziland*, 1946–47, published by the Colonial Relations Office, London.

6. See *Annual Reports on Swaziland*, 1948–49.


CHAPTER 12

Sources and Allocations of Household Funds in Rural Lesotho: Problems in Grass-Roots Economic Data Collection

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There have been many studies of such aspects of Lesotho’s economy as the migrant labour system, agricultural production, industrial potential and balance of payments. However, there is little concrete information concerning the everyday economic life of the individual Basotho who are the agricultural producers, the petty traders, the domestic workers, the consumers, the dependents of migrant workers and the reproducers of the labour force. The aim of this paper is to summarise the results of one such study in order to illustrate the methodological problems involved and the contributions which such grassroots research can make. In the context of this conference I wish to make a plea that those who are concerned with the macrolevel issues of the political economy of Southern Africa should not neglect detailed village level studies. These studies illuminate and give reality to the statistics gathered from formal national sources; they remind us of the uncertain basis of much of the data we take for granted; and they point to omissions which exist in the data available. I hope that this will serve as a stimulus to others to carry out similar studies and to improve upon the methods for collecting and analysing such microdata sets.

My study of the source and allocation of household funds was part of a larger doctoral research project concerning women’s economic and social strategies in relation to the migrant labour of Basotho men (Gay, 1980). It was conducted in a large village near Mohale’s Hoek – a village in which I lived for 14 months during 1976 and 1977. Through the assistance of the Institute of Southern African Studies I was able to prepare a detailed report on one aspect of that research, analysing records of household cash flows. This paper is a summary of that more detailed report (Gay, forthcoming).

My research method involved systematic quantitative data collection through household census, surveys, time allocation studies, household income, expenditure records, etc. It also included planned participatory observation of many aspects of the economic and social life of the village. I think it is important to stress this second, less common approach. Through actual participation in the life of the village being studied, one is able to monitor data collection processes closely and thus to avoid some of the omissions and errors in data collected in less personal ways by paid enumerators through broad sample surveys.
Methodological problems

On the basis of my initial two months in the village I became aware of people’s overwhelming preoccupation with chelete (that is, money): how it could be obtained, how it must be spent, and how those without it suffered. Thus I felt it was essential to obtain detailed information about cash flows within the village, at the same time as I was pursuing many other lines of investigation for my broader research project. Let me illustrate some of the methodological problems I faced.

Unit of analysis: what is a household?

I asked 33 households to keep detailed records of what I have naively called household income and household expenditure. But what is a household? Household boundaries are difficult to define in any society, or households grow and then split as children marry, live for a time with the husband’s parents, and then establish their own independent family units. Thus in Lesotho there are often incipient young families encapsulated within parental households. Sometimes money and other assets are regarded as belonging to a young man and his wife, while at other times they are considered to belong to the parents – a situation often revealed in conflicts between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law when the man who unites them (son/husband) is away in the mines.

There are additional problems in this migrant labour society because individuals who are regarded as members of a single household must live apart in order to earn money, attend school, and maintain rural homes and fields. The wages of an absent migrant worker must be divided between what he spends on himself in the Republic, what he sends or gives to others, and what his rural dependents actually receive. Furthermore his rural dependants may also receive money from other relatives, friends, and income-generating activities. Should household income be considered as total wages earned by all members no matter where they live, or only as cash flows received by the resident members in Lesotho? In addition there are problems of secrecy concerning sources and amounts of income. Wives, husbands and parents are often unaware of what each other actually earns and spends, and may deliberately conceal such information from each other as well as from strangers trying to do economic research.

In the light of these problems I chose to confine my study to the sources of funds available to and utilized by the village households I was studying, depending upon the voluntary reporting of one individual in each household. Other researchers such as van der Wiel have looked at similar questions from the other end, collecting official information on mine wages and conducting interviews with migrant workers (van der Wiel, 1977). I believe that both of these approaches are necessary to understand the realities of economic life in this labour reserve society.
Unit of analysis: cash flows

A second problem concerns the nature of income itself. I chose to confine my study to cash flows, without attempting the extremely difficult task of also measuring and valuing agricultural produce, home processing of foods, house construction, and other assets and subsistence activities. Of course my study would have been more complete if I had not limited myself in this way. I hope that other researchers will have the time and dependable techniques for presenting a more complete picture of rural household income, resources and allocations.

Sample

A third problem concerns sampling. The village I had studied had 296 households. Because of the culturally defined role of men as household heads, and the importance of male control over productive resources and access to wage employment, I divided the households into three main groups according to the household head's status. Omitting a small group of widowed or temporarily separated men (5.2 per cent of all village households), this gave the following groups:

(a) those headed by an absent married migrant worker (39.2 per cent of the village);
(b) those headed by a married man who was resident (23 per cent of the village);
(c) those headed by women, primarily widows (32.8 per cent of the village).

I then asked 40 households, randomly selected and proportionally representative of each of these groups, to participate in a study of household cash flows. (The number was reduced by attrition to 33 by the end of the year).

Since written records of cash received and spent had to be kept, there were two groups unavoidably underrepresented. Households with no functionally literate members were necessarily excluded; these tended to be the smallest, poorest and oldest households. In addition, large prosperous households with a variety of business ventures and wage earners were too busy with their own complex economic activities to be willing to keep additional financial records for my purposes. Thus the both poorest and the richest households were omitted from the quantifiable data collection process, although my role as a participant observer in the village at last allowed me to become well acquainted with the activities of such families.

Timing

For an ideal study I should have had accounts kept continuously throughout the year, but such a research design was unrealistic. I could not personally supervise such a continuous data collection process nor could I hope to obtain the cooperation of informants for such a sustained period. Thus I followed a procedure used in two similar studies (Wallman, 1969; Lesotho, 1973) and collected data during January, April, July and October, sampling the four
seasons. The implications of this must be recognized. First, this means that when I speak of average monthly cash follows, the average is based on four, not twelve, months. Second, there is no record for the months which intervene between those sampled. Thus major receipts of cash and major allocations which occurred just before or just after the recorded periods are not known. Thus there are inconsistencies between individual household income and expenditure: inconsistencies which might not have occurred if all 12 months had been reported.

**Conduct of the study and reliability of data**

A literate adult in each household was asked to keep a daily record of all money received by resident members and all cash allocations. School exercise notebooks had been prepared in advance with ruled pages for record keeping. Each account keeper was visited at the beginning, middle and end of each month to give encouragement, assistance and reminders of items they might have omitted. Had it been possible to visit each individual daily or even weekly no doubt the records would have been more complete. In general the record keepers were cooperative and tried to do their best at this unfamiliar task. One woman said she was glad to do it because she now had a way to prove to her critical migrant husband how she was using the money he sent. Certainly there were unavoidable and perhaps deliberate omissions. Nevertheless the amount of detail given, the internal consistency of most books throughout the year, and the correspondence of recorded amounts with known retail prices and with observed household activities gives a much more complete set of data than hitherto available on rural cash flows in Lesotho.

**Household assets and economic profiles of sample sub-groups**

For the sample as a whole the average de jure household size is 5.7 members while the average de facto size is 4.8 members. There is on average 1.1 employed members per household, 2.1 cattle and 1.5 fields.

Group A consists of 13 households headed by absent migrant workers with 5.3 de jure and 4.3 de facto members. These are primarily young nuclear families consisting of husband, wife, and children only. Because the husbands are all working, the households tend to be in the early stages of household development with fewer members, fields, cattle, buildings and other possessions than the other two groups, but with substantially larger cash flows.

Group B consists of nine households headed by men who were village residents throughout 1977. Four of the men are retired and living on small pensions, two are locally employed and one is self-employed as a herbalist. Most are actively involved in local agricultural activities. The household heads are mature men, older than those in group A, with larger families (6.2 de jure and 5.1 de facto members), accumulated assets, and usually with adult children who are employed in Lesotho or in South Africa.
Group C consists of 11 households headed by women, nine of whom are widows. None of the women has wage employment although most receive occasional financial assistance from adult children. The female household heads are on average older than the heads of Groups A and B. Some of these are large households still living on the assets accumulated by the deceased husbands, while others consist of only a poor widow or deserted woman with one or two children or grandchildren. The average size is 5.6 de jure and 4.5 de facto members.

Overview of the village economy

Fully 79.2 per cent of the village men between the ages of 20 and 49 were away as migrant workers for some portion of 1977. Thus the majority of young wives bear responsibility as household managers using the remittances sent by their husbands and maintaining the economic activities of the household through the months the men are absent. Young wives must act in accordance with the instructions of the men who send the money but they make most of the day-to-day decisions about allocation of funds and must find ways to cope with emergencies, seeking the advice of relatives on important matters. If remittances fail or are inadequate they seek other means to supplement the limited cash flows and exert more independent control over the money which they themselves can obtain.

The first concerns of a newly married couple are to be allocated a building site, to construct a simple house, and thus, by moving to a new homestead, to establish their independence as an economic unit. As children are born and fields, tools and livestock are acquired, their attention turns to clothing, feeding and educating children, to agriculture and homestead improvement. In later years sheer survival may be the dominant preoccupation.

In the densely populated lowland areas like the one studied here, particularly in the dry southern regions, the agricultural production of most households is far too small to yield marketable surpluses or even to meet most household’s subsistence needs. Only 15.6 per cent of the 225 households on which yield data was collected reported agricultural yields which were sufficiently large to supply the minimum subsistence level of carbohydrates for a year. A few households sold grain or legumes in unprocessed form, while many village households brewed and sold beer from sorghum which they grew.

Despite inadequate lowland grazing, livestock remain important in the village economy and social system. About a third of all households own sheep or goats providing small incomes at shearing time, occasional meat, and animals for ritual slaughter. Cattle, owned by a third of the households, provide traction for ploughing and hauling, dung for fuel and plastering, small amounts of milk and occasional meat, usually only on ritual occasions. Traditional customs concerning bridewealth exchange and celebration of marriages, births, deaths and other ancestral rituals assure a degree of distribution of livestock, meat, and other food and drink between households. Thus even the poorest families with no livestock are able to benefit on occasions from the assets of their richer relatives and neighbours.
Since livestock must be herded and cared for and fields must be ploughed, young boys and elderly men carry out these tasks in the absence of so many migrant working males. Some very poor families hire out their sons as herdboys, while families who own animals must either keep their own sons from attending school, must foster the sons of others, or must hire other boys or old men. The value of this labour, as well as the domestic and agricultural labour of women and children, should be considered in a complete analysis of village economic systems.

Pigs and fowls are often reared by women both for household use and for sale. Fruit and garden produce is another source of food as well as providing income to those families able to produce marketable surpluses. In this village there is no community garden. It is primarily the richer households able to afford secure fencing and perhaps even a water tap within their own compound who are able to establish flourishing gardens.

An often neglected aspect of village food systems is the gathering of wild vegetables from the veld and fields, particularly for those households without gardens and with insufficient money to purchase tinned food or imported cabbage. Likewise there is a daily need for fuel with which to cook. Many women spend several hours a day collecting dung, brush, weeds and firewood unless they can afford to buy paraffin.

Central to the village economy is the exchange system whereby goods are bought and sold. In the town of Mohale’s Hoek, just 40 minutes walk from the village, there are large well-stocked wholesale dealers, building and furniture suppliers, supermarkets, and many small shops and cafes, as well as a central market area where fruits, vegetables, cooked food and handsewn garments are sold. In the village there are five small cafes where imported foods, paraffin, soap and other consumer goods can be purchased. Some individuals also bring in consumer goods like clothing and utensils from the Republic which they sell to less mobile neighbours. Households with grain, beans, vegetables, chickens, eggs or meat to sell do so informally from their homes. A few women collect firewood, reeds and thatching grass from common land to sell to their more affluent neighbours. The sale of home-brewed beer as well as resale of imported beer and spirits plays an important part in local economic and social life. Knitted, crocheted and machine-sewn garments and woven grass mats, hats, brooms and beer strainers are occasionally sold by one villager to another but there is no developed external market for handcrafted goods, and little incentive for increased local production. Some men make fired mud bricks or cement blocks and haul rocks and sticks for house construction. Most clothing, utensils, building supplies, tools and agricultural inputs are purchased from the trading stores and government agencies in Mohale’s Hoek.
It can be seen that the economy of this village, like that of most villages in lowland Lesotho, is not based on subsistence production. Rather, this is a highly monetized economy, penetrated at every point by the economy of South Africa. Large amounts of cash are brought in by those with wage employment and goods are brought in by foreign and local traders. Small amounts of money then circulate within the village although most of the money is quite promptly repatriated to South Africa for imported goods. Villagers such as these cannot be considered as a rural peasantry, but as a rural proletariat, supplying South Africa’s labour needs, reproducing that labour force, providing markets for the products of South African agriculture and industry, and compelling the able-bodied to go and sell their labour in order to obtain the cash flows necessary for meeting the expanding needs and wants of a growing population.

In 1977, 68 per cent of the village men, and 3.5 per cent of the women, were working in South Africa. In addition, 15.7 per cent of the men and 15.9 per cent of the women had some kind of full-time or part-time employment within Lesotho. The largest local source of employment for men is the construction industry; government jobs are second in importance. Most women who work are either employed as domestic workers or as clerks in shops and cafés.

By turning to the detailed reports of household cash flows we can obtain a picture of the relative importance of the different sources of household funds, and the types of cash allocations made.

Sources of household funds

Each of the 33 cooperating households recorded the receipt of all money during January, April, July and October, itemizing the amounts of money and the sources. Table 1 (p. 124) shows the monthly cash received, averaged over the four sampled months for the entire sample. Because of limited space, cash inflows and outflows for the separate months have not been reported here. The most striking difference found was that the average total reported inflow for October was much higher than for the other three reported months (R104.20 in October). The main reason is that October is the ploughing season when extra amounts of money are sent home by migrants to cover agricultural inputs, even though funds needed to cover ongoing subsistence needs remain relatively constant. January inflow (R54.14) is less than average because most migrants bring home clothing, gifts and cash for Christmas and then may send nothing for the succeeding months.
Table 1

Household Cash Receipts per Month for the Entire Sample averaged over Four Reported Months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of income</th>
<th>Average amount</th>
<th>Range*</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From husbands</td>
<td>R 41.96</td>
<td>R (0-600)</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From children</td>
<td>11.99</td>
<td>(0-160)</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From other relatives and friends</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>(0-100)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnings of women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from brewing beer</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>(0-62.05)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from wages and other activities</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>(0-29.30)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>(0-222)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>(0-37)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73.85</td>
<td>(0-608.50)</td>
<td>99.9**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*range here meaning the minimum and maximum reported by any household in any single month.
**rounding error.

Table 2 opposite shows the breakdown of sources and amounts of money received by the three sub-groups. It can be seen that the total cash receipts reported by Group A (Migrants) is about twice that reported by Groups B and C. Since Group A households are somewhat smaller, the inequality is even greater when we consider the amount of money available on a per capita basis. The difference is obviously due to the fairly regular remittances sent by migrant husbands; this in turn is related to the earning capacity of young men and the investments necessary to establish a new household. It can also be seen that income derived from women’s brewing, wages and other income-generating activities is inversely correlated with remittances and gifts from husbands and children. Agricultural income is highest for Group B households, all of whom have a resident adult male who can engage in cultivation and livestock care. The female-headed households reported surprisingly little cash received from agriculture although they have fields and livestock. However it must be remembered that they are probably consuming most of their own crops as food or selling grain in the form of beer in the absence of other sources of money.
TABLE 2
Household Cash Receipts per Month for Each Sub-group
Averaged over All Four Reported Months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of income</th>
<th>Group A Migrant male head</th>
<th>Group B Resident male head</th>
<th>Group C Female head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband (Household head)</td>
<td>89.11 83.7 %</td>
<td>25.15 46.7 %</td>
<td>- 38.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>4.20 3.9 %</td>
<td>13.39 24.8 %</td>
<td>10.16 19.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other relatives, and friends</td>
<td>3.94 3.7 %</td>
<td>4.16 7.7 %</td>
<td>20.05 38.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband (Household head)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife or female head</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.52 4.7 %</td>
<td>11.91 23.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from brewing</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.45 2.7 %</td>
<td>3.73 7.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wages &amp; other activities</td>
<td>1.99 1.9 %</td>
<td>6.55 12.1 %</td>
<td>5.09 9.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.03 1.0 %</td>
<td>0.69 1.3 %</td>
<td>0.81 1.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>5.08 4.8 %</td>
<td>6.28 12.5 %</td>
<td>20.05 38.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106.41 100.0 %</td>
<td>53.91 100.0 %</td>
<td>51.75 99.9 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*rounding error

Funds from husbands

It is clear that money which the husband contributes is the most important source of household funds: 56.8 per cent of the reported overall monthly average. Such money comes from migrant remittances, pensions, wages earned by men with local employment, and money earned by husbands in the local informal sector, particularly construction, transport, and ploughing. Certainly the major share comes from migrant remittances.

It must be remembered that one third of the households in the sample as well as one-third in the village and in Lesotho, are headed by women without husbands – primarily widows. Such households, by definition, do not have any income from husbands. Furthermore, even if there is a wage-earning male as household head there is no guarantee that his family will receive regular or adequate support. Because of competing cash demands and perhaps marital disputes, some migrants send or bring little at all, leaving their wives in virtually the same position as female household heads.

The data collected show a great range in amounts actually remitted, a range which is of course masked in the computing of averages. Differences are partly due to the types of major investments commonly made at different phases of household development (bride wealth, house building, livestock purchases, funerals) and to seasonal demands such as school fees in January and ploughing costs in October. The irregularity is also due to the fact that some men send a single large sum only once every few months and nothing in between, and can only collect deferred pay at the end of each contract period. Five of the 13 wives in Group A reported receiving money from their husbands in each of the months sampled (although not necessarily in the intervening months). Amounts ranged from R20 to R600, the largest sums being sent for house construction. In contrast there were wives who received nothing during the four sampled months.
Contributions from sons and daughters

Money from children who are employed constitutes the second most important source of household funds, amounting to 16.2 per cent of the monthly average. Naturally it is the older household heads who are most dependent upon their children. Most of the recorded contributions are made by unmarried sons who are still members of parental households. However, some unmarried sons send no money home at all, spending it all on their own clothing, personal goods and gifts, or banking it for the future. Money which migrant sons and grandsons send to their parents is consistently less than that sent by migrant husbands to their wives. The largest recorded amount sent by a son was only R30. Not surprisingly, those sons who are still living at home and working in the nearby town are the most regular contributors to the parental households which still feed and house them.

Unmarried working daughters also make small contributions, particularly if the parents are caring for the daughters' pre-marital children. The amounts sent by sons reflect the higher salaries and greater employment opportunities enjoyed by male Basotho. Married daughters with homes of their own are rarely able to send money to their parents if they do not have independent incomes, for they cannot freely use their husband's remittances for their own natal families. The marriage of daughters does bring bridewealth into the parents' household, a source of income which did not happen to appear in any of the sampled months. One household, however, received R340 as a cash bridewealth payment during February providing the widower mother with the capital to build a new cooking hut.

There is an interesting seasonal variation in contributions from adult children. Far more contributions are recorded during the ploughing season (October) than any other month. I think this reflects the special interest children take in helping their parents to cultivate the family fields by cash, if not by labour. By helping in this way they do not only contribute to the parent's subsistence, but also place themselves in a favoured position for reallocation of fields when the parents become ill or die.

Contributions from other relatives and friends

Small and irregular gifts of money and goods are often made by relatives who are not members of a given household, particularly in times of emergency or on visits. Unrelated friends constitute another important source of money which is particularly important to women without husbands. Such women are severely disadvantaged because they have no wage-earning husband; but they are free from the social control which a husband normally exerts over his wife's social relations. Thus gifts may come from men who have clandestine or open sexual affairs with the women in question.
Women's earnings brewing

In the Tables, I have distinguished two categories of female earnings, separating brewing from all other activities because of its unique importance. It can be seen that brewing provides more than twice as much cash as all other forms of women's cash generating activities. Furthermore, the amount of money circulated within the village is considerable, perhaps only exceeded by that associated with local construction activities. In a study of village brewing I discovered that an average of R1074.80 is spent in this village on home-brewed beer per month, or R3.63 per household. Over half of the 296 households reported brewing joala (home-made beer) for sale at least occasionally during 1977. Of these, 11 did so less than once a month, 77 did so between one and three times a month, while 63 brewed for sale once a week or oftener. Of the households sampled, 20 reported some income from the sale of joala or the sale of sprouted sorghum from which joala is brewed.

The cash receipts from brewing may seem small in comparison with migrant earnings and remittances sent home. Table 1 shows only R5.35 per month (or 7.2 per cent of total funds) received from brewing, in contrast to R41.96 (56.8 per cent) from husbands. However, examination of individual cases and contrasts between sub-groups shows that brewing assumes great importance for those households with no regular wage earners. Looking at Table 2 we see that Group A households reported only 1 per cent of their money to come from brewing, while Group C reported 23 per cent from this source. For one divorced woman in the sample, brewing and the sale of sprouted sorghum provided 84 per cent of her small monthly cash receipts.

Another significant aspect of brewing is money obtained through rotating credit associations formed by groups of women who brew on a regular basis. The woman who brews on a particular day receives all the profits from her sales as well as a pool of money or other goods which members agree to bring. There were 12 such groups in the village, with between 4 and 12 members each. Most met weekly contributing between 50 cents and R2 each time; some also brought predetermined amounts of powdered soap or paraffin. Written records of joala sales and group contributions are carefully kept so few members default. Thus members are forced into a regular plan of income-generating and saving, and each can depend upon a single large amount of goods or money at dependable intervals.

The majority of customers at the village beer houses, and those who spend the largest amounts of money, are men: migrant workers home on leave, local working men coming in the evening and on weekends, or simply men passing through the village. Thus brewing provides one of the few dependable mechanisms whereby considerable sums of money earned by men outside the village are circulated within it, and whereby such money passes into the hands of women who themselves have no employment or regular source of mine remittances. Women who sell sprouted sorghum or firewood to the women who brew also participate in this form of redistribution of migrant earnings.
Women’s earnings and income-generating activities other than brewing

Many village women I met said they wanted mosebetsi (work), meaning paid employment over and above the domestic and agricultural work they were already doing. How many would have been willing and free to take employment is another question. It is extremely difficult to measure unemployment, under-employment, and available labour among rural women who must maintain homes and farms and families, yet need dependable cash income.

At present the opportunities for women to find paid employment are very limited in most of rural Lesotho. For those who live near rural towns and roadsides and do manage to find employment, jobs are usually poorly paid and often only part-time. In the village studied, some unmarried girls and a few married women with secondary school education or vocational training worked as teachers, government or shop clerks, or policewomen. Those with less education could only obtain poorly paid jobs doing laundry, cleaning, cooking, child-minding or brewing for more prosperous households – often for women who themselves had paid employment. In the sample of 33 households there were only five women with part-time or full-time wage employment in the village or town; the highest paid received only R2 a day for cleaning in a bank two days a week.

Some women who cannot find jobs or cannot leave their families and homes regularly, still earn small amounts of money within the village by selling their domestic or agricultural labour to others: doing laundry, smearing floors, grinding grain, hoeing fields, or harvesting crops on a piecework basis. Women in 67 out of 227 households interviewed said they had hoed on the fields of others either for cash payments of 50 to 76 cents a day, or for a bag of grain if they hoed an entire field, taking two or three weeks. Many women help friends, relatives and neighbours at harvest time although payments for this work are almost always in kind rather than cash: usually a basin of grain for a day of harvesting or winnowing or maize cobs for fuel. Small though the amounts are, such agricultural work is crucial to women without fields, women without the means to plough and plant, and women whose own crops may have failed due to drought or flood.

We have already mentioned the other types of goods which women gather, produce and process for sale as well as imported goods which some women sell. Apart from brewing, all of these activities together amount to only 2.9 per cent of the average monthly reported household cash receipts, and no more than 7.2 per cent for the Group C female headed households.

Agricultural earnings

Agriculture contributes little more than women’s earnings to the cash funds of the households studied, only 7.2 per cent for the monthly average, ranging from 4.8 per cent for young Group A households, to 12.1 per cent for Group B households. More of the money reported under agriculture came from payment for agricultural services (ploughing and planting) than from either the sale of crops or from livestock. Furthermore, the receipts for ploughing and planting
were concentrated in only 2 households. One was a retired man with oxen and plough; the other was a mature migrant who had just purchased a second-hand tractor.

### Allocation of household funds

Table 3 presents the data on reported expenditures of all 33 households averaged over the four sampled months, while Table 4 gives the breakdown by sub-groups. (For Tables 3 and 4 see overleaf.)

The major expenditures under food and drink are for maize meal, meat, fish and chickens, wheat flour, sugar, milk (primarily powdered baby formula), vegetables (primarily imported cabbage), fats and oils, and coffee, tea and cocoa. This list illustrates the heavy dependence on imported foodstuffs. Even the amounts spent on fruit, vegetables, meat, chickens, milk and bread went primarily for imported rather than local produce. Medical care and toiletries include hospital and clinic expenses, private doctor fees, medicines and toilet goods such as toothpaste, vaseline, deodorants, skin lightening creams, hair treatments and other cosmetics. Cleansing materials, particularly laundry soap, are an important regular part of every woman’s budgeting. Fuel for cooking and heating, as well as candles and matches are needed by all. A few of the poorest meet most of their fuel needs by gathering dung and brush; others with regular cash incomes do almost all of their cooking with paraffin which accounts for 78.5 per cent of all expenditure on fuel. Clothing, together with shoes and blankets, is a major item which would be much higher were it not for the fact that many migrants bring home such goods as gifts from the Republic. Almost all items in this category are imported. The Education category is primarily for school fees, books and uniforms although postage and writing materials have also been included. In 1977 primary pupils paid only a rand or two a year in fees but the nearest secondary school cost R100 per year and the high school fees were R180 plus costly books and uniforms. In the light of the information on available household funds we can see why many families cannot afford the expense of secondary schooling. 54 per cent of the village children were attending elementary school but only 6 per cent were in secondary or high schools during 1977. Building construction costs are an important expenditure at early stages of the household development cycle. The total amount spent by one family for a tiny mud and stick house with metal roof was R179.25 while another household spent R797.30 on building a two-room cement block house. Household equipment such as dishes, utensils, batteries and furniture was a small item for most household in the sample. However one son about to get married spent R200 on furniture for himself and R90 for tools and a heater for his parents, considerably inflating the average for the sample that month. During October an average of R25.45 was spent on agriculture, whereas no more than a rand was spent in any of the other three months. Although half the households paid for ploughing and others bought seeds, fertilizer and animal food, the agriculture average is inflated by the large amount (R307.17) which one household spent to repair and operate a second hand tractor they had just purchased.
### TABLE 3

**Household Expenditures per Month**

*For the Entire Sample Averaged over All Four Reported Months*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of expenditure</th>
<th>Average amount</th>
<th>Range*</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and drink</td>
<td>24.61</td>
<td>(1.09 - 138.59)</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical, toiletries</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>(0.00 - 25.60)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleansing materials</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>(0.00 - 8.12)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>(0.00 - 15.09)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td>(0.00 - 97.50)</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, stationery</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>(0.00 - 77.00)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House building</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>(0.00 - 204.00)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household equipment</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>(0.00 - 306.36)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>(0.00 - 313.12)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>(0.00 - 45.00)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80.98</strong></td>
<td>(2.23 - 424.11)</td>
<td><strong>100.1</strong>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*range here means minimum and maximum reported by any household in any month.

**TABLE 4

**Household Expenditure per Month for Each Sub-group**

*Averaged over All Four Reported Months*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of expenditure</th>
<th>Group A Migrant male head</th>
<th>Group B Resident male head</th>
<th>Group C Female head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and drink</td>
<td>25.23</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>24.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical, toiletries</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleansing materials</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>12.61</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, stationery</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House building</td>
<td>16.20</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>8.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household equipment</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>14.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90.60</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*rounding error

**Major themes and implications for rural development strategies**

The integration of Lesotho within the Southern African economy and her present dependence upon South African industry, agriculture and commerce are reflected in these data on both sources and allocations of household funds.
Migrant remittances

The degree of individual household dependence on migrant remittances is clear. Despite cutbacks in migrant recruitment since 1977 due to the labour "stabilization" policies, salaries and job opportunities for men remain much higher in the Republic than in Lesotho. Migrant earnings contributed over 40 per cent of the Gross National Product in the late 1970s (Gray, Robertson and Walton, 1980 : 63). This inflow of money can make a significant contribution to rural development to the extent that it is circulated to other members of the rural community and invested in ways that build up the rural productive potential, rather than being dissipated on non-productive imported consumer goods. As long as the migrant labour system persists, policy makers should design strategies to assist individual migrants and their families in knowing how to make such productive local investments and in the transfer of skills to the rural environment. Means should be devised to make sure that deferred pay is used for the development of the families whose migrant members earned it.

Economic opportunities for women

We have noted the number of rural women who seek opportunities for cash earning despite pitifully low wages and their own family and farm responsibilities. Such activities are of particular importance for female-headed households. Women who do find wage employment manage to arrange somehow for their domestic and agricultural work to be done. Before making generalizations about the negative effects of female wage labour and income-generating activities on agricultural production, it is essential to assess the degree of underemployment of rural women, the seasonal patterns of activity, the need for money, and the complex networks of family aid and labour exchange which already exist. The amount of time, energy and resources which go into the brewing of joala shows the determination of rural women to find their own sources of cash income if more productive activities are not available. Much attention should be given to the creation of new opportunities for female employment and income-generating activities, particularly those which will improve the quality of rural life, health, housing and education.

South African consumer goods

Lesotho's imports have risen from R22.9 million in 1970 to R237 million in 1978: incomes rise and aid pours in but there is little increase in local production. Detailed analysis of the items listed under each category of household expenditure illustrated the day-to-day dependence on South African products. An analysis of the April expenditures for one migrant's wife, for example, showed that 93 per cent of all her cash expenditure was on South African or multinational products (Gay, 1980:146).

Encouragement of local production and marketing and the striving towards self-sufficiency and self-reliance must be more than just catchwords in Lesotho. Although complete self-sufficiency is an impossible goal, genuine efforts must be
made to reduce the flow of South African goods into Lesotho and to provide training, assistance, credit facilities and protection to local producers. Given the omnipresence of South African business, there should be consumer protection legislation and consumer education programmes in Lesotho. This would help consumers to guard against false advertising and deceptive packaging, to assess relative nutritional value, unit cost and durability of products and to understand the operation of banks, life insurance policies and hire-purchase schemes. Consumers should be encouraged to invest in goods with productive potential rather than let themselves be seduced into wasting their money on impractical luxury goods which will benefit nobody but South African businessmen.

**Rural differentiation**

In this general summary I have been unable to discuss the individual cases which reveal the extent of economic differentiation in the community studied, although it has been implicit at many points. I am convinced that analysis of such detailed microdata sets and particularly the economic relationships between individuals, will tell us much more about social and economic inequality and about incipient class formation than unsubstantiated theorizing. (See Spiegel (1979) for an excellent example of such analysis in the context of relevant theory).

Most rural Basotho are disadvantaged both in relation to white South Africa and in relation to the urban Basotho elite. Hence special compensatory efforts must be focused on the economic development of the rural area. Within these areas, attention must be given to different segments of the population with careful analysis of the economic needs, strategies and potentials of each group.

To the extent that the more prosperous families can give their children the advantages of good nutrition, medical care, advanced education and employment opportunities, they are preparing the next generation to move even beyond their own economic position. Similarly, to the extent that the children of the poorest rural families are deprived of such opportunities, they are likely to become the next generation of the unhealthy, ill-educated and unemployed. Given Lesotho's expanding urban elite, the number of successful rural businessmen, the limited number of migrants in a well-paid "stabilized" work force, and the implications of the new Land Act, it is likely that the gap between those with inheritable land and secure incomes, and the poverty-stricken landless unemployed is bound to increase.

Thus, the rural economic differentiation we have noted points to new forms of class distinction within Lesotho and the need for new ways to assure the fullest development of all. To fail to recognize this and simply lump all villagers together as a "rural proletariat" or "rural peasantry" or "the poorest of the poor" would be unrealistic. One would then be unable to understand and help the diverse segments of the rural population at points of greatest need, and would lose opportunities for creative approaches to rural development, based on the diverse potential and indigenous cooperative mechanisms of community members themselves. Before new development projects are introduced, every
effort should be made to recognize, investigate, strengthen and utilize the resources already at hand. Careful collection of village-level economic data should be an important part of such study and of all rural development plans.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 13
Social Inequality as a Crucial Problem
of Research in Southern Africa

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Introduction

The purpose for writing this paper can be stated at the outset as that of seeking to make a contribution to the identification of a problem of entrenched social inequality in Southern Africa, with particular reference to Central Africa which is here singled out in order to show how, during the 1940s, social research officers of the then Rhodes-Livingstone Institute skirted round the problem of social inequality which was created by the incorporation of the sub-region into the world capitalist system. We seek first to show how these research officers evaded the issue, by examining theoretical assumptions behind their prestigious sociological studies in the region. We are here referring to social anthropology, and intend this paper to serve as an exercise in sociological theory with reference to what social anthropologists have written about the Central African society. We focus our analysis on the colonial situation but go beyond polemics in that we attempt to “return to fundamentals.” We give credit to Mafeje for urging us to explain “the origins and structures of liberal ethics” which underlie all social sciences. Secondly, and following from the first point, we examine what we have termed “the liberal philosophy of individualism” before touching on what we regard as future research priorities. In this respect, we stress the need to analyse social formations which resulted from the combination of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production, and which are today characterised by the domination of the former over the latter.

Our argument is that an analysis of colonial social formations is bound to lead to a reinterpretation of some of the institutions in the region which colonial social anthropologists classified as “traditional” when they were actually “colonial”. Elsewhere, we have tried to make such a reinterpretation of thangata as a traditional institution of reciprocal assistance among kinsmen and thangata as forced labour, as well as of “village” on customary land where kinsmen live undisturbed and “village” on a colonial plantation where thangata as forced labour was practiced. We have come to the conclusion that the village in Central Africa is not as traditional as colonial anthropologists made us believe. It follows that the theoretical aspect of this paper is also based on our rejection of what has been written about the persistence of precapitalist institutions in Central Africa.
despite change brought about by the superimposition during the nineteenth century of the imperial system on to precapitalist societies in the sub-region. The thesis of the persistence of precapitalist institutions was put forward as a direct reaction by the social research officers of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute against the conclusion made by the 1935 Nyasaland Commission on Emigrant Labour that labour migration was detrimental to tribal life. Max Gluckman’s influence in this respect was remarkable. He was critical of government commissions for not being the most effective way of enquiring into social problems simply because of their superficial research techniques. We agree with him on this point. We also agree with him when he points out that the sociological theory which one uses to interpret social facts is more important than the techniques of investigation. But the question we ask is “What sociological theory”? To answer this question we need to have a close look at the state of sociological studies in Central Africa.

Sociological theory in Central African studies

Functionalism, the theory by which social anthropologists attempted to show how each society existed as a system of regularities within its environment, is already a spent force. But we take the trouble to discuss it here because it was uncritically used by the researchers under discussion to explain to colonial administrators of the sub-region the social problem with which the latter were confronted. It was on the basis of this explanation that the administrators guided change in Central Africa. We seek to argue that the theoretical basis on which this change was guided was defective as it did not in any way concern itself with the central problem of social inequality to which this paper is being addressed. It was defective in that it attributed the wrong function to conflict.

Social conflict was given a central place in Gluckman’s analysis. In the traditional society like that of the Zulu of the eastern seaboard of South Africa he saw conflict existing between territorial groups of people. Segmentation along lines of descent characterised such a society. Each segment, which he called “tribe”, was led by a chief to whom its members paid their allegiance, as opposed to other groups even though all such groups and their respective chiefs acknowledged the overlordship of the king. In other words, the king was the centre of unity of all groups while inter-group conflicts were met by certain countervailing institutions which existed throughout the governmental hierarchy. He noted, of course, that civil wars broke out in such societies; but he added also that in these systems a civil war did not destroy but maintained the political system as a whole. The mechanism that prevented conflict from breaking up the political system was that as people united against a tyrannous king, they also combined under the king to prevent any group becoming too powerful.

It is important to stress the point that to Gluckman the precondition for social conflict to be an integrative mechanism is the existence of social groups standing on the same level of segmentation. Granted that Gluckman’s analysis
also shows that the statelike Zulu can be divided horizontally between people who belong to the ruling class as opposed to their subjects, however, there is no attempt toanalyse the relationship of domination and dependency between the two classes. Instead, Gluckman dissolves the Zulu class structure into their cultural homogeneity, and classifies the Zulu as casteless. Hence, even though it may be claimed that he was influenced in his thinking by Karl Marx’s writings, the fact remains that to Gluckman the interests of the dominant Zulu and those of their subjects merged. This is unlike Marx’s conceptualisation of the state which, to him, existed to protect common interests of the ruling class as opposed to the rest.

It is perhaps understandable when one does not apply the concept of ‘class’ to a society whose economy is based on primitive instruments of production, and where relations of production are in harmony with forces of production. But one cannot understand why Gluckman did not seem persuaded to apply rigorously the concept to the colonial situation which he characterised in his analysis of the social situation in modern Zululand. Here the plural character of the society was compounded by the fact that groups which drew membership from both whites and blacks existed side by side with racially-based groups. It was noted that the two colour-groups did not separate into groups of equal status. Yet, Gluckman emphasised the importance of the many-sided affiliations of every individual as well as every group as the basic integrative mechanism. To him, the schism between the two colour-groups is itself the pattern of their main integration into one community.

We do not accept this conclusion because it grossly oversimplifies the relationship between colonising and colonised groups of people about whom Gluckman was writing. To justify our rejection of this conclusion, we need to go beyond the sociological theory of Central African studies in order to uncover the underlying philosophy of individualism that characterises the sociology of the sub-region.

The challenge of today in studies of ex-colonial formations is that of trying to characterise the relationship between social anthropology and other social sciences in so far as their role in making the colonial situation work is concerned. Archie Mafeje is critical of radical anthropologists who, he says, while they are acutely aware of the limitations of functionalist anthropology and are willing to unmask it by using Marxist categories, they nevertheless create an epistemological contradiction by treating colonial anthropology in isolation from metropolitan bourgeois social sciences which are equally functionalist and imperialist.

It is understandable that social anthropologists should be concerned about their isolation from the rest of the social scientists. The wake of decolonisation of the Third World has revealed that nationalist governments in Africa at last view anthropologists with distrust because they have, at one time or another, participated in a tradition of direct or indirect association with colonial authorities.
To bring themselves into the fold of social science some of them have suggested that anthropology should break down and merge with other disciplines, others have abandoned the discipline and rechristened themselves as sociologists, while still others advocate the incorporation of at least economic anthropology within the broader approach of 'political economy'. Mafeje is not in agreement with the way colonial anthropologists interpreted their data. But he also extends his disagreement to other social scientists who, like colonial anthropologists, shared a common body of either which influenced their theoretical positions. In drawing our attention to this very important relationship, he is disagreeing with Bernard Magubane who has criticised James Clyde Mitchell and Arnold P. Epstein for saying that white oppressors in the Copperbelt of Zambia during the colonial days formed a prestige group to which Africans aspired. Magubane is particularly critical of Mitchell’s and Epstein’s use of trivial indices to account for social changes in Central African towns. Clothes, furniture, articles of food and motor cars are the indices in question, and these are discussed by Mitchell and Epstein without referring to the framework of the system and to the type of conflict that was dominant or latent in society. But, as Mafeje rightly points out, Mitchell’s and Epstein’s crime does not reside in pointing out the sadness of the parody but in failing to trace it back to what they, themselves, represented as bourgeois liberals.

For us to be able to appreciate what the disagreement between Mafeje and Magubane is all about, we need to evaluate some aspects of sociological studies of the Central African society by relating them to the framework of the colonial system as suggested by Magubane, and then by explaining the origin of this colonial framework in terms of the structure of liberal ethics as suggested by Mafeje. In adopting this approach our aim is to argue that Magubane’s and Mafeje’s studies are complementary. This is not to deny the fact that to Magubane the ultimate framework of reference must be the colonial order, while for Mafeje it must be the structure of liberal ethics. Yet, to us, the separation of the colonial order from the structure of liberal ethics is conceptual rather than empirical. We seek to demonstrate this by looking at sources which gave theoretical inspiration to Mitchell and Epstein and at the environment in which the theory in question was elaborated.

The seminal papers which have greatly influenced the thinking of Mitchell, Epstein and other research officers of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute are about the colonial situation in Zululand of South Africa. Gluckman had them published in Bantu Studies in 1940 and in its successor called African Studies in 1942, and Mitchell had them republished after he had persuaded the author to do so. One of the reasons why Mitchell thought these papers were worth republishing was stated as follows.

From the point of view of the development of social anthropological theory, they are likely to rank in future as important milestones. It is in these essays that Gluckman first outlined an approach to the study of social change which he has subsequently developed, and which has provided the central
Indeed, these essays came to be important milestones in the development of sociological theory that came to be applied to the study of the Central African society. We have already given an outline of the theory in question in the preceding paragraphs of this paper. Here we need only complete the picture by pointing out that the theory was based on a methodological approach called “situational analysis”. This is an ethnographic method of research involving the collection of field data which consists of several events that are linked by the presence of the observer.28

What then is the relationship between situational analysis and the functionalist theory espoused by Max Gluckman, and how different is it from structural analysis? Another look at Gluckman’s paper29 shows that situational analysis concentrates on a social situation as

the behaviour on some occasion of members of a community as such, analysed and compared with other occasions...

The approach is behaviouristic rather than structural. This behaviouristic definition of the social situation should be contrasted with the structural definition of the colonial situation, which is one of dependence of colonised people on colonisers and one of domination of the latter over the former. The way the colonial situation emerged and the way the structure was formed are clearly explained by Magubane when he lists stages of acculturation. They are:30

1. an initial period of contact between the invading whites and African resistance to white rule of formerly independent chiefdoms, and white use of physical force to overcome African resistance;
2. a period of “acquiescence”: some Africans, alienated from their traditional society, are impelled to acquire the techniques and social forms of the dominant group, as shown by adopting its religions, going to school, and assimilating value patterns and cultural traits functional in the new order;
3. a period of resistance in a new way: Africans develop a “National” consciousness that transcends “tribal” divisions and confront the colonial power with the demand of national liberation.

Of course Gluckman also traces the evolution of the single socio-economic system of South Africa, beginning from the mercantilist expansion of Europe and the passing of ships round the Cape of Good Hope, up to 1879 when the British army made a decisive invasion of Zululand.81 But by defining the “social situation” in behaviouristic terms, he denied himself the opportunity to focus his analysis of the situation in Zululand on the colonial formation. He merely referred to it when he mentioned the economic integration of Zululand into the South African industrial and agricultural system82 and saw the mode of production as having changed from subsistence economy to one of farming and work wages83 without specifying what processes were involved in bringing this change about. His main concern was to divide Zulu and European
groups into subsidiary groups\textsuperscript{84} in order to show that many relationships and interests cut across the dividing racial line,\textsuperscript{85} and in saying all this, Gluckman was also denying the South African situation its dynamic forces expressed in the form of African opposition to the colonial situation through chiefs, churches, and even trade unions before they were banned. To him all this opposition was ineffective and gave psychological satisfaction only.\textsuperscript{36}

When he applied this theory to the statelike Lozi of Zambia in Central Africa, Gluckman again failed to examine the dynamic aspects of the relationship between members of the royal group and commoners. Instead, he saw the society as divided into territorial administrative units, while their leaders (the councillors) were grouped into three categories according to the arrangement of their seats in the King's Court. The councillors in question were those drawn from the rank-and-file of commoners, stewards, and those in whose veins flowed royal blood or whose spouses belonged to the royal clan. The crux of the argument is that men scattered about the kingdom were attached to each set of councillors in such a way that people of the same administrative division belonged to different sets.\textsuperscript{87} This arrangement, we are told, had the effect of administrative divisions not rising against the king in support of their officials in spite of the fact that councillors checked and controlled the king.\textsuperscript{35}

When the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute was formed in 1938 to plan social research in Central Africa\textsuperscript{39} its first Director was Godfrey Wilson whose theoretical approach to the analysis of social change was similar to Max Gluckman's. But Wilson's untimely death led to the appointment in 1945 of Max Gluckman to be the next Director, and under him the Institute was able to attract research officers who faithfully adhered to their Director's theoretical approach. He chose labour migration as the phenomenon that presented major problems confronting governments,\textsuperscript{41} and this problem was analysed in terms of a dual social structure whose elements (rural and urban social systems) were linked by the migrant whose behaviour was deemed to be situational.

We have already pointed out that the research officers of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute wrote what they did in reaction against a point of view expressed in 1935 by the Nyasaland Commission on Emigrant Labour that labour migration had a disruptive effect on tribal life. Elizabeth Colson\textsuperscript{42} is quite explicit in her rejection of this point of view. She bases her rejection on William Watson's research in rural Zambia which led him to the conclusion that Mambwe participation in industry has not led to the break-down in tribal life.

Watson aptly chose the title of his monograph as “tribal cohesion in a money economy”. In this he was joined by Jaap van Velsen\textsuperscript{44} who directed his analysis to labour migration amongst the Lakeside Tonga of Malawi as a positive factor in the continuity of tribal society. All this was in line with Max Gluckman's earlier statement that he did not view the social process at work in Central Africa as entirely disintegrative.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, in one of his periodic reviews of the progress made by the Research Institute, Gluckman\textsuperscript{46} reinforced his attack on the thesis of “structural disruption” by stating unequivocally that the moment a labour
migrant left his rural village for town he became detribalised though he still remained under the tribal influence. Again, that in town the migrant was not organised by tribal principles but by the universal principle of trade unionism; yet when he exercised his right to choose leaders, he was guided by tribal principles. It was this thesis of the persistence of African traditional institutions which Watson and van Velsen tried to exemplify in rural Central African societies, while Epstein and Mitchell tried to do so in the Copperbelt towns.

As a matter of fact, Mitchell had tested this thesis on the rural Yao of Malawi before he turned to urban studies. His unit of analysis was the Yao village, and he warned his readers not to confuse the village he was studying with the administrative village which had been introduced to Malawi by colonial administrators. For him 'village' referred to the indigenous social group. In adopting this kind of definition he was following Gluckman’s footsteps as he had earlier on defined the Central African village as:

a kinship and domestic organisation in which subsistence peasants make their living and spend most of their time, and where it is proper for a man to die.

It was in 1947 when this definition was formulated, and that was fifty-six years since the time when the imperial system of administration was imposed on the people of Central Africa. The village was by that time an integral part of this imperial system.

Though it should be admitted that Gluckman and Mitchell made extensive use of historical material in their anthropological writings, it is regretted that their yearning for the objectified indigenous social groups prevented them from tracing the evolution of the imperial system of the administrative village and its associated problem of underdevelopment. They failed to do this because they did not consider how the village economy increasingly came under state-administered institutions. It is true that in the passage quoted above Gluckman refers to "subsistence peasants". But this reference is fortuitous because it was not his main concern to show how the precapitalist economy of the village articulated with the capitalist mode of production. His concern was to treat a village as a political unit divorced from the appropriate mode of production. In abstracting traditional institutions from the colonial situation Gluckman and Mitchell were in fact using a fashionable method of explaining to European administrators how African societies functioned as political systems. The administrators were not concerned with the economic development of African villages; they were concerned with the problem of maintaining law and order, and any analysis of the political economy was not relevant to them.
Structure of liberal ethics

What then is the structure of liberal ethics like, and how is it related to the theory that runs through the Rhodes–Livingstone's sociology of Central Africa? To answer these questions let us first have a look at the sociological content of neoclassical economics since capitalist economics is based on liberal principles. The basic criterion for defining an economy based on market principles is assumed, by students of capitalist economics, to be harmonious competition among individuals who are also assumed to be equal beneficiaries of the existence and operation of the market economy. Talcott Parsons, a renowned scholar who undoubtedly influenced the development of sociology in the United States of America, couched his sociological formulations in a language that conforms to the language of liberal economists. Gluckman was an admirer of Parsons and the latter's influence on him was tremendous. But Parsons constructed his consensual model with reference to advanced western industrial societies, while Gluckman's functionalist conflict model was constructed to explain what was going on in colonial Africa. There is no way of course in which the degree of industrialisation in the United States of America can be comparable to that in colonial Africa. Nevertheless, what appears to be the difference between the two does not rule out the fact that even the colonial societies were governed by competitive individualism of the market economy which is characterised by Parsons and Gluckman's sociological point of view which forms the content of neoclassical economies.

However, the manner in which such competitive interaction operated in metropolitan countries differed from the way it did in colonies. This can be explained with reference to what C. B. McPherson has said about processes that led to the democratisation of liberalism, which eventually resulted in the liberalisation of democracy in Western Europe. He tells us that such processes as were at work led to change in occidental societies from feudalistic economic systems to liberal economic systems and finally to democratised liberal economic systems. The forces at work included the emergence of a commercial class which attracted to emerging towns the runaway serfs who, through this change, were able to choose between working for competing feudal lords, and working for competing commercial managers. This process of change, he adds, which took place between the 17th and 19th centuries, resulted in the individualisation of the occidental society. By the 19th century the competitively individualistic liberal economy had reached its maturity in that it became so capitalised that it earned its current name of "capitalist market economy". The difference between it and the feudal economic system is that custom, status and authoritarianism which had characterised feudalism were no longer cornerstones of the new economic system. But, like the feudal system, the new system was characterised by relations of inequality between those who owned the means of livelihood and those who lived on the surplus produced by the former.

As opposed to the feudal economy, the capitalist market economy is called liberal because of an element of choice given to workers, and of liberty given to capitalists to accumulate as much property as they are capable of doing so. But
the dictates of social Darwinism are such that those who are capable of competing more effectively than others must survive that competition at the expense of those who are not so capable. Hence, in the market economy all people may be free and yet some are freer than others. Such a system is bound to generate discontent among the underprivileged, and discontent as we know leads to revolts. To counter such possible development, concludes McPherson, liberalism had to be democratised.

By democracy he means a way of freeing the whole of humanity, a point of view he adopts from the inspirations of oppressed people in society. But liberalism, on the other hand, involves inequality in the exercise of freedom of choice. Hence by adding the one to the other, creators of liberal democracy juxtaposed two diametrically opposed principles of social organisation. However, when they started colonising the Third World, especially Southern Africa, creators of liberal democracy exported to this region the principle of liberalism minus its democratic counterpart. Cut-throat competition was the sole governing principle of the early colonising process; it could only be regulated by the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884. What was characteristic of this cut-throat competition is that colonised people in the region were eliminated from it before they were even given a chance to compete. Such elimination was not always achieved by physical conquest, as is implied in Magubane's stages of acculturation. In some countries subtle methods such as evangelisation, treaty-making, indirect rule and so on, were resorted to instead of bloodshed. But the result was the same, and that is: that once each imperial power had finally acquired a territory, its next step was to devise mechanisms for controlling what came to be known as 'natives' and perpetuating their exclusion from equal participation in the exploitation of their natural resources.

In South Africa, where Max Gluckman was born and had his first university education, there developed a structure which was a combination of the liberal framework and a monopsonist system of group control of mineral resources, a structure which continues today to exclude Africans from equal participation in the sphere of economic and political competition. Instead, the Africans have been converted into perpetual but unproletarianised labourers through the system of labour migration. The relationship that emerged from this kind of structure, therefore, is one of perpetual dependency on the part of Africans, and of domination on the part of colonisers. Structural dependency and domination are the two defining features of a neo-colonial situation which is based on monopolised liberalism in Southern Africa. Hence, talking about the colonial situation is not glossing over the importance of liberal ethics, as Mafeje seems to imply. We only have to delve deep into Gluckman's, Mitchell's, Epstein's and, indeed, other Rhodes-Livingstone's research officers' characterisation of this colonial situation in order to perceive the structure of liberal ethics behind it, which Magubane has not done.

We hold the view that the structure of liberal ethics is inherent in the sociology of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and that we can uncover it by examining theoretical assumptions underlying the method of research used. We have seen that the assumption was that traditional institutions persisted in their
pure form and that the method of situational analysis was used to detach these institutions from their historical connection and observe them in isolation from their connection with the capitalist system. 55 We should hasten to add that this metaphysical approach was used in order to give scientific support to an orderly formation of the colonial situation. Indeed, it is now common knowledge that British social anthropologists who worked in Africa were looking for traditional institutions on which to harness indirect rule which was increasingly proving more effective than direct rule. 56 They also extended the same way of conceptualising traditional societies to studies that sought to explain social change, their concern being to warn the administrator of the persistence of traditional institutions whose change was not easy to bring about. By using the behaviouristic approach they were able only to explain how the African labour migrant benefited from both the European material culture and tribal membership. Granted that they were aware that the widespread use by Africans of European material culture had brought only superficial change to tribal life in rural areas, 57 these social researchers did not give a scientific explanation of reasons for this superficial change. To them labour migration presented the major problem to the colonial administration 58 and it was the colonial administration, rather than the migrant labourer, that dictated the way the problem of research was formulated by Max Gluckman. But this way of looking at change was only masking what was actually going on by way of the disintegration or modification of traditional institutions in the face of an advancing wave of imperialism. In rural Africa relationships between leaders and followers, youths and elders, as well as men and women, were greatly affected by labour migration and other social processes of change during the colonial days.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, we would like to point to the direction to which cooperative research among social scientists in member countries of SADCC should move. We feel that the problem of social inequality can best be tackled through an analysis of the colonial mode of production. This mode combines capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production, with the former being dominant over the latter. 59 The domination of the capitalist mode comes about in that the crucial forces of production are entirely owned by colonisers or ex-colonisers while relations of production vary with the character of the actual principle of social organisation which colonisers found in existence when they first came and had to modify in a particular situation to suit their needs. The link between world capitalism and subsistence economies in different parts of rural Southern Africa today is characterised by this mode of production. Through this link emerges a new political economy which is structured in the same way as that of the metropolis save that the economy in a neo-colony is sustained by both instruments of production and modified traditional principles of organisation. In a highly capitalised economy private property is divorced from labour, while in a neo-colony certain sectors of the economy allow peasants to operate with
their own instruments of production while devising subtle mechanisms to transfer much of what colonised people produce to their colonial masters. This is why the money economy in Central Africa did not disrupt subsistence production, and this is not the same way as saying that traditional institutions resisted change. Rather, colonial masters caused those African institutions which could be used in the productive process to continue, while those institutions which could not be so used were destroyed. In the process social inequalities were perpetuated.

Our advice, therefore, is that for us to be able to understand the character of social inequalities, we should pay attention to changes that pre-capitalist formations are going through and the extent to which these changes mean progress or retrogress to the people of this region. We can do this by examining agrarian policies which are calculated to transform systems of land tenure from customary to non-customary forms of property relations and by finding out whether these transformations bring about social equality or not. There is also need to scrutinise agricultural policies and practices in order to find out if there is balanced emphasis between cashcropping for export and foodcropping for subsistence. In doing all this we should adopt a comparative approach that will keep on reminding us about what our erstwhile colonial masters did as compared to what we are doing. In this way we may hopefully learn from mistakes that were made during the colonial days. We only need to use appropriate concepts in order to discover such mistakes. In this paper we have preferred the use of the concept of ‘mode of production’ to the use of the concept of ‘structural functionalism’. And in saying all that we had to say, we have assumed that the contribution which social scientists should aim at making towards making SADCC a success is that of doing research which will expose weaknesses in the current social formations in the region with a view to taking steps to strengthen them. Some of these weaknesses, we contend, arise from the fact that we have not understood assumptions on which colonial administrators built the political economies which we inherited; and for this lack of understanding we have succumbed to the advice of many expatriate experts whose assumptions are no different from those held by our colonial masters.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. By Central Africa we mean the sub-region in which Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe are found.


8. Ibid., p. 32–33.


22. Ibid., p. 308.


24. Ibid., p. 420.


27. Loc. cit.


29. Ibid., p. 10.


32. Ibid., p. 16.
33. Ibid., p. 42.
34. Ibid., p. 19-28.
35. Loc. cit.
36. Loc. cit.
38. Loc. cit.
49. Ibid., p. 91-2.
57. E. Watson, “Migrant Labour and Detribalisation” in John Middleton

58. GLUCKMAN (1945), op. cit., p. 7.

PART THREE

PRIORITIES AND THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN THE SADCC MEMBER STATES

Section B

The State, Law, and Public Administration
The Kenyan writer, Ngugi wa Thiong’o once suggested a striking image of society¹, in which one man sits on the shoulders of another. From the perspective of the man on top, law should have as its purpose maintaining his privileged position. From the point of view of the man below, law should have as its purpose getting rid of his oppressors.

In most states at most times, of course law represents the interests of those on top – indeed, they hold their position precisely because it does so. Only in the period shortly after a successful revolution does the paradox exist, that the submerged mass of the population holds political power, while economic power still rests in the hands of the rich and powerful. Radical social change can only come about to the extent that contradictions exist between the political rulers and their constituency, and the economic ruling class.

At Independence, that situation existed in at least some African countries. I take Zimbabwe as a typical example. There, as elsewhere, the revolutionaries fought for state power. Their task became to use state power to alleviate the poverty and oppression that Zimbabwe’s masses inherited from the colonial era. State power expresses itself through the legal order, that is, the normative system in which the state has a finger. In the main, the books treat the legal order as a free good in abundant supply.

On the contrary, this paper contends that the legal order constitutes a scarce resource. A given legal order serves some purposes; it cannot serve others. The legal order received by the revolutionary government cannot, save through serendipity, adequately serve the new government. Development requires its own sort of legal order. Precious little reliable knowledge exists on the question of what sort of legal order will best induce the sort of social change we call development. This paper suggests an agenda for research likely to generate the relevant knowledge.

I discuss, first, the relationship between the legal order and development; second, a methodology of doing research on the legal order; and, finally specific topics for research.
On April 18, 1980 Robert Mugabe and his comrades seized the levers of power of Zimbabwe’s government. As did first generation black governments elsewhere in Africa, they proposed to use their new power in aid of developments in favour of the mass of the population. To do that required them to use the legal order. I use the phrase “legal order” instead of the “law” for the latter too easily summons visions of black-letter rules. The legal order encompasses more than that. It includes the rules — statutes, government regulations, local government bylaws, court precedents, conventions. It also includes the law-making institutions that promulgate the rules — legislatures, ministries, courts, councils and a host of others. Finally, it includes law-implementing institutions — courts, police, prisons, sheriffs, ministries and more. The legal order consists of a great buzzing process of officials acting under colour of their office.

That great buzzing process constitutes government’s principal tool to alleviate the poverty of Zimbabwe’s black masses. Of poverty, Zimbabwe has an abundance. Its peasants in the former reserves starve on an average of £28 per capita per year. 75 per cent of the children of wage workers on the large white owned commercial farms suffer from malignant malnutrition. 85 per cent of them have never in their lives attended a clinic nor seen a medical officer. The average white farmer owns about ninety times as much as the average black peasant. The gap between the lowest income percentile and the highest income percentile, they say, looms wider than in any other country in the world.

Poverty exists because people behave in repetitive patterns that is, in institutions. Peasants do not use tractors, but short-handled hoes, Bankers make loans not to peasants, but to commercial farmers. The agents of multinational corporations pay their workers excruciatingly low wages. They ship their profits out of the country, rather than reinvesting them locally. Government officials maintain strong formal and informal communications channels not with the poor, but with the rich and powerful — and government represents those to whom it listens. Society consists of people interacting in regular patterns. Those patterns produce poverty and oppression for most, and wealth and privilege for a few. The few keep riding on the shoulders of the many.

Regular patterns of behaviour exist as part of a normative system. The great buzzing process of the legal order constitutes a normative system, the only one over which government has much control. If government wants to change society in ways it defines as developmental, it has no exit save to use the legal order to accomplish that end.

Too often, social scientists assume that the legal order can deliver any new behaviours they desire. If the state fails to deliver the changed behaviour, some scholars merely assume that subjective weaknesses in the political leadership constituted the fatal flaw. Despite the rulers’ protestations, these analysts hold, the political rulers secretly did not want to bring about change.

The legal process, however, comes in short supply, and frequently very expensively. Like any tool, each legal order has its own in-built limits. It can accomplish some tasks. It cannot accomplish others. For example, every colonial
African legal code contained a Cooperatives Act. These laws laid down rules for marketing or consumer cooperatives. In cooperatives of those sorts, typically the cooperators do not do the work of the cooperatives. They employ a manager secretaries, bookkeepers, clerks and labourers to work in the cooperative offices and godowns and shops. To manage the cooperative, they rely on a Management Committee. Just as an investor in a large corporation does not propose to participate in management, so a member of a marketing cooperative does not propose to manage the cooperative. Instead the members elect a Committee which in turn employs a managing director and other workers. Every independent African State, however, says that it wants to foster producer cooperatives. The members of a producer cooperative work on the cooperative themselves. They need a law that facilitates self-management by the workers of the cooperative. They do not propose to delegate management to a management committee, with a member's participation limited to an annual meeting where he votes for the committee members. A Cooperatives Act that requires a Management Committee impedes the creation of member-managed producer cooperatives.

What laws do Robert Mugabe and his comrades need to change society, to abolish poverty and oppression in Zimbabwe? What changes do the law-making processes require in order to generate these new laws? For most social scientists, these questions pose a new problem. Social scientists have not always perceived the State as a critical variable in society. The Enlightenment naively supposed that if the masses at large took control of the state under a democratic constitution, society would ineluctably emerge from the "gloomy night... the reign of tyranny... its gags, inquisitors and spies... its herd of harpies". It would come into a sunny upland of peace and prosperity for all. That failed. Three generations of social scientists looked for explanations – Marx, Weber, Croce, Schimmel, Pareto, Durkheim, and dozens of others. Most did not explain the failure as a failure of the legal order. After World War II for a brief period we lived in a neo-enlightenment. Led by the United States, world capitalism seemed to have achieved a steady state. The problem therefore changed. Academia's yea-sayers looked for explanations of why capitalism had created consensus. Some found it in the end of ideology; others in high N-achievement; others, in notions of inherent social solidarity; still others in the beneficent competition of elites.

The 1960s exploded the euphoria of the neo-enlightenment. Vietnam, France in 1968, and most of all, the Third World's revolutions demonstrated that behind the peaceful social facade there existed not consensus but deep-seated conflict. A new problematic arose: how to explain the failure of the neo-enlightenment? Instrumentalist and structuralist theory tried to explain the role of the state in a conflict, capitalist society. Milliband, Althusser, Poulantzas, and a host of others addressed that problem. They taught that, one way or another, the capitalist State inevitably represents the capitalist class, at least "in the final instance".
The State, law and development: the problem stated

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After taking power, however, Robert Mugabe and his government faced another new problematic. The day after the new Zimbabwean flag snapped in the breeze, Zimbabwe's government claimed to have a socialist orientation. It claimed to represent the black, poor, 97 per cent of the populace. Zimbabwe, however, still had capitalist law, capitalist property relations, capitalist relations of production, a state structure geared to service capitalism, and a capitalist class. A socialist government ruled a capitalist state. Zimbabwe entered upon a truly revolutionary moment, when the government and the economic ruling class had sharp contradictions.

Government's task lay in using the legal order and state power to transform society in favour of its black and poor constituency. It no longer sufficed merely to explain why the law ineluctably represented the will of the economic ruling class. Instrumentalist and structuralist theories alike advised government to give up, for in their view "in the final instance" the legal order and the state must represent the wishes not of the poor, but the rich. Scholarship has hardly addressed the new problematic. Zimbabwe's new governors will find precious little in the literature to tell them how to use the legal order to transform society. Most law schools boast that they teach a student to "think like a lawyer". By that they mean a lawyer in the private sector. "Thinking like a lawyer" has come to mean dealing with the law, as it were, like fixed trees in a forest. The law student learns how to guide a client, through the forest. His lecturers do not teach him ways of thinking about how, by creating new laws, to change the forest.

Few social scientists did much better. Mainly they proposed theories about how to deal with social problems within the existing institutions. They rarely suggested solutions that challenged the status quo. When they did, almost never did they discuss the specific aspects of the institutions that created the social problem. Mainly, they ended with no more than a generalized call to change the institution, not specifics about what required change, and how to go about it. They proposed general strategies. Very few people studied how to translate general strategies into the specifics that development requires.

For example, a number of scholars have studied the tourist industry as an aid of development. Recently, Zimbabwe's Ministry of Informaion and Tourism decided that it should hive off to a new governmental corporation the tourism components of the ministerial portfolio. The ministry's civil servants had considerable knowledge about the substantive activities that corporation should undertake. No place could they find useful information about the institution required to accomplish those activities. Why a government corporation instead of a department form? If a corporation, ought it to have a board of directors? What qualifications should they have? What forms of ministerial control over the corporation should exist, with what consequences? On these sorts of questions, no information seems to exist with respect to the tourist industry, and precious little about government corporations generally. Without ministerial directives about those specifics, the legislative drafter must decide. In Zimbabwe, the legislative drafters all received their training under the old regime. The drafter therefore will usually decide by copying provisions of laws of the prece-
ding colonial government. Thus the ideology, perspectives and techniques of the Ian Smith regime ineluctably come to shape Zimbabwe's new public corporations. Those corporations will not be likely to respond to the ideology, perspectives and style of the Mugabe government. Mr Mugabe and his comrades must use the legal order to change the institutions that create, maintain and reproduce the poverty and vulnerability of Zimbabwe's black masses. This paper proposes an agenda of research on the legal order and development. I discuss first theoretical issues: methodology of research, perspectives and general models of law and society.

Methodology, perspectives and models

In the nature of things no country can copy verbatim an institution from some other country, and expect it to work in its new environment precisely as it worked back home. Nevertheless, we can only learn through experience. To achieve development Robert Mugabe and his colleagues need reliable knowledge that will help them to create workable new institutions. Lest they replicate the failures elsewhere, the lessons taught by analogous experience in other countries must inform that knowledge. They require general heuristic propositions to guide their efforts to discover new versions of the legal order likely to change society in desirable ways.

Without a theory, the search for knowledge becomes aimless. Too often, our papers resemble the ditty-bag of an idiot, fully of shiny pebbles, bright feathers, and odd seeds, but without rhyme or meaning. We need a criteria of relevance. Three general guidelines for relevance exist: methodology, perspectives and vocabulary. Since I have elsewhere discussed these at length, I mention them here in barebones outline.

Methodology

The outcomes of research in law and development constitute proposals for new law. Those proposals always constitute prescriptive statements. To produce those outcomes two sorts of research methodology exist. The first proposes an ends-means agenda:

1. Specify the ends or goals desired.
   (a) Determine ends or goals by asking political authorities or, searching the researcher's own values.
2. Determine the most efficient means to accomplish those goals.
   (a) Propose several alternative means.
   (b) Use data to determine their respective costs and benefits.

Note that this sort of research ordinarily does not produce propositions of reliable knowledge, that is, general heuristic statements of broad applicability. The outcome consists only of a recommendation of a specific means to accomplish a specific goal. It supposes a discontinuity between "policy" and "academic"
research. This agenda tends to put the question of goals outside the researchers' competence. Conversely, in most versions, it pretends that the question of means does not fall within the realm of value-judgements.

Problem-solving constitutes an alternative methodology:

1. Specify the difficulty that calls for solution.
   (a) Determine the problem from Grand Theory, or from political authorities.
   (b) Use data to ensure that the claimed difficulty in fact exists.
2. Generate alternative possible causal explanations for the difficulty, and choose between them.
3. Propose alternative solutions for the difficulty. These must address the causes revealed by the explanations selected. Choose between these proposed solutions.
   (a) Use data on costs and benefits to choose between them.
4. Implement and monitor the solution.
   (a) Use data to determine how well the solution resolves the original difficulty. (It never works perfectly. That raises a new difficulty and the process repeats itself.)

This sort of research denies any contradiction between "academic" and "policy" research. In the same research, one must generate explanations that constitute general propositions embodying reliable knowledge, proposals for solution (i.e. "policy"), and an agenda for testing them.

The validity of this agenda (and therefore the validity both of the propositions of reliable knowledge and policy recommendations it produces) depends upon a special meaning it attaches to the word "cause", and the agenda's explicit use of experience as the test of knowledge. Most social scientists today accept the central proposition of the dialectic, that all the world constitutes an interrelated, mutually interacting set of actors and forces. Marxists addressed this in the counter-intuitive assertion of the unity of opposites. Even though superficially phenomena seem antagonistic, they have an underlying relationship. Whatever their ideological convictions, practically all social scientists today accept the notion of interrelatedness.

The startling proposition of the unity of opposites wars with the methodology by which we ordinarily seek to comprehend phenomena. Most social scientists look for hypotheses that identify an independent and dependent variable. In that view, one set of events determines another set of events, in a causal relationship that travels in only one way.

That denies human choice for it supposes that given a particular independent variable, human actors can act in only the way that the hypotheses predicts. Thus a person may hold to the notion that the mode of production (in Marxist thought, the base) determines the legal order (part of the superstructure). At independence, Tanzania had a colonial capitalist mode of production. Following the one-way, causal notion, that base determines the superstructure, Tanzania's failure to use the law and the state fully to restructure its mode of production becomes inevitable.¹⁶
That denies the dialectic's command. If all social behaviour interrelates, then just as the activity that constitutes the mode of production "causes" the activity that constitutes the legal order, so the legal order "causes" the mode of production. That leads to an intellectual cul-de-sac. If everything determines everything, how to understand anything? I suggest that an answer to that question depends upon an analysis of action.

Action implies choice. Psychologists have an interest in instinctive, reflexive behaviour. Social scientists and historians study action—that is, behaviour involving choice. The simplest model of society consists of people and collectivities choosing within a world they did not choose.

In that mode, the constraints and resources of their arena of choice channels people's action. It is as though the actor walked through a forest with trees, rocks, swamps, ponds, rivers. He must choose his path. That choice he makes within the constraints and resources embodied in the forest. Without divine intervention, he cannot easily pass through a rock wall, nor walk on water. By explicating the structure of the traveller's world—the external forest and his subjective appreciation of it—we can explain his actions. In this special sense, we can state the causes of his behaviour. Based on that explanation, we can propose ways to rearrange his milieu—by driving a tunnel through a rock wall, perhaps, or bridging a river—and thus to structure his arena of choice. The material world constrains choice and thus constrains the range of outcomes; thus behaviour depends upon the real world. Because within the arena of choice man can choose, he can by his actions change the world. People choose amidst the constraints and resources of the world. We explain their behaviour by explicating their arenas of choice.17

The proposed agenda for research differs from the usual model in a second way. It explicitly incorporates the notion of what John Dewey called learning through experience (Marxists and others call it praxis). It perceives all policy interventions as a sort of experiment. The implementation of a proposal for solution generates data that tests all preceding steps. If the bridge falls down, it may demonstrate the faultiness of the construction, the engineering, or even the basic physics and mechanics upon which the design rested. Problem-solving research thus uses experience as the test of validity. We learn through doing.

**Perspective and Grand Theory**

In problem-solving, a variety of discretionary choices exist. Obviously, if only the subjective value-sets of the researcher controls those choices, the result must rest upon those, not upon data, just as the result in the ends-means agenda explicitly rests upon the values that guided the choice of ends. How to guide those discretionary choices?

Different researchers typically use one of three different sorts of guides. Some merely declare their personal, subjective values—"basic human needs" or "freedom", for example. Others use an Utopian vision or ideal type—"free enterprise" or "socialism". Still others base themselves on Grand Theory, such
as Marxism or neo-classical economics. Values, ideal types, Grand Theory: all serve as functional equivalents in guiding discretionary choices in problem-solving research. A researcher with a populist value-set will in general likely make much the same research decisions as one with a socialist ideal-type or one adhering to Marxist theory.

Although they constitute functional equivalents, these three guides to discretion have quite different epistemological statuses. Data cannot directly control subjective values or selection of an Utopian ideal type. If asked to justify adherence to a populist perspective or a socialist ideal type, one can appropriately respond, "That is the sort of man I am." Typically, they state ends or goals.

Grand Theory, however, consists of explanations. Karl Marx's *Capital* purports to explain the workings of the British economy. He spent twenty years in the British Museum finding the data to test his explanation. One is told that the word "socialism" does not appear in its four long volumes. Adam Smith did not write a tract in favour of capitalism. He wrote an explanation for the *Wealth of Nations*. If asked to justify adherence to Grand Theory, one can appropriately respond only by explicating the data that falsifies contrary theory and supports one's own.

The use of Grand Theory, however, does not completely solve the difficulty. All Grand Theory aims at explanation of what its author perceives as the principal difficulty of the society. Karl Marx chose to explain capitalism's poverty amidst plenty. Max Weber chose to explain how the ruling class managed to maintain power despite the injustice of the system. Marx's explanation leads to revolutionary solutions, Weber's to repressive ones.

In the final analysis, therefore, one cannot avoid having a perspective. One must choose sides. One must do research from the perspective of the man on top, or from the perspective of the man underneath. Once having made that choice, however, the use of Grand Theory can substitute the use of data and reason for mere subjective value-choice. Today, practically no academic admits to an aristocratic perspective. We all march under the populist banner. In principle, therefore, we can use data to resolve our differences.

Models

The third criterion of relevance in research consists of the vocabulary we use. This filters information. The Eskimos are said to have thirty-two words for snow; English has a paltry few. Obviously Eskimos see differences in snow conditions that we do not.

In the social sciences, in general, vocabularies arise out of ideal types or models. Theorists construct models as first-cut explanations of phenomena. Max Weber's models of bureaucracy, for example, set a vocabulary for talking about bureaucracy that held for two generations. Here I offer a model of obedience to law.

Those who wield state power cannot do so effectively until they learn to use it to induce changed behaviour. They must have at least a theory about why people obey the law.
As we have seen, the interconnectedness of the world requires a model of society in which individuals and collectivities make choices within the range of constraints and resources of their milieu—i.e. within an arena of choice. In the face of a rule of law requiring him to act in a particular way, the individual will do so if, but only if:

1. The rule prescribes the desired behaviour with sufficient precision so that he can follow it;
2. He receives notice of the existence of the rule and its content;
3. He has opportunity to obey;
4. He has capacity to obey;
5. It serves his interest to obey;
6. His ideologies, values or other subjective factors lead him to perceive that his interest lies in obedience; and he will more likely obey if he makes up his mind about obeying or not in a public, participatory forum.18

The legal order impinges upon the arena of choice in two ways. First, lawmakers address a rule to individuals or collectivities, prescribing behaviour. Second, laws command officials to intervene in the addressee’s arena of choice in ways likely to induce conforming behaviour. Many people perceive “legal” intervention narrowly to mean only punishments, designed to affect the interests of the addressee. If an addressee knows that disobedience will likely end with his neck and head parting company, the argument goes, he will likely choose to obey.

The model suggested, however, argues that disobedience may have many explanations besides interest. To induce conforming behaviour, therefore, officials may have to interfere in the arena of choice at a variety of points: they may help communicate the law; provide opportunity to obey through education or by supplying inputs to create capacity to obey; to induce addressees to increase agricultural production, pay higher prices for produce or supply dip-tanks for cattle; by education and political activity change the addressee’s ideology; by structuring the addressee’s decision-making process into a public, participatory, small group discussion, make it more likely that he will decide to obey.

This vocabulary makes it possible to structure research which takes as the independent variable the activities that comprise the legal order. If we can explain a problematic situation in terms of how the legal order deals with it, it becomes possible to propose a solution addressed to the cause identified. Put more simply, if we can explain a difficulty in terms of the legal order, we can propose amendments to the law that may lead to a solution. If we can explain how the legal order creates, sustains and reproduces under-development, we can propose ways to amend the legal order so as to induce development.

Research on theory

Methodology, Grand Theory, vocabulary; these constitute the basic building blocks of theory. The adequacy of the theory that emerges depends upon the adequacy of the building blocks.
Every specific piece of research thus tests our building blocks. In all our research, we must expose our methodology, our Grand Theory, and our vocabulary to the test of data. Just as building and monitoring a bridge may test the basic physics upon which the engineer based the design, so the implementation of a law may test the methodology, Grand Theory, and vocabulary used in the research that led to the new law.

Some specific topics

Law and economic development

If a private entrepreneur came to a competent corporate lawyer with a proposal to create a new hotel corporation, he would expect this lawyer to advise him about the structure of the corporation: the qualifications for the board, the capital structure, the powers and privileges of various shares, the officers of the corporation, and so forth. He comes to the lawyer because the lawyer presumably has expertise in these areas. If he raised a question about which the lawyer had no expertise, the lawyer would consult the books, in the reasonable expectation that most questions that private entrepreneurs raise, scholars have researched and published.

A great deal of research exists upon the institutions of the legal order in developed capitalist countries, usually from a perspective that can lead only to incremental change within the existing institutional framework. For example, literally reams of articles discuss the specific working of company law (i.e. the law of private corporations). Thousands of articles examine industrial relations law in Britain or the United States. Businessmen must know how law works. Only so can they make investments with some degree of assurance about their exposure to state action. Ever eager to please, academics have provided the necessary research.

By contrast, the Minister who enquires about what Development Planning Act will best serve Zimbabwe, will have great difficulty in finding anybody who, on the basis of extant research can answer his question. What sorts of structures will most likely produce the best development plans? What sorts of laws will most likely induce the behaviour that those structures imply? Research on these and other questions deeply implicated in development hardly exists. I list a variety of titles for research related to economic development:

The law of economic planning
Land use planning
Land tenure reform for producer co-operatives
Cooperative law
The law governing the training of high-level manpower
Mining law
Irrigation law
The law governing agricultural extension
Marketing Board law
The law of development banking
Insurance law for development
Multinational corporate activity within the country (i.e. an Investment Code)
The law of nationalization
Tax law for development.

Seemingly, the list can go on endlessly.

A special need exists for research on the law and institutions relating to regional integration. Zimbabwe will not likely forego building its own electric power plant, instead to purchase power from Mozambique’s Cabora Bassa hydro-electric plant, unless it has guarantees that if the regime in Mozambique should change, the regime would not use electricity as a weapon against Zimbabwe.

Forging a legal order that ensures a high probability of compliance becomes difficult enough within a nation-state in which the state has a monopoly of legitimate violence, and all the pulls upon human volition associated with legitimacy. How to create a supra-national legal order that induces a high degree of compliance without ultimate reliance upon coercion? That poses a problem of great difficulty. Experience during the Zimbabwean war of liberation demonstrated that an international system can achieve compliance. Zambia and Rhodesia (as it then was) participated in a common electricity grid. Even though Zambia kept closed the border between it and Zimbabwe, electricity from a power plant on the Zimbabwean side of the border continued to light Zambia’s cities and run its coal mines. What can we learn from that experience to help us create new laws and institutions likely to replicate it?

Research on the legal order itself

Development requires a gaggle of new laws and new sorts of implementation. These laws differ fundamentally from those of the old regime. That is to say, development requires a new range of decisions from the State’s law-making and law-implementing institutions.

Many theorists conceive the state as an infinitely flexible bureaucratic tool. In England, the civil service boasts that, without changing its structure under Labour it can nationalise industry, and under the Conservatives denationalise it. In this view, at most a development-minded government need change some of the personnel in the decision-making structure.

An alternative theory argues that, while a new government must of course recruit and socialize people differently from before, the requirements of change in the decision-making institutions of the state go beyond that.¹⁹

A decision-making structure consists of input processes and institutions, conversion processes and institutions, feedback processes and institutions, and outputs.
The range of outputs depends upon the range of inputs, the range of feedbacks, and the kinds of conversion processes that the system admits. That depends upon the precise sorts of processes and institutions that constitute the decision-making institution as a whole. These determine the sorts of people recruited for various posts, their socialization (and hence likely their perspectives), the kinds of theories put forward, the data taken into account, the issues addressed, the information about previous decisions received, the relative freedom for innovation, and a host of factors that together preform the range of outputs.

A decision-making structure in time comes to respond to the order of problems that present themselves for decision. In time de jure and de facto procedures and institutions come to limit inputs, feedbacks and conversion processes to those that ensure a range of outputs that does not threaten the extant political, social and economic order. The man who sits on the shoulders of the others thus need not interfere in every decision. He can rest assured that whatever decisions emerge from the decision-making machinery of the state, will not threaten his superior position. The decision-making structures of the colonial state ensured that, however much an occasional decision might seem to threaten the interests of a particular fraction of the ruling class, overall the decisions that emerged would not threaten the continued existence of the system as a whole.

Decision-making institutions, like other institutions, consist of the repetitive patterns of behaviour of their various actors. The legal order defines the decision-making institutions of the state by laying down norms for the behaviour of judges, ministers, civil servants, police, public corporations, and all the rest of the great buzzing process that makes up the legal order and the state.

If Africa's independent states propose to develop, they must change the law that governs their political economy. To change those laws requires new decision-making structures whose range of outputs will consist of decisions quite different from those required to sustain the old economic order. Lenin put it more colourfully. He said that as its first task the Revolution must "smash" the
bourgeois state. One cannot "smash" the state with brickbats. Of course one must change the state's personnel. That does not suffice: one must also devise a new legal order likely to bring about a new patterns of behaviour by the actors who comprise the legal order itself.

The projects that call for research read like a roll-call of the various state institutions. I mention a few:

- Ministerial structures ("development administration" as opposed to "public administration")
- Parliament
- Courts, both appellate and trial
- Police
- The organization of public enterprise
- Legislative drafting.

A government represents those to whom it listens. To use the vocabulary of our decision-making model, those who supply inputs and feedbacks influence the output. One can say the same thing in yet another way: Government represents those who participate in the decision-making process. If Government seriously proposes to represent the little man who carries the rich and powerful on his shoulders, it must structure participatory governmental institutions. How to do that becomes a central theme for research on the legal order.

**Conclusion**

A government bent on development in favour of the mass of the population must enact new laws likely to induce changes in the old, oppressive order. However phrased, knowledge about how to use law to change things does not spring from a lawyer's mind as did Athene from the brain of Zeus, full grown and fully clothed. That knowledge comes only from the study of how governments have tried to use law to change society, and what has worked, and why, and what has not worked, and why. To develop sound theory we must study practice, just as the study of practice becomes meaningless without a theory.

A workers' and peasants' government without knowledge about how to change institutions cannot "smash" the state. Without knowledge it cannot induce changed behaviour. Unless it can do that, it cannot institute new modes of production, nor create new decision-making institutions likely to produce change-oriented laws, nor create the new participatory institutions that constitute a necessary condition for government to represent not the classes but the masses. It cannot create new state institutions whose actors will obey the rules - that is adhere to the minimum content of the principle of legality.

Unless the new government quickly brings about changed institutions, however, it is likely to lose its revolutionary opportunities, whatever its present good intentions. Capitalist institutions require capitalists. Like all institutions capitalist ones reproduce themselves. To do that, they continuously create capitalists. If Robert Mugabe's government does not quickly transform the received
legal order, the capitalist and authoritarian institutions it defines will create a new class of capitalists. Experience teachers that those new capitalists will come from the ranks of those positioned to seize their advantage – that is, whatever their ideological purity or professed revolutionary ardour, from among the members of the new political élite. Then learned scholars will explain it all in terms of implacable forces, psychological weaknesses, or the petit bourgeois character of the government.

The regrettable failure of so many African revolutions has led an increasing number of scholars to conclude that world capitalist forces have such strength that inevitably they will bring all small Third World countries under their control – at least all except those that have oil in large quantities. They argue that in fact African leaders have no space within which to choose. They argue that the very notion of a discipline of law and development contradicts reality, for it assumes that change can happen.20

As its central methodological assertion, Marxism claims that freedom requires that we recognise reality. That aphorism encapsulates the dialectic. It thunders a command that revolutionaries only at risk ignore. We cannot dream our way to a better world, but we can change it. Man made it, man can change it. As it did for Marx, that delightfully Eighteenth Century Enlightenment assertion remains true today. Despite its many constraints in the area of the nation-state, to induce societal change, organised governments have as their principal tool the legal order. Unless academics study how the legal order induces change, we cannot generate the knowledge that revolutionary government must have in order to transform society. I know of no polity for which anybody would claim perfection.

Within a world of his own choosing, however, man must decide where to go next. He must choose. Governments exercise choice by employing the legal order in one fashion or another. To make choice meaningful scholars ought to get about the business of supplying reliable knowledge that will make it possible to "smash the bourgeois state". They must study the workings of the legal order. In short, they must do research about Law and Development.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

I am indebted to Stewart Cant for helpful criticisms, although mistakes, of course are mine alone.

1. In a lecture at the University of Zimbabwe in September 1981.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
6. See e. g. Co-operative Societies, Cap. 193 (Zimbabwe).
7. The quotation comes from Thomas Jefferson's campaign song in the election of 1800.
18. Ibid.
CHAPTER 15

Public Administration in Lesotho: An Outline of Research Needs

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Introduction

This paper has been written with two main aims in mind. First, it contains a summary report of some research which has been carried out on Lesotho’s system of public administration in recent years. Secondly, and arising out of the work done, we try to suggest directions in which research might usefully go in the future. We would thus hope that our paper will be of some value to scholars in the public administration field who wish to carry out fieldwork in Lesotho. Although our concern in this paper is mainly with the administration of rural development in the districts, we have also made a few comments about possibilities for research on urban local government and administration and on central government administration.

Administration at the district level

Until recently the main district representative of the Ministry of Interior, and the head of Government at district level, was the District Administrator (D.A.). At Independence in 1966, Lesotho inherited the colonial post of District Commissioner. This was changed soon after to District Administrative Secretary. In 1970 a further change took place and the post of District Administrator was created. The powers and functions of this post were formulated in a Cabinet Circular of that year\(^1\). At the time the D.A.s were part of the Prime Minister’s Office; some years later they were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. The main point stressed in the Circular was that the D.A. should “take effective control of District Administration and represent the Government in each district”\(^2\) (underlining in original).

It was possible to classify the functions of the D.A. into two types. The first were broadly formulated functions for which the D.A. was not given executive power, nor the necessary manpower. For example, he was expected to initiate district level planning and pay special attention to agricultural development. There was a second group of more precisely formulated functions for which the D.A. was given executive powers. Included under this heading were...
chieftainship affairs, the administration of land, the administration of the district headquarters and the financial administration of the district (for which he was responsible to the Accountant-General). In addition, the D.A. was directly responsible to the Prime Minister's Office for matters relating to defence and security. The appointment of a D.A. was not just a matter for the parent ministry, Interior, but needed the approval of the Prime Minister's Office.

The role of the D.A. from the development point of view was more apparent than real. With emphasis on lines of command directly from Ministerial headquarters in Maseru to field staff, the coordination function at district level was not performed very successfully. The D.A. had responsibility, but lacked authority over representatives of other Ministries, in the absence of which that responsibility could not be fulfilled. Some D.A.s, however, achieved more than others; much seemed to depend on the personality of particular incumbents of the post and on the spirit of cooperation prevalent among civil servants in a particular district. Another major problem was the frequency of turnover of D.A.s. For example, most of those who were visited in 1978 were replaced in 1979. In such circumstances, there was nothing like enough time for an officer to gain adequate knowledge of his district in the way required by the 1970 circular. This, of course, not only limited their effectiveness in developmental terms but also posed problems for such other tasks as dealing with chieftainship and security. The post of D.A. was abolished in November 1980. Head of Government at district level became the District Coordinator (D.C.). This officer is on the establishment of the Cabinet Office and directly responsible to the Senior Permanent Secretary, the head of the civil service.

The D.C.s are officers of higher rank than the D.A.s, being equivalent to Deputy Permanent Secretaries, and have direct access to the Senior Permanent Secretary. The Government produced terms of reference for the D.C.s in 1981. Although many of their duties and responsibilities are the same as those of the former D.A.s, there are significant differences. The main one is that district heads of Ministries and Departments will be required to report directly to him on policy whilst being permitted to communicate with their headquarters only on technical/professional matters. It would be premature to comment in detail on the working of these new arrangements. However, the terms of reference clearly make D.C.s more powerful figures than were the D.A.s.

An important place at the district level is also occupied by the Ministry of Agriculture and Marketing. (Until 1979 it also had responsibility for cooperatives). It should be understood that the term "Agriculture" includes what is in many countries called Animal Husbandry.

Until 1980 the senior official in the district was the District Agricultural Coordinator (D.A.C.). Subordinate to him were representatives of various divisions of the Ministry such as nutrition, livestock and crops. The post of D.A.C. was seen as a way of improving coordination between the various divisions in the districts. The D.A.C. was expected to develop a more unified approach as an alternative to the somewhat fragmented structure prevalent in the early 1970s.

The D.A.C. was faced with the same sort of problem as the D.A., and now
the D.C., except that the D.A.C. had to coordinate the work of officers within the same ministry rather than that of officers of various ministries. Whilst improvements seem to have occurred during the period due to the D.A.C.s, the specialised nature of the agricultural extension services remained a difficult issue.

In order to reverse this trend the Ministry of Agriculture and Marketing is at present introducing administrative reform. In the first place, the D.A.C. has recently been replaced by the District Agricultural Officer (D.A.O.) as head of the Ministry at district level. D.A.O.s tend to be considerably younger, but mostly hold degrees, unlike the D.A.C.s. Understandably, the take over has been painful in some instances, but on the whole the D.A.C.s and D.A.O.s have been able to work out some form of cooperation.

The second measure is a shift away from the specialised agricultural extension agent to the multi-purpose extension agent. No longer is a district served by several Divisions within the Ministry, working largely in an uncoordinated fashion. All former specialised extension agents have been united in a multi-purpose extension service. As part of this exercise the D.A.C. was restyled District Extension Officer (D.E.O.) and as such is heading the district extension service.

Since independence, Lesotho has had substantial experience of internationally funded area based development projects with the emphasis on agriculture. As has been found elsewhere, the excessive tendency of these projects towards autonomy from government has vitiated their contribution to agricultural development in the long term. To correct this a programme covering all the lowland areas for the country was introduced in an attempt to alleviate certain basic farming constraints which had been identified.

Thus the Basic Agricultural Services Programme (B.A.S.P.) was operating in most of the lowland area of Lesotho in 1979. It has several major components: a system of stores for the supply of inputs to farmers; mobile crop purchasing teams; the improvement and maintenance of roads; extension; credit; and help in the repair and maintenance of farming equipment. These components have been based on key farming constraints identified by the Ministry of Agriculture. Funding for B.A.S.P. has been arranged through the Governments of the United Kingdom, West Germany and the E.E.C. The programme has gone some way to meeting its commitments in terms of infrastructural developments. Roads, stores etc. have been built, albeit a long way behind schedule (a variety of administrative difficulties have occurred – for example, financial delays, lack of personnel and poor cooperation from other ministries).

Our third Ministry for review is Cooperatives and Rural Development. As noted earlier, cooperatives are a recent addition to the Ministry – until 1979 it formed part of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, even the Ministry of Rural Development itself is quite a recent creation, only having been formed in 1976. At the time of its formation, the new Ministry was intended to perform a general coordinating role covering all aspects of rural development. But its position vis-à-vis other key ministries was never clarified and it is now a minor rural works ministry with a particular role to play in fostering community participation. Among the works functions carried out by the Ministry are village water sup-
plies, access tracks, communal gardens, clinic improvements and soil conservation works. All of these activities potentially overlap with the work of existing Ministries. For example, on the face of it, a function such as the construction of village water supplies might be farmed out to the Ministry of Water, Energy, and Mining or the building of access tracks to Works. However, what all of the listed functions have in common is an emphasis on involving local communities actively in the exercise from beginning to end. For this purpose, each district is headed by a District Community Development Officer (D.C.D.O.) who may have one or two other officers with community development training to assist him. Also, a limited number of technical staff may also be available to assist in the various works activities.

A problem which is likely to arise in a ministry such as Rural Development is the tendency to encourage (or “motivate”) communities to express their “felt needs” but without having the subsequent capacity to meet them. This is precisely what has happened in the case of Village Water Supplies, one of the major functions of the ministry. Quite a lot of research has now been carried out on this particular subject and several points emerge. Far more villages want water supplies than can be readily provided with them, given existing technical capacity. As of 1978, the ministry was faced with a backlog of about 500 applications. If (optimistically) a rate of construction of 35–40 per year can be achieved, the backlog may be cleared by 1990, assuming (again optimistically) that few further applications are received. Until recently maintenance has been neglected with the result that about 20 per cent of supplies in the country need attention—meaning that about 30,000 people are either not receiving water at all from a supply which has been installed or that it is being received irregularly. Critical needs for improvements in the village water supply system are: increased technical capacity within the districts, both for construction and maintenance; increased involvement of communities in the management of their own systems; better planning of supplies at district level; and improved monitoring at central government level. It must be said that the ministry is quite aware of these requirements and is taking measures to meet them.

With the recent shift of the Department of Cooperatives to the ministry, an additional burden has been imposed on its organisation. Many cooperative societies are in difficulty but the department’s staffing position is precarious as often a district will have only one assistant to cope with ten or more cooperatives. At present, the department is moving in the direction of multi-purpose cooperatives which will cater for a wide range of activities—marketing, thrift and credit and the communal purchase of agricultural implements and consumer goods.

Our final ministry for review is Health and Social Welfare. The evidence suggests that this ministry has taken a considerable interest in decentralisation over the last few years. Instrumental in this development has been its acceptance of the concept of “Primary Health Care” — a stress on the importance of taking health care closer to the people of the country. Thus, P.H.C. implies a closer working knowledge on the part of health personnel of the conditions under which communities actually live. This is a prerequisite if the preventive element in P.H.C. is to come to the fore.
P.H.C.’s acceptance has also had implications for the ministry’s thinking in the financial sphere. Most officials interviewed took the view that the power to spend needs to be decentralised for P.H.C. to work. This is primarily because many financial decisions need to be based to a considerable extent on conditions existing in rural communities.

So far we have dealt with each of four ministries individually. Our analysis of the work of the D.A. suggested that he achieved little by way of co-ordination of their various activities. There is, however, another mechanism for coordination available – the District Development Committee. When originally founded in 1966 the membership of the D.D.C. was confined to civil servants. However, subsequently a variety of non-civil servants have been included, such as chiefs, “prominent citizens” (pro-government politicians) and traders. In addition the D.A. (who was chairman of the D.D.C.) frequently requested representatives of villages or institutions to be discussed at a particular D.D.C. meeting to attend. Judging by the general pattern of attendance, however, the D.D.C. is still primarily a civil service dominated committee. A possible exception is in the new district of Thaba-Tseka where attempts are being made to organise the committee in a more representative way. In general the D.D.C.s are not only unrepresentative (this even applies to the non-civil servants such as prominent citizens and chiefs) but have other problems associated with them. First, the D.D.C.s have no funds of their own and are limited to making suggestions to headquarters. Secondly, little is done in the D.D.C.s which can be described as district planning. Thirdly, communication with ministerial headquarters is poor.

Chiefs and villages

So far we have done relatively little work at the village level but a few observations can nevertheless be made. First, by virtue of the way they are recruited (i.e. inheritance), the performance of the chiefs is very random. Some of them perceive their roles very actively and make as much use as they can of the opportunities available to them to develop their areas. Others do practically nothing and contribute to the demoralisation of their people.

Although at a rather slower pace than in most other African countries, the power of the chiefs has been declining as a result of central government policy. The process began in the colonial period. More recently, the Land Act of 1979 has further diminished their powers.

In addition to diminished legal authority, chieftainship is also losing traditional authority as a result of changes in Lesotho’s society as a whole. With decreased legal and traditional authority, a chief’s personality becomes of decisive importance in the performance of his duties, and reinforces the randomness of performance referred to earlier. If the chieftainship is to be preserved, ways will need to be found to increase chiefs’ awareness of their potential role as community leaders in the administration of development.

Hitherto, we have not discussed the working of the Village Development
Committees (V.D.C.s). These committees were mostly established by the ruling B.N.P. party in the period 1970–1973.

Responsibility for them is now vested in the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development. Detailed research remains to be done but some observations can be made. First, the committees are often excessively politicised, thus making them divisive rather than fostering a unified approach to village development. Secondly, their relationship with the Ministry seems to have led to their only paying attention to matters within that ministry's purview. Many of them seem to concentrate almost entirely on village water supply to the exclusion of such crucial developmental issues as agriculture and health. Thirdly, the ability of the ministry to advise V.D.C.s on development matters is low because of the shortage of field staff working in the villages. Fourthly, the non-responsiveness government to V.D.C. requests and proposals tends to promote feelings of apathy.

Local administration and government in urban areas

In the colonial period the urban areas were administered by the District Commissioner, who usually consulted the Principal Chief on major decisions. During the period of the District Councils 1959–1968, the administration of the towns was largely a matter of local government. With the abolition of local government in 1968, Central Government became responsible for the provision of urban services, with the Ministry of the Interior in a coordinating role.

For Maseru Town, a separate Office, part of the Ministry of the Interior, was established soon after the abolition of the District Councils. This Office, chronically understaffed, lacking funds and prestige, has been unable to provide Maseru with an efficient administration.

Recognising the lack of services and inefficient administration of Maseru, Government decided to create a local authority for the Town which is intended to be established in the course of 1982. For this purpose an Urban Government Bill is being prepared and a large portion of our work in 1981 concerned consultancy on the introduction of urban local government in Maseru.

Research priorities: some suggestions

In many less developed countries research of the kind here described confronts serious obstacles. In a number of countries it is extremely difficult to carry out political science/public administration research at all. In others, it is necessary for a complicated procedure of “research clearance” to be undertaken, involving detailed official scrutiny of research proposals. Further, in some countries, once such research exercises begin, the investigation is likely to be hindered at various points. All of this is symptomatic of the fear many governments entertain concerning the possible damaging effects for them of detailed research into “sensitive” issues. The problem is by no means confined to the less developed countries where, however, it seems to be especially prevalent.

As far as our work is concerned, it is possible to paint a broadly positive
picture of the relationship which has been developed between research team and government. Liaison was firmly established early on and has been maintained quite well ever since. Problems, of course, have arisen over such matters as access to files, interviewees feeling threatened and therefore replying in a tense manner, etc. Broadly, however, the government has been anxious to assist rather than to obstruct. In our view, this outlook augurs well for future research activities in allied fields. The climate for administrative research in Lesotho may, then, be classified as a relatively "open" one.

We have identified scope for possible future administrative research at three levels: the centre; the district; and sub-district. It should not be expected that our list is exhaustive, merely that it represents an indication of work in the field which may prove of interest.

Central government level

At Central Government level, there is clearly much to be done. To begin, with, there is much scope for consultancy by researchers who are outside government. It is, however, far from obvious that they should be from outside Lesotho as well. In our view, there is quite a contribution here to be made by the University's Department of Political and Administrative Studies (renamed as such in 1981), by researchers from the Institute of Southern African Studies, and by other outside bodies such as the Institute of Development Management.

As far as decentralization is concerned, it is clear that a vital component of the exercise concerns central management. If a reform of this kind is to work, there is need for a coordinating authority at the centre to both control the process and to give impetus should inertia take root. The government is currently attempting to establish authority of this kind within the Prime Minister's Office, following suggestions made by the 1980 Roma Decentralization Workshop. Research in the future could usefully give attention to the operations of the central authorities in dealing with decentralization.

Secondly, we do not as yet have much information (beyond the very impressionistic) as far as attitudes towards reform are concerned. At central government level, we suspect that key decision-makers are far from unanimous about the present reform directions. It might be possible to carry out an analysis, mainly on the basis of interviews, of what sort of attitude Ministers, Permanent Secretaries etc., may have towards the issues we have been discussing in this paper. In saying this, we do of course recognize that research to assess attitudes on complex policy issues is not without theoretical and practical difficulty. Nevertheless, we consider research along these lines important for an assessment of possibilities for administrative reform in the country.

Another area we have barely touched so far is the role of the National Assembly. Firstly, it will be very useful to discover rather more about how parliamentarians see the issue of government performance in rural development. Also, by looking at particular policy matters it could be interesting to see just how far the assembly does have a policy-making role. Is it a mere rubber-stamp? Or does it carry some weight in central government policy deliberations?
Another research area worth exploring could be the field of personnel management. Issues such as recruitment, training, staff appraisal and organisation and methods are all in need of inquiry. Public Administration researchers with skills in these fields may help both to identify "bottlenecks" and, perhaps suggest remedies.

So far, our work has only marginally investigated financial administration. Yet it is clear that decentralization can only work if satisfactory financial arrangements are reached. As a beginning, work is needed on what the budgetary process amounts to now. A second stage would be an examination of how changes are occurring as a result of decentralization. As an example here, it would be useful to look at how the D.C.s are using their newly created powers in the field of public finance. In the future, there may be consultancy to be done on the financial aspects of devolution.

On a more historical note, it might be worth exploring the past record of the area based development projects in Lesotho (e.g. Thaba-Bosiu, Khomokhoana) to see if there is anything to be learnt from them as far as administration is concerned. It seems to be generally agreed that the overall picture is a rather dismal one. Our question, however, would be how far administrative factors have contributed to failures observed. A difficulty here, of course, is that most of the expatriates concerned are no longer in Lesotho. There should, however, be a lot of material on file and many Basotho participants to interview. We do not discount the possibility of bias here; at the same time, we feel this to be a problem which adequately sensitive researchers should be able to overcome.

District level

Turning to the districts, a crucial issue would appear to be the role played by the District Coordinators. They have now been in post for over a year, long enough for early teething problems to have been sorted out and for the emergence of some sort of administrative pattern. At the moment, little detailed work has been done regarding the D.C.s, and it is clearly important for the whole decentralization exercise to see how this innovation is working in practice. Of particular interest would be some account of the relationships the D.C.s have with other heads of department in the districts.

Are they the powerful figures the proposed terms of reference suggest, or are they little more than thinly disguised versions of the old D.A.s? The extent of the D.C.s' political role is also a matter perhaps worth investigating.

Another recent innovation of some potential importance has been the introduction of District Agricultural Officers together with moves to reorganize the whole agricultural extension service. These developments might also repay detailed study, possibly along the lines of David Leonard's work in Western Kenya. The latter focused a good deal of attention on both the internal dynamics of the agricultural extension service and on the interaction of extension agents with the farming population. To our knowledge, there has been little work along these lines in Lesotho.

It is our view that additional work could be carried out on the District
Development Committees. We already have a set of questionnaires from participants awaiting detailed analysis. When this work is completed we should at least have improved understanding of how the D.D.C. operated in the past. It should, however, now be possible to go beyond that and monitor the efforts being made to strengthen district planning. There may even be scope here for action research, in which researchers themselves become involved in the drafting of district planning guidelines and the adoption of new management procedures. Robert Chambers has reported in detail on work along these lines carried out elsewhere. In the Lesotho case, there should be opportunities for collaboration with the various government ministries involved in district planning, including the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development which has recently posted District Resource Planners in the field.

Crucial for the improvement of district level planning is the reinforcement of links between sub-district, district and Central Government level. As has been discussed in our paper, these links at the moment are weak and in many cases non-existent. To realize some sort of bottom-up planning, participation by local level institutions in the various stages of the planning process is essential. Therefore, it is not enough to study local level committees and Central Government management of decentralization; the linkage issue in our view is crucial. Improving and institutionalising such links should, among others, contribute to improved access by the people to the bureaucracy, an issue which we mention in some more detail below.

Finally, on the district level, there is a more historical topic which could be of interest, assuming the availability of documentation and reliable informants. In the late 1960s the District Councils first declined in power, then were abolished. No thorough account has yet appeared of how this happened. It is surely important to know something more than we now do in view of the increasing possibility of some form of local government being reintroduced, initially in Maseru Town but subsequently perhaps elsewhere in the country.

**The sub-district level**

Although the Lesotho bureaucracy does not penetrate very deeply below the level of the district, there are many issues directly affecting villagers which require further study. Firstly, the highly complicated Land Act of 1979 is now being implemented. This exercise could be vital for the country's rural development strategy. As yet, we do not know much about the extent of implementation and problems that are arising. There is, for example, a new committee structure brought into being by this piece of legislation. Field studies of the operation of this structure could prove fascinating.

There are, of course, other committees which exist (although without the same statutory basis as the Land Committees). Analysis of their operations could also provide useful data about the realities of rural development in Lesotho. There are numerous important questions to be asked about the Village Development Committees, for example: the extent of representativeness of the mem-
bers; linkages with the formal government machinery; and how far have political and religious divisions in the villages affected their working?

Another complex and vital issue would appear to be chieftainship. The chiefs are certainly in the process of quite significantly losing their powers. For example, the Land Act would appear to have altered their position considerably. If the chiefs are to play any sort of developmental role, some issues such as the following might be explored: people’s perception of the role of chieftainship in development; how far do the views of the chiefs still carry weight with central government; do chiefs influence central government to develop their own wards; do chiefs have any influence at district level; are they playing any role, either positive or negative, in agricultural extension; and how far do they contribute to village self-help activity?

As yet our work on agricultural and health administration has not penetrated to the village level. It would be helpful if work could be done on the impact of such measures as the Basic Agricultural Services Programme and Primary Health Care. In both cases, there would seem to be a lot of scope for interdisciplinary research, drawing in practitioners from such fields as the economics of agriculture and rural sociology. This may prove a particularly fertile field for a research institute encompassing a variety of social science disciplines. Outside evaluation of these two programmes might well be welcomed by the ministries concerned, as well as by the central development planning authorities.

Conclusion

Of course, there are other government programmes which could also be examined along these lines. A further question to raise in such an exercise would not merely be concerned with impact, but also with the extent to which the people have access to the resources and services controlled bureaucratically. Here, an issue to be studied is the degree of inequality of access existing within the rural areas, while also research could be done on a possible “urban bias” in the provision of services. How far do certain groups, individuals etc., have advantages over others in their dealings with bureaucracy as far as resource allocation is concerned?

In sketch form, we have suggested examples of research topics. In no case can we claim to offer a detailed research design nor anything approaching comprehensiveness. However, we feel confident that public administration research can significantly contribute to an improved understanding of Lesotho’s developmental problems.

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Priorities and Opportunities for Historical Research in Swaziland

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Introduction

During the past decade the cascade of literature dealing with capital penetration into Southern Africa and its various consequences has set all of us, liberal and radical, awash. There is no sign of let-up. We have learned that pre-industrial economies were self-sustaining at the very least, some of them very much more than that; and that many were dynamic in their subsequent response to market forces. We have learned that peasants had to be forced to go to work, and how efficient the systems of coercion were. We have learned how those pre-capitalist societies reacted to the seductions and the entrapments of capitalism, some through collaboration, others through patterns of resistance, most, surely, combining the two.

Recently, we have begun to learn more about certain aspects of all of this. Scholars are seeking to discover more about the true nature of pre-capitalist economies; indeed, they are trying to reach agreeable definitions of what a peasant is, and what constitutes peasant history. They want to know more about the nature of migrant labour and the work tasks involved. By reading between the lines they are seeing things that previous scholars did not: the beginnings of worker class consciousness, and its perceptive response to labour market forces and working conditions. Where others saw African indolence and sloth, they see passive resistance. They are seeing declines in agricultural productivity not as further examples of African backwardness, but as consequences of complex forces: changes in work patterns, sex roles, family structures, agricultural technology, and peasant attitudes and values, all consequent to capital penetration. They want to know more about the process of proletarianization, or semi-proletarianization, or whatever term they can agree upon.

Finally, and most importantly, scholars want to know what all of this means. To most of us it suggests that peasant and worker consciousness, collaboration and resistance, alterations in sex roles and other social transformations are all aspects of the wider question, class formation, and that has led to the question, referring to the condition of the masses, of whether anything has changed very much at all.

All of these issues have been studied and re-studied in most areas of South-
ern Africa – Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique, Lesotho – but not Swaziland. I would argue that a great deal can be learned from a closer study of Swaziland.

Partly this is for the reason that has led to its neglect: it is small (out of the way, perhaps), and less of a labour pool than most countries in the catchment area. But limited size does not have to connote insignificance, and it can mean manageability. Insignificant is a relative term: five per cent or less of the labour flowing to the mines in any given year might not seem like much; but if that same migrant labour force constitutes thirty per cent or more of the male working population, its impact on the contributing society becomes considerable. And if twenty per cent or so of the local labour force turns out to be itself imported (making up for outmigration), there are further implications. One of them is that Swaziland, in its smallness, can be seen as a microcosm for issues arising in wider areas. In the previous example, for instance, the question arises of how Swaziland, the recipient of imported migrant labour, deals with it once it becomes surplus. The answer is that it repatriates it pretty much as South Africa does, by forcing it back to its catchment area (in this case, Mozambique and Malawi). When one talks of oscillation in Southern Africa, it turns out one is talking about secondary and even tertiary waves, and Swaziland becomes a compendium of Zimbabwe.

That is not Swaziland's only parallel with Zimbabwe. Indeed, one can easily conclude that Swaziland's neglect in the study of these issues has in part been because it has been misplaced. In many important aspects Swaziland is not at all similar to its sister BLS states, Lesotho and Botswana. In terms of capital penetration and European settlers, its history until quite recently has been much closer to Zimbabwe's than any other area's.

That, in turn, has led to the misperception of Swaziland's significance in the study of underdevelopment. The Swazi experience in responding to, and ultimately capitulating to, capital penetration was, if anything, reminiscent of postmineral South Africa, and 20th century Zimbabwe. It is worth remembering that the Swazi were expelled from two-thirds of their land in 1914, the year after the Natives Land Act. Post-1945 Swaziland was the recipient of massive capitalization from abroad, as were both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Accordingly, the modesty of the Swazi numbers on the Rand mine rosters becomes precisely the point: the migration was largely internal after 1945, in response to this capital penetration; and, one finds, the Swazi response to these postwar forces was vigorous indeed, and eminently worthy of further research.

Research topics

There are at least a half-dozen research topics in the context of this discussion which are both important and viable in terms of available resources. The remainder of this paper will elaborate on them.
Agricultural history

Investigating the pre-industrial economy of Swaziland is essential to the understanding of all that follows. It is not being researched comprehensively, so far as I know. Two dissertations are being written on recent agricultural topics by Edward Mguni (University of Sussex) on cattle; and by Bongi Sikhondze (University of London) on cotton. The agricultural base (especially) of the pre-capitalist economy is dealt with in Philip Bonner's dissertation on the Dlaminis (soon to be published), but it is largely ancillary to his political argument.

Swaziland was generally accepted to have been surplus producing until the mid-1890s, becoming a chronic grain importer after the land expropriation of 1914. In the years after World War I, however, I expect research to find that choice entered the equation; that the Swazi elected to grow cash crops instead of subsistence ones, with needed grain purchased from crop earnings, cattle sales, or wages. The history of technological change and productivity improvement prior to 1970 is largely unresearched. There are indications that returning Swazi war veterans played a role in agricultural modernization.

Capital penetration

Here there are two phases, pre-1945, and postwar.

Pre-1945

A fair amount has been written on the pre-war period. Bonner's treatment of the 1880s concessions period is definitive. Martin Fransman's dissertation, as amplified and elaborated upon by Jonathan Crush, quite adequately describes the subsequent story of the British land partition (1907) and expropriation (1914). My own work will expand on this by suggesting a conspiratorial relationship between settler and colonial state aimed at creating a labour reservoir. Early policy on water allocation, which resulted in disequilibrium of resources between settler and Swazi, is being studied by a law student at Cambridge University, S. G. Heilbron. Work needs to be done on the patterns of settlement and resettlement which resulted from all this, between the wars. Little is known about the consequences (social, political, agricultural, demographic) of Swazi resettlement in the Native Areas, or about the political economy of the newly-acquired European areas.

The initial emphasis of European interest (which profoundly affected the character of the partition) was mining, backed largely by British capital. But this quickly shifted to ranching (in which Afrikaner capital played a larger role) and, by the 1930s, cash-cropping in cotton and tobacco. Keen British-Afrikaner rivalry in this development affected settlement patterns (for example, the Returned Soldiers' Settlement Scheme, and the Mushroom Land Settlement Corporation). The role of entrepreneurs— in particular, Allister Miller— ought to be investigated.
Postwar

Capital penetration into Swaziland in the past 35 years is central to every other area of investigation suggested here, and it has hardly been touched historically. The capital was initially British, later South African, and more recently still, American and Japanese. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Colonial Development Corporation underwrote the first irrigation schemes which gave rise to the sugar and citrus industries. British and South African capital developed the timber industry. During the 1960s and 1970s, foreign capital added mining, food processing, light manufacturing and retail industries. All have transformed the political economy of Swaziland, and shaped its labour market. New horizons have been charted, and new dependencies created. In many ways, Swaziland of 1981 resembles Colin Leys’ Kenya of a decade ago. 6

Labour history

Proletarianization and external migration.

Whatever term one chooses, it is valid to talk of a process in Swaziland by which men and women were placed in a condition of dependency upon wage labour in South African mines, farms, or other industry. Migration, begun in earnest to rebuild cattle herds decimated by Afrikaner-introduced turn-of-the-century epidemics, was later imprinted on the society by the nature of the colonial state’s land expropriation and tax policies. Swazi were placed on reserves which it was known would become overpopulated and overgrazed within a generation. Native Areas of greatest deprivation appear to have generated the greatest rates of pre-adult malnutrition, and of per capita outmigration. The Native Recruiting Corporation (N.R.C.) became established in Swaziland during the 1920s, initially by offering capitation fees to a handful of storeowners/recruiters in or near the Native Areas, and later (postwar) through a network of salaried professional recruiters. A class of migrant labour was produced, signing on for from six to a dozen or more mine tours in a career, before retiring to labour which was less demanding and closer to home, in asbestos, timber, or sugar. The homestead was preserved by the delegation of one or two sons to this task, leaving the family predominantly agricultural (though less productive).

Recruiting competition before the war came from local farms and ranches, and after 1938, the asbestos mine at Havelock. Settlers ensured continuity of their farm labour by making it a condition of post-1914 tenancy (typically six months labour at 10 shillings per month) for all males. A variation provided that one or more males per homestead go forward to the Rand mines, with the farm owner pocketing the capitation fee.

Internal migration

Migrant labour to internal enterprise developed with the rise of asbestos mining and the cotton and tobacco industries. Wattle, sugar, commercial
timber, and irrigated cash crop industries after the war vastly increased flow patterns from traditional source areas (southern Swaziland, where surplus population remained most concentrated). Company vehicles toured the south weekly, engaging labour and returning it on the weekends.

Acute scarcity in the 1950s was partly alleviated by employing women and children, and (in sugar and asbestos especially) Mozambican and Malawian labour. But increasingly, local industry responded to the tight labour market by increasing wages and enhancing benefits (food, quarters, contract length). Timber wages rose from 2s. 3d. 1947 to £1. 10s. per day in 1976. The N.R.C. kept pace with timber and other competing industries as wages rose year by year, but it could not compete with the local industries’ proximity to home, the most important factor to many Swazi. Wages aside, N.R.C. output turned in large part on the length of its contract. The standard 9-month contract of the 1930s was replaced periodically by a 6-month agreement, which, because it allowed for planting and harvesting time, was very popular. The Assisted Voluntary Scheme (A.V.S.) shortened the length to four months. (Labour from Nyasaland and Mozambique, meanwhile, was working under 12, 18, even 24-month contracts, preferred by the mining industry).

Enough Swazi labour responded to these arrangements by signing on with the N.R.C. that, in the view of the local Federation of Employers, the labour market was unacceptably restricted. The Federation, and the European Advisory Council, successfully lobbied for state intervention; from 1950, local employers were allowed to grant cash advances to recruits of £5, while the N.R.C. and other outside recruiters were limited to £3. The N.R.C. was eventually forced to shorten its contract length and raise its wages, in part to compensate. Intense competition for scarce labour continued until the early 1960s, and the Swazi worker was the beneficiary, leveraging his scarcity into better wages and conditions.

Labour class consciousness

Swazi response to these conditions belies the traditional image of the pliable and compliant native labour force. On the contrary, Swazi labour, collectively over the past three decades at least, helped generate the conditions under which their labour was marketed. They did this not only by withdrawing their labour from industries which offered inferior pay or conditions (Peak Timbers, notably, and the N.R.C.) in favour of those better suiting them. They did it as well by creating and cultivating a source of income which provided an alternative to unacceptible work conditions: cattle. Prudent investment in, and shrewd marketing of, cattle provided the wherewithal for many undertakings, not the least of which was avoiding work which was considered unremunerative, unpleasant, demeaning, or dangerous. Swazi marketing practices merit more research, but initial evidence indicates a striking negative correlation between cattle prices and N.R.C. output; and certainly the recruiters were convinced of this.
Labour resistance

The acute labour shortage which gave these relative advantages to Swazi workers lasted only until the early sixties. Relaxation of the market, a response to population growth and a levelling off of capital investment, led companies to withdraw concessions previously granted to attract labour, and to enforce more strictly the existing regulations. Timber companies cracked down on absenteeism, while the N.R.C. reverted to the unpopular 9-month contract. The Swazi labourer responded by unionizing (where he could), and conducting a series of strikes and job actions throughout 1963 and 1964. The most notable unrest occurred at the Big Bend sugar complex, serious enough for British army troops to be flown in to restore order, and remain until 1968. Although the state, backed by the monarchy, suppressed unionism thereafter, overt labour resistance continued for over two years, and continued less discernably well after independence.

Social history

Much of the social history of Swaziland is interrelated with labour history, and, like it, has largely escaped investigation. The growth of the labour market, internal and external, has profoundly affected family and homestead history, and the history of women. Epidemiology, both human and animal, has in turn deeply influenced all these branches of social history. Research thus far has been limited to studies of the homestead and of women, by economists and sociologists, over the recent past. These constitute an excellent beginning, on which must be built studies of social change going back at least one hundred years.

Other history

Aside from the more traditional areas of history meriting investigation (political, colonial), there are several aspects of Swazi history needing research for which significant sources are available. Biographies could profitably be written on two central figures in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: Labotsibeni, Queen Regent from the 1890s to the 1920s, and Allister Miller, a principal in practically every significant political and economic development from 1888 until his death in 1951.

A business history of Swaziland (as distinct from capital penetration) would enable us to know more about the organizational and technological development of postwar industries: sugar, timber, irrigation and railroad systems, mining and the like. A history of the Native Recruiting Corporation and other recruiting organizations, particularly its postwar rivals, Anglo-American and the Natal Coal Owners Labour Association, would be of great interest.
Resources

The primary resource for all subjects mentioned in this paper (and many not touched upon) are the holdings of the Swaziland National Archives, Lobamba. Recently moved from Mbabane, it is currently being organized and catalogued in its new building. Many of the holdings were indexed in 1962 by the Government Archivist, V. F. Ellenberger. It includes extensive documentation of a variety of subjects from the 1880s to the present; possesses a collection of the Times of Swaziland (regrettably incomplete); and holds a handsomely bound and indexed photocopy collection of documents relating to 19th century Swaziland located in the State Archives, Pretoria. In addition to a good collection of secondary sources, its files contain many early photographs, along with some artifacts and memorabilia.

A second important resource for recent history, labour in particular, but many other social aspects as well, are the papers of the Native Recruiting Corporation, located at its old headquarters at Siteki (formerly Stegi). That office was responsible for Swaziland recruiting for the N.R.C. In addition, its recruiting arm extended into northern Natal (through the Maputa and Ingwavuma offices), and the eastern Transvaal (Piet Retief). Moreover, the Stegi headquarters administered the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association’s (Wenela’s) recruiting operations in southern Mozambique, providing an alternative to the heavy flow of labour through the main attestation point of Ressano Garcia. A complete series of monthly reports from the various offices, and from Stegi to Johannesburg in summary form, covering the years 1946 to 1981, describes recruiting and a host of other conditions in Swaziland, northern Natal, southern Mozambique, and the eastern Transvaal, under the following headings: Health of the Natives; Crops and Rainfall; Stock/Cattle Conditions; Recruiting Prospects; District Tours; Labour Supplies to Other Industries; Roads; Voluntary Deferred Pay and Native Remittances; and General.

From these files one can obtain a comprehensive picture of diverse details of life and conditions in Swaziland, among them: cattle marketing; political conditions in the recruiting areas; capital penetration post-1945; introduction of cash crops; cattle disease; climatological conditions and pests; pestilences and human epidemiology; crop conditions and technological change in agriculture; labour relations, conditions, and wages; and others.

The N.R.C. papers also include documents series, mostly complete from 1946 to 1981, covering every aspect of N.R.C./Wenela operations. Much of the material contains quantifiable data.

Other valuable sources are to be found in the various government ministries; the Allister Miller papers (Killie Campbell Library, Durban); and the papers of the Federation of Swaziland Employers, and the Swaziland Chamber of Commerce and Industries.
Conclusion

It will be unfortunate if the underemphasis on historical research in Swaziland should continue, for whatever reason, particularly the assumptions that its size, or the numbers it contributed to the Witwatersrand mines, render it unimportant. Its size in fact makes for relative ease of research, and proffers it as a compendium of, and comparison base for, what was happening elsewhere.

In any study of capital penetration and labour market development in Southern Africa, Swaziland has much to contribute. The Swazi were only one of numerous peasantry’s in the subcontinent which were responding to the forces and the lures of capitalism. The indications are that those responses were as resourceful as any we are now studying. Homestead composition, work roles, cattle and crop husbandry, nutrition patterns, agricultural technology and marketing, and political and social relationships (to name a few) were all transformed, in some cases radically, during this century. Swazi per capita income today, one of the highest figures on the continent, suggest that the peasant response was not without its successes.

Underdevelopment and dependency are currently embattled concepts because they are seen as unidimensional, neglecting the dynamics of peripheral response to capital penetration. Swaziland affords a wealth of resources which will facilitate the reinterpretation of its history. That study, in turn, can make a significant contribution to the revision of Southern African history now taking place.

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PART THREE

PRIORITIES AND THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN THE SADCC MEMBER STATES

Section C

Environment, Health and Education
CHAPTER 17

Resources Survey and Decentralized Planning Priorities in Lesotho

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Introduction

For a number of years the Department of Geography at NUL has offered two applied programmes of study to Basotho students who want to graduate in urban and regional planning (URP) and in the field of the applied environmental sciences (AES). In the context of these programmes coordinated staff-student research is carried out, the results of which are and will be issued in the form of reports.

In this paper we will attempt to indicate the relevance of this integrated approach for resources surveys as well as for decentralized development planning at the district level, in the wider context of development planning priorities in Lesotho.

Development priorities for Lesotho

Lesotho’s broad development aims have recently been formulated as “a reduction of vulnerability, an increase in domestic employment, an increase in social welfare, a promotion of social justice, a protection of the land and water resource base and an exploitation of these to the fullest extent and an ensuring of deeper involvement and fuller participation of the community in national development” (Government of Lesotho 1981: 45). These objectives point to the necessity to concentrate development efforts on the rural parts of Lesotho, hence it appears that the agricultural sector deserves attention in particular.

In the recent past, rural development policy of the Lesotho Government has been focusing on large area-based development projects. These area-based projects have not been successful. A variety of reasons have been mentioned (Nobe and Seckler, 1979; ILO, 1979; Huisman and Sterkenburg, 1981), such as:

(a) the projects were too ambitious in terms of scale, duration and finance;
(b) there was a lack of knowledge of local conditions and priorities;
(c) insufficient attention was given to the price of inputs in relation to the value of output, resulting from a disproportionate attention to increasing production;
(d) a sectoral approach prevailed and the wider context of rural development was often neglected. In particular the relationship between the various
production aspects, between production and conservation, and between production and social services, received insufficient attention;

(e) the execution of the projects was hampered by lack of staff and poor relationships between the project staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers, which often resulted in a lack of motivation especially by the local population.

These and other experiences in the past, have made it clear that the successful implementation of rural development policy in Lesotho requires an institutionalized participation of the rural population in all phases of the planning process and development activities. This should be carried out taking into account the natural environmental and resource conditions of the area. This again is hard to achieve without a decentralization in planning and in plan implementation.

Lesotho has exhibited an increasing centralization in planning and plan implementation since independence. In July 1980 a workshop at NUL, attended by several government representatives, concluded that decentralization is highly desirable and should be regarded as one of the first priorities of Lesotho's development policy. (Workshop on Decentralization, 1980). Decentralized development planning requires an adequate data base and the selection of proper spatial units for planning and plan implementation. Some attention will therefore be paid to the type of development studies carried out in Lesotho so far and to the spatial aspects of development planning in the country.

Types of development and development-related studies in Lesotho

Land resource and land resource surveys

The Third Five Year Development Plan of The Kingdom of Lesotho 1980–1985 mentions as one of the aims of the plan “the protection of the land and water resource base and exploitation to the fullest extent . . . to safeguard and enhance the productivity of our physical heritage” (pp. 45–46).

A large amount of research related to land resources if Lesotho has been undertaken. One needs only to glance through a bibliography on publications relating to the country (Chakela, 1973; Willet & Ambrose, 1980) to realize this.

The bulk of research and publications on land resources in Lesotho was produced by various government departments, by personnel working in the area-based projects and by government appointed consultants.

The major part deals with the inventory (i.e. survey and mapping) of land resources, while a smaller number deal with land evaluation and conservation. Only a few studies focus on land degradation.

Important surveys have been undertaken and much valuable material has been collected. Still, from reading the research results, one cannot escape the impression of a pattern ranging from fairly to distinctly isolated research activities.

An important step towards a more integrated form of land resources research was undertaken by D.O.S. in 1968. The procedure adopted was similar to the one developed by the C.S.I.R.O. of Australia, whereby the lands are subdivided
and grouped according to relief, soils and vegetation criteria and later classified in terms of agricultural potential. A basic technique used was the interpretation of aerial photography, which was supplemented by field checks and laboratory analysis. Apart from its intrinsic value, the study was also important because it showed the way research should be undertaken in order to arrive at optimal use and development of the natural resources of a region. A multidisciplinary approach should produce a comprehensive Land Resources Survey.

The Third Five Year Development Plan of the Kingdom of Lesotho (1981) spells out planned research efforts in relation to the land resources under different categories:

Food and Agriculture (ch. 8)
Water, Mineral Resources and Power (ch. 10)
Cooperatives and Rural Development (ch. 7)

In each of those chapters the importance of the land as a critical resource has been stressed (e.g. p. 187) and the need for research on the land resources in Lesotho is mentioned.

Short-term as well as long-term research plans relating to the land resources of Lesotho, however, are spelled out only in very general terms and relevant remarks are spread over the sections and subsections, seemingly without any coordinative and integrative plan behind them.

Socio-spatial and socio-economic studies on Lesotho

In the socio-economic and socio-spatial fields the number of studies on Lesotho is surprisingly large. Below we will limit ourselves to a few comments only.

Bibliographies show an abundance of studies on the microscale. However, comprehensive studies, in the sense of covering both economic, social and spatial aspects, appear to refer only to very small spatial units, e.g. a village or a number of villages. Within the various area-based development projects ample attention has been paid to data collection, but the reports focus on aspects of the planning environment only. With regard to the macro (national) level it appears that most studies concentrate on a specific resource or on a specific sector of the economy. At the meso level (regional or district level) studies are extremely rare. In this context it seems relevant to question the reason for the paucity of meso level studies.

One explanation would be that a large number of reports were produced by visiting experts who came on short term contracts as consultants. This made it impossible for them to establish intensive contacts with the local population. Furthermore, relatively few reports are based upon primary data. They concentrate mainly on specific development-related aspects at the national level, or on local problems.

The lack of meso level studies of a comprehensive and inventory nature makes the implementation of a decentralized rural development policy an extremely difficult task to carry out. We feel, therefore, that one of the tasks of a national research institute like ISAS should be to study aspects of decentralized rural development planning in this country.
Spatial aspects of development planning in Lesotho

Development planning calls for a clear identification and demarcation of spatial units to which the planning activities refer. The planning at lower levels than the national level is generally seen as having a better chance of realising goals like the participation of the local population in plan formulation and implementation. It is therefore necessary to make a study of typologies of spatial units, their possible role in the process of rural development, and of methods of regionalization (Huisman and Sterkenburg, 1981).

Lesotho's territory can be subdivided into three types of spatial units: administrative units, agro-ecological units and units for the purpose of data collection.

The following types of administrative subdivisions may be distinguished in the country: districts, wards, chiefs' areas, headmen's areas and urban areas. At present the country has ten districts, of which, with the exception of the Thaba-Tseka District, the boundaries have not formally been gazetted. The functions of the district administration, with particular reference to planning, have recently been studied in detail (van de Geer and Wallis, 1980).

Lesotho has 22 wards. Mapping of these wards reveals that the system is far from contiguous. Chiefs' areas and headmen's areas fall within wards and form the lower echelons of the Sotho traditional political system.

In the field of rural development, the major function of the chieftainship is to allocate and revoke land-use rights, in accordance with the Laws of Lerotholi. It is often doubted whether this chieftainship control takes place in an effective way. This doubt applies specifically to security of tenure as an important factor for the increase of agricultural output, and to the communal use of grazing areas in relation to soil conservation problems. We may conclude that, from the point of view of the government, the district is the most suitable unit for decentralized development planning, because of the possibility of utilizing manpower already allocated to the area.

This conclusion should be regarded as being of crucial importance since the government has a coordinating and stimulating role in the development process of the country. The agro-ecological units are of considerable importance to rural development because they provide a set of similar ecological conditions which make uniform measures possible for farming activities. These measures should be based upon a thorough analysis of the natural resources, their carrying capacity, and their use in relation to suitability. Four main studies deal with the subdivision of the Lesotho national space into homogeneous agro-ecological zones. (Youthed, 1963; Morojele, 1963; Phillips, 1963; and Bawden & Carroll, 1968). From study of these reports one may conclude that the usefulness of homogenous agro-ecological zones in Lesotho for planning purposes in rural areas is complicated by the characteristics of the farming system. Agricultural activities, particularly with regard to livestock, often cross the boundaries of these units. This aspect has to be taken into account in an analysis of this type of area within the district as administrative unit. In vulnerable ecological
conditions these should be considered as being of specific importance. Again we conclude that an analysis at the meso level is needed.

For the Population Census 1966, 1093 enumeration areas were created on the basis of a number of practical criteria. These areas were also used as the units of data collection during the 1970 Agricultural Census.

After having mapped all spatial subdivisions one observes that the various administrative areas, agro-ecological zones and data collection units show a complex jigsaw pattern of spatial organization. The two most important types of administrative areas, the wards and the districts, seldom coincide. The agro-ecological zones cross boundaries of wards and districts, and, moreover, may not form homogeneous units with respect to the farming system. The data collection units form a different system again. The territory of these units may cross the boundaries of districts and wards. This makes the collecting of data within a selected planning unit very difficult. This pattern of spatial units relevant to development is further complicated by the addition of units for rural development efforts, such as the large scale area-based projects.

Apart from Thaba-Tseka, where that project functioned as the initial stage of a district development plan, the project areas show little relation to existing spatial units. The areas selected did not coincide with district boundaries. This made cooperation or integration with regular services provided by the government at district level impossible. Project boundaries also crossed those of wards, which are territorial units within which land tenure issues are dealt with.

With regard to the relationship of project areas and agro-ecological units, the situation is somewhat unclear. Many project areas in fact were river basins. The river basins do not necessarily form a functional unit for the local farming population. Because of the characteristics of the farming system which often has an arable farming and a livestock component, farmers included in the project area may exercise part of their activities outside the project area. Project activities therefore may have covered part of the farming system only.

We may conclude the following: decentralisation means working at a lower level of geographical scale, which makes an adaptation to local ecological and production conditions possible. It enables local participation to function effectively. Administratively, the most appropriate planning unit is the district. The co-ordinating body, the District Planning Unit, with its specialized manpower still has to be established. Within the district two types of spatial units are of importance: the wards, as the units in which land allocation takes place, and the agro-ecological zones, the latter determining the optimal use of natural resources and needing specific conservational treatment.

Summary and conclusion

Integrated district planning surveys

Policies that imply setting equal standards for all regions cannot resolve the different problems. It has been emphasized that the scale at which to devolve certain powers in Lesotho should be the district level.
District planning is a form of subnational area planning. Area planning has some salient features. The primary feature is its area or spatial focus. A second feature is the establishment of a planning apparatus within the district. Another feature which is of crucial importance, is the presentation of a comprehensive and integrated view of the area’s possibilities for development. People’s activities are so much interwoven with the land that the survey of land resources and the survey of human resources should not be seen as separate exercises; optimally both should be integrated in order to be able to produce a final comprehensive picture of all the resources, human and physical, available in an area.

In each planning process the inventory of the existing situation is an essential step between the formulation of the objectives and the design of the plan.

In this context it seems useful to outline the basic elements of district planning surveys:

- a survey of physical and human resources;
- a survey of productive activities in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors;
- a survey of the present land use system;
- a survey of services and service centres;
- an analysis of development constraints in the fields of resources, productive activities, and services, and the institutional structure; suggestions for improvement of the existing situation.

With regard to the survey of physical resources it should be mentioned that such a survey should concentrate especially on four areas:

(a) In Lesotho medium and large mapping, fieldwork and related laboratory work still need to be undertaken in many areas in relation to land and water resources.

(b) Estimation of the growth potential of the different natural resources is of vital importance to the development planning of an area.

(c) Land evaluation, is necessary i.e. the estimation of the suitability of soil and landscape elements for different forms of land use.

(d) The study of land degradation and conservation needs is also important. In the Lesotho context it is especially necessary to study soil erosion processes and the consequential damage to the landscape; the silting up of the dams and streams; and the increased peak runoff in stream systems.

The above-mentioned approach needs to be undertaken at different scales: country-wide; at the level of the catchment area; and also at the level of the single landscape unit. Preferably, various activities need to be undertaken simultaneously, in order to get regular feedback from team members.

An important research technique in land resources studies, apart from field checks and laboratory analysis, is the use of aerial photography and satellite imagery, especially at the inventory level, but also for the study of temporal characteristics of certain features by comparing sequential photography.

Lesotho already possesses good general aerial photographic coverage,
which has been made at increasingly shorter intervals since 1951, as well as photo covers flown for area based projects. Especially for the past and present project areas, therefore, a choice of scales suitable for the different branches of land resources studies exist.

The Applied Environmental Sciences Programme of the N.U.L. has undertaken some resource surveys in Lesotho together with the International Institute of Aerial Survey and Earth Science (Schmitz and Verstappens, (eds.) 1978) Within the same programme efforts are being undertaken in order to establish. basic land units and land unit patterns in Lesotho (Schmitz, 1978, 1980).

Since 1980 the Urban and Regional Planning Programme of the N.U.L. has been carrying out a survey in a district of Lesotho, the Mafeteng District, with special emphasis on the analysis of socio-economic and socio-spatial aspects of the existing situation. The research programme is divided into two phases. In the first phase the agricultural production structure was analysed. Besides, variables were explored which possibly influence the spatial differentation in the farm structure, such as magnitude of labour migration, accessibility, and location of specific government programmes directed towards the improvement of agriculture. In addition, the research has included an inventory of agro-support services, such as extension, input supply, credit and marketing.

In the second phase, which started in 1981, research has focused on an inventory and analysis of non-agricultural services and the role of service centres. Services provided from the main service centre – Mafeteng – have been analysed in relation to the town's internal production structure.

The recently established F.A.O. land use planning unit in the Ministry of Agriculture seems to be increasingly in favour of a similar integrated survey approach as well (UNDP, 1981), which we consider an important step again towards the formulation of comprehensive plans for development alternatives.

For the Institute of Southern African Studies at N.U.L. we see integrated district surveys, as outlined above, as an important research priority, to which all sections of the University could contribute.

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CHAPTER 18

The Role of Health and Environment in Development with Specific Reference to Southern Africa

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Introduction

The expected rapid development in Africa post-independence has not occurred for many reasons. One major factor has been the vast increase in the cost of fuels, especially oil, and of manufactured goods.

Another major obstacle to improving the standard of living of the majority of the people has been the low level of awareness of the economic and political importance of health and environmental problems. In 1981, the worker in most of Africa has to overcome the problems associated with malnutrition, high disease incidence and environmental contamination, usually with little help from the establishment. Dr Mahler, the Director of the World Health Organisation (WHO) has declared his intention of eradicating the main diseases of mankind by the year 2000. To help achieve this objective the WHO has established the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) aimed at tackling the six most serious diseases. These are:

- Malaria
- Schistosomiasis (Bilharziasis).
- Filariasis (Elephantiasis and River Blindness).
- African and South American forms of Trypanosomiasis (Sleeping sickness).
- Leishmaniasis.
- Leprosy.

All of these diseases occur within Southern Africa infecting millions of people.

Malaria

Many people consider themselves to be immune to diseases such as malaria and yet in Africa it kills more people than any other disease. The malaria situation in 1976 suggested that 2,048 million people lived in malaria infected regions with 436 million in eradicated zones, 1,260 million in areas where some control was being undertaken and over 352 million where no control was even reported. According to Dorozyński, 25 per cent of all adults living in Africa
have malaria, with over one million children dying of the disease per annum. These are underestimates due to the lack of accurate records for most of the continent. The spread of drug resistant strains of malaria, especially of cerebral malaria caused by *Plasmodium falciparum*, has resulted in a dramatic increase in the mortality due to malaria in Africa and Asia.

The common treatment of malaria used to be chloroquine (marketed as Nivaquine, Resochin, Malarex) which when taken orally was effective and safe. However, if given intravenously as Resochin it, on occasions, caused heart failure and death. In 1981 there exist many strains of malaria which are termed "chloroquine resistant" because chloroquine has little, if any, effect on them. Such strains are common in Asia and spreading within Africa. This drug resistance to malaria has been reported in South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. More research is needed to clarify the extent of this problem in Southern Africa.

The use of chemical insecticides against both the adult and larval stages of the mosquito vectors of malaria was initially successful, but expensive. The establishment of insecticide resistant strains of mosquitoes has made control more difficult and more expensive. The use of chemicals on waterways leads to pollution problems which can be overcome by limited application of biodegradable chemicals. In Zimbabwe the use of the insecticide DDT (Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) has been so extensive that the levels of DDT residues in the soils are the highest in Africa at over 20 times the WHO recommended maximum. Fortunately DDT is one of the less toxic insecticides.

Health planners often consider that sick people can either treat themselves or receive adequate medical assistance. In most of Southern Africa this is sadly not true. Twenty kilometres between a village and a clinic, or first aid post, may not seem far until one is very sick and has to walk that distance. Treatments given at health centres often involve long waits for a few aspirins and therefore discourage people from attending, unless they are critically sick. At this stage the patients are often too ill to be treated as outpatients and their chances of permanent damage to their health considerable. Malaria should be diagnosed from a blood smear taken from the patient before treatment and an effective antimalarial drug administered. The figures for malaria prevalence in most of Africa come from hospital and clinic records, many of which are informed opinions rather than scientific diagnosis. This occurs because the dispenser or medical officer has only a few minutes with each patient. In Tanzania, flow charts were used to assist semi-qualified people in identifying and treating the major diseases and referring the more complicated cases to hospitals. This scheme worked fairly well, though it failed to diagnose cholera in 1976-77 and a viral encephalitis in children in 1976.

**Schistosomiasis**

Schistosomiasis has been considered by some as being of little medical importance. It infects over 200 million people, is found throughout Africa except for Lesotho and is associated with irrigation schemes. Man obtains the infection from water containing the infective larval stage or cercaria, which occur
in most slow running or still waters in Africa where there is faecal or urinary contamination. The adult schistosomes live in the liver and blood vessels associated with the intestine and bladder.

Schistosomiasis has increased throughout the world with the building of hydro-electric dams and irrigation schemes. The prevalence rate rose from 0.1 per cent to 98 per cent in the people living around Lake Volta during the first three years following the formation of this man made lake,4 while on Lake Kariba, Zimbabwe, *Schistosoma haematobium* infections reached 68 per cent in school children. These parasites are now regarded as being endemic throughout all of Africa.

The disease known as schistosomiasis appears to reduce the ability of the host to work, while rarely resulting in death. The urinary form *S. haematobium*, causes cancer-like growths called granuloma which are associated with the tissues of the urino-genital tract. There is growing evidence that these parasites cause cardiac damage, liver sclerosis and anaemia in man.

It is important to note that both schistosomiasis and malaria have increased their geographical distribution since the 1950s resulting in the numbers of people being infected reaching new heights. It is now unlikely that any person living in Africa, except in Lesotho, has not been exposed to either malaria or schistosomiasis.

Many people consider that there is a limit to the number of schistosomes that any individual can harbour in his body due to the theory of concomitant immunity. This suggests that the parasites within a host stimulate the body to produce protective antibodies which operate only against new invasive forms of the same parasite, thus keeping the number of the parasites within the body constant. Ongom showed in West Nile District of Uganda that people living in or near the River Nile had increasing numbers of schistosomes as they grew older.5 This is in direct contradiction of the theory of concomitant immunity and needs further investigation.

Control of schistosomiasis has usually been attempted using molluscicides together with chemotherapy. Until recently, the treatment of human schistosomiasis has been ineffective. Today the use of metrifonate (Bilarcil) against *Schistosoma haematobium* and praziquantel against *S. mansoni* can kill 90 per cent of these worms with one oral treatment. In both the Transvaal (South Africa) and in the island of St. Lucia (West Indies) environmental modifications have been extensively used to reduce water contact and control schistosomiasis. Pitchford6 in the Transvaal introduced piped water into villages linked to storage facilities to provide safe water and showed that schistosomiasis could be controlled in this manner. In St. Lucia the same approach was tried with considerable success. Recently the Swaziland government has considered the same approach.

**Other parasitic infections**

Filariasis has a much more limited distribution, occurring in most of Africa down to Zimbabwe. In the coastal regions of Eastern and Southern Africa the
form caused by *Wuchereria bancrofti* infects up to 90 per cent of the people. The incidence of enlarged limbs (known as elephantiasis) occurs in less than one per cent of all infected people. The form causing River Blindness due to *Onchocerca volvulus* is found in Africa South of the Sahara down to Angola, Zambia and Tanzania. The former type is associated with towns and an urban living mosquito, the latter with fast rivers and irrigation schemes.

Sleeping sickness is important in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In these regions the vector, the tsetse fly, is responsible for the transmission of nagana to cattle and sleeping sickness to man. Today, control schemes are operating in most of these countries usually based on the judicious use of insecticides, though biological control has been attempted in both Zimbabwe and Tanzania.

Diseases caused by the helminthes (worms) such as *Ascaris* and the hookworms are very common among all communities. *Necator americanus* (a hookworm) has been recorded as being associated with the poor conditions prevalent within the mines of the Rand region of South Africa. Hookworms are blood feeders, causing anaemia in people having heavy infections of over 1 000 worms as each worm causes a blood loss of 0.05 ml of blood per person per day. Since the 1930s these parasites have been known to be responsible for nutritional dwarfism as a result of prolonged hookworm anaemia.

The effects of many of these diseases on a community can be accumulative in that one or more different types may exist in the same host at the same time. The ability of the body to fight infections is related to the nutritional status of that person. It is now known that undernutrition leads to a reduction in the levels of protective immunity making the malnourished prone to diseases, especially the infectious type such as measles, tuberculosis and pneumonia. Thus, it is not surprising to note that measles is a major killer of children in Africa.

**Migration and the spread of disease**

Occupations and movements of people play a major role in the transmission of disease. The mining industry is of major economic importance to the whole subcontinent of Southern Africa, generating both money and employment. The mines of Shaba province of Zaire, the Copperbelt of Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa recruit labour from all of the surrounding regions. The migrant labourer may move across the subcontinent, travelling through different disease zones and transporting these diseases. At the same time the migrant may become a victim of the same diseases.

The mine worker is continuously exposed to and receives a battering from the fine particles present within the mine which damage the body. The delicate membranes of the eye are harmed causing conjunctivitis, the lungs are lined with particles restricting breathing (giving rise to a condition known as phthisis) or silicates may enter the lung tissue causing silicosis. Studies on people having silicosis in Zimbabwe by Girwood revealed that “the attack rate of pulmonary tuberculosis in established silicotics has been found to be thirty times greater than for non-silicotics”. 9
The spread of tuberculosis among the people of Southern Africa has been attributed to the mining industry sending home sick miners. Inside the village community the sick person unintentionally infects his friends and family. In South Africa there are ten deaths per day due to tuberculosis reported, with 52,664 new cases every year, with at least ten million people at risk. These figures represent a cost of 31.5 million rand for prevention and cure within South Africa and reflect the poor housing and nutritional status prevalent in parts of the region.

Human migration as a cause of disease transmission is far more common than usually appreciated. The outbreaks of *el tor* cholera which swept the world have often been transmitted by travellers. Some people may be asymptomatic carriers, that is they have the disease without symptoms and can infect others. One such carrier was shown to carry cholera and pass infective faeces for nearly 6 years. The outbreak of cholera sweeping Southern Africa probably arrived from Eastern Africa, as suggested in Figure 1. Cholera was initially found in Tanzania and Kenya in 1976 and appears to have moved southwards. At this time it is established in two parts of South Africa.

Vaccination of all people passing through disease zones is of the utmost importance. Cholera vaccine is far from ideal, however it does provide some protection. Some countries, notably Saudi Arabia, require pilgrims from cholera endemic areas to be vaccinated and treated for the disease before being allowed in. Treatment of this disease using antibiotics such as tetracycline has proved very successful.
International cooperation in controlling diseases can work. In 1980 the WHO Global Eradication of Smallpox programme was successfully completed. Vaccination has, for the first time, removed a disease from the face of the earth. The last smallpox cases recorded within the region were in Mozambique, 1969; after Mozambique, 1969; cover Swaziland, 1969; Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 1970; Malawi and South Africa, 1971; and Botswana in 1973. The last recorded natural infection was in Somalia in 1978.

Increased nutritional status of the individual will result in some reduction in the incidence of disease, the relationship is shown in Figure 2. The point where death or clinical signs of malnutrition are seen depends on many factors. It should be noted that the severely malnourished have little, if any, chance of survival unless hospitalised.

![Figure 2. DISEASE AND MALNUTRITION IN CHILDREN.](image)

Conclusion

The health system in Lesotho tries to reach as many people as possible and consists of some 17 hospitals and 75 clinics for a population of about 1.3 million. To overcome some of the problems related to a montane environment there is a functional flying doctor system utilizing fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. Even so there are times during the year when, due to rains or snow, help cannot reach those in need.
The environmental problems facing Southern Africa include pollution, soil erosion, overgrazing and reduced soil fertility. The use of wood as fuel in many urban situations has resulted in thermal inversions, or smogs, during the winter months. This feature is found in Soweto (South Africa), Lusaka (Zambia) and Maseru (Lesotho). The smogs can give rise to pulmonary conditions.

Overgrazing and failure to rotate crops has resulted in reduced soil fertility, while geological features have helped to increase soil erosion. The introduction of maize and beans or the rotation of crops appears to be the cheapest and most reliable method of increasing soil fertility and productivity.

The dumping of unwanted wastes, such as beer cans, provides breeding sites for disease vectors. The need to prevent faecal contamination of waterways is urgent if the spread of cholera, gastroenteritis and bacillary dysentery are to be stopped. Faecal contamination of water supplies is very common in all of South Africa. In Lesotho, Feachem et al.\textsuperscript{14} state that nearly all domestic water supplies examined were subject to some form of faecal contamination. In 1978 there were 13 227 cases of gastroenteritis in Lesotho, as shown in Figure 3. The seasonal peaking of this disease is associated with the vast increase in numbers of flies during the warm periods of December and January.

The seasonal relationship between water, environment and disease is complicated. Generally the peak disease incidence occurs when the rains or growing season is established, which is the time when food deprivation is at its height. Research is needed into the extent of these problems in all regions of the continent, together with simple cheap methods for the supply of disease free water, introduction of more latrines, better village food storage methods and more effective land utilisation. It is apparent that the
need for a well-organized health programme providing the basic treatment of the common diseases, the provision of safe water, latrines and health education, together with improved agricultural production will cause a greater improvement in the standard of living of the people than any political dogma.

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CHAPTER 19

Research into Tourism in Southern Africa, with Particular Reference to Lesotho

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In a recent collection of papers examining the effects of tourism in the Third World, de Kadt makes the important observation that:

better information on the structure of the tourism industry... should be made more widely available to negotiators and planners in developing countries. This is equally true as regards the operation of transnational hotel chains and such multifarious arrangements between transnational tourism enterprises and local operators as operating and management contracts, franchise agreements and hotel leasing agreements.¹

Such a call to raise the study of tourism from the morass of endless value judgements, in which it is currently enmeshed, to a level which stresses examination of the organisational complexity and corporate structure of the tourist industry, is a welcome one. ² Unfortunately it has been answered by only too few researchers to date. ³ We would, however, go further than de Kadt in arguing the necessity for such a focus in the context of Southern Africa. Given the primary intention of our own research to describe and explain spatial and temporal patterns of tourist movements in Southern Africa over the last decade, we contend that it is necessary to study also the nature of the capital movements in the region which generally precede and invariably determine the direction and volume of subsequent movements of tourists. It is these movements of capital and tourists which combined, in turn, have significant impacts on local politics, economics and populations and which therefore bear close examination.

In this paper it is our intention to outline briefly our initial research findings in Lesotho and then suggest research themes for the local and regional study of tourism. We believe that the experience of Lesotho in marketing its tourism potential has parallels, certainly in the cases of Swaziland and Botswana, and very possibly in Zimbabwe and Malawi.

Tourism in Lesotho

Of course, why study tourism at all? Is it not economically insignificant in the development efforts of most Third World countries? No attempt is made here to wade into the literature concerned with the economic value of tourism
and to outline the case for Lesotho. Any conclusions are inevitably historically and spatially specific. It has been shown, for example, that the creation of employment through tourism development is expensive, but this is not necessarily the case. Similarly, tourism earnings often filter back to the capital source outside the destination country, but this need not be so. It is apparent, then, that tourism development can be designed in accordance with many objectives and a generally applicable, hard and fast judgement of its value is nonsensical. Thus, for Lesotho, we suggest that there is a justification for tourism studies in terms of its contribution to the economy of the country.

During the period 1974–75 to 1977–78, for which relatively accurate data are available, tourism comprised an average of 5.0 per cent of G.N.P.\(^4\). This figure is not insignificant but hardly represents tourism's full economic impact on Lesotho. If one subtracts from Lesotho's gross earnings the value of Basotho wages accumulated in the Republic and remitted to Lesotho and Customs Union Revenue (neither of which have anything to do with direct domestic production), the contribution of tourism to foreign exchange earnings works out at an average of 36.4 per cent for the former period and 43.1 per cent in 1977/78.\(^5\)

Modern sector employment in 1975 was estimated at 27 500 with 500 in the tourist sector.\(^6\) Projected employment in tourism in 1980 was put at 1 000 but was in fact 1 500\(^7\) out of a total of 40 000.\(^8\) Therefore, from 1975 to 1980, the contribution of the tourism industry to modern sector employment rose from 1.8 per cent to 3.75 per cent. Furthermore, these figures are doubled if one excludes employment in the governmental sector, which is consumptive rather than productive of governmental revenue.\(^9\)

It appears that no figures are readily available in Lesotho for the economic comparison of various sectors, including tourism, in terms of employment creation. The Associated Research Consultants (ARC) used an East African figure of 75 jobs per 100 beds in their calculations which works out at approximately M9 330 per job.\(^10\) To decide whether or not this is a justified expense requires further research, but there is little doubt that tourism's contribution to employment creation is not insignificant and is far from stagnant.

Tourism in Lesotho was of little importance prior to 1970. Tourist inflow in the 1960s was estimated at 4 000 per annum\(^11\) but this rose to 75 000 in 1973,\(^12\) largely in response to the opening of the Holiday Inn in Maseru in 1970. Despite Lesotho's promotional efforts, the major source of tourists in Lesotho is, and will remain, South Africa, and the majority of South Africans are attracted by the facilities available in Maseru. This will continue to be the case given the standard of accommodation elsewhere in Lesotho. Although the splendour of Lesotho's mountain scenery is unquestioned, similar environments in South Africa itself, such as in the Natal Drakensberg area, are more popular for two main reasons; the higher standard of the accommodation and the access roads. Hence, we recommend that research be directed towards an understanding of tourist preferences and expectations within the South African market.

The tourism industry in Lesotho, then, is entrenched in Maseru and dispersion to the rest of the country remains insignificant. This concentration on
Maseru and the dependence on the South African market are factors of tremendous importance in the planning and future development of the tourism sector.

Unfortunately, the three development plans produced for Lesotho since independence give little indication of any precise and coordinated tourism policy. Indeed, this uncertainty seems prevalent in the Lesotho Tourist Corporation (LTC). Concern extends, it seems, only to the management of current projects. The only document specifically dealing with tourism planning was produced in 1974 by a consultancy based in Nairobi (ARC). The report, perhaps not surprisingly, was enthusiastic about Lesotho’s potential and envisaged a string of resorts and hotels around the country, all mainly capitalised from local sources (both public and private). Many of the recommendations put forward in the report were directed towards a dispersion or tourist facilities away from Maseru on the assumption that the tourists would follow. This objective was clearly an optimistic one given, that most tourists in 1973, as largely the case at present, were interested primarily in the casino at the Holiday Inn.

ARC laid out an ambitious programme of substantial investment for the period 1974 to 1981, but in fact actual expenditure was a little over half that recommended. Developments in the tourism industry during this period also had very little in common with ARC’s proposals. Moreover the directions of the ARC policy and government policy were quite opposed. ARC looked for dispersion to the rural areas and the attraction of the nature loving and sporting South African; the Government completed the Hilton Project further entrenching the tourist industry in Maseru and for the most part, attracting gamblers.

The recent third development plan provides little enlightenment as to tourism policy. In particular, the proposals seem piecemeal and contradictory. Perhaps this is due in part to tourism’s low priority as an area for development. This low priority, despite tourism’s disguised but significant contribution to the economy, is reflected in the lack of research and knowledge of tourism in Lesotho. Our own research into the spatial and temporal characteristics of tourism in Lesotho represents an attempt to fill this gap. We strongly contend that our methodology can be applied equally well in other parts of the region and that the disturbing trends we reveal will be encountered by other countries in Southern Africa to a greater or lesser extent, and that these discoveries provide the focus for further research on this theme.

Although we examined length of stay data, occupancy rates, bed/night availability, spatial variations in bed capacity and occupancy, and the seasonality of tourist inflow, the parameters of greatest regional significance are gross figures for tourist inflow, changing South African destination preferences and the origins of tourists to Lesotho.

Despite definitional problems, differing systems of enumeration, and the lack of hotel returns before 1979, it has been possible to plot tourist inflow from 1969 to 1981 on the basis of several assumptions and compare this with the ARC projections which visualised a not unreasonable 10 per cent rise between 1973 and 1976, accelerating to 15 per cent between 1976 and 1981, dependent on governmental implementation of the report’s recommendations. The two
plots are shown in Figure 1 and the divergence between them is quite dramatic. While a steady expansion in tourist inflow was envisaged by ARC, this expansion in fact tailed off around 1978, and the number of arrivals plummeted in 1980. There seems to be no recognition of this trend in tourism development planning for the next five years, and the expansion of tourist facilities is proposed while, it appears, the market is contracting.

**FIGURE 1**

Number of Tourists Visiting Lesotho, 1969-1981

**SOURCES**

1. ARC Estimate.
2. ARC Estimate.
11-12. Third Development Plan figures including 'kinship visitors'.
13. Authors' calculation of 11 less 'kinship visitors'.
14. Authors' calculation of 12 less 'kinship visitors'.
Since Lesotho is almost entirely dependent on the South African market (90.5 per cent in 1979), it follows that the tourism industry will be heavily affected by changing tastes and preferences among South Africans and developments within the Southern African region. Some recent data relating to South African departures is available from the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism in Pretoria. In 1979, 855 176 South African departures were recorded and 811 766 in 1980. Unfortunately, not all destinations were specified. The specified totals come to 511 446 and 626 127 for 1979 and 1980 respectively.\(^{13}\)

From these one can gain some insight of changing destination patterns. One notes in particular a sharp fall in the importance of the African market accompanied by a doubling of Europe’s share. In 1979, 84 per cent of the specified departures were to African destinations. This dropped to 67.9 per cent in 1980. In contrast, Europe’s share of the market increased from 10.9 per cent to 22.5 per cent. Increases were also noted for Asia (1.9 per cent to 3.7 per cent, the Americas (2.4 per cent to 4.6 per cent) and Oceania (0.7 per cent to 1.2 per cent).

That the market is becoming more dispersed is suggested, in addition, by identifying countries taking over 5 per cent of the market. In 1979 there were nine of these, five of them in Africa (Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mauritius). In 1980 the number had increased to 17, including the same five African countries. In particular, the share of Swaziland fell from 37.9 per cent to 23.5 per cent; Botswana, 18.3 per cent to 15.0 per cent; Lesotho from 16.0 per cent to 10.0 per cent. Lesotho and Botswana have both dropped down the league table; Lesotho from third to fourth and Botswana from second to third. The reason for this is the spectacular increase in Zimbabwean tourism, taking 7.7 per cent of the market in 1979 and 13.8 per cent in 1980, but Lesotho looks in danger of being relegated further. In 1980 the United Kingdom attracted 9.7 per cent of the specified total of South African departures, less than 2 000 fewer than Lesotho, having almost doubled its share from 1979.

There is little reason to expect this marked dispersion in departure destinations to be reversed in the short term. The gold boom of 1980, the relative competitiveness of flight prices to Europe and the United States, and the probability of reductions on these routes are factors which will accelerate rather than counteract this trend.

Of particular interest are the changes in tourist origins from within South Africa. Data from Holiday Inn, Maseru, records for 1972, 1976 and 1980 were used in this analysis. For each guest card in the samples, the stated place of residence was traced and the number of visitors concerned then assigned to the coding cell in which the residence fell. The 98 coding cells were created by fitting a rectangular grid of 125 km by 125 km cells over a 1: 2 500 000 map of South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho and South East Botswana. Disregarding cells providing less than 5.0 per cent of the total we were left with only the same four for the three years of analysis:

- Cell 20: Johannesburg, Pretoria, Witwatersrand
- Cell 52: Bloemfontein and district
- Cell 67: Durban and district
- Cell 89: Cape Town and district
Figure 2 shows changes in the relative importance of these four major source areas of tourists. The most significant feature of the data is the spectacular decline in the importance of cell 20, which supplied almost half of the guests in 1976 but less than a third in 1980. This has been accompanied by a less dramatic, but as significant, near doubling of cell 52’s share from 1972 to 1980.
Research themes in the Southern African region

It is clear then that the popularity of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland as tourist destinations is declining as South Africans move further afield for their holidays. From an analysis of local data we have shown this trend to be dramatic in the case of Lesotho. However, the explanation is not as simple as gross national figures would suggest. In our investigation of tourist origins we discovered that far fewer derive from the Witwatersrand than previously. This is almost certainly the consequence of the development of Sun City. Indeed, the effects of this large resort in Bophuthatswana will also be strongly felt in both Swaziland and Botswana, which rely heavily on the Witwatersrand market. There is, therefore, an immediate need to examine the impact of Sun City on the tourism industry of these two countries. It is then necessary to extend the analysis to the effects of investments in the Bantustans which characterise the current policies of both the major hotel groups in South Africa. The following questions are therefore of particular importance.

To what extent do Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana rely on gambling and other activities restricted in South Africa to attract tourists? Hence, what will be the effect of the establishment of similar facilities in the Bantustans? Can Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland successfully compete for this section of the market, or will it be necessary to radically rethink marketing strategies and reformulate planning objectives?

Thus we have proceeded on the premise that a detailed study of corporate strategy and activity in the Southern African tourist industry is a prerequisite to understanding the changing patterns of tourist movements for Lesotho (as in our own research) and the region as a whole (data still to be collected and analysed). Within this theme, the following are identified as areas of particular interest:

(a) the history of the major hotelling chains in Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s including information on formation, development, acquisition, expansion and control. Also the claim of Turner that "by the standards of other industries, tourism is relatively unorganized, with no single company dominating" must be critically examined in the Southern African context;\(^\text{14}\)
(b) the economic and spatial conflict between South African and international tourist capital including details of market strategy, segmentation and competition;
(c) the spatial logic of capital investment in the region including study of economic and political conditions and locational factors, state-capital linkages both within South Africa and the surrounding dependent states.

The American newsmagazine, Newsweek, in an article entitled "Southern Africa's Gambling Bonanza" noted that:

all told, Rennies currently operates five casinos in a chain of 28 Ho-
Holiday Inn hotels in Southern Africa. It is taking in 145 million annually at its casinos, compared with 235 million for Southern Suns.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus specified are the names most commonly associated in the public mind with the tourist industry in Southern Africa. What is less well known is the structure of control and ownership over these two hotelling chains and the history which has propelled them centre-stage in the competitive search for the super-profits bonanza to be extracted from the pockets of affluent white South Africa. Therefore, we consider the collection and analysis of basic data on the corporate structure of the Southern African hotelling industry an important task and, arising directly out of our investigations in this area, we have identified an inventory of research themes. Data gathering on these themes is proceeding but incomplete. Hence we simply outline here those areas of interest in which research is required:

**Monopoly trends in the Southern African tourist industry**

Two major forms of monopoly can be identified in the region;

(a) Formal monopoly: formal agreements between particular fractions of tourist capital with local polities to exclude all others from a given area, region or country. A number of such agreements have characterised the industry throughout the 1970s and investigation is suggested of the rationale behind such agreements and their nature and effects.

(b) Informal monopoly: we find considerable evidence to support the existence of an informal monopoly trend in Southern African tourism. Some of this evidence is implicit in our analysis of corporate structure but this, taken with other data which we have, is to date suggestive rather than exhaustive.

**Market segmentation**

For long periods market segmentation produced only minimal competition between the major hotelling groups. The precise character of these segments must be further investigated, so too must the activities of the groups within each segment. Two segments of particular importance - casinos and the metropolitan business market - have in recent times proved so lucrative that they have now become objects of intense competition. The emergence of these two segments and their interpenetration by the rival groups deserve closer attention.

**Spatial logic**

In order to achieve greater understanding of movements of capital and tourists in the region, the following are suggested for investigation.
(a) **Capital**

- conditions of investment within South Africa (including the homelands) and the neighbouring states.
- the nature of South African state policy *vis-à-vis* the role of the major hotelling groups in the homelands scheme;
- the international experience and designs of tourist capital. It is suggested, for example, that it was Southern Sun's abortive experience in Mozambique and the Malagasy Republic that precipitated their almost exclusive attention to the South African market;
- the projected trend of expansion into the black areas of metropolitan South Africa in alliance with the emergent black bourgeoisie.

(b) **Tourists**

It is our intention to build up a clearer picture of tourist movements in the region to augment the picture derived for Lesotho and then to explain these patterns with reference to:

- the impact of new casino areas on traditional destinations as stated above. Clearly there has been an impact in Lesotho – but is this experience repeated, say, in Botswana and Swaziland? And can it be attributed purely to this factor?
- the nature of the marketing of traditional and new destinations. How, for example, are events in Lesotho and Swaziland reported in the South African media, and with what effects? How are the homelands' tourist operations marketed in the media?
- what proportion of the market are returnees? There are suggestions that this is very high for the homelands and low for Lesotho and Swaziland. Are these reliable?
- it is suggested that it is necessary to undertake surveys of tourists to determine further aspects of tourist behaviour.

**Conclusion**

We have already proposed a study of the Lesotho handicrafts industry in subsequent phases of our own research programme. Here we suggest that it is also important to begin to make some assessment of the social, economic and environmental impact of tourism on receiver areas. So large are the stakes involved in the current tourist boom in South Africa that any deleterious effects of tourism have been surreptitiously swept under the carpet. A more informed analysis of this is clearly needed.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

5. Ibid., p. 16. Calculated from Ministry of Finance estimates.
8. Ibid., p. 84.
9. Ibid., calculated from p. 84.
13. Personal communication, 11 September 1981. The following discussion employs calculations based on the specified totals. If the unspecified figures are biased towards particular destinations this will introduce inaccuracies and cast some doubt on the conclusions below. In addition, these departures include non-tourists although the totals should not be high except in the case of peripheral states, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland.
CHAPTER 20

The Need for Research into Production-Related Education

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Introduction

Does education really lead to development? A cynic looking at the histories of Lesotho, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Uganda might even argue that education leads to underdevelopment. All those countries once had flourishing agricultural sectors. But the fruits of the peasant economy were invested in extensive educational systems which were the pride of English-speaking Africa. However all four countries have suffered a long decline in productivity because their investment in irrelevant clericalisation drew labour and capital away from production and promoted external dependency. Hence there was no longer a sufficient productive base to support the employment of the newly educated, and the countries were beset by a combination of tangled clerical bureaucracy and a brain drain of talent abroad.

Of course, it was not all so simple for Lesotho, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Uganda - or latterly for Zambia or Tanzania which appear to have followed the same trail. All the countries were part of a colonial and neocolonial system which coerced and cajoled them into line as peripheries of the capitalist world market. But our cynical characterisation of their underdevelopment through education, if a caricature, serves to bring out important points about the inherited nature of formal educational systems in African countries. This is no place to repeat in any detail the accepted diagnosis of conventional education being geared to producing a comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie subservient to the needs of neocolonialism. Suffice it to say that conventional education is designed to produce a small elite, and a minority with education cannot by definition be expanded to embrace the majority without being dysfunctional. You can’t have a nation of bureaucrats: each bureaucrat needs a brace of strong peasant or worker shoulders to sit on. (Unless one revolutionises one’s bureaucracy actually to add to the sum of production). In other words, as African countries move towards the goal of universal nine year education, conventional ex-colonial education becomes even more irrelevant to the needs of widespread and sustained development.
Historical background

This realisation of the inadequacy of conventional education is no blinding light for educational planners and philosophers in Africa today. It has been refracted through numerous government planning documents and national educational commissions during the 1970s – just as it glinted through the colonial states in the American-funded Phelps-Stokes educational commissions of the 1920s, and in earlier missionary experiments. But all these flashes of light soon dim and fade, as vested educational interests shade them out and the sheer vigour of experimentation burns out. Schools of Industry, Hand and Eye Training, Industrial Education, School in the Bush, Polytechnic Training, Relevant Activity-Based Community Education, the Brigades, Non-Formal Education – the list of experimental institutions, catch-phrases, and their attached gurus, is endless. The need for forms of production-related education, to raise the consciousness and productivity of the masses, is almost universally conceded in rhetoric and has long been advocated by socialist-oriented thinkers. Educationalists of different ideological persuasions nowadays accept the concept of lifelong education, whereby everyone should continue to be a learner, a worker, and a teacher for the rest of their lives. Yet educational planners consistently steer clear of production-related education as if it were an untried and untested passing fad. Experimental production-related educational schemes, such as the Brigades in Botswana, are allowed to flourish on the enthusiasm of their founders, and then we find ourselves continually reinventing the wheel on an experimental basis and never putting it to a good use on a wagon.

Recent trends

It will be the argument of this paper that, rather than waiting for the millennium of integrated mental and manual education to descend upon us, there are plenty of specific projects, even in Southern Africa, that can be looked at here and now. We can learn from actual, planned and defunct projects of production-related education by research, evaluation and experimentation. My own institute, the National Institute of Research (NIR) at the University College of Botswana, is trying to do that by coordinating research and evaluation on the Brigades in the country. There is also in Southern Africa a new Foundation for Education with Production set up at the beginning of 1981 to propagate educational ideas “based on learning with productive work and on community participation and control.” FEP is actively involved with such experimentation in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia, as well maintaining contacts in Tanzania, Nicaragua, Cuba, England, Grenada and elsewhere.

There is a growing literature on production-related education in 18th–19th century capitalist and 20th century socialist countries in Europe and Asia. This is complemented by historical studies of Afro-American and East African industrial education, and of informal craft training in contemporary Kenya.
We may distinguish five areas in which questions of production-related education are raised:

(a) formal trade or craft training – the major question being, how far does it have wider education-for-living objectives?
(b) practical and manual skills training within primary, secondary and tertiary education;
(c) youth training within production units with educational objectives (such as Brigades);
(d) education within the work-place, i.e. workers’ education, including both skills upgrading and intellectual recreation;
(e) community or adult education, which in peasant societies focuses on extending and implanting productive skills which raise the general level of development.

Two types of production-related education, the village polytechnics of Kenya and the Brigades of Botswana, have received considerable international attention in research and evaluation over the past ten years.

Both were born of the secular missionary tradition in the 1960s as informal nongovernment institutions; becoming formalised by the needs of foreign donor finance as they spread to a large number of rural centres during the 1970s; and entering the 1980s as the lowest craft level of the national vocational technical educational system under government direction. Government responsibility for Brigades in Botswana had shifted from the Department of Community Development to the Ministry of Education. At the time of writing there are moves to break loose the community development activities of Brigades from their responsibility for formal vocational training.

Whether this will be a liberation and rebirth, or final fatal blow to the integrated education and development ideals of Brigades, remains to be seen. Current financial troubles have focused attention excessively on short-term questions of administration and financial management – rather than the vital questions of educational objectives and relations within the community, i.e. Brigades as agents of the proclaimed national needs of rural development and employment creation.

The 1970s saw the discovery of the ‘informal sector’ and of informal skills training, starting in Kenya, and eventually being digested into UNESCO jargon as ‘Non-formal Education.’ The African Artisan, by Kenneth King, drew attention to old established methods of skills acquisition in Nairobi by informal master/apprentice relationships. There is great scope for such studies of bush mechanics and smiths, fixers and welders in Southern Africa. The universal phenomenon of wire cars, bicycles and aircraft made by children in Southern Africa has been recognised by museums in art competitions – but one looks in vain for an educational literature analysing its implications for technological development. University departments – such as Economics in Zimbabwe and Adult Education in Botswana – have made a start in surveys of handicraft production and informal sector services. One hesitates advocating more intensive studies, for fear of the irrelevant trendism that besets intermediate/appropriate technology studies.
But there is obvious scope for students of a wide range of university disciplines, projecting studies of the present into both the past and future. In educational terms we need to know who teaches whom, and how do they do it, and how far the learning process is from trial and error.

A third and most vital area of development in production-related education during the 1970s was in the Liberation Movements. Most available information touches on Frelimo in Mozambique and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, though neither is yet the subject of anything like a definitive survey. The development of Frelimo educational policy paralleled that of the party – from an elitist movement drawing on the nationalist traditions of its English-speaking neighbours, into a mass-based party built out of peasant experience, through the process of national liberation into socialist transformation. It appears that the People’s Republic of Mozambique has much to offer its neighbours in experience of curriculum and educational materials evaluation, incorporating a practical emphasis into formal studies starting from grade one upwards and now approaching high school level. ZANU-PF educational developments have had a more chequered career. Papers and educational materials used in the ZANU-PF schools in Mozambique during the Chimurenga War were destroyed by Smith-Muzorewa customs officials when brought across the border at the end of the war. At least four countries in Southern Africa have ongoing projects in production-related education that merit research and evaluation.

Zambia embarked on Education-for-Development reforms in 1974–75, on the crest of a wave of socialism in the ruling party. All educational institutions were required to become production units and to democratize their operations. A national debate began, against a background of falling copper prices and détente with the white South and ended with the dilution or reversal of the new educational policy in 1977–78. However some production units survive, and the Zambian experience presents a significant case study of practical/productive education in the schools curriculum. Similarly, Botswana has since diluted or postponed its 1977 Education-for-Kagisano reforms, including practical emphasis within the curriculum. But as noted above, the Brigades still survive despite numerous prognostications of their death and are moving out of youth training into non-formal adult education for rural or periurban development, while government moves in to take over district craft level training.

Zimbabwe has seen a post-war revival of secular missionary projects of productive education, financed largely from Scandinavia, combined with model Chindunduma schools designed to carry on the collective, productive principles of Chimurenga education. But as yet these developments remain peripheral in the national system of education, while they are struggling with ex-colonial institutions, curricula and mentalities within the Ministry of Education and Culture. Zimbabwean educational reform is also perhaps constrained by the desire to be compatible with its English-speaking neighbours, Zambia and Botswana, rather than with Mozambique from where the Chimurenga educational tradition came. Mozambique, on the other hand, could ignore both its colonial heritage, and its neighbours in reforming its curriculum: after nationalising it, it is socialising it, and now it can look forward to internationalising it in the Southern
African context. A National Institute for Development of Education (INDE), within the Ministry of Education and Culture, has been coordinating curriculum reform since 1979. Its current task is to implant worker consciousness through the curriculum. Other Southern African educationalists might well look to INDE for comparison and evaluation of its thorough-going curriculum reform.

The need to coordinate and compare education development in Southern Africa is recognised by the Foundation for Education with Production (FEP), already mentioned in this essay. Currently based in Gaborone, it was grown out of, but has 'left behind' the Brigades in Botswana after a series of Swedish-financed educational seminars held at Dar es Salaam (1974), Maputo (1976), Uppsala (1979), Lusaka (1980), and recently Salisbury/Harare (1981). Within Botswana FEP has its own construction/horticulture cooperative with members recruited from unemployed youths at factory gates in Gaborone. Otherwise it acts as an international consultant, encouraging experimentation in mass-based pedagogy—notably the Rusununguko school founded by ZANU-PF in Northern Zimbabwe—and publishing a new journal to be called *Education with Production*.

### Research themes

The survey of production-related educational activities, which appears above, is no doubt inadequate and impressionistic. It needs to be broadened by discussion and debate. The same applies to research priorities. Who is the writer to dictate priorities, national or regional? What follows is a list, in random order, of topics for research, evaluation and experimentation.

#### Examination and assessment

Experience shows that these are at the core of a student's perception of the curriculum because, like it or not, certificates are essential in our highly bureaucratized states. It is better then to use them as weapons of change. For example, in Botswana, trade testing for construction crafts is pitched at the division of labour within the twelve largest enterprises in the country. Trade testing should therefore be pitched at the all-round craft expertise needed in small rural enterprises. More radically, exams and especially continuous assessment should be redesigned to diagnose individual strengths and weaknesses, for students and teachers to build on, rather than just be hurdles or filters for class promotion.

#### Production-related academic teaching

What has been called “Development Studies” (DS), teaching trainees and pupils their role in the productive basis of society, has had a chequered career in Southern Africa. It began as a Junior Certificate (JC) subject in Botswana in 1970, and spread to Lesotho and Swaziland, where it was modified along Civics/Family Studies lines while it was dropped altogether in Botswana in 1980. It only survived as a Brigades academic subject after a 1980 attempt to drop it in favour of more Maths and Science. Meanwhile DS became a Matriculation/
O level subject, and is now in process of being adopted at O or A levels to replace conventional economics in Zimbabwe secondary schools.

DS is obviously a good idea but it needs thorough reevaluation on a comparative basis between countries. Why has it failed? How can it succeed? We can point to lack of a supporting textbook - ever since a million word tome failed to find a publisher in 1969. We can point to sheer overcrowding of the syllabus at JC level (the O-level syllabus is in fact much shorter); lack of integration with practical work and with other social studies (e.g. geography and history); and to ideological incompatibility with current educational bureaucracies; as well as more pedagogical points about complicated vocabulary, etc.

**Practical curriculum**

Do we necessarily need separate practical subjects such as agriculture, carpentry, welding, domestic science (i.e. nutrition, sanitation etc.) for males as well as females? Can we not integrate practical elements into every subject - so that geometry includes measuring land, geography includes taking soil samples, and language and literature involve talking to people?

**Community relations**

This is a topic overloaded with rhetoric. Community schools usually exist only in name. How can schools really learn from and be responsible to communities? Answers must start from the definition of community and of its interests. Is it the whole local community impartially, or will there be positive (compensatory) discrimination in favour of some sections? Community participation in running educational facilities all too often unthinkingly reverts to participation by current users or local rulers only. Alternatively, it is maintained in name only by institutional staff and planners who feel morally superior to the community that is meant to rule them.

**Cooperative settlements**

A persistent question in the history of Botswana's Brigades and elsewhere is whether the products of the new education should join the wider society or set up new alternative communities. On the one hand, this is an ideological debate reminiscent of Utopian socialists and monastic or hippy orders: join and compromise, or live in segregated purity. On the other hand, it is a practical problem: there is no suitable employment for young Brigade trainees in either communal or commercial agricultural sectors, so set them up as basically agricultural producer cooperative settlements which produce and generate demand for goods. Enough such microcosms will eventually transform the macrocosm of rural society. A variant of this strategy is to set up periurban cooperative settlements to transform urban-industrial society from the bottom upwards. Such experimentation is already happening in a number of countries, and has generated its own successes and failures. Where is the research and evaluation?
Media and entertainment

Another field of current experimentation in production-related education is demonstration or simulation of development activities by such techniques as radio 'soap operas' and popular drama. Popular theatre, using puppets or real villagers to act out problems and solutions of village life, has been active in Tanzania, Botswana and possibly Zambia in the recent past.10

Employee education

On the principle of everyone being simultaneously worker-learner-teacher, there is enormous scope for research on education (in the broadest sense) in the workplace11. How far are employees allowed or encouraged to improve their skills and recreate themselves? In the Southern African context of previously unskilled workers, such questions are intimately related to acquiring literacy in their own language and a rudimentary knowledge of English (or Portuguese). Lest we be misunderstood, we should stress that production-related education in any democratic society cannot simply be training of better skilled drones to serve the state. It must always have a cultural dimension, expanding recreational and intellectual productivity for all as part of the general raising of living standards. Nor must it be limited to study of the local and national environment: the child and the adult must have the whole world opened to them. Education of the intellect comes as much, if not more, from information and entertainment services as from special educational programmes. The New Man must be a whole man.

Conclusion

It seems to us at the NIR in Botswana that educational research in the SADCC states awaits more collaborative and comparative studies, using the sort of information and documentation network raised at this month's SADCC meeting in Blantyre. So we welcome the formation of Educational Research Associations in Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana during 1981, and look forward to further cooperation. We further consider that the field of production-related education should be a priority field for research, along with the fields of preschool education and national examination cooperation already identified.

But we would summon a word of caution about research becoming too rarified and mystified as the craft of educational doctors and their doctoral apprentices. Such people are, after all, only marginally involved in productive processes. Their skills are largely those of intellectual organisation and synthesis. The real brains of research into production-related education are among common people and those educationalists who are most closely in touch with them - that means peasants, workers, primary teachers, and even (oh heresy) pupils. At present production-related education has too many of the characteristics of a passing fad, i.e. you should not have too much trouble getting foreign donor funds to study it this year. What it lacks is widespread roots with which to penetrate the whole basic curriculum.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


'Curriculum Development: The Mozambican Experience' (by GIDEON NDODE & JAN OVERVEST); 'Education System in Zimbabwe Refugee Schools in Zimbabwe' (by JOSPHAT NHUNDU); 'Creating a New Mentality Education in Zimbabwe' (by JANICE MCLAUGHLIN, dated Nov. 1980).


9. Foundation for Education with Production, P.O. Box 20906, Gaborone, Botswana.


11. See papers presented at a Seminar on Education for Self-Reliance, op. cit., recounting Nicaraguan, Yugoslav, Ethiopian, Cuban and Swedish experience; also "The Role of Workers' Education in Zimbabwe's Social Tranformation" (by PATRICK VAN RENSBURG, STEPHEN CASTLES and PIETER RICHER); "Literacy for Development in Zimbabwe" (by TAKA MUDARIKI). Also for women's education in the workplace, i.e. the peasant household, see KATHLEEN HIGGINS, Women Farmers and their Training: an Evaluation of Non-Formal Training (Gaborone, 1981) (National Institute of Research Working Paper No. 39).
CHAPTER 21

Women, Wage Employment and Adult Education in Botswana: Priority Research Implications

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Introduction

This paper will examine the role and limitations of wage employment in raising the living standards of the people of Botswana, with special reference to women. The aim is not to answer but to raise questions on what implications this has for adult education in terms of research priorities. The emphasis on women is a result of the following factors:

1. research is continuously revealing that female-headed households are increasingly becoming a significant phenomenon; representing some 40 per cent to 50 per cent of Botswana’s households;¹
2. among Botswana’s poorest classes in the rural areas, households headed by females tend to be at the very bottom;²
3. wage employment opportunities are very, very limited in Botswana, but what is available is accessible predominantly to men. For unskilled females, domestic work is the largest employer;
4. wage employment has become the only meaningful source of income for the majority of the people, even though it is extremely scarce.

History has reduced Botswana’s peasant producers from the level of subsistence production to that of dependency on South Africa and world capitalism.³ Through migrant labour peasants were drawn from their land and forced to sell their labour to industries and commercial farms in South Africa. Through taxation and other means the Europeans created for the Blacks cash needs which could not be satisfied through subsistence peasant production. But the drainage of labour from the rural areas also had the effects of lowering such peasant production to below subsistence level.⁴ Because, through sexual designation of industrial tasks, it was overwhelmingly male labour that was recruited into the capitalist industries, women’s formerly productive labour, which was forced to remain in the rural areas, was reduced to dependency on male financial support.

So at independence in 1966 the Government and the people of Botswana were faced with the following major economic problems:

1. below subsistence production among peasants;
2. negligible industrial activity within the country, and therefore few or no jobs for the people, and few or no commercial activities;
3. very few commodities for export. In fact the country imported processed goods from South Africa, but exported mostly migrant labour, and then beef.

The development strategy Government adopted, was to have an open door policy where all and sundry could come and invest in the country and hopefully help generate capitalist economic activity. The cattle industry was developed and, with the discovery of diamonds in Orapa, and copper and nickel in Selebi-Phikwe, the economy came to be dominated by cattle and diamonds. The substantial income generated by the export of diamonds was reinvested in the beef industry and cattle ranching. It is within the context of the political economy of Botswana and its position in the world economy as a supplier of beef and diamonds, that the problems of wage employment and adult education for women will be analysed.

The political economy of adult education in Botswana

Adult education in this paper will be taken to mean “The organised process by which adults learn knowledge, attitudes or skills for individual, community or national development”. It is a social institution which can be used either to reproduce inequalities or to help/contribute to structural transformation in society. In which case, if the aim of research into adult education programmes is to find effective ways of helping the majority of Batswana to achieve democracy, self-reliance and unity, then that must needs be a challenge to the whole network of existing social relations that the existing programmes help to reproduce.

A very noticeable feature in the development of adult education in Botswana is the Government’s lack of commitment to such programmes. Although there are many and varied adult education activities, they are largely uncoordinated and rather ad hoc. There does not seem to have been any effort to cost them systematically and evaluate whether or not they are worthy. These programmes can be grouped under four broad headings as follows:

1. extension programmes: these comprise agricultural extension programmes related to nutrition and health, cooperative education, community development, wildlife education, etc. For most of these it is not clear how and why the target groups are chosen or whether or not the information communicated actually reaches the groups and changes their behaviour or how the kind of information communicated has been determined or by whom;

2. adult literacy programmes: in 1972 recommendations to launch a national adult literacy programme were turned down only to be accepted in 1979. Although it is not clear from the literature on these programmes why the Government decided to accept them now and not then, evidence would suggest a very low level of commitment. For instance, one of the major technical impediments to the effectiveness of these programmes
is the Government’s policy that they be carried out in Setswana, even among communities not at all familiar with the language;

3. **cultural and recreational programmes**: these comprise the activities of museums, libraries and cultural organizations. Neglect of these activities would suggest a relatively weak national consciousness which in turn begs for historical research. For instance, the Government took over the National Museum only in 1976, and established the National Cultural Council in 1978;

4. **training programmes**: since independence the Government has recognised the urgent need to localise and to train manpower. Attempts have been made to alleviate the acute shortage of manpower through inservice training for the public service, primary school teachers, extension workers and other adult educators. Preservice training is also provided. However, the problem still remains acute. It is not clear whether and to what extent proposals made in favour of these training programmes have actually been implemented.

Documents describing adult education programmes rarely explain reason for success or failure. But, notably, agricultural extension programmes have been repeatedly reported to fail to reach beyond a small class of rich peasants. This is particularly important to observe because, as noted above Botswana’s economy revolves around beef and diamonds. In 1976, for instance, the Government launched land tenure reforms for a scheme called the Tribal Grazing Land Policy which was meant to allocate land to a small class of large cattle owners who would transform themselves into capitalist ranchers and supply the Botswana Meat Commission with beef for the European Economic Community. At the launching of this policy, national radio campaigns were also launched to gain public acceptance. In fact the development strategy of Botswana has been to create a small class of petty bourgeois entrepreneurs and agricultural producers who would benefit from the country’s developing capitalist mode of production. Adult education programmes are thus geared at teaching the masses to accept this.

In relation to women, an important feature to note regarding these educational programmes is that most extension programmes tend to have a largely female participation. The exception is that of agricultural extension where, as already noted above, the target group has been a small, cattle owning group. The beneficiaries of these programmes had to have basic farming implements (which most women would traditionally not have) and had to be males domiciled in the rural areas. In other extension fields, females predominate, but the male administration of these programmes has not perceived this as significant nor noticed this involvement, until very recently. It has now come to be common knowledge that these programmes fail, but not enough systematic, class analysis has been done to show the reasons why they fail.

In order to understand the economic status of women, and their being relegated to the periphery in adult education even when they form the majority of participants, it is important to look at the wage employment structure and where women fit into it, and perhaps why they are turning hopefully to the urban areas in search of an alternative to subsistence agriculture.
The political economy of Botswana and how it affects the structure of wage employment

Botswana’s economy, led by diamonds and beef, has grown in remarkable leaps and bounds since independence. The new relations to the means of production now emerging are characterised by the class positions of the people of Botswana. These classes are as follows:

1. an externally based capitalist class who own the mining technology and expertise, control the markets and marketing of minerals, control the commercial banks, and have large shares in the parastatal institutions, and most or all of the big enterprises;

2. a local petty bourgeoisie comprised of (a) at the top, big cattle ranchers who own the largest percentage of the national herd, have access to loans from the National Development Bank, and derive most of their income from sale of cattle and related activities; (b) traders, a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, found mostly in state institutions as policy-makers, and who also own large herds of cattle; ranchers who derive part of their income from commercial, arable agriculture and who are the beneficiaries of government initiated agriculture development efforts; (c) intellectuals and professionals like doctors, lawyers, university lecturers, etc., who earn salaries above P600.00 per month and who also invest their cash earnings in the rural areas as well as in town as landlords, traders, etc;

3. the working class comprised of (a) an urban-based proletariat who depend on their salaries: domestic workers, house-maids and gardeners, industrial-class workers (non-permanent and non-pensionable cadres) and other unskilled workers most of whom earn salaries below P100.00 a month; (b) rural based wage earners who work on other people’s farms either in the freehold sector, where salaries are around P7.00 per month, or in the traditional sector where they are mainly paid in kind; others are domestic workers who are also paid in kind;

4. the poor peasantry: this class is made up of peasants who do not own cattle, or who own less than ten head, who depend on borrowed draught power for ploughing, or do not plough at all, who depend on their family labour when they do plough, and who generally derive most of their income from remittances from wage-earning relatives, gifts, food gathering, hunting, beer brewing, and sale of gathered/hunted goods like wood and wild fruits. Some 40 per cent of these derive part of their income from looking after mafisa cattle thereby getting in return for their labour, access to milk, meat, and sometimes even draught power;

5. the lumpenproletariat: under this class I would lump together the landless unemployed ranging from (a) the rural-based who may have access to land but cannot produce from it for lack of draught power but who, on the other hand, cannot find wage employment and are reduced to begging or odd jobs in exchange for a meal here and there; (b) the urban based unemployed who derive their income from prostitution, beer-brewing, sale of wood or cooked food, and others engaged in petty trading from
which they gain enough for subsistence or even possibly to create a surplus; and to the unemployed youth like orange sellers and others who spend most of their time drifting around town and doing odd jobs like sar washing, carrying groceries for shoppers, etc.

The above outline of the class structure of Botswana should serve to indicate, not only the developing pattern of relations to the means of production, but also the pattern of distribution of national wealth. The wage employment structure revolves around the two dominant commodities of beef and diamonds. Diamonds have had a significant impact on the creation of foreign exchange as well as attracting foreign investment into the country. But being a capital intensive industry diamond mining has not generated much employment around mining, and most of the wealth it has created is being syphoned out of the country in the following ways: profits accruing to the mining magnates; the buying and repaying of externally manufactured mining technology, importing of mining expertise; sale of the mineral products before they are processed; and repaying loans borrowed from commercial banks, multinationals, governments and other foreign agencies. What fraction remains in the country is mainly reinvested in the development of the beef industry and the building of roads and other physical infrastructure geared at servicing and facilitating the development of the mining industry. None of these economic activities have had a significant impact on raising the living standards of the masses of Botswana, because the development strategy has been to foster the growth of a small class of the privileged to enter into capitalist enterprises. Thus not enough jobs are being created, and at the same time not much is being invested on any large scale in arable agriculture which would benefit more people in the rural areas.

Turning now to the jobs available to Batswana we find that 50 per cent of Batswana wage employees (excluding domestic workers and non-freehold farm workers) are engaged in production and related work. Three-quarters of these production workers are absorbed by construction, mining, government (industrial class and local government), and manufacturing. Fourteen per cent of the wage employees are engaged in service work, with central government and commerce absorbing seven-tenths of these service workers. Professional and technical workers form the third largest group of citizen workers (12.5 per cent). Three-fifths of these workers are in education (state and private), while a further three-tenths are in central and local government. Sales work and work in freehold agriculture each absorb 4 per cent of Batswana workers. Over nine-tenths of the sales workers are in commerce, while two-thirds of freehold agricultural workers are hired by freehold farmers. The smallest group of workers are the managerial cadre. They form 2.5 per cent of Batswana workers, and one-fifth of them are hired by central and local government.

Domestic workers are yet another group of employees. However they are statistically poorly accounted for because of the fluidity of their occupation. When they were still included in employment statistics in 1976 they formed the second largest group after the total sum of government workers. Statistics on traditional agricultural workers are also quite difficult to come by.
The foregoing descriptive account only indicates what job types are available in the country. Now the important question to ask is, for whom these jobs are available, and to what extent wage employment enables Batswana to make a decent living?

Of Batswana wage earners employed in the country 75 per cent are men. Few employment opportunities exist for women although the female population is larger than the male. We noted above that 50 per cent of Batswana employees are production workers. This is a predominantly male sphere dominated by construction, mining, government employment and manufacturing in that order. For instance, in construction, women are less than a tenth of the employees, while in local government and the industrial class of central government, they form there-tenths of the workers.

The professional and technical field is the only area where female workers are a significant percentage. This field is largely made up of education where females comprise two-thirds of the employees. (Education employs 60 per cent of the professional and technical workers, secondly, about 67 per cent of its employees are women). Commerce also employs a large percentage of women as sales workers, production workers, service and clerical workers. Two-fifths of commerce workers are women. Government institutions, altogether, form the biggest employer in the country. If we exclude state education, government workers comprise only about three-tenths females.

Before getting into an analysis of the wage structure and how it affects development, it is perhaps necessary, at this juncture, to trace the basis of sexual discrimination in employment opportunities. In the precapitalist economic order, both Tswana men and women engaged in productive income generating labour: crop production being primarily a woman’s job while cattle rearing was a man’s. With the advent of the capitalist division of labour, men were recruited to work in the European industries while women were forced (though sexual designation of industrial tasks) to stay behind in peasant production. This way the capitalists were able to pay their black workers bachelor, rather than family, wages: their families were assumed to derive their livelihood from peasant agriculture. The peasant women thus bore the costs of social security and the development of labour force which would otherwise have been borne by the capitalists if they had regarded the Africans as a full proleteriat (i.e. depending solely on their wages). Because women were expected to stay behind in the rural areas and not go out in search of wage employment, the notion of women as solely housekeepers and not cash income earners came to take root and be nurtured as the ideal situation for them. Disregarding the fact that they had always contributed to their own maintenance even when they were under the control and guardianship of their menfolk, women came to be seen as non-productive consumers. Even when, from the 1940s women started working in considerable numbers, they were normally paid lower wages than their male counterparts: the argument being that men were providers for families while women were not. These prejudices continue to colour men’s attitudes towards women workers. This is particularly important since, because history has placed them in the advantaged position of decision making, men dominate employment policies,
career advancement, labour recruitment and promotion of female workers. Now, more than ever before, it is imperative that all obstacles to sexual equality in access to employment be removed. Historical developments from 1885 to the present have freed women from men’s control and ushered in the new phenomenon of female-headed households. Up to 50 per cent (and certainly 40 per cent) of Botswana’s households are headed by women. The implication of this new phenomenon is that women are bread-earners for their families and must therefore be given a fair opportunity to find decent salaried jobs to maintain them.

The wage structure of Botswana is such that most of the workers cannot accumulate much money to improve their living standard. The following statistics must be taken to show a trend because they are a bit outdated. About 67 per cent of the wage labourers earn from less than P20.00 per month to P150.00 per month. In commerce 60 per cent of the workers earn between P51.00 and P100.00 per month and 90 per cent below P200.00. The rationale for the low wages in the lower income brackets is that urban workers should not far exceed rural dwellers in income. Incomes policy is in fact based on the erroneous conception of Botswana as having a dual economy composed of rural poor and urban rich. In the final analysis it is the poorer groups who share their poverty rather than sharing in the national wealth. The upper classes get the larger share of the country’s wealth. For instance 50 per cent of the urban households have 80 per cent of the total income. These high salaried employees earn enough to accumulate and even invest in rural agriculture. So although wage employment as a source of income is a direct way of distributing national wealth, and therefore a direct way of improving people’s living standards, for many Batswana it is out of reach. Of the lucky few who manage to get jobs most do not earn above subsistence. An essential task should therefore be to discuss in what ways women in particular and the poor in general should be assisted to find alternatives in income generation besides wage employment. However strategies for improving opportunities for women to (1) find jobs, (2) get the training and education which will enable them to obtain jobs presently designated “male”, (3) get promotion into policy making and decision making posts in their jobs, need also to be discussed and practical suggestions made concerning them.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. See Rural Incomes Survey (Gaborone, 1974), and National Migration Study reports such as D. M. Cooper, Rural-Urban Migration and Female-headed Households in Botswana Towns (Gaborone, 1979); and Wendy Izzard, Rural-Urban Migration of Women in Botswana (Gaborone 1979). Also S. Kossoudji and E. Mueller, The Economic status of Female-headed Households in Rural

3. For a discussion of subsistence production among Batswana peasants, see ISAAC SCHAPERA, Migrant Labour and Tribal Life (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). Schapera argues that the Batswana were self-sufficient in food production until contact with Europeans. He also records changes in tribal life with the advent of the European cash economy and industry.

4. Ibid., pp. 164-167.


6. Ibid., pp. XVI – XIX

7. Ibid., p. XVI – XIX.


12. Ibid., p. 13.


15. Ibid., p. 13.


17. I. SCHAPERA, op cit., p. 64.

18. Employment Survey (Gaborone, 1980).

PART FOUR

THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
CHAPTER 22

Setting Research Priorities for a University Research Institute in Southern Africa

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Introduction

"Institutes established with(in) universities to perform (the) function (of applied social research) are at the centre of a great, and very healthy debate, namely, how can universities demonstrate their relevance in national development (and what is 'relevance'; indeed, what is 'development'? and at the same time preserve the necessary autonomy to perform their historically distinctive, and far more crucial, function of fundamental thinking, objective study and critical analysis of the national societies whose development is being sought." (Coleman, 1972: 307).

The occasion for writing this paper is a consultative workshop on research priorities, held as "an integral part of the establishment and implementation of the Institute of Southern African Studies" (Sefali, 1981: 1) at the National University of Lesotho, with the goal of promoting collaborative research projects in the region which "will be practical and policy oriented so as to aid respective governments in decision making" (Setai, 1980: 1). Doubtless, one reason for inviting a paper from the Institute for African Studies at the University of Zambia was its historical lineage, which goes back to the establishment in 1938 of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

Since that time no less than four Directors have committed to writing their views on the setting of priorities for research at the Institute (Gluckman, 1945; Heron, 1966; van Velsen, 1974; Kashoki, 1978). My attempt to follow in their footsteps will be restrained by a degree of scepticism regarding the notion that research priorities (and still less plans) can be determined in a fully rational manner. The various criteria which determine what research shall be done are in my experience more often negotiated among various interested parties at highly intuitive level and bear only a rather tenuous link to the systematic formulations of armchair planners. Good research relies on bold, inductive leaps of the imagination, just as much as on cool, deductive reasoning, and for this reason my approach to ways of setting priorities at the Institute has concentrated more on the design of a structure and process, within whose bounds researchers are encouraged to be creative, than on itemizing topics which should
be investigated. Nevertheless, I do not subscribe to a completely *laissez-faire* approach to the programming of research, and I shall devote much of my attention in this paper to problems of social responsibility in social research. For a concrete account of what has taken place in the way of research at the Institute in recent years, readers should refer to the Annual Reports for the years 1977–78, 1979, 1980, and 1981.

**Issues and problems**

*The Social Research Institute as a broker with a multiple clientele*

A Research Institute which professes a concern with contemporary society thereby implies that it has something of value to offer to a variety of different interested parties, or clients. A rough categorization of this multiple clientele is depicted in Figure 1. Needless to say the demands of different client groups are often somewhat at variance with each other and may sometimes appear totally incompatible.

An additional complexity lies in the fact that each of these client groups is itself a dynamic, kaleidoscopic configuration of elements, which is not only changing continuously from its own momentum, but is also sometimes directly influenced by the activities of the Research Institute. New theoretical ideas...
generated by institute researchers may come to feature prominently in the structure of teaching programmes offered by the University departments. Policy alternatives identified by the researchers may be taken up and incorporated in the operations of Government departments and other agencies. And, if we may judge from the impact of Marx and Freud on popular thought in some societies, even the conceptual patterns and aspirations of the 'man in the street' may come to reflect ideas generated by social scientists.

Thus for the Institute to cater to the interests of any particular client means more than a passive acceptance of instructions. Rather it is a matter of responding constructively to an often ill-defined stimulus. This requirement, although demanding on the intellectual energy and ingenuity of researchers, constitutes a crucial privilege which deserves persistent protection, since it provides the necessary flexibility for coordinating the demands of various different clients, amongst whom must be numbered the researchers themselves. The Institute itself as a corporate entity needs at least a general policy (and may benefit from devising fairly detailed guidelines) on how to perform its role as a broker at the centre of this network of varied clients.

Dealing with the national government

In nations which have recently attained political independence (which includes most of the states in Africa) the expansion of social services is often an important part of the government's political platform. Coupled with a highly centralised distribution of formal power, this tends to make the government an attractive client for researchers who aspire to influence the form of their society for the better. In most African countries, moreover, the national government is the principal source of funding for such universities and social research institutes as exist within the nation's boundaries. It therefore expects (and periodically explicitly demands) that social research conducted by the Institute be relevant to government programmes.

Problems confronting the Institute in dealing with government occur on three different planes: moral, theoretical and practical. On the moral plane the question arises whether the researcher working on a project commissioned by government retains the freedom to make his or her own value judgements in the interpretation of the phenomena studied. The right to do this is best claimed at the outset of such a partnership. Speaking at a graduation ceremony where the Head of State was about to confer the degrees in his capacity as Chancellor of the national university, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia proclaimed that:

"If the zealous and objective pursuit of the truth leads academics ... to a position which is not consonant with current state policy, be it in the practical or theoretical sphere, then from their position of authority and competence within their specialised areas they have the responsibility to make this manifest to the State." (Mwanza, 1976:9)

The claim that under these circumstances the scholar has an obligation to criti-
cize is made on a political (i.e., a moral) plane. Its acceptance by the government implies a relationship of mutual trust.

The degree to which such trust prevails varies from one country to another and fluctuates over time. Kashiki (1978: 375) has pointed to the potential for conflict contained in party political injunctions to “reeducate counterrevolutionaries,” and posed the question of how far the bounds of “ideological propriety” restrict the scholar’s freedom to expound “alternative ways of perceiving reality.” Some scholars regard the avoidance of close contact with an ideologically doctrinaire national government as the only safe way of preserving their moral integrity. Others question whether such a stance of ‘detached objectivity’ is genuinely motivated by scientific considerations, arguing that it may be construed instead as a myth used to legitimise the scholar’s reluctance to make a particular political commitment, and that such a reluctance constitutes in itself a definable political stance. This perspective suggests that social scientists have a responsibility to contribute to the refinement (and, if necessary, the reconstruction) of the national ideology.

On the plane of theory, the problem confronting the search for political relevance has often been represented as a dichotomy between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ social research. Increasingly, however, it has been recognised in recent years that so-called ‘pure’ research often yields insights which can be applied by policy-makers, and that research designed to address a specific policy problem can contribute, at the same time, to the advancement of basic theory. Indeed, the explication of the relevance of basic theoretical issues to policy decisions is probably a necessary step for the validation of social scientific theories. The issue is therefore more one of emphasis than of choosing between opposing alternatives. Moreover, a social research institute which is responding acceptably to the government’s requests for short-term, policy oriented studies will find it easier to justify some longer term, more basic theoretical studies.

Practical problems in dealing with government arise mainly in the business of implementing the researcher’s policy recommendations. Brown (1979) has traced the progressive disillusionment of Max Gluckman, an early Director of this Institute, as he saw more and more of his ambitious plans to influence Northern Rhodesian colonial policy frustrated. There is a great danger for the committed researcher of assuming that his or her perspective on the topic of investigation necessarily deserves the highest priority when it comes to action. Even if he or she has achieved a superior understanding of the topic (and this is certainly not guaranteed by scientific credentials alone), it is highly unlikely that the researcher will have access to all the information relevant to decisions regarding the allocation of resources.

Apart from the question of prioritization, policy recommendations by researchers may fail to be implemented for a number of reasons which are more amenable to correction. Many researchers fail to give adequate attention to the task of addressing their policy making audience in terms which are fully comprehensible and persuasive. Even if they recognise the importance of this communicative task, researchers often lack sufficient knowledge of the attitudes, skills and background of this audience and the technical know-how required to phrase
their reports appropriately. Then there is the problem of ‘engineering’ the scientific principles of policy recommendations into feasible action plans. As Coleman (1972 : 305) notes, this is a field in which few people have acquired expertise, and for a researcher to engage in it requires a high degree of ‘action involvement’, which in turn calls for a greater moral commitment to the goals of the implementing agency than does merely conducting the original study. Finally there are often limitations of executive capability in government departments. The researcher who has devoted time and effort to the persuasion of government to accept his or her recommendations and to form their articulation into an action plan may be induced to assist yet further by designing a system for monitoring the implementation of the plan.

The various problems outlined in this section point to the need for an explicit process of negotiation between the social research institute and the national government when commissioned studies are undertaken. In this process the reciprocal obligations of the two parties need to be acknowledged on both sides, e.g. the right to publish research findings and the obligation to respect the confidentiality of certain categories of information. The initial statement of the problem by government may need to be expanded or even substantially redefined, and will certainly need to be further articulated, before empirical investigation begins. Theoretical and methodological issues will need to be worked out by the researchers before a plan of work is ready which can be used to agree on access to data, resource requirements and a realistic timetable for the study. Provided that there is good faith on both sides, this process of negotiation can be undertaken without too much conflict and sets the stage for better cooperation in later stages of the sequence of research and implementation.

Responding to the felt needs of other sections of society

A great deal of research addressed to contemporary social issues involves the observation and/or interviewing of many individuals other than government officials, with a view to understanding their behaviour, dispositions, attitude, aspirations, etc. These individuals and the groups with which they identify have their own interests to which researchers need to be sensitive for the short-term practical reason of enlisting their cooperation, but also for longer-term ethical reasons and even for theoretical reasons. To describe a human being as the subject of study presumes a detached objectivity which fails to give due recognition to the self-consciousness and autonomy which inform human action (cf. Joynson, 1974; Shotter, 1975). On the other hand, casting someone in the role of informant implies an extractive process of research, which raises difficult questions of remuneration. “Far too much psychological research in the Third World has in my view been addressed to an international audience of scholars, with little or no concern for whether the interpretations it offers have any meaning for the people who were studied”. (Serpell, 1979 : 288)

The explicit recognition by social scientists of an obligation towards the individuals and the communities amongst whom they are collecting primary data has far reaching implications for methodology, and for institutional policy.
and above the traditional tasks of extracting information from a target population, analysing it and interpreting it for the benefit of other scholars and/or for governments and other large scale service agencies, the researchers face the challenge of concurrently serving as a resource to the target community – relaying their perceived needs to external powers, explaining to them the goals of planned interventions and (most difficult of all) formulating interpretations of the data they collect which are illuminating and/or useful to the community (cf. Taylor, 1971).

The best strategies for fulfilling these varied functions are a subject of current debate at the University of Zambia* and elsewhere. Meanwhile, a research institute which seeks to promote these interests can usefully insist on researchers articulating their plan of action in various ways. First they should spell out the ethical safeguards to be followed in protecting confidentiality; and second they should commit themselves to certain forms of feedback to local audiences. Beyond these two minimal requirements researchers may be encouraged to invite local participation in the definition of research problems and/or in the specification of methods (cf. Serpell, 1980).

A social research Institute has a unique interest in the promotion of this kind of local level answerability among researchers, since, irrespective of the specific outcome of any particular project, it professes an abiding commitment to the value of social research in general. The Institute cannot, and should not seek to, take responsibility for the particular views expressed by individual researchers. But it should encourage its staff to explain and justify those views to each and every interested party, client or audience. In exchange for this minimal level of responsibility to the host community, the Institute is on firmer ground in asking for reciprocal assistance to the researcher in the form of divulging information and giving up time to answering questions.

Some types of social grouping, however, may express a more active political focus in their demands on research. Such interest groups include ad hoc associations formed to resist a particular government intervention, labour unions and producer cooperatives, charitable, religious or statutory bodies committed to the welfare of a particular section of the population, and even large-scale business enterprises. The Institute can protect the individual researcher from biasing influence in such cases by insisting that the demands on the interest group be formally negotiated in the same spirit of give and take as that outlined for dealing with the national government.

**The community of scholars**

A researcher working in a university research institute is in a position to regard him or herself as a member of at least three scholarly communities: the institute itself, the university as a whole, and an international network of scholars working on topics related to his or her own. Within each of these communities, the researcher may define the borders of his or her affiliation or alliances in

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*Notably in a series of seminars organised in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences by Lolle Nauta and Patrick Ncube during 1980–81*
disciplinary, regional or problem focused terms. The particular composition of the Institute’s intellectual resources can thus be viewed through a number of different filtering lenses. The range of disciplines represented in their postgraduate training is one popular filter, especially amongst observers from disciplinary based departments of the university. (Through this filter at the time of writing our Institute for African Studies looks as follows: anthropology, demography, economics, history, law, literature, management science, musicology, psychology, public health, social work, sociology – no attempt is made to assign numbers to each discipline since several of our staff have received training in more than one discipline).

The regional focus can be specified in terms of ethnicity, nationality, locus of postgraduate training and locus of research experience. Each of these criteria has a certain relevance, but their application involves varying degrees of political content. Whereas Africanisation of academic staff is generally viewed as a desirable goal in the context of building up self-reliance in the newly independent nations on the continent, ‘tribal balancing’ among indigenous nationals is regarded by many as an unrealistic and diversionary goal for an academic institution. (Our Institute has at present nine Zambian nationals – eight of them indigenous – on its academic staff of 15, including two without postgraduate training. They are not expected to declare their tribal affiliation). Postgraduate training is in scarce supply on the African continent, so that many African scholars have to train abroad. But many of them choose to focus their dissertation work on African topics. (All of our seven postgraduate trained Zambian researchers did their graduate studies on topics pertaining to Zambia, as did two of our expatriate researchers, while two others wrote on neighbouring African countries).

The problem focus is often more difficult to categorise and hence more difficult to project as a public image. And yet it is widely recognised that new developments in research often draw on ideas from several disciplines, and that the major social problems of the real world generally call for multidisciplinary study. A social research Institute, especially if it does not become excessively large and fragmented, provides exceptional opportunities for interaction and collaboration among researchers with different disciplinary specialisations, who may seldom interact within the compartmentalised curriculum of university departments. The particular strategy adopted for the promotion of multidisciplinary research at our Institute is briefly described later in this paper.

Given the multiple filters through which a given array of scholars can be regarded, the establishment of research priorities within the community of scholars tends to be highly controversial. Should the range of disciplines represented in the Institute reflect the same proportions as those in the relevant Schools or Faculties of the university as a whole? Such a principle would overlook two related issues. In many countries there is an attempt to relate the size of student enrolments (and hence of academic staff establishments in the Schools charged with teaching) to the priority needs for local manpower in the economy. But there is no clear reason to believe that the magnitude of current manpower needs will be directly related to the priority needs for research to advance the frontiers of knowledge in a given domain. Indeed, there may be crucial areas of
ignorance which require investigation but in which the need for manpower trained at the first degree level is minimal. (It has been argued in the past that this is true in Zambia for the domains of demography and linguistics: and Research Fellowships were reserved for these two disciplines from 1965 to 1977 at the Institute for African Studies, although no plans for a major undergraduate concentration in either field have even been proposed in the University of Zambia Senate).

A second problem concerns the degree of freedom to be accorded to individual researchers in formulating actual research projects. Little is known about the process by which an accumulation of knowledge in a given field precipitates the emergence of those new ideas which significantly advance the understanding of that field. But there is at least a latent assumption shared among most scholars that the key process is hidden within the genius of an individual mind. This assumption informs the elitist demand by members of all scholarly communities for a certain degree of autonomy to be accorded to individual researchers to try out ‘their own’ ideas. On the other hand, an awareness of the multiple clientele of the research institute leads scholars to expect certain limits to be imposed on their freedom to investigate whatever they will and at the same time be paid for doing so.

The scholarly community acts as a kind of buffer between the competing claims of individual initiative and society’s definitions of priorities. This can be done at two levels: in respect of prioritisation (what should be studied?), and in respect of methodology (how should it be studied)? The other clients of the institute are generally more concerned to take part at the first than at the second level. The process of formal ‘peer review’ by a technical expert can be used to good effect to clarify for a multisectoral committee the theoretical significance of issues whose short-term practical importance is obscure, as well as methodological limitations on the feasibility of gathering information for which the need is apparent. It should be noted, however, that to those working outside the walls of academia the difference between bona fide, impartially evaluative review and personally biased favouritism is not always easy to discern. However real the theoretical and ideological cleavages that exist within the community of scholars, there remains, in the social dynamics of determining research priorities, an important sense in which that community is perceived by those outside it to act as a single interest group.

One aspect of the community of scholars which is especially vulnerable to mistrust by government and other locally based interest groups in Third World countries is the strength of its international connections. The scholar’s membership of a disciplinary ‘guild’ in which the leading figures are mainly based abroad raises legitimate questions about the local relevance of the theories and methods to which he or she declares a professional commitment. As Berrien (1967 : 38) has noted:

“With the emphasis on developing countries, investigators are fanning out from those countries where research techniques have reached a higher level of sophistication into those where the supply of indigenous skilled researchers is severely restricted. These emissaries necessarily carry with them
their ethnic biases which shape the significance and the definition of problems. Because of their great scientific armamentation and sophisticated technical methodology developed in, and appropriate to, their home environments there may be a tendency to overwhelm the host researchers into accepting totally inappropriate research issues and methodologies."

International organisations have played a part in the promotion of this unhappy phenomenon by seeking out nationals from several countries to participate in projects which are preconceived from a 'hologeistic' perspective. The part played by local conditions in such research designs is often little more than providing an opportunity to test some feature of a theory. From such a perspective the community in question is viewed somewhat like a 'preparation' in biomedical research* and the implications of the research for the community itself scarcely feature among the objectives. Thus the Director-General of the World Health Organization recently sadly observed that "in many instances researchers in developing countries serve at best as data collectors for outside experts". (WHO, 1975)

A number of incentives are proferred by international agencies to recruit the participation in such ventures by mid-career scholars in Africa. These include not only funds to cover research expenses, but also consultancy fees, free travel abroad and — not least — the prestigious opportunity to interact with renowned scholars at international meetings. Fortunately, these agencies are becoming increasingly aware of the potentially diversionary impact of these 'fringe benefits' and often prefer to negotiate their contracts with institutions rather than with individual scholars. It is then left to local administrators to perform a delicate balancing act, trying to maximize the flow of international resources into local social research without distorting the locally determined scale of research priorities.

Lest I appear to be casting the international agencies in a totally negative light, I should point out that our experience at the Institute for African Studies has been very mixed. In some cases international agencies have directly precipitated research activity in Zambia which has been accepted by many local observers as deserving priority attention. In other cases they have facilitated constructive interaction between the university and government. Perhaps the rarest form of support offered has been the unconditional supply of resources 'to do with as you see fit'. It is, of course, understandable that these agencies have their own criteria, but given that many of them include among their objectives the enhancement of local institutional research capabilities, it would seem appropriate for them to attach greater emphasis to the participation by such local institutions in the definition of research priorities.

The issue of culture

Institutes for African Studies around the world seem to fall mainly into two contrasting categories: those focusing on political issues and those centred

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* I am indebted to Kenneth Traupmann for drawing this analogy to my attention.
around the arts. Our own Institute gives more prominence to social and economic research than to either of those more traditional foci. But we do retain a commitment to the study of cultural forms including various facets of the arts. The basis on which many researchers in the arts prefer to justify their domain of enquiry has less to do with the analysis of pressing problems than with the documentation of existing sources of strength in African society. They stress the intrinsic, recreational and emotionally satisfying properties of the arts, which in the present writer's view have a greater bearing on the case for allocating funds to manifestation of the arts and to artistic education than on the case for research funds. On the other hand, the need for research and documentation of the arts can also be seen as a reflection of a social problem which has definable historical roots:

"One of the techniques used by the colonial invaders of Africa—in Northern Rhodesia as elsewhere—for maintaining a monopoly of power over the indigenous people was the propagation of an ideology of racial and cultural superiority. Having established themselves as a dominant group on the strength of their powerful technology, Europeans in Africa proceeded to mystify the people they had conquered with a complex web of myth interwined with science and history, designed to prove that European domination was not merely a prize of military and economic might, but more fundamentally the natural consequence of a superior culture invented by the superior minds of a superior race. It is debatable whether this propaganda was more effectively spread by the colonial administration or by the Christian missionaries who variously preceded the colonialists or entered the region under their protection.

Certainly such education as was provided for Africans in Northern Rhodesia was conceived explicitly as an introduction to Western culture, and tended either to disregard or to condemn those local cultural forms and values which were at variance with British, Christian practices. Education along these lines placed the student in a position of potential moral and intellectual conflict. On the one hand, his aspirations within the highly competitive school progression geared him to assimilating as thoroughly as possible the value and conceptual frameworks presented by his teachers and their textbooks. On the other hand, his awareness of the injustices perpetrated by Europeans against his people and of the exclusion from European society of educated Africans gave him grounds for doubting whether assimilation of European culture was either desirable or useful to him in the long run.

The conflict between the values of home and school produced many different forms of intellectual compromise among Africans educated in the colonial schools. Some turned against their parents and indeed against their entire cultural heritage and sought to establish themselves as British in all but racial origin. Others rejected the values promoted by the school education so completely that they deprived themselves and their children of access even to morally neutral elements of Western technology. Both
these groups failed to escape completely the influence of the culture they rejected wholesale, since their social and physical environment required them, willy-nilly, to acknowledge certain facets of both cultures. Various forms of eclecticism were more widely preferred as solutions. Some of these have found expression in the writings of African intellectuals, under such titles as Negritude, African Socialism, Zambian Humanism, although it should be recognized that these philosophies have wider implications in the field of economics. In many individuals, however, a large number of potential conflicts were not worked out in a logically coherent philosophy, but either emotionally repressed or consciously ignored. In these cases, moral uncertainty, intellectual confusion, bitterness towards others, and contempt for the self are among the hazards threatening their maintenance of a healthy personal identity.” (Serpell & Mwanalushi, 1976: 4-5)

The challenge which these phenomena pose for cultural research is multidimensional. There is the task of rediscovering the stock of wisdom embedded in African oral traditions, which calls not only for recording what the old people can remember but also for analysing it and interpreting it to the younger generations. There is the task of reaffirming the value of indigenous African cultural forms, of demonstrating their relevance as a criterion of worth in contemporary society, and there is the task of disseminating indigenous African cultural information to a wider audience than it is currently able to reach. This constitutes a natural consequence for a research institution to the tasks of rediscovery and reaffirmation. In addition it can be seen as serving utilitarian functions in respect of the development of educational curricula, the entertainment industry, and more generally of promoting a more balanced dialogue between the generations in Africa.

All this may seem rather remote from social and economic research on contemporary issues. But it is not unreasonable to hope that the literature which emerges from cultural research may serve as a source of inspiration to future African social scientists for the generation of culturally meaningful social theories. Kashoki (1979: 177), for instance, has argued that

“instead of the present almost wholesale adoption of the Western intellectual tradition(s), the future African scholar will need to construct models and theories based on concepts and biases embedded in his own culture.”

Such an enterprise needs to be tempered by the recognition that culture is not a static concept. Colson, (1980: 651) has offered the interesting speculation that as Third World scholars move into the discipline of anthropology,

“we should be able to look forward to the development of theoretical models which deal with humans as forward-thrusting explorers of the possible rather than as conservators of the past... If so, this requires a good deal of rethinking of basic assumptions about the nature of social order and a recognition that culture refers to phenomena which humans create and can alter when they will.”

This type of dynamic cultural eclecticism seems to be especially prevalent in the multilingual social setting of modern African cities such as Lusaka (Serpell, 1978) and Nairobi (Parkin, 1974), where many of the continent’s social research
institutes are likely to be established. Moreover, it is an attractive mode of thought for many African scholars, because of their bicultural education.

Coordinating the interests of a multiple clientele

Sufficient has been said above to discredit the stance of detached impartiality which has sometimes been advanced as an ideal for social research. Research is not undertaken just "for its own sake," even if the primary identifiable motive is intellectual curiosity. What constitutes an 'interesting question' depends on a number of factors some of which can be systematically related to the observer's social role, cultural background and educational specialisation. Likewise, whether the explanations offered by researchers are received as 'correct', or 'elegant' will depend very much on the audience to whom they are addressed.

I have argued that a wide variety of legitimate interests can be identified which are relevant to the determination of priorities for social research. Some of these interests can occasionally come into direct conflict, while at other times they are complementary and mutually compatible. In the next section I will briefly describe the consultative machinery which has evolved at the University of Zambia to facilitate the convergence of these multiple interests in the determination of research policy at the Institute for African Studies. The central characteristics of this machinery have been the creation of opportunities for university scholars to sit with clients from outside the university and discuss the need for research of various kinds, and the use of problem areas rather than disciplines as criteria for demarcating areas of concern.

Structure and process at Institute for African Studies of the University of Zambia 1977–81

In his perceptive analysis of applied social research and training in nine African universities, Coleman (1972 : 294–6) identified a number of sources of persistent tension between the teaching and research functions of the university. Apart from the fact that the two activities compete for the time of the individual scholar, he noted that the staff of teaching departments often express:

1. a sense of envy of their colleagues' (in research institutes) relative freedom from teaching obligations, greater access to research funds and facilities, and greater opportunity to publish and accelerate their professional advancement;
2. a fear of their department's corporate research output being preempted or eclipsed by the research institute; and
3. a contempt for the institute's applied, policy oriented research as a threat to the academic integrity of the university, as diversionary from the critical study of fundamental issues, and as superficial.

On the other side, he found a number of negative reciprocal perspectives on the part of institute researchers:
1. a sense of physical and 'psychic' marginality to the mainstream of university life;
2. a resentment at having their research projects significantly determined by persons or processes other than autonomous personal choice;
3. frustration at having to work towards inflexible deadlines for the submission of commissioned reports; and
4. envy of the long vacations enjoyed by teaching staff when students are off campus.

These mutually suspicious and resentful attitudes of institute and department personnel have certainly contributed as much as the wider societal issues discussed above to the pressure for policy development at the Institute for African Studies of the University of Zambia. I shall not, however, attempt to document their influence, or indeed the step by step evolution of the present framework. Rather I shall outline the major characteristics of the framework which has emerged.

The Institute presently comprises the following five Research Units:
- Arts and Communication Studies Unit
- Community Health Research Unit
- Manpower Research Unit
- Technology and Industry Research Unit
- Urban Community Research Unit

The terms of reference of the five units were drawn up in 1977. (They can be found in the Annual Reports of the Institute). Suggestions for priority topics were invited from all members of a Programme Committee, as well as from the Deans of all the Schools of the University. A total of 40 submissions were received, emanating from a total of 18 sources (6 staff of the Institute, 6 members of the Programme Committee, 4 other staff of the University and 2 Zambian organizations outside the University). These were discussed by the Committee which grouped them into five sets and proposed the establishment of a programme divided into five units. The terms of reference of these units were formulated to cover the concerns expressed in all of the proposals except those which seemed already to fall within the purview of the University's other two research units: the Rural Development Studies Bureau and the Educational Research Bureau. In adopting this scheme the University Senate anticipated that the terms of reference of the units might be modified from time to time, but that they would constitute a broad framework for research mounted at the Institute over the period 1978–82.

The composition and terms of reference of the Programme Committee have undergone a number of revisions over the years from 1977 to 1982. At all stages, however, the guiding principle has been to maintain a balance between the representation of internal university concerns and that of the felt needs of government and other sections of Zambian society. Currently the Institute and the two research bureaux have a small Joint Programme Committee comprising the Vice-Chancellor and seven Deans and Directors of the University, while the Research Advisory Committee, which meets once per year, includes representatives of eight government departments, the national party, the city council,
five statutory bodies, three private sector organizations and five UN agencies, as well as eight senior academic staff of the university. From 1977 to 1980, the functions of these two bodies were combined by a smaller committee comprising members from both inside and outside the university.

The Institute has an establishment in 1982 of twelve academic posts, including that of the Director. In addition to fully qualified Research Fellows, the Institute is sometimes able to deploy recent graduates of the University of Zambia sponsored under the Staff Development Fellowship scheme. Visiting researchers sponsored by other institutions whose projects are approved by the Institute are accorded the status of Research Affiliate and work in various degrees of association with the Institute’s own research programme.

Applications for appointment to the academic staff are invited initially from incumbent staff of other sections of the University under the provisions of a secondment scheme, which requires the applicant to submit a specific research proposal. These proposals are reviewed and short listed for the Appointments Committee by the Programme Committee in the light of the following criteria:

- the value of the proposed project in furthering and complementing the present concerns of the Research Unit in question;
- the relevance of the applicant’s experience to the proposed research project;
- referees’ reports and other evidence of the applicant’s academic competence;
- the prospects for the applicant returning to full-time teaching at the University and thus feeding back into teaching programmes some of the knowledge gained in the research.

Only when posts cannot be filled by secondment are they advertised outside the University.

The generation of a good research proposal, whether by an applicant or by an incumbent research officer, is usually a gradual process. An individual or an agency may formulate a preliminary statement of a problem or topic which stimulates an exploratory dialogue. Staff of the institute are generally in a position to link such proposals to some existing literature which may lead to an expansion or a refinement of the project proposal. Depending on the scale of the project it may be necessary to recruit additional staff and/or to raise additional funds for its implementation, while in other cases problems of methodology may require consultation with outside bodies. Eventually a fully articulated research proposal for submission to the Programme Committee must review the relevant literature, specify the objectives of the project and the methods to be followed in attaining them, the time frame for completing the project and the resources to be used.

The publication and dissemination of research results is an important dimension of the work of any research institute. The Institute for African Studies publishes a journal twice a year, *African Social Research*, and two annual monograph series, *Zambian Papers* and *Communications of the Institute*, as well as occasional books. In addition, four of the Units issue their own series of limited
circulation reports: Community Health Research Reports, Human Aspects of Technology in Zambia, Manpower Research Reports, and Urban Community Reports.

The Editorial Board of the Institute’s formal publications is composed of scholars based in various sections of the University. The current editorial policy is to invite contributions from all those working in the general field of social research in Africa, especially in sociology and social anthropology, psychology, economics, human geography and demography, history and political science. Special consideration is given to material on Zambia, but articles are also welcomed from those engaged on work elsewhere when the findings appear to be applicable to Zambia or to provide important points of contrast. Preference is given to reports of original research and especially of primary data collected by the author. In view of the wide range of disciplines covered by the journal, authors are requested to couch their articles in a style and language comprehensible to educated readers without a specialist knowledge of the subject area, and to explain such technical terminology as they find it essential to include.

Kashoki (1978) has pointed out the difficulties of maintaining such a publication policy, and predicted a trend as the University of Zambia expands for authors more and more to address their publications to a narrow scholarly audience. Clearly such a trend, if it becomes exclusive of other publishing, would work against the objective advocated in this paper of responding in a coordinated fashion to the demands of the Institute’s multiple clientele. On the other hand, it may be unwise to try and address all of the interested parties through a single vehicle. Many of the people in the target communities of social research in Africa do not have a command of English adequate to read even the most general of the articles published in our journal. If we are willing to write (and speak) for them in African languages, perhaps we should concede also the need for ‘executive summaries’ addressed to senior civil servants, for rhetorical appeals to politicians, and even for technically phrased, methodologically meticulous, theoretically oriented reports to our academic colleagues. The way forward, it seems to me, is a diversification of the types of publication issued by the research institute, with different editorial policies tailored to the needs of the various kinds of audience to which the Institute and its social research should speak.

In this connection, in 1980 the Institute appointed for the first time a Documentalist and is currently planning to expand the scope of his activities. The first documentation project has been focused on the collection and storage of documents pertaining to the field of human settlements, and on abstracting and classifying them to facilitate retrieval by various categories of potential users, including planners, designers, constructors, housing authorities, Government authorities, administrators, schools, mass media, researchers and research agencies, local inhabitants and other interested groups (Curutchet, 1981). It is proposed that such annotated bibliographies should be generated for other topic areas in the future, reflecting the broad scope of the Institute’s research, and that consultative seminars should be mounted to explore the priority needs for research-based information by various sectors of the public.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Two discussions were especially helpful in clarifying my ideas for this paper. The first took place in Paris in June 1980 following an invited presentation at the Collège de France in which I traced some of the developments in social research at the University of Zambia since 1965. The participants whose contributions I recall were Lucien Demonio, Yves Person, Mbuza Sibukonda, Pierre Smith and Claude Tardits. The second was convened in September 1981 among the academic staff of the Institute for African Studies in Lusaka and included contributions by Raj Bardouille, Mary Frost, Peter Hayward, Katele Kalumba, Mwesa Mapoma, Christopher Mupimpila, Shimwaayi Muntemba, Keith Rennie and Mwizenge Tembo. I am indebted to all these people for their critical stimulus.

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Strategies of Social Research in Mozambique: The Case of the Centre of African Studies of the Eduardo Mondlane University

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Universidade Eduardo Mondlane

As a research and research training institute, the Centre of African Studies is only one single focus of social research in Mozambique. Within the Eduardo Mondlane University, at specialised research institutes, and especially within the research divisions of the various government Ministries, Mozambicans are engaged in expanding the concrete knowledge of Mozambican conditions so necessary for the tasks of transition today, and so neglected by colonial intellectuals. Yet as limited and specific as they are, the experience of the Centre of African Studies, the history of its development, its ongoing work, and its organisation, express much of what is central and significant to the strategy of social research in Mozambique.

To understand the place of research in Mozambique today, one must begin with its context: Mozambique is a socialist state, with a Marxist-Leninist party, engaged in a struggle which encompasses many fronts to build a socialist society, to develop a socialist economy. This struggle begins from a base shared by the people throughout Southern Africa: the deformed class structure and dependent economy which is the heritage of colonial capitalism.

Portuguese colonial-capitalism in Mozambique had several cardinal characteristics: the shortage and weakness of Portuguese capital resulted in a heavy reliance on other capitals; capital acting in Mozambique came with the understanding that the colonial state would assume the task of recruiting and assuring cheap African labour for sugar and tea plantations, for cotton cultivation, for port and rail construction; and the productivity and profitability of enormous sectors of the capitalist economy depended on this activity on the part of the state. During the colonial period the great majority of the Mozambican peasantry, obliged to sell their labour power to capitalist producers, or to produce cash crops for the market, were formally subsumed by capitalist production. But the cheapness of their labour power depended on the maintenance of the family’s ability to feed itself, never relying completely on the migrant’s wage or the income from cash crop production. Thus the colonial system tried to ensure that the peasantry was not definitively separated from their means of production: communal land tenure was maintained to avoid the emergence of any landless group of fully proletarianised African workers. The result was that large sectors of the Mozambican population were semiproletarianized, bound to migrant labour or cash crop cultivation by their need to survive and yet also bound to their land and
rudimentary production of their subsistence. Internal capital accumulation was very weak, and tied to the conditions of colonial exploitation: capitalist agriculture depended on ready supplies of cheap wage-labour on a seasonal basis; factories processed export crops or simply finished inputs imported from the metropole.

Mozambique, like its neighbouring peoples within Southern Africa, confronted yet another common problem. Internal capital accumulation was tied largely to the interests of South African capital, and this interdependence of colonial Mozambique with the South Africa economy, made its economy weak, subservient, and even politically vulnerable. In the case of Mozambique, the dependence on South Africa was particularly marked. Mozambique was, in fact, a service economy within the Southern African region. These services comprised the provision of railway and harbour facilities for exports and imports from South Africa, and from Rhodesia, and the supply of labour principally to the South African mining industry, but also to agriculture. For close on a century, Mozambicans have been contracted in large numbers to South Africa. The peasant economy of the Southern provinces was made completely dependent on mine labour for its production, and the proceeds of mine labour were one of the important sources of funds for internal accumulation in the colonial period. Mozambique’s railway and port developments were built and organised in response to the initiatives and requirement of South African capital, and the South African traffic and linked activities, together with the proceeds from the sale of labour, were the principal source of foreign exchange.

After the 1960s, when Portugal’s home economy was buckling under the impact of the liberation wars, Portugal ceded more and more ground to South African capital, which overtook Portugal as the main source of Mozambique’s imports; at this period about two-thirds of Mozambique’s foreign currency earnings came from South Africa.

Mozambique’s experience and condition up to this point is specific and yet not unique. There is a vast common experience within Southern Africa of subjection to colonial capitalism in its varied and yet common forms, and to the subordination of all the economies and societies of the region to the domination of South African capital. But in the era of struggles for national liberation, Mozambique’s history and condition diverge into a rather distinct path. There is no country in Southern Africa, of course, whose struggle exactly matches that of another country, and these differences are reflected in the different class structures, government policies and economic problems which the countries of the sub-continent confront today. In Mozambique in turn it is not possible to comprehend the present situation without understanding the history of FRELIMO, which began as a national liberation movement. Through a series of struggles conducted during and after the liberation war, and continuously during the independence period, it rejected nationalism to emerge with a class line. FRELIMO’s capacity not only to develop a class line but to apply it organisationally to winning concrete struggles allowed it to take power, and to define a strategy of socialist development\(^9\). It is this political unity which defines the areas of action for social research in Mozambique today.
The strategy of socialist transition, based on a class alliance between peasants and workers, defined by FRELIMO, has affected the research of the Centre of African Studies (CEA) in three principal ways: first in the choice of research problems; secondly, in the unity of research with teaching and the application of research; and thirdly, by setting the analytical unity within which the research is conceived and executed, and within which the Centre operates as a whole.

Choice of problem

Building a strong material base for a socialist society means, above all, transforming the systems of production inherited from the colonial economy. This is why in the choice of problems for research the CEA has focused on problems of transforming production. These studies of production are important not only for the issues of transformation which they pose, but also for the ways in which they help in the building of a stronger historical understanding of the patterns of colonial exploitation from which transformation begins. The purpose of the Centre is thus to provide information on the present conditions of production in order to permit concrete measures to be devised to implement general strategy. Research problems are chosen, then, not only because they focus on particular problems in socialist development but also because the issues they raise can be drawn upon by organised structures within Government and FRELIMO, who can not only respond to information, but also put it to work.

The series of CEA field studies on transformation of production within a strategy of socialist development began with the problems of the Mozambican miner. What kinds of changes in the organization of the economy in Mozambique would be required to break the dependence on mine labour, and what kind of immediate measures would best defend the interests of the miners and the process of transition? If the ending of labour export, and by extension, the ending of the subordination of the economy to South African capitalism is a necessary condition for the creation of a material base for the construction of socialism, how can this reintegration of a Mozambican work force within the domestic economy be achieved? How can the workforce and the skills it has acquired in Mozambique’s industrialisation programme be used, especially in the heavy industry, transport and mining sectors? How can this formerly exported labour be reintegrated within the agricultural sector? One of the conclusions from the miners’ study was that the dependence of family agriculture on the supplementary wages from mine labour was so strong that only a major transformation of agriculture would allow for a radical break in the system.4

The next series of research studies turned their attention directly to problems in the socialisation of the countryside in southern Mozambique. This was an attempt to see how state farms and agricultural producer cooperatives, growing and consolidating together, could be the basis for transforming family agriculture. In all of these studies the research was concerned to show that the process of transition must be studied as a whole. That one cannot, for example, look at the problem of the cooperative movement by studying cooperatives
divorced from an understanding of the present organisation of family agriculture from which they must grow, and that the cooperativisation of the countryside is an imperative for the advance of the socialist revolution. This is because in the first instance, if cooperatives cannot provide an income for peasant families which is at least equal to that which they get from labour migration, it will be impossible to phase out that labour migration, whether out of Mozambique or to the urban centres within the country. It is also because if the cooperative sector does not develop as an autonomous and highly productive complement to the state sector, the old relationship between the state and the family sector of the peasantry will not have been dissolved. This is why the socialisation of the countryside, or the rural economy, has two complementary spheres of operation, in the state farm sector and the cooperative sector together, and why research directed at their relationship helps to clarify problems that arise during the process of transition.

Of course the strategy of cooperativisation of the countryside should not be looked at merely at the level of the raising of productivity, as though production and politics are separated. FRELIMO's tradition and leadership enforce the insistence that the mobilisation of productivity is a political act, and needs political organisation, and the raising of productivity is inextricably bound up with the need to reorganise the labour process so that the working class is in power at the point of production, and the worker-peasant alliance wields the power of the state. So socialisation of the countryside means not only the enlargement of the economic productive base, but the reordering of class relations, the process of transformation from old production forms to new ones.

These issues of not merely raising productivity, but of developing new forms of production organisation, were raised in a series of research studies on which the Centre embarked, as part of a general investigation into the production of cotton in Mozambique.

Mozambique was a major cotton producer in the colonial period, relying first on obligatory cultivation by peasant families and increasingly towards the end of the colonial period, on colonial farms using cheap seasonal labour. Cotton exports are necessary to finance the importation of inputs and equipment, and cotton is needed for the textile factories that will provide cheap, good clothing for peasants and workers. The problem is therefore not one of halting production of cotton, but how to produce it in new collective forms. This question was the focus of a series of CEA rural studies conducted over two years in two cotton growing provinces as well as of two studies on productivity problems in textile mills.

Once again the focus was on the problems and processes of transition, but as before, these studies helped to build a stronger historical understanding of the patterns of colonial exploitation from which transformation begins. Thus, the Portuguese state initiated cotton production in Mozambique in an attempt to reduce the dependence of the Portuguese textile industry on imported raw cotton. Capital, much of it foreign, was persuaded to invest in the construction of ginning factories in the colonies by means of concessions to ensure profitability. These conditions were met even though colonial cotton was sold in Portugal.
below world market prices. Measures taken included forcing peasant smallholders to produce cotton; granting commercial monopolies within fixed zones of cultivation; fixing the price paid to peasant producers at the lowest level in Africa; reducing shipping rates for cotton; granting tax incentives; and credit and marketing facilities in Portugal via the state.

The peasantry were forced to grow cotton in nearly all those parts of Mozambique unoccupied by plantations or colonial farms, and where climate and soil permitted — and occasionally in unfavourable areas as well. Cotton cultivation became the main means of exploiting the peasantry in the northern provinces, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa, which had previously acted principally as labour reserves for the plantations. In the central and southern provinces, where men were either forced into contract labour in plantation, or migrated to South Africa or Rhodesia, as it then was, cotton was cultivated by women, or by men too old or infirm for wage labour.

Since cotton growing uses land both intensively and extensively, serious problems of soil exhaustion, especially in Nampula, began to emerge. To make matters worse, the peasants had been forced to cut back on food production, particularly of grains, because they competed with cotton. There were several severe famines in the 1940s which can be linked directly to the expansion of cotton cultivation. The administration attempted to resolve the situation through forced cassava cultivation in many of the cotton areas.

In the latter part of the colonial period, the major structural change in cotton cultivation was the growth of capitalist settler farming. By the end of the colonial period they dominated production. Settlers were able to appropriate prime cotton land, or to pay only nominal prices for it. The rapid growth of the settler farms meant, of course, a parallel rise in the demand for seasonal wage labour. Some peasants who had been driven off good cotton land by the settlers turned to occasional wage-labour, and other workers were recruited by the use of administrative pressures, especially at harvest time. By the early 1970s upward pressure on wages had led to substantially increased daily rates of pay (although the piece-rate for the harvest was unaffected), threatening the profitability of the settler farms. The situation was resolved when the end of forced cultivation in the family sector released labour for recruitment, and when state extension services to the family sector in certain areas were cut back. The history of the settler farmers was thus inseparably bound up with that of the peasant cotton cultivators.

The cotton industry was particularly hard hit by the flight of many of the Portuguese settlers and state employees after independence. Most of the farmers who had dominated production in the early 1970s left in the first few years, abandoning unharvested crops, broken tractors and unpaid loans. Many state employees also left abruptly, often destroying their records before they went. The private truckers and merchants, without whom in many areas cotton could not be moved or marketed, also fled. The development of the new collective units, state farms and cooperatives was blocked by management problems, market disorganization and lack of inputs.

Accordingly, when the Centre turned its attention to the cotton sector, it
addressed itself to the following questions. How to move from a backward, seasonal, and labour intensive form of production, without incurring foreign debts which would threaten cotton's own export earnings? The Mozambican strategy is to articulate state farms and cooperatives and to concentrate them around centres of industrial development. This in turn raises some other issues: how are the problems of seasonal wage-labour in the state sector to be resolved in the transitional period? How can family cotton producers be convinced that cooperative farms produce more and better? How are the concentrated poles of development to be linked to the hinterland areas so that the whole region develops? How to organise a fast, cheap marketing system to link the producers to the ginning factories? The strategy of grouping production units around an industrial centre provides a longer-term solution; in the short term, however, the issue is how to reduce marketing costs and assure supply to the factories, without tying the state into inefficient marketing patterns and into subsidizing private commercial capital. How to obtain favourable terms of trade in an unstable and competitive market, in which Mozambican cotton plays a minor part? In the long term, the expansion of cotton production in Mozambique will be absorbed by the local textile industry, so the question will lose its importance. In the short term, however, it is vital to know which kinds of producer groups or long term buying arrangements will most favour Mozambique.

Thus the cotton research project was a study of development problems and policies in a particularly crucial sector of the economy, and by cutting vertically through the economic, and political aspects of cotton production, the research was able to examine policy for industry as well as for agriculture, and for state services.

It was in the course of this study that it became clear that one could not study the transformation of production only by studying the various forms of production in themselves — in the state sector, within cooperatives, in family agriculture. Capitalist exploitation in the colonial period depended on the organisational role of the state in production itself; thus the task of transformation includes transformation of the fundamental relation between the state and workers and peasants.

The Centre's research next began to look explicitly at forms of state action and planning which directly or indirectly affect production: marketing policy, terms of trade, transport, extension services, education and training.

This focus on the reconstruction of the revolutionary state became particularly important in the study of the labour force on the tea plantations of Zambezia where the newly formed state sector faced the task of maintaining production while trying to transform the entire basis of production of the colonial period: a cheap seasonal labour force recruited by the state. Here the answer is not only transforming labour use on the plantations but also completely changing the organisation of family agriculture whose backwardness has been linked to its role as the source of cheap seasonal labour. Thus the study was concerned with understanding not only how the plantations could be transformed but also what role the state sector could play in dynamising the process of socialization of family agriculture through cooperatives.
With each step of research it has become increasingly clear that the choice of problem cannot be determined simply by deciding to look at what FRELIMO's strategy of socialist transformation means in a particular sector of production. The process of transformation is one of continual struggle. This means that correct tactical positions are as important as strategy, and that good research provides the basis for the definition of tactical positions linked to strategy. This point emerged sharply in the research in the port of Maputo which was concerned with the transformation of a labour force based in the colonial period on unstable casual labour and which necessarily needed to consider problems of how to raise efficiency and productivity within the port, in line with the SADCC strategy.

In the port it was found that the basic problem of transformation lay in a contradiction of class structure: the colonial capitalist organisation of labour pitted against administrative workers – permanent workers with good salaries, generally colonialists – against a large pool of poorly paid casual Black manual workers. Gradual reforms after the flight of the settlers – permanent hiring of many workers, wage increases and promotions – made no fundamental assault on the system. It presently constitutes the major block to socialist transformation of the port, both in its rigid structure of unproductive labour and in its divisive maintenance of conflicting interests among various groups of productive workers. To move against this system, above all, requires a much more precise and yet simple system of information and control of production at the level of port zones. In short, the investigation of the problems of the labour force led into a much narrower and perhaps more technical area of port management.

In the course of all the research outlined above, the Centre's researchers have felt the need to respond directly in its choice of problems to the tactical questions which FRELIMO must confront in implementing its strategy of transition. This raises issues of the presentation of research results, and the audience to which they are directed. Who is interested, and involved, in social research? How will they be able to apply it in practice? It has become increasingly clear that not only must there be structures organised to respond to this information but that, at some level, research concerns must coincide with those issues which are on the development strategy agenda, and within the general plan of action. This point arrives, then, at the second principal guideline of social research in Mozambique: the unity of theory, teaching and the application of research results.

Unity of theory, teaching and practical application of research

In the context of Mozambique, social research must play an immediate and active role in the process of socialist transformation. There is often too little time for extended study, for decisions must be taken immediately. When one writes up research results one attends not to the latest state of theoretical debate on the issue, but rather to the language and expectations of people working to implement the FRELIMO line in concrete situations. As the Revolution advances,
the things they need to know also constantly change. Thus the aim of the CEA has not been to produce a series of definitive research studies but rather to make social research an acceptable step in the formulation and implementation of policy.

Here Mozambique confronts the barriers erected by a colonial educational system and a formerly fascist University actively engaged in making sure that social research did not serve as a base for forces of opposition. Economics was the only social science represented in the colonial University and its programme was one which emphasized rote and dogma rather than active analysis.

For their part non-Mozambican researchers—and Mozambique draws heavily on those known as cooperantes (cooperators) — although they have a certain advantage in training and research experience, also have difficulties in contributing to an activist conception of research. There is the difficulty of moving from a work experience which makes critique and opposition the most important role of the radical researcher to one in which analysis is critical in form, because it operates within a perspective of social transformation, but has to confront actual problems of that transformation process.

To attack both sides of this difficulty in making social research a practical tool of the Mozambican revolution, the Centre decided, firstly to combine research activity within a development course, so that theory and research practice could be undertaken together; and, secondly, to direct the course at students drawn from government and political structures who would remain within their work places at the same time as they underwent their research training. The intention is that the students will in turn be able to integrate tools of investigation into their work, and thus train others as well through common practice. The students who have thus far been enrolled in the Centre’s development research-training course have come from the national headquarters of FRELIMO, from the Army, from Ministries like Agriculture, Education and Information, from the national banks, and so on. The course does not seek to confront the professional preoccupations of each of the students, which would be clearly impossible in an interdisciplinary training of this character, but to identify those issues of production and politics to which specialists can ultimately bring to bear their particular training, given an initially acute analysis of the problems and processes of transformation.

These linkages of teaching and research, and between research and practice, are the product of several years of work. The linkages are not necessarily easy to conceive, and they are even more difficult to maintain in practice. They confront problems and diverse interpretation in the application of Marxist theory and methods; they also confront problems of educational method.

Over time a curriculum has been devised which has four principal aspects to reflect the elements considered central in the training of social researchers in Mozambique. In the first place, the course aims to give a solid introduction to Mozambican political economy: the colonial economy, the development of FRELIMO, the strategy of development and practical problems of implementation. Here the Centre relies to a great extent on work already done by the Centre in previous courses; through its investigations, the course manufactures texts
which can be used both by the Centre and by other education programs. Secondly, the course locates the experience of Mozambique within its regional context; it concentrates particularly on the principal contradictions within South Africa itself and how these weigh in regional development. Thirdly, the course has to be oriented by a particular research project, linked with a specific problem in Mozambique's strategy of socialist development. In the first half of the course there is work done on research design – the definition of the questions, formulation of hypotheses, discussion of methods. The research projects chosen involve fieldwork, so that students can experience themselves how data are collected and organized and analysed. In part, the field work is, of course, also intended to put students and staff directly in touch with problems of transition at the base level. In the second half of the course the material is analysed and written up, locating this research in more general problems of socialist transformation in Mozambique.

The aim of the course, then, is to come to terms with the concrete reality of transformation in Mozambique. Yet this does not mean that “theory” is considered unimportant. In fact the fourth element of the course – thorough analytical grounding in the basics of political economy applied to understanding imperialism in Africa and socialist revolution in Mozambique – is the real basis of the course. It is the stress on analytical unity which permits the Centre to join together the other three elements of the course, and it is active and critical use of analytical tools which are considered to be the essential step in the training of Mozambicans in social research.

Our analytical unity as Marxists: science in politics

Within the Centre its ability to function, as a collective in teaching, research and publication is based on its participants’ analytical unity as Marxists. The Centre’s capacity for making this work relevant to the process of socialist transformation in Mozambique is based on the fact that its staff and students share this common position with FRELIMO. This unity is not derived from the expression of common dogmas nor the repetition of invariable laws of history; neither is it simply the result of a common vision of the future society which all would like to create. Rather it is the application of scientific materialist analysis to the problems of socialist transformation in the concrete and specific historical conditions of Mozambique.

FRELIMO’s consistent insistence on making Marxist theory serve the particular experience of the Mozambique Revolution is perhaps the most important determinant of strategies of social research in Mozambique. It implies discussion and debate based on knowledge of concrete conditions, and it challenges received wisdoms. The concept of countries of “socialist orientation,” for example, has been challenged because it does not permit an adequate analysis of the direction of the Mozambique Revolution. There is a strong conception of how the Mozambique experience will contribute to the growth of Marxist theory and thus contribute to the tools of analysis of the international socialist move-
ment. At the same time the purpose of discussion and debate is to contribute to clarification of line – the definition of strategy of socialist transformation in specific areas and the formulation of tactical measures which will advance the process of transformation. So debate and discussion have limits and must be inserted within organized programs of change. This is why the CEA does not operate as a broker for independent research projects, as interesting or as well grounded in Marxist analysis as they may be. The unity of analytical approach is based and controlled, in the last instance, by unity of practice.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The strategy to construct a socialist state, and economy, led by a vanguard party, is developed in a series of FRELIMO documents.
   For English texts of the most important documents of the 3rd Congress, for example, see Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO (London: MAGIC, 1978) and also “Congress Special Issue”, AIM Information Bulletin (Maputo), 9/10, (March 1977).

2. Unfortunately, the majority of helpful materialist and/or empirically rich, bourgeois analyses on this topic are available only in Portuguese. However, in English see Perry Anderson's now outdated “Portugal and the end of ultra-colonialism”, New Left Review, 15-17, (1962), which lays heavy emphasis on the special weaknesses of Portuguese capital as a source for the political inability of Portugal to resolve the colonial question. Anderson's analysis for many years held more or less undisputed sway, with ultra-colonialism acting as an ideological counterbalance to the official Portuguese concept “Luso-tropicalism” derived from the Brazilian Gilberto Freyre. In Portuguese, see Armando Castro, O sistema colonial português em África (meados do século XX) (The Portuguese colonial system in Africa in the middle of the 20th century), (Lisboa: Caminho, 1978), written in 1958 but unpubli- shable under Fascism. For a recent CEA periodization specifically on Mozambique, see Marc Wuyts, “Economia Política do colonialismo em Moçambique” (Political economy of colonialism in Mozambique), Estudos Moçambicanos 1, (1980).

3. For example, see an extremely important keynote speech made by Central Committee member Sérgio Vieira to the International Scientific Conference, Berlin, October 1980. For the English text see The joint struggle of the working-class movement and the national liberation movement against imperialism and for social progress (Dresden: Zeit in Bild, 1981), Vol. 1, pp. 39-61. On the current situation, a readily available source of considerable interest is Godwin Matatu's interview with President Samora Machel in Africa, 107, July 1980, which discusses strategy for the concrete struggle against underdevelopment both nationally and regionally.

4. The economic priorities of the first phase of the transitional period were formulated in the Social and Economic Directives adopted in 1977 by
FRELIMO's Third Congress. "Our strategy for development", said this programme, "rests on agricultural production".

"The Revolution demands that we extend the experience of the liberated areas to the entire country. The organisation of peasants into rural communities is essential for the development of collective life in the countryside and for the creation of the necessary conditions for socialised agriculture. Because it generates a common surplus, collective production is the only way of enabling the Mozambican peasant to pass to more advanced forms of work and to introduce mechanised production and the first forms of industrialisation in the rural areas."

The phasing of Mozambique's agricultural policy; the relative weight given to the development of communal villages (aldeias comunais) with co-operative production as their material base, and to the state farm sector. These issues and their contingent policy decisions continue to be formulated within the political structures of FRELIMO and the government.

"In our country Marxism is the product of the War of National Liberation. We did not proclaim Marxism after Independence. The war turned itself, in the process of its development, into a peoples' revolutionary war. It was this which allowed the Mozambique Liberation Front to change itself into a Marxist–Leninist party."

"Some people think that Mozambique's socialist policy is produced by a small group. We want to say that this is not how it is. The group made a synthesis of aspirations and of practice. It was not a small group which waged people's war in Mozambique. It was the entire people." (Press conference by President Machel, 22 March 1980, Maputo).
Problems of research in Swaziland

Since World War II an avalanche of published works has appeared on the Southern African region in general and the Republic of South Africa in particular. Few regions can of late have been subjected to such close scrutiny and analysis. Yet, in this microscopic examination of Southern Africa, Swaziland has been comparatively neglected. This is reflected in published bibliographies on Southern Africa where works on Swaziland invariably constitute 5 per cent or less of the listings. Obvious political, geographic and other factors account for this but it does mean that, in most respects, Swaziland is virgin territory research-wise. It offers, therefore, an exciting prospect for serious and original research but it suggests too that there are serious obstacles to the would-be researcher. And indeed there are.

Perhaps the most serious is the lack of an established research tradition. Research does not seem to be seen as a critical national priority and consequently there are powerful disincentives or obstacles to the creation of such a tradition. There is, for example, no functioning national or central body supervising, coordinating or promoting research in terms of established national priorities, and no centre assembling and holding all published research reports and results for ready access to other researchers.

In 1972, the Swaziland Government established a National Research Council whose brief it was to establish such priorities and monitor and facilitate research related to the nation’s development objectives. It never attained any of its goals and has actually been defunct for some years. It spluttered briefly to life with occasional meetings; subcommittees were formed but they remained little more than “paper tigers”. The NRC’s problem was that it was a body without flesh: it lacked a secretariat, its chairperson was possibly the busiest permanent secretary in government but, above all, it had no funds of its own, not a cent with which to finance some of the excellent proposals which were put up to it.

This lack of a serious national commitment to research is perhaps well illustrated by the fate of the Agricultural Research Station at Malkerns. Originally under the rubric of the Ministry of Agriculture, control was transferred to the University’s Faculty of Agriculture in the late 1960s. A strong research team – largely expatriate – was built up and solid research results were
produced. In the late 1970s and for reasons never made public, the Ministry reassumed control and from a research angle the action has had disastrous consequences. Today only two of the twelve established research posts are occupied, the institute produces virtually nothing of substance and the confidence of international donors in the facility has been severely eroded. The institution is literally a hollow shell, though plans are afoot to revive it with a research team imported from Pennsylvania State University in the United States.

In the absence of effective state support for research, one would have hoped that the local University faculty would fill the leadership void but this has not been the case, for entirely understandable reasons. The University College of Swaziland at this stage of its development is essentially a teaching institution. Virtually all its energies and limited resources have necessarily had to be devoted to servicing its degree curricula now fully evolved in the country. At this stage little more than lip service can be paid to the traditional academic function of scholarly research. Some reasons for this are given below.

(a) Government's annual fiscal subvention to the University is less than that of both Botswana and Lesotho and such that in recent years no more than E6000 p.a. has been able to be allocated to the University's Research and Publications Committee;

(b) this inadequate subvention has also produced a severe understaffing in all teaching departments and a consequent lecturing overload on the faculty, thereby rendering serious, sustained and original research a virtual impossibility. Comparison of staffing levels in the equivalent departments on the three BLS campuses reveals that establishments in Swaziland are only half the size of those in the other two countries;

(c) the central University administration in Swaziland is fragile due both to understaffing and to a dearth of administrative experience.

In all, therefore, the dictum “publish or perish” so applicable elsewhere is not applicable in Swaziland. Indeed were one, on top of one’s teaching and administrative load, to attempt serious research one could perish from the effort!

There are occasionally instances where individuals do have the time and resources for research in Swaziland. But even in these circumstances there are difficulties. One is to be found in the disorganisation of the national archives. This institution holds an impressive volume of material but too little of it is properly indexed and catalogued. This is due largely to the absence of properly trained archivists. There is only one employee at the archives with any degree of training in what is a specialised area and he cannot cope singlehandedly with the task. The result is that the would-be archival researcher enjoys none of the usual short cuts to the body of material to be examined. A second problem relating to the archives is that they are by no means complete. Too much valuable information in the form of government reports and documents, company records, etc. lie scattered over a myriad of institutions across the country. Particularly is this so in the case of government or ministerial reports that lie gathering dust on shelves in some bureaucrat’s office or in locked glass cabinets in ministerial conference rooms out of sight and out of mind. They are not
collected together by some central pool within the bureaucracy or by a government printer or the Department of Information. The consequence is that one occasionally encounters the circumstance where a team commissioned by one Ministry undertakes and perhaps completes a body of research only to find that they have virtually duplicated work produced sometime before that by another Ministry.

A final problem requiring mention is the shortage of skilled national research manpower. In particularly short supply are Swazis with extensive experience of applied research. This is no surprise given the problems discussed above but the University is guilty too, of not doing enough to develop research skills amongst its students. The consequence is that too much of the applied research in Swaziland is in the hands of expatriates, many of the "fly by night" variety, the overpaid jet-setting international migrant who flits from country to country producing work characterised by superficiality, ignorance and cultural ethnocentricity. The eradication of this expensive and irritating pest is overdue.

These then are some of the problems – by no means unique to Swaziland – to which this workshop needs to address itself. Devising means by which they can be overcome will do much to establish solid traditions for research in our respective countries.

Opportunities for research in Swaziland

The country's small size makes it a manageable research environment. An added positive factor lies in the fact that those embarking on research are not confronted by a maze of bureaucratic regulations before being able to proceed into the field. No government agency exists to vet all research proposals and expatriates experience little difficulty in obtaining residence permits where they cite research as their purpose for being in the country. In short, the climate for research appears to be open and the State evidences no paranoia about research. Of course this may be an illusion. Perhaps the State's relaxed attitude exists only because no one has yet ventured into politically sensitive areas. But for the moment research in Swaziland is not hedged in by bureaucracy and State suspicion. This is an advantage which all too few Third World nations offer.

In recent months a new institution has emerged in Swaziland which promises to give a major impetus to research efforts in the country and which could do much to overcome some of the problems and obstacles discussed in the first part of the paper. This is the Social Science Research Unit (SSRU) which forms part of the Faculty of Social Science at the University. The SSRU has been set up through Dutch funding with the stated goal of developing the applied social science research capacity of the university. To this end, funds have been provided for (i) a full-time administrative director, (ii) research fellows in the areas of Sociology, Statistics and Economics, (iii) three research assistants recruited from amongst Swazi graduates in the social sciences, and (iv) the establishment of a documentation centre for the collection of relevant Swaziana. In addition funding has been provided for a rural research project which will be conducted in stages over a three year period. It will involve the entire research
team of the Unit as well as numerous part-time student researchers. The specific focus of this project has not yet been determined; that will be done only after a period of consultation with relevant officials involved in rural development planning and a study of previously conducted rural research in Swaziland. This will lead to a workshop in August 1982 from which the project proper will emerge. While this rural research project will consume a considerable proportion of the Unit’s time, the SSRU will also undertake other research projects on contract to either the Swaziland Government or various international agencies. These will be conducted either by the SSRU itself or subcontracted out to an individual academic or an academic department. Only projects which fall within the research policy guidelines and general policy of the SSRU will be accepted. There are attached as an appendix to this paper, but the relevant point to note is that the project must be policy oriented and relevant to national development problems and policies as well as contain a substantial training component for Swazi graduates and students. The SSRU will levy a 20 per cent administration fee for all contracts undertaken. In this way, it is hoped that the SSRU will ultimately become self-financing.

The SSRU has the potential to tackle some of the problems cited earlier. It should, for example:

(a) do much to create a tradition for applied social science research in the country. Its establishment means that for the first time within the University there is now a core of specialists whose sole task will be to do research and who will have the necessary back-up infrastructure. This is a great leap forward;

(b) become a focus for social science research in Swaziland and hence be able to influence the development of research priorities, effect a degree of coordination of research activities and thereby eliminate wasteful duplication;

(c) build up through its administrative levy a pool of funds which could be a major stimulus to research in the country. It will mean that the SSRU will be able to initiate its own research projects. To this end, the SSRU envisages a time when it will be able to provide a facility to distinguished scholars to spend periods on attachment to it. All this will do much for the research climate within the University;

(d) develop a pool of skilled national research manpower. This it will do by being able to employ research assistants for two year periods at a time and then assist them to procure placement for graduate studies. In addition, the utilisation of student researchers in the field studies will contribute to developing local research skills;

(e) provide through the Documentation Centre a central and easily accessible resource base for the collection of relevant documentation. Initially the intention is to collect together all government and other reports relating to rural development but later to expand the range to include historical material in the area of labour history, capital penetration, the development of worker consciousness etc.

The SSRU’s emergence has opened up opportunities for research in
Southern Africa Research for Development

Direction for research in Swaziland

In addition to the themes identified by Booth (see chapter 16), I would suggest two other areas for historical analysis – the Swazi peasantry and the working class within the context of the emergence and growth of labour class consciousness. In his unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Martin Fransman 1 devotes considerable attention to analysing the success – which he claims was virtually unequalled anywhere else in Africa – of the traditional Swazi rulers in maintaining their political and social dominance of Swazi society. He attributes this success to the continued and virtually unanimous support of the peasantry which he suggests was the product of “coercive” mechanisms – the peasantry’s dependence on the Swazi rulers for access to land, tribute labour requirements, and the political and ideological institutions of the so-called “Swazi mode of production”.

While these coercive mechanisms were unquestionably a major factor, it is not clear that they constitute a complete explanation as Fransman seems to ignore or discount other important political factors such as that of migration. The movement of Swazi peasants from their rural homesteads to either the kingdom’s export enclaves or to South Africa has been a dominant feature of rural life in this century, but we have little knowledge of the political effect of what new research is now revealing to have been a significantly larger scale phenomenon than earlier studies had indicated. Booth elsewhere 2 has shown that in 1936 an estimated 67 per cent of the male working population left the country in search of jobs; add to that the fact of internal migration and we can see that, even in the pre-World War II period before the large-scale inflow of foreign multinational capital, which produced a serious labour shortage and generated intense competition for labour, the dislocation of settled rural population patterns was enormous affecting men, women and children. This must have had important political effects and we need to know what they were. We need to ask, for example, how the rural power structure was affected by extensive migration? Was it strengthened or weakened, and how? Did it reduce pressure on the land thereby defusing a potential peasant grievance, viz, landlessness? or did it make the Swazi ruler’s task more difficult by weakening the peasants’ ties to the land? How would the course of Swazi politics have been changed in the decolonisation years had that absentee 67 per cent of Swazi males been in the rural areas?

Fransman also pays little attention to the degree of social stratification within the peasantry and the political effects thereof. His depiction of the Swazi rural political economy is too simple: it is one of an omnipotent ruling chieftancy strata and an undifferentiated mass of poor and overly dependent subjects. Again the impact of migration upon social stratification is ignored. What, for example, did the returned migrants do with their accumulated capital? Did they manage to expand their land allocation or did they perhaps purchase title deed land or
did they use it to increase the size of their herds or acquire another wife? Clearly all of these – and no doubt other things – did occur to different degrees and we need to investigate their impact upon the rural balance of power.

Other areas need study. Fransman places great emphasis upon the peasants’ tribute labour obligation as an instrument of domination and subordination but fails to substantiate his proposition. He may be way off target, as others have suggested that the custom is not regarded by peasants as either coercive or excessively burdensome. Investigations are required to determine the extent and impact of this customary institution. Finally, a good deal is known about the methods used by the Swazi rulers to reacquire alienated land (Lifa Fund etc.) but what is not clearly known is what happened to this repossessed land and the political impact of repossession. To whom was the land distributed? On what basis and to what effect? How politically has the power of distribution been exercised? These are fascinating though possibly sensitive questions but clearly the Swazi peasantry is a topic wide open to study and so too is the working class.

Little work has been done in this area. There has been no major study of the dramatic events of 1963 and 1964 when labour unrest spread from the large export enclave centres into the capital and evoked a panicky response from the colonial state with the bringing in of British troops “to restore order”. No authoritative explanation exists for this sudden upsurge in labour militancy or for other political events in the recent period, such as the failure of opposition political parties.

There is important work to be done therefore in the area of social history but this should not be to the neglect of applied and policy-oriented research allied to national development objectives. In this regard, priority should be given to the collection of data which will increase government’s capacity to plan more effectively for the nation’s rural and urban development. Surveys in recent years have provided a generalised picture of the rural homestead population and the impact upon rural life of the Rural Development Area programme; however little urban related data has been collected except on such topics as urban housing and living conditions. What is required are specific micro studies in order to elicit more exact data for the planning process.

The SSRU has two studies in mind in the initial stages of its operation. They are of:

(a) the resource base of the rural homestead; and
(b) the urban dwellers with emphasis upon the urban poor.

The Swazi homestead family is the primary target of the State’s rural development policy and, as such, it is felt that precise information is needed about the family and its environment, particularly its resource base. By this term is meant the whole complex of physical, cultural and socioeconomic factors that comprise the context within which the homestead makes decisions in regard to levels and patterns of agricultural production, participation in State-sponsored “improvement” schemes, altering long standing production and/or herding patterns etc. In this regard, data will be sought on:
(i) the decision-making process within the homestead, particularly in the light of extensive and long term out migration of male members of the family;

(ii) the decision-making process at the community level and the impact – positive and/or negative – upon official development objectives of the traditional political and administrative infrastructure, particularly in regard to such of its powers as the allocation of land and grazing rights;

(iii) factors of production, such as, *inter alia*, the availability of labour, soil fertility, and tenure and grazing rights, access to irrigation, water rights, herd sizes and their yields, culling and calving rates, access to marketing channels, transportation constraints, the profitability of different crops, quality and accessibility of extension services and willingness to use them, access to credit, etc.

Some of these data already exist but here the intention is to develop over a two to three year period a detailed and comprehensive portrait of the actual workings of the modern homestead and its interaction with both its immediate community and the wider market.

Few studies have been made of Swaziland’s urban environment. The SSRU’s study would seek to identify the various categories of urban dwellers and their different socioeconomic and spatial (inter and intra urban) mobility patterns so as to acquire an accurate picture of actual processes underway within the major urban centres. A sound knowledge of these processes is necessary for adequate urban planning, the lack of which has had disastrous effects in some of the larger cities of tropical Africa. A special focus would be the urban poor category and its capacity to generate income through informal or marginal economic activities. This study would complement the rural study by providing information on rural-urban linkages and the rate of rural-urban migration which appears to be accelerating due to restrictions on recruitment to the South African mines and the seeming tendency of the RDA programme to release rural labour to the towns and export enclaves.

Finally, one might suggest as an urgent priority a cost-benefit analysis of the continuing membership of the BLS countries in the Southern African Customs Union. The “advantages” to these countries of membership has become an unquestioned article of faith in government circles but, to the author’s knowledge, no serious study exists to substantiate the proposition. At the very least the proposition should be tested. Properly undertaken on a regional basis, this would be a large scale undertaking involving a sizeable research team but it is likely that international funding would be forthcoming for the venture (in the light of the attempts to build a counter-constellation of states) through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). This study could be regionally coordinated through the SSRU in Swaziland, ISAS in Lesotho and the NIR in Botswana. Perhaps this workshop could give specific attention to this suggestion particularly as it would provide an ideal mechanism for developing links between research institutions in the region.
Conclusion

Finally, to reiterate some earlier points, this workshop should give serious attention to ways and means by which:

(i) solid research traditions can be built up in our respective countries;
(ii) obstacles to research can be overcome or lessened;
(iii) greater regional cooperation and coordination can be developed. Resources for research are finite and, with the number of research institutes now existing in southern Africa, the danger of misusing these resources in a duplication of efforts is great. The research needs of the region are too great and urgent to allow this to happen.

APPENDIX

Research Policy Guidelines and Policy of the Social Science Research Unit

The selection by the University of externally contracted research projects to be administered by the Social Science Research Unit would generally be governed by the following criteria:

(a) projects must be directly relevant to key development problems of Swaziland which from time to time shall be prioritised by the Advisory Board of the SSRU – bearing in mind research trends, data gaps, official development strategies, etc.;
(b) each project should contain a substantial training component for Swazi graduates and undergraduates in various facets of research such as sampling, surveying, coding, analysis, and team supervision;
(c) research findings should provide useful teaching and training material for departments within the Faculty of Social Science except in those cases where, by the nature of the contract, results may only be publicly released by the contracting agent;
(d) projects should be mounted with a multi-disciplinary approach to development problems incorporating interdepartmental and possibly interfaculty inputs for methodology, subject matter and analysis;
(e) The SSRU, until such time that the scope of the project expands, will be operated under the Faculty of Social Science and will be responsible for the monitoring and administration of its research projects. However, supervision of the individual project is open to any university or non-university person selected on the basis of his or her competence in the relevant field of enquiry.

NOTES

PART FIVE

INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND RESEARCH COORDINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
CHAPTER 25

SADCC Information Resource Systems:
A Sub-System for PADIS

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At some future date when the Pan-African Documentation and Information System (PADIS) if fully operational it will be the most resourceful centre for retrieval of numerical and non-numerical data, together with scientific and technical documentation concerning African countries separately or collectively. For the time being there are more notable collections of documents in European and American centres, and within the UN information network. PADIS now seeks to mobilise these external resources as well as the unexplored wealth of primary source materials available in government offices, universities, parastatals and research centres in the region.

From its data base at Addis Ababa PADIS will create linkages with five sub-systems in Northern, Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. In the spirit of the Roma Declaration this paper submits proposals, seeking to liberate the nine SADCC countries from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa for books, reports and reference information. As with other areas of encroachment South Africa has succeeded in denying self-generated growth of information systems that are capable of supplying most demands in neighbouring countries. The Republic has built up huge arsenals of Southern Africana in its research libraries and administrative units as well as public and private archives. Many of their holdings of source materials were printed and published in South Africa itself although the manuscripts were prepared outside. This is because the Republic serves as the major publishing house for the sub-region. Consequently much of the decision as to what information should be made available is vetted, censored and controlled. Any system aimed at creating self-sufficiency, not only in the gathering of already published data, but also in deciding the content of current documents must seek ways and means of avoiding South Africa's control of the intellectual system, through publishing.

It is obvious that primary documentation needed for analysis of African economic and social phenomena can only be obtained from source, that is, from the creators of such documents, in each country. The present anomaly whereby Pretoria has maintained an interlibrary loan network receiving and distributing documents to 60 odd research centres and libraries in central and southern Africa, needs a substitute system. At the moment the National Library in Pretoria has been distributing vital data, on the basis of which officials take vital decisions in
SADCC states. There is also the pernicious *Jacobsen's Index of Objectionable Literature* which effectively limits free flow of information from the outside world, into the rest of landlocked Southern and Central Africa.

To control a people’s information system is to control their minds and actions. Despite the obvious need to break the stranglehold of information dependence, the following paragraphs describe much wider resources that can be harnessed. In 1981 PADIS proposed a PADIS-NET i.e. a Pan African data transmission network for intercommunication between 50 National Information and Documentation Centres (NIDCs) with five subregional poles, including a Southern African Documentation and Information System (SADIS).

This paper starts from the broad perspective of international systems with which PADIS is already connected by virtue of its membership of the United Nations family; and focuses on systems that store information relevant to policies aimed at economic liberation with integrated development. It will be proposed that there should be a four tier structure. At the base will be PADIS (1) itself, supporting and supplementing the rest; with SADIS (2), acting to coordinate NIDCs in the sub-region and linking with sectoral systems (3) for transport and communication; agriculture; energy; industry; trade; finance; manpower development. These will be located in the SADCC country charged with each specific responsibility. At the apex of the structure will be the NIDCs (4).

**International information systems**

Models have been projected, seeking to bring about international availability of publications. The best known model is Universal Bibliographic Control (UBC). It would have an exhaustive supply of world literature and be capable of supplying any published literature, on demand. Ideally therefore UBC aims to create a system of international information sharing, whereby anyone in any part of the world would be able to obtain any printed material from some clearing-house, or data bank. Actually the UBC model does not envisage a physical monolithic structure, rather a set of mutually beneficial arrangements drawn from strong national information systems. Even so, when viewed from a global perspective UBC appears rather utopian and only marginally practicable. Apart from communications not adequately provided in many parts of the world, success would very much depend on the viability of a model that would rest on a stable political base. For this latter reason alone, its universality cannot be guaranteed unless it comes under the control of the United Nations. Thus the cardinal advantage of the UN information systems described below is their relative immunity to political instability.

However, they did not just grow like the fabled Topsy, but were largely drawn from existing national information centres, as must be the case with PADIS and its sub-regional satellites. Developed countries already have adequate national information centres; smaller countries on the other hand have yet to create the necessary infrastructures. This makes the dependency ratio quite high in terms of contributions to international availability. Thus African and
Asian information centres depend much more on book loans and photocopies from the British Library, Library of Congress, Bibliothèque Nationale, Biblioteca Nacional etc. than vice versa. While present bilateral arrangements are satisfactory, there have been barriers, where, for example, documents requested no longer exist; items that exist cannot be located; items might exist and be located but are not available for loan. In the final analysis therefore, Africa needs compensatory arrangements serving also as supplements to international resources.

UN information systems not only compensate and supplement what is available, but are among those that can be drawn on independently by researchers on various priority projects concerning SADCC. Since it was established in the 1960s the United Nations Information System in Science and Technology (UNISIST) has encouraged a larger network under bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Any of the UN systems preceding or succeeding UNISIST, can be accessed for data on a variety of subjects or provide advisory services to member states and their official agencies. They may be broadly grouped into bibliographic systems and referral systems.

The purely bibliographic systems are better known i.e. those that identify and record in a standardised form, published materials on a given subject field on a single country, region, or on worldwide basis. The African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) Tangier, maintains a bibliographic centre. It would be drawn on by PADIS, as effective administration is crucial to all the sectoral strategies identified in the Lusaka Declaration of April 1980.

Referral systems are not so popular with researchers due to the indirect and often tedious methods of processing information, although they are technically able to receive requests and refer inquiries to sources more likely to provide the information desired. The UN Research Institute for Social Development in Geneva has provided worldwide referral services since 1964 on social development and research, standards of living, development policy and analysis, community participation, and related topics. Data can be retrieved on policy making in development and its consequences on society at large.

Manpower development

Document clearing houses in particular subject fields, have been growing and dying like mushrooms. Usually they are the outcome of enthusiastic conference recommendations! While they last, clearing houses are fruitful sources maintaining records of research and development being planned, currently in progress, or completed. The Population Information and Documentation System for Africa (PIDSA) in Accra was conceived to collect, analyse, abstract and disseminate demographic information for social and economic project planning in Africa South of the Sahara. PIDSA is consequently a useful source for manpower development strategy.

Most National Documentation Centres have similar facilities in their “clear-
ring houses", and are able to provide relevant documents deriving from local research. At both national and international levels the clearing house unit could provide referral services to another country with identical research problems. Their main value lies in avoidance of duplication which all too often arises from there not being enough indexing and abstracting services for exchange of current information on specialised fields involving another country. Efficient national documentation centres can also stimulate establishment of information support units in government and parastatals.

Given adequate communication, data bases too can be very resourceful. Most have the capacity for a formidable array of files. They would store and organise data on specific or broad subjects, then make them available through electronic processing methods, if there are computer terminals at the receiving end. WHO has a Programme Management Information System (WHO/PMIS) with a data bank, based on country profiles for family planning, communicable diseases, and environmental health. Clearly, these are subjects which any healthy manpower development project might take into account.

Agriculture

More recently there have been a few information analysis centres. Not only do they analyse documents, they may, on request, also synthesise and repackage according to standard prescriptions, for distribution. FAO's Agrarian Research and Intelligence Services (FAO/ARIS) provides information analysis from Rome on agrarian reforms, land settlement, cooperatives, social welfare services, and rural institutions. Together with FAO's Agricultural Information System (AGRIS), SADCC's other priority to research livestock disease, soil conservation and crop production for semi-arid tropics, should discover ample resources in Rome.

Transport and communications

Transport and communications happen to be the top priority sector for economic liberation strategy. It is well supplied by UN information systems that are sometimes linked with financial data e.g. the World Bank Referral Service can supply information on transportation, with collaterals to finance and aid coordination. WORLD BANK/REF is supplemented by an interactive bibliographic indexing system, also located in Washington D.C.

Trade

The Statistics Division of the Economic Community for Africa, (ECA) has an External Trade Data Base containing several files including international trade, commodity trade, trade statistics, and exchange rates compiled from
relevant government publications. Supplementary to the above, code-named ECA/TRADE files, the ECA library itself would supply data through bibliographic searches and referrals.

The Geneva library of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT/LIB) serves the External Relations and Information Division. It provides information to staff of international organisations on tariff and multilateral trade negotiations, customs unions, general systems of preferences etc. All of this should be useful to SADCC in any attempt to break away from the South African customs union, to seek its own trade partners abroad. For economic reasons PADIS will maintain direct links with ECA Statistics Division so that SADIS draws exhaustively from GATT/LIB resources as necessary.

It will be appreciated from the foregoing sketch, why PADIS was conceived and launched as a decentralised social and economic resource network, to develop in three phases from 1980 to 1989. The resources are just too vast for centralisation. Sponsors include the Development Sciences Information System (DEVSIS), the ECA itself as host, supported by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), UNDP, the African Development Bank (ADB), and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The PADIS concept grew out of a long felt need to meet the requirements of various persons, with varying habits of searching and using information through national resources, but often extending their searches elsewhere.

As a decentralised system PADIS would support partially self-sufficient subsystems in each subregion resembling those of the European Economic Community (EEC) which has maintained its own regional information system EURONET/EURODOC for many years, for similar reasons of coordinated development.

**SADIS: Southern African Documentation and Information System**

From its inauguration in 1979 it was understood that the Southern African Development Coordination Conference would harness subregional resources with regard to transport and communications, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, energy, water and minerals, trade and industry, employment and skills. The following year SADCC II recommended that a crucial supporting service would be an *integrated scientific and technical documentation service*, if the above separate units were to achieve sustained, uniform development.

One of the five units was isolated for special mention: agricultural projects for sub-regional food security would, among other things, require an *early warning system* in each country; accordingly there should be a data bank. Systematic arrangements for forecasting crop production and food availability would allow appropriate action to be taken to forestall critical food shortages so that dependence on countries outside SADCC is reduced to a minimum. *A reliable data bank would be an important element of an early warning system and... for other respects of a regional food security plan.*

It was, nevertheless, assumed that successful implementation of this, and other projects, would require consolidated information, rather than comprehen-
sive systems in each of the nine states. A subregional resources information system was accordingly projected. Of necessity the system might be large and complex but should be so structured that it can be manipulated for users working on a variety of projects. It would not result in unnecessary duplication if sectoral, specialised units were also established for concentrated action, as suggested above in the suggested four-tier structure.

A feasibility study was carried out in 1980 by the African Bibliographic Centre (Washington D.C.) partly to see if existing national information and documentation centres can bear the weight of a SADIS coordinating superstructure, and at the same time serve as a linchpin. Reasonably self-sufficient NIDCs are essential also for internal development, whether or not connected with regional projects. Should SADIS be decentralised it would make for stricter managerial control, administrative efficiency and speed of operation. This way, it would be a resource centre to control multiplication of essential, although expensive, information processing technology.

A central training agency should be established to produce various categories of information specialists on a regular basis; there should also be ad hoc national training centres for updating skills and orienting them to peculiar local problems of data collection. It might enhance the entire regional objective if a SADCC information network could serve as a subsystem for PADIS; and yet it should be self-sufficient in most respects, such as creating its own linkages with international information systems, pertinent to Southern Africa's peculiar needs. The rationale is that donor organisations like SIDA, DANIDA and DSE may be linked to European information systems that must be retained.

In actual operation, SADIS will sharpen its awareness to the fact that researchers, especially those doing comparative studies or working on multinational projects, have to have international information resources. There are also public servants and consultants of various descriptions, who depend on scientific and technical facts on the basis of which they could advise governments. At the other extreme are the grass roots, rural workers who are still seeking easily understandable information to answer questions like: when or how to put seeds in the ground; how to water their farms and cattle in the dry season; how to protect their crops against pests; and numerous other natural or artificial environmental problems.

SADIS will appreciate the role played by information when officials are formulating national economic and social plans. Also that some plans are more successful if they can be connected to growth points in another country, on behalf of a subregion. Consequently it will seek to design a coordinated network. It should thus serve as a catalyst to those national information systems that have been trying valiantly to convince their governments to regard information as a national asset which could contribute substantially to socio economic development. By and large national governments have not invested adequate sums in their libraries, archives or documentation centres. This is partly because the value of information is hard to demonstrate in convincing concrete terms. Added to which it has been difficult for higher officials, although having a keen sense of appreciation, to formulate practicable national information policies that could
serve most needs. For these reasons promotion programmes are most essential.

The concept of free flow of information across national boundaries has been accepted by regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the erstwhile East African Common Services Organisation. The need to make information a vital input for regional planning has not yet made an impact, as there has been acute shortage of trained personnel who can apply international standards in processing and transfer. In addition to physical communication and storage hardware, professional information personnel are crucial components in efficient utilisation of information.

All along, international organisations including DSE, IDRC, UNESCO and ECA have supported development of both the plant and personnel components of bibliographic control, from the national to subregional levels. Partly in furtherance of technical cooperation among countries at the same level of development, or for proper utilisation of technical assistance, or their commitment to improve local conditions, workshops, seminars and conferences have been held to find ways and means of providing services adequate to social and economic advancement in Africa. Despite all these efforts there still lacks a solid base of scientific information analysis for feasibility studies and project evaluation. Expert reports continue to repeat themselves in circular motion; and progress reports, if not exactly retrospective in outlook, often lack up-to-date statistical evidence that can be used as starting points for further project development. The SADIS subsystem will help correct the above situation and provide accurate data relevant to conception of policies and their formulation, leading to scientific planning, monitoring and evaluation.

SADIS would identify, collect, and disseminate relevant documentation for planners and policy formulators as well as officials who implement decisions, but also serve independent research workers who might be involved in decision making. It is realised the varying conditions might impede cooperation unless descriptors in data bases adopt uniform terminologies. Common standards in citation and referencing should also be adopted. To this end, PADIS intends to produce user manuals, guidelines and thesauri. SADIS should provide synonymous, supplementary and alternative terms because of its peculiar geopolitical status. Rapidity of information transfer from country to country would require on-line information hardware so that computer terminals, located in each subregional, and member states' national focal point would feed into, and draw from, the data bank in Addis Ababa.

In terms of service, the system would provide:

1. Indexing and abstracting services (depending on a large number of subject analysts being available);
2. Current awareness profiles, and retrospective bibliographic searches, on demand (by manual or electronic methods offered on subject bases);
3. Selective dissemination of information (depending on identification of specialised user needs);
4. Referral services (if transnational continental communication can be facilitated);
5. Document delivery (granting adequate postal services);
 provision of information bearing magnetic tapes to interested member states (where national computer centres are available and accessible to recipient consultants, planners and decision makers).

The following profile is offered for management of the subsystem:

**SADIS Profile**

1. **Objective**
   To collect, process, analyse, and disseminate scientific and technical information concerning SADCC originating from inside and outside. It should be located at a Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, or its equivalent. Location should be at a geographically central country; or country with superior communication; or the SADCC secretariat.

2. **Finance**
   2.1 SADCC states through SADCC secretariat.
   2.2 Contributions from Ministries responsible for libraries, archives, documentation centres, museums and other information centres.
   2.3 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research where SADIS is located.
   2.4 Material subsidies from UNISIST, UNESCO, and interested international bodies.
   2.5 Service charges.

3. **Information personnel**
   3.1 Formal education for information (documentation, library, archives personnel).
   3.2 Contract specialists (to begin with).
   3.3 Periodic consultants to update system.
   3.4 Workshops and seminars.
   3.5 Continuing education of users.

4. **Primary and secondary sources**
   4.1 Government and para-governmental organisations.
   4.2 Research organisations.
   4.3 University departments.
   4.4 Libraries, archives, museums.
   4.5 Commercial and official publishing houses
   4.6 Agricultural extension officers as rural information medium.

5. **Coordination and publicity**
   5.1 National focal points; NIDCs will coordinate and collect national resources of information.
   5.2 Relations with sectoral information systems and PADIS.
   5.3 User awareness publicity.
   5.4 Operations manual.
   5.5 Newsletter for NIDCs in region.
6. Communication and control inputs
6.1 Manual, mechanical and electronic information gathering, and dissemination.
6.2 Indexes, catalogues, lists, research reviews, bibliographic bulletins.
6.3 Register of specialised (micro) information cells.
6.4 Directories of special holdings.
6.5 Directories of computer data bases.
6.6 Translations bureaux.
6.7 Glossaries; polyglot dictionaries; thesauri.

7. Information transfer targets
7.1 Rural communities.
7.2 Policy/decision makers in government.
7.3 Private researchers and parastatals.
7.4 Research organisations.
7.5 Select foreign research organisations and governments, on request.
7.6 Exchange with other information systems.

8. Periodic evaluation
8.1 User studies.
8.2 Capability studies by consultant information specialists.
8.3 Triennial comprehensive evaluation.
8.4 Relations with international system on research in documentation (ISORID).

Some practical problems of regional information systems

In general, systems that are specially designed for a region raise several difficult questions. Initially they may be financed by a number of international bodies as in the case of PADIS; but there is no guarantee that they will continue to receive adequate support after termination of initial multilateral funding. Many regional projects have tottered on the brink of collapse when aid agreements expire (more often for reasons of political interference among participants than for purely financial reasons). Whatever the cause, it is not realistic to expect the host country to support indefinitely, a system meant to serve an entire continent or subregion. If it had to continue support for an intervening period while participating countries are accumulating their quota, it might not be able to maintain the same level of service.

Finance and management

At this stage it would be impossible accurately to cost an information system for a SADIS network. A rough estimate can be drawn from the PADIS African regional scheme at US$160 million to start initial operations. If the approximately 60 million population of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe comprise 20 per cent of the entire African population, then the SADIS network will cost US$32 million. To launch the system, multilateral assistance might be forthcoming from some of the 18 international development agencies who attended the SADCC 2 meeting in Maputo in November 1980.

Subsequently SADCC countries will have to bear the cost of maintaining the system on a permanent basis. It costs a considerable sum of money to install an effective information service. However experience has shown the investment appears to be less than the benefit. Therefore the service should be self-financing even if nominal charges only are made. Cost-benefit ratios are not calculable on information systems in the short run, but benefits are inestimable in the long run. When the losses that result from premature project termination (owing to lack of statistical and evaluative informations) are weighed against savings that might have been made, the information component in successful project implementation more than compensates the system. The arithmetic of continuing support almost always would arouse debate on proportionate contributions: by population or per capita income? Would services be provided free or would they be charged for and at what rates? It might be decided not to charge SADCC consumers, as charges tend to inhibit use.

As far as management is concerned what would be the criteria for determining personnel quotas; what categories of expertise should be sought? These delicate questions are not impossible to resolve, but they take time. As said, politico-economic stability is of the essence in successful cooperation; differences among neighbouring states usually happen at short notice and jeopardise schemes previously negotiated on amicable terms. Perhaps the most important management question is location of the SADCC Information Sub-system. Should it be a unit of the Secretariat in Botswana, or geographically centralised and since facility of communication is vital, should it not be located where the infrastructure is relatively more developed than elsewhere - as in Zimbabwe?

Documentation and information services

By 1989 when PADIS phase 3 is reached, SADIS might have put into operation all the services previously outlined. In the immediate future a document delivery service should suffice. In quantitative aggregate it may seem that there are more Africana documents outside the African region, than within it. In that case technical arrangements for international exchange, or direct transfer of retrospective documents will have to be made. Rather than take the risk of the system collapsing under the sheer burden of accumulating retrospective, current and recurrent documents however, a SADIS document clearing house might expend its initial energies and resources by building up essential primary source documents at home. This is to say that in actual fact there are potentially more primary information resources on this continent, than elsewhere; except that project documents, report literature, government publications, journals etc. are yet to be systematically organised for use.
Given adequate communication infrastructures, the distances that documents have to travel are obviously shorter for subsystems, therefore cheaper (although not necessarily faster). If countries within the subregion are already linked by various forms of cooperation (economic, political and transport) as envisaged in the Southern African development coordination scheme, such linkages would facilitate information transfer. All things considered, document delivery services would find it expeditious to circulate items among clients whose conditions are better known to each other.

There are items of information which will have to be delivered much faster than by post. Present PADIS plans for teletransmission include telecommunication interfaces with information networks inside and outside Africa, through a ground satellite with 128 terminals; therefore speedy transfer is possible.

Africa being a multilingual region, her information systems have to contend with the different official languages used for scientific, technical and official communication, English, French, Spanish, Arabic and Portuguese; but also with one or two indigenous languages used in extension agriculture. PADIS itself aims to operate within the three languages of ECA: Arabic, English and French. This will not suffice SADIS requirements as a fair amount of SADCC economic liberation strategies will consist in integrated development projects. Thus data for a project located in an anglophone country might only be obtainable from a lusophone neighbouring country, as between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, or Angola and Zambia. For supporting documentation to reach its fullest potential therefore, a Translations Unit will have to be established preferably in SADIS rather than PADIS. On the credit side, it would lead to promotion of balanced regional cooperation; on the debit side the cost might be prohibitively expensive for a subsystem.

User categories

Since SADCC will focus on economic development there might be no need to carry out elaborate user need studies at this stage, except with regard to the kind of documents in greatest demand or providing the most information.

The following individual institutional, national and international user categories can be identified: individual users will comprise private researchers, official investigators, and small scale industrial entrepreneurs in the first instance, plus official advisers in ministries of economic planning, in the second instance. They tend to search for multifaceted data, the source of which they often cannot detect without some assistance from information specialists. Even when the individual knows his source and how to get it, he often cannot afford the cost, thereby placing the item beyond his reach.

For this reason, much research data on Africa is more easily obtainable from international resources than locally. If these are to be obtained without strain, then retrieval mechanisms should have international compatibility as far as possible, in terms of both hardware and software. Common terminologies in
the form of thesauri, can be compiled for each project sector as well as standardised citation indices.

International donor agencies, development banks and private financiers of miscellaneous projects would continue to require vital numerical data, with accompanying technical information. Their need would encourage compilation of national statistics at a more efficient level than is being done at the moment.

It is at the institutional level that most search and retrieval problems will be encountered. For the most part, government ministries and parastatal organisations in Africa have paid lip-service to the importance of information support units. There are haphazard collections that are more often than not staffed by persons whose work schedules are crowded with other responsibilities not connected with information gathering and management. Their documentation centres are supported by inadequate budgets. Altogether most are incapable of supplying up-to-date and accurate data for decision making, planning and completion of development.

The cumulative result has been that a good deal of planning is done without supporting facts; and where there is need for coordinated programmes at the national level, institutions have carried on in quite, not totally effective, and wasteful isolation. Therefore the most effective corrective device for regional coordination is for a coordinated data base.

Perhaps the most important category to whom information should be continuously fed, so that the early warning system for increased food production proves successful, consists of the farmer himself and agricultural extension officer. Research results must be transmitted in meaningful practicable terms to both the above. As there can be no satisfactory substitute for local experience the necessary information will have to be prepared and disseminated at the national level. At the moment, the limited agricultural research and extension resources which the region is able to deploy, acts as a constraint on the ability of many food producers to apply appropriate technology to their production. There are different agroecological conditions within the region, therefore both research and information will have to have specific local orientation. Crop diseases, pest control, foot and mouth disease plus other transnational hazards like flood and drought, can however be tackled collectively.

The United Nations Environment Programme maintains an international referral system on the above and related hazards: UNEP-INFOTERRA has appointed national focal points in one or two countries of the region, who can transfer the benefits of international information resources. An evaluation survey carried out in 1980 however showed that the sub-Saharan African region as a whole is not particularly well covered by the INFOTERRA network.

**Information personnel training**

In discussing user-problems a number of crucial questions arise as to reconciliation of meaningful terminologies between information specialists, and the user-scholars they serve. Mutually comprehensible terms for descriptors have to
be applied in order to facilitate retrieval. In the social sciences as a whole both specialists understand that construction of information retrieval systems, and periodic validation of new concepts in various disciplines, constitute a vital social process, leading to a healthy growth of knowledge.

The process of knowledge transfer becomes restricted when information specialists who create systems of retrieval are not themselves engaged in the intellectual growth of the ideas they try to structure; which is probably why a few important tools such as Sociological Abstracts are compiled almost entirely by experts in the subject. The feeling nowadays is that they could more profitably spend their time exploring particular subjects and leave information processing to information specialists.

Ultimately the development of information services should be an active association between those who possess training in the information sciences and those who are responsible for the knowledge contained in documents. If this association is not brought about a user is likely to lose sight of valuable information concerning his subject. It is for this reason that a compromise must be sought between subject specialisation and information specialisation. It goes without saying that the effectiveness of an information system will depend on the skill with which it is designed and operated, as well as the facility with which users can manipulate the system to advantage.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

3. By March 1981 the present computer which can be linked to 64 terminals will be upgraded to reach 128 terminals.
4. Databases, because they are designed for various categories of users, usually publish manuals and directories giving sources of information to be found in their files. The subject scope is usually described by up to 10 descriptors, enabling the potential researcher to identify in advance, the value of the information be obtained. PADIS intends to provide similar guidelines.
CHAPTER 26

Research Coordination and Cooperation: A Case for a Southern Africa Regional Research Coordination Council

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Introduction

The birth of SADCC, a direct off-spring of "front-linism", in Arusha in July 1979 (Kornegay & Verkerodt, 1979) and its subsequent ratification at the Lusaka Summit in April 1980 (Nsekela, 1981) has precipitated many and intertwined activities with far reaching implications for the development of the Southern African Region. This is another contradictory but related development to the Pretoria concept of a Constellation of African States in southern and central Africa, (Green, 1979–1980). This new framework of regional cooperation on a multilateral basis is a further demonstration by the front-line states of their unswerving commitment to sever the internationally embarrassing yet inevitable tentacles which economically and otherwise bind some of the countries to the Pretoria regime. This move should also be seen in the context of the challenges posed by both the New International Economic and Information Orders and SADCC's collective strategy to accommodate their implications for the socioeconomic, educational and cultural welfare of SADCC member countries' rural communities.

Since its founding SADCC has, so far, held more than 85 meetings at governmental level on both bilateral and regional cooperation (Cavan et al, 1981). A definite programme of action and the allocation of specific studies, tasks and responsibilities to member governments best suited to undertake them have already been accomplished (Grundy, 1981). SADCC's priority sectors, which are by no means exhaustive, have been identified as: transport and communication, food security, soil and land conservation and utilization, industrial and energy development and conservation, fisheries, wildlife and tourism. This is an indication that henceforth research and development (R&D) must be geared towards the realisation of the objectives of these and other related sectors of SADCC's regional economies.

R & D in Southern Africa: problems and prospects

Almost twenty years ago, an American professor pointed out that R&D was not the exclusive right of the institutions of higher learning. He further asserted that 87 per cent of the total R&D activities carried out in any country was done
outside these institutions and geared towards some definite sectors of the country's development (Machlup, 1962). This view has since been endorsed by scholars in other disciplines (Martin, 1968; Haag, 1977). Haag in particular has concluded that "Research is no longer aimed at merely satisfying the intellectual needs, but contributes positively to the growth and development of the economy and is important and indeed essential to national development." A study of the successive National Development Plans of the various countries of Southern Africa – in the ISAS context defined to include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zaire and Zimbabwe – reveals that (with the exception of Namibia) the governments of these countries, since attaining independence, have not only incorporated some aspects of research in their respective national development strategies but some of the governments have established institutions to oversee national research programmes.

However, in the education sector it has proved difficult, given the limited resources and the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the region, to improve the standards and quality of education. Experts in educational affairs in the region have acknowledged that,

'... as a result of the present situation in this region of the world and especially in the southern part of Africa, the universities of Southern Africa were experiencing difficulties in organising research and teaching in history that were immeasurably harder to overcome than those of universities off the continent of Africa... An exceptional effort was therefore needed, both within Africa and at international level, to find a way out of the present situation and facilitate the take off of research and high quality teaching in a region of Africa, where... research workers were very keen to investigate, innovate and discover but were deprived – unless they worked in universities outside Africa – of the means and time to conduct serious research (UNESCO, 1977).'

In May 1981 leading education experts reaffirmed this problem and further identified what they considered to be the major constraints in educational research and how to solve them in the Boleswa countries (Otaala and Pandey, 1981).

However, from the foregoing, it is evident that the acknowledgement of the shortcomings in the realisation of national development objectives in almost every sector of national economies in the majority of the SADCC member countries on the one hand, and the persistent procrastination in the tackling of these problems on the other, is paradoxically rooted in the lack of clear-cut national research policies. SADCC may deliver many member countries from evils more formidable than the proclaimed priority agenda items. For sure, individual governments of SADCC member-countries – probably more than any other government in Africa – require more action than the mere five-year recycled statements of their intentions to eradicate "disease, ignorance and poverty", and their comminative evils which for ever scour the rural communities. It may be safe to surmise that now that the SADCC countries are united for a common purpose, this union should result in the evolution of a regional research policy whose seeds should disperse and germinate into viable national research policies in each member country of the SADCC group.
In order, therefore, for the SADCC member countries to solve their R&D problems, they must not only understand the parameters of their respective national research constraints, and what on a regional scale would constitute issues for which a common solution is required, but must forge a meaningful and action oriented technical cooperation. From the deliberations of the Nairobi UNDP sponsored Conference (UNDP, 1980), which seems to reaffirm the SADCC line of action, it is clear that it is high time countries of Africa, facing common challenges, cooperated technically at home. It is of no immediate use for these countries to purport to cooperate at international gatherings away from the battlefield. Technical cooperation is the only viable scientific tool for socio-economic and even political integration. This is one sure way in which SADCC member countries can either bilaterally or multilaterally exploit their respective resources, including research, which would otherwise be either uneconomical or expensive for one country to undertake.

It is against this background that this paper suggests the introduction of some degree of research coordination and cooperation in the region at two levels - national and regional. Where a country lacks machinery for the control of research, some guidelines are also suggested. Finally, an institutional framework for research coordination and cooperation at regional level is proposed.

The end or the beginning of problems - after a country achieves Independence?

At what point in time and space do things go wrong after a country achieves independence? All those involved invest heavily in its *liberation research*, which is always well coordinated and all those involved both locally and internationally cooperate to ensure total success. Why does that sense of commitment, cooperation and coordination suddenly disappear? The following are some of the reasons.

During the struggle for Uhuru, research projects do not form part of the concrete issues of the struggle. Hence, they do not constitute a package deal of assurances which the prospective leaders give to their supporters, the freedom fighters. It would be betrayal of trust, indeed suicidal, if, after gaining independence, the new rulers provided those services and goods which did not form the basis for the liberation. However essential it may be, research *per se* cannot take priority over the provision of land, schools, water, medical facilities, food, housing, job opportunities, etc. This explains why research is relegated to secondary, coincidental and, indeed, academic interest.

Another factor is that after “liberation research” has achieved its goals, the incoming government’s priorities change for obvious reasons. According to Lewis (1969) this is inevitable because “The politicians come to office ill-informed because there has been so little research and discussion of concrete problems.” This in itself is not an insurmountable problem. The root of the problem lies in the behaviour of the outgoing colonial/racist minority administrators. Besides disposing of essential research and policy documents, as they did on the
eve of Kenya's Independence (Sanger, 1961, ECARBICA 1973), they not only totally refuse to cooperate with the new administrators, but there are cases where they carry out overt acts of sabotage.

Under such circumstances one would reasonably expect the local academics to come to the aid of their new administrators by giving them advice and support on all salient features of national development. On the contrary, the academics - the breed of colonial "ivory tower" institutions - embark on systematic but futile criticisms of their new rulers. They maintain a concrete wall of inaccessibility to the government which, ironically, maintains these very institutions of higher learning. In other words, they support the status quo.

The other teething problem stems from reliance on foreign assistance which has its own limitations and at times frustrations. It takes a long time to get aid flowing, which is dictated by the political and diplomatic relations between the participating country and the recipient country. On this type of aid a word of caution has been sounded by the Prime Minister of Swaziland thus, "... given the most goodwill in the world, help from foreign assistance cannot do the job" (Swaziland, Government of, 1973). This implies that it is no use a country receiving foreign aid, in whatever form, if that country does not have capacities in the form of counterpart administrators, scientists, monitoring and evaluating agencies, etc., who can determine and manipulate the usefulness and/or the alternative uses to which the aid should be put, or be able to absorb new knowledge, skills or technologies forming part of that aid.

The foregoing would partly explain why, for instance, the UNESCO statistics on R&D for the year 1977 (UNESCO, 1977) show that several years after gaining independence, there were still unreliable, or non-existent, statistical entries on the countries of this region.

**Hazards of uncontrolled research**

Where foreign aid is in the form of personnel or where the local research scene is dominated by foreigners, such an arrangement may eventually be detrimental to the interests of the host country. This is not news. It is on record that in 1900, for example, the English people protested against "...the danger to Britain's economic position of German dominance in industrial research..." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1974). Within the region, Haag (1977) commenting on similar danger has aptly and appropriately put the case thus: "The importation of foreign researchers or the delegation of researchers to foreign institutions is economically and politically intolerable as a long term arrangement." What is or is not a long term arrangement is a matter of interpretation. It would depend entirely on the research circumstances prevailing in a particular country at any one given time.

To these two dangers identified by Haag two more must be added. These are Cultural and Educational in nature. The former danger arises out of the collection and exportation of research materials - broadly speaking - without leaving copies or representative specimens thereof. This is by far the most serious
and prevalent danger. The drain of a country’s cultural property and its total alienation robs it of vital research materials. By robbing a country of its “National Estate” it becomes impossible for a government to plan and execute meaningful and indigenously conceived educational programmes relevant to the local conditions and needs.

It is on record that vital research materials which document crucial African political developments in Southern Africa since late last century are scattered in American, British, Canadian, and European repositories, away from the very region in which they were created. The following illustrative questions are posed to highlight the magnitude of the problems posed by uncontrolled foreign researchers.

Except where it can be justified, should an archaeologist be allowed to excavate and export important ruins? Or should an expatriate heading a government agency be permitted to pack and carry away “his” research and working documents, essential to the functioning of that agency? Or should a naturalist be allowed to collect and export rare specimens of fauna/flora, maybe the only known last surviving species of their kind, without leaving any clue as to the eventual location of these items? Or should an anthropologist be allowed to stay among a people and freely tape-record their songs, legends, folklore, myths, or photograph/collect their material culture, from, for example, the last known surviving centenarian, and export all such collections?*

In order for research to play its effective role in national development, the government must ensure that research operates within a national framework and is coordinated with all sectors of the country’s economy. In this way, some of the problems alluded to above would be kept in constant check.

Research control and coordination underscore governmental responsibility to safeguard the “National Estate” from indiscriminate exploitation by unscrupulous researchers. It is the duty of and a right of the government at all times to be vigilant about what research activities are taking place in the country. In this way, the government will not only be able to monitor research activities but also be in a position to retrieve whatever research findings and raw data which may be needed for national planning and development.

Absence of research controls results in unpleasant and at times embarrassing consequences. Government planners, policy and decision makers, industrialists, research scholars and future generations will find it not only difficult to operate but be forced to duplicate efforts, waste time and money, delay the execution of vital development projects, etc., simply because previous research findings, studies and documents are irretrievable when needed. Also, lack of communication between those in possession of either the required information, or knowledge about the materials, and those in need of the records makes it hard to locate and utilise the information required. It is no secret that the continued contradictions or inconsistencies in many government policies and national development programmes are largely attributed to and stem from this uncertainty. It

* See the controls imposed by the Botswana Government under the Anthropological Research Act 1967 [Cap. 509: 02].
has been confirmed, for example, that in most countries within the region, people carry out research without the slightest knowledge of the government or institutions of higher learning. Given such a "laissez-faire" situation, can the government effectively monitor, let alone coordinate research activities for national development? Although the problems alluded to above are basically national in character, they have both regional and international implications. Being national problems, they can only be solved through the machinery of national governments. What options are open to governments?

The development of indigenous research manpower: the role of the University

One option has been suggested by Haag, (1977) in the following terms: "By developing indigenous research manpower the universities provide the basis for the development of a national research policy and research culture and thus can support the whole process of national development."

Within the region, the universities should provide a foundation upon which research policy and culture should be articulated. The role of the university must be seen to permeate every stratum of national development and not be limited to the fulfilment of its own immediate and traditional needs. Professor Mohapeloa has suggested practical ways in which the university in a developing country can aid development. He has this to say:

... the university which, like other educational sectors, should be in touch with society, must involve itself in rural development. This should be done by means of research and suitably structured courses. Which means the university should teach what rural development is and prepare teachers who will understand what their role and that of their pupils, should be. It should also participate actively in rural development. It can teach about, and participate in, rural development in many ways; and this should be done as part of the ordinary work of the faculties and departments (Mohapeloa, 1981).

Mohapeloa has underscored one of the basic functions of the National University of Lesotho. Section 5 (c) of Lesotho's National University Act 1976 empowers the University "To promote by research and other means the advancement of knowledge and its practical application to social, technological problems primarily within Lesotho and more generally in Southern Africa."

The option before us has many implications. Evolution of a national research policy implies that a country has attained a high functional level in its development, where research, like any other national resource, requires some degree of governmental control. That is to say, people in that country must have reached a stage in their standard of living where they appreciate the value of research, and where they no longer can tolerate foreign encroachment on their sovereign research rights; and where the lack of research policy is detrimental to the planning and development of their country.

At present this is a patriotic stand without substance. The prevailing conditions, especially the intensified "liberation research" aimed at freeing Namibia
and South Africa, all suggest that reliance on foreign researchers in research institutions in the SADCC member countries is likely to continue well into the next century and beyond. This assumption is based on experience from other countries, especially those in Africa, which indicates that the development of local research capacities cannot be realised overnight. This is a long term objective which requires careful planning and steady implementation. Besides, there are a number of constraints which must be identified and contained if a viable local research capability is to be developed.

**Constraints to evolution of a national research policy**

The following are some of the constraints, in varying degrees, common to all the SADCC member countries.

In the majority of countries there is an acute shortage of post-graduate training facilities for research workers. Most of the local people in research fields are forced to go overseas for specialised or higher training. Some students after qualifying, aware of the lack of facilities for research in their home countries, opt not to return. Others exposed to alien practices and influences and, at times, an irrelevant kind of training, on return home, cannot relate their training to the solution of local research problems.

Lack of properly organised national information infrastructures, i.e. archives, documentation and library services are some of the most pressing problems in this part of the region. Governments are doing their best to rectify the problems but a lot remains to be done to bring these services to accepted international standards. This constraint is compounded by the behaviour of most governments – generally in the developing countries – who seem to have no confidence in their own national scholars. The powers that be, for some reason, regard their own highly trained and qualified manpower as subversives. To avoid colliding with the governments or being unnecessarily frustrated, these scholars leave their countries. This results in a grave brain drain.

Another constraint is the apparent inability of governments to control the operations of transnational corporations. This problem is closely related to foreign donors who, at times, insist on and dictate priorities, and the order in which a particular research project must be executed in the recipient country. Added to this frustration is the fact that most foreign researchers come from different countries which espouse different national ideologies and political dogmas. These alien differences, unfortunately, are particularly marked in research activities in the host countries. By and large, foreign scholars write their research findings in their native languages. This practice, though understandable, makes it impossible for the users in the host country to utilise the information written in foreign languages. The host countries are held at deliberate cultural ransom!

Research at universities and other institutions of higher learning is characterised by ‘ivory tower’ tendencies. Research findings/documents are not only hard to obtain locally, but, as if to prove their scholarly attainment, the authors
prefer to publish in international journals of limited or restricted circulation. The other problem rampant among the civil servants, is that although most public servants are the products of universities, for some strange reason, they hardly read, let alone understand, university documents. These bureaucrats dismiss university documents as lengthy, academic and/or as being out of step with a country’s national development objectives.

Finally, lack of central machinery for the control of research activities in a country results in fragmented, uncoordinated and usually wasteful research in terms of a country’s national development.

Research coordination at national level

In order to control and coordinate research activities a government should examine and address itself to the following points: (1) whether the current legislation/regulations as well as procedures for the control, clearance and coordination of research activities are adequate; (2) areas, relationships and terms of cooperation between government research and research by nongovernmental, locally based, foreign government agencies, scholars, etc., and their implications for the host country’s national development programmes; (3) the effect on and implications for research programmes in the country if clearance and control were both centralised in either specific or general terms; (4) the structure and administrative machinery for research control and coordination in institutions of higher learning and in quasi-governmental agencies vis-à-vis national development programmes; (5) what role is played by the existing institutions in charge of information handling in national research programmes; (6) the country’s research capabilities in terms of manpower and facilities for the control and coordination of research activities; (7) the possibilities of controlling and coordination of research activities of transnational and multinational corporations in the country; (8) the best way of ensuring that, without affecting an individual’s right of possession or ownership, the original data and research materials of whatever description collected by the individual are retained within the country; and (9) the possibility of evolving a national research policy consistent with the country’s national development objectives and restructured on the lines of the foregoing points.

Interim measures for the coordination of research

Except in cases of national emergency, governments normally take their time to consider, approve and implement any new proposals. Therefore, before policy on research control and coordination is approved, the following interim measures, which could be modified to suit the needs of an individual country, may be applied until proper control measures are worked out.

(1) For coordination of research activities between government, research institutions, research workers, and other agencies, every research application
must be linked to an appropriate ministry or governmental agency. This would ensure that suitable arrangements are made for the monitoring, coordination and evaluation of research activities. (2) Research workers must declare all raw research materials and collections that they may acquire in the course of their research activities. (3) Every research worker must, at no cost to the host government, deposit with a local institution approved for that purpose, one half of the representative specimens of any raw materials and collections, copies of tape-recordings as well as photographs. (4) Every researcher must deposit, or cause to be deposited, copies of his final research documents in a manner similar to the one suggested in (3) above. It should be the responsibility of the sponsors to ensure that these interim arrangements are complied with by research workers under their sponsorship.

To improve research coordination and to eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic delays in the processing of research applications for clearance, it is necessary as part of the interim arrangements, to establish a “Committee on Research Coordination and Clearance”, whose chairman should preferably be a senior civil servant of high academic/professional standing. The Committee, with a full time secretariat whose functions should be confined to the administration of research matters, should operate under the umbrella of a key government ministry.

**National council for research, science and technology**

Research coordination and cooperation at regional level implies that at national level such activities are well coordinated. With the exception of one or two countries, the majority of the countries in the region have either to establish national agencies or to rehabilitate dormant ones for the control and coordination of research.* In order to integrate regional research activities properly, each country should endeavour to establish a National Research Council. This Council should not be confused with a “National Research Clearance and Coordination Committee.” Where a Council exists the Committee would normally be one of its sub-committees. Alternatively, on the establishment of the Council the functions of the Committee would devolve on the Council, whichever is preferable. Experience from other countries, especially within Africa, shows that no satisfactory long term policy for national research programmes can be planned and developed without the enactment of appropriate legislation for this purpose. It is essential, therefore, that the functions of a National Council for Science and Technology or a National Research Council, or by whatever label the Council may be known, must be clearly defined by law.

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*According to a quick survey I carried out recently in preparation of this paper, it was discovered that: Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia have functional agencies in charge of research. Swaziland does have one which is non-functional. Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Namibia do not have anything. Angola, Zaire and Mozambique did not respond to the questionnaire.*
Research coordination at regional level

In order to coordinate research programmes at regional level, there must be functional research institutions at national level. At present any reference to research coordination in the region would merely be propositional for the following, among other, reasons: (1) There is no regional legal or administrative machinery in which research coordination can be accommodated. (2) Not all countries in the region are at the same level of socio economic, political, educational, informational, and even cultural, development. (3) The countries' respective national economic priorities differ. (4) Different countries espouse different political and national ideologies and dogmas, and subscribe to different international political ideologies. (5) The countries' historical backgrounds are totally different. Given such a set-up, it is not practically possible at this stage to implement an arrangement of this nature on a regional scale even if there were functional National Research Councils.

Besides the above impediments, it is essential to recapitulate the dimensions of our assignment at a regional level. Geographically, Southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of Research Facilities</th>
<th>Ratio of Research Institutions to the Population per Country</th>
<th>Ratio of Research Facilities to the size of each Country in km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola*</td>
<td>1 246 700</td>
<td>6 768 570</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1: 615 325</td>
<td>1: 113 336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana*</td>
<td>582 000</td>
<td>791 000</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1: 14 648</td>
<td>1: 10 777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho*</td>
<td>30 355</td>
<td>1 216 815</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1: 81 121</td>
<td>1: 2 023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi*</td>
<td>118 484</td>
<td>5 817 700</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1: 264 441</td>
<td>1: 5 385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique*</td>
<td>783 030</td>
<td>11 750 000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1: 734 375</td>
<td>1: 48 939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia*</td>
<td>824 292</td>
<td>989 100</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1: 34 107</td>
<td>1: 28 423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland*</td>
<td>17 363</td>
<td>530 000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1: 21 200</td>
<td>1: 694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire*</td>
<td>2 344 885</td>
<td>27 869 000</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1: 456 869</td>
<td>1: 38 440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia*</td>
<td>752 614</td>
<td>5 834 000</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1: 104 179</td>
<td>1: 13 439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe*</td>
<td>390 308</td>
<td>7 360 000</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1: 82 697</td>
<td>1: 4 385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 090 031</strong></td>
<td><strong>68 926 185</strong></td>
<td><strong>377</strong></td>
<td>1: 182 828</td>
<td>1: 18 806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources and Notes**

1 These totals include: National Archives, Museums, Research Institutes, National as well Public and Private Libraries, where known.
4 The figure for Lesotho was given to me by a prominent Mosotho librarian.
6 D. Hartridge & T. Robarts, (ed. and comp.), *Directory of Rhodesian Libraries* (Salisbury, 1975). From the above Table it may be registered that on a regional level, one research institution serves an area of approximately 19,000 km² and a human population of over 180,000. However, in reality these facilities are concentrated in urban areas.
Southern Africa Research for Development

Southern Africa Research for Development covers an area of approximately 8,000,000 km² with a human population of approximately 100,000,000. Table 1 opposite will help to elucidate the magnitude of the problem before us. Vast areas are not only inaccessible but sparsely populated. The available research infrastructures, i.e. information, research and teaching services (at tertiary level teaching and training), cannot conveniently sustain multidisciplinary research. Table 1 also shows the ratio of research infrastructures to the population in each country as well as the relationship of these institutions to the size of each country.

Need for research cooperation

SADCC has already laid down a viable framework for regional economic cooperation. The catalogue of areas, reasons and scope for cooperation is endless. For the purposes of this paper, a few areas will be cited to reinforce the quest for research cooperation.

In the first instance, the study of problems associated with interstate affairs as well as international issues becomes meaningful only where transboundary cooperation is possible. If a scholar is to succeed in the acquisition of knowledge he must endeavour to cross not only political boundaries but geographical barriers. Whether for the purposes of gathering first hand information (Gibson, 1972), or carrying out an excavation, undertaking field interviews, or just comparing notes and sharing in an intellectual discussion with his contemporaries in another country, cooperation at that level is inevitable. Even without necessarily crossing geopolitical boundaries, it is acknowledged that a researcher “...must always be aware of the achievements of his colleagues in other countries” (Mathisen, 1963: 3).

Historical studies in the region of Southern Africa have basically concerned themselves with studies within smaller country or even area units than overall regional problem areas. Where an area of study covers more than three or even four states/countries, some interstate or intercountry cooperation becomes necessary. Furthermore in some studies like those on the energy crisis, monetary flows, apartheid, transfer of technology, information control, air-piracy, migrant labour, climatic changes, currency smuggling, pornography, trafficking in drugs, etc., it is only through interstate/country and international cooperation and coordination of efforts that a researcher can arrive at meaningful findings. With regard to research in international relations, Mathisen, a scholar of international affairs, has summed up the concept of cooperation as follows: “...the increasing interdependence of the nations naturally accentuates the need for cooperation and rational division of research tasks among scholars in different parts of the world” (Mathisen, 1963).

In the context of the Southern Africa region, interdependence assumes a different connotation. It could have the meaning attributed to it by either the SADCC Group or Pretoria as evidenced by Chester Crocker’s recent speech (Crocker, 1981: 4). For the poorer countries of the region, cooperation is extremely vital. It would enable scholars in these countries to learn to reduce the risks
of making mistakes that other scholars elsewhere have made. In any case, inter-country cooperation results in the evolution of reasonable and meaningful scientific standards and uniformity in the usage of research terms and concepts. The promotion of interstate and intercountry cooperation, especially in the field of social sciences, is beneficial to small and economically weak and landlocked states in the region. Localisation of research in these countries, though maybe beneficial to an individual country, should be discouraged. More often than not, under the pretext of evolving indigenous research, dangers arise of "exposing the social sciences to the grave consequences of relapsing into parochialism", asserts Mathisen.

To enhance cooperation among the states and to discourage the lowering of standards in research activities, there is need for a regional watch-dog which should be in charge of research matters at this level.

**Mechanism for cooperation**

In reference to cooperation among SADCC member states, the late President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, had this to say in his keynote address at the SADCC Conference in Arusha in July 1979:

The five Front-Line States have already shown that cooperation is possible among the independent states of Southern Africa regardless of their different ideologies and economic systems. We have been working harmoniously together to evoke common political problems. I see no reason why we cannot work together harmoniously to solve common economic problems.

Fortified with such dynamic guidance and reassurance from our leaders, the logical consequence is to forge regional cooperation in all fields including research. It is only through viable research programmes that meaningful economic and political programmes can be planned and implemented. Pointers towards a better mechanism for cooperation are: (a) All countries in the Region are members of the United Nations and one or other of its specialised agencies. (b) These countries are also members of the Organization of African Unity and one or other of its agencies, as well as of other regional groupings (Sohn, 1971). (c) These countries also belong to many professional, educational, scientific, and academic associations. Furthermore, the SADCC Ministers, meeting in Maputo in November 1980

"... agreed on the importance of incorporating Southern African Studies into the teaching and research of national universities. Centres for Southern African Studies have been established in Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Universities without such centres have been urged to co-operate with the existing Centres in the development of their own teaching and research." (Kgarebe, 1981).

This is indeed a broad spectrum of components of regional cooperation to choose from. With a few legal and organisational trimmings added here and there to accommodate problems inherent in the evolution of regional groupings, it is
possible that irrespective of the mode of cooperation employed, the body envisaged should be able to harmonise not only regional but national and sectoral research programmes. Indeed the future of the organisation would seem bright. However, the only disconcerting nightmare to overcome through proper planning is the discomforting record of past failures of many African regional groupings.

The establishment of a regional non-partisan mechanism which would service the research needs of SADCC’s member-states could be achieved through any of the internationally known modes. Cooperation could be either (a) Bilateral: where two states or one state and an international organisation are parties; or (b) Multilateral: where several states are parties and the arrangement is open to others. In passing, it may be mentioned that there are also private and public forms of co-operation.

The regional body envisaged can only emerge through the multilateral kind of co-operation, either of all or several of the states in the region. This approach would create a truly representative and viable research co-ordinating agency in whose operations each government would have a stake.

Depending on the level of and parties to the co-operation, the establishment of a Southern Africa Regional Research Coordination Council (SARRCC) would indeed be a natural consequence of that cooperation.

Cooperation *per se* does not necessarily imply coordination, though on the other hand, coordination usually carries with it an element of cooperation.

**Towards a Southern African Regional Research Coordination Council**

Based on historical, ecological as well as other considerations, the SADCC member countries may be grouped in any of the many possible combinations as would make coordination of activities less cumbersome. The following is suggested as one of the ways in which the countries may be grouped:

**Group A:**
Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Zaire. These are all littoral countries. Their research priorities will be largely influenced by their immediate environment.

**Group B:**
The countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These have a common historical background; and they have a lot of problems which are attributable to and influenced by their immediate relationships with the Republic of South Africa.

**Group C:**
This group would comprise of the countries of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. They have a common historical background and geographically form a cohesive area of study.
The establishment of a Regional Research Coordination Council should be implicitly spelt out in the National Legislation/Administrative Arrangements constituting National Research Councils in the respective member countries. In the absence of a regional body politic with powers to legislate, this approach is necessary. The legislation should make provision for the composition, funding, management, functions and staffing of the Council.

The Council should function through Special Subcommittees which should be in charge of specific areas of research coordination. These committees should be grouped according to the broad fields of research activities envisaged within the region – particularly the SADCC agenda of priorities.

The legislation setting up the Regional Council should be framed in such a way that the operational systems are not so rigid that they interfere with, or impinge on, the sovereignty of the member-states. On the other hand, it must be flexible enough to ensure that confusion, overlapping of research projects, parochialism in research methodologies, and other related problems, are kept in check.

The establishment of the Council should not result in the lack of initiative at the local and subregional, even sectoral, levels. This has been a common tendency in all developing countries where national research organisations affiliated to overseas research institutions have relied so much on the parent organisations for leadership, direction and even on matters of purely domestic concern, that they have been unable to initiate or localise certain programmes. On the whole, the Council must be elastic and in some measure fluid in its functions and organisation.

**Functions of the Regional Council**

The Southern African Regional Research Coordination Council should have the following, among other things, as its objectives and functions: (a) formulation of regional, subregional, national as well as sectoral research projects, models etc., for the use of SADCC member-states; (b) mobilization of known and available regional research capacities; (c) encouraging the sharing of limited available regional resources amongst the member states, thereby fostering the spirit of self-reliance and mutual support; (d) collection and dissemination of information on research capacities of each member country in the region; (e) assisting governments in the region to prepare inventories of national institutions with research or potential research capabilities; (f) acting as a regional clearing house for requests for funds for regional and national research projects; (g) screening foreign specialists in any field who are destined to work in the region, basing its judgement on qualifications and their relevance to the region; (h) development of regional research facilities, e.g. archives; documentation, and library services; computer, editing, translation, printing, publication, reprographic, and conservation services; (i) sponsoring and training of scientific personnel and supporting staff; (j) encouraging and facilitating government to government, institution to institution, and even individual to individual contacts; (k) making summaries of all important inaccessible materials on the region and facilitating...
their exploitation by scholars; (l) taping the talents of all banned and imprisoned or exiled authors within the region and facilitating the publication of their banned works; (m) developing and maintaining uniformity and consistency in research standards in the region; (n) acting as a liaison agency between international organisations and an individual country where for some economic reasons that country is unable to participate in any international arrangement for any collaborative research programmes; (o) organising and hosting seminars, conferences, workshops, etc; and (p) generally, acting as advisor to SADCC member states on all matters of research.

Conclusion

The need for proper planning and coordination of research activities at sectoral, national and regional levels in the region of Southern Africa has become more pressing as a result of SADCC's commitment to liberate her member countries from not only the economic strangleholds of the Pretoria regime, but from any other undesirable foreign domination.

In the spirit of the 1980 Lusaka Declaration (as in the spirit of the 1969 Lusaka commitment which, despite all the ridicule it encountered, culminated in the political freedom of the countries of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe), the SADCC member countries have resolutely committed themselves to co-operate not only in the integration of their respective economies but in the uplifting of the living standards of their rural communities. This commitment first and foremost calls for the redefining of research strategies which should be articulated in harmony with SADCC member countries' developmental objectives.

At national level, research should form an integral part of national plans for economic and social development. Each country should endeavour to formulate a national research policy, and involve its institutions of higher learning in the evolution of national research policy and culture. Contemporaneously, each country should establish or rehabilitate a National Research Council whose functions must be clearly defined by law.

There cannot be any meaningful coordination of research activities at a regional level unless there are functional research machineries at national levels. At national level, research control and coordination would ensure that there is no duplication of efforts, wastage of time and money, or delay in the execution of national development programmes. At the present, the lack of research policies in most of the countries of the region is greatly retrogressive to the realisation of development objectives – particularly the evolution of meaningful indigenous research capacities and culture.

To synchronize SADCC's developmental objectives calls for the co-ordination of research activities at regional level. This would be ensured through the founding of a non-partisan regional body to which all SADCC member countries must be committed. If this body is sustained through the provision of the necessary input it would go a long way in fundamentally changing not only the economic and research, but the political scene of the region of Southern Africa,
in which the development of indigenous research capacities and culture have for a long time been clogged by imported technologies.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


Ecarbica, *ECARBICA Journal*, vol. 1 no. 2 (September 1973).


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Sir SERETSE KHAMa, Keynote Speech at Arusha, Tanzania, 3rd July 1979.


PART SIX

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Roma Declaration on Research for Development in Southern Africa

The first International Workshop on Research Priorities in Southern Africa was held at the Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho, from 23rd to the 27th November, 1981. The list of participants included scholars from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, India, and the United Kingdom, as well as representatives from the International Development Research Centre, African Bibliographic Center and Lesotho National Development Corporation.

The participants warmly received and highly appreciated the Welcome Address by His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II, Chancellor of the National University of Lesotho; as well as the Opening Address by Mr J. R. L. Kotsokeane, the Senior Permanent Secretary, Secretary to the Cabinet and Chairman of the University Council.

After the delivery of the Keynote Paper by the Director of the Institute of Southern African Studies, Dr. Sefali, papers and reports were presented by participants at the panel sessions of the workshop. The reports and discussions dealt with problems, priorities and directions of research as well as strategies for research coordination and cooperation in the region of Southern Africa for economic liberation and development.

The course of the discussions in the panel sessions demonstrated many common concerns on the part of the participants with respect to the current sociopolitical and economic situation in Southern Africa, and the need to promote locally based research to support implementation of the SADCC strategy of economic liberation and regional cooperation for development in Southern Africa.

The participants firmly supported the efforts of the nine SADCC member states of Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) to consolidate the gains of their political independence, to reduce their economic dependency on the Republic of South Africa and to promote regional cooperation among themselves within the framework of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). They called upon the international community to give maximum support to the SADCC member states of Southern Africa in their struggle for economic liberation and in resisting the destabilisation policies of their racist neighbour, the Republic of South Africa.

The participants discussed priority areas of research in both social and natural sciences in those critical areas that are closely related to the development efforts of the SADCC member states. Because of the disciplines repre-
sented by participants, discussions and detailed proposals centred on the social sciences. It was agreed that it was desirable to promote joint research across disciplines and also by teams from more than one country, perhaps initially involving groups from two countries with common interests, such as the joint Mozambique – Zimbabwe research projects already underway. It was also agreed to be highly desirable that all research institutes in the region exchange information and documentation.

The participants saw a major task of research in the region as being to provide a necessary base for the policy choices governments must make to promote development, and instruments for the SADCC strategy of reducing economic dependency on the Republic of South Africa and the promotion of regional cooperation among the SADCC member states.

Specifically, it was also recognised that there is an urgent need for continuing research on South Africa, to monitor and forecast developments in the Republic of South Africa as they affect the neighbouring states of the region. The participants agreed that among important areas for research are continued investigations in support of the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia, and of the true nature of such tactics by the apartheid regime as the “constellation of states” and Bantustanization.

The Workshop members agreed that within the framework of the overall liberation struggle it is vital to focus research on the obstacles which in the past undermined the effective role of women. This is essential to ensure that they make their full potential contribution to the transformation and development of the region. There is a need for continued and deeper analysis of the nature, character, and functions of the post-colonial state in the SADCC member countries, and of the possibilities for, and limits upon, the use of state power to achieve the SADCC and national objectives. Another important area is the investigation of the cultural and physical resources, aspirations and problems of local communities and individuals within SADCC member states. Many participants also laid great stress on the diverse needs in each country in the areas of education, cultural studies, the natural sciences, medicine and public health, veterinary and agricultural sciences, and technology.

Participants agreed that it would be desirable to formulate improved mechanisms to promote research cooperation and information exchange for the region as a whole. This would take time, but although the countries differ in their national interests, political and social systems, and other ways, they do all belong to SADCC and face many similar problems. Participants emphasised the need to improve and expand the exchange of documentation, research reports and information generally between the nine member states of SADCC, and the research institutes of the region especially.

Participants also agreed that every effort should be made by institutions in the region to promote national research manpower capability. This involves not only the recognition of the importance of research by academics, but also the involvement of students and others in the research process itself, and ensuring that both the process and results of research are integrated into both teaching and national development.
The participants noted that in their struggle for economic and technological independence, the SADCC member states would rely as far as possible on their own efforts. The general consensus was that the cardinal task of scientific research in the region of Southern Africa is to help build a sound and independent technological basis for the socioeconomic development of the SADCC member states within the framework of the SADCC strategy of regional cooperation for development.

It was also agreed that it should be emphasised both to governments of the region and international agencies that there already exists within the region considerable research capacity and experience. It is highly desirable that this local capacity and experience be utilised and strengthened by the consumers of consultancy services in government and international organisations. This can be done by turning first to local, national or regional research institutes for services required, rather than calling in expertise from outside the region. Also, governments should be pressed to use local consultants in equal cooperation with external consultants, where local capacity is inadequate. More generally, it was agreed that there is scope for greater cooperation between governments and local universities and research institutions, and that such cooperation should be encouraged.

The participants expressed great concern at the proliferation of those aid agreements for research projects which ignore and tend to undermine existing local research capacity. Such agreements not infrequently require employment of international consultants as project managers and research coordinators rather than using local personnel. The research institutions of the region, working together, should create a framework and self-reliant criteria for more effective evaluation and utilization of international agencies’ contributions to research.

The participants appreciated the need to establish or study the feasibility of establishing an institutional mechanism to promote research, documentation, and information exchange activities within the Southern African region. Towards this end, the establishment of a regional Continuation Committee was agreed upon as part of the necessary follow-up to the Workshop. The committee will interact with the individuals and institutions represented at the Workshop, the SADCC secretariat, SAUSSC, CODESRIA, AAU, PADIS, and other interested parties in order to eventually, establish a Southern Africa Development Research Association (SADRA). Such an organization would represent and promote the emerging development-oriented research, information, and documentation network in Southern Africa.

The participants called on the delegates from existing full-time research institutes to request their institutions to nominate with immediate effect one individual as its representative on the Continuation Committee, charged with formulating plans for further development of the proposed Association, and with submitting an agreed statement of immediate shared objectives to SADCC and other relevant parties. In the case of countries which did not send a delegate of this status to the Workshop, either one of the delegates from that country or a person invited from that country should seek to obtain a suitable nomination to represent the research community in that country.
Nominations should be sent to ISAS as Secretariat by 15 January 1982; ISAS should seek to convene an early meeting of the Continuation Committee to which the representatives would bring as much information and documentation as possible on all existing research facilities in their countries. A report of the work of this Continuation Committee should be made available at the SAUSCC meeting in Lusaka in July 1982.

Among other functions such a SADRA might undertake would be:

1. Promotion of documentation exchange in close liaison with PADIS. (In this connection, participants agreed that all the existing facilities for the regional collection and exchange of information in the region be closely linked to any new regional documentation services to be established).
2. Promotion of bilateral, multilateral, and comparative research projects in support of the SADCC objectives.
3. Sponsorship and organization of further regional research workshops, particularly on specific issues and areas of research, including research methodology.
4. Sponsorship and publication of:
   - edited volumes of research papers on the region
   - a journal of regional studies
   - a newsletter
5. Sponsorship and organization of workshops for the improvement and reorientation of curricula by the inclusion of locally generated research and documentation.
6. Facilitation of student and staff exchange between institutions.

The workshop demonstrated that the form of exchange of research experience that had taken place had been useful in promoting understanding and identification of common research tasks. The participants expressed the desire that regional workshops of this kind in Southern Africa should be continued in future.

The participants expressed deep appreciation to the Institute of Southern African Studies at the National University of Lesotho for taking the initiative in organising the first regional workshop on research priorities in Southern Africa, and to the sponsors, the IDRC, NUFFIC, LNDC, and NUL.

The participants and representatives of the research institutes represented agreed that this declaration be communicated to the Secretariat of SADCC and to the national governments of SADCC member states by ISAS on behalf of the Regional Continuation Committee.

Adopted at the plenary session at Roma, Lesotho, on 27 November 1981.
APPENDIX A

Opening Address

MR. J. R. L. KOTSOKOANE

Senior Permanent Secretary, Secretary to the Cabinet and Chairman of the University Council

Mr. Chairman,
Your Majesty,
Honourable Ministers,
Your Excellencies,
Colleagues and Distinguished Guests,

Allow me, first of all, to thank His Majesty for His warm welcome. I am sure we have all listened attentively and have been stimulated by His Majesty's speech.

According to the information supplied to me, the purpose of this workshop is to identify research priorities and to formulate strategies for coordination and cooperation in Southern Africa. As a student of science, and having observed research work in both industrialized and non-industrialized countries, I have a personal interest in the workshop, which, I feel, is long overdue. I am convinced that research, both applied and pure, should be developed to a high standard and that it should be orientated to the solution of problems. I do not, of course, underestimate the value of research for its own sake but, as a citizen of a non-industrialized country, I am concerned about the many problems that are crying out for solution. I also believe that research should be coordinated at both national and regional levels. Only by sharing our findings can we make our research efforts effective and fruitful.

In broad terms, ours is a difficult environment. The ecological spectrum ranges from poor to rich – from scarcity to abundance. Needless to say, the activities and productivity of people are affected by their environment. According to UNCTAD V (1979), three of the countries in our region are among the poorest in the world. The World Bank Atlas (1980) places all the countries in our region in the per capita income group of 700 U.S. dollars and less. About five of these countries are in the U.S. $300 – 700 range, while the rest are in the less than 300 U.S. dollars range. These figures compare unfavourably with those of industrialized countries which are in the 7000 U.S. dollars range and above.

Mr Chairman, Sir, I venture to say that we would be better off if we knew more above our environment; if we knew more about the sociology of poverty; if we knew more about the economics of poverty; if we knew more about the psychology of poverty. In short, if we knew more about the many constraints to
the development of our region, we would be in a better position to improve our condition.

Knowledge and information provided by research would enable us to understand why so many projects have failed and why, after two decades of independence our economies are not performing according to their potential.

I think this is an appropriate occasion to question some prevailing assumptions concerning some intellectual trends we have followed since achieving political independence. We have inherited intellectual positions and perspectives from our colonial masters which, in my view, are not always appropriate to our societies. Simultaneously, however, we should guard against what seem like intellectual double standards. We must reject the lowering of standards on the grounds that some universal theories and practices are more appropriate for industrialized countries than for the non-industrialized countries. This as we know, is the myth which underlies apartheid, namely, the exaggeration of socio-cultural differences for political reasons.

In economics, we seem to be inspired by old and discredited theories or by new and unproven ones. How else can we explain the weakness of our economies? In agriculture, one gets the impression that the advice we get is influenced by classical theories. Too much of the blame for low productivity is ascribed to the limited amount of available land for agriculture. This view, Mr. Chairman, contrasts with what is happening in technologically advanced countries. For example, the United States tills less land today than it did fifty years ago — yet her productivity has increased. The reason for the increased output is the application of new techniques to agriculture. On a given area of land, output can be increased through proper husbandry, advanced techniques and proper management. In education we still use inappropriate yardsticks to measure the academic performance of our children. In law, we seem reluctant to merge our traditional systems with those we inherited from our colonial masters, that is, to indigenize our legal systems.

In the spirit of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), we must reduce our abject economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa. The problems caused by this dependence are well known to all of us. They are cultural, social, political and, of course, economic. We should not allow this state of affairs to continue indefinitely and uncontrolled. We must find ways and means of redressing the balance, at least.

The North-South debate dramatises our problems even more. Recent World Bank figures suggest that the gap between North and South has increased over the past thirty years. Nearly one million people in the Southern Hemisphere are said to live in absolute poverty. Their average life expectancy is 56 years compared with 72 for the industrialized North. These problems are aggravated by the fact that the North is maintaining a steady trade surplus with the South, which is experiencing expanding debts, in addition to increasing energy bills.

The state of intra-African trade is unsatisfactory, to put it mildly. According to the 1977 U.N. Foreign Trade Statistics for Africa, intra-African trade constituted only six per cent of total African trade. North Africa contributed the
largest share of trade with the rest of the world, while the West African subregion accounted for most of the intra-African trade. To our embarrassment, our region accounted for most of the trade with South Africa. The need for remedial measures cannot be over-emphasized.

Recently our governments established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and negotiations for the establishment of a wider Preferential Trade Area (PTA) are well underway. In April 1980, the SADCC member countries adopted a declaration in Lusaka, whose essential thrust was socio-economic development within and among themselves. To this end, they stated their objectives as follows:

1. Reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa.
2. Forging of links to create genuine and equitable regional integration.
3. Mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies.
4. Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation.

The objectives of the PTA are to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity. Such cooperation and development will emphasize trade, industry, transport, customs, communications and agriculture.

Mr. Chairman, Sir, Distinguished Delegates, I have mentioned only a few of the many issues requiring the attention of your workshop. Above all, they are questions of economic liberation, without which our political independence is greatly compromised. Our respective Governments have initiated action aimed at creating an institutional framework conducive to rapid socio-economic development. They are asking for and expecting a substantial input from you the intellectuals.

*Ladies and Gentlemen, I declare this workshop well and truly open. Thank you.*
It is a great pleasure for me to give a closing note after such an intensive and stimulating experience this week. I am pleased to note that over 90 per cent of the countries of Southern Africa are represented here and have participated at this important move to streamline and put into perspective the development research ambitions of Southern Africa and to work out functional unity.

The participating team has realised the need to develop a practical and viable mechanism for coordinated research activities; methods of developing a platform to share research findings and to carry out team research projects in the region. The workshop has also examined ways of encouraging research by personnel in the region rather than depend on temporarily imported research services. I have no doubt that governments and other institutions, organisations and agencies in Southern Africa will find this workshop a very constructive and useful exercise.

It is high time that development policies in this region are based not on results from short term, pilot studies done on an ad hoc basis but on well-thought-out, in depth and systematic research efforts. Very often research activities have to be rushed and cut short as researchers hurry to supply policy makers with information on which to base decisions. Even big development projects always lack the backing of in depth research efforts. One hopes that workshops such as this one will help to strengthen research activities in Southern Africa, and ensure that research activities especially by our universities and other institutions of higher learning are of immediate relevance to the development needs of our countries.

It is indeed pleasing to note that the workshop did not look at research divorced from teaching and training. I observe that you explored effective ways of integrating development of research capacity with teaching. This is very encouraging because, in my view, it is one of the best ways to stimulate development of local research talents and capacity as we raise both the quantity and quality of output from our institutions of higher learning.

The ambition of the workshop to align research efforts with development needs, as well as examine, explore, adapt, and adopt ways to develop research skills simultaneously with teaching is a very plausible move.
It is important, however, to remind you, to stress and to appeal to you all, ladies and gentlemen, that development problems are never overcome at conferences and workshops. The success of this workshop therefore, does not depend on how well organised, well integrated and well attended it was. It does not even depend on the quality of the papers, the eloquence with which they were presented, or the quality of discussions. It does not even depend on the generosity of the sponsorship, or on excellent publication of proceedings, or on whatever short term experiences you may have had during this week. The real success of this valuable and well overdue exercise, lies in the extent to which each one of you will individually, institutionally, nationally and regionally apply the recommendations and suggestions made at this workshop. I am particularly keen to see recommendations on regional cooperation practically supported by people at individual, institutional and even national levels.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not know whether or not you have addressed or you will one day decide to address or extend your research activity to cover the most topical issue of peace and its opposite whatever its shape, longevity, and intensity.

One Afro-American soul musician cynically does not want peace but social justice and equal rights. But is peace not as much the cause as it is the result of social justice and equal rights? Can you in your research answer this question?

One of the beliefs of UNESCO is –

"Since wars begin in the minds of man, it is in the minds of man where the instruments of peace must be constructed”.

Can we paraphrase this by saying people go to war because there is no justice or equal rights? Do people go to war because history tells us that people went to war before our day and time? Or do people go to war because on the morning of the birth of Christ the Bible says an angelic choir sang: “and peace on earth to men of good will”, thereby supposing that men of other than good will go to war?

I know we need peace; lasting, stable and durable peace. Our forebears loved peace. But we also know many of them died in wars against peace. Even yesterday people died in wars against peace. Tomorrow people will die in wars against peace.

In your research, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, you may wish to answer some or all of the following questions:

(a) Why does war begin in the minds of man?
(b) Should people defend their peace against the enemy?
(c) Who is the enemy and who is the people – those who fight to defend peace or those who fight to destroy it?
(d) What is peace and whose is it?
(e) Can it equate to democracy – the luxury of the majority regardless of the minority?
(f) Is democracy itself not the negation of peace – if peace means social justice and equal rights.
Compartmentalised, isolated, and individualised efforts are always a drawback in our development efforts and this is a more serious problem in research, especially in our region of Southern Africa where we do not have an overabundance of specialist personnel, and where a broad spectrum of areas still need to be researched anew.

To end this short note let me congratulate the Institute of Southern African Studies and the National University of Lesotho for hosting this workshop. It has been a pleasure for Lesotho to host this workshop and we are looking forward to positive follow-up outcomes. We look to our new research Institute to continue this good work.

On behalf of ISAS, the National University of Lesotho, governments of Southern Africa represented here, and indeed on behalf of all, I wish to express our strongly felt appreciatiopn to the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), represented here by Drs. Smart and Langdon and Miss Desrosier, for their support and keen interest in the development efforts of Southern Africa as expressed by the generous financial support to this conference. The Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation (NUFFIC) through the Free University of Amsterdam, the Lesotho National Development Corporation and our local University have also contributed quite generously to the financial needs of this exercise.

The elegance with which this workshop has been run results from this joint effort by all these and other international and local organisations. I say “these and other organisations”, because other organisations such as the African Bibliographic Centre in the United States and some universities and institutions even outside the region of Southern Africa have enriched participation at this workshop by sending, at their expense, very keen, task-oriented and devoted representatives. In short, this is not the case of too many cooks spoiling the broth, but it is a case of a synergistic outcome of joint efforts.

I thank His Majesty, the King, as national leader as well as Chancellor, and His Government for taking keen interest in the activities of our only and young National University. Their participation at this workshop has been a real stimulant.

With these few comments, let me take this opportunity to congratulate you on such successful deliberations. I wish you pleasant trips to your respective places of residence and work to implement the valuable suggestions, recommendations, and resolutions which you made. Please do come again.

Ladies and Gentlemen I now declare this workshop officially closed!
### TABLE 1

**Basic indicators for SADCC countries and South Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>G.N.P.</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Adult Literacy</th>
<th>G.N.P. per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>Dollars</td>
<td>km²</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1970-79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3 036</td>
<td>1 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1 160</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2 550</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4 680</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2 800</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3 337</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC Total or average</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>18 900</td>
<td>4 884</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.S.A.</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>49 000</td>
<td>1 221</td>
<td>1 720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Growth Rate**

- Angola: 2.3%
- Botswana: 2.2%
- Lesotho: 1.3%
- Malawi: 2.8%
- Mozambique: 2.5%
- Swaziland: 2.6%
- Tanzania: 3.4%
- Zambia: 3.0%
- Zimbabwe: 3.3%

**Growth Rate 1960-1979**

- Angola: 2.3%
- Botswana: 2.2%
- Lesotho: 1.3%
- Malawi: 2.8%
- Mozambique: 2.5%
- Swaziland: 2.6%
- Tanzania: 3.4%
- Zambia: 3.0%
- Zimbabwe: 3.3%

**Growth Rate Life Expectancy at birth years, 1960-1979**

- Angola: 2.3%
- Botswana: 2.2%
- Lesotho: 1.3%
- Malawi: 2.8%
- Mozambique: 2.5%
- Swaziland: 2.6%
- Tanzania: 3.4%
- Zambia: 3.0%
- Zimbabwe: 3.3%

**Sources:**
- Note: for some countries, literacy rates are not for 1976 but a year close to it. .. means not available. Averages for SADCC are weighted by population.

### TABLE 2

**South Africa – Southern Africa Trade Links**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>Value of South African Exports to, million U.S.$</th>
<th>Value of South African Imports from, million U.S.$</th>
<th>% of total Imports coming from S. Africa</th>
<th>% of total Exports going to S. Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola, 1978</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana, 1980</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho, 1979</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi, 1978</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique, 1978</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland, 1980</td>
<td>about 515</td>
<td>about 33</td>
<td>“Most”</td>
<td>“about 10%”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia, 1978</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe, 1977</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Tanzania has no recorded trade with South Africa; some of the above data are likely to be underestimated.

**Sources:**
- IMF, *Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1980* (Washington, DC: 1980);
TABLE 3

Migrant Labour to South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1. Workers in South Africa June 1981</th>
<th>2. Approximate Domestic Wage-Labour employment, and year of data</th>
<th>3. 1 as % of 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>300 000 (1977)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>23 200</td>
<td>69 400 (1978)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>140 746</td>
<td>39 000 (1980)</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>32 319</td>
<td>353 700 (1978)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>56 424</td>
<td>455 000 (1977)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>10 377</td>
<td>71 256 (1978)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>372 500 (1977)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>19 853</td>
<td>989 000 (1979)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>287 230</td>
<td>2 650 000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Column 1 data originate from official South African sources and are probably underestimates. Some estimates in column 2 are, according to their sources, “very approximate”. The “total” entry of column 2 is simply the column total.

TABLE 4

Cargo flows through certain Ports

(1 000 tons and %; exports and imports combined, 1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>South African Ports</th>
<th>Mozambican Ports</th>
<th>Dar-es-Salaam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>275 (72%)</td>
<td>107 (28%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>800 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>745 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>510 (34%)</td>
<td>60 (4%)</td>
<td>950 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2 500 (75%)</td>
<td>830 (25%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 285 (48%)</td>
<td>2 542 (38%)</td>
<td>950 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These are rough estimates, and also omit Lesotho’s traffic, all of which goes through South African channels.
APPENDIX D


LIST OF ALL PAPERS PRESENTED AND AUTHORS:

2. “Opening Address”, Mr. J.R.L. Kotsokoane, Senior Permanent Secretary. 6 pp.
18. “Application of Social Accounting Methods to Development Planning in Swaziland”, Dr. M. S. Matsebula, Department of Economics, University College of Swaziland. 13 pp.
19. “Priorities and Opportunities for Research in Swaziland”, Alan R. Booth, Ohio University, USA, and University College of Swaziland. 14 pp.

32. "Research Information and Documentation Services Coordination in Southern Africa", Francis Inganji, NIR, University College of Botswana. 22 pp.


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The Institute of Southern African Studies

The Institute of Southern African Studies has been established to promote, plan and coordinate development-orientated and policy-related research in the “priority fields” of Southern African Studies. It is a research and teaching institute whose area of interest is the Southern African region – Lesotho, Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, Republic of South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This region is tied together by historic, cultural, political and economic forces which have far reaching implications for all who live in it. It is the aim of the Institute of Southern African Studies to unravel such forces and make them comprehensible to those decision makers who deal with the affairs of Southern Africa.

Activities of the Institute for Southern African Studies are primarily directed at those development and policy problems in Southern Africa of significance to decision makers. This includes not only long term research projects and teaching but also provision of short term consultancy and advice to government, parastatal organisations and the private sector as well as provision of specialised documentation and publication services.

The Institute has established links with academic departments of the National University and the Government of Lesotho, and it continues to forge links with other universities, governments, communities, institutes and scholars in the region as well as with interested organisations elsewhere with similar objectives. In fact, as a result of the November 1981 Workshop on Research Priorities in Southern African at which most universities and research institutes in the SADCC states were represented; and also because of the Institute’s participation in other workshops, conferences and seminars hosted by other institutions in the region, the NUL Institute of Southern African Studies has already gone a long way towards establishing links and working relationship with most of the universities and research institutions in the SADCC countries.

The Institute of Southern African Studies Five-Year Development Plan, 1981–86, approved by Senate and Council; and the National University of Lesotho Five Year Development Plan 1981–86, emphasise the commitment to both the research and teaching activities of the Institute. However, it is underlined that the best approach and timing for the implementation of an M. A. programme will be explored as soon as research programmes are well established.

The Institute is divided into two initial divisions, the Research Division and the Documentation and Publications Division. It is planned that both the documentation and publication services must became operational as quickly as possible as these are to play a very important supportive and resource role for all
the other Institute's activities including the research projects and programmes which have already been initiated.

The Institute became fully active during the 1981/82 academic year after the engagement of its first four senior staff members including the Director, two Senior Research Fellows, one of whom is the Documentalist, and the Academic Secretary. Work has already been started on the first of several projects planned to be undertaken under the Institute's umbrella in the coming years.