'DESTITUITION' AND ABSOLUTE POVERTY REDUCTION:
LIVELIHOODS, ENTITLEMENTS, TRAMPOLINES, SAFETY NETS

INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY

1. Destitution as posed in Botswana is a question of absolute poverty and of lack of livelihood opportunities. It tends to be posed in terms of isolated individuals although an household oriented approach might be more logical.

2. How many are destitute is not clear. The 41% of household (including isolated individuals) survey analysis asserts to have means below minimum food needs (excluding all other expenditure) is simply not correct. If it were Old Town Gaborone would be poorer than Maputo and rural Botswana as poor as rural Mozambique which is quite clearly (even to the naked eye) not the case. There are not 600,000 destitute - 300,000 might be more plausible (excluding present old age pension or destitution allowance payments who would otherwise be destitute.

3. That there are less destitute persons does not reduce the importance of the issue - it may make it less intractable. There is a need to act to reduce or alleviate absolute poverty/destitution now by entitlements (e.g. old age pension and by enlarging livelihood opportunities) and to alleviate it by trampolines (preserving ability to bounce back - e.g. drought relief) and safety nets (permanent inability to earn alleviation e.g. council named disabled persons). At the same time a reanalysis of the survey data, more intensive household consumption studies, identification of main categories of absolutely poor people and also of the 20,000 nominated for destitution payments payments by local councils are needed to follow through in subsequent stages of meeting needs/increasing opportunities.

4. Absolute poverty/destitution is basically too few able bodied hands to feed too many hungry mouths. There are multiple (sometimes overlapping) causes:
   a. old age
   b. physical or mental handicap
   c. orphanhood (young age)
d. natural disaster (e.g. drought)
e. economic disaster (e.g. multiple enterprise closures)
f. location inimical to access to livelihood
g. mismatch education/skills and viable livelihood opportunities
h. personal (e.g. drunkenness) and cultural (e.g. hunter-gatherer with inadequate access to land/water) handicaps

These differences as well as the colonial history of the term 'destitution' do suggest new terminology but more important new approaches may help understanding -tackling - mastering on an articulated, broad front basis.

5. Certain persons (or those heading households caring for them) should receive entitlements as of right - e.g. old age pensions and (aids) orphans allowances. The aged have earned the right to a decent retirement with some degree of independence and orphaned children have the right to have their chances for a full life sustained. Seriously disabled (physically or mentally) persons are arguably in a similar category. The concept of entitlements as a right for the old, the young who need new families and the disabled does accord with most historic African values/practices. Especially in urban areas, and with the HIV epidemic it is unlikely extended families can cope for all or even most of these persons.

6. Intermediate entitlement/allowance cases include drought and unemployment victims. These are trampoline cases: public prudence and human decency both point to support until the end of the drought/unemployment so the afflicted can bounce back into self sustaining livelihoods (employment/self employment).

There are other - probably smaller categories of individuals needing to be identified, (as groups or individuals) to receive allowances, whether temporarily (and if so how long) or indefinitely but that can be facilitated by meeting the needs of the largest groups of people first and by improving statistical analysis. For many of these smaller categories local government and civil society (e.g. women's group church) entities may be best placed to identify 'destitutes' and to administer support.
7. The two largest additional categories are those female headed and Basarwa households in absolute poverty/destitution. The total number in these households could total 300,000, but not all are in absolute poverty. Therefore a local government check system using simple tests (e.g. absence of waged job, access to land and animal power or regular remittances for women would be needed to identify the perhaps 35,000 household/150,000 persons who may be absolutely poor.

8. Basarwa so called 'Bushmen' but no human being ever voluntarily called himself a 'bushman') pose special problems. Facilitating improved hunger/gather, mixed small stock-garden-hunter/gatherer or other livelihoods all face historical, knowledge and specialised resource barriers. Further Basarwa culture (because elaborate, contextual, and small, hierarchical band oriented) is brittle so that disorientation leading to e.g. drunkenness, despair and laziness and (presumably) petty theft are higher than for other population groups.

These two examples help illustrate a problem of estimation (as opposed to implementation) by type of household - overlap. Aged persons who are female are household heads. female headed households include some Basarwa as well as handicapped person headed households. Careful - and potentially tedious reanalysis of basis survey data will be needed to secure an accurate re-estimation, the ones in the concluding section of this paper are highly approximate.

9. 'Undeserving poor' i.e. drunk, drugged, petty criminal, lazy anti social persons do exist in Botswana as in all countries) and many are destitute. Their existence and the perfectly reasonable negative reaction of most Botswanans (whatever their ethnic community and whether 'traditional' or 'modern') to them should not be allowed to hold up action in respect to entitlements/allowances for the - probably - 90% to 95% of the destitute who do not fall (have not placed themselves) in this category. Why so few of the 20,000 local council identified destitute allowance recipients become new - destitute needs analysis. Quiet sitting back content with the allowance (dependence syndrome) is not a plausible general explanation, even if it probably applies to some individuals. One reason may be that most are permanently handicapped; are women heads of households with no education; several children and no access to land, livestock
or remittances or - more generally - have no access to viable livelihoods their knowledge/skills enable them to perform. Drunken layabouts are rather unlikely to have been nominated in the first place so a social misfit/culture of dependency explanation does not seem *a priori* likely beyond - perhaps - 5% to 10% (i.e. 1,000 to 2,000) in modern towns and larger 'traditional' villages.

10. Certain procedural issues also deserve reflection:

a. is payment of allowances in kind desirable? When? Why? It is the opposite of Botswana old age pension and drought relief work procedures. (Since goods are saleable it seems unlikely to be very helpful in respect of Basarwa cultural collision/drink problems.)

b. is central means testing plausible for entitlements? In respect to old age pensions Botswana's answer is - rightly - no. Making the income taxable is simple, just and avoids administrative costs and complications. The same would apply to disability/handicapped allowances and to those for (aids) orphans. The existing large allowance programmes self-select/select out the non-poor. Drought relief work will presumably not be taken up except by quite poor households and local councils do not nominate non-poor as destitute.

c. for which categories should persons in receipt of benefits be checked for continued or ended) eligibility and how often? Should (aids) orphans allowance end at 15 or 18? (Theoretically 12 - allowing 6 years school, if begun at 6 and no repeating is an alternative but a 12 year old child on her/his own cannot found a sustainable/lifetime livelihood.)

11. Livelihood access enlargement issues are a large part of absolute poverty/destitution reduction. They are not treated in this memo because they are in practice a complex, strategic issue quite different in scope, approach from alleviating/reducing poverty by entitlements, allowances, safety nets and trampolines. Referral/information provision to employment/livelihood promotion officials by destitution/absolute poverty allowance officials/agencies is desirable.
12. 'Non deserving poor'/social problem/borderline criminal persons are not discussed further for two reasons:

a. they require very different expertise than either entitlement/allowance identification/monitoring or livelihood access enhancement

b. entitlement/allowance personnel, should not be 'informers' for the police (let alone refer all rejected applicants to them) because this will inevitably handicap them in work with those deserving/eligible for allowances/entitlement. (Referrals to livelihood programmes are not logically objectionable but - except perhaps for Basarwa wishing to return to rural communities - it is unlikely these people can benefit from them without advice - education - services related to their social problems/deficiencies.

DESTITUITION: WORDS, CONTEXTS, PRACTICES

13. 'Destitution' in Botswana is fairly clearly a British colonial concept (Southern Africa variant) which may or may not have a pre-European Tsetswana equivalent. For DC's it was seen to relate to isolated (fairly literally i.e. outside extended family support structures) individuals who were aged or disabled through no particular fault of their own and to vagabonds, layabouts, drunkards and 'Bushmen' (Basarwa). The first category were perceived as a contingent liability of the state if no relatives or analogue (e.g. church congregation's missionary society) could be found to support them and the others as relatively to very 'undeserving' poor. The policy response on a small scale (as funds were small) was small payments (in kind and/or cash) to help the individuals in the first group to survive. These were not entitlements but government 'grace and favour' transfers and bore less relation to need than to the goodwill and financial position of the DC. Clearly that is not a concept appropriate to Botswana today, nor one relating easily to historic concepts of extended family duties and afflicted member entitlements nor to evolution of that system into one involving extended family plus civil society plus state contributions. Therefore there may well be a case for a change in terminology ('afflicted'? 'unfortunate') but it is the Tsetswana terminology which is more important and which needs to be linked to some historic but
living concept which implies 'merit', 'right to support' and/or externally inflicted misfortune.

14. 'Destitution/Absolute Poverty - even excluding the provision of access to employment/self employment (livelihood) is not a one size fits all cases concept. A person who has lost a job at a closed textile mill, a Basarwa whose broken world/society has driven him (her) to drink, an aged person outside the pension/social security net and with few or no savings, a rural household hit by drought, a blind or feeble minded person, an (aids or other) orphan, the members of a female headed household with no waged job, livestock, remittances or trading business all are likely to be absolutely poor (indigent, destitute) but beyond that have little in common. Therefore any single approach or instrument is unlikely to be a sound way forward toward absolute poverty reduction.

Identifiable categories comprised of identifiable households/individuals can be defined and applied with entitlements or allowances tailored to the needs of members of that category. Cumulatively this can substantially reduce absolute poverty and create a relatively non-dependence based entitlement/allowance system. Further it can do so even before the true numbers of destitute persons or the main groups into which they cluster are clearly identified.

ENTITLEMENTS: AGED, DISABLED, ORPHANS

15. Three identifiable sets of individuals can - logically and in terms of Botswana historic values be perceived as entitled to social support. Traditionally this came from their extended families (with only isolated individuals or members of very poor families 'destitute') but increasingly - especially in urban areas which will soon (2005 odd) be over 50% of all Botswanans - that is no longer practicable nor acceptable to at least some younger (earning) household members.

16. The three clusters are:

a. aged - working life completed, right to decent retirement;
b. **seriously physically or mentally handicapped** - unable to work and with a human claim on society not to be forced to be sick, starving, naked. (Probably majority of 20,000 now registered/nominated by local councils)

c. **(aids) orphans** - defined as children under 15 (or alternative cut-off age) whose caring parent (parents) have died who have been or need to be taken into 'new families' (the Tsetswana term is the key one - 'adopted' *may* be an acceptable English analogue, 'fostered' probably is not). The right flows from society's duty to give each child/all children a chance to achieve a decent life, a right included in Convention on Rights of Child. Unlike 'a' and 'b' members these **individuals will over time become self reliant** livelihood earners (whereas over time 'a' and 'b' members will cease to draw payments on death since age and infirmity are unlikely to be reversible.

17. The appropriate **rate** of payment is **some percent of the minimum wage** - say 80% or $60 for categories a and b and $30/month for orphans because aged and disabled are likely to be heads of (small i.e. 1 or 2 dependents) households whereas orphans **by definition are not**. For aged and physically infirm it would be paid to the person eligible and for the mentally infirm and the orphans to the senior female in the caring household (the person in practice responsible for most of the care and of the expenditure).

18. The experience with the old age pension (category 'a') suggests:

   i) in practice **identification is practicable** via local government;

   ii) **payment in cash** does not cause demonstrable misuse of funds in any significant proportion of cases (with the alleged but not quantitatively verified case of Basarwa);

   iii) **means testing** - whatever the philosophical issues - is **unsound** because of administrative requirements, so long as the payment is low and is included in total household income for tax purposes.
iv) with payments below the minimum wage aged persons with financially viable relatives continue to receive family transfers - erosion of extended family support is not demonstrably speeded;

v) the case for looking at whether individual claimants have dependents (i.e. household versus individual issue) is real. Arguably a claimant of an entitlement should be able to seek additional for each beyond 2 but this should not be automatic;

vi) The existence of and the reasons for the entitlement should be publicised both to inform those entitled so they do come forward to claim and to secure public support by demonstrating these, payments are very much consistent with historic Botswana values).

19. The probable numbers of entitled persons ('destitute' entitled persons) are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Absolutely Poor</th>
<th>Absolutely Poor Dependents&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Total Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Aged</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Handicapped</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>35,000&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
1. Household members where household head handicapped and absolutely poor.
2. Number in (new/adoptive) households, which are absolutely poor.
3. All estimates + or - 20%. Significant overlap. True total households perhaps 75,000 and persons 170,000.

20. The orphans category is dominated by 'Aids Orphans' (50,000 plus by 2000). The increase in numbers - and the concentration of orphans within extended households - is such that the traditional 'new family' option needs help, especially when it is aged
grandparents who need to raise/care for the children. Here certain practical considerations apply:

i. the overwhelming majority or orphans with no financially viable 'new homes' are aids orphans, but the logical category is all orphans;

ii. the tests of eligibility should be:

   a. in 'new home' because caring parent died;
   
   b. no evidence of present/remitting parent. Searching for a shadowy father - let alone collecting from him - is administratively burdensome, probably financially loss making after costing staff time, denying children their future (or carers their adequacy of food - shelter - clothing) because someone else is delinquent.

ALLOWANCES: SAFETY NETS, SUPPLEMENTS, TRAMPOLINES

21. Beyond the three areas of entitlement a number of other contextual circumstances and/or group characteristics create a case for public finance to avert a needless destitution. These are somewhat - thought not in any extreme cartesian? sense- different from the entitlement cases:

   a. some either avert destitution or/and provide a route back out of it - i.e. temporary trampolines. The main rural case (existing) is the drought work for food programme. The main rural one is short term loss of employment benefits;

   b. in general there is a broader acceptance that all aged, severely handicapped and orphaned children should receive a payment as of right even if they are, after it, significantly above the destitution level with such payments subject to income tax claw back. There is no such general acceptance in respect of - e.g. - female headed households although there is probably wide acceptance destitute ones deserve assistance. The drought work for food programme is self means tested - those who would not be poor without it do not seek the work and in practice nobody objects if after the work the household is significantly above the destitution/absolute poverty line but still poor;
c. there is the probability that a lower share of the 'allowance eligible' than of the 'entitlement' groups are destitute;

d. as a result of 'c' some method beyond simple self presentation category (age-disability-orphan) check/registration is needed. This is reinforced by the fact that in these cases (unlike aged and handicapped) and potentially quickly - but at unpredictable times) - the individuals/households can earn their way out of destitution/absolute poverty and then cease to be allowance eligible.

22. The groups which need to be seen as requiring case by case examination of individuals/households for destitution/absolute poverty include:

a. **rural small agricultural sector households during droughts** (like old age pensions already achieved so will not be discussed further);

b. **urban persons loosing jobs** - 80% of minimum wage - say $60 - for 6 or 12 months - to the extent comparable social security scheme benefits are not available to them;

c. **female headed households** with 2 or more dependents, no formal sector job, nor access to large livestock, or nor substantial trading (or other business) and no regular remittance income;

d. **Basarwa households/individuals**;

e. **pregnant women, young children**, who are both severely underweight and failing to gain weight.

These groups overlap but - so long as it is clear only one allowance can be received - that is not a serious objection in principle nor barrier to operation. It does cloud pre-programme cost forecasting. Group 'e' is a safety net gap filling one in Botswana, but in Mozambique it is the primary urban absolute poverty reduction mechanism because data and administration are inadequate for other tests - except in part severely handicapped and aged.
23. **Female headed households** are not all destitute - especially if that is taken as meaning literally or virtually no income. But, if data in other African countries is a guide, a disproportionate share of those without formal sector jobs, small businesses or livestock are in absolute poverty because of the hand/mouths ratio interacting with low human (education) and financial/physical capital access. The same considerations apply in part to Basarwa but in that case the shaken and marginal nature of their culture and the difficulties of achieving a less jagged process of change and pattern of interaction with the dominant culture and economic patterns are generally crucial.

24. The failsafe (vulnerable persons at high risk/medically identified) **low weight/low weight gain** children and pregnant women category also poses the point that below the absolute poverty line is not the same as destitute if taken to imply no income and that size of household needs to be taken into account in determining allowance. Further these categories are ones from which working out of absolute poverty is more likely to be feasible and in which testing (subsequent weight) is feasible. The problem of 'non-deserving' poor also arises (as it does at least in popular image for Basarwa) in that a husband who drinks up the children's food and chews up the woman's clothes by using his wage on beer and biltong (or a woman who cannot manage a potentially adequate budget) are not the same as age, disability and parents' death of AIDS. But the view that the children and mothers should be saved from malnutrition/illness first and the drunkard or bad money manager disciplined or taught second is one likely to have wide public normative acceptance if made lucidly.

25. In each of these five categories **identification is perfectly feasible** given:

a. **publicity**, setting out eligible categories and 'qualifications' and to whom to apply (for work or allowance;

b. **guidelines** for local councils/development committees and health care personnel to use in determining eligibility for allowance (and for reporting on applications and decisions with rationales as well as entitled persons list);

c. addressing the **level of entitlement** issue with respect to household numbers and to (low but not nil) income in a way consistent with simplicity and cost control;
setting dates for review to determine further eligibility (or otherwise) and linkages/referrals to programmes design to expand (in number) and enhance (in income) livelihoods to facilitate trampoline (back to self sustaining livelihood) results.

The first two points are relatively clear in principle and, indeed, in practice. Guideline setting - in terms potentially eligible as well as officials and counsellors can understand - may be detailed and laborious (e.g. what is a substantial trading business and/or access to cattle/other large livestock?). But with care and common sense (the trading/livestock guidelines are keys to rough estimation of income/identification of low or less low income) it is well within Botswanan government capacity. Levels of entitlement and variations with household size as well as duration of benefit/re-evaluation are addressed in a subsequent setting.

FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS, MALNUTRITION AND ASSISTANCE

26. Not all female headed households exist in absolute poverty. In many SSA studies they do not have overall average incomes - especially adjusted to a per capita basis because female headed households are smaller than those with two parents. For example in Maputo female headed households have a bi modal distribution because those headed by teachers, nurses, middle level public servants, enterprise sector salary earners and stall proprietors have above average. But those headed by women with neither a formal sector job nor a substantial (relatively speaking) business undertaking are well below average and most are in absolute poverty (albeit not with nil or approximately nil incomes). This pattern is exacerbated by 'temporarily' or 'conditionally' female headed households with a known, regularly, remitting but physically absent male member which are nearly all above average income.

27. The basic hands/mouths ratio problem does apply to female headed households with dependents (children, aged, infirm relatives) unless the hands are particularly skilled (e.g. nurses, secretaries) or have access to finance/facilities (e.g. stall traders) i.e. human and physical/financial capital.
28. Therefore it is reasonable to set up an allowance payable to female headed households with dependents (other than those in themselves in receipt of an entitlement e.g. aged in Botswana now and, if orphans, handicapped become entitled, household members of those categories) who meet the following negative criteria:

a. no formal sector waged employment;

b. no significant enterprise/business;

c. no access to/ownership of large stock (basically cattle but perhaps in cropping areas also donkeys);

d. no regular substantial (over half the minimum wage per month or some similar rule of thumb) remittance or pension income.

These conditions are intelligible - if publicised - to women who are eligible under them and to committees - members - officials who need to check applications. A very few applicants will apparently meet all the criteria but will not in fact be absolutely poor. Presumably some means of rejection can be built into the guidelines. Even if 100 (a rather high estimate) not absolutely poor slip by out of - say - 20-25,000 approved that is a small price to pay for a significant reduction in absolute poverty. Direct income estimation (an multitudinous experience -including Household Surveys as well as attempted allowance schemes) will either fail to be even as accurate as guideline testing or disproportionately costly in respect to personnel time as well as finance.

29. This (female headed household) category logically has an analogue - male headed household with one earning adult plus dependents. In practice that appears to be an empty box. Men with children dependent on them in African culture and practice do restore a 'complete' household by marrying again (de facto and/or de jure). The female headed category is in practice often overlooked even when substantial and even by (male) officials who are neither loutish nor insensitive. In Maputo Council Executive members supposed women somehow could always earn (in an inversion of Marie Antoinette one literally said 'They can always bake cakes' to the ill concealed fury of a female colleague and the amazement of the inquiring consultant!) so that male
unemployed artisans who had no tools nor funds to buy them were a much more important category - a stance which was simply statistically implausible. The *setting and explaining* of the *criterion* should both *inform* and *sensitise* the *counsellors/officials* as to the nature of this particular aspect of the 'destitution'/absolute poverty challenge. As with rural public workers (regular and drought income loss offset), a firm Gaborone line that women are eligible must be given equal access and must be informed of these facts is likely to be adequate to offset inertia and oversite based on not looking rather than deep seated Chauvinism and/or tunnel visions on women's roles which *do* not appear to characterise Tsetswana society today to anything like the degree they do Zimbabwean official and historical/traditional cultures.

30. The *low weight/negligible weight gain* for *pregnant women and young children* category is a *failsafe* one. The harm *caused* by absolute poverty/destitution is in large measure to mothers/mothers-to-be and to young children. Below norm *weight* (in pregnancy or of children) combined with low or nil *weight growth* identify cases in which that harm is being inflicted. The data on which to act is - in Botswana both urban and rural - readily available from/via the health service. Therefore, there is a normative case for acting and a relatively simple means to know when to act on whose behalf. The numbers are likely to be of the order of 10,000 - under 5% of children in Botswana suffer from severe malnutrition and perhaps 10% of pregnant women are seriously underweight. A detailed means of defining low weight/lack of weight gain for this purpose and means of data recording/authority alerting is available from the Mozambique Ministry of Health and the urban food (in fact paid in cash and for general necessities albeit surveys suggest 75%-85% spent on food) supplement institution (GAPVV) which have operated primarily on these criteria with over 200,000 households served during 1990-1994. In Mozambique, this programme was first line, not failsafe, because the more complicated screening/identification possible in Botswana was perceived as unattainable and urban because war prevented the real universal access to maternal and child primary health care needed to achieve broad coverage and equitable resource use in rural areas.
31. In both of these systems the chance of regaining livelihood self sufficiency are real (so they are really for households not for persons) so that an annual or eighteen-month recheck/renewal (or otherwise) cycle may be prudent. If possible, this process should be used to learn why renewal was necessary, i.e. why livelihood had not improved. (The most common answer is likely to be that for an adult woman in rural Botswana with no education, no cattle or donkeys and no cash capital, earning enough to keep herself and two dependents out of absolute poverty is rarely possible. However, this needs to be checked against more formally surveyed actual experience.)

32. In the malnutrition case, there is need to check why:

a. Dependents who are entitled (e.g. aged, orphans, handicapped) but not claiming;

b. Female-headed and eligible to seek allowance but not doing so;

c. Other barrier to livelihood (what?)

d. Wasting (probably predominately drinking?) or poor budgeting of resources.

For 'a' and 'b', the evident cure is to sort the paperwork. For 'c' the results help build up knowledge of absolute poverty and perhaps how to overcome it. 'd' raises questions as it suggests someone is 'undeserving' but not the children and often not the mother. That may suggest pay first; try to educate or correct later. If other poor women can be hired - or churches and women's groups involved - to teach better resource management that will help at least to a degree and poses no ethical problems. Male (or female) drunkenness is harder to address. The problems are not unique to nor best addressed as a spin-off of allowances. Suffice it to say that penalising the already victimised children by denying allowances seems counterproductive and trying to lock up unsupporting, drink-dominated males rather unpromising as a general strategy.

BASARWA - CULTURE, LIVELIHOOD, DESTITUTION

33. It is quite probable that 25,000 to 40,000 Basarwa (5,000 to 8,000 households) are 'destitute'/absolutely poor and that most are not now in receipt of any state allowance. This is at root an economic/cultural problem. Without stronger/broader livelihoods for
their members, Basarwa communities are not viable, cannot adapt, tend to collapse. Individual Basarwa, without at least full primary education and also without the social frame/personal security frame of a working Basarwa community/band - e.g. in urban areas - are likely to become personally shattered and alienated, unable to cope, fallen into drunkenness - begging - petty theft and be generally highly unsympathetic (even if pitiable) as perceived by other communities and by officials.

34. The basic medium and long term approach needs to be rooted in livelihood redevelopment.

a  Revitalising hunter-gatherer elements of life and income where practicable (e.g. in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve provision of water - (only to households with a hunter-gatherer historic tradition) could help.

b  Introducing small stock and gardens (as well as base homesteads near water-school-health post) into Basarwa (or San) economic culture has some cases of success and deserves further support.

c  Probably a base village with hunting-gathering small stock, gardens can safely develop outreach in to the tourism (and other rural) sector, e.g. employment (not only as game trackers) and provision of inputs - whether crafts or food).

d  Once there are stronger Basarwa rural economic units, disoriented/dependent/destitute urban Basarwa could more plausibly be urged to return to and be reintegrated into rural life.

e  Developing user-friendly/Basarwa used complete primary (or comparable adult/vocational) education (presumably on the basis of consultation both with elders and educated younger Basarwa) is crucial to facilitating ability to access different livelihood patterns.

f  Paying allowances in kind is no cure for alcohol addiction which is itself usually (for Basarwa) a symptom or means of retreat from an incomprehensible and hostile world. Possibly consulting with Native American, Australian Aboriginal and New
Zealand Maori local bodies who have achieved some success in reducing alcohol addiction and its causes (by no means all have) would help develop approaches relevant to Botswana since there are broad similarities in pre-European conquest socio-economic patterns and in social fragmentation under European rule. Direct use of such personnel in Botswana beyond workshops may not be practicable both because of the extreme language barrier (with most Basarwa even if not with Botswana professionals and officials) and because many particular socio-economic aspects (e.g. a major role of fishing, use of houses, forest-related livelihoods) are quite different.

35. The needs of the Basarwa deserve holistic priority attention. However, because most are probably destitute (numbers and location need more detailed study) a standard allowance (say, 80% of minimum wage or $60 a month) should be recommended by local councils for all Basarwa households not seen to possess realistic livelihoods. That is an interim measure to bridge the gap until livelihood access development becomes more robust. This should not be a "Basarwa allowance" which would be damaging to their (already all too feeble) self respect and to their (already all too negative) public image. It should be a procedural guideline to local council officials to look at the economic position of certain groups likely to be destitute, including Basarwa and female headed households in which the head of the household had neither a waged job, access to livestock, regular remittance income nor a substantial trading business. The point is not to stigmatise nor to pamper either Basarwa or female heads of households but to recognise that they are in fact likely to be destitute in a high proportion of cases with little realistic chance of gaining an adequate livelihood.

PARALLEL AND COMPLEMENTARY STEPS

36. The first stage of radical reduction of absolute poverty in Botswana is to identify the main categories of afflicted persons/households and to provide income entitlements or allowances. That leaves three further sets of actions needed:

a  Providing access to assistance to these individuals who are absolutely poor or destitute but do not belong to one of the readily definable risk categories;
b Recognising that one aspect of destitution is frequently isolation from effective family and social group links - a needless inadequate means to consume may alleviate but will rarely solve;

c Relating employment/livelihood creation and/or enhancement programmes to the needs and capabilities of potentially economically active persons who are now absolutely poor (including applied adult education to enhance their skills/human capital).

37. A variety of exogenous and personal, economic and social catastrophes can plunge an individual or a household into absolute poverty. While it is probably that the "at-risk" categories canvassed above comprise 90% of the destitute/absolutely poor persons of Botswana, the other 10% are also people in need. Two complementary approaches are possible:

a Continued use of the district council/development committee recommendation mechanism. Individually caused cases of destitution should often be clear at a local level even if not readily sign-posted from Gaborone;

b Involvement (with skills training and in some cases finance) of civil society groups (especially churches, women's groups and, in urban areas, trade unions). These do have contacts with absolutely poor people - including members or ex-members - and in some cases potential capacity to assist them in social and in relationship and livelihood reconstruction which the state, even at local government level, usually lacks.

38. The civil society group role can be important in relation to AIDS (and other) orphans - as well as in respect of other aspects of HIV prevention by education and of hospice type care for terminally afflicted human beings. Orphanages are not optimal, large and impersonal ones still less so. While some expert staff are needed, 'para' staff whose basic asset is tender, loving care can be very valuable and are available voluntarily and at lower cost to civil society bodies. Thus, up to 25 to 75 children orphanages sponsored by churches or women's groups with supportive government finance and training would probably serve children's needs better and at lower cost than a lesser
The number of 250 person orphanages. Separate hospice facilities for HIV positive orphans - who will die within two years and may well not find new homes - may also be needed.

39. The 25 to 75 person residential - work experience - school and education providing unit sponsored and supported by a civil society body is almost certainly a sounder approach to the needs of street children (including the majority who have some contact with their families but cannot be supported by them). In Maputo, at least two such centres (one Anglican, one Catholic) exist. They have been relatively successful in rebuilding family links for some residents and in providing day facilities (teaching, two meals, clothing) for children from very poor households who would, in their absence probably have become street children.

40. The previous examples indicate a special strength of civil society bodies - reducing isolation. They - unlike the state - can provide human links restoring the isolated individual to social belongingness. Because destitution/absolute poverty is usually social as well as economic, that is a need complementary to the need for capacity to buy basic consumption needs.

41. There are several things Botswana could do to support a broader civil society outreach:

a. Indicate its position that such efforts/activities are important;

b. Assist in setting up/financing "para professional" training programmes for counsellors and child carers;

c. Complement civil society institutions internal and own fund raising resources. The Mozambique policy is in principle to do this, but, in fact, because of budget constraints own resources and - especially - external fund raising have been virtually the sole sources to date. This pattern of finance creates excessive vulnerability to donor 'fatigue' or style shifts and, given Botswana's less precarious fiscal position, is avoidable. For example, teachers at street children or AIDS orphan homes and a portion of food costs could be provided. (Indeed in respect of orphans any entitlement adopted for the child payable to the carer would logically go to the
church and women's group sponsoring the home.) Similarly, if hospices for terminally ill AIDS victims with no family able to care for them are sponsored by civil society groups they should receive grants - if only because keeping these persons in hospitals is far more expensive and disruptive of curative work.

42. Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that the basic means to ending absolute poverty is enhancing decent livelihoods. Entitlements and allowances - especially the latter - are an acknowledgement that not everyone can achieve a sustaining livelihood and that it will take time to increase the number of productive enough and fairly enough remunerated livelihoods in Botswana to make full use of the trampoline (bounce back to being self sustaining) impact of interim allowances.

43. While an overall livelihood strategy cannot - and should not - be part of an allowances/entitlements strategic approach, there is one key interaction. The entitlements/allowances registration/distribution process and related research should help show:

a Main groupings of absolutely poor/destitute persons;

b At least in most cases the causes of descent into destitution;

c The skills and time for income generation available to absolutely poor persons/households;

d The barriers to utilising 'c' to regain economic self sufficiency.

44. That body of data can help identify what types of livelihood can be relevant to present absolutely poor people and what types of adult/vocational training could assist them in making a transition to economic self sufficiency.

HOW MANY? WHO? WHY?

45. Botswana has been among the leaders in household income - and poverty - mapping particularly in respect of rural households. Its 1972 Rural Household Income Survey was a pioneering effort and its demonstration of 42% of households in absolute
poverty as well as a very uneven income distribution had a seminal effect of research on and understanding of African rural poverty. Subsequent surveys have lengthened and broadened (to urban) the coverage.

46. **The present problem is that the reported level of destitution/absolute poverty is too high to be credible.** Further, the early 1970s and 1990s successive surveys show no significant decline (indeed probably an increase in destitution narrowly defined) which is an implausible trend especially as per household real income is estimated as having increased 10% in real terms at all levels (with no real change in inequality of distribution) which should have reduced absolute poverty/distribution.

47. The latest survey estimates **destitution** - defined as household income less than nutritionally adequate low cost diet - affects 41% of all Botswana, i.e. over 600,000 persons and about 125,000 households with fairly narrow differences between the urban 40% and rural 60%.

48. This estimate **cannot be accurate**:

   a. It implies of the order of **50% absolute poverty** versus late 1990 **30% to 35% in Tanzania** and **35% to 45% in Mozambique** (higher %'s presented elsewhere are on the $1 per day per person World Bank 'one size fits all' poverty, **not** an absolute poverty or destitution, definition) which appears unlikely in relation to overall GDP data and to physical observation of poor urban and rural areas in the three countries. The Old Town in Gaborone is **not** dominated by destitute persons and, in general, Botswana urban - small town - rural observations simply do not suggest deeper, wider, more generalised poverty than in Tanzania, let alone Mozambique;

   b. It also implies that the **sharp increase** in employment (one household in ten with a wage earner to one in three) in construction, in commerce, and in draught relief (work for food in particular) has led to **only 0.4% a year growth in real household income** and to a **growth in the % as well as numbers of absolutely poor** (who are, on that basis, at least 30% in Gaborone - but remarkably invisible);

   c. **Which is absurd.**
49. The data therefore hamper/endanger both national dialogue and action:

a They lead to a clamour (largely by non-poor opposition politicians and by non-poor domestic and external academics) that Botswana is dominated by deepening absolute poverty 'proving' the state is the tool of external exploiters (e.g. de Beers) and domestic funded cattle barons who have no sympathy with poor Botswana. This is both objectively untrue and psychologically disabling of rational discourse.

b To suppose 600,000 persons are destitute in 'normal' years while perhaps 150,000 draw or directly benefit from destitution or age payments implies 450,000 are in dire need. That suggests fiscal impossibility as a barrier to any substantial programme which is not the case if - say - the correct figure is - say - 300,000 of whom at least 100,000 are now catered for by pension entitlement and existing destitution allowances (including dependents of recipients).

50. The result is to deter step by step pragmatic tackling of particular identifiable clusters of absolutely poor people. That - as proposed above and summarised below - is both practicable, fiscally possible and likely to reduce destitution substantially. A parallel exercise should be launched to re-analyse and broaden the survey data to achieve a more realistic estimate of persons in absolute poverty. That may be 20% to 25% i.e. 300,000 pre state transfers and 150,000-175,000 post old age pensions and district identified 'destitutes' (probably largely handicapped and/or female headed households). The pre-transfer total should be substantially higher in drought years. However, with the education and health programme channeled resources and the guaranteed drought work for food programme post transfer, absolute poverty should not be substantially higher because for very poor households the drought impact is largely offset. Indeed arguably for poor rural households with no livestock drought benefits if two adult members take up emergency work may well be higher than lost crop production for household use and sale.

51. What - in the context of serious surveys and statistical exercises - can explain a potential 100% overestimation of destitute persons?
a Household income data are notoriously underestimated in surveys (globally not just in Botswana or SSA). For very poor households consumption is frequently 25% to 33% above income which implies regular increases in net debt (often larger in total than domestic bank lending) and negligible interest paid which is incredible. Apparently, estimating and remembering multiple small income items is not a skill most households possess to a high degree even if monthly reports are secured. In a one- or two-month survey additional seasonal problems arise. In addition, some incomes (prostitution, petty theft, even 'unlicensed' trading or service provision) are not reported because the statistical survey personnel are seen as linked to the state and thus to tax, licensing and police officers;

b Household produced and consumed items (so called subsistence) are a large proportion of rural household income/expenditure - food, food processing, housing. If these are valued as income at farmgate prices (food) and labour time (housing), while on the expenditure needed side they are budgeted at urban retail/rental, the results are wrong. A kilo of maize meal pounded on farm is worth as much in absolute poverty terms as a kilo of maize meal at urban retail. But if the 'income' is valued at farmgate maize kernel price and the 'needed spending' at urban retail maize meal, a discrepancy of from 3 to 5 to 1 is likely;

c The estimated poverty (efficiency) and absolute poverty (survival) budget requirements need to be checked to ensure they are not mispriced (beyond "b" above) or too inclusive. Well intended middle income statisticians (globally not just in SSA, much less only in Botswana) do tend to estimate by thinking what modest sufficiency and survival mean to them, which may not be consistent with poor people's perceptions;

d There may have been an inclusiveness creep in the "needed" budgets over time explaining the apparent (statistically but not visually absolute) increase in numbers in absolute poverty;

e Transfers (private or state) may be seriously under-recorded;
f Household consumption data need to be used to check how many households are in absolute poverty on the basis of consuming too little, in practice a more reliable approach than one based primarily on surveys of reported income.

52. A serious restudy may take 18-24 months. A crash study is not needed before action because key absolute poverty groups - notably disabled and orphans - can be identified and covered now. To seek to compress the study may well weaken results and will weaken their credibility (if not quite to the degree of one of Botswana's neighbours whose airline announced a "crash" - sic! - course in maintenance personnel training!).

53. In the long run, knowing how many in which clusters are absolutely poor should help refine policy. This is especially so if - as seems certain - they show less (but still all too many) absolutely poor people, thus making a sustained cluster by cluster approach more administratively and fiscally practicable. Unfortunately, these critics with a vested interest (political or intellectual) in the present high levels will attack any results showing less absolute poverty, and many others will initially be sceptical of an apparent "stroke of the pen" 50% reduction in absolute poverty.

SOME PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS AND PAYMENT POSSIBILITIES

54. The simplest and least administratively cumbersome means of setting absolute poverty reduction/avoidance entitlements and allowances is as a proportion of the minimum wage. The alternative of annual computation of the 1-3 person household absolute poverty line budget is much more complicated, and probably also much more contentious.

55. However, minimum wage use assumes that the minimum wage is in fact at or above 75% of the absolute poverty line for a household of 4-6. (The normal household of 5 or 6 will have at least one economically active/earning member other than the wage earner; thus at the 75% minimum wage level it will be over the APL.) An APL Household Budget for Botswana is likely to be in the range of $90-$100. (Maputo's is about $80-85 and both Maputo and Botswana's consumer manufacturer's basket is dominated by South African goods with Botswana's duty free and Maputo's largely
customs-avoiding.) In that case, a **minimum wage of $75/month** would meet the test. **80% would be $60 a month for an independent person/household head and $30 for an orphan** (or a mentally handicapped person who, in practice, was cared for as a child).

56. If Botswana has no actual APL Household Budget for a household of 5 or 6, then one needs to be calculated (basically nutritionally adequate and socially/culturally plausible food plus 50% for housing, fuel, clothing, soap, water, medical and education fees). Preferably one for an isolated individual and a household of 3 should be calculated as well. If there is a budget, but well outside the $90-100 range, then examination of what is included and recalculation is needed since while $90-$100 may be significantly too low or too high, this is less likely than not and a $125-$150 estimate is probably a poverty line (South African "efficiency line") **not** an APL household budget. A World Bank $1 per person per day (adjusted purchasing power) poverty estimate would be of the order of $125 plus per month for a household of 6 but for SSA adjusted purchasing power data are highly suspect (e.g. Mozambique three times Tanzania and comparable to Ghana, which is absurd).

57. Assuming a **minimum wage of about $75** then:

a 80% for aged and handicapped entitlements would produce **$60 a month for aged, disabled** as individuals who are independent or as heads of households;

b Because an additional child does not cost as much to sustain as a household, **$30 a month might be appropriate for orphans** (with payments to a single household not exceeding $90 i.e. 3 orphans) and perhaps for mentally handicapped who need to be cared for analogously to children;

c For the **entitlement categories**, problems arise both because the households in question usually do have some income and because household size varies widely. That suggests that for each category (female headed household with constrained livelihood access; Basarwa household with similar access constraints; household of pregnant woman or child below weight norm and not gaining weight) alternative recommendations can be made:
i. $60 (low household actual income and/or household of 4 or more);

ii. $30 (household income below APL but less radical evidence of near destitution and/or household size of 2 or 3)

d. A few entitled households will be 4 or more (most are likely to be 3 or less or to have - e.g. aged - two entitled persons). In these cases, they should be eligible to apply to district council/committee to approve $30 a month additional

e. This system is simple - arguably crude. It is based on the fact that estimation of small bits and pieces of income (especially if much is for household use - so-called "subsistence" - or for local trading) is exceedingly difficult and cannot be done by local government. Nor can their ability - with guidelines - to identify absolutely poor households usually be matched by equal expertise in estimating depth (how far below APL). However, a full or half option should be intelligible, and possibly to apply and administratively manageable. No safety net or social security system which only specialist intellectuals and administrators can understand can in practice be equitable or politically sustainable however logical its internal social, economic and ethical analysis. But nor can one which simply hands out allowance with no real tests as to either adequacy or eligibility.

58. If it is argued that school-book-uniform costs for orphans aged 6-15 or medicine charges for handicapped persons make the figures set out too low, an approach other than more complicated allowance structures could be tried e.g.:

i. Any allowance or entitlement holder to be able to apply to medical service point for a card which after first $10/month provides free medicine at public sector dispensary or hospital;

ii. Any entitled orphan to be eligible to apply to head teacher for waiver of fees (if any) and free provision (or cash to provide) required uniform and books

Because primary health and education are near universal these are not approaches likely to exclude. They focus on socially and/or physically necessary expenditure.
items that can vary sharply among households and place the duty of offsetting them on the point of service units of Health and Education who do have the ability to identify poor users and to administer cost waivers. That a few poor but not absolutely poor persons/households will slip through is a cost but probably a low one absolutely and certainly relative to denying effective primary school access to poor orphans or basic drugs to absolutely poor regular users of prescription drugs (e.g. diabetics).

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

59. The first step toward a coherent strategy for step-by-step tackling of absolute poverty alleviation and reduction is to identify the groups in which absolutely poor people are concentrated, and to estimate a net total eliminating double (e.g. aged/handicapped) to quadruplet (e.g. dependent, AIDS orphans in female headed, Basarwa household) counting. Set out in Table A, this gives an approximate net total of 300,000 entitled/eligible persons.

60. 125,000 - 150,000 of these persons are now covered through aged and district identified payments. The non-covered are of the order of 150,000 - 175,000.

61. To finance a poverty alleviation/reduction programme as set out above would cost approximately $120,000,000 a year. This is based on $60 a month for independent entitled and eligible individuals and $30 a month for orphans, dependent mentally handicapped and underweight/no weight gain pregnant women and children. No person may double claim (e.g. aged and handicapped is a $60 entitlement, not $120) and a household ceiling of perhaps $150 a month (two aged adults and one or more AIDS orphans) might be prudent to avoid both fraud and the appearance of 'over-generosity'.

62. Present entitled (aged) and eligible (district) recipients total about 80,000 and $7,500,000 a year. (Includes non-destitute but excludes dependents.)
Table A: Absolutely Poor\textsuperscript{1} Botswanans: A Reestimate
(Non-Drought Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entitled</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Head of Household\textsuperscript{2}</td>
<td>Other Payee</td>
<td>Dependents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicapped</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphans</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted for Overlap\textsuperscript{1} (125,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligible</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female Headed Households</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>112,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basarwa Households</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Failsafe</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Disemployed\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malnourished Children/Pregnant Women</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gross (overlapped) Total 143,000 47,500 369,500 560,000\textsuperscript{6}

Adjusted for Overlap\textsuperscript{7,8,9} 95,000 5,000 200,000 300,000

Notes:

1. Absolutely poor members of category only. Absolute poverty is unequal to colloquial meaning of destitution of zero or non zero income.
2. Includes present recipients who would be absolutely poor without old age pension or district determined 'destitution' payment.
3. Aged/handicapped and orphans in fact in absolutely poor, aged or handicapped headed households double counting stripped out.
4. Rough guesstimate.
5. Retrenched wage earners.
6. The approximation to the Income Survey 615,000 destitute is coincidental as its estimates are on a different basis and do not overlap.
7. See note 3. Further overlap among Female Headed and Basarwa Households and among entitled and eligible categories. The malnutrition Failsafe is likely to be largely overlap – it is a programme category.
8. Excludes drought impacted households (non drought year) for whom basically satisfactory temporary (drought period) income/consumption support strategy is in operation.
9. Rough estimate. Probably within + or − 10% range.
63. To these payments should be added $12,000,000 to cover subventions to civil society groups (e.g. for street children's homes, AIDS village hospices) and also 5% administrative costs. The last is relatively low but the programme as suggested has simple categories, identification mechanisms and (assuming cash via either Post Office or District Council office/sub office on presentation of eligibility/entitlement card) payments system.

The Civil Society group support programmes - unlike the straight individual/household transfers - should be handled via Health-Social Welfare-Community Development structures. More complex interaction and cooperation in programme context will be needed, e.g. small hospices in villages are more human places to die than large urban hospitals and can limit the misallocation of beds intended for treatment to patients for whom the only attainable good is a relatively pain-free death with some dignity. To achieve that, church and village group coordination (as well as financial support by Health) is needed at district and regional (sub-national) and national levels. In this case, the subvention will in fact be cost-saving - additional ministry hospital beds would cost more cash, and allowing AIDS afflicted to engross two-thirds of present (non-expanded) hospital beds would wreck the overall secondary and tertiary medical service delivery strategy and practice.

64. Whether $112,000,000 ($54,000,000 additional) a year, assuming 80% effective coverage, is a reasonable total to allocate to radical reduction of the number of persons existing under absolute poverty is partly a normative/ethical question but also partly macro-economic and partly fiscal. Normatively to spend 3% to 5% of GDP in the basic absolute poverty reduction programme in non-crisis years would appear reasonable in a medium income country. The overall total in Table B is of the order of 4% (2½ additional) of Botswana's GDP. The drought works, food and health services special programmes are not included. Adding them would give a crisis year total of 6% to 8%, still not on the face of it unreasonably high. It is likely to be a share of total (in this case territorial) income quite consistent with (or less than) what was/is seen as a social obligation on extended families in support of their unfortunate members.
Table B: Entitled/Eligible Programme Cost
(including Non-Absolutely Poor Entitled)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Head of Household (persons)</th>
<th>Other Payee</th>
<th>Annual Cost ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entitled</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged plus Handicapped at $60/month&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>79,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphans at $30/month</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>18,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>97,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Eligible**             |                             |             |                 |
| Female Headed/Basarwa Households<sup>2</sup> | 12,500 | - | 9,000,000 |
| At $60/month              | 12,500 | - | 9,000,000 |
| At $30/month              | 7,500<sup>3</sup> | - | 2,700,000 |

| **Failsafe**             |                             |             |                 |
| Urban Disemployed At $60/month | 10,000 | - | 7,200,000 |
| Malnourished Children/Pregnant Women At $30/month | - | 12,500 | 4,500,000 |
| Sub Total                | 30,000                      | 12,500      | 23,400,000      |

**Subventions to NEO/Civil Society Programmes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospices, Street Children Homes, Community Care, etc.</th>
<th>12,000,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme Total</td>
<td>132,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration (5%)</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>139,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less 20% Non Take Up&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>28,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**BUDGET BILL**                                         | $111,600,000|

**Memorandum Item**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ongoing Programmes at same monthly rates</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aged (60,000)</td>
<td>43,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Identified (20,000)</td>
<td>14,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Budget Bill</td>
<td>$57,600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**ADDED BUDGET BURDEN**                                 | $54,000,000|

Notes:
1. Includes non absolutely poor, but strips out aged/handicapped overlap.
2. Excludes Overlap.
3. Households identified as below absolute poverty line but with not significant pre state benefit resource inflows to support consumption.
4. In practice 20% of entitled/eligible will be missed/fail to claim. That is probably a conservative estimate for first 3 to 5 years of programme.
65. The **short term macro economic implications are relatively neutral.** The payments would be used almost entirely for basic consumption of poor households. They would be a shift from public sector savings (e.g. external resource augmentation) to consumption. Because of the high marginal propensity to import (especially with respect to food) the balance of payments effect would be substantial and negative. The multiplier effect in respect to additional production of goods and services (primarily commerce and transport) might cumulate to 50% of initial payments. Given the marginal nature of the shift and the present strength of the Botswana economy, the savings to consumption and the external balances shifts are manageable. To the extent parallel programmes over time enhanced - e.g. Basarwa, female headed household, urban unemployed - access to livelihoods, the programmes considered here would have a trampoline effect by pressuring/enhancing ability to benefit from earning opportunities, reducing net costs and increasing the positive multiplier impact.

66. The **medium to long term macroeconomic impact would be strongly positive** even though hard to quantify. This relates to the impact on children - both orphans and dependents in entitled or eligible person headed households who are at least half of all absolutely poor persons. Over the next two decades, perhaps 20% to 25% of Botswana's children will be orphans and another 20% to 25% (who are not orphans) brought up in female headed and/or handicapped, aged person, or Basarwa households. If they are to be well-fed, educated and with effective access to health services, it is essential that **they and their families do not exist in absolute poverty** but are enabled to live above the absolute poverty line. (The well-fed, well-educated, healthy, well-adjusted child in an otherwise destitute household which some 'child only' 'targeting' seems to posit is a mythical unreality, not a workable goal.) **If 40% to 50% of Botswana's children were to be brought up in absolute poverty, the impact in 2005 and subsequent labour force quality/productivity would be catastrophic.** (Until HIV infection can be reduced significantly and sustainably from the 40% to 50% of 15-50 year old adults at which it is likely to plateau, **new entries to the labour force will be constrained and the working hands to mouths to feed ratio** worsened which makes productivity of workers even more crucial.) The ill-educated, ill-fed, ill young persons will not be able to work long, hard or effectively. Assuming no more mineral
bonanzas, success or failure in reducing child absolute poverty is likely to make the difference between 1% to 2½% and 4% to 6% sustainable growth rates. The former as a trend means economic stagnation - human immiserisation - political and social destabilisation; the latter is consistent with macro economic as well as human development. This is the bottom line macro economic case for strategic attention to absolute poverty reduction.

67. The fiscal challenge of absolute poverty reduction will be significant but not impossible. The cost of the measures proposed (Table B) is $112,500,000 of which $57,500,000 is in respect to the aged and district identified ‘destitute’ entitlements/eligibilities now existing. That is about $75 per person and $35 per person additional for the proposed expanded programme.

68. The figures set out are gross. In the short term, additional tax revenue (especially in multiplier incomes in commerce, transport production and on imports) might claw back 15% to 20% leaving 80% to 85% net. In the medium and long term, the macro economic cost of not preserving and enhancing labour productivity means that ‘saving’ the expenditure could well cost revenue loss growing at up to $20 to $25 million a year (say, $100 million a year cumulative by 2005 and $225 to $250 million a year by 2010 at 1999 prices). In that sense, the case is that the expenditure is - in broad terms, not specific details - spending Botswana cannot afford not to make.

69. In fact, Botswana has less stringent challenges to raise expenditure on other heads than at the end of the 1970s or 1980s. In the former case, basic human services and physical infrastructure were the central challenge. Coverage is now near universal. At the end of the 1980s, security spending had to grow exponentially to deter the ‘implementation’ of the apartheid state’s ‘forward policy’ to Botswana. Now Southern Africa is a much safer neighbourhood (except for Angola and on the Central African frontier), expenditure growth can be focused on absolute poverty reduction.

70. The probably trajectory for state infrastructure investment is also one likely to reduce fiscal stress. The main continuing needs for qualitative jumps in fixed investment are communications (especially telecoms/infotech) and energy. With foundations now laid,
both should be attractive to private investment. With the end to apartheid and SADC succeeding SADCC, both should provide scale and coordination cost reduction potential because the main demand in Botswana is very close to South Africa's PWV triangle economic heart.

71. Therefore:

a. Absolute poverty reduction - on normative and human grounds - offers a new strategic development focus following on from those of the independence era which are largely achieved (more fully and faster than anybody envisaged 30 years ago) leaving a sense of drift;

b. To avoid a serious erosion of labour productivity and macro economic stagnation (triggered by HIV and AIDS orphans), absolute poverty among children (and therefore their households) must be reduced;

c. Two main categories - entitled and eligible - can be identified for state payments. The entitled are aged, handicapped, orphans. The first are already paid a modest income; the second probably include the majority of the 20,000 district identified 'destitute' payments; the necessity of meeting AIDS orphans' needs is already squarely on the agenda. Complete aged-handicapped-orphans programmes (at $60 per month for independent adults $30 a month for orphans) can and should be implemented in 2000;

d. 'Eligible' households probably cluster among female headed with severe livelihood access constraints and among Basarwa households. In these cases parallel livelihood access programmes can reduce the numbers needing transfers over the medium term but not do much in the short, so similar $60 per month payments for households meeting simple, verifiable criteria should be instituted (via the present district level system) over 2000-2002;

e. Two 'failsafe' mechanisms - for low weight/low weight gain pregnant women and children and probably urban disemployed (retrenched or "redeployed" as the World Bank disingenuously puts it) - should also be instituted over 2000-2001;
f. **NGOs/civil society** (notably religious, women's, community groups) should be assisted in providing humane **poverty alleviation/dignified death assistance** services (e.g. "street children's" homes/schools and village hospices) over 2000-2002;

g. The **statistical** base on poverty needs **re-examination** as it tends both to overestimate and not to provide adequate data by types of household readily identifiable for service provision. This should be **parallel with (not prior to) initial operational programming**;

h. **Somewhat more detail** on these proposals and how to implement them are contained in previous sections;

i. The overall proposals are **strategic - attainable** (as were those of the late 1960's through 1980's for near universal access to primary health, education, water, roads and drought relief) **if and only if they are a central overriding political and fiscal priority**. The human, social, ethical and economic cases for such a strategic choice are strong and consistent with previous Botswana/Tsetswana state and society priorities, programmes and implicit normative frames. Not incidentally they could – **together with access to productive livelihood enhancement** - provide a **strategic national focus** to follow on from the late 1960's-1990 access to basic services, roads and drought impact alleviation focal themes and thus renew a sense of national focus which has faltered since 1994. Because the main goals of the old focus (including an end to apartheid/national-regional security) have been achieved and mopping up secondary gaps is not, by itself, strategically emotionally (or socio-economically) enough a new strategic headline would be useful.

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Falmer, Brighton
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SADC AND THE CRISIS OF CENTRAL AFRICA

1. SADC is inextricably involved in the Central African crises:

a. the survival of one Member State - Angola - is put at risk by intervenors collaborating with UNITA and, therefore, such collusion automatically brings Angola into the war (in Democratic Congo and Congo B alike);

b. the costs both of keeping troops on the border and in forward positions to prevent spill-over and of refugees are very serious for another Member State - Tanzania;

c. in an attempt to stabilise and to exert influence over the government of President Kabila, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was admitted to SADC: therefore what happens there is a SADC concern (unless, rather implausibly, it expels DRC which would be an admission of failure with serious implications in itself);

d. the real threat of genocide from Rwanda to then Zaire to Congo (B) and CAR as well as Burundi is a threat to every state in the vicinity and an affront to the principles and the reputation of SADC and of every decent African state.

2. SADC has not - or so it appears - had a coherent DRC strategy and - as a fairly inevitable result - has not been effective in mediating, rebuilding or mastering conflict to meet the needs of Angola, Tanzania or DRC:

a. the combination of de facto support for expelling Mobutu and IH from Zaire by some SADC Member States with mediation (in fact negotiating Mobutu's departure) by South Africa were a reasonable combination but gave the external impression of incoherence not an agreed division of labour;

b. the case for rapid (near instant) admission of DRC as a Member State logically turned on gaining and using leverage on its government and of facilitating its rehabilitation - reconciliation - reconstruction (R-R-R) process. No real use of leverage, no mobilisation of regional technical assistance (beyond the Tanzania
military retraining team) and no creating of channels for facilitating external support (a major SADC role in respect to Mozambique over 1980-1985) was built up on a coherent, strategic basis. This does not appear to have been the result of disagreement within SADC, but of failure to follow on either by membership proponents to make use of membership to change DRC or of initial membership opponents to reduce the risk of damaging SADC involvement in military and governance crises over which it had no significant influence.

c. SADC/COSAS failed to make clear declarations (presumably at Summit or Council of Ministers level) that:

i. genocide was intolerable and that any government allying with its advocates (the recruitment of IH soldiers - especially artillerymen - by then President Lissouba) or not acting seriously to end the power of its perpetrators and/or acting in coordination with neighbours to do so (the failure of President Kabila to act effectively against IH in the NE quadrant of DRC or to reach a modus vivendi with Rwanda and Uganda for coordinated action against them) was viewed by SADC as clearly in violation of the minimum standards of decent governance and therefore a threat to the peoples of the region, the SADC and to its Member States (with diplomatic pressure on Lissouba and France as to IH recruitment and facilitation to Kinshasha/Kigali/Kampala arrangements to isolate and reduce the NE quadrant presence of IH 'remnants' in the DRC); and

ii. parallel warning that acting in collaboration with armed insurgencies against any SADC Member State government would be viewed as aggression/hostile action against SADC collectively as well as the state concerned (i.e. the Lissouba and later, Kampala-Kigali 'Western Front' collaboration with UNITA).

Presumably, subject to exact wording, SADC could have agreed on these principles and put not insignificant pressure on Brazzaville, Kinshasa, Kigali, Kampala to comply with them. In retrospect it is clear that Lissouba and the government of Rwanda and Uganda did not realise collaboration with UNITA virtually guaranteed
full scale Angolan intervention. Nor, apparently, did President Kabila realise that quarantining/wiping out the IH enclaves on the Uganda and Rwanda borders was vital to Rwanda/Uganda (however peripheral to Kinshasa priorities) and required either effective national DRC initiatives (probably impractical) or an agreed coordinated approach by DRC - R - U (plus probably Burundi and Tanzania);

d. SADC similarly has failed to articulate practical support beyond Tanzania's provision of a military training team no SADC provision of key technical assistance (training/interim revival management) - e.g. in police, tax collection, audit, financial control, contract negotiation - was attempted (let alone provided). Nor was there a linked drive to organise a SADC sponsored DRC R-R-R Conference to raise external grant funding to further initial R-R-R/Governance progress.

e. SADC/COSAS have given the impression that divergences based on state or personal status concerns - not strategic, policy or principle issues as such - between South Africa, and Zimbabwe were preventing any effective action in the security sector, especially in respect to the DRC;

f. the invasion of DRC by Rwanda and Uganda troops (albeit some of the Uganda troops were initially in DRC with Kinsha's consent as a block force against IH 'remnants') in collaboration with UNITA and ex-Mobutu troops (in the West) and a pot pourri of anti Kabila groups (in the east) required two immediate responses:

i. support for DRC government to prevent its overthrow and to block establishment of permanent UNITA logistical corridors and base areas - presumptively wiping out the 'Western Front' and holding the Eastern to the immediate (50-100km?) Burundi-Rwanda-Uganda border area;

ii. launching of a serious mediation programme to reconcile Kinshasa-Kigali-Kampala, set in motion processes to wipe out IH and allow as non-bloody a return to national governance in the East as possible plus the ta/external funding brokerage initiatives suggested earlier.
This probably did require a division of labour within SADC with Angola taking the lead on i (as it inevitably and predictably did) and Tanzanian-Mozambique-Botswana-South Africa taking the lead on ii. But a clear cacophony with Angola-Namibia-Zimbabwe de facto at war with Rwanda and rather incoherent Zambian and Mozambican (for SADC? For SA?) mediatory efforts plus quite separate and lower key Tanzanian ones could hardly be perceived as an agreed division of labour, strengthen SADC’s leverage on i and ii or strengthen its internal strength self confidence or add to its external prestige and credibility. Very much au contraire.

3. Recent events provide an opportunity for SADC to devise a coherent strategy and to seek to implement it (with an agreed division of labour):

a. the war is stalemated with the Western front gone and the Eastern more or less static (even if with bloody skirmishes in large part by ‘militias’ associated with but not under the control of Kinshasa – IH ‘remnants’ – nor of Kigali – e.g. Mai Mai, but also with bombing and artillery raids generating bitterness but no real military movement);

b. under these circumstances Angola cannot give top priority to deployment in DRC because the key immediate UNITA dangers are again in Angola and Zimbabwe faces severe military/political costs in fighting a militarily unwinnable (if also probably unloseable) war which presumably induces Harare to be responsive to a mediatory process;

c. Rwanda and Uganda have learned that without DRC active support IH cannot be eliminated (the attack on tourists in Uganda came out of a DRC zone occupied to 50km by Uganda troops for over two years) and have no very great interest (or at least President Museveni and Vice President Kagame and his key advisers have little interest – some pan Tutsi romanticists may well have) in dominating/presiding over chaos in Eastern DRC;

d. a new DRC-Rwanda-Uganda negotiation effort mediated by Tanzania (which is credible with each) expanded to COSAS/SADC has been launched and may be able
to associate most of the domestic insurgents in the process (always assuming they can be united enough to negotiate with one voice);

e. in Burundi President Buyoyo has achieved a credible trial and condemnation of the actual assassins of the late elected President (i.e. a Tutsi military President presiding over the condemnation for treason and murder of Tutsi military officers for the assassination of a Hutu President). At the same time the exiled Hutu opposition (which had come to appear to be – and to some extent to be – a Burundi Interahamwe) has had its ability to attack into Burundi largely eliminated with Tanzania-Rwanda and the insurgent ‘administration’ at Bukavu and Uvira all hostile. Those two developments may reopen the chances for the recently moribund mediation effort led by Tanzania (and specifically Mwalimu) to achieve something by increasing the Buyoyo Government’s credibility to Hutu and by reducing Hutu capabilities to wage war and Tutsi fears of that capability.

WHERE NOW? TOWARD STRATEGIC COMPONENTS

4. Recent events reopen an opportunity for SADC to become more effective in respect to regional security in Central Africa (primarily DRC, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, from military involvement Zimbabwe and Namibia and by location and spillover risk Tanzania but potentially including Congo-Brazzaville and CAR);

a. the war in Congo is at a deadlock and is not perceived by either governmental side (DRC, R-U) as winnable militarily;

b. Angola has achieved its vital interest of pushing UNITA bases away from its borders but wishes to see a permanent resolution of the threat of such bases in DRC or C-B;

c. Rwanda and (less clearly) Uganda have come to realise that UNITA is as much a ‘no go’ ally for Angola as IH is for them;
d. the front (in both senses) insurgent political entity in Eastern DRC is aware its political base is fragmented and limited and that R-U military involvement does nothing to endear it to Congolese;

e. the Banyamulenge dream of dominance at the centre (Kinshasa) in the DRC has died as has the vision (probably never R or U policy as such but not stamped on and toyed with at high levels in 1996-1998) of an Addis to Boma Pan Tutsi Confederacy are dead and the present cement in Banyamulenge support for insurgency and Rwandese troops is fear of something worse heightened by President Kabila’s covert rapprochement with some IH elements, but eroded by Eastern insurgency/Rwanda unleashing of self directed Mai Mai militias who have massacred Banyamulenge and Eastern DRC supporters no matter whether they were nominally associated with Kinshasa or Kigali/Kampala;

f. while Angola is probably paying most of the fiscal costs, Zimbabwe is paying a political and military morale price for an operation (6,000 men plus heli gunships and aircraft) half the size of the old Beira-NCala Corridor defence without the clear material interests and anti-apartheid mobilisation which made that exercise a rallying and unifying symbol;

g. Tanzania remains committed to a stable, peaceful resolution to save lives (and secondarily reduce self protection and refugee inundation costs as well as tertiarily to restore valuable trade links), desires to mediate and is seen by all parties (or almost all – not IH or UNITA, probably not Mai Mai) as an interlocuteur valable primarily interested in building peace and reducing suffering not narrow own interests (Kenya is not so perceived and Zambia’s seriousness, credibility and commitment to long haul mediation work apparently is viewed with some scepticism);

h. the DRC government now feels able to negotiate because it no longer fears immediate collapse and because it knows that the eastern insurgency is neither politically broadly based nor militarily self-sustaining and may feel a need to negotiate (and to give up in respect of issues not central to its vital interests e.g. IH
and a border cordon sanitaire involving non-DRC troops) because war prevents consolidation and R-R-R;

i. it remains weak in respect to finance, exports, infrastructure, basic services and foreign finance and is well aware of its need for trusted technical assistance services and (probably) for mediators/voices in court to reopen global institution/bilateral agency dialogue;

j. Burundi’s exiled Hutu opposition has lost its ability to mount a full scale cross border insurgency amounting to proto-genocide and may be in a mood to negotiate if it sees a valid context;

k. the conviction/sentencing of the (Tutsi army officer) assassins of the elected (Hutu) President of Burundi may give President Buyoyo’s (Tutsi, military backed) government a just adequate level of credibility to negotiate with the opposition while the weakening of the Burundian proto IH’s capacity may give it more freedom of manoeuvre vis à vis its hardline, preventative, proactive repression army hard core.

5. Thus the possibility of effective SADC action is (as evidenced by the Lusaka proto agreements) higher than over the past eighteen months. How much can be achieved is unclear but what is clear is that without serious effort on a regional basis leading to a common strategy, agreed division of labour nothing much will be agreed and the Central African cancer will eat at SADC and sub-Saharan Africa more widely. The division of labour is threefold:

a. assuring survival of DRC – to which SADC, having accepted it as a Member State, is committed. Here Angola and Zimbabwe are the key actors (and Namibia an associated one) and need to remain in that role until direct and externally umbilically linked domestic military threats are over;

b. mediators in encouraging and channelling dialogue to a dynamic of working agreements toward cross border peace – at present primarily Tanzania and Zambia but logically also including Mozambique, Botswana, South Africa.
c. providing technical/managerial expertise to DRC, forces to enforce a "cordon sanitaire" and to police a "neutral zone" (presumptively primarily, but not only, the mediators in the enforcing/policing but potentially all SADC Member States in DRC capacity enhancement) and a credible frame within which the DRC and external finance/ta sources could be brought into dialogue.

6. A broad strategic principle/process statement is needed by all SADC Member States with certain elements highlighted as necessary elements in any peace agreement/process:

a. root and branch condemnation of genocide and its agents/operators and, in particular, absolute non-cooperation with, and cooperation in eradication of, Interahamwe;

b. total non cooperation (militarily and economically) with regionally and internationally condemned insurgencies and in particular refusal to supply bases and trade channels for UNITA:

c. non creation or hiring (by any actor) of freelance, self interested militias under little or no discipline, practicing ethnic cleansing and pillage and in particular not backing Mai Mai nor IH remnants in that role;

d. provision of technical assistance to increase the governance capacity of the DRC (and if requested Rwanda and Burundi) and to facilitate their reopening dialogue with international and bilateral agencies;

e. coordinated action in support of Eastern Congo stability creation and peace process building in particular regional forces to assist in the safeguarding of Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi borders, the elimination of IH and the restoration (in practice creation) of representative civil governance in Eastern DRC within the framework of recognition of the DRC and of its territorial integrity. (Lusaka’s 90-180 day Foreign Force withdrawal/IH wipeout time frame is not realistic).
There does not appear to be anything in the above any SADC Member State (other than the DRC) should have much trouble endorsing once good diplomats (not necessarily in foreign offices) draft and refine it. Tanzania and Mozambique should be able to convince DRC to endorse “a” (President Kabila has no real commitment to IH – on the contrary – but he misguided and, given IH’s nature condemnably, seeks to make tactical use of them and of Mai Mai). Probably Angola and Zimbabwe (by indicating 25,000 troops, 50 gunships and 100 aircraft plus blanque check are not on offer) could cause DRC to accept a cordon sanitaire, a neutral zone and joint anti-IH gunforces).

Similarly in return for “a” Rwanda and Uganda (and Burundi) would now probably accept “b” and (especially as Mai Mai have proven to be “toutes azimuth killers”) “c”. They probably have no objection to building up civil governance in DRC so long as that is in a package safeguarding their borders. Rwanda and Uganda (up to a point) and the internal DRC military and political insurgency (especially Banyamulenge) need to be convinced the present Eastern Front insurgents will not be massacred and will have access to public service and to governance within the DRC. SADC can press on DRC the view that repression and bloodshed in Eastern DRC and against the Banyamulenge 5% to 10% (depending on ones definition of “creoles”) would be macro economically, politically and diplomatically disastrous (not least in relations with SADC and its Member States) as well as morally and in international human rights convention terms condemnable.

7. On the military/geopolitical front this articulates to include:

a. no attempt to revive the Western Front (which turns on UNITA);

b. no insurgent drives further into Shaba or Kasai (approaching Angola border);

c. a 50 to 100km zone on the Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi border of DRC in which a joint force will act to prevent IH/proto IH basing and cross border activity. The logical main providers are Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa with, if essential specific number/place/role are agreed, limited Uganda and Rwanda contingents – the last a feature DRC had in practice accepted
in respect of Uganda). A UN/OAU umbrella might add e.g. India or Malaysia and Mali or Ghana;

d. evacuation of the Shaba/Kasai border towns and of Kisangani by the insurgency and the creation of a “neutral zone” including areas west and northwest of Uvira-Bukavu-Uganda border axis (including but not necessarily limited to “c”) with armed policing by joint force;

e. SADC-DRC-local authority supervised/promoted/monitored local (district/town) and provincial elections in “d”. This is tricky because insurgents are likely to lose, but winners may well not be core supporters of President Kabila;

f. facilitation of Burundi peace negotiations including ending armed hostilities – return of refugees – a SADC (or OAU or ad hoc group) monitored election perhaps following a combined local government election/new constitution referendum.

8. The technical/managerial assistance aspects are more flexible but certain core DRC needs for advice, systems reconstruction, initial key managers can be identified:

a. Military training/retraining (Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe?)

b. Police training/retraining (ditto plus Botswana?)

c. Tax (especially Customs and Excise) Reconstruction–Training–Initial operation (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius)

d. Fiscal Control – including Honesty and Efficiency – (Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania, Mauritius, South Africa)

e. International Contract/”Concession” Design and Negotiation (Botswana and Mozambique)

f. Electoral (initial local i.e. district and urban) education/structuring/registering/monitoring (Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa – perhaps Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia).
The lack of listings for Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Zambia, Angola is not intended to mean their exclusion. Once an agreed agenda of areas is agreed between SADC and DRC (and conceivably SADC and Rwanda and/or Burundi) all Member States should be asked to participate.

**Financing is a problem.** However the total personnel in “a” through “f” should not exceed 1,000 to 1,500 which divided by – say – 10 participating SADC Member States is not inherently impracticable. In addition if SADC-DRC-Rwanda-Uganda made a joint request for finance from UNDP (bypassing UNDP’s own hopelessly slow and inappropriately staffed south-south unit) the emphasis on “governance” of its Managing Director “annoint” (is there no end to World Bank “colonisation” e.g. ECA, UNICEF, tried ADB, now UNDP? Not, alas, IMF!) and its general African crisis facing role ought to produce perhaps $5-10 million a year for three years if the Nordics, Netherlands, Canada, Japan, Australia could be convinced to make designated contributions for that purpose to cover most of it. (See below why USA-EU-UK excluded here because of need for them to be convinced to finance cordon sanitaire/neutral zone forces.)

9. A special problem will arise if as a result of, or in the process of, the negotiation process Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi seek to join SADC. In the medium term that is a reasonable dynamic (and one Uganda was very tentatively exploring in 1996-7). In the short term it would probably be premature objectively and unacceptably subjectively to most SADC states. As such a request (such requests) is (are) by no means implausible, SADC should think ahead to a response:

a. **not now,** secured and stable peace first;

b. specific technical **cooperation** and access to/association with specific SADC services (e.g. “early warning”, “regional food security”, telecommunications/posts coordination) could be negotiated at once jointly or severally;

c. **once the Great Lakes had become a Zone of Peace** full membership accession dialogue could begin and be pursued expeditiously;
d. the best advisor on how to finesse any such request and what concrete steps would be useful when is Tanzania (which Burundi semi formally has asked to join and with whom Rwanda explored federal accession more elliptically – both to Tanzania’s unmitigated horror).

10. If SADC is to play this multifaceted role set it needs:

a. **priority commitment** – which in principle exits;

b. a **coherent strategy/articulation package which is practicable** (the above is a first approximation which suggests practicability is attainable);

c. **domestic allocation of personnel** (including but not only military and police), **attention** and **funds**;

d. **raising external** – OAU, UNO, bilateral – **endorsement** and **provision of funds**. The OAU will pretty clearly endorse anything coherent giving it even a symbolic (but prominent) role and will then lobby for funds but has no funds and not all that much credibility of its own. The UN will endorse – very vaguely (which may be as well given its Central African record) – but has no funds unless the US and EU so decide (Japan will not take an **African** initiative except at Reconstruction–Rehabilitation–Reconciliation stage on which Mozambique could provide advice on ways and means). The USA and EU both wish to promote peace and especially to avert explosions forcing them to spend large amounts of money and most especially to lay on “body bags”. They want peace (or what can pass for peace) on the cheap and with no casualties to their nationals. SADC need not endorse this strategy (which is exceedingly cynical however grandly clothed in humanitarian, “do no harm” and “African ownership” rhetoric) but can usefully exploit it to get its own strategy endorsed and at least the peace enforcing/policing/anti IH elements funded. South Africa and perhaps Mozambique and Tanzania ought to be able to **convince the USA** that the above approach fits its “African force” model and is worth – say – **$25 million a year for 3 years**. The UK and Botswana via the UK and Mozambique via Portugal should be able to lend a **similar initiative to the EU**. The UN – or NU as it was styled in the Portuguese initials during UNOMOZ to
considerable ribald comment – operation in Mozambique cost $500 million and refugee support/emergency assistance over 1986-94 perhaps $1,000 million and the Somalia and Rwanda operations more on UN forces though less on refugee support and human survival. Therefore $50 million a year for three years ought to be saleable as a cheap way to peace and a good conscience in Washington, Brussels et al. That ought to be enough to cover costs of cordon sanitaire/neutral zone. **Election preparation/monitoring** is a “popular fashion” aid topic so should be fundable if that stage is reached – those who financed and supported it in Mozambique did a good job including achieving an operation seen to be Mozambican driven even if foreign finance and technical expertise fuelled and can be called on again albeit perhaps are needed only minimally as to personnel since Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania have relevant electoral education-preparation-operation experience. (So does Mauritius up to a point, but it has never had either one party to competitive transition nor conflict background experience).

**A PRACTICAL DIGRESSION: NUTS AND BOLTS**

11. **To agree IH and UNITA (and Mai Mai?) must be removed from the DRC and that no SADC or Central African government may do business with them** (except Angola with UNITA in a peace talk context) is potentially possible if none too easy. To implement such a decision and to be seen by suspicious parties to be doing so is a much more difficult matter.

12. In respect to UNITA (easiest case) neither Rwanda nor Uganda (nor Burundi) has any real use for UNITA except in the context of Western Congolese threats to Kinshasa nor any historic loyalty/debts to them. Nor - presumably - would the DRC expect them to be able to turn over/withdraw from DRC the UNITA forces whose presence is based on the Mobutu period, not the 1998 intervention. A clear cut-off of relations could be transparent, would not (at least in the context of a border peace zone settlement) have any serious cost and is as much as could be expected. Angola and DRC could then agree mutually acceptable eradication strategies (in practice including Angolan troops).
13. IH is another matter. DRC has no historic obligation to them (apart from the initial Rwanda-Uganda alliance with then President to be Kabila against them!) and in the context of a settlement they are a liability. So far so good. But, having made the grave moral and practical error of recruiting them as auxiliary armed forces, it is hard to see how the DRC government can be seen to have cut links even if it ceases to employ/`recognise` them. Rwanda’s apparent proposals that IH be forcibly repatriated as refugees are neither practicable nor a desirable use of UNHCR:

a. IH are not refugees - to ignore that fact at Goma and more widely has repeatedly led to disaster);

b. IH fighting cadres and their immediate families are hard to divide into armed ravanchists and refugees because IH are "equal opportunity killers" with women and children as young as 8 taking part (thus the 1997 Eastern Congo massacres of groups whose care were IH cadres but probably did include some genuine refugees);

c. The DRC cannot realistically be supposed able to turn over IH auxiliary forces and relatives to UNHCR nor UNHCR to keep them under control if they did. The worsening of relations between Uganda/Rwanda and DRC related in large part to DRC’s inability to ‘take out’ the IH units driven into the Northeast quadrant of the Congo during the drive to Kinshasa;

d. Forced repatriation is not part of UNHCR’s mandate, but totally inconsistent with it or with the credibility of UNHCR to act in genuine refugee situations. If forced repatriation of killers and associates is needed a different mechanism/institution should be employed.

14. Nor is it very helpful to say the DRC should disarm, arrest, hand over perhaps 5,000 IH fighters 15,000 family members and - say - 50,000 other waHutu from Rwanda. It cannot do so. In general its logistical and disciplinary capacities are low; it is not in contact with many of the 50,000; if it attempted such an exercise IH would fight and/or melt away into areas outside the DRC’s effective reach (as the guerilla raid on the Uganda gorilla tourist camp from a DRC zone nominally swept and controlled by Uganda troops for at least a year demonstrates).
15. The mirror image is "no reprisals" against supporters of the insurgent regime and of the Uganda-Rwanda-Burundi interveners. What is meant? For example Mai Mai have fought on both sides and while a militia for Rwanda and/or (more or less simultaneously) DRC have massacred both IH and Kabila supporters and also Banyamulenge villagers (with whom they have bad historic relations). The twin campaigns have let loose all the antagonistic fragments – ethnic, military and political - in the Eastern DRC in a shifting series of bush fires. Restoring any real and lasting order and peace will be a violent process and one man's peacemaking may well appear to be reprisals to another observer. That is the bottom line case for Southern African neutral peace restoring force - its law and order recreation/reinforcement would have some chance of being seen to be even handed and not reprisals.

16. The Banyamulenge case is special because many are (were?) resident in the central and western Congo. They are a large (though under 10% of DRC citizens), influential (including in commerce) and unpopular (not just with Mobutu and Kabila) people, while usually perceived as WaTutsi it appears that (ironically) they are both WaTutsi and WaTutu who stand together in solidarity against discrimination by other Congolese and the IH killing machine. After the Western Front adventure it is unclear how the DRC is supposed to protect them as well as how violent other DRC people (other than Mai Mai who are committed to 'eliminating' them) are likely to be in respect to them if the DRC government is required to use reconciliatory language and own policy. (Setting up a nation with DRC trust territory run by SADC plus Uganda is not a practicable proposition). Mai Mai is in a sense a mirror image but at least located in Kivu/Northern Shaba not throughout DRC.

17. The bottom line problem is not one of declarations nor even of strategic logic. Persons deeply committed to visions certain if pursued to cause mass bloodshed and chaos and able to mobilise and to arm supporters are deeply dangerous. From the perspective of peace, order and reconciliation they are indeed nuts and all the more dangerous for that reason. The IH (and presumably Mai Mai) leaders and Jonas (Judas) Savimbi are precisely such persons. The armed forces associated with such bloody handed visionaries are usually very loyal to them but not to broader, shifting alliances of
convenience. (IH defended Kisangani for Mobutu and now harasses it for Kabila.) Any attempt to disarm and disband them is likely to lead both to armed conflict and to their melting away to fight another day unless they can be bolted down. In practice (at least at present) bolted down means militarily hunted down and destroyed as effective fighting units. Quite literally this is a bloody business and to pretend otherwise is dangerous self deception, an area in which Lusaka appears to have engaged in wishful ‘thinking’.

18. It is this practical problem of bolting down forces which are - from a realistic stable peace success perspective - nuts which suggests a five front approach:

1. a declaration by all militarily involved states (Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, DRC, Chad, Congo-B, CAR, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia) banning contact with support of IH/UNITA/ethnic militias;

2. endorsed/supported by SADC jointly and severally;

3. specific Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi border security zones (in DRC) in which limited (pre-agreed) numbers of their armed forces are allowed to act against IH as and how necessary for a limited (3 to 5 years?) period of time. The concept of 90 days to withdraw these troops and 180 days for a Commission to disarm IH, Mai Mai, etc., and unify the DRC and insurgent armies is totally unrealistic no matter how desirable it would be if practicable;

4. a broader peace restoration zone up toward Kindu and Kisangani (which should be restored to direct DRC control) with SADC military/police/civil governance restoration presence (presumably largely Mozambique-Botswana-Tanzania-South Africa as respected, competent, 'neutral' parties) to avert/end reprisals and to hold local/provincial elections with some provision for DRC access and civil programmes again for a limited period (3 to 5 years);

5. probably a new mediatory forum for the Burundi government and those opposition forces (internal or external) rejecting IH type approaches in deed and word.
This is an appallingly difficult agenda. It is a possible one if external finance for segments 3 and 4 (and the results of 5) can be mobilised. It ought to be able to avert worsening of the Central African holocaust and have a real chance of creating an environment in which DRC, Congo (B), Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and their peoples can live, reconcile, rehabilitate and develop. None of these goals is certain of attainment and the process will not be speedy, simple, or easy. Nor will peace restoring be peaceful - ending the ability of IH and UNITA to prevent peace requires more than killing people but it does require "degrading" their military capacities which does mean killing IH and UNITA militants and bystanders of varying degrees of innocence. This is an unappealing scenario but unless it can be followed even good faith treaties, commitments and peace keeping (rather than peace restoring/enemies of peace crushing) forces will not avert at best a continuing cancer of escalating violence and at worst massive regional coronaries of full scale war.

19. UNITA is not identical to IH. Its socio-political base and much of its leadership are necessary partners to reconciliation and mediation. But to believe a live Savimbi and a live peace process are compatible is - after over 35 years evidence to the contrary - a desperate hope. IH is naked and unalloyed evil. With an organisation and leadership whose basis for being is genocide (Interahamwe literally means “those who stand together” but its own propaganda has turned this to “those who kill together”) there cannot and should not be reconciliations. With UNITA, less Savimbi, Angola could and would perceive a need to make peace. Because no real DRC/Angola conflict of concerns or perception arises over UNITA and Uganda/Rwanda are not its protectors it has not been a topic of the Lusaka talks. How to ‘pacify’ Mai Mai is unclear, unlike IH and UNITA they are a genuine DRC group/people.

20. The Lusaka talks have made a start – but only that:

a. the crucial IH ‘destruction’ is not faced realistically (as noted above);

b. until IH is ‘deconstructed’, Uganda and Rwanda will insist at least on a border cordon sanitaire zone;
c. A UN Security Council endorsement of an African Force under an OAU or SADC umbrella is highly desirable as is a UN call for providing finance. UN operational leadership or Northern armed forces should be as welcome as cholera (and probably are at least in Kigali). In practice the Northwest would prefer endorsing/financing, not lending/deploying troops. If a symbolic non-African contingent of two is seen as useful India (frontier armed police) and Malaysia (infantry) might be recruitable;

d. An OAU endorsement/mandate is probably crucial as is avoiding an attempted OAU civil governance/military leadership team. If non-SADC African Forces are to be sought Mali and Ghana (police) would seem desirable candidates;

e. SADC (COSAS) needs to lead on negotiating UN Endorsement/OAU Mandate. It must be to restore/enforce/consolidate peace, not a standard UN ‘peacekeeping’ mandate – there is no present peace to keep and initially peace will have to ‘flow from the barrel of a gun’ (preferably only pointed but if need be fired);

f. SADC needs to negotiate not only the UN/OAU resolutions but also:

   i. the UN SG’s Special Representative (perhaps the retired Tanzanian Principal Secretary/Foreign who served in that capacity in Liberia?).

   ii. The Military Commander for the peacemaking force (an experienced senior officer from a state not previously militarily involved with a credible army – presumptively South Africa or Tanzania);

   iii. A senior civil governance liaison link/monitor with DRC, ex insurgents (probably a retired senior minister or secretary from Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania or South Africa);

   iv. $75 to $100 million a year external finance for an initial three years if 15,000 army/police are to be deployed. (Say 7,500 normal army, 5,000 armed police, 2,500 army engineering, logistics and health personnel who could assist rehabilitation/reconstruction. Initially – for longer than 90 days – 7,500
additional Uganda/Rwanda troops to combat/destroy IH within 30 miles/50 km of border will be needed. After IH is broken 7,500 efficient, mainline troops with helicopters – armoured personnel carriers – light field artillery can keep the military peace if there are 5,000 armed civil police to keep the civil peace.)

None of the above is inconsistent with the public thrust of Lusaka but is apparently necessary follow on to a somewhat sketchy agreement which looks dangerously close to playing ‘pass the packet’ (in this case a grenade with the pin pulled) in respect to IH. IH will not fade away; DRC cannot demobilise it; UNHCR cannot repatriate them; someone must break them militarily and nobody should pretend that does not mean killing substantial numbers of IH cadres including women and child soldiers.

21. The least non meaningful conclusion to this rather grim perspective may be two quotations one from a UN Field Office in Maputo’s reaction to head office advice it was too late to avert a 1992-93 Southern African “Great Death” from the 1992-93 “Great Dearth” following the 1991-92 “Great Drought” and the second from the Hindu Scriptures:

I agree it may well be too late to avert famine.
But if we do not even try, history will not forgive us – nor should it.

As Krishna to Arjuna on the field of battle:
Not Farewell
But Fare Forward
Voyagers.

R.H. Green
Falmer, Brighton
July 1999