IN THE BEGINNING: PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN 1960's PAN AFRICANISM AND 1990's REGIONALISM

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International Conference on Reflections on Leadership in Africa: 40 Years After Independence
Institute of Development Studies (Dar es Salaam) Tanzania
15th-17th December 1997

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INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION: In The Beginning</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE END OF THE BEGINNING: OAU and ECA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE NRUMAH-NYERERE DIVIDE: A Revisitation To Reinterpret</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB REGIONAL TRAJECTORIES 1960-1980: Instability, Persistence, Unevenness, Deterioration</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE - PAN AFRICAN RENAISSANCE 1961-1980</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF RELIANCE AND SECURITY: Liberation and The Road to SADCC</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY RECONSIDERED AND REDEFINED: From The Beira Corridor To Kinshasa</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARALLEL SECURITY VENTURES: The Horn and the Freed Slave States</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC MEANS IN FLUX - 1980/1996</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN AFRICANISM REVITALISED: Full Circle Round or Upward Spiral?</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN AFRICANISM 2000: Portents, Problematics and Potentials</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION: In The Beginning

1. PAN AFRICANISM historically focused on three goals:
   a. self determination
   b. self respect
   c. self relieded
   (or independence now/peace with each other/to achieve development)

2. It is in that context that Pan Africanism perceived Continental (or SSA) regional union as:
   a. necessary
   b. natural
   c. self evident
   (This perception partly related to ensuring continued independence, peace and economic prosperity, but also to the fact that Pan Africanism as an overarching exile and diaspora movement - for better and for worse - lacked the visceral national and institutional loyalties which mar - and make - regionalism today.)

3. Pan Africanism as regionalism was partly from distance, partly from strategy and partly from inadvertence very broad brush. Union government (representative, perhaps federal), unified armed forces (responsible to a union president) and an economic union (little more articulated than removal of barriers) were posited. These were seen as achieving security from recolonisation, local military indiscipline (i.e. coups), border wars. Its concept of security was implicitly household to macro though with the former almost assumed and certainly not institutionally articulated. Further that security was to be a base for economic
progress with economies of scale, continental self reliance for most markets and sources, industrialisation, hydro power and transport the most usually cited means. Education, health services and representative union government (together with freedom from colonialism and neo-colonialism) were assumed or asserted to be adequate to ensure equitable distribution and near universal inclusion in gains.

4. The greatest obstacle to the regional vision of Pan Africanism was - in part inevitably -
the course of the liberation struggle.

a. because each colony was a territorial entity with a state apparatus, the form of the struggle (inevitably unless it took the form of regional, or at least multi colony, armed revolution) was to secure control over and domestication (wresting from colonial suzerainty) of that apparatus;

b. this fairly inevitably led to different sub routes to and timetabling of territorial independence;

c. either independence as federal/confederal unities or immediate merger of newly independent states, far from being inevitable, required difficult acts of will and of synthesising territorial and leadership interests;

d. the attempts to achieve union at independence - or, more usually, immediately thereafter: Ethiopia - Eritrea, Mali Federation, East African Union, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania, and (much later) Cape Verde - Guinea Bissau were with one exception still born, tempestuous and short lived or (at least in one party’s perception) new colonialisms leading to violent resistance and dissolution. The Cameroon exception reunited an entity World War I had sundered and the affiliating member was well under a fifth the size of its partner. The Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union, while assuredly grounded in overlapping concerns for the survival of self determination by both entities, owed little to Pan Africanism and is neither replicable nor much of an advertisement for quasi confederal unification;

e. arguably greater political willingness to accept real union (and a loss of some senior positions and freedom of allocation) could have limited the entrenching of the territorial constructs of the Congress of Berlin but only three Presidents - Leopold
Senghor, Modeiba Keita and Julius Nyerere - were willing to risk/invest in that exercise. The first two rapidly retreated when faced with the costs and limitations of actual Federal Union and Mwalimu found no takers in Kenya or Uganda for a 1962-63 independence of an East African Union (not least because both numbers and polls suggested he - not Jomo Kenyatta and certainly not Milton Obote - would be elected as its executive president).

f. the one armed sub-regional revolution (Zimbabwe-Angola-Mozambique-Namibia-South Africa) was much later (indeed possible only after West and East African independence) and because of contextual variations (including the colonial role of South Africa in Namibia and the disproportionate size of South Africa relative to its regional siblings) did not lead and could not have led to Federal Union albeit it did give rise to the strongest sub-regional movement dynamic and institutional structure building economic and security coordination toward integration in SSA to date.

THE END OF THE BEGINNING: OAU and ECA

1. In practice newly independent African states (and for that matter Ethiopia, Liberia and Egypt) were singularly unwilling to merge sovereignty or to agree to substantial supranational institutions with real power especially in respect to armed forces. They were - in principle - enthusiastic about multinational economic initiatives in the abstract and in future perspective albeit much more equivocal about those inherited from the colonial era.

2. The former characteristic was general - the existing French and British pan territorial political structures were swept away whatever their previous nature, duration or potential users to successor states. The reasons varied in detail but real divergences of interest and lack of agreement on gain (not least high office) sharing were a common theme. The second varied - Francophone West African and Anglophone East African sub-regional economic structures (and independent state attachment to them in principle deep enough to cause devotion of major effort to restructuring, rehabilitation or even resurrection) did survive and apparently build independent roots into the mid 1970’s and each still has both
real and potential political economic backing even though the east African one is largely both dead and superseded and the West African one has become less important relatively and perhaps even absolutely.

3. The founding of the OAU as a multinational institution of states focusing on political issues external and common to its members amounted to taking five decisions:

a. **Pan African union was not an immediate agenda item** and could become so only if a very large majority of state governments (continentally, SSA wide or sub-regionally) wished it to be;

b. in the meantime both intra state and **inter state security required respecting boundaries** at independence and **rejection of forced union as well as of secession**;

c. military coordination should be subject to **ad hoc** national contribution of forces under agreed OAU criteria (i.e. **de facto** impossible);

d. Pan African **liberation ideals were to remain focused on the last external bastions - Rhodesias/Nyasaland, ‘Portuguese’ Africa, Namibia, South Africa**;

e. except for external economic strategic issues (e.g. on occasion external debt and African common markets), **economic regionalism would be delegated to ECA**. (The OAU had no economic policy analysis unit of its own before 1994.)

f. The **OAU** therefore became from birth a **club of governments** committed to progress within, and maintenance of, a system of national states.

4. The ECA was created as one of the UN system's global net of regional economic commissions within the central UN bureaucratic/administrative structure. Its remit was economic research and analysis with a focus on proposals relevant to national/regional economic development. While continentally oriented and relating to overall and topical African ministerial fora, it was (and is) legally accountable to New York and headed by a Secretary General appointed, and operating on a budget provided, from there.

Institutionally it is, at least in form, roughly analogous to a colonial administration with a metropolitan named governor (albeit a territorial national) and civil service and a metropolitan determined budget with territorial advisory councils plus a significant
territorial minority representation in the metropolitan parliament (General Assembly). In practice - given New York’s lack of the will or the means to impose detailed agendas - this gives a strong ECA Secretary General near independence from both African states and the SG, a role at least one played (or to critics overplayed) with very considerable diligence, skill and vision and to some substantial effect. Arguably such an institution was always a problematic partner for the OAU.

5. The political (OAU)/economic (ECA) or vision (OAU)/articulation (ECA) division of labour de facto agreed in the early and mid 1960’s has proven durable (perhaps too durable) but has always been problematic:

a. operational politics and operational economics cannot neatly be divided in the way implicitly envisaged;

b. the OAU’s personnel capacities have not enabled neither to make concrete proposals for articulation to the ECA nor to evaluate and enter into serious dialogue on the substance of ECA proposals:

c. the OAU has become - in Addis and in member states - a diplomats’ preserve and the ECA a social and economic ministerial and official one with further weakening of operational interaction nationally as well as continentally.

6. The impact of these arrangements on Pan Africanism and regionalism has proven to be major and severely negative even though neither the OAU nor ECA ever so intended:

a. the formal Pan African leadership in OAU hands contracted to the continuing liberation struggle because integration based on economic means passed to the ECA or individual states and political route integration had been virtually set to one side in adopting the club of states approach to OAU;

b. but ECA was not well equipped to handle the political realities of economic regionalism - though it certainly tried to fill this gap - nor to address intra regional bargaining over net gain sharing and status so that successful regional community launching and - especially - development depended in both ECOWAS and SADCC on a handful of state leaders playing catalytic and diplomatic mobilisation roles (in the
latter case at cross purposes with ECA) and in that of PTA on the determination and
dynamism of ECA's then secretary general which, necessarily, could hardly be a
continuing presence once it was established;

c. as a result Pan Africanism in the classical sense contracted, falling back largely to
furthering liberation of remaining occupied territories (not unifying independent ones)
and the political kingdom (with the economic to follow). On the economic front it was
replaced not by the EEC model of political visions through economic means but by an
overly economistic set of sub-regional constructs with inadequate attention to the
political economics of survival let alone the political dynamics of Pan African
integration.

THE NKRUMAH-NYERERE DIVIDE: A Revisitation To Reinterpret

1. The debate on classic Pan Africanism and speedy political and military union vs. slow,
economic based integration in the early 1960's is often posed as one between Osagyefo
Nkrumah and Mwalimu Nyerere with the actual OAU/ECA tandem and its evolution a
victory for the conservative, nationalist pragmatism of the latter. This is a distinctly
inaccurate and unhelpful interpretation. Indeed in terms of the actual OAU-ECA-
Integration evolution over 1960-1980 President Nyerere's goals and vision were every bit
as much the losers as those of President Nkrumah.

2. In respect to commitment to classical Pan Africanism's goal of continental unity Presidents
Nkrumah and Nyerere were relatively close together with the real conceptual divide
between them and a much more cautious conservative and nationalist position whose
leading proponents were Presidents Houphouet Boigny of the Cote d'Ivoire and Johnstone
Kenyatta of Kenya with an intermediate group of whom the leading members were
President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and the Nigerian leadership ultimately backed
the conservative position.
3. This is not to suggest that there were no basic Nkrumah-Nyerere differences but they turned on paths, means and the nature of legitimate consent more than on objectives:

a. Nkrumah’s “seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto ye” led to a much lower attention to economic issues and means than Nyerere’s contention that independence was a basic condition for social and economic development;

b. Nyerere, after the failure of his efforts to achieve a joint independence of Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania as an East African Union, was convinced economic means leading to economic integration - not a leap to political and military union - was the only practicable way toward Pan African unification. He did not disagree with Nkrumah’s contention that to will an end is to will an adequate means but did view the continental High Command/Government means as inadequate because unattainable;

c. Mwalimu believed in participatory consensus as the basis for political legitimacy and stability while Nkrumah was far more willing to seek to shout, face or force down opposition - an authoritarian reflex which, whatever its normative evaluation, was hardly practicable in an African heads of state context;

d. In the absence of a feasible road to immediate - or indeed imminent - political union and in light of the early independence history of - e.g. - Latin America and the recent, apparently ‘unreal’ nature of African territorial boundaries, Mwalimu placed a high priority on arrangements to limit border wars, secessionist wars and full scale wars of conquest - goals which the OAU has, whatever its limitations, achieved to a surprising degree - cf Latin America 1810-1910;

e. further Nyerere - who did have close working links with neighbouring states (and independence movements) viewed sub-regional groupings among already ‘acquainted’ states as necessary building blocks toward the continental level with the OAU, ECA and ADB as - *inter alia* - means to broaden contact and mutual understanding/feeling at ease as well as more tangible links. Nkrumah who was - along with Sekou Toure - isolated politically in West Africa had no sympathy for sub-regionalism nor step by step approaches until very late in his presidency.
4. The conservative camp either did not believe in the classic Pan African goals or, to be kinder, had a radically revisionist interpretation of two insofar as they related to African unity. Self determination was defined fairly rigidly within the parameters of territorial states. Cooperation among them and self reliance was posed in Eurafrikan terms which critics saw as acceptance of neo-colonial dependency albeit this is for too simple and unkind a characterisation of the (ultimately failed) vision of Le Vieux (President Felix Houphouet Boigny) its most systematic and steadfast political proponent and articulator. Its agreement with President Nyerere was in a sense entirely procedural and first stage - OAU as a forum of sovereign states, self defined sub-regional groups as the main means to operational cooperation with economics their main content. In respect to views on subsequent deeper and more political unification the divide was (as became much clearer in the 1970’s) very great.

5. The characterisation of President Nyerere’s stance - and later that of SADCC/SADC - as pragmatic and that of President Nkrumah - and later that of PTA - as radical is also misleading. President Nyerere was certainly willing to alter policies - even strategic policies - and to alter the balance of means quite drastically but in order to hold to, not depart from, goals and principles. Two major cases illustrate. In 1961-2 in arguing for a participatory, competitive one party system Secretary General (as he then was) Nyerere explicitly said review might be needed in 30 years as unity and participation were the goals and ethnic, class or religious based parties (not multiple parties per se) the ills to be avoided. In 1992 he advocated a multi party system. Similarly in 1984-85 he backed the initiation of radical economic strategy reformulation not because he agreed with the ‘global’ neo-liberal consensus (any more than did Ministers Jamal and Msuya who had advocated the 1984-85 changes from 1981) but because he was convinced no viable alternative to preserve the health-education-nutrition-national identity gains of 1961-1978 was in fact available.

6. Similarly President Nkrumah’s radicalism could often be interpreted as rapidly altering means to sustain power as much as pursuit of any more general principle. Like President Nyerere he believed that in the absence of a dynamic national entrepreneurial class a leading state economic role was necessary to achieve full economic participation (let alone self determination or self reliance), but - in comparison to Tanzania - the Ghanaian pattern
of policies and actions lacked a coherent strategy, a defined set of sub goals and the ability to remain solvent even briefly even in the favourable world economic and political economic context of 1958-1962. At a very different level when President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo was assassinated by Sergeant Eyadama (as he then was) acting for Jacques Foccart and the Elysee, Julius Nyerere wept in Dar es Salaam both at the imposition of neo colonial rule and the loss of innocence while according to Accra gossip (indicative even if possibly apocryphal) Osayefo laughed in Christiansborg Castle seeing the event only in terms of short run Ghana-Togo political relations.


1. The *de facto* division of labour OAU-political/ECA-economic endured and evolved over at least a decade and a half and arguably remains basically unchanged to date.

2. The OAU’s main agenda items were:
   a. averting border wars
   b. discouraging - by non recognition and non support - secessionism;
   c. pursuing the struggle for liberation of remaining colonies and South Africa;
   d. coordinating African policy on major global issues seen as of direct concern to Africa;
   e. promoting African interstate cooperation including regionalism;
   f. eschewing state and OAU intervention in - broadly defined - “internal affairs” of member states.

3. In respect to the first two heads, the OAU had been remarkably successful up to 1990. The main exception was Somali irredentism (or perhaps Somalian given that the only actual take-over was of Somaliland in a manner the High Court of the United Republic held to be invalid). The long running, albeit episodic, Nigerian-Cameroonian skirmishes turn the interaction of a woefully defined boundary (the main channel of the Cross River, whose whole delta shifts north and south in addition to shifts in which is - at times are - the
main channel) with a probable underlying oil reservoir. The Libyan-Tchadian war flowed from Vichy France’s purported ceding of territory to Mussolini’s Italy and Libya’s claim to be Mussolini’s heir. But these stand out because they are exceptions - potential for irredentism, exceedingly vague or badly documented boundaries (including all ex-German territory water boundaries) and shifting in territorial lines during the colonial period could easily have spawned a hundred real wars - as they did during Latin America’s early years of independence.

4. Secessionist conflicts - except the break-up of last minute before or minute after independence unions - have been rare. The major examples - Biafra (if one ignores Ojukwu’s clear drive to capture at least all of Southern Nigeria) and - at times- the Southern Sudan - have not been replicated. Borderline cases - e.g. Mali’s Touaregs, Senegal’s Cassamantians - look more like autonomy or redress of grievances struggles than secessionist wars. Even in the Sudan case there have been periods of quasi federal rule and is now a unified Southern Liberation Movement-Northern Democratic Party coalition with an agreed proposed federal constitution seeking to oust the despot military/mediaevalist Islamic sect government in Khartoum. (The Sudan’s main Islamic tendency - Mahdism - is firmly in the insurgent alliance camp).

5. In fact the OAU has been ultra conservative in cases such as Eritrea and the Republic of Somaliland (1994) where a merger of independent states on confederal terms had been violated by the larger entity so that a clear legal case for the legitimacy of separation existed. Eritrea became acceptable to the OAU only once it had the blessing of the new government in Addis while the Republic of Somaliland (which has a functioning government and public services) has no formal recognitions and clear de facto recognition only from Ethiopia and Eritrea. The exception - the Sahara Democratic Republic whose territory was handed over to Morocco by Spain when it feared losing it - nearly tore the OAU apart before the SDR was seated (and Morocco withdrew).

6. Liberation relatively rapidly came to focus on Southern Africa - beyond the Ruvuma, Zaire/Congo and Zambesi rivers. The OAU was influential diplomatically and in coordinating African voices. However the Front line States (by the early 1970’s Tanzania,
Zambia and Botswana with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe added by the middle of 1980) was much more operationally significant than the OAU as - on the diplomatic front - arguably was Nigeria.

7. The contrast between rhetoric and structures and operational support turned on the OAU’s general lack of resources - of finance and, largely as a consequence, personnel. The FLS saw a compact grouping with close links (from 1961 on) to Liberation Movements as a preferable channel for resources than a weak OAU some of whose member’s relations with the old RSA seemed to be covertly collaborationist, while Nigeria’s diplomatic offensive for the same reasons and to maximise prestige and influence gains was also kept largely separate from and at times imperfectly coordinated with either OAU or FLS.

8. Coordination was uneven but not negligible. Over time Francophone African global stands have become less tied to those of the Elysee and more akin to those of Anglophone Africa. West African diplomatic, political and economic stresses now turn more on Abidjan, Lagos and - secondarily - Dakar and Accra differences of interest than on either ideology or closeness to Paris (let alone London). However the coordination has had limits because of the OAU’s weak economic analysis capacity. Common economic stances usually turn on ECA and/or single state initiatives and ECA background papers and even draft text preparation.

9. However, on integration the OAU de facto dropped out of the picture. The two exceptions - the Final Act of Lagos (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1990) - were in practice ECA initiatives and texts (with nationally proposed amendments, particularly to support sub-continental building blocks as a first stage) adopted by the OAU. Given that the OAU has been founded on rejection of early political union (and the experience with smaller union efforts was unpromising) and had little if any economic analysis capacity or serious participation of main economic ministers this result, however unintended, was probably inevitable.

10. The avoidance of interference in internal affairs came to be read exceedingly broadly. Tanzania for example was viewed as very much out of line when in the early 1970’s it charged the Micombero Regime in Burundi with genocide and - despite substantial unease by many states - Emperor Bokassa (CAE), President Macias Nguema (Equatorial Guinea),
President Iddi Amin Dada (Uganda), President Mengistu Hailie Mariam (Ethopia) and President Mobutu Tse Tse Soko (Zaire) were members in good standing until they were internally overthrown in the first four cases and until the mid 1990’s in the last. This interpretation of noninterference neutered the OAU as a regional force toward good governance. (The African Charter of the Rights and Responsibilities of People and Peoples was an initiative of Gambia’s President Jawara even if endorsed verbally by the OAU.) This did nothing for its reputation in Africa any more than abroad. By the early 1990’s the policy had become politically bankrupt because a series of nominally civil wars - Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia/Somaliland, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo (then Zaire) - clearly interacted across borders and themselves spread instability and the real danger of war to their neighbours.

11. ECA - with a much larger budget and staff - took over the continental economic analysis and prescription role, nominally on behalf of OAU and under the leadership of Councils of National Ministers but in fact largely autonomously under the strategic vision and particular concerns (or lack thereof) of its Secretary Generals and their closest associates. This was particularly true in respect to economic coordination, cooperation and community building which has been an ECA focus for over three and a half decades.

12. ECA evolved from an industry by industry and key transport link approach to sub-regional community promotion to African Common Market prophetic leadership. The shift appears to relate in large part to its dominant 1975-90 figure Professor Adebayo Adedeji - initially in his role as the driving force behind ECOWAS while a Nigerian cabinet minister and later as head of ECA. The results of sectoral, project, and handful of country efforts to the late 1960’s were sparse and ECOWAS (and the then East African Community) appeared much more promising models. Partly because of an exceedingly unfortunate mutual misunderstanding between the FLS/SADCC and ECA (especially its key Southern African official Bax Nomvete), but also because only SADC/SADCC and PTA (which unfortunately overlapped) showed much signs of sub-regional economic dynamic building ECA from 1980 on focused increasingly on achieving an African Common Market by 2000. Whether this was any more a feasible direct objective than Nkrumah’s political union is a matter of judgement. Clearly it was at odds with deeper, more extensive sectoral coordination/integration and with linking of security and good governance ‘deep’
economic community building dynamic. Clearly too - at least in retrospect - it had no political base. Those states actually placing priority on political or political economic coordination/integration concentrated on SADCC and/or PTA while the others showed little signs of serious interest in continental Common Market Building.

13. **In the 1980’s ECA became much more overtly political.** It championed:

   a. autonomous African directed recovery strategies (APPERS and AASAP) and in that endeavour came into vehement conflict with the IFI’s and major external countries;

   b. good governance - participation, accountability, honesty, frugality (in numerous annual reports and overall socio-political-economic projections). This did resonate with some audiences in Africa and externally but had limited (if any) impact on the regimes at which it was presumably most directed;

   c. encouraged greater and more independent roles for African NGO’s (not very clearly defined nor differentiated from external NGO’s present in Africa) in the Arusha Charter which probably stimulated and may marginally have strengthened the NGO’s but had little resonance with governments especially because major domestic social sector bodies (e.g. churches, mosques, trade unions) were not clearly included, whereas external NGO’s (rapidly coming to be seen as neo-liberal state deconstruction tools or worse) apparently were.

14. The basic reasons for the shift were fairly clear. ECA if acting purely as economic technocrats could not address the 1980’s crises effectively and an ECA technical economic/OAU diplomatic division of labour left yawning political economic and good governance gaps. Professor Adedeji hoped to catalyse African leadership by outspoken initiatives from ECA based on at least some independent professional analysis. The results - while not negligible, especially in some African states and potentially having longer gestation results on both intellectual and official thinking- were disappointing.

15. ECA did not venture directly into most aspects of security. Its partial entry was largely at the household level - food, livelihood, safety nets - notably in the Khartoum Declaration from what was *de facto* a joint conference with UNICEF. Traditional military/policy/law and order security - probably prudently - it continued to view as outside its remit.
16. As of 1990 the results - and especially the future - of ECA’s integration and political economic strategic initiatives were problematic but not necessarily gloomy. When Secretary General Adedeji resigned, ECA - in terms of strategic leadership whether analytical, strategic or intellectual - first slowed, then stalled and began to disintegrate.

SUB REGIONAL TRAJECTORIES 1960-1980: Instability, Persistence, Unevenness, Deterioration

1. Over 1960-1980 Sub-Regionalism was both the central focus of integration and its greatest source of frustration. Its two standard bearers: the East African Common Market and Services Organisation born again in 1967 as the East African Community, and the new Economic Community of West African States launched soon after, respectively disintegrated and stagnated. Elsewhere new sub-regional initiatives remained on paper and, of the old Francophone groupings UDEAC diminished and eroded while the West African monetary and economic grouping, survived but at low and increasingly peripheral benefit levels.

2. However, while deeply disappointing that record was not as uniformly negative as a brusque summary of 1980 makes it appear to be. The cynical play on ECOWAS acronym as “The echo (of the EEC Treaty) was” underestimates both the forces that brought it into being, the continuing belief in it that has both prevented dissolution and also limited decay thus keeping in being the potential for its - partial - mid 1990’s recovery.

3. In the immediate post colonial period many colonial territory economic links were broken but a surprisingly high number - in Francophone West and Equatorial Africa and Anglophone East Africa - survived and, for a time seemed to prosper under independent management. Joint arrangements for infrastructure and operating units (e.g. ports and railways) disintegrated rapidly except in East Africa (where they were in a real sense the backbone of the EAC’s emergence) and in respect to Senegal River Basin dams. Rather later (because independence came later) the Central African Common Market and its parallel institutions were dissolved because they were integrally tied to the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and because the independence of Zambia and Malawi left Southern Rhodesia (as it then was) under “responsible” settler governance. Unequal
distribution of gains alone would not have led inevitably to dissolution - in the EACM-EACSO to EAC case it led to renegotiation and rebalancing. But in East Africa in the 1930's the move to make Kenya a settler colony with "responsible" settler governance had failed so that all three states were majority ruled independent and - whatever their differences - relations among Mzee Kenyatta, Dr Obote and Mwalimu Nyerere were very different from those among President Kaunda, Kamuzu Banda and any of the Rhodesian Front Prime Ministers.

4. Francophonia had West African and Equatorial African customs unions, common currencies, equalisation funds (to offset re-export losses of duty to interior states from port city breaking and wholesaling) and various other joint activities overseen by councils of ministers and officials and professional central bank staffs. These did provide direct gains - not least lower cost customs administration and a certain degree of manufacturing specialisation and intertrade - even if the special currency arrangements providing French external payments and deficit cover in return for a fixed metropolitan/peripheral franc exchange rate and severe restraints on fiscal use of the central bank were dominant. These monetary relations were part of the Euroafrican concept which - at least to Le Vieux and President Senghor - did offer a certain balance between preferences for French (later partly generalised to EU) goods, companies and personnel and French underwriting of fiscal and currency stability. However unwise or unequal they may in fact have been, they were not seen (at least in Dakar, Abidjan, Yaounde and Brazzaville) as one way streets or as the partnership of rider and horse.

5. While the French Colonial West African Federation (AOF) was effectively dismantled before and terminated at independence, the economic regional arrangements associated with it survived. The most important was a joint central bank with a fixed exchange rate with the French franc linked to severe limits on fiscal lending by the Bank and French underwriting of fiscal (subject to limits) and current account deficits. Whether a fixed exchange rate with the franc made much sense when the CFA countries inflation rates far exceeded France's is open to question (the ultimate devaluation doubling the CFA/French Franc ratio came only in 1994) as is the viability of fixed parities among a very disparate group of economies with markedly different structural and growth (or stagnation) dynamics. The clear gain was the French Treasury underwriting of deficits and
convertibility. The (substantial) interstate trade preferences (within an envelope of preferences to France and later EEC) did have some positive effect on trade (and because it suited French company concerns did to some degree disperse manufacturing) and the "solidarity fund" (nominally a transfer channel from richer coastal Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire to poorer landlocked states but in practice a reimbursement of revenue lost on reexports from coastal to landlocked states under a customs allocation based on original declared destination of imports) did allow simplified transit trade and duty collection procedures consistent with avoiding loss of landlocked state net revenues.

6. These arrangements remained relatively stable through the 1970's but - except for those related to the CFA franc and its French underwriting - eroded in the 1980's. They showed little dynamism and new ventures - e.g. Air Afrique, the regional airline - tended to come to grief either because of clashes between national prestige/and commercial goals or - more seriously - from weak management and failure of sponsoring governments to pay their bills.

7. In principle the Francophone arrangements were no barrier to a broader ECOWAS grouping including the Anglophone states. In practice they were for four reasons:

a. France (but also Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal) feared that Nigeria would be super-competitive economically and especially political economically;

b. the CFA states - reasonably - were quite unwilling to deconstruct their institutions until ECOWAS had a track record of offering larger gains (which it could not in the monetary or aid field and did not in respect to trade);

c. continued Francophone African groupings linked to France's Francophonic (basically France/Afrique) created grave (and partly unfounded) suspicions that while the voices were the voices of African leaders the hands were the hands of the French Treasury and the Elysee;

d. the combination of overvaluation but convertibility of the CFA franc and overvaluation (often more extreme) and nonconvertibility of Anglophone currencies gave rise to complex, cumulative incentives to smuggling and to currency routing hardly conducive to positive officially visible interstate economic relations.
8. The road to ECOWAS was initially mapped by ECA and Anglophone West Africa - notably Nigeria. Its most consistent and able advocate was Professor Adedeji and its political motor Nigeria which perceived West African regionalism under its leadership as economically (e.g. industrialisation) and politically potentially highly profitable. The process of convincing the Francophone states (and to a lesser extent Ghana) to join was lengthy taking over a decade. The key facilitating mechanism may well have been a Nigerian funded (out of what proved to be fleeting oil generated surpluses) of a West African soft development finance institution tied to ECOWAS.

9. In form ECOWAS is modelled on the EU with a broad array of initial sectors and more added fairly regularly (perhaps to camouflaging failure to progress in existing ones). While ECOWAS did set up a trade balance clearing mechanism, highly unrealistic official exchange rates and lagged or non clearing by debtors rapidly rendered it at best peripheral and no serious tariff preferences emerged despite interminable negotiations. An initially radical right of entry and establishment for all regional nationals dissolved back to visa free visit access as expelling foreigners proved politically popular in economic crisis periods notably Ghana in the late 1960’s and 1970’s and Nigeria in the 1990’s but even more frequently, though on a lesser scale, in several Francophone states. Part of the problem was that Nigeria’s surpluses and thus the regional development fund evaporated and Nigerian industry proved both largely uncompetitive and domestic market fixated. Until late in the 1980’s, ECOWAS did not address security issues substantively either at macro level (e.g. coup prevention/exile activities) or at household (e.g. refugees/response to drought).

10. The East African Community (1967) had a history dating back to the 1920’s and common rail, port, posts and telecommunications, airline, tax collection, research and education institutions and - until just before the transition from EACSO/EACM to EAC - a common currency. There was little divergence of view on its providing overall net gains but vehement difference in views both on static interterritorial distribution and on dynamic (growth) distribution impact. The one empirical study attempted suggested net gains of 2% to 3% of regional GDP, dominated by joint public utilities, with Kenya’s net gain larger than the regional, Uganda’s within the margin of error of estimation and Tanzania’s negative. Kenya’s own official public view was that it subsidised its partners statically but
perhaps gained dynamically while Tanzania and (less clearly) Uganda saw themselves as present losers but potential gainers. Therefore restructuring was mutually agreed to be a necessity for survival and a potential means both to sustainable regionalism and enhanced national economic development.

11. Restructuring - via a three member country dialogue at Ministerial level under an independent Chairman and concluded at a Heads of State Summit - involved a detailed formal treaty (with an independent dispute settlement procedure - in the event unused), two major excisions (the University of East Africa and - nominally separately - the East African Currency Board and its EA shilling), two substantial additions (the East African Development Bank and Eastern African Management Institute - both of which have survived EAC), substantial relocation of headquarters (previously all in Kenya) to achieve revenue/expenditure balance territorially, interim infant industry tariffs within EAC for Tanzania and Uganda and an EADB investment share weighted to assist their manufacturing sectors to catch up.

12 Before the Amin coup in Uganda and the external balance crises of the mid 1970's, EAC looked to be succeeding. Tanzania appeared to have achieved static net gains (largely by reallocation) and substantially more dynamic export growth to Kenya. Negotiations had been begun for the accession of Zambia, Burundi, Ethiopia and Somalia with at least the first and second making substantial progress. Additional sectoral institutions in consultancy and balanced industrial promotion were also well on the way to agreement.

13 The Amin coup doomed EAC - albeit actual break-up was six years later. EAC's dynamic had been triangular. Two axes Kenya-Uganda and Kenya-Tanzania were economic relations with Kenya the stronger party in each (more so vis-à-vis Uganda which had no other viable route to the sea) and were balanced by the third which was political between Tanzania and Uganda (who had no substantial direct economic links) to counter Kenyan economic dominance. While Tanzania agreed to work with Uganda at practical level (especially in EAC) it effectively never de jure recognised the Amin regime. While many Uganda officials remained in post and some Ministers were familiar figures, Amin's lack of interest in economic issues and violent reaction to initiatives by others meant Uganda could only deal with day to day business or - with a serious lag - crises not new directions
nor strategy. Trust and momentum were lost and strains in the mid 1970’s over forex transfers built up rather than being resolved.

14. Other zones of the Continent can be sketched more briefly. Despite efforts including tentative institutionalisation, Mahgrebin economic sub-regionalism never really got off the ground. Partly this turned on tensions among the potential member states, partly on alternative non-regional zonal economic scenarios (Mediterranean - i.e. EU - African and other littoral and Arab - i.e. North African - West Asian) and partly on Egyptian interest in Africa being both of moderate intensity and of substantial regional diversity (i.e. Khartoum, Lagos, Nairobi, Accra, Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Dakar almost as much as the Mahgreb).

15. The Horn (Sudan-Ethiopia/Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia/Somaliland) has not been perceived as a sub-region economically nor, until recently, politically. As a Northern extension of the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (to which at one point all of its states adhered) it has been a technical and political minefield rather than a functioning zone.

16. The Indian Ocean island economies hardly constitute a zone by themselves as their links are either almost entirely European (Seychelles, Reunion, Comores) or European and Mainland African (Mauritius, Madagascar). Mauritius did become an active PTA/COMESA (and now SADC) member for trade expansion reasons; Madagascar (distracted by domestic instability and a certain ambivalence as to its Africaness) has not.

17. Equatorial Africa ended colonialism with two quasi economic (or at least trade and monetary) unions - UDEAC among the five former French colonies and Congo Belge-Ruanda-Urundi in the Belgian sphere. The latter broke up at independence in 1960 and attempts to float successors (e.g. the High Economic Community of the Great Lakes) never had much reality. UDEAC lost members for a variety of reasons and eroded more than its Francophone West African parallels albeit the central bank/common currency
survived and even added Equatorial Guinea. The 1980’s attempt to create a Central African Economic Community (modelled on ECOWAS) achieved treaties and vestigial offices but no substantive reality.

18. The South African economic zone - with occupied Namibia and the ex High Commission Territories (BLS) as the core and Mozambique, the ex-Central African Federation states as the inner periphery and Angola, (then) Zaire, Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros as the outer periphery - was relatively strong but hardly Pan African (classical or otherwise). Indeed it was increasingly used (sometimes to the frustration of its economic technocratic managers) quite overtly in the opposite cause of making Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid.

19. Other nominally regional economic groupings were either mini in nominal and micro in actual economic coverage, e.g. Liberia-Sierra Leone-Guinea, or overtly special purpose, e.g. Senegal and Kagera Basin authorities among those with a water/communication/land use focus based on coordinated development of specified cross frontier areas. These did not per se conflict with broader sub-regional groupings, but nor were they logically building blocks toward a deeper broader dynamic. The African Development Bank might have played such a role but did not, apparently as a result of three factors:

a. it never articulated and gave programmatic content to its endorsement of economic regionalism and, indeed, only began to analyse it in any detail at the very end of the 1980’s;

b. was repeatedly riven by inter African, African - External member and general lending programme viability/efficiency challenges;

c. as a result never being very clearly seen as an actor in sub-regional economic regionalism even though some sub-regional bodies (notably SADCC/SADC) thought it had a vocation for such a role and should articulate and implement one as did some senior ADB personnel.
SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE - PAN AFRICAN
RENAISSANCE 1961-1980

1. The one area in which Pan African rhetoric and the self reliance - self determination - self respect themes remained alive throughout in an all African and/or Sub-Regional focus was the Southern African Liberation Struggle. The reasons at one level are obvious - at least emotionally and in public pronouncements African leaders and states were all committed to completing decolonisation and coordinated action among Liberation Movements and neighbouring independent states was important irrespective of the subsequent projected balance of nationalism and regionalism. An additional factor turned on Mwalimu Nyerere’s and Tanzanians’ more generally being more concerned about completion of liberation and more committed to trying to forge regionalism even at the price of some de facto transfer of powers than has been typical either of Presidents or peoples.

2. The most relevant phase of this continuation and latter renaissance of classic Pan Africanism began in 1961 with the independence of Tanzania, moved forward structurally in 1980 with the inauguration of SADCC and again in 1994-95 with the entry of the New South Africa into the regional economic arrangements (by then SADC) and the 1995-96 transformation of the Front line States into a household to national security organisation more overtly linked to SADC than had been the case of FLS/SADCC interaction.

3. From independence Tanzania provided bases for Liberation Movements - initially primarily Zambian, Mozambican, South African, Namibian and to a lesser extent Zimbabwean and Angolan. Whatever the initial debate on the provision of bases for armed action, the Portuguese concluded it by a policy of no negotiations with Frelimo and repeated (if tiny and strategically useless) armed raids into Tanzania. Because of its clear and sustained commitment, Tanzania became central to the advance of independence in Southern African at the operational level, to OAU efforts to back it via the Liberation Committee (based in Dar es Salaam and Tanzanian led) and in building up the Front Line States. These comprised Tanzania plus the states in which liberation movements won power plus Botswana - which had a less fraught evolution - but minus Malawi - whose President Kamuzu Banda was little interested in further liberation (regionally or at home) once he was President (presently President for Life) of an independent Malawi.
4. By their nature the FLS (including their *de facto* associate members - SWAPO, ANC and earlier FRELIMO, MPLA and both major Zimbabwean Liberation Movements) were engaged in coordinated and/or unified action. Initially their views on regionalism, while positive, were very general and vague and their explorations toward wider aspects of regional security and good governance once minority rule was ended vaguer still.

5. In the late 1970's - partly sparked by the trauma of 1973-74 global economic crises shock impacts on Southern Africa, the FLS began to consider building up a framework of economic coordination (including joint approaches to, agenda for and negotiations with external funding partners). These were seen from the start as *de facto* the economic wing of the FLS with the two main areas of dialogue whether they should be freestanding or overtly part of the FLS structure and whether non-FLS Southern African states (Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi) should be members.

6. Because of its origins this approach to economic regionalism was always overtly political economic - including reducing and defending against South African economic penetration of, and near hegemony over, neighbouring economies. This put it potentially at odds with ECA’s much more technocratic Addis to Gaborone (gradually expanded to Cape to Cairo, or at least Khartoum) preferential trade area to common market to community project whose origins dated to the early 1960’s but which was revived in the mid and late 1970’s. The Northern, Central and Island PTA states were not integrally involved in the liberation struggle, coordination beyond commerce (unless on a smorgesbjord basis) was easy to envisage for Greater Southern Africa (through Tanzania and economically, albeit not politically then Zaire) and for Greater East Africa (Kenya-Uganda-Rwanda-Burundi-Tanzania) but less so among the two foci and still less adding the Indian Ocean states and the Horn. Further ECA had arguably tried too hard and been too up front on the issue, limiting perceived domestic involvement and commitment both at political and senior official levels.

7. However until the very end of the 1970’s, FLS economic regional thinking was very general and had no real articulated economic analysis or economic strategy content. Further until 1978 it was somewhat hampered by Tanzania’s economic regionalism policy capacity being focused on the ultimately doomed effort to save the East African Community. In addition the heritage of the EAC the Rhodesias-Nyasaland economic
union, the South African monetary and customs unions and "Portugal in Africa" economic 'unification' meant that political commitment was tempered by fears it could go very wrong and end as a disunifying and destabilising force.

SELF RELIANCE AND SECURITY: Liberation and The Road To SADCC

1. A drawing together of security and classic Pan Africanism more generally with economic regionalism evolved in Southern African over the 1970's culminating in the formal launching of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference in April 1980. The OAU and especially its Liberation Committee had always held to classic Pan Africanism (in a sense because Southern Africa was the last frontier of the external minority rule against which early Pan Africanism had struggled). Tanzania had backed and hosted the main Liberation Movements politically and to a degree militarily and grouped five of the newly independent states (Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, and parallel to SADCC's emergence Zimbabwe) into the Frontline States as a regional liberation/military security coordination and support group.

2. Tanzania had also pursued bilateral economic cooperation agreements - of substantial scope and substance with Zambia and to a lesser extent Mozambique, though much less so with respect to Botswana or Angola let alone Lesotho. However, these while consistent with the FLS were initially parallel in nature. The Tanzania-Zambia rail, road haulage and pipe line ventures were integral to Zambia's economic, political and military survival following Rhodesia's illegal declaration of independence, but did not form part of any broader political economic cum security strategy nor were they closely linked to arrangements with Mozambique, Botswana and Angola. Indeed Tanzania's approach to regionalism in respect to Zambia was to encourage and to back its negotiating for accession to EAC.

3. In the last years of the 1970's this piecemeal approach was transformed into a much more holistic one in which SADCC became de facto the economic wing of the FLS and, at least at heads of state and senior ministerial level, economic strategy and programming came to be perceived as integrally related to and part of liberation and security. By its context,
membership and objectives SADCC was far more overtly political economic than any of its post colonial predecessors (or than PTA). Four strands contributed to this evolution:

a. the growing realisation that liberation support depended on relatively strong economies and independent (of the South African systems) transport and communications with independent neighbours and the outside world;

b. the break-up of the EAC and CACM the which left Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe free to look for new regional arrangements and ones more related to national strategies than their predecessors, combined with Botswana’s (and Swaziland’s) desire to loosen South African hegemony over its economy;

c. Mozambique (and to a lesser degree Angola) was concerned with security including access to soft, long term Northwestern finance which its declining to join the ACP, IMF or World Bank prejudiced and saw regional economic diplomacy jointly with its neighbours as highly relevant while Lesotho - whatever the limits of its possible economic links with the non-contiguous SADCC core - saw a regional economic grouping as a morale and diplomatic boost and a less provocative vehicle for expressing its Africaness and commitment to liberation than FLS membership.

d. An independent group of public servants (notably Bernard Chidzero, David Anderson and Amon Nsekela) and academicians (including the author) had begun formulating a strategy for coordinated economic regionalism particularly in respect to external financial mobilisation and allocation (thus the second C in SADCC) initially to lead to joint ECA-EEC sponsored conference. When misunderstandings ended the ECA link, they turned - via Presidents Nyerere, Khama and Kaunda - to the FLS as potential sole sponsor.

4. During 1988-89 the endorsement of three FLS Heads of State led to a FLS Foreign Ministers’ decision to convene a senior official meeting in Gaborone which led to a Ministerial Council (chaired by Botswana’s then Vice President Quett Masire) and an official meeting (chaired by Tanzania’s then High Commissioner to London Amon Nsekela) in Arusha to approve broad goals/strategy and a basic statement of purpose document followed by a meeting for dialogue with invited guests (basically potential national and international agency cooperating partners) hosted by President Khama. In
April 1991 SADCC was founded at Heads of State/Government level with the Lusaka Declaration and appended heads of programme and in November it held its first meeting with external supporters based on an initial set of coordinated key projects, strategies and studies agreed at SADCC official and ministerial meetings.

5. The prefounding and early history of SADCC are marked by six elements less prominent in most other sub-regional initiatives:

a. **self determination in the sense of government (FLS) set strategy and priority instruments** with little dependence on standard economic union theory or experience;

b. **self reliance in the sense of main policy guideline determination and project approval by ministers responsible to heads of state** based on official (national and regional) articulation and - on occasion - proposals with no institutional technical assistance at strategic level and only three FLS chosen key external advisers (one diplomacy, one administration, one strategy and policy articulation and analysis);

c. a premise that **promotion of common interests commonly perceived** to require or to be pursued more effectively by sub-regional coordination - not trade barrier reduction - was the appropriate central goal of a regional grouping;

d. resulting in a **multi sectoral approach** in which production (including knowledge, transport and communications) coordination took precedence over trade barrier reduction because trade was seen as the consequential handmaid of production not its causative mistress;

e. overt **grounding of economic instruments in a political economic context** and four central strategic goals (reducing unilateral external dependence - especially but not only on RSA; building mutually beneficial regional arrangements; mobilising and allocating resources to these ends; building up an economic and political economic context of external support by dialogue and diplomacy);

f. as a result **launching SADCC with a declaration of context, strategic intent, main initial potential sectors and instruments for initial action** (The Lusaka Declaration) with an appended list of **main activities** for the next year (amended annually).
Because of the commonly perceived common interest theme and the "deep" sectoral approach (vs. a broad shallow trade barrier reduction one) freedom to build up as needed on the basis of experience was perceived to make a full blown normal Treaty structure premature - albeit the drafters of the Lusaka Declaration never expected it to be SADCC's basic constitution for a decade.

6. Less overtly the SADCC process **took account of governance** in several senses:
   a. states to whom the political economic context of apartheid at bay and striking back was peripheral were perceived as unlikely to have an adequate array of common economic concerns;
   b. states perceived as friendly to, or tolerant of dealings with, South Africa were ruled out if on the margins of the core Southern African region;
   c. some (implicit) standards of decent governance were seen as a prerequisite to membership and in particular military governance and coups were viewed very negatively.

7. Despite external pressures on its behalf and an expressed desire to join Zaire was viewed as totally excluded on the second and third counts and Kenya - had it then desired to join - would have been seen as ruled out on all three. The **actual debate concerned** the three non FLS members (**Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi**). Lesotho's internal governance patterns did give rise to some reservations as - given its location - did the limited applicability of many (not all e.g. air transport, telecommunications, food security) SADCC programmatic instruments. However, it was overtly on the side of liberation and saw SADCC membership as politically and diplomatically useful so no serious issue of exclusion arose. Swaziland was perceived by some as more problematic as a result of its diplomacy and political economy of balancing among its larger neighbours to achieve some freedom of manoeuvre. However, Mozambique's firm endorsement on the basic of economic efficacy of SADCC's transport sector and on that of strengthening Swazi distancing from South Africa were accepted by other FLS states. The most doubtful case was Malawi ("Hastings' Bandastan" as some termed it). It was clearly at some levels allied with RSA, hosted an externally manipulated guerrilla force (RENAMO) seeking to overthrow an FLS government (Mozambique); had border disputes with two other FLS
members (Zambia, Tanzania) and advocated the deconstruction of central and northern Mozambique to create Rombezia ('Greater Malawi'). However, Mozambique, and less energetically Tanzania, argued that the economic logic of inclusive regionalism was bolstered by the political economic that a coordinated transport sector would influence "FLS locked" Malawi while the SADCC structures and processes would reinforce the elements in the Malawi public service and cabinet who - for whatever reasons - opposed the pro-South African and especially the pro-Renamo policy stance.

SECURITY RECONSIDERED AND REDEFINED: From The Beira Corridor To Kinshasa

1. SADCC/SADC have always been quite overtly about security: economic security, the economic defence of military security, economic diplomacy in support of (as well as parallel to) political, food security in the face of calamity (drought) and catastrophe (war), internal security in the sense of minimum standards of governance, external security in the sense of actions of neighbours (whether overtly externally aggressive or not) threatening the economic and social as well as political and military security of Member States. Until the early 1990's this rather protean (or in more complimentary terms holistic) definition of security was implicit and intuitive built up from the "case law" of urgent strategic decisions and tactical programming to defend against threats to security. This combination of quite general principles, strategies to address overriding challenges to them, immediate concrete action and subsequent reflection, revision and coordination of themes is the main way in which SADCC can fairly said to have been pragmatic. (It was also pragmatic in preferring dialogue to shouting and dropping proposals for instruments which led to internal discord (e.g. an attempt to unify currencies) or fixed, uniform external disinterest (e.g. a Sub-Regional Development Bank combining direct lending - technical assistant and merchant banking).

2. In part this was a result of the sharp change in South African strategy over 1979-81. 1977-79 had been marked by a lull in South African support for RENAMO and in aggressive action by it and its ally UNITA in Angola. Economic pressures via delays in transport, shifting cargo away from Maputo, reducing allowed hiring of Southern African
workers, ending the gold arrangement on remittances to Mozambique (a long running one but not very large in term of subsidy until the end of the 1960’s when gold soared above the $35 an ounce rate and one presumably allowed to run up to $200 million a year to support Portuguese resistance to FRELIMO, not Mozambican territorial development) and manipulation of trade volumes and prices were - accurately over 1977-80 - the perceived threats which SADCC sought to counter. In 1979-80 South African reorganised its economic offensive into the ‘Greater Southern Africa Co-Prosperity Sphere’ launched at Carleton House after SADCC’s Arusha Conference and perhaps more significantly added a military/political destabilisation front to create a unified Forward Strategy to make Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid. As a result the tactic against the 1980 SADCC Consultative Conference in Maputo was a counter forum in Mbabane but to the 1981 Blantyre Conference was armed attacks on oil facilities and navigation aids at Beira (then one of Malawi’s two main ports).

3. SADCC adjusted - the transport and communications sectors’ work rapidly became focused on creating (especially in respect to ground satellite stations) or repairing/renewing (especially in respect to the rail and port corridors to Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Ncala, Luanda and - most crucial - Beira) to maintain or achieve secure routes among SADCC states and with the outside world bypassing South Africa. The project clusters were economically analysed and economically sound (the South African routes were longer and had greater satellite and port bottlenecks) but the overriding concerns were to avert Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola and avoid Malawi, Swaziland and (to a lesser degree) Zambia being left totally dependent on South African road-rail-port-telecoms links.

4. The military/economic interaction shows most clearly in the Defence of the Beira Corridor, Zimbabwe’s key independent route to the sea (road, rail, pipeline). Defence coordination involved Mozambique, Zimbabwe and at a later stage Tanzania. Diplomatic focused on pressuring Malawi to end rest, relaxation, reprovisioning and regrouping bases for Renamo; economic on mobilising resources and personnel to overcome 1972-79 deferred maintenance and damage from South African/Renamo raids to keep port, pipeline, road and rail rolling and - via the mixed (public/private, Zimbabwe/Mozambique) Beira Corridor Authority build up the corridor’s economy. Each of the coordinated fronts
was successful - the 1987 battles outside Quelimane and at the Sena Bridge on the Zambesi defeating the Buffalo Brigade/Renamo forces were the eastern parallel to South Africa’s defeat in the skies over Cuito Canavale in the West, while in 1986-87 Malawi ended large scale RENAMO basing facilities. And - central to the SADCC front - the corridor traffic rolled on. These outcomes it must be said were close run and without the regional collaboration via FLS/SADCC the fall of Beira, the blockade of Zimbabwe and even the launch of Rombezia (Malawi-Northern Mozambique) might well have happened.

5. SADCC also sought to address more directly economic security - national and household - in respect to food. 1985-87 efforts at Annual Consultative Conferences had limited results. In part this related to apparently separate (or at best parallel) national and regional programmes, in part to weaknesses on most proposals and - perhaps most key - the non fit between Consultative Conference and emergency hunger appeal timings and between the bilateral and multilateral officials at SADCC meetings and those who actually dealt with emergency/humanitarian relief. By the time of the Great Drought of 1991-92 and the Great Dearth (and prospective Great Famine) of 1992-93, SADCC's Food Security Unit had learned from experience. It had the earliest definitive data for the region and for several countries; coordinated holistic national appeals and launched a awareness and mobilisation campaign early in 1992. This led to earlier international assessment (and confirmation of most SADCC estimates and analysis) and an early donor conference cosponsored by SADCC and the UN which achieved just enough grain just in time to avert mass starvation. A parallel SADCC-RSA (by then en route to the New South Africa) transport coordination group achieved substantial logistical success- only the routes via South Africa (overprogrammed by donors against SADCC/SARR advice) developed serious bottlenecks.

6. During the SADC period water came to be a security focus. At household level this relates to pre-emptive maintenance of extant facilities and building up more drought secure sources notably in the Limpopo Valley and for Beira and Maputo. Nationally it turns on water agreements on transborder rivers and potentially, coordinated river basin management. Because Southern Africa faces growing overall water shortages such agreements (specifically set out as a sector priority with dated progress targets) are essential to averting severe tensions and, potentially, war. The problems were realised
earlier, but as the Orange, Zambesi and Kunene River clusters involved both occupied Namibia and South Africa; the Okavango basin occupied Namibia and the Mozambique-Swaziland-Vaal and Limpopo basin ones South Africa, no action was seen as possible earlier.

7. Cross border cooperation against crime - especially the arms, drugs and stolen vehicle trades - was largely impossible prior to the 1990’s. By 1992 it had begun on a tentative basis and by 1994 illegal mass immigration was also seen as a common concern.

8. However, both at governmental and civil society level, a perception had developed that without household physical and economic security national crime and massive population movement security concerns could not be handled. The corridors of development approach (notably Maputo-South Africa) was intended, at least in part, to meet the household level challenge by increasing deep poverty areas’ livelihood development possibilities (in southern Mozambique in the Maputo Corridor case).

9. A parallel rethinking related to acceptable governance. SADCC had always been concerned about a degree of “like mindedness” and minimum acceptable governance standards. In particular it was very anti military coups - seriously considering excluding the 1986 Lesotho government. The 1994 Lesotho military coup with a (usurpers’) royal face caused it to act decisively. No SADC state recognised the coupsters and SADC - like its members - continued to recognise the elected government. In its support South Africa (and in parallel its civil society especially the trade union sector) gradually tightened an economic blockade while Botswana-Zimbabwe-South Africa negotiated a non-violent restoration of the elected government. The contrast with the parallel - except for regional response - case of Gambia is instructive. However, the very special conditions (an elected government which could credibly continue to be recognised and the ease of a total blockade) were probably not fully recognised - thus ECOWAS’s problems in attempting a parallel 1997 exercise in support of the elected government of Sierra Leone against a mutinous army/internal rebel coup.

10. In 1993-94 SADC and its member states had extensive dialogue and discussion sessions with each other and (especially but not only in South Africa and Namibia) with civil society groups culminating in the 1994 Windhoek Conference. Here the definition of
security as household to regional and survival/livelihood to military and the need for a holistic multi-sectoral approach addressing base causes as well as symptoms were broadly agreed. Subsequent institutional development has been more tentative - perhaps deliberately. A council system (official/ministerial) reporting to Heads of State has been set up - nominally parallel to rather than an integral part of SADC but involving the same countries and serviced by a secretariat in the Gaborone SADC headquarters. It is composed of Foreign-Defence-Home Affairs (Police, Immigration) representatives. However, Food Security and Water clearly also have roles in the broad concept of security as do corridor projects and other SADC programmes intended to raise livelihood opportunities of poor households.

11. In practice the security action has been either low profile (crime prevention, immigration management) or fronted by a single state (usually South Africa or Zimbabwe) speaking on behalf of all (or most). The 1995 Commonwealth decisions on Nigeria were in large part made possible by Zimbabwe, subsequently backed by South Africa. The motivation appears to have been two fold - the denial of decent governance to and imposition of military tyranny on any Africans threatens all Africans, and African self respect requires a clear stand by African states (not just outsiders) on the Abacha regime. Over 1995-1997 the SADC security group became increasingly involved in the Great Lakes crisis and the revolutionary ouster of Mobutu. Here, there were precise, SADC concerns - the economies and military security of Tanzania, Zambia and Angola were threatened (Mobutu was a firm UNITA backer and vica versa). The South African leadership role in respect to regional ‘mediation’ in respect to Zaire (as it then was) clearly aimed at reducing economic strains on and military risks to the three member states and equally clearly saw as speedy a handover of power (with the lowest possible level of bloodshed) by Mobutu as a necessary component in achieving that goal. How much influence (e.g. by offering cooperation and/or membership) on President Kabila’s Congo government South Africa and/or SADC have and or can achieve remains unclear, but Mobutu and his genocidal Hutu revanchist allies no longer threaten Angola, Zambia and Tanzania while UNITA’s ability to revert to war once again is crippled.
PARALLEL SECURITY VENTURES: The Horn and the Freed Slave States

1. The return of SADCC/SADC to security considerations turned in part on leadership at Presidential, Ministerial and official levels and in part on the particular context of the Southern African Liberation Struggle. It was also facilitated by the definition of purpose as furtherance of common interests perceived as such by its member states and of structuring integral state involvement into central decision making and sectoral programme articulation. Certainly it was these characteristics (together with its clear linkage to the history of liberation) which facilitated rapid South African accession after the change of government and kept a real - however uneven among sectors and countries - economic coordination toward integration economic dynamic moving. However, SADCC/SADC was not unique - the challenges of the 1980’s and 1990’s have included a rising number of civil wars with dire sub-regional consequences because of spillover (refugees, violence) impact on their neighbours. While COMESA (perhaps surprisingly) has not sought to act on these altered realities, ECOWAS has, as has the Horn-Kenya Intergovernmental Group Against Drought and for Development which was initially a (decreasingly effective) locust, quelea bird and drought combating body associated with food security.

2. ECOWAS moved into security operations first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone although between the two it notably failed to do so in Gambia in 1994 where its action would almost certainly have led to the relatively speedy and non violent restoration of SSA’s longest running multi party election chosen democratic government. The road to security operations - including, unlike SADC, deployment of substantial multi country armed forces much more willing to take proactive and reactive combat roles than UN peacekeeping forces - is perhaps typical of ECOWAS dynamics. The initiative in both cases was Nigerian (as apparently was the key decision not to act in the Gambian case) and the doubtful, bystander or in some cases counter acting states were Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal albeit Ghana and Guinea were prominent Nigerian allies and the Cote d’Ivoire (under pressure of massive refugee flows and episodic spillover of violence) came to acquiesce in ECOWAS action albeit not providing significant personnel. Indeed the inaction on Gambia probably turned on Senegal’s clear (if misguided) preference for the coupsters it did not know over President Jawara whom it did know in respect to halting
entrepot (as seen from Banjual) smuggling (in Dakar’s optic) trade and facilitating action against the Casamance rebels.

3. Nigeria initially intervened unilaterally in Liberia to prop up President Doe - the sergeant being a friend of Nigeria’s then military leaders. As the situation deteriorated Nigeria sought ECOWAS backing (or cover) and adopted a less partisan political stance. The tortuous series of negotiations and (oft broken) agreements among Liberian fractions and the oscillating degrees of competence and effectiveness of the ECOWAS forces (eventually OAU and UN blessed and partly Northwestern state funded) did lead to a truce, partial disarmament and a reasonably free and fair 1997 election with a very clear outcome - ironically by the leader (Charles Taylor) Nigeria had initially intervened to block.

4. Sierra Leone again featured Nigerian led involvement albeit Ghana and Guinea were very keen on action because of the refugee crises the civil war imposed on them. The stepped up operations in 1996-97 appear to be a Nigerian response to international condemnation of its military governance. Protecting forces did facilitate a free and fair election but before any truce agreement/negotiating frame with the RUF. The subsequent 1996 agreement broke down when the Sierra Leone army staged at least its 10th major and 6th successful coup. ECOWAS continued to recognise President Kabbah (in exile in Conakry but with village defence militias in the field in Sierra Leone), to hold bases in Freetown (notably the international airport) and to seek (by a mix of military and negotiating) means to pressure the mutineers to abandon their new RUF allies and accept the return of the lawful government.

5. Liberia and Sierra Leone have special histories. Both were established as homes for freed slaves (from the USA in Liberia and from the UK and - especially - from slaverships interdicted by the Royal Navy in Sierra Leone). Both developed highly polarised socio-political structures pitting Afro-Americans, and Creoles respectively against ‘tribals’. In Liberia, the Doe Coup and its bloody aftermath were the definitive overthrow of the Afro-American establishment. In the Sierra Leone case, Creole political power ended (peaceably - by election) in the 1960’s. In both initial revolts and subsequent changes of government were army led (from the blocking of Siaka Stevens’ election in the 1970’s through the overthrow of President Kabbah in 1997 in Sierra Leone and from the Doe
coup through a confused series of army fraction and semi ethnic group militias in Liberia). In each case good governance was totally absent - indeed had never existed in Liberia - and civil governance greatly eroded and manipulated to serve corrupt and corrupting interests even before the wars of the last decade. In both countries the actual practice of war has been brutal, indisciplined and humanly/socially corrosive. Whether ECOWAS has addressed this context and evolved a strategy for helping newly elected governments to restore good governance - including basic service delivery and total demobilisation of all armed bands (most certainly including the present so called Sierra Leone army) and training new loyal, professional police and army units is very doubtful. While the same criticism can be made of the UN, the EU and the USA and other bilateral donors, it remains an apparent weakness in ECOWAS's security vision that it has to date only two major features - armed force to create a semi cessation of hostilities and a pact among armed fractions leading to an internationally assisted and monitored election. That, experience suggests is not, by itself, enough to secure more than a truce.

6. The IGAD case is somewhat different from the ECOWAS because IGAD was previously an (almost non functional) special purpose group focused on drought response and insect/bird pest combating. The tentative renaissance as a security promotion forum (and, almost as a side-show the drafting of an economic community treaty even though all of its members are also COMESA members) arose out of the long running civil wars in the Sudan and the collapse of civil governance in Somalia and more particularly the massive flows of refugees and, at least potentially, of massive armed conflict across borders.

7. IGAD has held a number of series of official, ministerial and - incomplete - summit meetings focusing on dialogue to achieve a lasting settlement of the Sudanese civil war and to secure the re-emergence of recognisable (in both senses) territory wide civil governance in Somalia. All have broken down and there is little evidence of better future outcomes.

8. In fact an unofficial grouping of Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the de facto Republic of Somaliland (the old British Somaliland) and the Sudanese alliance of the southern Liberation movements and the main Northern Democratic parties has become much more a sub regional security group for the Horn than IGAD. (Uganda is not directly involved in respect to Somalia/Somaliland and Somaliland is not involved in respect to the Sudan.
The Khartoum regime and the Somalian factions are not members and Somaliland only a partial *de facto* one.

9. This composition makes what might be called the *Kampala-Addis-Asmara* group more analogous to the FLS vis-à-vis South Africa than to a sub-regional group addressing the security concerns of its members.

a. in respect to the Sudan the military/minority Islamic fraction regime is perceived as the main obstacle to peace in the Sudan and security for both its people and its neighbours;

b. in Somalia/Somaliland the government of Somaliland is perceived as a valid government (and useful economic partner) whether as a separate state or part of a confederal Somalia; the irredentist Somali groups attacking Ethiopia (especially Ethiopia's Somali Region and its leaders) as mortal enemies and the rest of the Somalia fractions as certainly part of the problem and only dubiously part of any stable answer;

c. resulting in provision of bases, logistics, supplies and diplomatic promotion for the Sudanese alliance with the overt aim of assisting it to liberate the Sudan;

d. *de facto* recognition of Somaliland;

e. a policy of attacking bases for raids into Ethiopia with encouragement for negotiation toward a confederal dynamic among other Somalia fractions.

10. In the case of the Sudan (and of Somaliland at least for the foreseeable future) a clear strategy exists. It requires a change (a violent change) of government in the Sudan. This is clearly inconsistent with the historic OAU stance but not necessarily with the views of its present Secretary General and a number of its members on how progress toward Horn peace and security might be furthered. The twin horrors of genocide in Rwanda and the intolerably protracted death of the Mobutu regime in (then) Zaire have vastly eroded the conviction and the intellectual foundations of the "internal affairs" doctrine as has the manifest fact that at least Liberia and Somalia have lacked any plausible pretence at national governments for well over half a decade.

11. The lack of clarity (or at least *de facto* transparency) on means in the case of Somalia is arguably a weakness but equally arguably a strength. No alliance comparable to the main
Southern Liberation Movement - main Islamic fraction (Mahdism) - main Democratic Parties one in the case of the Sudan exists. Ethiopia has neither the means nor the desire to impose a settlement and its overt backing of a fraction (even, or perhaps especially if handled largely by Ethiopian Somalis) would run a high risk of being counterproductive. (Even in the Sudanese case, Ethiopia has deliberately encouraged Eritrea to provide the base for the de facto government in exile and to be the leading diplomatic proponent of the front.) Quarantining, attacking bases for raids, averting the spread of chaos to Somaliland and quietly encouraging discourse among fractions is arguably the least bad strategy available for the Horn proper.

ECONOMIC MEANS IN FLUX - 1980/1996

1. The 1980’s saw significant progress in two sub regional economic organisations - SADCC and PTA - and their transformation into economic communities - SADC and COMESA - at the turn of the decade. ECOWAS and the Francophone West African groupings survived but the former failed to launch a serious economic coordination programme or achieve trade preferences while the latter continued trade - fiscal redistribution currency union activities but with a general perception of relative stagnation or decline at least until 1994.

2. The fact that both relatively successful bodies were located in Eastern and Southern Africa suggests that, for whatever reasons this area was contextually better placed for regionalism. Further the reality that of the non-SADCC PTA members only Kenya and Mauritius and later Uganda were economically active (and that Mozambique and especially Angola economic involvement in trade was limited) suggests that an overriding condition was absence of domestic civil war and presence of a priority political economic motivation - key markets for Kenya and Mauritius and routes to the sea for Uganda. The two organisations were quite divergent in origins, overall approach and initial strategic instruments.

3. SADCC as discussed above was the product of the FLS with a focus on economic self determination, self reliance and security. Coordination of economic strategic and project clusters in transport, communications, food security, energy, animal disease control and
agricultural research and extension were its core areas. Trade was somewhat latter in
emerging with an articulated strategy and, when it did, focused on identifying
complementarities, promoting commercial sector exchange of information, state facilitation
of trade credit and harmonisation/simplification of customs-transit-interstate vehicle
regulations, not on tariff preferences or commercial clearing arrangements. The reasons
were complex:

a. to the extent the threats to economic (and political) survival were transport disruption
and communications blockage or tapping, transport and communications maintenance
and augmentation were a precondition both for trade and for survival:

b. more generally the physical, transport cost and information gap barriers to trade were
perceived as more crucial than tariffs, while medium term swing credits and trade
finance were thought to be key to reducing quota constructions;

c. and in the longer term SADCC worked on the basis that coordination and expansion of
production combined with pooling of information would be validated (not caused) by
trade; and

d. PTA’s tariff preferences and commercial clearing were usable among SADCC states
(except Botswana and, at that time, Angola) so that replication would waste effort and
cause controversy.

4. SADCC also had substantial institutional and processual divergences from PTA’s
standard central secretariat driven model. The driving forces in the official - ministerial -
heads of state chain (advised at each level by the central and, where appropriate sectoral,
secretariats) were the government members. Decisions were debated and drafts frequently
amended, substituted or rejected as a matter of course. The central secretariat’s core staff
(after two years of a Botswana seconded plus associated individuals interim secretariat)
was kept small and by 1988 comprised 100% citizens using consultants (citizen and
outside world, individually chosen and ta provided) on special topics or reviews. The bulk
of the staff were in sectoral units, each under the leadership of a member state with a
priority interest in that sector. Staffs varied - dominantly citizens in agriculture and food
security because Zimbabwe and Botswana had relevant professionals and funds to cover
‘free’ secondment, mixed in energy (where Angola had funds but less specialised
personnel) and largely (though not exclusively especially in respect to policy) expatriates in Transport and Communication (where Mozambique had limited citizen professionals and less funds). Central (and sectoral) secretariat work centred on articulating strategic and policy proposals and referring back for approval leading (especially in the sectors) to programme and project collection-evaluation-coordination leading to sectoral draft regional programmes for state approval. In addition information collection, public relations and diplomacy (e.g. mobilising project support, negotiating the EEC-SADCC compact which was the first giving an ACP region a real voice in allocation and use of EEC regional funding) were secretariat duties.

5. PTA focused on neo-classical official trade barrier reduction - tariffs, quotas, customs and transit documentation and procedures and commercial (90 day) trade balance clearing. Unlike ECOWAS (much less other nominal sub-regional groupings) it achieved a series of tariff reduction rounds, at least substantial quota easing, a clearing mechanism based in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe which did - with hiccups - clear and did cover the bulk of rather narrowly defined - interstate current account balances and (albeit the driving force was UNCTAD and non-PTA SADCC states were involved in the exercise) at least significant customs, transit and interstate vehicle nomenclature forms and procedures harmonisation and simplification. In addition - after a false start via the old EADB (which Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania decided to reactivate on, and as, their own) it established a COMESA Trade Bank with not insignificant pledged resources. While interstate trade remained a low proportion of total external trade and most intra PTA trade was in a limited number of largely bilateral spokes centred on Harare and Nairobi, these achievements cannot fairly be described as negligible.

6. Outside trade PTA was less effective. Its attempts to create a regional transport and communications plan and a regional early warning system directly conflicted with/duplicated sectors in which SADCC had functioning programmes. It did not focus on Indian Ocean shipping or coordination (merger?) of air transport where SADCC did little or nothing. The Mombasa and Dar es Salaam based Northern and Central Transit corridors to Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Uganda are sometimes claimed as a PTA achievement but in practice are the continuation of littoral/landlocked state forums, dialogues and programmes reaching back to the 1960's.
7. Institutionally PTA had a relatively large and highly centralised secretariat which sought - via late presentation of information and production of decision texts which it clearly suggested should not be challenged or amended by states - to dominate the PTA decision taking process. This was ‘successful’ and did speed ‘decisions’, but left a rather lower level of state commitment to the organisation or the ‘decided’ programmes than characterised SADCC.

8. Until the end of the 1980’s, SADCC and PTA clashed sharply on the appropriateness of external finance mobilisation and, therefore, the appropriateness of member/cooperating partner consultative conferences. PTA contended that involving outside sources of finance in regional programming was inherently “neo-colonial” and that nationally agreed projects should be nationally financed (presumably with nationally negotiated external finance components). At times it suggested any other approach was fraudulent or subservient. While the view of many SADCC officials as well as national officials and ministers that this was a xenophobic smokescreen to cover up PTA’s failure to unlock additional (or reallocated) finance for its programme may have been unfair, the exclusivist approach was never an option for SADCC:

a. to achieve a regional coordinated programme’s implementation required that additional resources be mobilised;

b. except for Botswana and - at some points in time - Angola, states could not mobilise additional domestic resources and - except under special conditions - could not be expected to reallocate substantial sums from national to regional projects;

c. therefore it was essential to secure external financial commitments - both additional and reallocated to regionally agreed priorities and projects;
d. which could only be done by combining regionally agreed programme/project priority packages (to avert donor-individual state disruption of regional project and location priorities - a source of bitter resentment in the old EAC) with full discourse with prospective funders at a SADCC managed regional consultative conference.

SADCC’s sectoral reach made the financial flow issue much more central to it than to PTA since trade barrier reduction, documentation harmonisation and simplification and 90 day clearing houses do not require resource comparable to transport and communications (in which expenditure on regional programme components was approaching $500 million a year by the mid 1990’s) or even food security (where 1992-93 external emergency aid to the regional probably exceeded $500 million).

9. The issue of extending ability to implement via external cooperation versus being coopted by outsiders is ultimately an empirical one. On that test SADCC/SADC have “held the fort”:

a. clearly regionally oriented and coordinated programmes of expenditure in the public sector have risen - in a context of extreme resource scarcity - and by the late 1990’s were of the order of $1,000 million a year:

b. most of this - by the nature of the large, capital and import intensive projects which dominate transport, communications and energy - has come from abroad;

c. some - even if not all - of the external flows are additional (at least to Southern Africa) and more are reallocated from lower priority (or anti regional) projects which would otherwise have been financed;

d. especially in the 1990’s, sub-regionally oriented enterprise investment (e.g. in Beira Corridor and in export oriented manufacturing in several countries) has grown along with host domestic and external resources;

e. SADC runs the only Consultative Group programmed and managed by the recipients and putting up a cooperation proposal agenda analysed, evaluated prioritised and agreed by them (occasionally, but not usually, with some donor advice and/or adapted project suggestions);
f. the Annual Consultative Conference - rather less central to SADCC (and especially SADC) than its share of total, and especially Northern, press coverage would suggest - is an open forum for sessional and corridor dialogue but both the keynote theme setting address and the final draft communique are by its Chairman (the Ministerial Chairman of SADCC) on the advice of his own officials and consultants;

g. Donor preferences do affect the degree to which projects are funded, but occasional donor attempts to substitute projects or to interfere on political grounds with the structuring and scope of ones they accept have been vigorously - and largely successfully - resisted;

h. SADCC gained a reputation for hard headed economic approaches, dialogue (neither shouting nor passive acceptance) and pragmatism (accepting limits of attainable) at the same time it rejected occasional donor proposals on economic ideology, included ANC and SWAPO in conference attenders and sometimes speakers and criticised certain donor actions - e.g. Jonas Savimbi’s 1996 White House visit - firmly (even if not abusively).

This can not be fairly described as the record of “objective and subjective servants of neo-colonial penetration” as has been asserted. In the context of the greatly constricted degrees of freedom open to small, poor, crisis wracked economies in the 1980s and 1990s it represents a not inconsiderable success in sustaining self determination and self respect even if - as SADC is the first to assert - the immediate levels of external reliance are too high.

10. The criticism that SADCC/SADC are in fact a regional transport and communication coordinating group and little more is in part too hasty, in part out of context and in part because focus on spending alone (i.e. not policy, strategy, trade and investment together with public sector investment projects) distorts. In part, however, it may have been fair comment until the mid 1990’s.

a. over 1980-1990 the economic and territorial survival of Mozambique and the survival of Zimbabwe’s ability to stand up to South Africa (which ultimately rested on access via non South African routes to key imports (inter alia petroleum products, arms, vehicles and - in drought years - food) were at risk so that keeping the routes to
Mozambican (and to a lesser extent Tanzanian) ports open was logically SADCC's first priority;

b. programmes to catch up on maintenance, to debottleneck, to expand existing links and to fill gaps were relatively non controversial with donors (albeit over 1980-85 they were somewhat disingenuously described as “new projects” to fit with the then donor fashion against rehabilitation, maintenance and restoration), could be produced quite rapidly and had clearer technical and (on the face of it) economic parameters than most other projects so attracted an overwhelming proportion of donor commitments;

c. per contra knowledge exchange and new research: e.g. in drought resistant crops and coordinated control programmes: e.g. against rinderpest, tse tse fly and the greater borer beetle, were much less cash intensive or high profile especially as their (at least partially achieved) purpose was to preempted impending disasters;

d. other sectors entailed substantial gestation -e.g. early warning systems and food security and hydroelectric grid interconnection and regional sourcing - so had little or no profile for years. But over 1980-90 Zimbabwe turned from projecting up to $2,000 new thermal stations to looking to a regional grid and major power imports (from Zimbabwe, and potentially Botswana and Angola, as well as Zambia) as the strategic way forward while the 1992-93 drought response has already been cited;

e. certain sectors - not least trade and mining - did stagnate because sectoral unit sponsoring countries did not have the ideas, personnel and finance to make them dynamic. That was in part a price of Member State involvement by sectoral sponsorship, but in part a reflection that the lagging areas either did not have wide priority backing (e.g. mining), posed serious problems in synthesising initially incompatible national positions (e.g. trade) or had no through roads to substantial breakthroughs (e.g. a regional development finance institution).

11. In the 1990’s both SADCC and PTA transformed themselves into economic communities - SADC and COMESA. In neither case did the change in name lead directly to a major shift in focus - SADC’s stress on security and COMESA’s on trade barrier reduction (including trade finance and clearing) remained and evolved. However for the first time SADC (unlike SADCC) set a common market as a goal. It added labour (including interstate
employment) and water (particularly interstate river water use agreements) as sectors and in each sector began drawing up detailed subsectoral covenant objectives with target dates for progress. COMESA shifted toward greater stress on sub regional mobilisation of external resources for sub regional programming including the Trade Bank.

12. The single most important event of the mid 1990’s for SADC/COMESA was South Africa’s decision to join SADC (virtually predictable given FLS and SADCC links of the ANC) and not to adhere to COMESA (much less predictable). Structurally - as well as in terms of historic contact and support - SADC was easier: sectoral programmes other than trade (e.g. Maputo corridor, water use agreements, intra regional/interstate power contracts, transport and communications, animal disease control, marine fisheries, tourism, food security) offer clear potential gains both to South African and to its new partners and do so rapidly while negotiating a front end weighted South African and a back end weighted partner route to a common market is technically and politically much more difficult because four SADCC partners are already in a customs union with South Africa. That meant that - apart from clearing and harmonisation - immediate gains to SA and COMESA from trade alone might have been low and negotiations tedious. That South Africa takes its economic links including trade with the sub-region seriously is demonstrated by its rejection of a number of EU proposals in its negotiations for a fresco style preferential toward free trade agreement on the grounds they would seriously impair SA-Southern African economic integration and conflict with its SADC obligations. SA’s accession to SADC ended any chance COMESA could - as it continued to propose - simply absorb SADC. Its failure to adhere to COMESA poses a potential medium term crisis illustrated by Mauritius sudden accession to SADC (in addition to its long standing COMESA membership) presumably because it sees achieving preferential access to South Africa’s market as essential. Kenya (and perhaps Uganda as much for regional security as trade or economic sectoral reasons) might well wish to follow the same course. If the Reserve Bank of South Africa then opened a parallel clearing system, COMESA might look very shaky indeed, unless and until the Horn becomes a potential area of economic/security integration under the leadership of Ethiopia, a new Sudanese regime and just conceivably (purely on security grounds) Uganda.
13. However at present both SADC and COMESA are, and are perceived by most of their members, as **making progress** and **delivering some economic benefits**. Mauritius for example does view COMESA as useful in respect to East African markets and joined SADC to extend preferential access to SA not to leave COMESA. The duty reduction quota easing, form and regulation harmonising and user friendlying, trade finance augmenting, commercial clearing core of COMESA is sound and in no way inherently contradictory to SADC membership. SADC’s successes have been, and remain largely, in sectors other than official trade barrier reduction. South Africa’s accession has broadened and augmented them. On tariff/quota preferences the challenges are:

a. **avoiding conflicts for the 10 COMESA/SADCC co-members**, a condition which moving rapidly to a *de facto* identical set of preferences to COMESA’s among the 7 other than South Africa and its 4 customs union partners would meet for the short to medium term;

b. negotiating a **non symmetrical barrier reduction** between South Africa and the 7 (and therefore unless a special arrangement can be devised) the other SACUA members and the 7 with initial cuts by RSA (and SACUA more generally) deeper;

c. averting a conflict between the **EU’s desire for a (very partial) EU-SA free trade agreement and SA’s determination to foster, not torpedo, sub-regional integration**;

d. negotiating to broaden COMESA’s clearing mechanism coverage to all interested and contiguous African states i.e. SADC-COMESA and potentially Congo (ex Zaire), Madagascar.

None of these challenges is such as to pose technical or economic problems of great severity. Nor is there reason to doubt political commitment in the relevant states. Diplomatic problems on both the SADC-COMESA and the EU-SA (or EU-SA-SADC) axes may be more difficult to finesse.

14. In **West Africa** there has been a **refurbishing of the Francophone free trade, tariff redistribution, monetary union arrangements**. These appear to have been catalysed by the 1994 devaluation and the desire to ensure continued French Treasury fiscal and forex
cover. The occasion was taken to review re-examine, reaffirm, retile (rather more than restructure or redirect) the regional arrangements as well. This may well increase benefit flows marginally, but they are likely to remain on a low plateau.

15. **ECOWAS** has shown some signs of renewed attempts to build operational programmes in some of its economic sectors and in particular to get a preferential tariff scheme into operation and to unblock the clearing house. If these succeed, they will provide an economic complement to the security front and perhaps put ECOWAS on the road to at least a modest recovery albeit not a breakthrough to a status comparable to COMESA or SADC.

**PAN AFRICANISM REVITALISED: Full Circle Round or Upward Spiral?**

1. Late 1990’s regionalism has in significant respects returned to the self determination, self reliance, self respect themes of classic Pan Africanism. This is most clear-cut in the case of SADC with its FLS and Southern African Liberation Struggle roots but is also present in ECOWAS, IGAD and the Uganda-Ethiopia-Eritrea-Sudan united opposition groupings work on conflict containment, resolution and transformation to good governance. Beyond trade it is least evident in COMESA except at rhetorical level.

2. Continentally the OAU has become vocal on good governance over the past five years and has abandoned the strict “domestic affairs” rubric in attempting to play mediatory roles in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Somalia and Sudan. However, it has limited funds, personnel or credibility and has tended to act in support of national (e.g. Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria) or Sub-Regional (ECOWAS, SADC) initiatives/interventions. Whether it can in this way build up a body of expertise and reputation (and thus the basis for mobilising resources and “on call” peace enforcing troops) is not yet clear. In part it depends on the OAU being prominently associated with one or more success stories. Its most high profile involvements - Liberia and Sierra Leone - are highly problematic as to outcome.

3. The idea of an **African peace keeping** (enforcing) military force made up of specially trained committed forces from several countries - a compromise between a permanently
unified armed force and peace ad hocery is again under discussion. Unfortunately the first high profile proposals came not from the OAU but from the USA. While the ideas of Northwestern financial underwriting, of OAU involvement and of African forces to contain and master African war and near war crises are welcome (and in discussion in Africa before the USA initiative) the up front leadership role apparently envisaged by the USA and use of the force being tied to the totally discredited - at least in Africa - UN approach to peace pronouncing and conflict fleeing forces which facilitated rather than blocked Rwanda genocide and de facto consolidated Aideed and Morgan in Somalia are not by any means universally welcome. It is noteworthy that the ECOMOG forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone are willing to fight for peace (whatever their tactical and capability limitations) and the Kampala-Addis-Asmara alliance to resolve the Sudanese civil war by transition to a peaceful, legitimate, federal governments’ approaches peace making more robust than even the NATO campaign in Bosnia.

4. The US training of troops from several countries - e.g. Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, Mali, Zimbabwe and potentially more - is not yet a problem. But it can become so if the OAU does not swiftly take command of setting parameters for when and how the force could be called up and deployed and also agreeing on a command structure when called into action plus a coordinated training programme. Realistically such OAU leadership will be possible only if championed by South Africa with firm Zimbabwean, Botswanan, Namibian, preferably Mozambican and Rwandais, Tanzanian, Ugandan, Ethiopian, Eritrean, Senegalese, Malian and Ghanaian support and at least open consent from Cote d’Ivoire and preferably from Congo (Brazza), Congo (ex Zaire), Angola and Cameroon. Realistically the force would be SSA focused as Egypt’s Middle East concerns and the Saharan Democratic Republic’s liberation struggle are not arenas in which it could be deployed for both political and military reasons.

5. ECA has become virtually irrelevant and will remain so until it redefines a vision, a set of strategic priorities and a credible set of programmes including dialogues. This irrelevance is particular notable in respect to Pan Africanism, governance and regionalism but is currently generic.

6. The ADB is rebuilding its financial and programming credibility and has secured funding to reopen the ADF. That does not by itself constitute a regionalist strategy, but ADF
credits are the only rational ADB funding for over half its members and to have an impact on sub-regionalism and its drawing into a building block dynamic toward continental economic coordination to integration. ADB must be able to contribute to financing integration to play a meaningful role in dialogue about it. Earlier in the 1990’s ADB had begun to engage in serious research on sub-regionalism. That data base remains relevant to renewed strategy development now that the mid 1990’s financial mobilisation and operational credibility crises appears to be en route to resolution.

7. However, the trends visible today - most notably in SADC but also in ECOWAS and the Kampala-Addis-Asmara proto grouping - do not reflect a simple recreation of classic Pan Africanism nor an abandonment of the initial OAU model in its entirety. They include:

a. viewing security issues in terms of a unified position arrived at by a critical mass of governments whether within or outside a formal sub-regional institution;

b. deferring consideration of unification of armed forces, albeit with tentative thinking on joint training, allocation for peacekeeping duty and standby command-logistical-communications structures of components of security services;

c. relating military and diplomatic to household and economic security because the latter are seen to be causally linked to macro domestic insecurity threatening neighbours;

d. abandoning serious discussion of political unification - at least as a general approach - but also resiling from the OAU’s previous hardline “internal affairs” position while groping toward definitions of decent (unacceptably bad) governance and types/levels of domestic insecurity/dissidence which threaten neighbours and therefore are of legitimate sub-regional and OAU concern;

e. viewing economic means as important both in their own right and as means toward political and political economic objectives;

f. concentrating on community building among contiguous states with multiple common interests best pursued jointly and with some minimum levels of “like mindedness” as to governance as an immediate through medium term objective with a
8. Whether these strands represent initial steps toward a consistent, contextual, feasible synthesis adapting Pan African goals and the realities of states and peoples in a way more structural change oriented than the OAU and more realistic and articulated (especially as to economic means and their processual and developmental interactions with security) than was classic Pan Africanism is as yet an open question. To argue that they were simply random adoption of unrelated responses to varying crises would be as unrealistic as to assert that a clear road to sub-regional economic and security communities and their unification of continental level was certain.

9. The abandonment of a very conservative, national supremacy version of internal affairs - non interference in - poses particular problems both conceptually and practically. The more radical of the classic Pan Africanists - not least Osagyefo Nkrumah - did view unification as an overriding principle justifying sweeping away obstacles - including entrenched, unsympathetic national governments - by force. More reflective Pan Africanists - e.g. Mwalimu Nyerere - saw a need for clearly expressed consent as a basis for legitimate unification. In practice Osagyefo never seriously contemplated overthrowing conservative West African governments to achieve union and Mwalimu’s management of the Tanzaniyika-Zanzibar union creation was - by Tanzanian standards - singularly low on transparency and clear, free expression following discourse to determine public preference. The two basic positions - intervene to protect or to promote the common good (regional or sub-regional, security or political) and avoid action without prior consent and in particular action imposed by force across initial boundaries (e.g. the so called unification of Somaliland and Somalia as well as the 1961 suppression of confederalism converting Eritrea from a partner into an imperial outland) remain conceptually and to a large degree practically distinct or at least distinguishable. The latter is not on the OAU or formal sub-regional community agenda’s now nor arrive there in the currently foreseeable future.

10. The real difficulty is in **defining and applying a workable position preserving the principles of consent, of avoidance of self serving interference** in a neighbour who neither poses a threat to the intervenor nor to African self respect, self determination or
self reliance (as e.g. Macias Nguema and Emperor Bokassa arguably did even if they could hardly be claimed to threaten the economic or military security of e.g. Cameroon, Nigeria, Gabon or Congo-Brazzaville) and of ability to take coordinated action from diplomacy and mediation through to economic sanctions and ultimately force when clear security risks/costs or truly monstrous malgovernance were palpably present. This problem was blurred until 1994 because in the case of deconstructing Portugal in Africa, the Rhodesian rebel state, occupied Namibia and the old South Africa diplomacy failed, economic sanctions (even when international backing was secured) were at best slow and partial tools, counterattacks (economic and military) imposed real security costs and risks and consent - or at least non consent to the existing regimes - was palpably present. The last point was - even in these cases - not as self evident when applied to the independence government. Luckily Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa had independently monitored free and fair elections prior to the change of regime which gave the incoming governments clear evidence of consent and a legitimacy they would not otherwise have had. In retrospect it is very unfortunate that internationally supervised (Portuguese supervision would have been neither feasible nor credible) elections were not held in Mozambique and Angola at independence. While these could not have averted later South African malign intervention, they would have increased the seen legitimacy of the governments and - especially in Mozambique - reduced the cracks providing leverage for Rhodesian and South African rebellion fomenting. Even in Angola the process of elections and - realistically - coalition building to seek to transcend the over 400 year old three way social and political cleavages within the country might have averted over a quarter century (and still counting) of civil war.

11. It is instructive that the only case - other than Southern African - in which the OAU has been able to declare a regime illegitimate - and then only after over a decade of tortured dialogue and disagreement - was that of the Sahara Democratic Republic. That is basically a case of colonial (or imperial) expansion - by Morocco. Thus - especially once Mauritania renounced its claims - the OAU eventually did come to recognise POLISARIO
as a legitimate liberation movement and - because it had a certain presence in the territory - a government. Arguably Burundi has become a quasi comparable case but it can be distinguished because:

a. sanctions were initially imposed primarily by Burundi’s neighbours (or arguably by Uganda and Rwanda plus a near SADC consensus and Eritrea/Ethiopia);

b. their endorsement by the OAU is tacit rather than clear;

c. the Burundi problematic is not simple - the President and his cabinet are not the basic enemies of decent governance but rather the competing armed forces - the Burundi Army which supports/constrains the President and the “Committee for the Defence of Democracy” (effectively the Burundian Interahamwe) which promotes and tentatively practices genocide and at a deeper level the pathological hatred based on the waHutu drive for power and vengeance and the waTutsi response of fear and preventive repression;

d. leading an incredibly difficult attempt to mediate a solution acceptable to the President (and his waTutsi and -potentially - moderate waHutu constituency) and to waHutu leaders willing to engage in a new attempt at intercommunal governance;

e. the need for Burundian state support in the military process of Zaire to Congo and the parallel loss of CDD bases) have rendered the economic blocage and the more general quarantine very leaky indeed and also reduced immediate military pressure on the Burundi army.

12. In other cases the OAU has remained unable to act or even to take clear verbal stands. The 1994 coups in Lesotho and Gambia illustrate. The OAU vaguely deplored both but sub-regional action in one case and inaction in the other determined the outcome. Again in 1997 in respect to Sierra Leone, the OAU has deplored the army mutiny allied to the pre-existing rebellion but has called for mediation (in principle to restore the elected government) while warning against punitive measures let alone the use of force. Its present inability to endorse the ‘liberation alliance’ against the military - minority Islamic
fraction regime in Khartoum is understandable, but arises from failure to denounce and to organise action to reverse the military coup against the elected government (now a member of the ‘liberation alliance’) in 1989.

13. Whether the OAU is inherently unable to develop a less hands off (or impotent hand wringing) stance is not clear. The SDR case demonstrates that neither unanimity nor full consensus is required to shift from non-interventionism to backing liberation. The SDR was recognised by the OAU once a majority of OAU members had recognised it. Presumably non-recognition of a coup regime (and suspension of membership) or continued recognition of the (hopefully temporarily) ousted legitimate regime by majority action is possible if general conditions for such action can be agreed and adopted. The problem of present illegitimate regimes and of initially legitimate ones which become illegitimate (e.g. some would argue potentially Swaziland, Kenya and Zambia) as well as of a coup rising or revolt against a clearly illegitimate government would appear to pose more intractable problems for the OAU, as they do sub-regionally. The Royal government in Swaziland clearly did enjoy legitimacy. It clearly still enjoys it from a substantial fraction of the population, while the urban/plantation/trade union alliance for a modern democratic system, a purge of abuses and a constitutional monarchy also has the consent of a substantial fraction. On present courses there is real danger of a civil war with spillover costs (economic, social and local political) to Mozambique and South Africa. But the Lesotho coup reversal model is not relevant - mediation maximising areas of agreement or at least trade-off consent is needed with little reason to suppose sanctions or formal condemnations would serve. ‘Quiet’ (although hardly covert or silent) diplomacy at national and provincial level is seen by South Africa and Mozambique as more likely to be productive. But what of cases less clear cut than Sierra Leone and Swaziland e.g. long running governments of decreasing legitimacy with growing tendencies for repression and for at least potentially violent opposition to grow - e.g. Kenya, Nigeria? Or of military coup regimes which have democratised themselves by highly managed elections e.g. Niger, Gambia - and how to distinguish them from military interventions leading to genuine elections e.g. Mali, Ghana. Indeed Ghana is exactly the type of case which poses major problems. Retired Lieutenant Rawlings in 1981 overthrew a government which had been fairly elected (indeed in elections he supervised) but had sunk into corruption and gross incompetence, and as events demonstrated, had negligible internal support or legitimacy.
For a decade attempts (probably in this case quite genuine) to devise and hold broad dialogue on alternatives to Westminster style elections dominated state political thinking and indeed such a system was devised for local government (successfully in many rural, but few urban, districts) and ultimately a reasonably free and fair national election on fairly standard Northwestern lines returned President Rawlings to office. Clearly reasonable persons could disagree (and did) on the legitimacy of the coup, the nature of the alternative seeking process, the lag in securing any transparent process of expressing public consent (or otherwise). These cases suggest a step by step approach starting with clearly unrepresentative coups against reasonably clearly legitimate elected governments (e.g. Gambia, Sierra Leone) and quarantines of gross and repressive malgovernance cases especially in cases of initial overthrow of legitimate, elected governments (e.g. Sudan).

14. These problems are not unique to Africa. The EU has been able to avoid confronting them directly by:

a. placing general validation of good governance in the hands of the Council of Europe;

b. declining to admit to states not clearly based on consent and with apparently stable, credible democratic systems (cf the dates of Spanish, Portuguese and Greek accession and at least one of the reasons Turkish accession originally envisaged as by or before 1975 steadily recedes into the indeterminate future);

c. human rights issues are handleable under an agreed European rights statute and via an independent judicial structure. As the frame is agreed, the decision are judicial not executive and the cases do not strike at the heart of any state’s governance system no major crises erupt although even in this case there are tensions.

Perhaps a more analogous case is South East Asia and ASEAN. Since its membership ranges from a tumultuous multi party democracy (but earlier a personalised dictatorship) through an only modestly restructured and liberalised communist state to a highly repressive military/ruling clique elite dominated state which combines rapid growth in output, access to basic services and erosion of poverty with negligible accountability, severe repression and the invasion and annexation of a small neighbour, ASEAN has believed that a rigid “non interference in internal affairs” rubric was necessary. It acted on that in admitting a state in which a free and fair (or at least tilted against the winners)
election had given a clear 80% mandate which was swept aside by a highly repressive military regime using violence and forced labour as instruments of first resort. One or two members did mutter mild dissent but accepted the line of quiet diplomacy once tied in by membership. In 1997 the coup using a parallel army and public official cadre by Cambodia’s second largest party has forced ASEAN to reconsider; to suspend Cambodian accession; to seek to mediate (quite unsuccessfully) and to consider whether “preventative diplomacy” and a doctrine that “the change of a government (at least an existing, recognised elected one!) through the use of force is unacceptable” could be substituted prospectively (not retrospectively) for the all encompassing “internal affairs” one.

15. If one asks how **classic Pan Africanism** dealt with “internal affairs” and consent the short answer is that it did not because in its scenario neither question appeared to arise:

a. if all African states **joined an African Union** at or immediately after independence the issue of “internal affairs” **could not arise** - except in respect to division of powers between the Union and territorial governments;

b. because classic Pan Africanism was **within the prism of struggle to overthrow colonialism which did have overwhelming consent**, it was assumed that the new Union Government would automatically be based on consent.

16. The first assumption assumed a scenario now falsified by history. The second was either very broad brush indeed or naive. Consent to African Union and consent for any particular structure of Union governance, of Union/Territorial division of powers (assuming confederalism which Mwalimu did see as necessary but Osagyefo did not with Padmore and du Bois not squarely addressing the issue - let alone a totally centralised state) and electoral process are not and never were the same thing. UNITA and its base for example supported the independence of Angola, but very much denied consent to a government they saw as a direct ascendant of the 1600-1800 Prazeiro (pre colonial neo-colonial) state and the 1875-1920 Luanda “creole” ascendancy.

These are clearly issues both sub-regional communities and the OAU must revisit. For different reasons neither classic Pan Africanism nor classic “non interference” provides a way forward.
PAN AFRICANISM 2000: Portents, Problematics and Potentials

1. Has the recent re-emergence of Pan Africanism been a realistic attempt to forge an instrument for progress toward peace and self determination, economic progress and self reliance, decent governance and self respect? Or is it a forged - in a rather different sense - millennarist cult lashing out to ease the pain of repetitive disasters rather than addressing their causes? That is a fair question: the rapid evaporation of classic Pan Africanism; the failure of economistic free trade regionalism to generate either major concrete gains or political sex appeal and the 1980’s-1990’s explosion of civil wars and levels of social discord threatening more armed conflict or state deliquescence may not be portents heralding the triumph on the ground - as opposed to in neo liberal and neo Marxian salons - of Afro Pessimism but they are, or should be, vaccinations against naïveté.

2. Nonetheless, three counter points can be made:

   a. re-emergent Pan Africanism is not naive and maximalist, but rather only too aware of obstacles and reconciled to identifying and moving forward step by step in highly unpropitious global, sub-regional and - often - national contexts;

   b. the combination of household through regional security with economic means to enable enhanced production is a response to challenges which is at least coherently thought through and has been effective elsewhere, e.g. in EU, ASEAN;

   c. the sub-region (Southern Africa) and the states (e.g. South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia) most committed to sub-regionalism on a broad front and to joint action to contain insecurity across borders and to intervene on behalf of decent governance are those associated with national peace and reconciliation processes (Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea) or with dynamics which have averted high levels of internal conflict (e.g. Botswana, Tanzania) and with recoveries in growth in production and provision of basic services. The correlation seems to be between sound national and proactive regional strategiesm, not of using Pan Africanism as a form of khat (g’at) to ease the woes of domestic failure.
To that it is still fair comment to points to the limits of the gains, the problematicity of security, production and governance forward dynamics and the evaporation of initially apparently fruitful initiatives e.g. ECOWAS founding wave of euphoria, EAC's first two years.

3. What are the key points around which sustainability of Pan Africanism as a major component in a renewed, sustainable developmental dynamic will turn and progress toward which (or otherwise) usable as both ex post tests and ex ante warning systems on the health of institutions and processes?

a. combining official, infrastructural (e.g. lack of transport and communication) and enterprise (e.g. non orientation to regional sourcing and selling) trade barrier reduction with coordinated household and enterprise production expansion to increase intra African trade;

b. building economic unification/coordination instruments beyond trade barrier reduction which are based on commonly perceived common interests more efficiently pursued together and which add up to an increasingly important positive economic impulse;

c. providing security mechanisms relevant to households (e.g. food security, freedom from armed incursions), societies (e.g. law and order, freedom from refugee and neighbouring violent chaos burdens) and countries (e.g. from massive military expenses and actual or standby security force mobilisations and/or operations) and have proactive, preventive, and mediatory as well as defensively reactive, crisis containing and quarantining elements;

e. developing a workable definition of mutual affairs (as contrasted with internal) and a practicable dynamic for pre-emptive diplomacy, mediation and/or intervention to forestall, reduce, contain and/or restore from armed conflict;

f. involving enterprises, civil society and citizens in a sub-regional dynamic that is more than diplomacy and more open than civil service/cabinet decision taking and implementing.
4. Trade promotion by official barrier reduction needs to be rethought in the context of the global tariff barrier reduction and quota elimination features of 1990’s globalism promoted in Africa by international financial institutions. The lower basic tariffs, the less possibility exists for tariff preferences and the fewer and looser quota restrictions the less important will be quota preferences. This is not to say COMESA and SADC should not press forward to sub-regional common markets and ECOWAS develop a viable dynamic to the same end, but that even in the official barrier reduction sphere complementary measures will be needed.

5. SADC’s preferential trade regime could logically comprise:

   a. adoption of PTA tariff preferences for all SADC members other than SA and coordinating future reduction rounds;

   b. immediate RSA (and necessarily other SACUA member) preferential reductions for all other SADC members and in particular extending any free trade lines negotiated with EU to all SADC members (and for that matter all COMESA members or even all OAU members as a first step toward the Abuja Treaty goal of an African Common Market and to avert reverse discrimination for extra continental relative African supplies);

   c. a phased, dated programme to give similar preferences to South Africa (arguably these could be extended to other SACUA members immediately, given rules of origin tests this should not be impossible).

6. Beyond the possible SADC-COMESA preference systems de facto merger and the South African extension of EU duty free access to all OAU members, it is hard to identify any short term opportunities for progress toward an All African Common Market. In principle the North African states could extend fresco arrangement tariff preferences granted to the EU to other African states at no evident cost to themselves but their political and political economic priorities are (except perhaps for Egypt) not such as to suggest this is a realistic short term option.
7. Important **complementary trade measures** include:

a. reactivating clearing agreements and broadening them to cover all interstate transactions within their sub-regions (including legal transit, re-export, invisibles and capital transfer items);

b. strengthening clearing by sub-regional Central Bank consultative groups which - *inter alia* - seek to reduce exchange rate over (or theoretically under) valuation obstacles to open trade and clearing particularly in respect to Angola and Nigeria;

c. completing customs nomenclature, procedural (especially valuation) and transit traffic arrangements and related vehicle licensing harmonisation - an exercise which in principle and perhaps in practice could be conducted continentally or at least by all SADC, COMESA and ECOWAS members and all other currently interested states;

d. eliminating "paper tariffs" (e.g. delays in clearing and release; repetitive rejection of papers for purely technical or typographical errors; 'inexplicable' delays or misrouting affecting transit traffic) which can nullify apparent preferences and indeed create nearly impermeable barriers to trade;

e. promotion - in close coordination with national and sub-regional enterprise fora of looking to African markets and for African sources (a less than common practice in most Africa countries). Catalytic funding to exploratory trade visits and trade fair participation by enterprise and to (preferably enterprise run, internet oriented) commercial

8. The case for reducing legal and administrative barriers to trade is important but is complementary - rather than alternative - to reducing real (whether physical, information or outlook) barriers. **Physical** barriers are primarily transport and communications infrastructure. This has gaps but even more numerous sections in disrepair and high unit costs. e.g. the "natural protection" of Ethiopian manufactures with duty free access to the Kenyan market (and vica versa) against duty paid EU or Japanese or North American manufactures is significantly negative because there is no cost viable road route and high cost and low reliability of coastal shipping (and Addis to Assab or Berbera) routes mean intra COMESA transport costs are above EU-Nairobi. **Information** barriers turn on lack
of timeous, reliable, detailed commercial data as to sources, markets, routings, finances, specifications, administrative requirements etc. Ethiopian (like Zimbabwean) wine includes modest amounts of high and medium quality and could be competitive with South African in Kenya and Tanzania (as could Zimbabwean in Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya) but neither producers/exporters nor importers/wholesalers have the data to develop the trade on any systematic basis. **Outlook** barriers are linked to data (data not sought is rarely transmitted regularly) and to institutional (e.g. financial facilities) limitations.

SSA producers are in general not very export oriented and still less oriented to non-traditional (including SSA) exports. The commercial sector and the input procurement and investment sides of other sectors are import oriented (perhaps too much so) but with limited exceptions do not look to neighbours as sources. The disproportionate scope of South African exports (and to a lesser degree imports) from SSA and of both Zimbabwean and Kenya exports to neighbours are evidence that different outlooks (in conjunction with less official barriers and less exiguous transport and communication infrastructure) can cause structural shifts in export volumes and destinations and in import sourcing.

9. The reduction of non-legal/administrative barriers or “paper tariffs”, documentation diversities and obscurities and **user unfriendly land frontier immigration/customs** and provision of **improved clearing** have several advantages over simple tariff preferences:

   a. analytically they are **globally cost friendly** because they reduce cost barriers to intra SSA trade improving resource allocation and reducing CIFC (cost including freight and commercialisation) ex user for SSA (or sub-regional) goods absolutely and relative to extra regional sources by cost efficient, market consistent ways rather than by raising costs to extraregional suppliers;

   b. therefore they unambiguously reduce costs to SSA users while allowing higher production by SSA suppliers (which regional protection by preference is likely to increase user costs) and reduce trade diversion by **levelling the market playing field** (whereas at best preferences level by offsetting unlevelling);
c. and are not, therefore, subject to challenge at WTO or to erosion by global trade barrier liberalisation (which will continue and from which SSA cannot opt out) reducing headline tariffs and, pari passu, the room available for preferences.

10. At a deeper level production and employment are ends while international (or for that matter domestic) trade is a means to validate the production by linking supply to effective demand. This is a basic economic analysis point - whether in classical, neo-classical, Marxist or mainstream Northwestern thinking. Interestingly it is also a point which corresponds to politicians 'and voters' perceptions. They care about production, infrastructure and employment, not trade as such. The downside in respect to the political perception is an overemphasis on exports (justifying increased production and employment) and hostility to, or malign neglect of, intra sub-regional imports (seen as eating up market possibilities for domestic producers). The imbalance is dangerous, because - at least in SSA sub-regional contexts - unless poorer states can increase sub-regional exports they can rarely afford to increase sub-regional imports paid for with hard currency from extra-regional exports and borrowing. Even if they could - e.g. less poor states such as Botswana with 'natural' extra regional trade surpluses - they are hardly likely to wish to share the costs of regional protection unless they have countervailing gains whether in production for export, transit transport cost reduction, security or/and other sectors.

11. If production (including research and training), employment, transport and communications, food security, power, water management and classically defined security as well as trade are valid agenda items of sub-regional bodies, the issue arises whether uniform schedules, priorities and sequences can be set out. The answer is almost certainly no. Both contexts and perceptions/priorities differ. SADCCs initial position - and still more its 1982-90 evolving position - was very different from PTA's. SADC's post 1990 priority for sub-regional water agreements turns both on the clear facts of aridity of much of the region and the number of major interstate river basins combined with the perception that unless water use and associated aspects of river basin development can be agreed by treaty soon serious hostilities among states (at best) land even war must be foreseen well before 2010. Perhaps the most general principles that can be set out are:
a. an agenda of perceived common interests more effectively (or only) attainable jointly (or on a coordinated basis) rather than severally;

b. which provide significant perceived benefits to each member state fairly rapidly as well as the prospect of rising benefits over time;

c. and are - in sum - large enough to make the process of regionalism a domestic priority (probably higher in some cases but significant in all) for member states;

d. with a dynamic of adding and revising (and dropping in cases of clear non success) to maintain the forward dynamic and to deepen integration; as well as
e. an openness to considering gradual expansion of membership to broaden integration.

That set of principles (or guidelines) implies that there is no reason each state has to be deeply concerned with all sectors or sub-sectors, let alone individual projects) e.g. marine fisheries in SADC are hardly of much concern to Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia or Zimbabwe - albeit fresh water ones are in some cases) but are important to Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mauritius. Similarly, while individual water use agreements and power grid linkages and interflows by their nature cannot involve all 12 SADC (let alone all 22 COMESA) states, the sectors are of concern to a substantial majority. Nor need net gains from each sector be large (indeed small losses on some way be acceptable) - it is the perceived sum which matters.

12. The new aspects of security are:

a. household (or individual or people’s) security e.g. food security;

b. community security e.g. from overwhelming transborder flows of migrants and - more clearly in classic security terms - drugs, guns and other criminal activities.

Household security is a new aspect of sub-regionalism, at least in Africa. In SADCC/SADC it has turned on joint and coordinated agricultural research, veterinary research and disease control, early warning systems and joint mobilisation of data, resources and logistics to meet drought caused dearth. If successful, water management
will have similar results cyclically in drought years and secularly for residents of water scarce interstate basins. The second aspect is in a sense a continuing one - immigration, drug, gun and crossborder crime cooperation are nothing new, albeit rarely high profile in SSA and a source of conundrums so long as the old South African existed. What is new is looking to causes - basically weakness of livelihood bases and domestic insecurity - and seeking to relate control measures to longer term proactive prevention e.g. in the proposed Mpulumanga - Maputo Corridor development zone.

13. The straightforward aspect of classical - basically military and external - security is joint action to face extra regional threats. e.g. the Mobutu Regime in Zaire by its conduct raised threats to the security of and imposed costs on Angola, Zambia and Tanzania. Experience indicated these would end only when the regime did. Thus South African/SADCC “mediation” was really seeking a speedy, low violence *modus vivendi* to secure a transfer of power. A second aspect has recently come to be seen as straightforward at least in extreme cases - the total collapse into bloody (literally) chaos of a sub-regional state or a blatantly unlawful coup against a legitimate regime. ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone (albeit not in Gambia or Niger) have acted on this front as has SADC in respect of Lesotho

14. Developing operational definitions and workable procedures for intervention in “mutual affairs” is probably the most difficult challenge - especially in cases of member states (within sub-regional groups and - especially - for the OAU). For adjacent states threats to physical security (by armed incursion, refugee waves and/or intervention in member internal conflicts) can in practice usually be identified with limited disagreement (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-ex Zaire, Sudan) and do not face the problem of veto by the offending state acting as a member. However, even in such of cases serious problems arise if most affected member states see the only viable solution as entailing a change of government and wish to act in support of actors seeking such a change by force (e.g. Uganda in Rwanda; Uganda, Rwanda and Angola in Zaire; Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea in Sudan). SADC escaped this in Zaire because Mobutu was already falling and lead military support intervenors (Uganda, Rwanda) are not SADC members.

15. The problems in respect to violent changes of government within a subregion are greater even if the presumptive right of the state in question to veto is either removed or side-
16. One guideline that probably could be agreed would be refusal to recognise coups against legitimate, elected governments and mediating with the threat of sanctions to achieve the reinstatement of the ousted government (e.g. Lesotho and Sierra Leone). Another - especially relevant to the OAU - would be to remove a state's right to veto action designed to meet a security threat which it posed. General specifications beyond these are not now possible but might become so. In cases such as Lesotho 1996-97, (continued unrest relating to diminished legitimacy of the elected Prime Minister and smouldering unconstitutional tendencies in security services), Zambia (electoral laws ruling out key candidates and causing opposition to boycott) and Swaziland (impasse on evolution to a less feudal, more competitive structure) quiet diplomacy, other mediation, encouragement of sub-regional civil society initiatives and - perhaps - economic/diplomatic sanctions can sometimes be effective.

17. The need for sub-regional or OAU broad consensus (which might involve qualified majority rather than unanimity) if action is to be productive and not to split the acting group is somewhat different from the issue of whether action should be formally organisational, de facto delegated to leading states and/or sub-regionally assented to national action. Except in the Lesotho case SADC has not acted in its own name but via South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and/or Botswana. Fairly clearly however consultations involving all or most SADC states have preceded the actions. In the Zaire and potentially the Sudan cases this approach has allowed South Africa to act as mediator - in practice to facilitate a change of regime - while other states took a more openly partisan position.

18. The need for business and civil society involvement in Pan African regionalism is both political and economic, normative and procedural. In respect to civil society it is a return to classical Pan Africanism but in respect to business it is part of incorporating articulated economic means for implementing steps toward self determination, self reliance and self respect. A functioning society - polity does have need to have three actors with discourse among them - government, enterprises, civil society. So too far a region.

19. In respect to business the problem is not primarily mechanical. Inclusion of Chambers of Commerce (and analogous) in consultation, specialised conferences and two way information flows is not uncommon. The problem is the tendency to parallel tunnel vision
- each side focusing on lobbying at the other in respect to its own goals and neither
focusing on areas of mutual interest and developing collaborative relationships. A linked
set of issues (which also overlap transborder movement of people aspects of security)
relates to trade unions which are civil society actors but also (primarily) economic ones
like enterprises. In general state - employer - worker relations are national issues but they
do have regional ramifications (especially if limitations on worker rights arise from states
and enterprises wishing to use such restrictions to compete against their neighbours, if
cross border employment is large and/or extreme poverty generates large flows of
economic refugees).

20. Civil society involvement - via organisations but also in a more general sense via sub-
regional legislative or proto legislative bodies - is needed partly on good governance
grounds and partly because **Pan African awareness and especially support for sub-
regional dynamics requires more than official meetings, press releases and gains which citizens do not automatically relate to regionalism.** Further since civil society
groups in SSA increasingly have both sub-regional and SSA wide forums with transborder
concerns in many of the same areas as sub-regional bodies the potential value of discourse
and - where possible - coordination and the potential costs of state/civil society tensions
and conflicting regional actions can be or become serious.

21. Sub-regional organisations need to develop strategy and structures in relations with civil
society (including religious, women's, community and domestic NGO's) and with the
economic sector (business, trade unions, farmer’s organisations). One of SADCC/SADC’s
strengths has been an openness to contact and communication and inclusion of these
groups in special conferences, but it cannot be said that adequate ongoing relations have to
date been developed by SADC or ECOWAS or COMESA. In this case the EU
institutional pattern of permanent consultative fora might be worth adaptation. The more
general issue of accountability - while probably relevant only to SADC in the short term -
needs to be revisited. There is a very strong case for a consultative, communication and
revising assembly whose resolutions would (at the least) have substantial weight in official
and ministerial work. The problem is that of election. The old EAC had a lively Assembly
of this kind, but its indirect election by (and usually from) national parliaments limited its
two way communication impact although it also increased willingness to give it not
inconsiderable legislative power - at least on paper. Direct election might be preferable, but so long as African sub-regional communities are basically multinational (coordinated and pooled national sovereignty) rather than supranational (partially pooling with delegation of sovereignty in specified areas) presumably implies that at least the Summit of Heads of State can override an Assembly vote.

22. The building block scenario for continental - or SSA - regionalism posits that both the habit of cooperation built up in smaller groupings and the lesser problems of bringing 4 or 6 - say - sub-regional units than 52 or 53 states together make this step by step path prudent or even necessary. However, the initial projection apparently was one of rapid evolution of strong, comparable sub-regional units throughout Africa (or at least SSA) - a process that has not taken place requiring a revisiting of possible revised scenarios.

23. In fact Eastern and Southern Africa has the only two dynamic Sub-Regional Communities - COMESA and SADC. These overlap though in ways which would logically facilitate merger (not take-over). For historic reasons merger is not an immediate possibility. ECOWAS certainly exists and might become dynamic again. If it did so in ways producing clear economic gains (including in respect to tariffs and other aspects of trade and clearing) then its gradual integration with the non-currency elements of Francophone West African coordination should no longer pose insuperable problems. Equatorial Africa, the Horn and North Africa in practice have no sub-regional groups. Therefore a literal reading of Abuja of achieving five sub-regional communities (by 1995) and merging then (about 2000) is not self evidently practicable even with adjusted target dates.

24. A Horn grouping may come into existence - either within COMESA or, like SADC, overlapping it. If convergence among SADCC/COMESA-Horn can be achieved then Egypt might consider accession. On the other side of the continent Congo (ex Zaire) is more likely to join SADC than to seek to revive the Equatorial (Central African) paper community. Thus a building block dynamic from South Africa through Congo, up the Indian Ocean and Red Sea coasts to Cairo and including the Indian Ocean states may be the most viable one. While initially not including ECOWAS or the six Equatorial states
north of Zaire, the process might catalyse forward movement in ECOWAS and (apart from their monetary union) the Equatorial 6 could join ECOWAS or divide (Cameroon-Tchad-Equatorial Guinea to ECOWAS and Gabon, CAR, Congo-Brazza with Congo-ex Zaire - to SADC respectively).

25. The keys to extending Pan African dynamics via the building block approach lie in SADC and the Horn. The achievement of decent, legitimate governance in Congo (ex Zaire), Rwanda and Burundi (to which SADC and in particular South Africa, Angola and Tanzania are devoting substantial attention and resources) would almost certainly lead to their accession. That would create strong economic reasons for both Kenya (which would be welcome only after the restoration of more consensual, and broadly accepted as legitimate, governance) and Uganda creating a very real Southern-Equatorial-Eastern African grouping with political economic and security goals in large part pursued by economic means. With a new legitimate, federal regime in the Sudan, the Horn would become a real political economic region led by the Sudan and Ethiopia and leading to at least a peaceful quasi federal settlement in Somalia (with or without confederation with Somaliland and Djibouti). The amalgamation of that grouping with SADC - East Africa - Congo would pose technical and timing issues but few basic political security, political economic problems. At that point economic and African frontier security goals (the SSA partners would not wish to become embroiled in West Asian security) would make accession attractive to Egypt. Ironically perhaps "Cape to Cairo" may yet become a Pan African unifying axis politically quite unlike the concept of Cecil John Rhodes.

26. It is easy to dismiss such a scenario as daydreaming (or over consumption of khat/g’at) and certainly there are obstacles and chances for division. But in 1980 (and even more in 1986 a prediction that by 1997 SADCC would be on the way to real integration including South Africa and its main security problems would be agreed water use rights and food security against drought and facilitating the achievement of good governance in Rwanda, Burundi and Congo (ex Zaire) internally on its external borders would have appeared an even less credible scenario.
27. On the 40th Anniversary of the independence of Ghana, the first African state committed to Pan Africanism the outlook for a renewed dynamic to African self reliance, self determination and self respect via political economic and security strategies pursued by the means of economic integration is more positive than it has been for nearly three decades. Southern African sub-regionalism is on the move and can merge with East African; the chaos of Central/Equatorial Africa and the Horn do show signs of removing entrenched, oppressive malgovernance and permitting forward movement. Bitterly ironically it is now West Africa which increasingly lags - where 40 years ago it led - in Pan African and sub-regional terms.

28. The role of leadership matters, but not solely in the sense of individual leaders important as they are contextually and as catalysts. Certainly FLS would not have become a force when and as it did without President Nyerere and nor would SADC have been launched when and as it was without the visions of President Khama and President Kaunda as well as Mwalimu. Certainly some ministers have been crucial or at least catalytic in key areas e.g. Senator Dennis Norman of Zimbabwe (as he then was) in launching SADC’s Food Security Unit and again - as Minister of Transport - in the successful struggle to prevent the Great Drought of 1991-92 and Great Dearth of 1992-93 from becoming the Great Death of 1993 or then Minister Adedeji of Nigeria in the creation of ECOWAS. Officials too have been key - e.g. Lebang Mpotokwane of Botswana as founding de facto Executive Secretary and later interim Executive Secretary of SADCC and Secretary General Adedeji of ECA. But individuals cannot play such roles unless their national contexts provide backing - otherwise their endeavours either bombard in a vacuum or, at best, flicker out when they leave the scene. Equally key is that of countries and of governance systems and goals built into their institutional and political structures committed to regionalism which are not dependent on one leader and, therefore, more enduring. Small countries can play catalytic roles e.g. Botswana in SADCC and (not entirely intentionally) Rwanda in creating the opening for sub-regional change in Equatorial Africa. But the big battalions matter - SADC’s dynamism today depends to a large extent on South Africa’s deep involvement and commitment while it is Ethiopia’s new government and governance that have created the - as yet problematic - dynamic toward a New Horn Sub Region. In West Africa Ghana and perhaps Senegal and Mali are minded to and could play significant
supporting roles albeit Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon are concerned primarily with serious
internal political and social cleavages and thus distracted. The basic problem is Nigeria.
Its malgovernance is not simply tragic for Nigerians. That sickness is contagious, prevents
ECOWAS from becoming a West African FLS/SADCC and condemns West Africa Pan
Africanism (at least at state level) and regionalism to drifting - drifting in a leaking boat
with a rising wind on a lee share, the ironbound breaker barred coast of West Africa.