ANGOLA: THE LIMITS AND FOCI OF COVERAGE
A NOTE OF INQUIRY

By Reginald Herbold Green

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On a cloth untrue
With a twisted cue
And Elliptical billiard balls.

- Gilbert and Sullivan

I.

POINTED PRESENTATION OR PRESENTATIONS FOR POINTS

Angola coverage both by the commercial media and by concerned non-official organisations and independent authors over 1975-1997 has/in large part tended to be selective, writer objective focused (sometimes to the point of tunnel vision) and on occasion related more to themes for which Angola was perceived (with greater or less accuracy) to be a stage than to Angola or Angolans as such. The results have hardly been particularly satisfactory in helping lay readers understand Angola nor in providing a data base (including understanding of dynamics) useful to those - Angolans and others - seeking to build a stable end to armed conflict and beginning of a process of reconciliation.¹

Three - somewhat stereotyped - types of publication/presentation became dominant as a result.

The first was part of the global assault on apartheid South Africa. South Africa had intervened in Angola and the war in which it was a key player had been humanly and economically devastating for Angola and most Angolans. Further the tactics - especially broadcast mining of fields to deny rural presence and urban food supply outside UNITA controlled areas - of its ally (or proxy as it was usually presented in this category of communications) were open to severe human concern/human rights criticisms as was its pattern of governance. The result - however intended - was to give the impression UNITA had a minimal domestic base, was largely a creation of South African policy and needed to be broken by total military defeat. The facts that several mid 1970's observers estimated it would have won 30% to 40% of the votes in a free and fair election and that its historical roots go back beyond 1500 and its current maximum leader and broad form to the beginning of the 1960's were either set aside in silence or strenuously denied.
The inverse of this demonisation of UNITA as *de facto* an emanation of apartheid was
doctrinaire presentation of the Government of Angola and the ruling MPLA. The ambivalence of their commitment to giving priority to poor Angolan's livelihoods and - perhaps - even to fully universal access to basic public services? were not explored. This canonisation of the MPLA - except among quasi official supporter groups and hard line Marxists or Usaphobes - was not pursued with equal vigour or detail to the demonisation of the UNITA-RSA-Apartheid triplet.

The inverse approach focused on Soviet aggression and the defence of Western Christian Democratic Civilisation by beleaguered South Africa and its gallant ally UNITA. However, again the canonisation tended (with the exception of a handful of Savimbi/UNITA acolytes) to be much less detailed than, or even almost subsidiary to, the demonisation of the MPLA and of Cuba both set out as knowing instruments and accomplices, hired agents or pure catspaws of the Kremlin's drive for world conquest. This approach included rather meretricious blaming of the breakdown of pre independence MPLA-MNLA-UNITA talks in mass violence (especially in greater Luanda) on the MPLA even more inaccurate creation of timetables placing Soviet and Cuban military intervention significantly before South African/CIA and quite incredible attempts to explain away Jonas Savimbi's rejection of the 1992 election outturn and return to an all too obviously preplanned war.

In a sense these two stylised schools of presentations were Janus faces. In extreme cases the presentations seemed to be much more concerned about broader issues than about Angola or Angolans (even if the communicators' intention was in fact to reduce human deprivation, brutalisation and death in Angola as was frequently the case in the first cluster). Communism and Apartheid were the targets, Angola was a stage on which they acted and the details of the stage sets and the character development of the (Angolan) supporting casts were peripheral to the delineation of the leading anti heroes and their somewhat cardboard antagonists.

A third cluster of Angolan stories/analysis turn on the post Caetano Portuguese political process. The delineation of Portuguese last stage official and of MPLA-UNITA motivations and actions is at the least motivated by and at times seen through a prism of Portuguese political faction fighting and transition to a new polity/political process.

Clearly different Portuguese political, business, intellectual and intelligence factions were linked to one or more Angolan political actors. The actions of members of these fractions in Angola do illuminate or at least cast flashes of light on their aspirations and actions in Portugal and visa versa. Because the fall of the Nuevo Estado was rooted in its inability to win the war to maintain the legacy of the sun never setting on the Portuguese state (a central nationalist justification for independence from Spain) late colonial, transitional and post colonial issues were much more central to the intellectual and political worlds of 1975-1990 Portugal than to
1960's France or Britain. That certainly produced a body of communications, but also problems in sorting out the accuracy and selection principles in work nominally focused on Angola but possibly actually intended to influence debate, dialogue or more direct action in Portugal.

Two more recent genres of writing on Angola can perhaps be short-handed as 'determined optimism' and 'a plague on all their hovels'. The raison d'être of the optimistic cluster is by no means uniform: humanitarian concerns, diplomatic détente desires, hope for UN peace process reputation enhancement, business interests can all lead to accentuating the positive so strongly as to suppress the problematic and - more dangerously - to seek to grease squeaky wheels on the assumption this will fine tune peace (not loosen bolts as wheels fly off).

The 'plague' genre is also rather fragmented. Pure weariness and disgust of spirit over the brutal and murderous failure of what could (at least physically and economically) have been a sunrise state is present - understandably so. That stance does imply that, with the possible exception of humanitarian survival assistance, any involvement in Angola or with any Angolan actors will be stale, flat, unprofitable and risky. That Angolan (or at any rate perception of and personal response to Angola) based sub-genre merges into the more general theosophy of Afro-Pessimism. Intellectually it can perhaps be styled social Newtonianism or Deconstructionist Social Physics. It marries Newton's 2nd and 3rd laws of thermodynamics (on the generalisation, weakening of force and increasing randomness of energy) with the - whatever I want and can enforce is right - neo-Popian (the poet not the prelate!) principles of Deconstructionism. There is a strand which clearly is writing about the authors' visions of the present and future of European/North American inner cities, but exporting the blame to Africa, and another which perceives socio-political disintegration in Africa as the global future (and is more concerned about the future Northern aspects). These broader 'plague' variants have little to do specifically with Angola, or sometimes even Africa as a whole, but do at least implicitly propose"a small and far away place" or supping "with a very long spoon" as guides for 'dealing with' Angola/Angolan actors.

Clearly the foregoing genre sketches are at best reductionist in respect to the less flawed writing. Clearly too some bodies of communication - e.g. Angola Matters - do seek to achieve balanced, multi authored, multi dimensional (by discipline and by viewpoint) presentation. Nonetheless a disquieting proportion even of serious writing/communication has been relatively close to the genre sketches. Polemic discourse has value; supportive discourse always has elements of propaganda - the issue is partly of balance within particular pieces of work and partly among them.
The reasons for concern are primarily twofold (and are pragmatic in the same way as Milton's opposition to externally imposed censorship):

a. the Angolan case is all too typical of African conflict in respect to presentations and communications;

b. the partialness of many communications is ultimately counterproductive in comprehending, mastering and reconstructing/reconciling out of conflict.

The point is not that independent communications on Angola have in general, been wilfully duplicitous nor that focused presentations on a handful of (believed to be) key themes treating other aspects as secondary or dispensable are necessarily operationally wrong or morally reprehensible.\(^4\) It is to argue that a broader range of perspectives and of vantage points both at any one time and over time is needed to avert principled polemics and articulated advocacy from deteriorating into shrill, dated and dangerously misleading parodies of themselves.

II

WHY? MALICE, MUDDLE AND/OR MOBILISATION?

To acquit the authors of the majority of the writing of mendacity or wilful suppression of evidence to mislead does not answer why the limitations and/or distortions cited arose.

**Scarcity** of accessible reliable, non-specialist friendly data on many facets of Angolans and Angola is a major contributing factor. There is a not insubstantial, albeit gap ridden and often non-objective body of writing on Angola but for non-specialist non-Lusophone persons (including almost all NGO and many non-Portuguese independent writers on aspects of Angola 1975-1997) it is neither easily accessible nor user friendly. At least until very recently this was compounded by an extreme government tendency to view almost all information as "Top Secret" because it might serve UNITA and/or South Africa.

**Focus** to achieve portability and to get the intended message across to achieve action toward the intended purpose posits brevity and avoidance not only of unrelated issues but also of general background and (except in volume length studies) even secondary aspects of the topic in hand. Most NGO/independent Angolan communication has been focused on:

a. apartheid

b. communism
c. calamities (natural disasters)
d. ending conflict
e. halting mining/removing mines (i.e. as a source of unnatural personal catastrophes consequential on war).

The negative formulations are deliberate - Angola communications have a distinct tendency to convey the impression of being dominantly against something whose halting or at least attrition is seen as a prerequisite condition for more positive programmes of action usually semi-articulated late in the piece. Especially in their negative formulations, each appears to be a topic on which reasonable people should be able to agree as to the problem with the material presented focused first on demonstrating its existence and secondly sketching what is to be done. In that context two reasons for simplification (both as to narrowing coverage and as to stressing main 'atrocities of the enemy' and not detailing 'minor errors of the friend') were compelling - avoiding distraction from the main theme and averting tedious argument over details which might sickly o'er or defer resolution until it lost the name of action.

Perceptions vary with location in the same sense that a mountain looks different from varying angles and distances. With exceptions, being close to a person, an institution, a course leads to greater empathy and to at least partial acceptance of its/their outlooks and judgements. NGO's in both Angola and Mozambique have illustrated this reality - indeed in Mozambique many were plus FRELIMO que FRELIMO in opposition to providing humanitarian relief to civilians in Renamo controlled areas partly because some would inevitably have been levied to feed troops (as the Government was perfectly aware) and because of the atrocities resulting from Renamo's use of terrorism as a strategic tool.

A special perception problem ca be summed up in the phrases "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" and "any part in a storm". Here outsider perceptions are usually more critical than those of decision takers. President Eduardo Mondlane commented "If I was sure I could control the use of funding I would take it from the Devil". Depending on the Devil in point (oddly enough the CIA) many independent writers would demur. Similarly in 1974/5 from UNITA's perspective it had to find an accessible military provider/sponsor or perish. While it had reason to suppose it might win a 35%-40% plurality in a free and fair election it had only one external ally - China - and no effective access to it. The only possibilities open to it were the CIA and South Africa in respect to funds and equipment and South Africa in respect to operational personnel. That by its choice it would massively escalate and lengthen the oncoming civil war - largely made inevitable by FNLA - was quite possibly not foreseen and would not have carried much weight because in a purely Angolan armed conflict MPLA would inevitably have won.
Access has also been a limiting factor beyond the absolute scarcity of information and time to track it down. Access to data (and going especially beyond the official record discourse and information) and to peer and sympathetic reader group credibility do constrain objectivity and fullness of coverage. In respect to Angola to suggest publicly UNITA had a long, genuine historic base or that some elements of the MPLA had distinctly authoritarian and exclusivist tendencies (even after the Nito Alves coup attempt and the marked change in the balance of power between the "new technocratic" and the "old creole" leadership fractions in MPLA) brought instant loss of access and credibility with the Government/MPLA and its external supporters and (most) NGOs even if some of the latter two groups were willing to consider the issues in private. This problem was particularly acute for writers who - even if writing in their personal capacity - were on the staff of or closely associated with organisations carrying out programmes in Angola.

This problem is a general one. In most cases it is probable many authors overreact and practice too much self censorship. However, Angola - in the midst of a war which did threaten to topple the state (or as UNITA and South Africa saw it entrench a neo-totalitarian, exclusivist, aggressive elite certain to pursue it aims across the Namibian frontier) - was an extreme case. While there were certainly officials and leaders wishing to pursue a strategy of broader access to information than was initially approved and were willing to make data and comments on problems well beyond UNITA/RSA available though bending rules that access was clearly limited to persons perceived as sympathetic with fairly overt hostility to UNITA/RSA a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for being so perceived.

Critical analysis and programmatic proposals tend to have a staged life cycle and Angola - because of the protracted mixed civil war/war of external aggression has, at least until very recently, remained stuck in the first stage. In that phase securing attention and getting the country or topic on the agenda. Shouting a simple message with examples to support it is - or is perceived to be - key. Once the item is squarely on the agenda then it is possible - to use Mwalimu Nyerere's admonition - to "Argue don't shout" although the argument may be highly robust and the dialogue one, if not of the deaf, of persons of impaired hearing. Only later when at least broad parametric boundaries of fact and of plausible action are agreed is a reasoned dialogue (with more acceptance of problematicities in ones own analysis and proposals) fully practicable. Why Angola appears to have become caught in a time warp - at least until very recently - is less clear. It has never been a regular headline topic; its press appearances have been intermittent and usually crisis related; the end of the cold war took it to the bottom division of the global geo-political agenda as seen from the North from 1989 through 1992 and the combination of a relatively weak international media performance by the
Government and the South African connection/dragon's teeth mining of fields associated with UNITA have encouraged "a plague on both your houses" turning away. Thus, perhaps, the continuation of shouting.

It is clearly past time to move on to the second and third stages as rapidly as possible - most of all in the interests of Angolans. However, this may require not so much wider and deeper analysis with more attention to problematicities in each and every communication but a wider variety of communications plus an excision of past polemics which are no longer purposeful (not it should be stressed the excision of history which is already much too prevalent).

**III.**

**GAPS, ADDED STRANDS AND RELATIONSHIPS**

Angola is a country whose care problem is comprehending, mastering and reconciling/rehabilitating out of armed conflict. The existing independent literature does focus on conflict but with overemphasis (at least in present and future terms) on external intervention and inadequate attention to the dynamics of domestic conflict and of its transformation to less fraught ways of managing and at least substantially resolving tensions.23

The data and analysis base gaps are numerous and, perhaps even more telling, is the tendency to static rather than dynamic analysis and of isolated rather than holistic presentations.24 To present them with full indication of - as opposed to guideposts to - then relevance to Angola is not practicable. Certainly it would be inconsistent with brevity but more basically it is impossible precisely because the gaps (especially as to causal and dynamic interactions) do exist.

**History** - beyond the recent history of conflict and negotiations toward settlements - is the largest and most serious gap. This is particularly true in Angola.

a. prior to colonial rule three substantial states existed - the Northern Kingdom of the Kongo; a prazeiro25 state behind Luanda; a Highlands Kingdom on the Huambo Plateau;

b. these appear to have come into contact and conflict largely as a result of relations (dating to the end of the 15th Century) with Portugal and prior to their 19th (and early 20th) century conquest all had long been pre-colonial, new-colonial polities;

c. the core leadership of FNLA, MPLA and UNITA descends (sometimes very literally) from and their core support areas are those of the three former states.
d. in the late 19th Century the old creole elites (Northern, Luanda, Plateau) were prominent and powerful including an acting governor general prior to their near suppression by the Republic which was much more interested in "jobs for the boys" of the rising bourgeoisie than the monarchy had been;

e. during the colonial period de facto forced migrant labour from the Plateau was used widely especially on coffee plantations and in diamond mining in the North leading to Plateau claims to the farms and mines as the product of their sweat and Northern hostility to the workers as Portuguese "carrier pigeons" invading their natural resource base.

f. the Liberation War against Portugal was fought by a Northern, a Central and a Plateau party. On occasion (not just in the 1974-75 run up to independence) they fought each other and, indeed, UNITA had a somewhat tense non-aggression pact with the Portuguese ceding it certain areas in return for concentrating its military operations against the MPLA;

g. the late Portuguese/early independence era saw the explosive rise of a hydrocarbon enclave raising total real state revenue by a factor of more than ten;

h. the course of the 1975-1977 and 1980-1991 wars was marked by substantial dependence of Angolan actors (including FNLA before its comprehensive defeat with some leaders absorbed into the MPLA group in subsidiary roles) on external allies (Zaire/CIA; USSR-Cuba and RSA-CIA-Zaire respectively) a trend reinforced because the Angolan war was on one side a relatively hi tech one with a middle power (South Africa) deploying front line jets and artillery and the Government building up a personnel capacity and weapons park able to defeat them by the 1988-89 Battle of Kuito Canavale.

i. the brutal bloody clashes in Luanda over 1974/75 and in Luanda and other towns when UNITA went back to war following the 1992 MPLA electoral victory, gave each side martyrs and grounds to distrust both the motivation of others and leaders' ability to control followers.

To attempt to comprehend or to master conflict in Angola without taking this history into account in a substantive and central way is likely to be a highroad to false breakthroughs, temporary respites, fudged 'solutions' and repetitive reversions to armed conflict. The 1974/75, 1988/92 and 1994/97 records of attempted tension and conflict management toward stable non-conflict fora and process creation does nothing to refute that contention. Unfortunately in Angola history is not repeating itself as farce but as ever deeper tragedies.

Economics - and in particular political economy and household economics - is also largely absent from or a peripheral tack on to, much of the writing. This is perhaps surprising since a substantial proportion is either at least partly Marxian or strongly influenced (even if in
reaction against it) by Marxian thought. One might have expected more attention to economic infrastructures and dynamics and less to particular leaders or political superstructures, more to class (or subclass or economic interest group) tensions conducive to conflict and less to "tribalism" and "ethnicity" (often asserted without definition rather than argued or explained).

In Angola there are clear fault lines between urban and rural, elite and poor urban ("Cimento" vs. "Canisa") by economic subclass (e.g. small farming household or family sector, planter, rural enterprise labour, small trader, official - politician) and by Region. These partly overlap and partly reinforce historic political divisions and are in turn directly affected by economic strategy and policy (e.g. rural enterprise vs. small farming family priority in agricultural strategy, priority given to achieving universal access to basic services and infrastructure). To leave this out of tension/conflict/reconciliation analysis (or indeed out of past crisis measures to reduce vulnerability to calamities) bears some resemblance to playing Hamlet without its name character just as the neglect of history excises the usurping regicide Claudius, plus Hamlet's mother and murdered crowned father!

Macro economic skeleton sketches combined with reflections on early independence period Marxian choices, (Leninist New Economic Policy with joint ventures dominant in hydrocarbons, manufacturing and mining - at least in intent - in the case of Angola) failure to fit and exacerbation of tensions and of their mirror mirror image in rather reductionist adjustment - stabilisation - growth strategies, labelled Structural Adjustment but clearly failing to adjust basic economic structures, are becoming more common. So are socio-economic allocation (poverty, child deprivation, socio-economic strategy integration from macro through household level is yet to be attempted. However, these are rarely integrated into political and historical analysis or related in an analytical way with conflict.

Angola's conflict today relates in particular as well as specific ways to economics from the standpoint of who gets what, why, when and how? The impact of colonial use of migrant, de facto forced, labour on building up cross claims to diamonds and coffee plantations has been cited. But the major factor is hydrocarbons. Angola's oil revenues are a glittering prize. By its nature hydrocarbon extraction and export is an enclave industry with direct benefits to a narrow group of workers and professionals and (under modern state-enterprise contracts) the central state. The revenue flow to the Angolan state is approaching $1,500 million a year and could - with peace - easily double by the early 2000's. How it is used will largely determine who benefits not simply in the narrow sense of which politicians and officials but more basically in respect to basic services, infrastructure, small farmer livelihoods, urban, employment, safety nets - by region, by occupational group and by economic sub-class.

Certainly once peace is achieved the hydrocarbon (and diamond) revenues can loosen constraints on measures to reduce tensions and to create a dynamic toward dialogue and
agreed allocation. But their scale and centralisation has created incentives to seek all out victory to control them which have not existed in cases in which peace with control of the central government cannot bring massive fiscal payoffs - e.g. Mozambique. It faces the inverse problem of, at best, minimally adequate resources to underpin reconciliation through enhancing basic service and infrastructure provision to regions which have historically perceived themselves as treated inequitably in allocation. Very limited margins to expand provision and barely adequate services anywhere create a blockage. Room for taking from supporting areas and cities to allocate to opposition regions and rural areas is distinctly constrained - as is the case in virtually any political process based on consent and multi-party elections. With large and growing hydrocarbon and diamond flows to the Treasury, an Angolan political management of tensions process would have many more degrees of freedom.

Ecological disciplinary based contributions to the study of conflict in SSA are - beyond passing asides and the lebensraum theme, formerly considered under will to conquest politics - relatively recent and not to date much centred on Angola. They often illustrate the shout phase, almost stereotypically with such grave distortions of reality and timing as to threaten their message being taken seriously.33

The problem is not whether declining resources - especially reasonable quality land - do lead to tensions and stresses: assuredly they do. The issue is when and how they contribute to conflict e.g. Rwanda and Burundi have been perceived as overpopulated for a century and from the 1920's were used as labour pools for North Kivu (with some - perhaps not major - linkage to the present Eastern Zaire rising). But conflict in the Interlake Zone dates back 500 years and while land related to conflict throughout the link appears to have more alleviation of access, tenure system, conquest feudal and power elements than land scarcity per se. Similarly migration - in search of more or better land - can lead to conflict, even if initially peaceful as the 'new' area fills up. But when and why? It has on balance rarely led to conflict in Tanzania but has on occasion (including very recently) in Kenya. In Southern Ghana "stranger farmer" entry onto land and ultimate relatively secure entry into the 'new' area local governance patterns (historic as well as modern), initially during British rule but continued since, has been relatively non conflictual while in the North the entry of the Kankamba has given rise to repeated conflict for over a century (including in the current decade).34

In the case of politics/governance, law and anthropology-sociology-psychology citing the disciplines as gaps would hardly be appropriate; but within each disciplinary cluster there are substantial sub-areas which are virtually empty. For example capacity to deliver services, law and order enabling ordinary people to go about ordinary daily life in peace and security, negotiating in a way which builds cumulative confidence that non-conflictual management of differences is possible have received little attention.
Even in respect to political parties and political processes coverage has been somewhat limited and/or superficial. Particular leaders and ethnic (or regional) factors have been stressed but not the nature of parties and the tensions among fractions within them. The nature of FRELIMO and - to a point - MPLA as broad front anti colonial coalitions and its implications for their future (united or as multiple parties) has received limited attention although MPLA's "old creole", "new creole" and "populist" fractions have been alluded to and the historic carnival tradition provides the same coded commentary on them as Caribbean and - to a degree - Brazilian carnivals on their system. FRELIMO has - partly because it and the Mozambican political process are more open - been analysed more. However, the implications of groupings of radical socialists, Northern fair sharists and hard-line capitalist roaders clearly not in full agreement with the Presidential-Governmental and (presumably) Party majority themes of free market social democracy with basic public service access, poverty alleviation (safety nets) and poverty reduction (private production/employment and public infrastructure) for possible party division, a new strategic synthesis or continued stresses do not appear to have been analysed in depth although they logically relate directly to the continuation or reversal of present policies.

Political institutions also seem to be viewed more formalistically than holistically. Elections are a means to select-reject-recertify leaders, but can also be a symbol of non violent tension management. Admittedly the operative word is "can" - in Angola they were no such thing and the question needs examination of when an election is more likely to renew than to contribute to ending armed conflict.

Parliaments need not govern to be significant both in general democratic and non conflictual conflict management terms. The Mozambique National Assembly does not govern, nor except at the margins amend legislation. The Government is Presidential and the checks on the President are calculations of voter acceptability and pressures of party leaders (including but not only FRELIMO MP's), enterprises and external governmental and NGO actors. But the National Assembly matters and matters more than simply being an open forum for dialogue and a sounding board for the opinions of various fractions of the public. It does study Government proposals, query them, delay them, seek - and marginally get - modifications. Within that process it does provide a forum for and create a process of tension management by political means between FRELIMO and Renamo MP's. Indeed there has even been one resolution adopted initiated by a cross party group of MP's.

The other major gap in political writing is on the aspect of governance which is second only to absence of naked oppression and state violence in public concern - access to basic services and infrastructure. Inequity (or at least inequality) in access (usually along regional,
urban/rural or ethnic lines) as well as corruption and law service quality have frequently been cited but usually as peripheral or as outcomes of conflict. They may well be more integral.

In Somalia the collapse of basic service access (largely education, veterinary, water-health was always weak) from the late 1960's to virtual implosion by 1990 predates the collapse of the Barre regime. While it hardly explains more than a small fraction of the North-western resistance that chewed his army to pieces, it may be more crucial in the regimes' loss of even passive support/acquiescence almost everywhere. In Sierra Leone the implosion of service provision was even earlier - a moribund civil government with next to no delivery capacity beyond Freetown predated the rise of the RUF to the status of a serious threat to the state by up to a decade and a half.

Even when collapse of service delivery is clearly a consequence of armed conflict, it can feed back into eroding political legitimacy just as its renewed provision can have positive political legitimacy implications. RENAMO's (and to a lesser extent UNITA's) targeting of health, education, water and food supply networks - and their personnel - and the Mozambique (and to a lesser extent the Angola) government attempts to defend them and to enhance access to them in secure zones strongly suggest all perceived them as key tests of Party user friendliness and legitimacy in ordinary people's eyes. Whether such factors are highly significant in Angola is less clear than in Mozambique.

The results of the importance of basic service access/delivery capacity are by no means entirely happy in the contexts of conflict and of immediate post conflict governance rehabilitation. The correlation of political importance to terrorist targeting is an evident example, but not the only one. Former armed parties are unwilling to envisage early surrender of local governance areas and of service delivery cadres not simply because they mistrust the new unified 'apolitical' government institutional structure but also because they see direct contact in provision of services (including law and order) as politically crucial. Negotiating reintegration has proven one of the more difficult aspects of reconciliation in Mozambique and has, to date, been virtually impossible in Angola.

The gaps in writing on law intersect with those in writing on political science/governance. The first is in the area of law, order and human rights as a capacity or delivery problem and the second on the symbolic aspects of the rule of law and of key legal constructs - e.g. constitutions.

Laws and the legal framework of institutions can aggravate tensions and/or hinder the resolution of conflict - by themselves they cannot end it. However, the rule of law - the concept and reality of a predictable, interpretable in advance, uniformly applied set of parameters bounding accepted conduct and placing sanctions on unacceptable - may have a
more basic importance in conflict resolution and tension management than individual laws. In that regard the importance may be symbolic. Namibia's Constitution is clearly too rigid with too many procedural elements almost unamendable or indeed entrenched against the possibility of amendment. But the certainty of protection against manipulation (at least without an overt coup d'état against the Constitution like President Fujimori's) and the process of agreed adoption were of importance in securing a speedy, agreed transition to independence with substantial and broad confidence.44

To the ordinary person - as can usually be confirmed by open ended discourse with and listening in to them - law and order and human rights mean primarily freedom to go about ordinary day to day life (which does include speaking freely and organising with others) without fear of repetitive forceful intervention by things, insurgents, corrupt politicians-officials-courts-police or state repression and with some confidence that violations will be pursued by the police, the courts and the state with some degree of effect. Law and order systems which seek with some success to achieve this trend to be popular and vice versa. While laws matter (and the rule of law even more) this is frequently a capacity problem of understaffed, underpaid, underequipped, underresourced law and order services. The contentions that law and order is never enough and can be abused are ones as well understood by ordinary Africans as by development analysts and human rights advocates - what ordinary Africans seem to grasp more readily than some analysts is that without law and order in the sense described there will be precious few effective human rights and precious little development.45

Sociology-Anthropology-Psychology are, at least in passing, present in much of the independent literature and central to some of it. However, they are not usually closely linked to other factors or to devising and sustaining processes of reconciliation and of conflict transcendence into non-violent tension management.46

One gap in sociology-anthropology is serious analysis of existing, emergent and potential civil society in Angola and other African states. One underlying problem is a tendency to impose a Northern (or a Northern NGO47) template and on that basis determine that African civil society is weak, fragmentary, nearly absent - or suddenly burgeoning with the emergence of a host of small, elite, quasi professional partnership groups which look rather like Northern NGO's. That approach is radically ahistorical, acontextual and Northern metropolitan oriented to a degree widely, vehemently and accurately denounced as intellectual neo-colonialism in other fields of analysis and discourse.48 Historically Africa has had civil society groupings: age groups, locality unions, religious organisations. Few historic African states were monolithic let alone totalitarian - the Zulu Empire and the Abomey Kingdom are apparent exceptions. In
present day Africa religious bodies (church and mosque from worship group to national level), trade unions, women's groups, some cooperatives, peasant unions, some village or urban neighbourhood bodies, youth groups and - much more occasionally - bodies relatively similar to Northern NGO's are the core of civil society. Because they do not "fit" they receive Northern concepts of NGO's and/or civil society they get relatively little analysis or support at least in conflict resolution and avoidance and 'democratisation' programming especially when significantly Northern influenced and financed.

That said civil society in Angola does appear to be less pervasive, influential and strong than in Mozambique or Namibia. Whether and why are questions which deserve priority investigation. The poor showing of "Third Parties" in the Angolan election - sometimes cited as evidence - is not particularly convincing. Except in former FNLA areas, no third actor looked likely to win and only MPLA and UNITA had arms so only they could stop or continue war. In Mozambique - where, unlike in Angola, FRELIMO's own political analysis and strategy made it relatively pro fair access for third parties - only one achieved 5% of the vote and that only marginally and possibly partly by midentification.

The psychology or psychology-sociology gap lies in analysis of how processes of trust building (suspension of disbelief) can be achieved to allow not simply elections but actual operation of institutions to manage tensions. To say that actual working together builds trust, as does the process of a contested election and seating of those elected, is valid. The problem is achieving the suspension of distrust to approach tensions and differences of opinion as manageable and to accept electoral defeat. Mozambique appears to have achieved this - why? how? with what remaining risks? Angola clearly has not done so and until it does any new "settlement" may prove as brittle and short lived as the 1989-92 one.

A problem related to gaps - whether seen as hidden gaps or as their mirror image of edifices of non-communication - is the use of terms which are at best bulging suitcases needing to be unpacked and at worst "symbolic truth" which is literally false or at least misleading. The two leading examples are Balkanisation and Tribalism/Ethnicity.

At one level Balkanisation is shorthand for the assertion that present conflicts are in part at least the result of the colonial era. That is usually valid. But at another level it is the assertion that larger states to combine peoples now in more than one state would have averted many conflicts. Angola is a case against that hypothesis. Arguably three states - Northern, Central, Southern - might have averted conflict though given the overriding importance of hydrocarbons and diamonds it is hard to see how that could have been achieved. In any event that would be a 'solution' through more, not less, Balkanisation. That point is relatively general - Africa's substantial wars have rarely been border conflicts related to pre-colonial state or cultural systems.
Ethnicity (for which Tribalism is usually a perjorative synonym reserved by 'civilised' writers for "lesser breeds without the law") has several meanings, (including regionalism). In any event it is not inherently a cause of conflict (as contrasted with tension or conflict of interest).

Ethnic groups with common cultures do tend to be interest groups. For example in Cambridge, Massachusetts for many years the key swing voting areas and council persons were "Portuguese" (encompassing Metropolitan Portuguese and Cape Verdians) who voted en bloc and used their swing role between the largely Irish/Italian 'machine' and the Harvard-MIT led 'reformers' to pursue measures they believed beneficial. That kind of ethnic identification/interest promotion is very general outside totally homogenous polities - e.g. Swaziland and Lesotho, albeit not Botswana. There is little evidence that it inevitably or even generally leads to conflict. Perceived inequity in access to services/infrastructure and/or political power certainly does lead to tensions and in extreme cases is a contributory factor to conflict. Sierra Leone is to a degree a potential case in point.

A related basis of interest promotion and tension and in pathological or unlucky, cases conflict is regionalism. Mozambique is a case in point. The South - for historic reasons, some predating conquest - is more culturally homogenous (though not totally so) and has been favoured (not least because of the - literally - extremely eccentric location of the capital. The North has been least favoured but the course of the liberation war created or North-South alliance which made tensions arising from peripherality none manageable by non-violent means. The Centre - which is by no means homogenous ethnically or in pre-colonial political history - has arguably been disfavoured and certainly so perceived itself (including its settlers community in the Portuguese rule period). The course of the liberation struggle aggravated these tensions. While it is unlikely that the result would have been sustained, armed civil conflict in the absence of external intervention, the regional (not inherently ethnic) tensions did provide tender for the intervenors and in the 1975-90 period of war came to have a conflict sustaining life of their own. Angola has some resemblances to Mozambique albeit it would be rash to argue that its tensions are so clearly primarily regional, not ethnic per se.52

The heritage of conquest - at least when ethnic divides are largely sustained by quasi feudal structures in which, even if usually not impossible individuals upward mobility is constrained by caste as much as or more than class rules - most certainly can lead to ethnic conflict. Rwanda and Burundi are evident examples whereas Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Liberia after Doe's breaking of the Americo Liberian resident colonial ascendancy do not appear to be. Even in these cases ethnic (caste) and elite (class) factors tend to interact. The 1959 Rwanda revolution was arguably an anti feudal jacquerie as much as an anti Tutsi pogrom but the 1994 genocide was a centrally run ethno-political campaign.53
To conflate self identified interest group, regional, feudal and class tensions under the rubric ethnicity - as is regularly done - seems unlikely to further conflict comprehension, reduction or transcendence.

This critique by identification of missing links and terrae incognitae is not intended to second guess the past:

a. the process of developing a body of independent writing on Angola itself illuminates weaknesses and non coverage not readily identifiable in any other way;

b. until recently Angola was arguably in the "shout" phase of the communication cycle;

c. the growth of a body of Angola oriented (Angolan and foreign) writers makes possible more coverage in more depth;

d. over time independent outcome oriented and more academic analysts have built up personal contacts and interchange of information and sometimes an interest in pursuing the outcome implication spin-offs of academic study and vice versa.

Rather the critique is a check list for informing future independent, analytical, outcome oriented work.54

IV.

ANGOLA: CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD EXPLORATORY AGENDAS

To set out an agenda for independent writing on Angola even its outcome oriented fraction has limitations. For one person to do so is either inherently contradictory or arrogant - especially if the person is not an Angolan.

A key strength of independent analytical, programmatic and advocacy writing is diversity. Therefore no one person or discipline can even in principle set or carry out an optimal agenda. Breadth and interaction are of importance in agenda building as in analysis and prescription. Further agendas are not an area for majority voting - topics which look distinctly second order (or not policy applied at all) today may have become central in five years (and vice versa). Knowledge - especially outside the natural sciences - does not evolve linearly along a turnpike and the changing contexts in which analysis and prescription exist play as large a role in the rapidly changing fashions55 in conflict and development studies work as do the lure of novelty and depressive impact failure of past efforts on writers.
What follows are a short list of items to go on an agenda not an entire agenda. They do relate to the gaps and weaknesses in prior work sketched in the previous section but are not the only topical themes which can be posited from them. In their present form they relate to the Angolan context - a list for Mozambique or South Africa or Namibia would be somewhat different.

1. **Absolute poverty reduction** - access to basic services, infrastructure, markets and livelihoods identifying state, civil society, enterprise roles, resources and requirements. The tension management, regional (and rural/urban plus cimento/canisa) disparities threatening conflict, medium term economic diversity/sustainability and political processual implications require attention.

2. **Civil governance capacity** - basic services, infrastructure and law and order as discussed in the previous section. Resource (fiscal and personnel) balances plus roles of central and local government, Angolan civil society and external NGO's require forward articulation to identify the range and timing of practicable courses of action as well as their probable distributive and sustainability (political as much as narrowly economic) implications.

3. **Accountability/transparency** at all levels including who knows what now and what constraints on elites are in practice. A number of sub themes arise ranging from what accounts (numerical and verbal) are needed to allow holding politicians entrepreneurs or civil society office holders to account to what type of 'accounting' for war deeds are necessary/conducive to reconciliation.

4. **Prioritised Public Resource Forward Estimation and Allocation.** This includes but goes beyond the second topic because the surplus generating sectors - in reconstruction, reconciliation and development as in war in the past - will for some years have high priority to raise future fiscal flows net of plough back and because absolute poverty reduction is not a total strategy - especially as its success reduces the proportion of basically poor households. Angola has degrees of freedom but optimal results are likely to require alternative allocation scenarios which do seek to balance sources and uses. The today's - or yesterday's - resource crisis coping of 1981-88 and especially 1993-97 is not a suitable - nor, with peace and a process toward reconciliation, a necessary - approach for 1998-2007.

5. **External debt write down** to free up fiscal resources otherwise mortgaged to pay past (largely war or war destroyed project) debt would certainly facilitate economic, political and social reconstruction. Historically external borrowings to sustain war have virtually never been paid in full and it is not evident why Angola should be an exception. A detailed
study of amounts, sources, terms, uses and probable lender attitudes to write down which is accessible beyond State organs would facilitate both identifying ways forward and mobilising external support.

6. The nature, capacities, constraints on and dynamics of civil society bodies - individually and as a whole - as perceived by Angolans not along procrustean Northern models is a clear priority for analysis integrally involving analytical contributions from within them. This sector is probably significantly more important to sustainable reconciliation, accountability creation and democratisation than efforts narrowly focused toward increasing the number of viable political parties.

7. The contextual and processual ways in which greater suspension of disbelief, broadening agendas for concrete discourse resulting in managing tensions/allocations and resultant mutual confidence/reconciliation among leaders and supporters of the main two political parties/armed fractions in Angola might (as well as cannot) be achieved is crucial - especially as it is perfectly plausible that either the 1988/89 or 2002/03 elections, if free and fair, will result in a change in majority party. A comparative study with Mozambique (despite very real historic and contextual divergences) might be of special value, particularly if carried out primarily by independent Angolan and Mozambican analysts.

8. The meaning of security and the potential for Southern African regionalisation of security interact with several of the previous themes. Security can - probably usefully - be analysed from household (e.g. food security, freedom from bandits), through police type communal (e.g. transborder crimes whether banditry, drug running, tax evasion or fraud), to macro military political. That approach can be regional if the regional body covers all of the sectors (as SADCC including COSAS does), can - explicitly or implicitly agree on minimum standards of effective governance and has little or no reason to expect rogue action on the security front by any member. How immediately crucial these themes are for Angola is unclear - in this as in other respects its involvement in regionalism is less central than for most SADC Member States but likely to develop with peace and a less war focused set of economic and security priorities.

9. Possible and desirable interactions between Angolan and external actors - particularly Angolan State/Local Government/Civil Society and External Diplomats/Donors-lenders/NGO's - could usefully be explored with a view to identifying patterns and institutions of interaction which achieve relatively agreed divisions of labour and safeguard Angolan leadership - and development of analytical and operational capacity to support it. A comparative study would again be useful this time to avert the pattern of fragmentation.
erosion of both State and Civil Society capacity (not always intentionally) by its supposed benefactors which is arguably the primary institutional structure problem confronting Mozambique today.\textsuperscript{64}

9. And - as a sub theme within the previous one - enhancing Angolan contributions to independent analytical and prescriptive writing. The issue is not - or should not be - exclusion of foreigners nor even of foreign led projects. The action needed is literally affirmative - more Angolan participants and more Angolan leadership especially in agenda designing\textsuperscript{65} and communication critiquing.

- RHG
Falmer
March 1997
NOTES

1 The author is arguably guilty to a degree of the limitations asserted in respect to the Angolan material in Children On The Front Line. The human and economic cost panorama set out was based on reasonably accurate data and reasoned estimates largely confirmed by subsequently available field data, as was the depiction of the Angolan polity as in large part a captive of external forces - South Africa's desire to make Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid and the proxy force backing manoeuvres of the USA, USSR and Cuba. However, a reader with little background was likely (though the text does not say this and - rather too subtly perhaps - implies otherwise) to receive the impression UNITA had no genuine domestic backing. Certainly the near 500 years of three way territorial conflict in present Angolan territory and their continuity and evolution under Portuguese rule are not even briefly spelled out. Why? First, space was limited and the authority of the text on its key areas - human and economic cost of war especially to children - required avoiding problematic or erroneous asides on broader issues. Second, the key purpose of saving children's lives was seen as necessitating a firm focus on the impact of war and particularly on South African involvement as the enemy and on both immediate emergency life saving and short to medium term life sustaining programmes. Third, COTFL both as a report for UNICEF and as a tool for rescuing Southern African children from the impact of apartheid had to be, at the least, not unacceptable to all or almost all Southern African states other than South Africa or its impact would be destroyed by "friendly fire". As a result while no wilful misstatement or data manipulation took place in respect to Angola (and also to Malawi) some issues were sidelined or stated only by implication.

2 The second branch of this potential criticism is less valid - universal access to primary education and health care were priorities albeit arguably both were seriously urban biased and the latter too curative/hospital focused. The lack of any functional focus on livelihood generation for poor rural and favela households is indisputable, but it was the rule not the exception in SSA and was exacerbated during the 1980-1996 period by a survival allocation priority system which gave pride of place to the petroleum sector (to generate the funds for all other priorities); near co-equal priority to a military capable of facing RSA's armed forces (as well as UNITA's guerrillas) on equal terms (a necessity for state survival); third substantial provision of income (in pay, perquisites and/or low cost access to resalable goods) to personnel seen as crucial to carrying out other priorities (notably oil, armed forces, some senior politicians and officials and - somewhat randomly - selected groups of 'key' unit workers); fourth health - education - emergency relief (which were weak but functional in non-war areas until 1990 but collapsed during the 1992-94 renewed war) and fifth, all else (which received precious little after about 1983). The point is not the absence of a legitimate case for the government's priorities nor that arguably Mozambique with less resources did better in respect to basic services and emergency survival support, but that these issues were simply set aside with all weaknesses set to the apartheid account.

3 Ironically some who later lost faith in Savimbi then documented in chilling detail the internal authoritarianism and tactical brutality of UNITA. Earlier these had not been
unease characterises much of the coverage of then Prime Minister Leaboa Jonathan’s government in Lesotho - a lion roaring against apartheid from the mountain top but also deeply anti democratic and prone to the use of thuggery (including by its uniformed forces) at home.

4 A somewhat bemusing (to readers outside the USA) sub group did treat Cuba as a “great power” and a global security danger to the USA. Somewhat contradictorily it also presented Cuba as purely a Soviet tool. The first contention was ludicrous while the second (in Angola as in Ethiopia) was problematic. Soviet and Cuban perceptions and own interests as well as roles and tactics did appear to diverge significantly even if secondarily.

5 On the face of the evidence none of the parties was blameless but MNLA was the initial instigator and UNITA the least prone to rapid resort to force (perhaps because the least well armed).

6 The best evidence on and analysis of timetables suggests that CIA political/strategic involvement and South African invasion clearly preceded the arrival of Cuban operational personnel or significant numbers of Cuban or USSR advisors and probably precipitated them. Like the previous note the topic is problematic; the criticism is that this body of communications treats it as non-problematic and adopts a purist position almost certainly quite unsustainable by the data available.

7 Both MPLA and UNITA agreed to the election (and battled over rules and areas controlled) on the genuine belief they would win. UNITA - unlike the Government - kept most of its best troops hidden (not demobilised or merged) in preparation for a fallback should it lose the election. The Government transfer of up to 20,000 ex-soldiers to paramilitary police was of a much lower order of magnitude and could hardly have been the base for a return to war. Because the return to war by UNITA - and the brutality of its onslaughts - totally eroded confidence (by anyone) and renewed memories of 1974-75 urban violence large numbers of civilians were massacred - largely by MPLA supporters/police in urban and UNITA supporters/troops in rural areas.

8 The author is not well acquainted with this school of writing on, or in tangency with Angola and is, therefore, unclear how much is primarily concerned with presenting and promoting Angolan and how much with Portuguese political actors.

9 In fact only in Sao Jorge de Ouidah, Goa and Guinea Bissau was the war lost or being lost militarily. In Mozambique the tide was probably - but not absolutely certainly - turning, but in Angola the Portuguese military were on a roll. The collapse of the metropolitan centre from weakness on the periphery related to the human and economic cost of the war and perhaps to a military perception it could never actually be won as opposed to contained - not to military disaster.

10 It is quite possible to be deeply critical of almost all Angolan actors but to feel - whether on general humanitarian or regional/sub-regional commitments - determined to "go on trying" in presentation, contribution to dialogue and, perhaps, action.
11 A somewhat uncharitable paraphrase of Churchill’s dictum on Charles II that he reached the heights of tolerance via the easy paths of indifference would be that many Afro pessimists reach the depths of neo-fascist racism via the elegant intellectual paths of philosophical solipsism.

12 Multi authored studies do have the advantage of presenting different intellectual and outlook perspectives. This allows a serious reader with some background (and time to) draw his own conclusions. But is also means that readership will be narrow, quasi specialist not broad and -potentially - political action motivating.

13 The present author offers no apology for having been a leading co-author of Children On The Front Line nor of avoiding detailed historico political background (generally, not just in Angola) to achieve brevity, clarity and focus. But as his much more nuanced chapter in Angola Matters may suggest, he would not argue that COTFL alone is an adequate base for understanding or contributing to reconciliation/rehabilitation in Angola. Similarly he has systematically expressed grave reservations in respect to UNITA, and especially as to its maximum leader Jonas Savimbi, but sees no contradiction between that and examining the 500 year dynamic leading to UNITA’s geographical and socio-political base nor to undertaking serious analysis of MPLA/Government strategy including problematic elements. MPLA’s petroleum-military-support staff resource allocation strategy over 1985-1996 clearly averted defeat - forced negotiation in a frame accepting the MPLA as majority party and may have achieved the initial base for termination of hostilities. But it is unlikely to be appropriate to reconciliation and trust building and would be quite inconsistent with achieving rapid advances toward universal access to basic services or improvement in rural and canisa household livelihoods which are - at least arguably - crucial to ensuring non renewal of conflict. To argue that is not to assert the strategy was wrong over 1985-95 (on balance the reverse) nor to endorse UNITA’s priority allocation strategy which has in fact never been articulated.

14 The divide between simplification/avoidance of distraction and manipulative suppression is narrow but deep and also real for any one viewer but not necessarily in the same place for all. For example Mozambican refugees interviewed in the course of the Gersoney Report attributed over 90% of atrocities to Renamo and under 5% to government. (Voting patterns in 1994 suggest this cannot be attributed to uniform political loyalty - arguably over half voted for Renamo.) That probably does justify war period analysis describing Renamo’s strategy as integrally involving terrorism and the Government’s as not. In respect to mines in Angola the situation has been much more problematic. Basically the Government mined to protect and UNITA to deny access. Both strategies resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties (and the latter in exacerbated urban food scarcity) but only that of UNITA broadcast mines in fields. To cite only the dragons’ teeth facet of mining is (however unintentionally) to mislead seriously - just as to assert it was Government policy as well is blatantly false.

15 Calamity relief is an exception. The stance that starvation is a bad thing has few critics and fairly terse presentation of overall conditions with a few key examples can lead directly to detailed strategic and tactical proposals for averting/limiting it.
16 This contention holds even for the apartheid/communism cases. By the late 1970’s apartheid had few defenders in principle outside South Africa - the issue was whether it was expansionist and deeply, directly constricting and snuffing out the lives of Angolans. While communism as a system and Russian neo-colonial regimes in Africa had a somewhat wider range of sympathiser by the late 1970’s it was a shrinking and relatively small minority. What needed proving was that Russia had instigated aggression in Angola and that the MPLA was a dependent tool, a brainwashed lackey (suffering from "false consciousness"?) or brutal self serving apparatchnik "bird of a feather". In retrospect the first set of contentions would appear to have been correct - but to explain less of Angola’s tragedy than their proponents believed - while the second are in substance as well as detail, at the most charitable reading, highly problematic.

17 This comment is not intended to be condescending. Any writer committed to a cause or to course of action does need to focus on the main themes and to stress the evidence favourable to his commitment. Where this becomes unobjective in the sense of falsification is never easy for a committed author - and very often not even for an informed relatively objective ‘outsider’ - to determine until long after the event.

18 President Mondlane’s remark came in answer to a private query from a casual friend whether he had suspected the opaque North American Foundations’ which at one point provided a substantial proportion of FRELIMO’s total resources and several years subsequently turned out to be CIA conduits. In general many observers might well accept that he was correct - FRELIMO clearly was not captured by the CIA and Mondlane’s integrity was rarely questioned outside ultra partisan polemics. But Jonas Savimbi could give the same reply in respect to UNITA’s past dependence on South African and CIA funding, equipment supply, training and combat support. To what extent did it sell its principles (assuming they ever went beyond securing power at the centre as well as in its Plateau heartland)? To what extent are the distinct personal differences between President Mondlane and Savimbi relevant and why?

19 The uneasy non-aggression pact with the Salazaar regime allowing UNITA freedom of action in two peripheral provinces in return for concentrating military operations against MPLA was defunct with the fall of Cacetano and was itself the product of UNITA’s severe military limitations.

20 That the most aggressive party - in terms of the Luanda canisa battles which made civil war inevitable - was in fact Holden Roberto’s FNLA represented; a distinct miscalculation on its part.

21 Presumably criticisms of UNITA and particularly of Jonas Savimbi or suggestions that the MPLA was in no basic sense a Soviet puppet, whatever else it might be, were at least equally access destructive for anti-communist/UNITA supporter writers.

22 In a parallel example, the authors of *Children On The Front Line* were conscious that even publishing the infant mortality and malnutrition plus related data on Malawi (and noting they were less bad than those of war ravaged Angola and Mozambique but distinctly worse than those of any other SADCC state) without critical commentary was likely to make UNICEF’s position in Malawi more difficult. While the Malawi Ministry of
Health and UNICEF were co-producers of the data, its publication had previously been banned because the Life Present correctly saw UNICEF's commitment to the principles to be embodied in the Convention on the Rights of the Child as intensely political and radically different from his own priorities and the data as providing sticks and stones for his critics to use. How to deal with these forces toward self censorship is not an easy issue to resolve. Avoiding wilful falsehood is one principle, but even that is not unambiguous in the case of selective omissions. Presenting objective data with a (sometimes deafening) lack of interpretation where possible can be seen as both principled and informative but is not necessarily accessible to all readers. Leaving areas in which publication would end access blank and hoping readers would note the gaps and draw conclusions - or at least questions - from them is a somewhat more tenuous self absolution (which the present author admits to having used especially when writing independently while actually working for a government).

23 Both the anti-apartheid and the anti-Communist genre's tended to assume a military victory, not a negotiated settlement. Even writing in a negotiated settlement context often appears to treat cease fires, demobilisations and elections as one off events which by themselves end conflict and create the conditions for civil management and resolution of tensions (divergences of interest).

24 These weaknesses in part characterise even more recent, more academic literature such as *Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development*, the conflict resolution study of Mozambique. More disciplines are brought in (though history and - in this case - law remain weak) and there is emphasis on dynamic and processual aspects but the disciplinary contributions do not always interact. That of economics is peculiarly non integrated perhaps because it concentrates on macro economics and strategy while the political science contributions pay little attention to the role of basic service (including law and order enabling persons to get on with daily life and livelihood) provision in achieving governmental legitimacy and managing/reducing areas of stress (or the reverse).

25 The Portuguese colonial prazeiro (crown estate) system ceded territories to persons to win, hold, rule, profit from for the Crown. In Angola it created a *de facto* feudal state behind the direct rule Luanda enclave. Its rulers were largely creole, inter-married with historic African leaders and founded the great old creole families who were of central importance in late 19th Century Luanda and are the dominant core of MPLA/Government political and military leadership today (especially since the Nito Alves coup attempt).

26 As it happens a von Dunen, like the 1997 incumbent President and Prime Minister. Late 19th Century Anglophone and Francophone West Africa had a parallel false dawn of African economic, professional and political advancement reversed after the turn of the century as did Mozambique. Because of their later colonisation the Congo, East Africa and German Africa lack this historical strand while settler rule denied it to Southern African other than Angola and Mozambique.

27 Presumably to the Crown the difference between nobles and commonality was so great as to render any commoner who spoke, read, worshipped, dressed, ate and fought Portuguese more or less similar creating avenues for advancement of colonial (Asian and Cape Verdian even more than Angolan and Mozambican) assimilados. The Republic with
far more concern for advancing bourgeois livelihoods and the Nuevo Estado of Salazar with its security concerns were far more prone to territorial and ethnic (in addition to cultural) racism.

28 The present peace settlement negotiation strand leaving UNITA in control of the diamond fields and Jonas Savimbi of a $35 million a year net cash flow from them would appear likely to exacerbate this tension and thus threaten renewed (North-Plateau) conflict.

29 Especially in the case of the 1992 urban killings by the MPLA supporters and the paramilitary police, it is by no means clear that strategy as opposed to genuine fury at being pitchforked back into war led to the thousands of murders of ordinary UNITA members, supporters, ex soldiers and suspected supporters. That, however, is irrelevant to the deep distrust it has created just as the particular responsibilities for and acts during the 1974/75 Luanda canisa wars are not directly relevant to the continuing heritage of distrust and bitterness they have engendered.

30 Exceptions such as Children On the Front Line and Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development are significant but even they rarely integrate all strands of economic perspectives with each other or with the social and political analysis.

31 Angola - like Mozambique - appears to have followed Marx of the Herald Tribune in India, not Marx on Ireland, in socio-political economic outlook and strategy. In the former Marx perceived colonialism as breaking up unchanging, irrational pre-colonial systems and laying the base for capitalist modernisation i.e. as an historically necessary and, on balance, progressive force. On Ireland he wrote the first structuralist critique of neo colonialism clearly viewing British rule (including the snuffing out of the first Irish industrial revolution) as deterring capitalist development and anything but progressive. The "new man" (socialist, humane, modern, rational, selfless) model was one therefore which was more Portuguese than the Portuguese in rooting out pre-colonial 'survivals'; stressed large scale enterprises (not only public sector ones) and regarded the 'peasantry' (family farming sector) as irremediably economically inefficient and potentially politically reactionary. The misfit with evolving African socio-economic patterns, with resource (especially professional personnel) availability and with average human balancing of idealism and self interest was massive and the belief very rapid, largely unexplained changes in daily life and relationship patterns would be wholly welcome was naive. While the philosophy was more deeply rooted and lasted longer in FRELIMO, it also influenced Angola substantially at least up to the relative loss of influence of the "New Creole" technocratic and ideological elite following the Alves coup attempt.

32 In a Federal State with an automatic revenue allocation formula - e.g. Nigeria - this can be a major conflict avoidance factor. Without those degrees of freedom it can lead to conflict - e.g. Papua New Guinea - unless the polity is relatively small in population, socio-politically relatively homogenous and possessed of a ruling leadership which uses the surpluses primarily to move toward universal basic service and safety net access and livelihood expansion - e.g. Botswana.

33 e.g. Worldwatch has causally linked genocide in Rwanda in 1994 with recorded harvest falls of 30% over 1989-93. This is - as put - arrant nonsense. Over a third of the country
had come under insurgent control so no official crop estimates for it existed after 1979. The problem of overcultivation (to the extent it is real not imminent) has been building up over several decades not arriving as a sudden calamity from 1990. The history of deeply conflicted wa Tutsi-wa Hutu relations among the lakes goes back to about 1,500 when lebensraum in the sense of conquest not environmentalism dominated it. Similar comments apply to their remarks on the Sudan which date the North/South conflict to the 1980's (not to at least a century earlier) and to the (predictable) failure of a northern apparatchnik capitalist land mining via mechanised sorghum extraction which had little impact on the South (and possibly little on actual domestic food availability) though it may (in respect to prior peasant and pastoral land user resentment) have increased Three City - West and Islamic Brotherhood - Maadhist conflict within the North.

34 There are some clues. Absolute land pressure does not explain the divergencies - on balance it is greater in the Forest Zone than in the North. In the Southern Ghana Forest Zone cases the "incomers" spoke mutually intelligible languages and over time came to participate in local governance/community bodies (historic and modern) in addition to (erosing) active participation in original home community affairs. The Kankamba did not speak a mutually intelligible language, had no fall back home base in Ghana (Gold Coast) so no traditional political protectors and were excluded from/unwilling to enter amicably into existing historical local governance. The recent creation of three Kankamba skins (savannah analogue to stools or thrones) may allow tension management by parallelism in rural areas facilitating amicable mutual participation in modern urban level governance.

35 Ironically perhaps the one article focusing on the political counterpoint of the Luanda Carnival and the historic tradition of popular political commentary, criticism and ridicule of the elite it carries on which is known to the author is by an academic historian specialising in Portuguese and pre-colonial era history but at times applying its patterns and dynamics to more recent events.

36 Arguably in the 1994 election (and perhaps before) RENAMO was also a coalition of all groupings alienated, for whatever reason, from FRELIMO. Therefore analysis of the role (and future political allies) of its locally based, basic services oriented leaders and the more educated, civil operation oriented incomers in it deserve more attention than it has received. They can constitute a shift from an insurgency to a political party mode or a cleavage line with some potentially allies of President Chissano's radical social democratic fraction in FRELIMO should FRELIMO fragment.

37 The inclusion of Provincial Proportional Representation - at RENAMO's insistence - in Mozambique is an example of the symbolic role. It was seen to guarantee to all voters in each Province (at least of the main two parties) that they would have a voice because winners would not take all, substantial minorities would also be represented. Ironically, because FRELIMO's plurality of the National Assembly vote (only for the Presidency did it win a majority) included huge margins in areas of strength and "near misses" in a number of districts elsewhere whereas RENAMO had fewer landslide and more moderate margins by district, a "first past the post" constituency member system would not only have wiped out the third party but also given RENAMO a slim Assembly majority.
38 The easy answer is that an election based on (necessarily false) assumptions by all major actors that they will win is a prelude to renewed war. Zimbabwe contradicts the generality of that hypothesis even if it did hold for Angola and is pessimistically predicted to hold by most observers (Liberian as well as foreign) of Liberia.

39 How efficient this process is in modifying proposals and why certain provisions are queried intensively when apparently more contentious ones have been passed on the nod (e.g. in respect to local governance where the proposals seem in fact advantageous to RENAMO and the actual objections made by it trivial) are problematic, but the importance of RENAMO and FRELIMO deputies being - and being seen by their constituencies to be - able to differ, compromise, reach agreement non-conflictually is important. An even more symbolic Assembly is that of Rwanda. The bulk of its members represent non-genocide oriented parties of the former regime (a majority being appointed by their parties to replace victims of that genocide) and a small minority (5) the ruling RPF. Clearly it is a talk shop and a decrree validating mechanism, not a normal legislature nor a real check on the RPF/RPA. But it has symbolic meaning: preserving a multi party state and at least the rudiments of a legislature with a built in waHutu majority. That is especially significant because no election is deemed helpful until it is viewed as certain that chauvinist (and, in particular, covert genocidist) parties could not achieve a significant share of the vote in a free and fair election - a condition most unlikely to be met until well into the next Millennium.

40 The cross party initiative was to make two Islamic holy days public holidays parallel to Christmas and Easter. The opposition was an odd Roman Catholic/Atheist-Agnostic amalgam. On official religious preference data - over a quarter Roman Catholic, one quarter each Protestant/Anglican and Historic African, almost a fifth Muslim and 4% Other/None one would have expected the government - which is broadly tolerant and pro religious bodies as civil society organisations - to agree. But it has not done so because the Roman Church opposes Islamic holyday recognition until Christmas and Easter are holidays under their own names - not, as now, Mother's Day and Family Day - and the supposedly large number of hard line non-theists among FRELIMO cadres oppose such a 'blessing' because of the earlier history of FRELIMO - Catholic (and to a lesser extent Anglican/Protestant) mutual hostility. Unless there are a remarkable number of respondents describing atheism/agnosticism as "Indigenous" African Religions, the electoral balance gain would clearly be to promulgate four Holy Days under their own names as public holidays - an action consistent with present Government endorsement of religious group social service and safety net provision in cooperation with (and in principle part financed by) the State.

41 Voting outcome is, at the least, not inconsistent with that hypothesis. Province by Province FRELIMO fared better in cities and in Districts in which at least some services had been maintained or restored over 1992-94. Renamo's post 1990 creation of a more than symbolic primary school network and broadening of the coverage of its initially primarily military health services may have had parallel positive results for it in some Districts.

42 Experience elsewhere varies. The recreated Republic of Somaliland has focused half its budget on basic water, health, veterinary, education and civil police functions and appears
to do so in response to the traditional representative institution - territory wide Council of Elders. Elsewhere in the former United Republic of Somalia, no such concern with civil governance (except in some cases civil police against banditry) is evident. However, quasi public/quasi civil society groups seeking to fill health, water, education gaps are usually encouraged and formally blessed albeit not funded.

43 Renamo has not allowed District personnel level reintegration except in Health. The exception may indicate the potential of confidence building in a potential win-win context. Health viewed RENAMO's 800 plus health service personnel as 95% plus requiring further and/or gap filling training. It offered to provide it over two years while providing interim government service (FRELIMO service as seen by RENAMO) or NGO cover. Once RENAMO came to believe Health meant what it said and would both deliver the training and return the personnel, the programme was welcomed presumably because of perceived benefits to RENAMO supporting areas. In the case of Education - a much less competent or innovative Ministry - no meeting of minds has proven possible so that two parallel (albeit geographically segregated) education systems remain in being.

44 The fact that South Africa under the NP was among the most manipulative of constitutional amenders in stripping out apparently entrenched positions ironically both raised white Namibian's demands for iron clad prevention clauses and SWAPO's willingness to accept them. What might happen were a need to amend an entrenched clause which was widely supported and did not infringe basic rights to arise in - say - 2038 is an interesting intellectual question, but hardly one invalidating the case for very restrictive provisions to further confidence building over 1988-2008. Logically a three quarters majority in two successive Parliaments followed by a two thirds vote in a referendum should do as much as the present prohibitions (massive long term majorities do find ways to change laws) but psychologically and symbolically it would not have served the same purpose at the relevant time.

45 History is relevant to particular perceptions in specific contexts. Mozambicans are more prone to unqualified support for more, more effective police than Angolans because Mozambican police are basically civil (in both senses) whereas Angola has a substantial paramilitary police component whose 1992-93 record in particular was at best problematic even if it arguably did prevent UNITA overwhelming the Government when it first returned to war.

46 Indeed some communications appear to assume not only that ending conflict is either a one off act or a brief series of actions but that the 'norm' to which a post conflict polity and society revert is an absence of tensions (conflicts of interest) not a setting in which these can be managed.

47 Northern NGO's are no more and no less part of African civil society than Northern Missionaries, well intentioned colonial administrators, aid agencies and well intentioned diplomats. Inherently they are accountable not to Africans but to home (Northern) members and financial supporters and to their own consciences. That can be consistent with cooperation with African civil society but not with being part of it. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that the broad financial, narrower intellectual/political and narrow
policy formulation bases of Northern NGO's (all unpaid) nor their paid operational staff are generally replicable in poor African societies.

48 Part of the growing African reaction to external scholars and NGO's since 1990 does relate to this misplaced intellectual arrogance. The substitution of unaccountable foreign NGO (not probably accountable domestic civil society bodies) for partially or potentially accountable States in service provision at the insistence of Northern donors and lenders plays a larger part. However, that process is itself partly the result of a rather ill fitting concept of what accountability, democracy and civil governance are or can be in Angola or elsewhere in Africa.

49 For example Mozambican churches (acting in concert for the first time in their history) were influential in creating a pro-peace climate - not least in the Presidential Palacio de la Ponta Vermelho - and in facilitating communications around the negotiating process at all levels. Partisan they were not but political they were - and effectively so. There does not appear to be a comparable Angolan analogue.

50 This Party's line on the Assembly ballot paper was the last. On the Presidential ballot paper the last line was FRELIMO's. Some investigatory evidence suggests a not insignificant number of voters wrongly assumed that FRELIMO's was the last line on both ballots.

51 The main exception was the Somalia-Ethiopia war. Present former United Republic of Somalia conflicts certainly are within the former states boundaries even if refugees, costs and sometimes violence spill across them. To contend that the Interlacustrine conflicts could be 'solved' by ethnic cleansing of all regional wa Tutsi to Burundi (or Rwanda) is a rerun of the idealistic homogenous nation state concept of President Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations, and the Nansen Office which dislocated perhaps 25,000,000 people and killed perhaps 10,000,000 over 1919-1922 with no great reduction either in ravanchist boundary conflicts or even intra state, intergroup tensions. In any case the Belgians did not create the pattern of wa Hutu-wa Tutsi groupings. Tanzanian and Ugandan experience demonstrate that they are not inherently and inevitably conflictual. While the catalyst for the rising against the Mobutu regime did relate to its oppression of citizen wa Tutsi and its uses of murderous wa Hutu armed refugees, the Zaire insurgency has a much broader set of causes as its rapid support base expansion and geographic advance demonstrate.

52 Inequity not merely inequality which is perceived as historic, not perpetuated by present government policy and is the object of measures intended to reduce it.

53 In 1959 local wa Hutu mobs often identified and did not harm "good Tutsi". In 1994 organised, centrally controlled and scheduled mobs killed all available wa Tutsi and wa Hutu identified as politically willing to live/work together with them. Probably at least a third of the 600,000-800,000 genocide victims were "moderate" wa Hutu.

54 This section in large part draws on a project development safari for ACDESS (African Centre for Development Economic and Strategic Studies) with its Director Professor Adebayo Adedeji in February/March 1997 as well as previous UNICEF, SADCC and Government of Mozambique based work over 1986-1995.
55 Some of the apparent strategic changes are on second examination more repackaging and reheadlineing than major substantive shifts. As a local women's group leader remarked, the content of "child survival and development", "children in especially difficult circumstances" and "rights of the child" oriented programmes on the ground are - or can be - remarkably similar. Reheadlineing may help mobilisation - especially if the initial headline failed to click e.g. the re-emergence of "basic needs"/"basic human needs" as "absolute poverty reduction" a decade later. Some however are cyclical - and do relate to substance - "community development"/"development from below" of the 1950's did fall out of the hit parade and re-emerged under rubrics such as "conscientisation" (a curious conversion in consciousness raising retranslation from consciousness raising) in the 1970's and "participatory development" in the late 1980's and 1990's. Basic Needs/War Against Poverty of the 1970's represented a prioritisation of targeted floors, inclusion and tension management by reducing inequality through wider access which definitely fell out of favour in the neo-liberal high noon of the 1980's (as well as never gaining favour in Marxian growth and investment maximisation models). Absolute poverty reduction (sometimes unfortunately titled "alleviation" which logically means safety nets to reduce the pain of poverty not access to services, livelihoods, infrastructure and markets to emerge from it) represents a return to the 1970's prioritisation. Again it has conservative (tension reduction and/or production maximisation focused) and reformist/progressive (broadening participation and degrees of freedom, reducing inequality and - especially inequity, poor household earned income maximisation) strands.

56 Oil and diamonds can be good servants or bad masters. How their revenues and foreign exchange flows are used will determine whether a broader Angolan economy becomes competitive or an oil elite finances a political elite a degree of protection of weak sectors, an overvalued exchange rate defeating competitiveness and elite/popular divisions tending toward conflict.

57 Angolan decision takers do not have total freedom from accountability - not even Jonas Savimbi. But what accountability, to whom, when on what basis requires more analysis in processual as well as historic and static terms.

58 Straightforward trials are practicable only when one actor in the combat won 'total victory' - e.g. Ethiopia, Rwanda. Truth and Justice Commissions with more (e.g. South Africa) or less (e.g. Chile) potential punitive spinoff are possible in the context of negotiated conflict cessation. There is a genuine discourse on whether and when facing the past including unvarnished horrors of all (or almost all) main actors reconciles and heals and when it lays up resentments toward renewed conflict. Only South Africa in Southern Africa has taken this route and to date the balance of debate in Namibia and Mozambique has not favoured such Commissions.

59 For example at least some Russian (ex USSR) obligations provide for payment in dollars at the rate of about 0.67 per rouble per $ in goods at world prices or in roubles. When signed the third option was meaningless. Today with the rouble at about 4,000 to the $ it clearly provides the logical starting point for Angolan offers to pay since R8,000 million on that basis is $2,000,000 instead of $12,000,000,000! Whether it would be fair or prudent
for Angola to pay $2 million "take it or leave it" is problematic; even to discuss paying $12,000 million is (from Angola's interests) nonsense.

60 War ravaged societies seriously seeking to reconstruct, reconcile, reduce poverty, rebuild/expand commercial exchanges usually can mobilise popular sympathy and business support in lender countries at least in respect of military imports and, perhaps, projects whose value was wiped out by war. In particular Western public and bank creditors and present/potential investors are highly likely to support a sharp writedown in payments to Russia as long as it is not characterised as a simple, naked default.

61 Civil society bodies which are in certain senses inherently political but usually not partisan political are likely to meet with much less resistance from MPLA and UNITA leaders seeking to maintain a duopoly on political office than FNLA or any fourth party. Further the context in Angola suggests most voters may very well not see further party options as very attractive while most Angolans might well wish to strengthen civil society bodies - especially those to which they adhere.

62 To reject the hypothesis that history is all about "Big Men" does not imply particular leaders and their characteristics do not matter. Savimbi's very clear, consistent, unswerving guest for national political power over 1958-1998 is both admirably principled to some core supporters and a real problem (even if he is now willing to participate in power not rule, or at least not before subsequent electoral success, which is itself problematic not clear) for almost all non-UNITA members.

63 The levels of expectations of what peace can bring and how fast, set against the cold realities of resources and timing, suggest a 5% to 10% swing away from the Government is likely - quite enough to elect UNITA and, if lags continued, turn them out again. While a MPLA-UNITA-MPLA electoral sequence once achieved might be valuable to processual consolidation of non conflictual resolution of tensions, it is by no means self evident a non conflictual, election mandated change of power in 1998/99 would happen.

64 For example in Mozambique external donors appear to provide health service finance - primarily to their NGO's - equal to double total (domestic and aid) Government Health Service spending to provide about a fifth as many services. A 10:1 unit cost ratio weakness ought to convince even (especially) ultra market advocates something is amiss. More sinisterly several major NGO's in the early 1990's proposed to set up a hermetically segregated early warning data collection - analysis - exchange system excluding the Ministry of Health system as sources, analysts, recipients as well as the -admittedly limited - Mozambican civil society health service sub-sector. As one of the prime movers is syndico anarchist in ideology and does not endorse a leading role for governmental health service provision and the other views both the Mozambican Government and most main civil society actors (the existing Christian and Muslim ones) as - literally - damned, the internal logic of the proposal is clear. What is less so is why any Mozambican should be willing to tolerate it or any foreign government willing to finance NGO's proposing this type of - literal - subversion of both state and civil society. A less fraught in intent but almost equally problematic case is the umbrella Mozambican/External NGO Forum. It may soon have a Mozambican majority, but by definition a church congregation operating and financing a 75 person street children's home and school, several safety net schemes for
poor households known to parishioners and a parallel middle school for pupils unable to gain state school places is not an NGO nor is the women's produce growing/selling coop which spearheaded Maputo Green Zone plot development and allocation to weave, provides various social as well as economic services to members and is a not uninfluential voice on women's needs, aspirations and priority to services. On the other hand a Mozambican professional cooperative whose members (say 10) are all paid (by external sources) to carry out projects for "the poor" can be a member (as several are). This seems, somehow, to be a disservice to Mozambican designed development of Mozambican civil society.

65 The Mozambique post conflict study cited earlier (and its Eritrean sibling) as well as the ACDESS Comprehending and Mastering Conflict project are examples of growing African participation in agenda articulation and implementation and in agenda initiation respectively.