ASPECTS OF BRITISH TECHNICAL COOPERATION (BOTSWANA AND MAURITIUS)

AN EVALUATION

APRIL 1977

MINISTRY OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
ELAND HOUSE.
STAG PLACE.
VICTORIA S.W.1.
ASPECTS OF BRITISH TECHNICAL COOPERATION

AN EVALUATION

BY

INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX

BOTSWANA: by Christopher Colclough and Robert Chambers

MAURITIUS: by Jake Jacobs and Bernard Schaffer

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Ministry of Overseas Development
Aspects of British Technical Cooperation

"Botswana: A Case Study" by Christopher Colclough and Robert Chambers

"Mauritius: A Case Study" by Jake Jacobs and Bernard Schaffer

INTRODUCTION

These two evaluations were carried out by the Institute of Development Studies on behalf of the ODM as part of the ODM's on-going programme of evaluation studies covering many facets of aid, capital aid as well as technical cooperation.

The terms of reference (which were drawn up in consultation with the British Council) are below. It was originally intended to cover three countries but it has not yet been possible to do the study in India. This may follow later. It was intended to produce a commentary on the lessons to be learned from all three studies, but this cannot be prepared until the India study has been carried out.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Studies of British Technical Cooperation in Botswana, India and Mauritius will be undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University.

2. Each country study should assess British Technical Cooperation with each of these countries over the last seven years in terms of:

   i. The intermediate objectives of strengthening the base of indigenous skills and assisting the implementation of the general development programmes of the host government.

   ii. Any other objectives perceived to be important by the host government. In each case comment should also be made on the relevance of more recent and current activities to ODM's present aid policy objectives.

3. In the light of the objectives referred to in paragraph 2, the study will assess for each sector the effectiveness of Technical Cooperation, and suggest ways in which it could be more effective in the future. For instance is it possible or desirable for Technical Cooperation to be coordinated more closely with UK capital aid?

4. In the case of Botswana, the study will concentrate on aid for education (excluding higher education) and rural development.
5. A comprehensive study of the training programme financed by the United Kingdom will not be undertaken, but the team may be able to comment on broad issues, such as sectoral priorities, within the programme. In particular the team will assess past experience with third country training, and explore possibilities for the future.

6. Examples of the issues that may be examined are:

- best ways of using technical cooperation personnel, e.g. experts, supplemented staff, or volunteers;
- political and social attitudes of UK personnel working overseas under the aid programme;
- participation of the recipient government in the selection of personnel, briefing etc.;
- the effect of terms and conditions of service on job performance;
- relationship of technical cooperation to policies of the recipient government;
- relationship to technical cooperation of other donors, including problems of coordination and comparative advantage in skills provision;
- extent of recipient's participation in implementation;
- provision of local costs and support services.
AN EVALUATION OF BRITISH TECHNICAL COOPERATION

BOTSWANA: A CASE STUDY

by

Christopher Colclough and Robert Chambers

March 1977
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I. Summary and Recommendations

Botswana has achieved remarkably high rates of economic growth over the last decade. The main constraint upon growth shifted from a lack of finance to an acute shortage of technical and professional workers during the early 1970s. Accordingly, the technical co-operation component of aid increased markedly in importance. Most of this increase was provided by ODM, who help to finance 70 per cent of all expatriate contract officers working in Botswana under co-operation agreements of various kinds. In contrast, less than ten per cent of volunteer staff in Botswana are financed by British agencies.

Much of British technical co-operation (UKTC) with Botswana does not directly support rural development. The main skill and occupational shortages are in technical and professional cadre positions related to modern sector development. Yet the Government's healthy financial position has been generated almost entirely by modern sector growth. Without it, the present opportunities and policies for rural development that are being promoted by the Government would have remained out of reach. The UKTC programme has had an important role in helping to generate these financial surpluses. It is primarily in this indirect and long-term sense that UKTC has helped the poorer people.

There seems no reason to seek a major change in the direction of ODM support within the near future. It is likely that its most useful role will continue to be in areas of urban/modern sector development - thereby releasing the most effective Batswana for rural programmes. This judgement assumes that Botswana will continue to give high priority to rural development in her future policies. Should the emphasis change - or not develop in the ways promised by recent events - some shift of British policy may then be appropriate, towards a greater emphasis upon direct rural support.

On the other hand, our enquiries have revealed that there are some important weaknesses in the UKTC programme with Botswana. In the main these comprise delays in recruitment, deficiencies in the motivation and attitudes of some of the British staff, problems experienced in training Batswana to replace expatriates, and difficulties caused by existing contractual arrangements for some categories of staff. Our analysis has led us to suggest a series of reforms which could improve the future effectiveness of ODM support. These conclusions and recommendations, grouped under five main heads, are summarized below. An indication is given of the paragraphs in the text where further analysis and discussion may be found.
Recruitment

a) Recruitment delays can be reduced, particularly for urgent vacancies, by the Botswana authorities giving a firmer indication of relative priorities for outstanding indents. No indications of such priorities should be given to ODM by the British High Commission before these having been agreed with the Director of Personnel. Manpower Review Missions should aim to return to ODM with a batch of new indents, and with a clear idea of the relative priorities attached to outstanding vacancies.

b) There is a need to pay much more attention to the process of finding the right man for the job. In particular the attitudes, motivation, social skills, family circumstances, and personal background of potential recruits should be focused upon more clearly than hitherto. In this regard:

1. A personnel officer should be seconded from the Directorate of Personnel to the Botswana High Commission in London, whose sole responsibility should be recruitment.

2. A system of confidential reports should be instituted for all OSAS and other contract officers to facilitate retention of the best people for other overseas work.

3. Interviews should take longer than at present, and should ascertain for example a man's family circumstances, whether he has teenage children, whether his wife would be happy not to have a job. Attempts should be made at this time to solicit the candidate's views about the kind of life he expects/wants to lead in Botswana, his view of an expatriate in Africa, etc.

4. ODM should work out, in co-operation with recipient governments, and after consultation with some of the women involved, ways in which wives of contract officers (and BHC staff) can be more effectively involved, and possibly employed, in local work.
5. Job descriptions should convey clearly the specific duties and responsibilities of the post, its level of seniority, and the number and level of employees who will be responsible to the officer in question.

(ii) Contractual Arrangements

a) Existing contractual arrangements tend to attract people with inappropriate attitudes towards work, and to the host country. The emphasis in contracts is upon short-term gains, but with the risk of a significant long-term loss. In most occupations overseas work is not considered to be an advantage when seeking re-entry to the UK labour market, and the fact that no longer-term security is offered by the British Government is a disincentive for both the younger person who has to consider building up his career and the older man with family responsibilities. In this regard:

1. ODM can expect to continue as a major source of TC personnel for the next ten to fifteen years. Efforts should be made to identify occupations and professions where there will be a continued long-term need. Perhaps 25 per cent of overseas appointments in these jobs ought to be under contractual arrangements which guarantee a career structure for a 10 to 15 year period-conditional upon satisfactory performance. Whether this would most appropriately be on secondment, corps of specialists or home-based arrangements would be a matter for discussion.

2. Particularly in the teaching profession attempts should be made to recognize overseas service as a positive factor when applying for re-appointment in UK. Teachers, particularly in the arts and social sciences, can gain much from overseas experience of immediate relevance to the quality of their teaching in this country. This may be as much a question of changing the attitudes of local education authorities as of giving teachers formal guarantees of re-appointment.
b) Contracts for OSAS teachers should be changed, so that teachers are required both to take overseas leave during school vacations, and, in the case of contract renewals, to return at the beginning of the following term, accepting pay in lieu of leave where they are so eligible.

(iii) Training

The training responsibilities of contract officers are inadequately implemented. In this regard:

a) All contracts, where appropriate, should mention the need to take initiative with training Batswana on the job. All TC personnel should be told that they are expected to make strenuous efforts to identify, encourage and train someone to replace them.

b) Training responsibilities should be addressed during the orientation course recommended under V b) to V d) below.

c) The counterpart system needs to be made more effective. Inter alia we believe it would help if all TC officers with counterparts set apart one hour each week to discuss the work done since the previous meeting, and problems that have arisen.

(iv) Range and Emphasis of Assistance

For as long as the Botswana Government is energetically pursuing its policy of social justice, including attempts to improve the lot of the poorer rural people, the British Government should continue to support the full range of TC needs as perceived and requested by the Botswana Government. At the same time:

a) This should not exclude possible specialisation depending upon Botswana's needs and the relative capabilities of the UK and other donors.

b) Urban bias should be carefully monitored. In particular, the UK should examine the urban-rural locations of its TC staff and be ready to increase the rural proportion, especially through volunteers and younger people, if requested.
c) In education, support for English-medium primary schools should be phased out over the next few years. Support for secondary education and teacher training should continue.

6.3

d) IVS should reverse its decision not to support the secondary school system.

6.10

(v) Training and Orientation for UKTC Personnel

UKTC should be made more effective through the carefully planned and managed training and orientation of UKTC personnel.

In particular:

a) UKTC personnel should receive professional management training.

5.10

b) UKTC personnel and their spouses should have a one or two-week orientation course soon after arriving in Botswana.

7.1

c) The course might be organised by extending an initiative already being undertaken for volunteer training by IVS.

7.2

d) Some 8 courses a year might be run, each involving about 12 UKTC personnel and their spouses.

7.3

e) In addition and on a voluntary basis, those UKTC personnel with direct responsibilities for rural policies and programmes should be permitted and encouraged to spend between one and three weeks living in a village as part of their orientation.

7.4
Two broadly different objectives of evaluation can be distinguished. The first may be referred to as a "summative" objective, where the aim is to assess the worth or overall contribution, according to agreed criteria, of what has been achieved. A "formative" objective, on the other hand, emphasizes the identification and diagnosis of current problems and opportunities, with a view to improving performance and benefits in the future. In this study of UK Technical Cooperation (UKTC) with Botswana we have primarily adopted the second objective, since this appears more feasible and more useful, both for UKTC and for Botswana.

We have interviewed over the space of a few weeks, about sixty officers of the Botswana Government, both expatriate and local, and personnel from some of the diplomatic missions and voluntary agencies. Our approach in each case was not to prepare a sample, or to ask a list of identical previously prepared questions. Rather, we tended to begin with general, open-ended discussion, and to pursue the major problems and themes that emerged and that appeared important to the interviewees and ourselves. In some cases, this led to in-depth sessions of two or three hours, and in others to interviews of only a few minutes. Whilst we recognise that this has placed more responsibility upon our own judgement and integrity than a more rigid approach would have done, the flexibility of the method has generated rather more insights than we feel we would otherwise have gained.

Any evaluation of UKTC which is looking towards the future has nonetheless to be set against the history and conditions of the country concerned. This is especially important in the case of Botswana because of the dramatic changes which have taken place during the ten years since Independence. We start therefore with a review of the economic development of Botswana during recent years, and the changing structure of British aid. We then consider general issues before focusing on two key sectors - rural development, and education.
III The Economic Background and the Changing Structure of British Aid

3.1 At the time of Botswana's Independence in 1966 it seemed that promoting economic development in the country would be a slow and difficult task. Until that date, the territory had been administered from Mafeking in the Republic of South Africa, which served as the country's capital. There was an almost complete lack of basic infrastructure outside the two small towns of Lobatse and Francistown, and the country was in the midst of the worst drought in living memory with one fifth of the population of almost 600,000 receiving famine relief. In 1966 revenue from internal sources amounted to less than P6 million,\(^1\) and the Government received a grant-in-aid from Britain to finance 60 per cent of its recurrent expenditure in that year. The Government's development expenditure of P5 million was entirely financed from overseas aid. Though it was known at that time that Botswana possessed potentially rich mineral deposits of copper-nickel, communications in this vast country were extremely difficult, and it seemed that the investment needed to develop the mineral sector would not be available for many years to come.

3.2 A British Economic Survey Mission which visited the territory on the eve of Independence to assess development prospects considered that mineral exploitation could have effects upon Government revenue only in the long-term. The problem thus appeared to be how to achieve development from other sources, in a way which did not significantly boost the budget deficit in the short-term, but which would eventually reduce the country's dependence upon grants-in-aid. The alternatives were limited. It seemed that agriculture, and in particular cattle-ranching, would necessarily remain the basis of the economy. Even with stringent economic and financial management by the Government it seemed at that time that the recurrent budget deficit, and hence the need for recurrent support from UK, would remain throughout the following decade.

\(^1\)Over the period since Independence, the exchange rate between sterling and the South African Rand has varied within the range £1 = R1.5 - R2.2. 'P' is an abbreviation for Pula, Botswana's national currency which was introduced in 1976, and which is at present tied to the US dollar at the same international value as the Rand. For the sake of simplicity Pula are used as the currency unit throughout this case study.
This early pessimism has been proved unfounded. Though admittedly from a very low income base, extremely high rates of economic growth have been sustained in Botswana since the late 1960's. Since the structure of growth has itself had a major influence upon aid flows, both in financial and manpower terms, it is useful to summarise the main ways in which these economic changes were achieved.

First in 1969 the terms of the Southern African Customs Union Agreement were re-negotiated. Prior to Independence the existing formula, which had been agreed to in 1910, had generated for Botswana about P1.2 million per annum. The immediate effect of the re-negotiation was roughly to triple the revenues accruing to Government from this source. But the medium term effects, when the imports resulting from large investments of foreign capital in Botswana began to accelerate, were much more substantial. By 1973/74 customs receipts reached P21 million.

Second, a very high priority was placed by the new Government upon the provision of physical infrastructure. A new capital, Gaborone, was completed shortly after Independence, and the construction of a copper-nickel mine and township at Selebi-Pikwe was started soon afterwards. As a result, between 1960 and 1970 approximately 55 per cent of Government's development expenditure was devoted to the provision of physical infrastructure, with, in some years, the proportion reaching 70 per cent. About 60 per cent of this expenditure took place in urban areas. In addition, a diamond mine and associated township was built at Orapa, almost entirely by private foreign capital. It is estimated that these mining and urban developments at Selebi-Pikwe and Orapa involved a total investment equivalent to over twice the country's GDP in 1970.

Third the viability of the mining prospects above, together with the facts that Botswana was still one of the poorest countries in the world, and very vulnerable to its powerful and potentially hostile neighbours, significantly increased the flow of aid funds for supportive social and physical investment. Thus external development finance increased from P4.5 million in 1967/8 to P23.2 million in 1972/3. Botswana received more financial aid per capita over that period than any other independent country for which data are available.
3.7 These circumstances, together with, more recently, increasingly favourable international prices for beef exports, generated rates of economic growth in excess of 20 per cent per annum over the period 1967/8 to 1973/4 and domestic income per capita is now estimated to be almost five times greater than its pre-Independence level.

3.8 A major target of the growth strategy has been that of maximizing Government's domestic revenues. In the early years, this was needed to release the country from its dependence upon recurrent support from UK. After this had been achieved in 1972/3, the goal of revenue maximisation was retained in the short-term, since it was seen as the means to secure substantial resources for re-investment in the rural areas. Nevertheless, associated with this strategy, certain tensions and problems have arisen that had not been foreseen. For example, there has been a significant growth of urban poverty, and a worsening of income inequalities both between and within rural and urban areas. Though significant financial surpluses have now been generated, the attempt to direct a major proportion of investment to the rural areas is of very recent origin. And those programmes that have been mounted have probably not yet affected the welfare of the very poorest people significantly. Most important for the purposes of the present study is the fact that there has been a big increase in the number of non-citizens employed in Botswana - from about 2,500 to 4,500 persons over the last ten years. The localisation problem is now more difficult to solve than it was at Independence: though expatriates are now a slightly smaller proportion of the formal sector labour force, both their absolute numbers and their average level of skill have increased and on balance, the training and experience required by Batswana to replace them involves both a stronger and longer preparation.

3.9 By any standards Botswana's economic growth over this period is remarkable, and a rapid increase in demand for skilled workers was inevitably associated with it. Though the demand for technical skills has been strongly influenced by the highly capital intensive investments that have been taking place, this increased dependence upon expatriate workers was particularly marked as a result of the paucity of education and training facilities in the country until the mid-1960's. At Independence only 1,500 children were enrolled in secondary schools, with pitifully small numbers at the higher levels of the system. In 1964, for example, 39 students were involved in fifth-form studies, of whom 27 passed the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examinations, 13 doing well enough to qualify for entrance to the local university. Yet at that time, only
of the 184 administrative and professional posts in the Public Service were held by Batswana; even at lower levels, only 275 out of 613 technical, executive and clerical posts were held by local officers. Thus, staffing requirements of the Public Service alone implied that the capacity of the secondary school system was completely inadequate to service the needs of the newly independent Botswana. Even with the strong emphasis the Government has given to the expansion and improvement of education and training facilities over the past decade, these small beginnings inevitably implied a big increase in expatriate recruitment in the short to medium term.

Thus the major constraint on Botswana's development shifted in the late 1960's from a shortage of finance to, increasingly, a shortage of skilled manpower. The increasing demands of implementing an ambitious development programme generated rapid increases in the Government establishment of about 13 per cent per year between 1969 and 1972 and about 11 per cent thereafter. A high priority was placed upon the localisation of the Public Service, and the fact that Government was able to have first choice from the students emerging from all levels of the education system allowed the number of non-citizens employed in established posts of the Central Government to decrease from 684 to 669 between 1969 and 1972 in spite of rapid establishment increases. But after the latter date competition for skilled Batswana from other sectors of the economy, together with a need to reduce the intolerably high level of vacancies in the Public Service, led to some increase in the number of expatriates working in government.

These trends are illustrated by Table I which shows the shift in the structure of UK aid to Botswana between 1969 and 1975. During the three years 1970, 1971 and 1972, financial aid was about 80 percent of total aid flows from the UK. However, technical cooperation then became more important, markedly so from 1972 to 1975, during which time it rose from about 20 per cent to about 40 per cent of the total disbursement. This resulted from an increase from 255 to 415 OSAS and other supplemented personnel working in Botswana, a jump of 60 per cent over the same three year period.

1 Data are for December of each year. Source: British Aid Statistics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Total (a) Disbursement</th>
<th>Financial Aid (b)</th>
<th>Technical Cooperation of which Personnel Costs (c)</th>
<th>2 as % of 1</th>
<th>3 as % of 1</th>
<th>4 as % of 1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4874</td>
<td>4325 (1602)</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2795</td>
<td>2218 (1159)</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4405</td>
<td>3691 (2828)</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>637</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>3354</td>
<td>2715 (2869)</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>535</td>
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<td>19.1</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>3309</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>70.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4047</td>
<td>2754</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4756</td>
<td>2907</td>
<td>1814</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Notes:**

a. Total disbursements include aid to Botswana to support the recurrent budget deficit. Recurrent subventions continued until the financial year 1971/72.

b. Figures in brackets show project aid only, i.e. total financial support minus recurrent subventions. Financial aid and project aid are the same from 1973 onwards.

c. Total costs of technical cooperation minus costs of students and trainees, supplies and equipment, land survey and other costs.

**Source:** British Aid Statistics
The number of expatriates financed by other donors also increased over these years - particularly those from North American volunteer organisations, and personnel from the Scandinavian countries. Though time-series data are not available, Tables 2a - 2c show the position that had emerged by mid-1975. The relative importance of the British programme in Botswana is immediately apparent. At that time fully 70 per cent of all TC personnel were wholly or partly financed by UK (Table 2a). Though only about 10 per cent of the volunteers were British (Table 2b), half of all the fully or partly funded personnel in Botswana at that time were from UK (Table 2c). Though accurate data are not available, these ratios have not significantly changed over the last eighteen months. Thus the quality of the British personnel working in Botswana is of critical importance to the implementation of the country's development programme, and British technical cooperation is liable to have profound economic and social effects upon the society.
### Table 2a.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OSAS</th>
<th>SCAAP</th>
<th>Corps of Specialists</th>
<th>SIDA</th>
<th>NORAD</th>
<th>DANIDA</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Total Contract Officers</th>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>8</td>
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(a) Local Government
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<tr>
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<th>IVS</th>
<th>Peace Corps</th>
<th>CUSO</th>
<th>Menno-vites</th>
<th>SIDA volunteers</th>
<th>NORAD vols</th>
<th>DANIDA vols</th>
<th>GVS</th>
<th>Total volunteers</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Botswana Government, Directorate of Personnel.
### Table 2c.

**Contract Officers and Volunteers working in Botswana at 31 May 1975, by Nationality.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Contract Officers</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage.a.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN b.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>550</strong></td>
<td><strong>306</strong></td>
<td><strong>856</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

a. Items do not add to total owing to rounding

b. Nationality unknown.

**Source:** Tables 2a and 2b.
1. How the System Works

The recruitment of TC personnel from UK is renegotiated on a two-yearly basis. This Manpower Review exercise establishes an overall ceiling for recruitment of OSAS and seconded officers, and establishes approximate ceilings for staff to work in each of the sectoral ministries. At present, following the review exercise which took place in November 1976, the ceiling stands at about 550 posts, which remains unchanged from its previous level of the last two years. In fact however the number of staff in post are always significantly less than the negotiated ceiling: the number of outstanding indents as a proportion of the total approved recruitment posts has been running at 15 to 20 per cent for some years.

From the Botswana Government side the preparation for the review negotiations involves compiling lists of all UK staff in post, classified by name, department, post, termination date, and estimated date of localisation. In addition, Ministries are required to detail their present establishment, showing UK and other TC personnel, local staff, and present vacancies, together with their expected training needs over the next three years. The Directorate of Personnel, in consultation with Department Heads, estimates growth requirements over the next three or four years together with the expected or desired levels of recruitment from other agencies, and thereby derives the likely TC needs under the British programme.

These needs are used as a basis for discussion with the ODM Manpower Review Team, who meet with the Directorate of Personnel, the British High Commissioner, and officers in each of the Ministries over a two week period. The ODM team formulate their own views of relative priorities on the basis of these discussions, and the overall and sectoral ceilings are agreed between the Botswana Government and ODM before the return of the team to UK. This framework then becomes the basis for the future cooperation programme.
The word "negotiation" is rather too strong to describe this process, at least on the basis of recent experience. During the latest review there was very little conflict between the priorities as seen by both parties, and since Botswana requested no increase in the existing ceiling, agreement proved to be easy and straightforward. In general ODM is very responsive to Botswana's needs, and both respects and generally accepts the priorities as seen by the Botswana Government. Negotiations have in the past been much tougher - though almost always in cases where some increase in the recruitment ceiling was requested. For example an increase of almost 30 per cent requested in 1972 required lengthy and detailed justification by the Botswana authorities before being agreed by ODM.

In the context of the above framework the process of recruitment is as follows. Following the annual estimates procedure whereby new posts are created in the establishment, a major recruitment drive occurs in mid-year from university leavers (both from Botswana and from Universities abroad) and at Christmas from the schools. For posts that cannot be filled from these or other local sources, or for posts that become vacant during the year for which no local candidates are available, the Directorate of Personnel decides whether or not to start recruitment from overseas. This is not usually undertaken for posts more junior than those in the middle of the technical cadre. If the request is sent to the UK for recruitment under OSAS terms an "indent", copied to the British High Commission, is sent to ODM, which gives a detailed job description together with details of local salary, location, department etc., attached to the post in question. ODM then instructs Crown Agents (usually) to advertise the post. The latter draw up a short list and conduct interviews, sending details of the short-listed candidates together with their CVs and occupational history to the Directorate of Personnel. Crown Agents usually indicate who would be their preferred candidate. This material is sent by the Directorate to the Head of Department in which the post falls, who in turn subsequently advises the Directorate as to which candidate if any should be appointed. The decision is then sent back to ODM who in turn instruct Crown Agents to appoint the person concerned on behalf of the Botswana Government.

1 The procedure for posts that are to be filled by British SCAAP or seconded officers is slightly different. Here the request is sent to the High Commission who then forward it, with comments, to ODM, who in turn undertake recruitment.
4.6 Delays in Recruitment

The average length of time that elapses between sending an indent from Botswana to appointment of a recruit is nine months, though often in cases of senior technical posts the delay is longer than this. Delays at the British end sometimes occur when no indication of the priority of different posts is given by Botswana. On the other hand, the comments sent by the High Commission can also be misleading. In the case of a recent vacancy with very high priority for the implementation of the Government's Incomes Policy it appears that the British High Commission in Gaborone believed recruitment not to be urgent. Five months after the indent for this post was sent to London, the post was not even listed in the ODM News Sheet showing the current status of recruitment for Botswana vacancies. London did not respond until a personal request from a Botswana Cabinet Minister to the British High Commissioner two months later succeeded in putting some urgency behind the original request. It now appears that it will be a full twelve months before this officer is in post. Too much must not be made of one example, but misunderstandings between the Directorate of Personnel and the High Commission should be relatively easy to avoid. Careful liaison between these agencies on the relative priorities of outstanding indents should occur in future, before the High Commission's comments are sent to ODM. An additional opportunity for speeding up the recruitment process is given by the Manpower Review exercise itself. During the review, progress with recruitment for outstanding vacancies should be examined. The Mission should also seek to identify new vacancies that will arise over the ensuing 6 to 12 months. The aim should be for members of the Review Team to return to London with a batch of new indents, and with clear instructions as to the relative priority of indents to which recruitment has not yet been successful.

Tables 3 and 4 give some indication of the changing sectoral composition of UK Technical Cooperation with Botswana over the past few years. Table 3 gives a rather aggregate picture owing to changes in sectoral groupings in the source document. However, it can be seen that though the proportion of TC personnel going to education increased between 1969 and 1975, the proportion going to health, agriculture and lands fell over the period.
Data on a ministerial basis are given in Table 4, for the period 1974-1976. A similar trend is revealed in that personnel in education have increased faster than the total for all ministries, whilst those in agriculture and local government have increased at a slightly slower rate. The main recipients of UKTC personnel are the Ministries of Works, Agriculture, Education and Finance, in that order, whilst the main increase over the last three years has been in the Ministry of Works and Communications. Though the data are interesting in their own right they do not in themselves reveal whether the UK programme is directly aiding the cause of rural development. Indeed, though it may be surprising, the Ministry of Works and Communications has had a major role in rural construction under the Accelerated Rural Development Programme, and British aid to this sector may well have been more directly instrumental in improving rural services over the past few years than has its provision of medical doctors and secondary school teachers. For sound judgements of this kind to be made one needs not merely information upon sectoral allocations nor even upon job titles, but rather upon the ways in which individual officers spend their time in the office, and the specific tasks they do.

In one sense it is arguable that the question whether the UKTC programme furthers the aims of 'aid to the poorest', or of rural development is misleading. This is particularly so in the case of a country which espouses these aims as a major focus of domestic policy, and where serious efforts are being made to achieve them. It would be wrong to assume that other skills can be ignored. The fact is that in requests made to UK by Botswana no special priority is given to rural development-related posts, precisely because the needs cover all sectors and all the higher levels of skill. Botswana does not particularly select out the UK to provide aid to the rural sector - indeed there are good reasons why she should not do so. One reason is given by the specialist nature of other recruitment agencies. Such specialism occurs either because the agencies themselves exercise preference, as with the highly selective approach of the Ford Foundation or of USAID, or because they are not in a position to supply the full range of skills that Botswana still requires. Much of the strength and value of the SIM approach is that it does not exercise undue leverage, that it is prepared to pick up unglamorous posts, and that it is prepared to assist on a wide front. As in other countries there are dangers of urban bias. But at this stage in Botswana the efficient working of the small urban sector is a necessary condition for rural development. The creation and operation of a basic structure of services in towns and large villages make it easier to extend services to remoter rural areas. For as long as the Botswana
### TABLE 3: UK PERSONNEL WORKING UNDER THE AID PROGRAMME IN BOTSWANA BY SELECTED ECONOMIC SECTOR (PERCENTAGE) AND TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social Services</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable Natural Resources</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Personnel</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Data in table are percentages of total.
2. Data are for December of each year shown, and are thus not comparable with Table 2.

**Source:** British Aid Statistics
### TABLE 4

**OSAS Staff in Post, by Ministry, 1974-1976.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>Percentage Increase since 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+ 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Planning (including Audit)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+ 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+ 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour and Home Affairs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>+ 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>+ 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>- 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Resources and Water</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+ 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government and Lands</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>+ 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works and Communications</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>+ 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+ 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total OSAS</strong></td>
<td><strong>298</strong></td>
<td><strong>360</strong></td>
<td><strong>415</strong></td>
<td><strong>+ 39</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondments, SCAAP</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>- 30</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corps of Specialists</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>+ 25</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>328</strong></td>
<td><strong>390</strong></td>
<td><strong>438</strong></td>
<td><strong>+ 38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** 1. Data are for June of each year shown and are thus not comparable with Table 3.

**Source:** ODM, Manpower Planning Unit.
Government is resolute in its attempt to reach and help the poorer people in the rural areas. It will not be inconsistent with the policy of "aid for the poorest" to meet a wide range of basic technical cooperation needs even where these are urban in orientation, while at the same time endeavouring to contribute more directly to the poor in the rural sector.

6. Skills

The facts that ODM supplies such a large proportion of the contract officers working in Botswana, and that these officers include people with middle-level as well as high-level skills and talents, do, however, bring special problems. The first of these, and perhaps the least intractable, concerns their professional skills. There is a feeling throughout the Botswana Government that, by and large, the OSAS programme provides people who perform their jobs with competence. There are, of course, some - occasionally serious - exceptions, where incompetence has resulted in the early termination of contracts. Such cases are probably inevitable in a programme which comprises more than 400 persons. On the other hand mediocrity, either in terms of proficiency or motivation, is much more common and this is a significant area of concern.

4.11 Again, the ways in which this can be tackled include action by both donor and recipient, but mainly concern methods of recruitment. On the Botswana side, there is a tendency to allow the job descriptions for TC posts to be written in a routine fashion. The specific duties and responsibilities of the post are not always entirely clear, which creates problems both for the advertising and selection agencies. It may not always be clear how senior the post is, nor whether it calls for managerial as well as technical responsibility. A second constraint is that the interviewing panel may often not have the benefit of a person or persons who have worked in Botswana or who know the difficulties and responsibilities of the job in question. Ideally a relatively senior Motswana, experienced in personnel matters, from the Botswana High Commission in London ought to be present at most interviews. Though attempts are made to achieve this the staff situation at the High Commission often does not allow it. Secondment of a person from the Directorate of Personnel to London whose sole concern was recruitment matters in UK would do much to strengthen the existing situation. This could do much to improve the effectiveness of the recruitment process, and the costs involved for Botswana would be easily justified.
The most important failure of the present system with regard to work proficiency, however, concerns the information that is made available to the Botswana Government on alternative candidates for a given post. Though curricula vitae are available, together with some impression of how well candidates performed under interview, only in very rare cases is there any indication of how such people have performed in earlier jobs in their career. In Botswana, as in other countries, no confidential assessments of performance are requested from the Ministries in which returning OSAS officers have worked, except in the rare cases where such an officer signs up with the Resettlement Bureau in London. Similarly, no requirement exists for the officers themselves to submit progress or terminal reports, as is the case with Seconded or SCAA officers. Consequently the only indication of failure in overseas assignments are cases of gross negligence, corruption or other such offences which justify early termination of contract. There is no real mechanism, at present, whereby mediocrity can be identified and remedied.

The introduction of a system of confidential reports is, however, fraught with difficulties. This is particularly the case when an employer knows that he is not likely to see the person again, let alone employ him. In overseas assignments this is compounded by the fact that one has no independent evidence of the integrity and reliability of the person who submits the report. Nevertheless we believe that some attempt to assess the performance of OSAS officers is essential if the efficiency and standards of service are to be improved. There are various possibilities. One would be to institute a system similar to that which, we believe operates in the diplomatic service, whereby one adverse report on performance would be viewed far less seriously than two or three. The benefits of this, or a similar system are potentially very considerable. It would allow, on the one hand, a more aggressive approach to recruitment by the ODM/Crown Agents, and on the other a much clearer means of deciding which people should be considered for what types of appointment overseas.

Attitudes

The most serious criticism of British Technical Cooperation personnel in Botswana, which we have encountered time and again in our interviews, is that they are sadly lacking in terms of commitment, motivation and social skills. Moreover these deficiencies are more widespread amongst the British than amongst personnel financed by other agencies. The older British Officers have often served in other African countries over many years.
Some — though they seem to be a minority — have benefitted greatly from this experience and put it to good use. Many others feel they have encountered all the problems before, and have minds closed to tackling the job in new ways. Many of these persons are paternalistic, enjoy a "colonial" type of existence, make little or no attempt to mix with Batswana outside the office, and are often still in Africa only because they could not preserve their present standard of living if they were to return to the UK. Batswana find even many of the younger officers unattractive as a body of people. It is felt that their motivation is mainly financial — wanting to save money for the mortgage, or have their children educated privately, or enjoy some travel, sun and game parks before embarking more seriously on a career after returning home. Many of these attitudes are understandable. We recognise also that there have been, and are a good number of able and dedicated British officers in Botswana who are not like this. What is important is not merely that the above attitudes exist, but rather the extent to which they exist, and the number of people who are primarily motivated in the above ways rather than from a sense of altruism, service or commitment.

Commitment is not too much to ask. We strongly believe that serious attempts must be made to improve the calibre and commitment of the British personnel in Botswana and, moreover, that this can be done. The first point again concerns recruitment. The fact that Britain has been a colonial power itself means that much more attention ought to be given to sorting out people with undesirable social attitudes than is the case, say, with the Swedes and the Danes. A man who has given 'long service in hard stations' may have much good and relevant experience which will be useful in Botswana. Equally, however, his social and political attitudes may be highly undesirable. Much more attention needs to be paid to this dimension during interviews. This includes not only attitudes, but also the personalities of candidates. We believe that to work closely with people of an entirely different social, cultural and economic background requires maturity and emotional stability. There are also particular difficulties of living in Botswana which place greater social strains on the individual than is the case in the UK: wives increasingly cannot find jobs and become bored; children in their late teenage years who are not in school can easily become a problem; privacy is more difficult to achieve, and personal, emotional or family difficulties are more difficult to conceal. All these circumstances imply that the attitudes and personality of a candidate are important and relevant to the question of whether he is suitable for a particular
Other donor agencies recognise this. SIDA, for example, interviews the whole family of job applicants who have been short-listed. The interviews last over a period of three days, during which time a man and wife are closely examined for evidence of their social and political attitudes and are given psychological tests. The Swedes also consider it important to select couples whose relationships are stable, since they believe that problems and disagreements are likely to be exacerbated by the additional strains of living abroad. As far as we can ascertain UK recruitment agencies have not so far paid close enough attention to these factors. This may well be a major reason why UKTC personnel are felt to be deficient in these respects.

In addition, more efforts need to be made by ODM to pursue ways in which the wives of contract officers (and of BHC staff) may be employed during their domicile abroad. Opportunities for voluntary work should be explored with recipient governments, and with the women concerned. Furthermore, the opportunity of sending husband and wife teams, with both of them on UKTC terms should be sought, rather than discouraged, as at present.

Closely associated with the problems of attitudes and motivation of contract officers is the question of security and the lack of career prospects for UKTC personnel after their return to the UK. The lack of security which OSAS officers have beyond their current contract has bad effects: it gives them a disincentive to train counterparts who might replace them; it makes OSAS contracts overseas unattractive to really able people from the UK who are in mid-career; and it discourages the best younger people in development work from continuing, since they cannot be assured of career. There is, then, a bias in the present contract system which tends to encourage and select precisely the type of person who ought not to be recruited. Statistics to justify this judgement are not easily available. But it is worth noting that of the young expatriate economist/planning officers who have worked in Botswana over the past five or six years, and who have now left Botswana, about half are now no longer working in jobs related to development. This is particularly serious since the young expatriates in this cadre have had a very high reputation in the country. They have had almost uniformly high standards of professional competence and have been notable for their integrity and for their commitment and dedication both to their jobs and to the aims and ideals of Botswana. It is precisely these kinds of people who should be encouraged to stay in overseas service, both to maintain a cadre of real expertise on the Third World within the UK and because the UK is likely to remain an important source of technical cooperation personnel for at least another 10 years.
The Training of Batswana

4.18 The final problem is the role of TC officers in training. Our interviews with senior Batswana in Government revealed the view that TC ought to serve a dual role. The primary one is that of a 'stop gap', supplying skills which local officers have not yet had chance to acquire. The second, which is seen as being almost as important, is that of helping Batswana to acquire those skills. This second objective, by common consensus, is only very poorly achieved.

4.19 One reason is that training is seldom institutionalised except at senior levels. In cases where counterparts are identified, the relationship is uneasy since neither party is entirely sure of his role. The success of the system largely depends upon the personalities of the two people involved. In the few cases where we did identify and interview Batswana who have gone through the counterpart system, their comments were usually negative. Often the expatriate officer had been too heavily pressed in terms of his own work-load to spend much time explaining the 'whys' and 'wherefores' of how the job was best done. With senior UKTC personnel the problem appears often to be not their attitudes to training, but rather their not really knowing how to set about it. It seems that the only way to improve these arrangements is to educate both expatriate and counterpart in the ways of getting the best out of their relationship. It may be that setting aside one hour each week to talk about the problems that have cropped up would be useful. The arrangements would need to vary according to the persons and the jobs concerned.

4.20 In less senior occupations, many OSAS officers tend to interpret their job description to the letter. If training is not mentioned as part of their responsibilities they resist becoming involved. This problem is exacerbated in some of the executive ministries, where trainers are designated as such, and are usually on a higher salary than their technical colleagues. Thus TC personnel often refuse to undertake training unless they are re-designated and paid more. The other major problem in this area is quite simply that many OSAS officers see it as against their own interests to train, since they would be 'working themselves out of a job'. Ways of overcoming these problems are suggested in the final section of this report. Meanwhile, however, we shall discuss some of the more important problems that have emerged from our sectoral studies of technical cooperation with Botswana in the fields of education and of rural development.
In his introduction to the draft National Development Plan 1976-81 the Vice President stressed that "The Government continues to attach the highest priority to the policy of rural development". In many places the Plan emphasises the national goal of social justice. This can be set beside the facts that the great majority of Batswana (6 out of 7) live in rural areas and that it is in the rural areas, especially those that are more remote, that most of the poorest people live. The strategy remains as it was in the previous plan to invest government revenue, much of it from the mining sector, in the rural areas both to decrease urban-rural inequalities and to benefit the poorer rural people.

In view of these national objectives and also of the British policy of more aid to the poorest, it is at first sight strange to note that almost three-quarters of British technical co-operation is not directly connected with rural development. Two points can be made here. First, by filling vital gaps which are not rurally-oriented, this TC is helping to maintain conditions in which rural development can take place. Without it basic services might not work, or local manpower might be diverted away from rural development in order to fill urban gaps. Second, there is no clear border-line between TC which is rurally-oriented and that which is not. Posts and Telecommunications and the Central Transport Organisation, with 21 and 29 TC officers in post respectively, are examples of organisations which might appear urban-oriented but the efficient functioning of which is a precondition for much rural development. In those organisations which are more directly involved in rural development (see table 5), there were in September/October 1976 some 136 staff in post, not including about 29 IVS volunteers, more than half of whom were doing rural work. The contribution of British TC is particularly marked in Agriculture including the Veterinary Department, and in Surveys and Lands, which between them account for 82 out of the 136.

There has been some international specialisation of technical assistance for rural development. Sweden has concentrated on TC for rural water development which it is also financing, and Norway has concentrated on TC for health which, again, it is helping to finance. The UK continues to provide support to the whole range of key departments and ministries, with a tendency

1. See Tables 4 and 5.
which may be increasing to specialise in the Ministry of Agriculture (28 in post), the Veterinary Department (26 in post), Surveys and Lands (18 in post) and, although this is perhaps further from rural development, Geological Survey (18 in post). These tendencies to specialise and also to link TC with capital assistance appear generally sensible, with the proviso that there may always be a danger of nurturing a cosy and inbred expatriate enclave which may operate below its potential and be self-perpetuating.

A full evaluation of UKTC for rural development would be a massive undertaking and would require a team with competence in several technical fields. What can be attempted here is a selective discussion. There is much technical assistance, such as that to the Veterinary Department, which is of critical importance to the Botswana economy. Training of agricultural and community development staff at the Botswana Agricultural College (6 UKTC persons) also has a key role. But to narrow the field the focus here will be on some initiatives, in agriculture, which appear to be promising or successful in contributing directly towards social justice and more aid to the poorest.

Such initiatives have to be seen against the background of rural poverty in Botswana. A recent Rural Income Distribution Survey found that 45 per cent of rural households own no cattle at all. Thus programmes for cattle, though vital for the economy, do not bring direct benefits to those who are worse off. However, 7 out of 8 rural households have some agricultural land, and in any one year 6 out of 8 rural households will plough. Programmes for arable farming if carefully devised and implemented have some potential at least for benefitting many of those in the poorer target group. Many of these are women heads of households, and women play a preponderant part in cultivation, performing most of the work, with men normally responsible for ploughing. Programmes for small stock can also be expected to reach some of those without cattle.

In the Ministry of Agriculture, some UKTC personnel are very actively engaged on work which seems likely to lead to improvements for some of those who are worse off. Some examples are:

(i) one UKTC person engaged on smallstock development, forming, and working through groups of owners. The main immediate measure is dosing to reduce the very high (said to be 50 per cent) mortality among young smallstock. While many smallstock owners also own cattle, they also include poorer people who do not.
one UKTC person engaged on the reorganisation of extension, devising and introducing management techniques which should make extension staff more productive and easier to detach from the larger, richer farmers and to link up with and assist those who are poorer.

A three-team arable farming research project involving some 10 UKTC staff. The original project began in 1970. The three teams are now simultaneously and respectively engaged on research (the Dryland Farming Research Scheme) and evaluation of that research with farmers (the Evaluation of Farming Systems and Agricultural Implements Project and the Integrated Farming Pilot Project). The innovations being tested include a form of tillage which retains moisture in the soil more than traditional ploughing, row planting using a seeder with fertiliser placement for each seed, row weeding and the use of donkeys for draught. A toolbar - the Makgonatsotlhe - developed by the Brigades at Mochudi is being tested by farmers under field conditions with supervision by UKTC personnel. Potential benefits of this cultivation system and of the toolbar for poorer people, if the tests continue to show promise, include:

- enabling more people to cultivate and to cultivate with less effort. The sweeping system of cultivation used with the Makgonatsotlhe requires less draught power than mouldboard ploughing. Donkeys can be used instead of oxen, and cultivation can be carried out by women, very few of whom are strong enough for conventional ploughing.

- bringing down the capital cost of draught power and thus enabling more people to become self-sufficient. The capital cost is dramatically reduced from about P1200 (for 8 oxen at P150 each) to about P90 (for 6 donkeys at P15 each)

- raising yields and reducing risks. Soil moisture is better retained and yields of sorghum and maize may on average be several times higher using the whole package (including fertiliser) than with traditional ploughing. In sum this is a case where a major multi-disciplinary R and D input by UKTC, both developing its own innovations and adopting and further developing those of others, is working closely with farmers on a system which may well prove to be of considerable benefit to the majority of rural dwellers in Botswana, including many of those who are poorer.
(iv) one UKTC person engaged on the formation of women’s groups, partly working with the Integrated Farming Pilot Project. Many women heads of households, often with their husbands absent in the mines, are responsible for agricultural operations, and constitute one of the most disadvantaged rural groups.

(v) one UKTC person who coordinated the public consultation on the national policy on tribal grazing land. This consultation, probably the first of its kind anywhere in the world, involved the formation of village teams, the training of radio listening group leaders, the formation of some 3,000 listening groups with an average attendance of 17 persons, and the completion and return of forms giving opinions which were then analysed and questions which were in many cases replied to on the radio. While the effect of all this on the poorest remains to be seen, many have probably been alerted and mobilised more than they would have been, and the chances have probably been reduced that the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy will benefit only the rich to the detriment of the poor.

It might be premature to cite these as successful contributions of UKTC to a policy of social justice and more aid to the poorest, but they are promising and exciting enough for it to be useful to ask what they have in common. Two features stand out to varying degrees: first, exposure to and two-way communication with rural people; and second, a readiness to innovate. Given that agricultural and most other rural development programmes have in the past tended to favour those who are better off, it may well be that these two characteristics are important, if not vital, if agricultural programmes are to be bent towards and to benefit the poorer rural people.

Examining UKTC more generally, however, these two characteristics are only partially found. In the first place, exposure to and two-way communication with rural people is rather rare and probably becoming rarer. There is a marked urban bias in UKTC for rural development. Amongst UK personnel in departments directly concerned with rural development (Table 5), the numbers who are urban-based and rural-based are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>urban-based</th>
<th>rural-based</th>
<th>not listed</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UKTC</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is probably a trend of shrink-back of UKTC from rural to urban areas. In the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, all District Agricultural Officers, who used to be expatriates are now Batswana, and only 3 out of the 5 Regional Agricultural Officers are still expatriates. It is the field posts which tend to be localised first while the urban headquarters in Gaborone and Lobatse remain heavily expatriate. It is questionable how much direct exposure these expatriates have to rural realities and how much they really see and understand especially about the poorer people when they do make field visits. It may be symptomatic that in the first 7 months of the current financial year, the Ministry of Agriculture is said to have spent only 29 per cent of its recurrent vote for transport. There may well be a tendency for a heavily expatriate urban-based ministry, in a country where rural travel is difficult and takes rather a long time, to be out of touch with its rural and especially poorer rural clients.

Second, the extent to which UKTC personnel are open to new ideas and to learning, committed personally to social justice and more aid to the poorest, and as able and willing to innovate as is needed in order to reach and benefit the poorest, is, to say the least patchy. There are outstanding examples, including some of those cited. Many of the younger UKTC personnel combine energy, enthusiasm, and sensitive commitment in a way which enables them to understand, be accepted by, and help those who are more disadvantaged. But there are also some older people whose minds have set inappropriately but who know how to survive. In agriculture they are probably less common than they were, and a second wave of UKTC has replaced some of them. But a problem still remains, especially when such people are involved in recruiting further staff themselves. For they may then be more inclined to perpetuate their own sort than to select the type of person who is really needed.

A further serious problem concerns management. Many of those UKTC personnel in senior posts in departments or ministries concerned with rural development have considerable practical experience. However, much of this has been in Africa where the earlier more or less automatic authority of the expatriate made management rather easy for them. Adaptation to the difficult tasks of training Batswana, of having counterparts and of working with other expatriate nationalities, demands a sensitivity not always fostered by the earlier experience. Few, if any, of the UKTC personnel have received professional management training; yet had they been working, say, for a multinational corporation instead of for OSAS or SCAAP, management training would have been a regular part of their personal and career development.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry or Department</th>
<th>No in post</th>
<th>Vacancies outstanding</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Location In post at September/October 1976 *</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gab- orone</td>
<td>Lob- atse</td>
<td>F' town</td>
<td>S- P</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ny of Ag</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana Ag College</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vet Dept</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Local Gov and Lands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveys and Lands</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG Audit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSW and C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads Dept</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Affairs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVS Vols</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. It is difficult to know where to draw the line between organisations directly and not directly involved with rural development. The Central Transport Organisation (29 persons, 28 of them urban-based) and Geological Survey (18 persons, all urban-based) are two borderline cases which are not involved here.
2. Some of the work of some of the Ministries/Departments listed here is urban.
3. F'town = Francistown, S-P = Selebi - Pikwe, Mn = Maun, Se = Serowe, Ma = Maunala, Other rural includes Kasane, Gomane, Xapye, Molepolole and Tutume.
4. The IVS Volunteers are as at 1 April 1976.
Future UKTC must depend in part on the evolution of Botswana's policies and programmes for rural development. The Government may move towards programmes much more specific to the rural poor, and simultaneously there may be a tendency to wish to contain, if not reduce, the heavy expatriate presence in urban areas. There may be an increased demand for people who will live, work and innovate in rural areas, together with a somewhat moderated demand for urban-based TC. This can only be speculation, but should this occur, it would be very much in line with "more aid for the poorest" for the UK to seize the opportunity presented.

The conclusions towards which this discussion leads are that for the future:

(i) selection of UKTC personnel for posts related to rural development should be oriented towards identifying and preferring people who are adaptable, predisposed or willing for direct rural contact, with appropriate attitudes towards Botswana and Batswana, and with a capacity to innovate.

(ii) Care should be taken in selecting those who do the selection.

(iii) The UK should examine the urban-rural locations of its staff and be ready to increase the rural proportion, especially through volunteers and younger people.

(iv) Technical staff with OSAS-type careers should receive management training.

(vi) As part of the orientation course specific to Botswana proposed below there should be a voluntary village live-in of between one and three weeks for UKTC personnel coming to Botswana to work on rural development.

British Technical Cooperation in the Education Sector

The circumstances described in section III of this case study led the Botswana Government to give the development of education in Botswana very high priority. The expansion of the formal system has been extremely rapid. Over the first ten years of Independence, enrolments in primary education increased by over 60 per cent and in secondary by more than 450 per cent, and the number of students enrolled for university degrees increased more than ten-fold over their 1966 levels. Programmes of technical, nursing, teacher and agricultural training are also very much larger today than they were in the mid-1960s. These rates of expansion have generated large increases in the demand
for teachers, particularly in the secondary schools, and it is in this area that most British and other technical cooperation in education has been and still is needed.

TABLE 6

Deployment of OSAS personnel in Education, as at September/October 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Teachers/Principals (English Medium Schools)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School Teachers/Principals</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training College Lecturers/Principals</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training Centre Lecturers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Officers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Unified Teaching Service</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>71</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Office of the President

| Botswana Training Centre Lecturers | 5 |

Ministry of Agriculture

| Botswana Agricultural College Lecturers/Instructors | 2 |

| **Grand Total** | **78** |

It can be seen from Table 6 that over 65 per cent of British supplemented personnel in education are teachers in primary and secondary schools. Though the need for British teachers will continue, the structure of support is likely to change significantly over the next few years.
With regard to primary education, OSAS personnel have traditionally taught in a small number of English-Medium Primary Schools. These schools have presented a problem for the Botswana Government. Their costs are high, and the quality of teaching and availability of resources are of a considerably higher standard than most other primary schools. Their continued existence - though in some ways anomalous and working against the principle of providing equal educational opportunities for all - is nevertheless accepted by the Government as necessary for the purpose of providing high quality education for expatriate primary school-age children. However, these schools have been organised in a way which has subsidised mainly the richer members of the local and expatriate communities. British Government support in the past has been based upon the need to ensure adequate education for British children, since this is a crucial factor in recruitment. A recent change in the policy of the Botswana Government, however, will facilitate the phased withdrawal of OSAS support from these schools.

At present the English-Medium Primary Schools are heavily subsidised by the Botswana Government. Recurrent costs per pupil are currently estimated at P370 p.a. compared with about P40 p.a. in Setswana-Medium Schools. The fees at the former schools have been P54 p.a., compared with P3 p.a. in the rest of the primary school system. The Government is committed to a policy of multi-racialism in education, and therefore has not excluded Batswana from the English-Medium schools. However the fees are in future to be raised to cover all costs, and the schools are to be transferred from Government to private management. Batswana children are expected to comprise about 50 per cent of the total enrolment of these schools. Though these children will in general have much better chances of progressing to secondary school than other children, owing to better teaching and resource standards, they will represent less than 3 per cent of the Form 1 intake each year, and the Government feels that the distortion created by the continued existence of these schools not be serious. Meanwhile, however, OSAS teachers will no longer be recruited, since present regulations preclude their employment outside the State sector. Though further technical cooperation may be possible under BESS arrangements, it is felt that the schools will be able to recruit teachers in adequate numbers from inside Botswana or abroad on a private contract basis. These changes should therefore release 16 OSAS posts (20 per cent of UKTC to Education) for re-allocation to other parts of the education sector, which we feel to be a welcome development.
The Botswana Government's policy on secondary education is summarised in the Fourth National Development Plan as follows:

"Universality of post-primary education is not possible within the foreseeable future. It is in the national interest that post-primary education should be geared to the requirements of an expanding economy. Therefore... (its) provision is governed in large part by manpower needs. Although post-primary education is to be exclusive the Government will ensure equality of opportunity through the fair distribution of facilities, the provision of bursaries and the use of an objective national selection system. Those individuals who are fortunate enough to receive post-primary education incur an obligation to the society that has educated them. This is given practical expression in the bonding system, which requires the recipients of state-subsidised training to serve the state for an initial period after graduating."

The rapid expansion of secondary schools in Botswana has to be seen in the context of the continued extreme dependence upon expatriate manpower, both in Government and in the private and parastatal sectors. The expansion that has occurred and that is planned has been based upon the target of localising almost all posts in all sectors of the economy by 1988-90, and the indications at present are that little or no secondary leaver unemployment will occur before that date. Certainly the current phase of secondary expansion (enrolments increasing by 28 per cent between 1976 and 1981) seems to be soundly justified on the basis of formal sector manpower needs. Even with rapid development of secondary teacher training facilities at the university, the expansion does imply, however, that the need for expatriate secondary school teachers will continue to be in excess of 300 persons until after 1980, many of whom will continue to be employed on a direct contract basis.

In the context of these needs it can be seen that OSAS secondary teachers are only a small percentage of the total, and it can be argued that existing levels of support should be maintained, or even increased in the short term - or at least for as long as the Government's projections for localisation needs remain plausible. There are, however, some important problems that currently affect the quality of the contribution made by the OSAS programme in secondary education, and which, we believe, need urgent attention.
The first, and most pressing, of these concerns contract arrangements for OSAS teachers. These are at present exactly similar to OSAS personnel working in the central Government. This means that from any date after the 27th month of service, a teacher may give three months notice of his intention to go on overseas leave, irrespective of the timing of his departure date with regard to the academic calendar, and irrespective of whether he is terminating or renewing his contract. In practice this means that teachers may go on terminal leave in the middle of a school term - and many do this - and in cases where a teacher is renewing his contract, the length of leave accrued makes it impossible to integrate his departure and return dates with school vacations. This circumstance both places heavy demands on other teachers whilst the officer is on overseas leave, and seriously disrupts the teaching of classes - often in the critical stage of preparation before examinations. We believe that this situation is a significant contributory factor to the current low educational standards in many of Botswana's secondary schools.

We recognise that a change in existing contractual arrangements is complex, in that it will also affect many countries other than Botswana. However, there are issues of principle that are common to all countries. Firstly, it seems inappropriate to argue that OSAS contracts have to be the same for both teachers and non-teachers, since the conditions of service are already substantially different with regard to local leave arrangements as between the two groups. Secondly, the required changes of a contractual nature can in most cases be minimal. From the perspective of Botswana the changes required are as follows: the majority of teachers ought to be hired as from the beginning of the school year (1 January). Contracts should run for 30 to 36 months, as under the new contracts recently introduced. Teachers would accumulate leave in the normal way, but would be required to take their statutory 10 days local leave per year during the school vacations. Overseas leave would preferably be taken as from the end of the school year (December) but in all cases would have to coincide with a school vacation. In cases where a teacher renewed his contract he would be required to return to Botswana for the beginning of the term, and would receive pay in lieu of leave in cases where his leave entitlement was longer. The Christmas school vacation in Botswana for example would allow a teacher up to seven weeks' leave in UK. These arrangements are felt to be a highly desirable innovation from the point of view of the Government. Also those OSAS teachers whom we interviewed all welcomed such a change. It would seem that the small change in contractual arrangements could be standardised for all countries recruiting OSAS teachers, though the timing of the start of contracts would vary between the different parts of the world.
We received reports, both from the Ministry of Education and from headmasters that British teachers tend to be reserved in mixing with the local community, and that outside the school they mix mainly with other expatriates. OSAS teachers often tend to be "nine-to-fivers" and are reluctant to take on voluntary extra-curricular duties. Here there seems to be a contrast with the volunteers, who though often less experienced and professionally competent, take the community aspects of their work very seriously and are enthusiastic organisers of out-of-school games, clubs and other activities.

In spite of this, however, it is significant that both the Ministry and most headmasters prefer OSAS teachers to any other TC or volunteer personnel. They have a reputation for doing a very solid and professional teaching job in the context of the timetable, and have the advantage over other nationalities of themselves being products of an education system that is very similar to Botswana's. They understand the JC/COSC system, and the content of the school curriculum is familiar to them. Though this may beg the question of whether changes in curriculum content are needed for most Batswana, it is probably true that OSAS teachers are at present better prepared to teach in secondary schools than those expatriates supplied by other agencies. One disappointment, however, is that the IVS have recently suspended recruitment of secondary school teachers for Botswana, mainly on the grounds that the secondary schools are producing an elite, and have little or nothing to do with assisting rural development. We feel rather strongly that this policy is short-sighted. There is a pressing political and social need to replace middle and senior-level expatriates in all sectors of Botswana's economy which, given the existing institutional structure in education and the labour market, can only be done through the medium of secondary and post-secondary education and training. Helping to raise the quality of these institutions - particularly in terms of extra-curricular activities - is an important task for the sustained growth of the modern sector and of government revenues. This will continue to be the main way of generating the resources needed for long-run rural development. Improving the quality of the secondary schools can therefore have important indirect benefits for the rural poor.

The position taken by IVS is also regrettable in that this agency has had the highest reputation among volunteer organisations supplying teachers, and had the additional advantage of familiarity with the syllabus and system as in the case of OSAS personnel. It is felt most desirable that this decision be reversed, since to force Botswana to recruit from other sources - particularly from agencies supplying personnel for whom English is not the mother tongue - may be a strongly sub-optimal use of volunteer resources, and may have unfortunate consequences throughout the secondary and post-secondary education system.
Earlier comments on the OSAS programme in education are also generally applicable to OSAS teachers and lecturers in the other post-secondary institutions. Here the numbers are smaller, and there is less need to be as concerned with extra curricular activities as in the schools. In these education and training programmes, professionalism and competence are the most important qualities amongst the staff, and in general, the principals, and the Ministry of Education have been satisfied with the calibre of the staff they have received. With the exception of initiatives taken by the University, which has had BESS supplemented personnel for a number of years, UKTC officers have not been heavily involved in the important and pioneering non-formal education programmes developed in Botswana over the last ten years. The Brigades, for example, have largely had volunteer assistance, and have been well served with enthusiastic young people, on whom much of the early success of the movement depended. A future supply of such people will be needed for some time. It is probably best that supplemented personnel should not be involved in these and similar schemes, owing to the difficulty of identifying the right type of people in the context of a contract system. Where, however, cases arise of volunteers who have proved their value to Botswana needing to be retained, requests for transfer to supplemented arrangements should be treated with imagination and sympathy. Past experience demonstrates that the value to Botswana of being able to retain young people with good local experience can often be far greater than that of recruiting two or three new contract people from abroad.

ODM has been notably involved in one educational project which may be able to affect significantly the quality of education given in Botswana's primary schools. The project is a major attempt at teacher up-grading and curriculum development that has used an imaginative approach to tackling the main problems in primary education. A team of 6 officers under SCAAP terms, together with a project leader, has for the past three years been conducting in-service training of teachers in the schools and in the TTC's, and has also helped with the pre-service training of primary school teachers. New teaching aids and books have been prepared, in both Setswana and English, and there is considerable enthusiasm, both amongst Ministry staff and the Principals of the Colleges for the progress that has been achieved. This is not the place to dwell on the detailed problems of the project, which are in the main connected with personnel difficulties arising from divided loyalties as between the TTCs and the project as a whole. Suffice it to say that these difficulties look as though they have now been solved, and with continued good leadership one may expect the second phase of the project to bring enhanced benefits for the primary schools over the next three years.
In summary, then, one can say that, though the main focus of UKTC in education has not been, nor is now explicitly directed at helping the least privileged members of the community, it has had important indirect benefits for such groups. Assistance to the English-Medium Primary Schools is a low priority, and hopefully will be phased out in the near future. OSAS personnel in the secondary and post-secondary system have a crucial part to play, both in helping the localisation of the formal sector, and at higher levels, in the training of Batswana teachers who are desperately needed in all branches of the system. In this sense, ODM's capital and personnel support for teacher education both in the TTCs, the University and the schools themselves is the right strategy. Notwithstanding this, Botswana will continue to depend upon OSAS teachers at secondary and higher levels for at least the next ten years.

VII. The Orientation of UKTC Personnel

We have already discussed the importance for successful TC of personal relations with Batswana, of sensitive and supporting attitudes towards national objectives, and of extra-curricular activities in the case of TC for education. There are no simple or fully effective ways of tackling these issues, but we strongly recommend one measure - a training course for newly arrived TC personnel and their spouses. We feel that an insufficient number of UKTC officers take the trouble to learn any Setswana, or to learn anything about local customs. Few of them know much about the development goals, of the country, or of its social and political history.

An orientation course of one or two weeks would help to remedy this. It could include an address by a Minister on national goals and policies and a brief introduction to the main issues and policies in each sector. This might be led by a planner from the Division of Economic Affairs and would draw on the current Development Plan as a source document. Each day could include language training to teach and practise the main Setswana greetings together with a small basic vocabulary. Lectures/films on Botswana could be arranged on development projects, and on the people and customs of the country. Rural visits perhaps including a large village, and a small village, and a cattle post, could be included. We envisage that the opportunity would be taken during this course to emphasize the training responsibilities of all TC officers - not merely to say that they are important, but to provide some help and guidance as to how they may be tackled by individuals. In this regard a role-playing exercise would be useful. This might set up typical office situations likely to confront a range of professional, administrative and technical personnel (for example, how to get the most out of a
counterpart relationship; how to relate to Batswana colleagues and subordinates; how to delegate, and to involve one's juniors in decision-making, etc).

The organisation of the course would be crucial. Details should be worked on without delay. It might be possible to start with volunteer training as proposed currently by IVS and build on that. This initiative will provide a training and orientation course for all volunteer agencies in Botswana, which will include some of the elements of the proposal we have outlined. There are clear benefits of coordinating this inter-agency training, if only because of the shortage of good Setswana teachers in Gaborone. Some elements of the course we propose would be common as between the TC and volunteer personnel (particularly the language training), though other aspects should be organised separately. The long-term aim would be a training centre for all arriving TC and volunteer personnel, financed on a per-capita fee-paying basis by each agency. The present initiative by IVS could be treated as a pilot project, over a period of six months with, perhaps, some newly arriving UKTC personnel participating on a voluntary and pilot basis.

UKTC personnel are likely to continue arriving in Botswana at the rate of about 100 per year. During any one year, this might mean eight of the main courses each involving about twelve families. Effective training of the sort we have in mind would carry risks and doubtless involve some failures. It would be critical for the trainers to be sensitive, imaginative, courageous, and very familiar with the country. We believe that this innovation could do much to much reduce the more negative and undesirable effects of TC that we have been discussing in this report, and we found a wide measure of agreement with this view amongst the senior Batswana officers with whom we have discussed the proposal.

As an adjunct to this course, an optional extra should be an opportunity for direct exposure to rural and village life. We have noted the pronounced urban bias of UKTC for rural development and we believe that many UKTC personnel whose work involves rural policies and programmes rarely have the opportunity to experience, observe, and understand at first hand the conditions and problems of rural life. We recommend that the minority of UKTC personnel who are directly concerned with rural policies and programmes should be permitted and encouraged to spend between one and three
weeks living in a village as part of their orientation. Experience with village live-ins already acquired by some of the volunteer agencies has both positive and negative lessons which should enable this proposal to be designed so that it is effective for the UKTC guest in the village and at the same time beneficial for the village hosts. An interpreter should be provided and some of the time taken up with a programme partially tailor-made for the needs and interests (health, agriculture, water etc) of the UKTC person. Each person might report at the end on some particular aspect of village life close to his or her professional interest. We believe that this simple measure, whilst not involving many UKTC officers, would have a considerable impact on the effectiveness of that UKTC which is directly concerned with rural development, besides providing personal experience of long-term value for other rurally-oriented work.
EVALUATION OF BRITISH TECHNICAL COOPERATION

MAURITIUS : A CASE STUDY

Jake Jacobs & Bernard Schaffer
Institute of Development Studies
at the University of Sussex
"The true state of every nation is the state of common life"
Dr. Samuel Johnson, Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland

OBJECT

I. The purpose of this assignment is to examine British Technical Cooperation (t/c) to the Government of Mauritius over the past three years*, to assess its outcome and to indicate possible ways in which it might be made more effective in the future.

MODUS OPERANDI

2. After the Ministry had prepared a three-year list of t/c assignments (52 in all) a smaller list of 21 assignments was agreed bearing in mind sectoral representation, type of t/c assignment and likely manageability during five man weeks. This is attached as Appendix A.

3. In the event 22 t/c** assignments were examined in Mauritius. For 21 of these, extensive papers were studied in the UK including those related to the application for t/c, recruitment, interim and final reports. The pattern of interviews in Mauritius was as follows: as many as possible of the actors concerned in each t/c assignment were interviewed under four general headings. The actors included the t/c officer (TCO) himself if available, members of the institution in which he had been working, representatives of the responsible Ministry and/or Department, representatives of the target group of clientele, in or outside Government, likely to be affected by the t/c assignment, representatives of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and the Aid Secretary in the British High Commission (BHC).

4. Thanks to the extremely efficient manner in which the visit of the authors of this report was handled within the Government of Mauritius (GOM) by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development who accepted responsibility for making all the appointments, it was possible for us to hold 98 interviews with 138 interested persons. These included the Ministers for Finance and Rodrigues, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the P.S. to the P.M.'s office, the Financial and Establishment Secretaries and the Director of Economic Planning.

* The original terms of reference required an assessment "over the last seven years" but after discussions between IDS and ODM this was reduced to three on the practical grounds that the Ministry would have been faced with an impossible task of retrieval and duplication of papers bearing in mind the time constraints.

** The 22nd was that of Mr. Walters who succeeded Mr. Craze (A2 on Appendix A) 1974-1976 as Income Tax Training Adviser.
5. The four general headings common to all interviews were as follows:
   A. A negative hypothesis; how different, if at all, would the situation now have been had the t/c assignment under discussion never taken place?
   B. To what extent did the interviewee consider that the terms of reference spelt out on the form requesting t/c had been carried out?
   C. To what extent did the outcome of the t/c assignment make an impact on the development of Mauritius?
   D. To what extent did the outcome of the t/c assignment make an impact on the most disadvantaged in Mauritius?

6. For questions B-D interviewers were pressed to quantify their replies on a scale of 0 to 5. Their answers are tabulated at Appendix B.

7. We emphasise that these gradings do not constitute a criticism of the performance of the TCOs concerned. They are a measurement of the outcomes of assignments. The gradings show some significant degree of consistency. There are important differences in the gradings of questions B and C and there are almost always very low grades for question D. Some of the grades illustrate the phasing of certain projects and delays or even failures to implement. All the gradings refer to the situation at the time the question was put.

8. Additionally, appropriate persons were asked to throw light on:
   (a) the background and origins of all the t/c assignments examined;
   (b) the processing of the t/c applications in Mauritius and in the UK;
   (c) the recruitment processes;
   (d) the briefing arrangements;
   (e) the reception arrangements;
   (f) the honouring of Government of Mauritius (GOM) undertakings including the provision of counterparts, where appropriate;
   (g) monitoring the work of TCOs;
   (h) the production and distribution of reports;
   (i) the effectiveness of the TCO in counterpart training and generally in communication;
   (j) the TCOs adaptability, inventiveness and readiness to innovate.

These issues will be examined in more detail later in the report. At Appendix E will be found a short statement on each of the 22 t/c assignments examined. These seek to answer the
negative hypothesis question (5A above) and to draw lessons.


10. We are mindful that 50% of our report is expected to relate to future policy and it is a matter of some regret to us that we were explicitly discouraged by ODM from visiting Rodrigues. The Secretary, Aid in the BHC was good enough to let us have a copy of the report of the ODM/GOM Mission which visited Rodrigues in November 1976. Unfortunately it was by then too late to rearrange our programme. Our regret was compounded by the fact that the newly appointed Minister for Rodrigues, at whose initiative we met, urged us strongly to see the island. In our opinion the needs of Rodrigues afford HMG an unparalleled opportunity which should not be missed, to make an effective contribution to development on the island fully in accordance with the ODM's development plan and ODM's country programme paper (CPP) for a comparatively modest investment. Moreover, such a development would be "an appropriate means of implementing (ODM's) new poverty-focused objectives" (CPP 5.3 p.10). We discuss this below, in relation to the Rural Development Programme (RDP) and Development Works Corporation (DWC).

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

11. There are two elements of change which are now beginning to affect deeply the operation of the United Kingdom t/c programme in Mauritius. They must be expressed in any evaluation of past and present t/c policies and in the consideration of future t/c projects.

12. The first is the nature of the development problems facing Mauritius itself. Mauritius is an island state which had until recently appeared to be well on the way towards solving its problems of emigration and employment. That is much less true at this moment. The second element is the organisation, role and premises of United Kingdom t/c programmes. The emphasis from the UK on poverty and distribution and on rural development presents several difficulties in Mauritius. In addition the significance of the United Kingdom role in t/c particularly in comparison with other bilateral donors has altered over the past two years (see Appendix D).

13. As far as the first change is concerned, it is true that increases in Mauritius GNP have coincided with heavy reductions in unemployment and apparent successes in family planning and population policies. However, increases in gross domestic income meant much heavier reliance on sugar, from approximately 25% of GDI in 1970 to 40% in 1974. The reduction in birth rate and the reduced natural rate of increase in the population seemed to falter and then level out in the last two or three years. There was indeed a "remarkable" increase in birth rate in 1974. The apparent improvement in employment figures was partly
a result of heavy sporadic recruitment into a somewhat crude and makeshift DWC and its relief programmes. Similarly the reduction in the emigration of skilled manpower had been partly effected by expansion in the public service, and in particular by extremely large increases in public service and public sector salaries. Anti-inflationary measures have scarcely gone beyond rather simple schemes of subsidy, as for ration rice and flour. There are evidently considerable elements of instability in this overall situation. In general, growth up to 1973-1974 was checked in 1975, ironically coinciding with the end of the first Four-Year Plan.

14. As for the UK t/c programme, some of the elements of change are especially challenging. It is not clear that they have been adequately taken into account. We indicate some of them here (we shall also take up some of their particular applications below, for example in relation to the RDP and possibilities for Rodrigues).

15. The present role of the public sector and public service salary policies are creating severe problems of budgetary deficit and inflation. That was not alleviated by the Sedgwick Reports on public service salaries. As it happens, however, the United Kingdom t/c programme in the recent past has in no sense at all challenged the premises of these policies, either about the size, shape and increase of public sector salaries, or through the DWC and relief works employment. In particular, to a considerable extent the UK TCOs themselves, seem to have shared the belief that inflation, brain-drain, etc., must be met by the types of increases which have been and are being granted. These increases have been large, anti-egalitarian within the service, and certainly so between the public service and less advantaged parts of the Mauritian community. Furthermore, public service salaries have been a leading influence in the formal sector. There are, of course, important exceptions. It is surprising how relatively uncritical of this trend UK TCOs in practice have been. The Wilson assignment on manpower planning is a notable exception. The issue is of course discussed in the country paper, but this document is not usually seen by TCOs.

16. The failure to achieve further reductions in population increase has been looked at briefly by the UK t/c programme, for example in Professor David Glass' mission. There seems to be an occasional assumption in the UK t/c programme that Mauritius is not apparently a sharply dualistic society. Yet it was clear that the recent failure in population programmes related in part to divisions within Mauritian society, including severe and sharp spatial inequalities. There seems to be uncertainty in the UK t/c programme whether or not Mauritius should be dealt with as a relatively uniform society, which is moving towards the middle income belt. This uncertainty is relevant to many sections of the UK t/c programme, like housing.

17. Insofar as there are remaining pockets of poverty and severe inequality in Mauritius, their distribution is rather complex. They occur in urban as well as rural and coastal areas and within some rural strata and occupational and other defined groups, including the Diego Garcian. Rodrigues, for example, is as
At the same time there are some developments in the UK t/c programme which are highly promising. The outstanding case is certainly the contribution the UK t/c programme is making to the legislation and now the implementation of a Mauritius Social Security programme.

The second change is the way in which the new focus which is attempting, and the organisation of the UK t/c programme, to meet some of these problems. In the past, for example, the operating premise of the UK t/c programmes and policy for Mauritius has been that the key problem of unemployment, including jobs for young and the skilled, would be solved predominantly, through industrialisation. This could achieve full employment by the 1980s. This approach too should dominate manpower planning and training and educational policy. It is not now clear how far policy itself has resolved this past preference for industrialisation with the new emphasis on rural development (see para. 26 below). For example, should UK help to concentrate provision of basic human needs in the poorest villages?

10. In practice there have been changes in Mauritius education, especially the recent abolition of educational fees at all levels, or rather their payment by the Government of Mauritius. This is, for the present, reinforcing rather than redirecting the belief in formal secondary education, certification through public examinations, etc. Is it right for a smaller UK t/c programme to continue to assist the university so much? Should it switch from assistance in industrial training also to a more rural focus? The UK t/c programme has made, for example, through the Wilson project, a most effective and influential contribution to Mauritius. Does that contribution need re-examination now in terms of the focus on rural development, which is so different from the whole point and stress of the type of manpower planning which has in fact been set up? Or, on the other hand, is the main point of the UK t/c programme to be implementation of the Nilson Report? It might in any case mean a re-examination of the contribution which the UK t/c programme is making at present to Mauritius education.

21. We recognise that these problems have been discussed in the CPP. However, unless they are also resolved it is difficult for the country paper to have the influence on UK t/c programme choices, briefing and implementation, that it should. It is our impression that it is only in those t/c projects which fit very well, as in Social Security, that the new policy is taken into account.

22. This is related to another aspect of change in the UK t/c programme which is also properly discussed in the CPP. The programme in Mauritius has already moved from its position being the dominant donor. Mauritius is in this respect one example of a larger number of places where the UK t/c programme no longer dominates the bilateral t/c scene. This does not mean, however, that making optimal use of such programmes is any easier, nor, in the aggregate, less important for ODM. We give figures below (Appendix C). The figures show the change and the comparative position of the UK t/c programme. An aspect of
this changed situation is that it presumably becomes easier and worthwhile to achieve what we suggest elsewhere, viz. that each t/c project is selected in terms of an overall strategy, that supervision and contact in the field between the Development Division, the British High Commission and the projects is maintained and also that, where relevant, the TCOs are in communication with each other (see para 36). The relation between the UK t/c programme and other t/c programmes also becomes more important for the UK. This is discussed below. None of these possibilities seems to be fulfilled at present. We give examples below in some projects. The apparent lack of communication between the t/c projects in manpower planning and in management services and establishments policy is a striking case.

23. There are two further difficulties which are evidently being met in the current UK t/c programme. The first is the degree to which the Government of Mauritius is itself aware of the UK's own concerns in its new aid policies. It is our impression that save where, as in Social Security, the Government of Mauritius and the counterpart are necessarily involved in a redistributive programme, few of the counterparts or official contacts have had any discussions about the new focus, nor have the UK, ODM, and the GOM discussed the implications.

24. The second difficulty is the actual problems of implementing a poverty-focused programme, case by case. As one of our colleagues has recently said elsewhere, about a basic human needs strategy, "The debate ... remains largely rhetorical in the absence of concrete analyses and proposals about the institutional structures for securing access to basic needs by the population presently denied them." (Dr. G.B. Lamb, IDS, 14 January 1977). This is precisely relevant to several t/c projects in Mauritius which should be brought into the debate, and to some of the most important developments now being considered in the programme.

25. We give examples of some of the problems which do arise, once it is decided to implement this new aid policy.

(1) The Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool has been set up by legislation to assist the small planters. It is in general terms a very good case of UK t/c. However, the programme is evidently not meeting the needs of the smallest nor many of the relatively small farmers. Certainly the allocation of its time is not dominated by their needs. In particular, those who were excluded (not merely the landless who are excluded perforce) in the past by size or type of landholding or by agricultural practice, remain so. To make the SPMP a more effective agency for the benefit of the smallest farmers, the following changes would be required:

(a) Rebriefing the TCO.
(b) Difficult institutional changes in the SPMP itself.
(c) A monitoring and evaluation system.
(d) Detailed technical and financial alterations.
(e) Changing the legislation.

(2) The Mauritius Housing Corporation is an extremely
well-known and successful example of UK t/c. It originated approximately a decade ago, as a result of a UK Report (Burgess), a loan from CDC and the appointment of the present General Manager. It is accepted as one of the best parastatal organisations in Mauritius. It is primarily a mortgage institution, with some land bank and now some construction functions. Its success in the past and its accumulated funds enable it to provide loans with a negligible margin for ongoing management expenses. It has had an indubitable effect on home ownership and attitudes in Mauritius as a whole. At the same time, figures show very clearly that the minimum income at which a borrower could service an MHC loan is at least twice the median Mauritian income. Furthermore it is the machinery for allocating, in effect, highly subsidised loans to developers to construct apartment blocks. Its gestures in the direction of low income loans have had a total negligible outcome. Currently there are alternative and serious Mauritius housing problems described to us by one senior official as "desperate". These include (a) the replacement of cyclone damage and (b) the provision of low income housing through the 1980s. It might well be thought that by now a contribution from UK t/c to housing in Mauritius would lie in just these directions. That can scarcely occur however, without a solution to detailed problems of policy and organisation by, for example, the Ministries of Finance and of Housing, and the Central Housing Authority (the present low cost, low income, construction parastatal organisation). There is a significant and long-standing French presence in physical planning, in "Matim". The present successful UK t/c project is coming to an end. Can the UK t/c programme be switched to these new directions?

(3) The major case of programmes specifically focused on rural poverty and development is the IBRD and SIDA involvement in the RDP. The United Kingdom association with this programme has only been via the DWC. Critical evaluations have been done by the East African Development Division (EADD) ("In November 1973 the High Commissioner, on advice from EADD, approved ... £170,000 for equipment purchases by DWC."). An evaluation was done by E.A. Dixon of EADD, November 1976). One choice for the UK, which we understand would be favoured by some, would be more involvement in the RDP, either via the DWC or in other ways. Such an involvement would present some disadvantages as the evaluations (supra) have indicated. Improvements in the DWC were in any case negated by rapid increases in numbers employed on relief works during the approach to the recent election. The RDP itself, while specifically aimed at matching the profile of poverty needs defined in villages, has its own difficult problems of poverty focused programmes, for example, the institutional hierarchy between the Village Development Officers, project management and the Ministry; the recruitment, location and role of Village Development Officers; the types of need met; and participation at the local level. On the other hand, as we indicate elsewhere, a highly appropriate involvement
would be available in Rodrigues. This would mean a switch in Rodrigues from dependence on relief work to a return to agricultural production, especially in livestock. Current assistance to Rodrigues includes a WFP programme, 1972-1977, $908,000, for small farmer land development food programmes and participation in the WFP school meals programme for Mauritius as a whole.

There are two preconditions for such a switch. One would be for the UK t/c programme to be prepared to make its rural development and poverty-focused projects concentrate on Rodrigues rather than spread through RDP and DWC as a whole. The second would be for local decisions which would give access for small livestock producers on Rodrigues to abattoir, cold-store and improved handling facilities. Here again there are explicit institutional problems as between the interests of Rodrigues and those of the Mauritius mainland abattoir and meat authorities.

SPECIFIC ISSUES AND PHASES

26. We have sought to examine the origin of each of the t/c assignments studied, bearing in mind the averred objects of the Development Plan and the CPP. Each project seems to have its own dynamic and is sustained by its own momentum. It is difficult to see how, if at all, each was measured against the criteria or desiderata laid down by those two documents. There is no evidence that the CPP or other relevant papers are brought to the attention of TCOs during their assignments. It is difficult to see evidence that the inadequate staff planning mentioned in the CPP (3.17, p.9) is assumed when terms of reference are prepared and TCOs briefed. It could be said that the CPP does not take a line that is easily followed with its formula (p.1) that t/c projects "are balanced between industrial and agricultural sectors". We take the opportunity of calling attention to the fact that the t/c application form (A.1) is quite outdated and needs to be redesigned. We note that the Secretary, Aid a year ago suggested that the form needed amendment.

27. One theme that is encountered frequently in the notes on assignments (Appendix E.) is that of terms of reference. Sometimes problems occur simply because terms of reference have been badly or even wrongly drafted. On other occasions they are not re-examined when assignments have continued over long periods of time or during changed circumstances. When in some cases they have been changed during an assignment, an objective examination of the case for, and implications of the change has not been made. Some consultants have been given terms of reference much too wide for their particular capacities.

28. We have suggested in Appendix E. (v. Hine and Jacobs and Henderson, Hughes and Bushy) that there may be justification for a routine examination of the terms of reference shortly after the arrival in post of the TCO or consultant. Secondly, improved structures of assignments as used in some cases (e.g. Appendix E. Bradbury) would help to avoid giving terms of reference which are too wide for any use in consultancy. Thirdly it would be helpful if GOM could be more involved in the selection by donors of private consultants. We understand that this arrangement is used by multilateral donors.
29. We have paid particular attention to the arrangements for briefing TCOs and supplemented personnel on appointment and on arrival in Mauritius. Some strong views on this issue were expressed during our meetings with more than two-thirds of all such persons (v. Appendix D) which suggest that the record is very patchy and at times most unsatisfactory. The publication "Living in Mauritius" is helpful on matters of general interest though not all the TCOs and supplemented personnel have seen a copy. It is for consideration whether more could be done both on appointment and on arrival to brief people on the professional aspects of their assignment. One senior person even suggested that it would pay ODM in the long run to arrange a brief pre-appointment visit to Mauritius. There is little doubt that in some cases this would be so (e.g. the Telecommunications Engineer who suffered from having to wait for equipment ordered before his arrival only to find on delivery that it was quite inappropriate for his needs. An advance visit would have permitted him to order appropriate equipment and supervise its despatch to Mauritius. Other similar examples were quoted by supplemented personnel at the University). The difficulty would be to identify these cases in advance. For the majority, such an arrangement would be wasteful. The point could be taken up in some cases in the overall structure of the project: this is discussed below.

30. We do suggest that more imagination could be shown in the UK to make briefing more effective. A ritualistic visit to Farnham Castle is patently not enough. Something at a higher level of sophistication is called for. Some discussion is, we suggest, desirable on whether the role of the TCO is to act as an agent of change or of consensus (see para. 39). The Geographical Desk is not, apparently, as a rule involved in briefing. We question this. Greater co-ordination with the GOM might also make it possible more frequently for appropriate Mauritians visiting the UK on both official and non-official matters to become involved in this process. There are examples of this having happened. The Mauritius High Commissioner in London would have to be involved since it is the most likely source of information concerning Mauritian visitors to the UK. It might also be considered as a resource for interviewers. It may not welcome the suggestion but the GOM has an overriding interest in the recruitment of qualified and well briefed t/c personnel.

31. Briefing is part of the recruitment process. There have been examples where it has been considered to be de trop because the person appointed has already had experience in Mauritius. In one case that previous experience outweighed the fact that the person concerned did not have the basic professional knowledge to carry out quite new duties. Opinion are mixed concerning the weighting that should be given to previous experience. It was even suggested that experience too far removed in time - 8-10 years was suggested - might be such a handicap as to exclude from consideration a person with such attributes on the grounds that local attitudes have changed so dramatically during the intervening years. (It might be argued on these grounds that one of the authors of this paper might have been deemed ineligible for this assignment). Our own view is that each case should be examined on its merits and no such rules of general application
made. Almost without exception those to whom we spoke in employing institutions stressed that the personal character of the TCO was what really counted as being of no less importance than his professional qualifications. Of course, by itself that view provides little help in selection or in briefing. Hence our specific emphasis on communication and training capacity. We could add as desirable attributes, an interest in adaptation, experiment and innovation. We take the opportunity of asking whether it is not time for ODM to have its own conditions of service for officers serving overseas. The application of Estacode - albeit with modifications - does not always make for easy working.

32. Once the officer has arrived in Mauritius he should be considered responsible for ensuring his own briefing. In this he should be able to expect support from the BHC and his employing institution. It is to be deplored that whatever the justification - or its absence - so many of the persons concerned consider that ODM, the BHC and indeed the GOM as a whole are "not interested" in them or the work they are doing. These views were expressed particularly strongly by OSAS and BESS personnel. (We are aware that very few OSAS appointments remain but we note that BHC has been "warned off supplemented personnel" by ODM. The Secretary, Aid BHC agrees with us that this is both undesirable and inappropriate).

33. It has been represented to us that a critical issue for technical co-operation concerns the satisfactory provision of a counterpart officer for TCOs. Because this is always likely to present the GOM with considerable problems it was even suggested by a very senior official in the Ministry of Economic Planning that t/c in the form of operational TCOs, many of whom require counterparts, should be phased out in favour of the consultancy type of t/c whereby a team of professional consultants visit Mauritius for a short period, submit a report and 1) the GOM to implement it - or not - from its own resources. We have suggested that it might be helpful to build into the BHC/GOM memorandum of understanding conditions under which counterparts when agreed should be provided. This might strengthen the hand both of BHC and GOM's Ministry of Economic Planning. However, it is not true to say as stated in a letter from ODM to BHC that GOM has "resolved that in future all posts should be purely advisory". We understand that there have been previous discussions between GOM and UNDP on this matter.

34. The senior officials' suggestion does not commend itself to us. It does however suggest that every person appointed by HMG through ODM, IUC or whatever should have it made clear to him at the outset that his appointment will involve an element of training. Training is not an operation which only concerns t/c appointments if and when they have a counterpart official working with them. On the contrary, all t/c appointments have an opportunity to act as trainers in some capacity and they should use their imagination to identify and exploit those opportunities. The implementation will vary. University and Institute of Education appointments carry the role inherently. In some cases, the impact on the whole section or organisation could be considered. (The writers of this report have for
example gone out of their way to explain to the Ministry of Economic Planning official assigned to them, the reasons for their own modus operandi and have endeavoured to involve him in all the aspects of the mission. It follows then that more attention must be paid at the recruitment stage to the capacity of the applicant to play a training role. Perhaps some reference to this could be made in the redesigned A.1 (v. para. 26).

35. The strictures on recruitment and briefing raise questions of monitoring the work of TCOs and supplemented personnel. We have no doubt that the very complainants referred to would be likely to double their objections were there to be extensive monitoring and time-consuming demands for over-frequent reporting. The comparison with UNDP is relevant yet all the parties concerned, ODM, BHC, GOM, employing institutions and TCOs have an interest that the progress with t/c assignments should be appropriately broadcast. We indicate below the relevance of this point in the reduced t/c programme which the UK now provides in Mauritius compared with the recent past (v. Appendix C). The CPP (p. 22) states that it has been agreed that a mid-term review of each t/c assignment should be conducted by the BHC, the TCO and the GOM. This does not seem to be happening (v. also references in the Smee report, para. 16). Although the persons in GOM to whom we have spoken on this subject acknowledge that the GOM ought to show an interest in these matters, very little has been done vis-à-vis UK t/c. We have noted the Uhlig report and the exchange its author had with the Secretary, Aid BHC. In our view it will be necessary for the BHC to convince the GOM that their comments during assignments and on their termination could be of mutual benefit. We have noted that such information is provided by the GOM to the GOI in respect of the latter's t/c programme though this is associated with visits from an Indian inspectorate (v. para. 44 below). The only knowledge we have of serious reporting by GOM to ODM on TCOs relates to annual reports on ODM forms on Corps of Specialist members.

36. Another aspect of monitoring concerns the opportunities afforded TCOs and others to be made aware of each other's presence and work. Such knowledge can be of direct usefulness on occasion. The Secretary Aid BHC has recently instituted a series of monthly notices to serve this purpose. The first of a series of luncheons has also taken place. We are informed that supplemented personnel have not been invited to attend. We recommend that they should be. Perhaps of more importance is our view - articulately shared by all the TCOs and supplemented personnel with whom we have discussed the matter - that such luncheons are not as satisfactory a forum for a discussion on problems and issues as was believed to be the case. Neither are random meetings in sports and social clubs. The Secretary, Aid has indicated that his attempts to have individual sessions with officers proved to be impossible because of the demands this arrangement looked like making on his time. We are not suggesting an inflexible formula of meetings at fixed intervals. We are suggesting that the issue needs to be put to the TCOs and supplemented personnel and opportunities created for an exchange of ideas as required. Perhaps the easiest vehicle for such an approach might be an addendum to
The next monthly list of personnel to be distributed by the C. There is one additional aspect to monitoring. BHC ought surely to monitor in general the response of the employing government - its response to previous t/c reports and in particular the honouring of its obligations to individual TCOs as well as under the Memorandum of understanding. These proposals, if accepted, will create additional demands on Aid Sections in BHCs who will need to ensure that they allocate their time appropriately.

37. As we have indicated, the arrangements for monitoring TCOs and others is not entirely satisfactory. Some experts feel they are neglected to the extent that no-one is interested in their work (v. para 32), in other cases ODM and the BHC have inadequate information concerning work progress. Periodic progress reports appear to be made by some officers though there seems to be no uniform policy on this. As we have already indicated, the mid-term evaluation cannot yet be said to be operational. One reason for this is acknowledged to be the inability of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development to convince employing departments and Ministries that they ought to devote appropriate resources to this operation. There is also a suggestion that subject Ministries and indeed TCOs themselves may resent criticism. The value of the only meeting to this end which has so far occurred was largely discounted by the casual, almost flippant nature of the comments which it evoked. It might strengthen the hand of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development if some reference to mid-term reviews were built into the memorandum of understanding. We have suggested that EADD might be able to play a role also. The opportunity is taken to revive a proposal made over a decade ago by one of the authors of this report. It was suggested to ODM that a very small inspectorate could play an effective role in monitoring the work of TCOs. It is not suggested that this inspectorate should have a professional capacity covering all aid sectors. Rather, would it be charged to carry out on a continuing scale the sort of work on which the present authors have been engaged in Mauritius. Alternatively there could be more ad hoc missions of the present type. It is pertinent to observe that the Government of India and France both maintain inspectorates for this purpose although their modes of operation differ from each other.

38. There remains the question of ex-post evaluation of t/c assignments. The quality of the reports by the TCO to the employing institution or Ministry has varied enormously. This does not only reflect the varied nature of assignments - in particular whether they have been advisory or executive. For assignments of more than one year we suggest that the report - in draft if need be - be submitted one month before the termination of the assignment, to permit comments by, or better, a dialogue between, interested parties. There appears to be a wide divergence of perception as to what is required in these reports.

39. We have already referred to the alternative role of a TCO as an agent of change or consensus. In approaching his work or making a report on his work a consultant ought to be aware that there are two extremes between which he may have options to work.
At one extreme he may come with pre-determined ideas and with a minimum of reference to local sources pronounce his advice and report accordingly. At the other extreme lies the method whereby he consults with as many interested persons as possible, seeking all the time to achieve a consensus which will at the end be reflected in his report. We suggest that it is this latter approach which is usually more likely to achieve desirable results. (As contrasting examples v. Appendix E. Benwell and IMR Limited). Additionally TCOs are asked to complete a pro forma for ODM. Not all do so. We should like to know more about how these forms are processed and where. Some of the longer reports would benefit greatly from an index and authors might be asked to bear this fact in mind.

40. Those officials in GOM with whom we have discussed the matter, acknowledge that GOM has been able to do very little by way of evaluating t/c assignments. They recognise that it is in their own interests to do more to this end. It is to be hoped that donors and recipients will feel able to exchange and indeed participate in these exercises.

41. The role of the ODM Development Division impinges on many of the above activities. At the moment of writing neither of the authors has had an opportunity of discussions with EADD Nairobi and indeed it is significant that no suggestion came from ODM that this would be a sensible step to take. Yet we have in the event been made aware of the significant difference EADD makes. We have also been able to see, via BHC Secretary, Aid, some of the excellent evaluations and reports produced by EADD and its officers. One of us proposes to visit EADD on his way home but meanwhile there are a number of matters which would appear to merit examination. Applications for t/c are, we are informed, copied by BHC to EADD but the latter is unlikely to comment "unless it is involved". We are not clear what are the criteria though we understand that it depends on capital aid being involved. Prima facie, EADD could play a useful role in a number of the processes enumerated above including monitoring and evaluation and even, possibly, recruitment. We found great ignorance in the Ministry of Economic Planning about the role and functions of EADD.

42. EADD might also have a useful role in the assessment of requests for the renewal of t/c assignments. It possesses the general advantage of absence from on-the-spot pressures and for that reason alone we suggest its involvement might be routinised (unless our proposals above for an inspectorate are acceptable). The GOM appears to have a very equivocal attitude to requests for renewal of the TCO assignments. On the one hand, it has been suggested that such applications constitute no more than an attempt to perpetuate the comfortable employment of disinterested officers. On the other hand the GOM will support applications for the renewal of a contract largely to defer once again the moment of truth when a Mauritian official must dispense with the comforting presence of an adviser. On this score there is a difference between the case of supplemented officers and that of TCOs.

43. There is some evidence to suggest (v. Appendix E. Pattinson and Brown) that renewals or extensions of assignments
are agreed without sufficient thought and examination of the justification put forward. This has happened because the negotiation of the extension or renewal takes place much too late. Could the Aid Section in BHC not be more active in anticipating cases where difficulties or embarrassment seem likely? This should certainly be raised at least one month before termination as a rule.

44. The role of other donors, the interrelationships of all donors and the relationship between GOM and other donors all have some bearing on the effectiveness of HMG's t/c policies in Mauritius. We were able to talk to the Aid Secretaries in the Indian HC, the French and US Embassies and the UNDP representative. We received the impression that despite interpersonal relationships of varying degrees of warmth, more could be done at an official level to keep each other informed – perhaps even to act in greater concert vis-à-vis the GOM. The goodwill appears to exist. Thus for example the Assistant Secretary Aid in the French Embassy provided us with records of French t/c in Mauritius, details of which were not available in the BHC. Likewise the Secretary, Aid BHC reported that other major aid donors would welcome the opportunity to meet jointly with the GOM when determining future programmes. The GOM believes that this is not in its interest although we suspect it may not be fully aware of donor attitudes to this question. The officials in the Ministry of Economic Planning received favourably our proposal that they might meet with donors to discuss the merits of such a new approach. It is clearly of some importance to encourage an exchange between donors. We can only ascribe to an unawareness of UK policy the statement of the Indian Aid Secretary that "... the UK is phasing out its aid to Mauritius". As he went on to say that this resulted in urgent requests being made to him by GOM for experts to replace retiring UK TCOs it will be seen that there would be advantages in maximising donor contacts. It is of course unlikely that all donors would respond positively to the creation of a mini DAC: there are obvious reasons why, say, EEC members might be happy to do so.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

45. We should like to express our thanks to all those people who have helped to make our mission possible. As we have said at the beginning of our report, the Director of Planning and his staff have afforded us every courtesy and assistance. From the number of interviews we have held quoted elsewhere, it will be appreciated what a superb job Mr. Dassarat of the Ministry of Planning did for us in making these arrangements. It also affords us much pleasure to thank the First Secretary (Aid) in the BHC who had almost daily sessions with us and went out of his way to provide us with documentation and information. His secretary too was most kind in typing at short notice much of the first draft of the report. Finally, we have to thank all those people in and outside the public service who, to a man (we much regret that there was not a woman amongst them) responded so readily to the demands we made on their time.
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*Applicable to revised terms of reference. Zero rating for original terms of reference.

** Or full 67/73/74 report

*** Final 87/78/79 report

1 In respect of sector only

11 The Ministry grades separately each of the three phases

W. Answer: B/C
### Fellowships and Scholarships Obtained

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### Country Training

I. TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

LONG TONGUE
Mr. D.L. Broadbent (m) Social Security Adviser
Mr. W. Chatin (m) Telecommunications Financial Adviser
Mr. A. Hewitt (m) Telecommunications External Line Plant Adviser
Mr. P. Mothemb (m) Workshops Superintendent
Mr. A. Riddison (m) Adviser to Sugar Planters' Mechanical Pool
Mr. P. Rolph (m) Director, Economic Intelligence Unit
Mr. J.D. Shell DOS Surveyor
Mr. L.F. Smeale (m) Financial Advisor, Local Government
Mr. D.G. Stewart Transport Engineer

SHORT TONGUE
Mr. W.J. Pope (m) Youth Employment Adviser
Mr. P. Watkins (m) (u) Adviser on Fire Services Legislation
Mr. D.J. Wood (m) Harapower Planning Adviser

ROY CADRO
Mr. G.C. Hunt Chief Engineer (Planning and Design), CWA
Mr. B.H. Lane (m) Deputy General Manager, CWA
Mr. W.G. Walker (m) Prisons Training Officer

II. DOCS

PERMANENT AND PENSIONABLE
Dr. D.J. Ghidalia (m) Specialist in Orthopaedic Surgery
Miss J.V. Hinton Education Officer
Dr. P.K. Mitra (m) Specialist in Anaesthetics

CONTRACT
Mr. P. M'Arjoy Cheaupney (m) Controller of Information Services
Mr. E.G. Golnith (m) Private Secretary and Controller to Governor General

CONTRACT, (WACL Seconded)
Mr. A.J. Bartlett (m) Factory Inspector
Corps of Specialists
Mr. J.F. Stratford (m) Director of Audit

III. BRUES

MAURITIAN HOUSING CORPORATION
Mr. J.C. Lrown (m) Manager

INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

Mr. R.W. Lord (m) Visiting Fellow in Arts and Crafts

UNIVERSITY

Dr. E.H. Coles (m) Senior Lecturer: Electrical Engineering
Mr. J.D. Peel (m) Senior, Instructor: Machine Shop
Mr. D. Fielding (m) Lecturer in Animal Science
Mr. A.C. Goodridge (m) Visiting Fellow, Public Finance
Mr. P.L. Taylor (m) Lecturer in Production/Mechanical Engineering

IV. CASKET AND FIBRES SUB TEAM

Mr. T.J. Hading (m) System Engineer
Mr. R. Lloyed (m) Electrical/Mechanical Engineer
Mr. S. McCarthy (m) Electronic Technician

V. OTHER BRITISH STAFF

INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

Mr. D. Davis (m)
ASSIGNMENT REPORTS

Note: details of the persons interviewed about each assignment and their perceptions of the outcome are shown in the Table at Appendix B.

Technical Co-operation Report W.J. Pape
Youth Employment Adviser
1972-1975 and 1977

Mr. Pape's endeavours have resulted directly in the creation of a Youth Advisory Service which is held in high esteem by employers in the private sector. His counterpart, albeit belatedly appointed, successfully took over the service on Mr. Pape's departure. In many ways this assignment was a model of t/c but paradoxically the brief visit currently in progress may bring about a crisis in the Service's relations with the Ministry of Employment. If the Service is seen to be an employment agency; if it is considered - as seems possible - that it will be judged by the Ministry on the number of placements effected, it is likely to become subject to the same pressures as the Employment service and in the process forfeit the confidence of private sector employers.

Technical Co-operation Reports A. Pattinson
Adviser to General Manager
Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool
1975-1979
P.E. Consultants
Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool Study
1973

In assessing the effects of these two assignments we have had the benefit of seeing a Development Division report of May 1976. As a result of the consultants' report capital aid made it possible to obtain the necessary machinery and equipment for a viable mechanical pool. The appointment of a qualified manager was a pre-condition but in the event Mr. Pattinson did not occupy this post despite his belief that it was as General Manager that he had been recruited. The result has not been entirely satisfactory in management terms and in our view it is a pity that the recent extension of Mr. Pattinson's contract was authorised in view of the fact that a substantive appointment of a General Manager had finally been made. Mr. Pattinson has undoubtedly made a major contribution to the operation of SPMP, but no-one seems to have asked whether the Pool is fulfilling the function for which it was designed, namely to supply mechanical cultivation to small planters. We received a number of definitions of "small planter" (up to 100 arpents in the view of the consultants) but it is apparent that the poorest planters derive little benefit. The Development Division report indeed makes no reference to them.
Both these assignments made an important contribution to the establishment of the Central Water Authority (CWA). Mr. Norman's contribution largely concerned fixing salary structures and preparing schemes of service. These exercises were satisfactorily achieved despite problems which arose from the decision made, after the application had been made for t/c, that the appointment would be that of adviser and not of Assistant General Manager as originally stated.

The outcome of Mr. Shackmaster's assignment was less satisfactory because the vital issue of water tariffs became a political shuttlecock whose existence has had repercussions far beyond CWA. If the legislation governing the operations of CWA is overhauled it could be that there will be a delayed benefit from this assignment.

It was not possible in the absence of Mr. Smale to get a clear picture of the nature of the first of his contracts. In particular whether or not it was intended to be a wholly University appointment. In any event he became extremely valuable to MLG and chaired a Financial Relations Commission. It seems generally agreed that he has acted more as an adviser on local government than on local government finance. This has had the approval of MLG which has benefited from Mr. Smale's computer courses for the operation of the computerisation of rates - one of his innovations. The Municipalities have been less happy but the situation is a very complex one involving the appointment of a Commission to replace elected councils. For the next two years it is anticipated that Mr. Smale will be working on the computerisation of salaries. The papers available from ODM do not discuss whether this change of function has been considered by them in agreeing to the extension.

It would appear that something went wrong with the recruitment processes for Mr. Marsh: perhaps the selection body paid too
much attention to his former service in Mauritius and too little matching that service with the job description. It became clear soon after arrival that he could not fulfil the duties of Training Officer. The Ministry of Communication responded by asking for Marsh's terms of reference to be amended. Although it took ten weeks for this approval to come through the outcome undoubtedly resulted in a successful contribution to technical co-operation and the completion of the Floreal Exchange expedited. It will cast a light on the Government of Mauritius filing and retrieval systems to mention that no-one we interviewed in either the Ministry or in the Department of Communications (v. Appendix B) was aware that a further t/c application for a Training Officer had been submitted. It also needs to be said that although the inauguration of the Floreal Exchange completed the island's automatic telephone network, the service is still suffering severely from what is euphemistically described as teething troubles.

In the event the efficiency of the telephone service may depend on the decision whether or not to convert it into a parastatal organisation (as the CWA and CEB). The terms of reference of the Crown Agents team made no reference to this point though it is one on which strong conflicting views exist within GOM.

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**Technical Co-operation Report E.G. Goldsmith**

*Private Secretary to the Governor General 1961-1977*

This assignment is sui generis. Whatever the justification for this appointment whether within OSAS or key cadre it is now quite indefensible as a call on technical co-operation funds. Plenty of qualified Mauritians are available to fill the post. If GOM finds it politically inexpedient to appoint a Mauritian they should contract with Mr. Goldsmith direct. There are precedents. There must be a limit set to t/c appointments no matter how effective and acceptable the officer concerned (as in this case).

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**Technical Co-operation Report A.G. Grimwade**

*Adviser on Leather and Hides Industries 1973*

This was not a well-prepared assignment. It is difficult to imagine how it was expected that in four months a newly-appointed adviser could be expected, inter alia to "organise producers in an association to buy raw materials and export products". In the event his recommendations did have some effect on the leather industry - notably on the introduction of machinery - but none on the footwear industry. However, we learned with interest that two Indian Government advisers on the creation of small industries who are working in the Ministry of Commerce have recently called for Mr. Grimwade's report which may thus, in the long run, have a somewhat greater impact on the leather industries than hitherto appeared likely. Furthermore, other proposals are now under consideration in the GOM whereby it may be possible
to effect a very considerable increase in the cattle population of Mauritius. Were these proposals to be implemented, Mr. Grimwade's assignment might assume greater significance.

Technical Co-operation Report A.N. Giles
Industrial Estates Coordinator
1974-1975

This assignment was instrumental in permitting GOM to maximise the opportunities presented by the establishment of the EPZ. The queue of would-be investors at the time of his appointment was showing signs of considerable frustration owing to GOM's inability to service them promptly. Significant job creation was thus made possible. However, no decision has yet been taken on the establishment of an autonomous parastatal agency. It has been argued that Mr. Giles' success has been a major factor in making it possible to postpone the decision on the creation of a parastatal body. A very successful short term operational assignment.

Technical Co-operation Report E.D. Craze
Income Tax Training Adviser
1972-1974

This appointment was an outcome of still earlier assignments dating back to 1968/69. It was an unfortunate accident of timing (though one asks oneself whether it could not have been foreseen) that the main achievement of this assignment was to produce a training manual which became, in the words of Craze's successor, "virtually obsolete overnight" as a result of a change in legislation coinciding with the publication of the manual. However, there is little doubt that in the event the task of his successor was made easier by his work on the manual and the training programme undoubtedly benefited from his presence.

Technical Co-operation Report Walters
Income Tax Training Adviser
1974-1976

When GOM applied for a renewal of Craze's appointment in mid-1973 it was not known that the IT legislation was due to be repealed and there was some debate as to the need for a further two years. In the event, Walters was able to revise Craze's manual and his assignment was extended by six months to enable him to complete the first one-year course. His counterpart is now running the second course, to the satisfaction of his Commissioner. This fact is seen as complete vindication of the success of Walters' appointment.

Both these assignments have special significance for Mauritius insofar as they relate to more effective revenue administration.

Technical Co-operation Report D.L. Bradbury
Social Security Expert
1976-1978

This officer has only been in post for two months so it is
clearly inappropriate to think in terms of evaluation. However, there are certain aspects to the appointment and its background which merit some comment and may indeed indicate the ingredients of one successful model for t/c assignments. The current project follows an ILO report submitted and rejected in 1972 and a visit, not sponsored by t/c, of Professor Abel-Smith and Mr. Lynes of the British Department of Health and Social Security. The resulting pension scheme has been accepted by GOM and Mr. Bradbury's appointment is designed to implement it. Appropriate new legislation has been prepared.

The nature of the project unquestionably satisfies ODM's new aid criteria. However, it is the way this particular t/c contribution has been structured that calls for notice. First, there was great concern shown at the highest political level which permitted an exchange at that level between t/c donor and recipient. Secondly, consultants of international repute were engaged outside t/c. Thirdly, the GOM deemed it worthwhile to send at its own expense a senior official for discussions with a donor institution and to meet the long term expert recruited under t/c in consultation with the consultants. Fourthly, arrangements were made for an additional consultant to be appointed after consultation with the first consultants. Fifthly, the consultant appointed under the fourth point above was able to make periodic visits to Mauritius and supervise the work of the long-term TCO. This mix seems likely to be extremely effective.

Technical Co-operation Report A.E. Bishop
Organisation and Methods
1971-1975

The project was rated well. In our opinion this is justified as far as Mr. Bishop's effort, energy and commitment are concerned. However, during the long course of the project, other events, especially concerned with pay, led to a staff demand for a reorganisation in establishments work. The proper response was a matter of dispute in the GOM. Mr. Bishop from then on became deeply involved in the outcome: an Establishments Cadre. This is a matter very different from his original terms of reference. Alternative UK advice might have been preferable at that moment.

Secondly, while Mr. Bishop was very fortunate in his counterpart, Mr. Labour, now head of the Management Services Unit (in the event the counterpart is now absent sick); the MSU is heavily under its establishment of seven; the MSU might well disappear into a Pay Research Unit, again a totally different device; Establishments Cadre itself is also under-established: for example, of 17 Senior Establishment Officers, there are 10 vacancies.

The general lesson is that when TCO's terms of reference or job is subject to alteration, the basic expertise of the officer should be used as a constraint in deciding whether the change is proper.
Technical Co-operation Report D.F. Wilson
Manpower Planning Adviser
1972-1974

This was an excellent, influential and appropriate project. Its effects continue, both in ODM and in Mauritius. The counterpart has been deeply affected by the project and is highly committed, as is the whole of the relatively stable Manpower Planning Unit which now exists in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.

However, it was unfortunate that the project was not able to have had a more adequate effect on the development of public sector salary policy in its time. We were struck by how little was known of the Wilson Report itself, and indeed the project as a whole, for example in the Establishments Department, or vice versa. Implementation of key recommendations of the Report in training policy, and especially training organisation, is still hanging fire. The precise position is complicated (see GOM 1975-1980 5-year plan, Chapter 9, para. 9.9). The relations with the Institute of Education and the Ministry of Education are not close. Further, other developments like the abolition of fees in formal certificated secondary education produce perturbations for the Wilson plan projections on that type of policy. Greater co-operation between TCOs (in this case Wilson and Bishop) would have been welcome, for example about training organisation and public sector establishments policy. Implementation seems also to require constant effort, attention and revision of original policy and technical premises. Compartmentalisation of inputs from t/c, perhaps especially with manpower planning, is understandable and difficult to avoid, but always costly.

Technical Co-operation Report J.C. Brown
Mauritian House Corporation
1968-1977

This is an extreme example of the supplemented officer employed over a very long run and extended often at the last moment. It is also an example of a successful project, both in the organisation created and in the counterpart. A good man was available and the TCO took progressive initiatives to clear his way. More and earlier overseas training could have been used. The urgent present problem is discussed in the main report. The present housing problems have been described as "desperate". The good will for continued UK t/c is available and with this officer in particular. He should now hand over to his counterpart. It would be inadvisable to continue him with the Mauritius Housing Corporation itself therefore. An alternative role can scarcely be worked out in the time available, pending decisions by the Mauritian Government on policy and organisation. It is also to be questioned whether this TCO himself would be the most appropriate man for the type of programme UK ODM should now support.
It cannot be said that the daunting problems of Traffic and Public Transport in Mauritius which were the subject of these two studies have been much abated as a result of their having taken place. Some tough political decisions remain to be taken - in particular on whether or not to nationalise public bus services, a step which the bus owners are doing all they can to bring about. One positive outcome has been the creation of a Transport Unit under the direction of a TCO (Stewart) which is collecting traffic data, examining the control of public transport including routing and making a study of traffic management in Port Louis. On the last activity the Unit cannot take action until it has seen the report of a conglomerate of French consultants (Matim appointed under French t/c auspices). There has been some suggestion from GOM that it would have liked to have been consulted over the choice of consultants for the Transport Study and would have welcomed the opportunity to have refined their terms of reference after their arrival in consultation with them. It is claimed that this is a practice which French t/c authorities encourage. So far it would be difficult to argue that the studies have done much more than throw further light on the problems. It is to be hoped that they have a long-run potential for contributing to the identification of solutions.

The tourist industry was given considerable emphasis in the Four-Year Development Plan and has had much impact, for example a four-fold increase in visitor arrivals over seven years; visible gross earnings from tourism increasing: 1967 - Rupees 18M, 1975 - Rupees 120M.

However, the earlier developments were dominated by a single hotel group and their own private efforts. There was some thought that this was inappropriate in a variety of ways. Hence the Government of Mauritius, prompted by the Mauritius Government Tourist Organisation, the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, asked for UK help in a variety of questions. The whole job was given to a single private marketing research organisation who conducted their work in three phases. While the first two phases met some local opposition by affected interests, they also had a definite impact, for example on leases and land use policy. The third phase met much greater opposition, not only because it implied a much larger Mauritius Government Tourist Organisation and a marketing effort in South Africa.
An unfortunate error in forecasting, though honestly adjusted, helped the opponents of IMR. Hence the chances of implementation are now low. To date no action has been taken outside the MGTO. The Ministry of Economic Planning and Development is currently considering the Report, but at a junior level.

There are several implications. In the selection of consultancy firms in such complex, delicate and wide-ranging issues, perhaps bilateral donors should involve the Government of Mauritius as multilateral donors and others do. Secondly, a single firm was asked to look at highly varied questions, like multiplier effects and research and evaluation, as well as marketing, land policy and organisation. Some longer local presence might have increased understanding and so the chances of implementation. The fourth question is the validity of reports which do not present an achieved local consensus (compare the Glass and Benwell cases).

Technical Co-operation Report D.W. Glass
Demographic Study
January-February 1975

This was a short but influential visit by a highly distinguished consultant. Apparently it coincided with a related visit by Mrs. Glass about which we have not been able to see any papers, despite considerable efforts. Clearly the visit by David Glass had an immediate effect on morale in the Family Planning and Mother and Child Health programmes and organisations. His report was also of use to the GOM in its approaches to other agencies, like UNICEF, for a mobile clinic. Some of his specific recommendations have not and could only with great difficulty have been implemented. Nevertheless, the suggestions, for example about village dhai involvement, recording of all religious marriages and amending the legislation about abortion and sterilisation, might be said to have a helpful effect in discussion. However, the accuracy of the sociological data assumed by some of these points, e.g. about the continued significance in village life of the dhai, is probably open to doubt. This is presumably a limitation to be borne in mind about short-term consultancies with very wide references.

Technical Co-operation Report J.D. Benwell
Probation Services Adviser
1976

This was an excellent and potentially successful project. Its structure has some slightly unusual and, again, potentially useful features. The approach to report writing itself, by the adviser, was also exemplary. The origin of the project was an understanding in the most concerned parts of the GOM itself about existing limitations in probation, aftercare and associated services and a desire to learn from the UK experience. There was no similar local agreement about what should happen in these areas. Hence the project was initiated in part to arbitrate between the disagreements.
The TCO was able to see papers before he arrived, as a result of ODM initiatives. He went out of his way to understand the local situation and to discuss and get agreement with the most relevant officials in the Government of Mauritius to anything which he put into his report. The report itself was direct, practical and detailed in its recommendations. The Officer also specifically recommended that there should be a return visit, in effect to help to introduce and implement this scheme when the report was agreed, and in particular to assist in training. This seemed to be a wholly admirable notion. However, either despite or because of changes in the GOM, with the Ministry of Reform Institutions for example, the report is not yet accepted or being implemented. There are a few disagreements at the most concerned official level, as was to be expected. It is true that the report would make significant changes in work carried out, especially for aftercare for ex-prisoners. It could be implemented nevertheless in a single major phase. There is a real risk that it will not now be implemented at all. In the absence of a TCO, there has to be care lest such a promising project does not wither on the vine.