General Overview

This is a troublesome mss. The 5 chapters by outside contributors are all basically sound and publishable. (There are detailed questions and some gaps). So too is the chapter on policing.

Chapter 4 is somewhat problematic because it fails to inquire what claims to contact with 'masses' young 'dissidents' had, why they didn't get majority support at either internal congress and how a national election when North/Grootfontein/Otavi-Taume/Oranjemund with majority of members couldn't have participated could be seen as democratic.

Chapter 10 has some problems - including defining all extant democracies as pseudo while offering no alternative guidelines. Most flow from problems in Chapters 3, 4. It does not seem fully consistent with Chapter 9.

Chapter 1 is a disingenuous hatchet job. (Invitation to a lynching?) In fact it is not a fair summary of main text especially of 5 non-editor chapters and policing.

Chapter 3 is a rather unscrupulous case for the prosecution not a serious investigation. Evidence cited can very readily be used to support a quite different analysis.

It is very hard not to believe the co-editors decided conclusions before they did research. Even evidence cited fits other frames just as well. Interestingly outside authors and co-editor on topic off main 'authoritarian to the core/watch Hawala rise again' theme come to rather different conclusions/general picture.

While several chapters cite interviews with SWAPO/ex-SWAPO people it seems no contributor has any experience working with SWAPO or observing internal functioning. This is a handicap. Both co-editors expected to get posts in Namibia and did not. Whether this affected views is unclear. In the case of one who was swanning about as Vice Chancellor anoint given his past record of intellectual flip flops and lack of intellectual integrity perhaps it did. In Saul's case probably not except wondering why SWAPO so suddenly (to an outsider or promotional solidarity group member) pragmatic instead of radical. (I was to have been there too but reconciliation did entail dropping as nearly all recruitment of prominent external advisors - only clear exception is Mark Bomani and he is very low profile in Windhoek. Not simple dropping now useless - was at Independence State Banquet and on another visit invited to see President without my ever having let him know I was there, and conversation was substantive.)

Except that 6 chapters don't play this would be Namibian Oppenheimer and Fitch. That book is more the end of their illusions about Ghana than of what Ghana said it was or less fulsome (before) observers (often less critical after) saw at time. In part this is end of JS's illusions about revolution/socialism in Africa, e.g. the bit on armed struggle democratizing (which is opposite of what SWAPO claimed). (There is a mirror image - many, not all, new leftish volunteer advisors/academics of mid-1970s/early 1980s are viewed poisonously by ex-stamping grounds where once near revered and return bitterness in full, e.g Marc Wuyts on Mozambique but not interestingly Joe Hanlon. Seem to have sold their
vision of New Jerusalem as reality 'their' African state could achieve and 'buyers' disillusion has turned to anger).

I do not see how 1-3 (and to a lesser degree 4-10) can be published as independent serious, inquiring study. Cases for the prosecution have their uses, but are not balanced intellectual inquiries which this volume claims to be (and other 6 chapters are).

What can be done is unclear. I've sent detailed comments on all chapters. You are quite free to send to co-editors/chapter authors. I could be pleasantly surprised but doubt response on 1-4 (and thus 10) will be very forthcoming. This "General" bit I evidently do not want sent to anybody.

In a strange way Chapter 4 is the academic and on paper analogue to Hawala at Lubango. Reminiscent of early 1970s new leftish witch-hunt which went from CIA hires professors (indeed it does - e.g. once tried to hire me to go to U. of Monrovia) and senior Ford person had close CIA links (MacGeorge Bundy certainly did) to an astounding list of USA academic intelligence agents in Africa running to - as I recall - 27 pages. Each name had evidence (of a sort - convincing if you assumed anybody on list was guilty before reading) after it. Oh yes, I was on it. In fairness John Saul had no hand in preparing that piece of left McCarthyism. And he did vehemently challenge some of people (including me) being on it. But he challenged inclusions individually not adverting to whole nature of list and weltanschauung of exercise. He was mildly uneasy about, criticised edges of left intellectual reign of terror at U of Dar (admittedly only beginning when he was there but roots of Nabudere/Museveni, etc - no Shivje not of it albeit tolerated by it - witch-hunt were clear enough) rather than seeing it for what it was and attacking root and branch. This is same problem as that which gave Hawala leeway to become entrenched.

I freely admit I gravely underestimated how much abuse and how much totally non-functional madness lay in security apparat operation at the time. But on co-editors' reading so did President Nujoma who had rather more data! And I would also feel I underestimated because it was very unlike civil side of SWAPO where I had some experience of dialogue and decision taking style and process.

Good luck!

Reg Green
Chapter 1

This chapter is deliberately and rather disingenuously hostile to SWAPO. It accentuates the negative, omits the positive, always chooses to take the most hostile view possible of complex situations and cites pretty suspect sources with no serious warning (indeed a pseudo warning seemingly intended to support) of doubtfulness. The questions to be asked are 'Why have authors set out to do a hatchet job and 'Why have they not been intellectually honest enough to say so?'

Pages 5-6

Preponderance of international context clear in timing and details. But in a Namibian context which was in large part SWAPO's creation.

Cost to RSA in funds and lives had become unbearable - real fear of collapse at centre unless withdrew from periphery. That was the lesson of the Lusophone war where the liberalism movements won by bringing down centre economically and socio-politically.

Reasons for peace of reconciliation from SWAPO's perspective simply not cited - wished to avoid both exodus and post independence civil strife or fertile soil for destabilisation. Also totally unclear what happened if prolonged Assembly deadlock except that AG continued to rule. In any case utterly unclear what in any detail was SWAPO's constitutional project. It had for example, always recognised some internal parties as legitimate in Namibia (but not as rival spokespoints abroad).

Page 7 ff

To study seriously is one thing. To put a case for the prosecution and to cite polemic/suspect sources (for prosecution only) uncritically is something else. This is subtle demonology as an answer to hagiography. The failure to note:

a.) Shipanga and younger educated opposition of 1970s claimed right to be Platonic guardians on basis of education. They spoke for 'masses' they did not know and held in contempt for their 'false consciousness' (rather like TANU/CCM 'left').

b.) There were spies. That does not justify Lubango. But it is a basic fact in causation. Without it one necessarily writes demonology.

Page 8

What do editors mean by "popular mobilisation"? Namibia rather well endowed with independent civil society groups not least churches which do have mass membership and - in some cases - congregation up patterns.

Page 9

The picture of internal SWAPO political culture amazes me. Not what I saw. There was disagreement and criticism at various levels. (Certainly true within delegation at 1981 'Nonimplementation talks in Geneva' and at UNIN policy seminars. Whole history of Peter Katjavivi or of Hage Geingob or of Libertine Amathila is one of partial dissent/criticism. Have been verbally
criticised, at times lost positions but never expelled let alone imprisoned and are Vice Chancellor, Prime Minister, Government Minister.

Page 10 ff

This is apparently a recanting of John Saul's illusions! SWAPO never claimed context of war increased possibilities of democracy and especially open public strategic and tactical debate. Quite the contrary! (Saul did argue it in 1960s/1970s.) Liberation by war when military victory or collapse of colonial power is the result may lead to radicalisation. It hampers democratisation - perforce armies are not participatory democratic laboratories.

Page 11

Problem is failure to admit up front that there were spies and that SWAPO was terrified of infiltration parallel to that of ANC where sad joke was "When two or three are gathered together, there an informer is present." At the time top SWAPO people were infinitely more alarmed at how much security and strategy had been compromised than about anything else. Well grounded security fears when facing a ruthless opponent led to horrible acts. That does not justify the acts nor the apparent unaccountability of Hawala to PLAN let alone to SWAPO, but to ignore the causal factor prevents serious consideration and paints too many actors as evil incarnate. Criticism that SWAPO does not want an inquiry is fair - the rationale that reconciliation bars a similar examination of formerly pro-South African figures who are still prominent is pragmatically just plausible (what it formally precludes is a trial) but not ethically convincing.

Page 12 - Para 2

Apparently authors believe syndico-anarchism is an effective and benign form of governance. (Mozambique did try it. Then tried to balance popular initiative by strategic framework and swung to detailed central control. From 1975 through 1980 continued oscillation to try to get a balance. RSA massive destabilisation and proxy war 1981 on halted that experimental balancing process and did lead to wartime authoritarianism.) No very evident successful examples.

Para 3

I know a little of SNM. Has same ambivalences as SWAPO. What is said is largely true but leaves out less attractive side - mirror image way SWAPO is treated.

Pages 18 and 22

Sloppy. Doesn't make clear:

a.) Northern population is where it always was - the process described is Centre and South. (Oddly editors do make this clear on Page 25 ff.)

b.) Centre/South labour was also de facto migrant and was significant on ranches and in towns. It had quite different rule frame.
The fact that South Africa suppressed/took over church schools is omitted. And blame for non-expansion when churches had little money beyond state subsidy seems to blame the people who tried to educate not those who ensured funds for adequate education weren't available.

North/South contrast very good.

Angola war aims of South Africa after 1975 until mid-1980s were primarily destabilising Angola and hitting PLAN to provide a buffer zone for pacifying Namibia. (See Geldenhuys Diplomacy of Isolation.) Viljoen/P.W. 'forward policy' was a pathological mutation of that, assisted by RSA realisation USA was eager to overthrow Luanda government and see Judas Savimbi or "X" installed which gave RSA carte blanche.

In that sense the sucking of RSA into over-extension leading to the catastrophic debacle in front of and in skies over Cuito Canavale owes a good deal to SWAPO. And endgame at C-C came when RSA's Southwest flank defence positions were smashed by a scratch force under Angolan officers but with substantial PLAN contingents.

"Formal legality" - precisely so. SWAPO was harried, spied on, terrorised. The degree of open activity (and especially mass protest) allowed was by no means large. Where there was a favourable micro context (e.g. Oranjemund) SWAPO (disguised within NUM in that case) took it. Idea wide 'normal' political action in Centre/South Namibia would have been practicable is fanciful.

As handled this is a disingenuous smear. "Responded to publicly and in an appropriate forum" would seem to mean in print or in press conference. (Other senior SWAPO members wrote some pretty savage reviews of Peter K's book. He remained head of research in SWAPO and became VC.) The apparent attempt to suggest by innuendo a 'fatwa' type response is - in the absence of evidence - at best scurrilous.
Chapter 2

This is basically an excellent piece of work. Very much an outside scholar's. Who is Susan Brown?

But:

a. underestimates how much of a defeat for RSA Cuito Canavale was

b. fails to see implications at home of "butcher's bill"

c. totally overlooks fiscal debacle of war.

Those, however, are areas she could readily look into and incorporate. Until that is done the chapter rather underplays the impact of PLAN on causing South Africa to decide to cut its losses and get out of Namibia.

Page 2

- But most decolonisation was not by war. 1947-1967 was main wave with only Algeria, Indonesia and North Vietnam by war (plus violent seizure of Ouidah by Dahomey – as it then was – and Goa by India from Portuguese).

- Rhodesia (settler revolt state), Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and East Timor (Portuguese colonies), Sahara Democratic Republic (Moroccan Colony), Eritrea (Ethiopian colony) and Namibia (South African colony) are a different phase because colonial masters were not prepared to envisage a basically peaceful transition.

Page 3

- Idea of bleeding South Africa economically (sabotage and 'defence'/occupation bills) was significant at least by 1976. When did it begin?

- The first part of quote detracts. Not evident forcing international community to take note is per se selfish or in interest of leaders only. Nor, I think, does author see it as such.

Page 6

- NB the Castro case suggests:

1. SWAPO did respond positively to rank and file critics

2. had good reason to fear RSA infiltrators at all levels including top.

The two explanations of how RSA informed are not mutually exclusive. Castro had to have a non-official contact point. Caltex manager would have been ideal for that role.

Page 7

- Para 3 casts doubt on thesis SWAPO could have proceeded in 1970s by use of its formal political legality to campaign openly in Namibia.
Unclear PLAN killed Elifas. Also unclear PLAN/SWAPO did view high level assassinations with approval. My impression at time was that SWAPO-Luanda and Lusaka genuinely did not know.

Blurring Geldenhuys and Dreyer and Geldenhuys and Viljoen/PW is not helpful.

JG abhorred Koevet and Special Forces (and said so). He was a professional/clean hands soldier and thought terrorism/butchery counterproductive.

JG did not favour deep penetration into Angola nor seeking to create either a UNITA government or a no man's land. His policy was short strikes against logistics/bases near border. He feared logic of "forward policy" would suck into quicksand as no logical stopping point before Mediterranean.

Not incidentally this son of Mariental apparently wanted more real reform than South Africa/DTA envisaged - a neo-Botswana with Kapuo as president perhaps.

Additional fact. A substantial number of intended 1978 UNIN entrants died at Kassinga. As a result smaller, younger, heavy female majority entering class.

A bit too non-committal on who was killed. The burial pit photos were clearly not faked and child/female dominance in death is only too visible in them.

end of quote. Note reference to goal of straining RSA budget. That issue is analysed in ACR articles on Namibia about 1984/5 - 1989/90.

Cuito Canavale was not a true stalemate -

- South Africa had lost control of skies - dared not challenge Angolan front line jets.
- Could defend entrenched positions (including over half national long range artillery park with USA stinger missiles hastily collected from UNITA.
- Could not pull out without loss of artillery and heavy death toll plus real risk of a rout.

- After the Southwest offensive rolled back South African flank ability to supply troops in front of C-C was at risk.

- Napoleon in Moscow was in a deadlock until he had to retreat because no supply line. RSA headed there by late 1988.

(Interestingly General Geldenhuys saw this in - I think - January. Publicly urged purpose [blocking 1988 Angolan government drive on Mavinga/Jamba - one of goals at any rate] achieved and prudent to pull out at once [would have been possible then] not sit there.)

Page 32 - Para 4

- Probably underestimates PLAN role. The Southwest part of front seems to have had few Cubans. Angolan overall command but high proportion of combat units (perhaps over 50%) PLAN. Smashed through to border as RSA screen positions had been weakened to concentrate at C-C. South Africa panicked:
  - supply route to 'Army of Cuito Canavale' at risk.
  - fear Angolan planes would seize command of northern Namibian skies. (At height of panic Ondangwa air base was briefly evacuated.)

- Para 5

As noted earlier JG had grave fears for safety/sanity of operation and wanted to pull out in January. March assault was Viljoen/Piet Wappen determined. Doubt he deployed to suck in Cubans but to avoid attacks he feared his forces could not stop and to create illusion flanks and supply line were safely secured.

Page 33

- How much had Cuba and Angola shifted? Had said for several years if RSA got out/stayed out Cubans would go home.

- RSA shifted. It had to get out of Angola or lose men/artillery at C-C. And loss of Southern Angola created grave doubts as to defence of at least northern Namibia.

- USA shifted either because it at last believed Cuba and Angola or because it felt RSA withdrawal would leave it rather naked and isolated in Angola.

Page 33

- ACR articles cited contain a South African white death toll estimate of over 2,000 to 1987. (Includes accidents, fatal illness on duty, later deaths, sabotage, etc., which RSA count does not.) As General Geldenhuys went on radio personally to denounce but neither defended official figure nor proposed another must have touched a very raw nerve!
Best guess about 3,000 white combatant deaths through 1989. That on RSA white population base is comparable to 180,000 odd in USA. Much lower losses in Vietnam were traumatic. South African white society - especially rural Afrikaner - is clan based. The socio-political cost can hardly have been insignificant.

Pages 33-34

No consideration of fiscal war bill influence. Yet PW and Pik cited as reasons for agreeing to UN supervised independence elections. Troops in Namibia weren't available for use at home. 50% increase in defence budget to defend Namibia and have forces at home to quell simultaneous township rising in all provinces economically not on. PLAN had in a real way forced RSA into believing it could not afford to hold on to Namibia even if militarily it could have. That may well have been PLAN's greatest single contribution.
This is the most problematic chapter. The problem does not lie so much in conclusions (whether one agrees or not) but in methodology. In several cases what raw evidence is provided rather suggests alternative interpretations (as arguably does praxis since return home). These are simply not seriously explored - occasionally dismissively presented as if incredible. There is a substantial body of evidence to suggest much more open dialogue (and disagreement) on civil policy (especially post return side) than is presented. And silence on heated, continued feminist dialogue in which feminists (two of whom are in Cabinet and one - Libertine - is arguably among 5 most powerful politicians) fairly steadily gained ground. As that is an area which suggests very different political culture and process outside military and - a fortiori - security context to leave it out is to falsify the whole. The basic problem appears to be that co-editors decided what they would conclude long before doing most of evidence collecting/sifting and carefully selected/fitted materials consistent with those conclusions. It is very much a case for the prosecution. There is no particular reason not to have volumes or articles which are that (e.g. Times of Namibia) but there is a reason not to present as objective, unbiased, in depth inquiries into reality.

Page 4 - "would not ... whole cloth" is tendentious as own evidence cited (and rather more, e.g. Toivo's speech from the dock) pretty clearly shows SWAPO would have gone to war even if OAU and USSR had not existed.

Pages 4/5 - At that date any immediate or foreseeable future attempt to launch full scale war with capturing Windhoek as its objective would have led to massacres and probably to extinction of SWAPO. Abrahams was a Cabinet (CC) member. He spoke publicly in that capacity against Cabinet position. That is grounds for dismissal in almost all polities. As he did this repeatedly it is reasonable to assume he had been warned. No evidence presented to show in Cabinet disagreement (even reraising issues) led to automatic firing (if it had Gurirab, Geingob, Hidipo Hamutenya, Pendukini, Libertine, Katjavivi would not have been in leadership group at independence and probably not Netumbo or Nahas either). Therefore what is shown is no more than precedent for "collective responsibility" principle and in an area (military strategy) in which presumably that principle is especially applicable.

Pages 5/6 - Like Page 4. Snide and misleading. Basic thrust was initial leaders' view that national not regional or ethnic party was desirable in itself and also tactically.

Page 6 - Para 2 - On evidence overstated. The educated/technocratic figures rose rapidly (not only in diplomatic corps) with full approval of/indeed presumably appointment by President Nujoma. This is very evident in who went where in government in 1990. Therefore while there is no reason to doubt they had a proprietary feeling "willing to tolerate", "holding...levers of power" overstate on evidence. (And Hawala was not in this group - he certainly sought with dangerous degree of success to lay hands on levers of power!)

Page 6 - late/7 - To use "Headman" in quote in note 8 is quite proper. To use it apparently as co-editors' view in text is remarkable. It was perfectly possible to disagree with President Nujoma to his face in
meetings (even with outsiders - admittedly trusted advisers - present) or to conduct a hot debate part of which in practice challenged previous consensus endorsed by President with President listening for some time before speaking and not necessarily restating old consensus when he did. Any respected African leader acquires some informed honorific - by nature of African custom. Kenyatta also "Old Man" and Nyerere "Teacher". "Ruthlessness..." of defending positions varies widely. Nyerere clearly was not very ruthless - admittedly did not need to be - unless protection of position includes against coups. Nyerere's idea of ruthlessness when he disagreed with National Assembly on a matter of principle (if not principle quite ready to compromise) was to 'threaten' a general election on the issue (himself and MP's), e.g. almost did it once on what both he and MP's perceived as issue of progressive income tax in 1992 (misperceived as it happens, but that is irrelevant to their or his actions).

Pages 7/8 - Yes. PLAN personnel inactive (or square bashing) under poor conditions. Until strategy - tactics - logistics - equipment - etc. worked out would have been fatal to toss them to wolves across border.

Page 8 - Castro case has subsequent implications. Leadership at first wouldn't believe allegations. When more came in they did investigate. Decided never to leave suspect in position to do damage on military front again. Once convinced traitor a dilemma. SWAPO wanted Tanzania courts to try for treason. Tanzania pointed out treason against a not yet state by acts in a third state (Zambia) couldn't be tried by T court. Did agree to hold under preventative detention as better for all concerned than, a) SWAPO trying/executing; b) SWAPO detaining; c) setting free to go back to his masters. What is solution for an armed liberation movement on political offences? Own statutes, judiciary seconded by host country using that country's criminal procedures, a normal prison system or agreement to have host prisons 'care for' them? (Might be fine in Tanzania or Zambia - one rather shudders at idea in wartime Angola!)

Pages 8/9 - The events described are mutiny. Military codes nowhere permit normal political activity. (That SWAPO clearly did not explain problems/contexts to troops is valid criticism as is apparent non-action of officers on certain 'terms and conditions' type grievances. It does not justify mutiny.) 'Resigning' from an army in a war (even if not in combat) is quite usually treated as 'desertion' which in wartime is not a minor offence. (The Central Police Station in Dar es Salaam doesn't have a "pit" albeit all its cells are rather insalubrious to put it mildly - an old inherited building poorly maintained.) A "low level" security camp confinement is a rather mild sentence for mutiny during war by world standards. (Tanzania had had a mutiny a few years before so was ultra sensitive to and a context in which SWAPO would become ultra sensitive to dangers of letting proto-mutinies simmer.)

Page 10. Handing over Chair to be re-elected is a very culture specific and context specific (Anglo-American parliamentary procedure) custom. It is not at all African. As President Nujoma knew no parliamentary procedure at the time (how could he have?) somewhat unsound to make anything of incident (especially as he did go along with procedure in end).
Page 11 - Para 2 - A Congress is neither necessary nor sufficient to deal with either corruption or admin. reform. Indeed - for slightly different reasons - unless detailed preparation in advance, it can at most lay down guidelines for subsequent executive action.

Page 12 - Para 2 - Military chapter suggests PLAN continued to fight effectively but in Angola as South Africa ground forward on the road to its disastrous defeat at Cuito Canavale. PLAN's last campaign was the Southwest Front drive from Lubango that rolled up RSA's left flank and threatened supply line to Cuito Canavale and Northern Namibian border defence. Quite effective fighting!

Page 13 - Para 1. Yes - health/education/food/military infrastructure very weak. But they later improved dramatically. Libertine's criticisms were received by giving her a pretty free hand to reform SWAPO's Zambia medical services - which she did.

Page 14 - end main para - UNITA issue didn't "come to a head". It became a non-issue when UNITA became a South African 'ally'/proxy - SWAPO could hardly choose to cooperate with those who had switched to shooting at them!

Page 16 - Logistics were later much improved. These were startup/training/resources problems. Clearly not very well (or at least convincingly) explained to troops.

Pages 17 ff - Before mutiny SYL/EC were in dialogue. Arrests, come after mutiny and statements (cited in text) by mutineers suggesting SYL people had been instrumental in their decision to mutiny.

- The demand included a 2/3 military majority on "commission of enquiry" which might be read as "militarisation" rather than "democratisation"! It can hardly be read as anything other than wartime mutiny.

- As noted, whatever limitations, EC was evidently not decided how to proceed, was talking with SYL until mutiny and mutineer statements implicating SYL in it. (May have implicated inaccurately -) "Incitement to mutiny" is a universal crime. Not normal to suppose democracy is furthered by one fraction going off to recruit the men with guns to its side in debate!

- "spontaneity" was frowned on for reason that ill thought out daftness would be deadly. Almost anything had to be approved by a 3-5 persons (not necessarily all EC) committee which was a remarkably slowing process as hard to get all together in one place and - for evident reasons - telexed or telephoned consultation was deemed unwise. (Technical advisers to Geneva Pre (non) Implementation talks were in part rung to come as meeting opened because for some topics relevant committee couldn't be gotten together until night before meeting!)

Debate - at least among several score persons - i.e. well beyond CC - and on non-military topics was often encouraged and usually quite acceptable.

Page 21 - quote. As exploitation of mineral resources was a SWAPO attack issue virtually from day 1 (and was taken up by the UN Commission) the criticism is so ill conceived one is forced to wonder how informed (or how serious as to content) the critic was.
Page 22 - On the contrary when military dissidents wanted dominant presentation to be that of a 2/3 military "commission of inquiry!" and issued statements implying they were working with/inspired by SYL very easy to conclude aim was to "seize power".

- the very odd handling of events, i.e. overplaying Shipanga (whose long-standing differences were more on switching from USSR to China which in Angola was a piece of spontaneous lunacy than on armed struggle. There must has been some evidence of RSA contact as SWAPO tried to get both Zambia and Tanzania to try him - presumptively for treason in a rerun of Castro. As asserted acts were in Zambia had KK been so minded a charge probably would have lain albeit probably not treason) presumably was for external PR use.

- The subsequent (security apparent) threat to younger, more educated, more technocratic element (majority of Cabinet including PM) was not by top leadership. Evidence cited by co-editors suggests top leadership including President Nujoma also under same threat!

- If valid criticisms of SYL and military dissidents are perceived as turning largely on administrative incompetence, failure to inform on policy/problems and cure seen as "modernisation"/"technical efficiency" then Peter Katjavivi's statement is correct. (Presumably that is how he saw it.)

Page 23/24 - The programme reads as if heads had been worked out in detail but text was hastily concocted out of remembered more or less relevant phrases (e.g. "land to the tiller" when rancher or ranchworker made more sense for 95% of land in question) because of time pressure. Even much later SWAPO leaders up against speech deadlines gave people (not necessarily SWAPO) broad heads and instructed to do speeches based on SWAPO policy and in some detail. Apart from fact that authors would have styles not necessarily like commissioners' their knowledge of details of SWAPO policy (which was often at dialogue or options stage!) was a lot to assume.

- Indeed. Decrees do relate to failure to get Tanzanian or Zambian Courts to try. And concentrate on political because other offences less serious or could be sent to local courts (e.g. theft, murder) or dealt with in de facto customary courts. (See note on Page 8 setting out dilemma).

Page 24 - last para. Paper does in practice trivialise security concerns, e.g. in lumping civilian side disagreement and mutiny/treason.

Page 25 - top - the spy/security apparent tragedy does not appear to be in the least similar to climate on civil side. The best evidence is who the majority of cabinet are. All were prone to speak minds/were in minority at times/survived easily enough and were at no risk except in security apparent saga/were as of return in senior enough positions that their appointments, while to a degree surprising, were not such as to lead to incredulity or suggest a total lack of continuity. (Hidipo - Nahas - Ben - Libertine - Pendukini - Hage - Nico Bessinger most evident ones in Cabinet and Moise T. and Peter K. in key non-Cabinet posts. If he'd lived Anton Lubowski would have been another - probably AG.)
One point not raised is context. Angola at least from 1980 was a notably paranoid polity (a point made very strongly by Mozambicans and evident by contrasting the atmospheres of Luanda and Maputo). The degree of security procedures and of top secreting everything was astounding. SWAPO was an object of this (confined to a limited number of apartment blocs/houses/office and regularly unable to get visas for persons it wanted to bring in for consultation or longer stay). While in private senior SWAPO people could be quite acerbic and almost patronisingly dismissive of this ambience—which contrasted markedly with own civil and post independence policy dialogue/debate—in practice they can hardly not have been influenced by it (contributing to security paranoia).

Further SWAPO's belief spies were hard to detect was probably enhanced by its own success in occupied Namibia. At one point it penetrated Grootfontein command centre and—when RSA concluded this to be the case—promptly distributed Xerox of top secret memo warning of probable penetration! Laudable competence but likely to lead to belief least likely persons might well be spies.

Page 26 - Viana was larger than suggested. All (most?) new arrivals from Namibia seem to have gone there. In 1988 at time of last student exodus at least 2,000—in tents but quasi permanent ones. Also 'housed' some staff (also partly tented) judging by kindergarten, school facilities.

Page 27 - Doubtless abuses. "No questions" depended on topic. 100% true on military issues. 0% so on health/family planning (an e.g. of early hot debate on male anti/female pro lines which Libertine/Pendukini/SWC won). Scholarships issue was partly central (if somewhat haphazard) personnel development programme, partly desire to balance military or at least camp working experience with training to avert isolated/self indulgent elite risk, partly that some (especially German) scholarships were used to indoctrinate against SWAPO. SWAPO was quite willing to accept scholarships from rather unlikely sources for rather unlikely courses!

SWAPO had chapels and chaplains (at least from Namibian Lutheran and Anglican churches) in camps. Cuba had a policy of near suppression of church. Tends to suggest either Cuba prevented attendance or SWAPO too readily accepted 'local custom'. (At that point doubtful there were any churches on school island. To allow its children to attend church SWAPO would have had to get Cubans to build [or at least provide space] and sent own chaplains.)

Contempt for intellectuals by older, less trained a general army problem. Crippled some units in Mozambique into 1980s. But what is cited suggests Nanyemba was moving to reduce that problem (or put educated soldiers in key positions even over opposition).
RSA regularly claimed 1,500 to 3,000 SWAPO 'terrorists' in Namibia at any one time. Occasional interludes claimed "broken back" and down to 100 or 25 but soon 1,500 to 3,000 again. RSA perceived as deadly risk barely under control - vide panic when Angolan/PLAN units swept to Kunene in 1988. Equally Geldenhuys was regularly saying he couldn't provide static security to every farm or store or railway post (in answer for demands for just that) as long as he was in Namibia.

Clearly possible to take quite different view on pre Security apparent history/situation even basically on evidence used by co-editors. One point missed. At some state (Nanyemba's death?) PLAN had become completely independent of civilian (EC) control. That would seem to be a crucial point.

Initial set up (rational and modern Soviet style security organisation practice) don't engage in madness of method of Lubango. (Brutal yes - mad no.) Nor was SNASP in Mozambique mad - it on the whole did its job effectively and while unloved either released, released to courts for trial or transferred to normal prisons pretty promptly as well as not collecting 300,000 (analogue to 1,000 Namibians in Angola) in the first place.

On face of it Hawala out of control (including PLAN's) after Nanyemba's death.

was Nujoma only "ready to credit" [which of course suggests very poor judgement but not complicity] or feeling insecure? (e.g. silence cited Note 81.)

Overall evidence suggests Hawala and Co. (unless barking mad) planned a coup of sorts. Work steadily up until only Nujoma left and turn him into puppet.

how much of a real risk that was is not clear. Top line targets (per names in notes to which Libertine and Ben Amathila and Theo Ben G. should be added) were not actually seized. Apparently Hawala had doubts whether he could get away with it or whether EC led by Sam would counter-attack (especially as Security being out of PLAN control meant it could not assume PLAN would back it against President Nujoma).

Dubious. Would not have opposed creation Security nor its limited reporting in principle. Would also have feared spies.

And nothing in prior history is at all like this spontaneous monomania of a handful of people led by a monster.

Surprising point is willingness of those at risk in 1983-88 (including President Nujoma) to forgive so readily (cover up is another matter) and to give Hawala a significant security side post. But seems more daft than anything else.

SWAPO's own (much earlier) demi official constitutional drafts and (incomplete) option papers were also not what might have been expected. They did include competitive elections and - in principle - other parties (e.g. SWANU), an independent judiciary, etc.
External pronouncements 1980 on were uneven. Clear endorsement of mutually beneficial external investment, clear retreat from total settler land confiscation (conversion to leasehold/no leases for absentees/etc) at least as early as January 1981 as high as President. Namibia Towards... slight misleading as at the time reconciliatory transition with whites staying didn't seem on cards (but even it endorses deals with De Beers/Tsumeb - not Rossing - keeping Barclays/Standard but getting shifted from Jo'burg to London groups, using de facto agreement with German community to keep some ranchers, technical staff, commercial and financial personnel).

Page 32 - last comment curious. Evidence cited suggest military side of PLAN terrorised by Hawala and Co. too.... to point of considering storming Lubango.

Note 10. Probably SWAPO disbelieved rumours as either rival's mutterings or RSA disinformation. Key point is apparent decision never to wait too long again which led to tragedy in initial acceptance of Hawala and his gang until he became so powerful real danger in trying to curb. (An army commander who feels only cure is to assault his nominal deputy's HQ is a frightened man!)

Note 12. Was Chinamen contemporary term - or later? (Shipanga was - as noted earlier - a Chinaman in Sino-Soviet choice sense.) Or was it Cultural Revolution which was the image. (If so Sam plays Chou en Lai role but wins and they Gang of Four but lose! More seriously Cultural Revolution was not exactly an exercise in democracy.)

Note 22. 40 or 50 in border camps (consistent with other sources) or border plus central?

Note 26. Not even logical unless SWAPO believed Vorster would include Namibian independence in detente which seems most unlikely (i.e. that SWAPO would have thought so - clearly Vorster wouldn't have done so!).

Note 27. Judas Savimbi was too clever. He had substantial OAU support he could have expanded (e.g. only FRELIMO was holding Tanzania to pretty ambiguous pro MPLA position) had he been willing to hold on for Chinese arms via Zambia. He thought USA/RSA alliance could sweep him to power and then leave him to do as he liked. (Savimbi is a black chauvinist when that is not totally incompatible with keeping on terms with his sponsors.)

Note 31. - modest living still true in Luanda and Lusaka in 1980s. Women collection was against policy - vehement feminist campaign on this. That it happened quite clear, how often in 1980s unclear. In general girls in 1988 exodus seem to have been protected and located in bush/given army boots to replace 'court' heeled shoes!!/taken to transport to Viana.

Note 38. - is claim true? Or (as SWAPO seems to have read it) had SYL claimed this to SMW-WP to get their (SMW's) backing against EC? If later it constituted clear incitement to mutiny.

Note 42 - conflates critics, civil dissidents, military dissidents, i.e. Geingob/Katjavivi/Libertine et al. - SYL - mutineers.
Note 44 - Muyongo broke (and went straight over to RSA) because he found he was not true #2 and couldn't build up his CANU followers into strong power base. (Many did not go back with him and Caprivi was 50-50 odd in general election and SWAPO carried the local government one.) Not a very ideological man except on detestation of Europeans (he'd tell friendly ones - i.e. friendly to SWAPO - to their faces) and - more basic - power for Muyongo.

Note 45. Key word is "tried" - period of attempts to use Zambian courts. Also note "could". In context of mutiny not particularly hard line or authoritarian.

Note 50. This is a possible reading. 2/3 Military Commission and non contact with/non representation of Ovambo worker/peasant (or other worker and small grower) base plus demand for instant say on basis superior education lead to rather different possible readings.

Note 61. Habeas corpus does exist in Tanzania in general. Detention order under Presidential authority, however, is outside it.

Note 63. Rather doubtful assertion. SWAPO was by then releasing Lubango prisoners who were far more dangerous than forgotten 1970s dissidents/mutineers especially if headed abroad. But as he was named 'agent', a person who had lost a relative or close friend might well have exercised 'spontaneity'.

Note 64. When Muyongo defected (as he went into RSA arms that seems the appropriate terms), problem that some who stayed in SWAPO were loyal to SWAPO but some might be (probably some were) left as sleepers. Separating important but no evident way to proceed responsibly.

Note 67 - Libertine in fact was #2 in Health and largely (not wholly) on Zambia side until quite late.

Note 72 - Figures look unlikely. More than 2,000 non-Ovambo in 50,000 in Angola. 1,000 is whole estimated detainees.

Note 73 - Clark total is 1000 odd. 1,100 minus 123 = 976. (assuming all 315 were detained.... students who left Namibia and never reached Viana could have 'disappeared' courtesy of Koevet as much as Hawala.) The additional 1,400 look implausible - Clark followed all names given with any precision. The problem is that as of 1989 the issue was being used by RSA in election so fabrications clearly were in circulation (probably to SWAPO's benefit - every pretty palpably false claim cast suspicion on ones which were in fact valid).

Note 82 - Again curious conflation PLAN-military (whose head thought of assaulting Lubango) and PLAN-security which was not under actual PLAN-M control!

Note 85 - cautious social democratic pragmatism would seem a more accurate description. Neo-colonial is objectively true given almost any SSA economic structure whatever state aims, i.e. it applies to Angola and Mozambique too -
Chapter 4

This could be a good chapter but fails to be. It systematically judges against the SWAPO leadership on each (or virtually each) issue. While occasionally critical of those who dissented from leadership it is very clearly on their side. Equally while it does state part of SWAPO case sometimes it does this in a dismissive way. The problem is not being critical but pretty deliberately tilting the playing field. The apparent reason - not stated - is a romantic syndico anarchist ideal of how organisations ought to/can work and a curiously Platonic Guardian view of the self asserted claims to represent the masses of radical activists with no evident mass base or contact with them. (A mirror image Trahison des Clercs perhaps?)

Page 1 - rather clearly demonstrates very real limitations on broad/open action, systematic record keeping or normal electoral processes. SWAPO could not act as a normal political party.

Page 2 - the logic of safe centre (in Dar or Lusaka or Luanda) where one could get and analyse data and relate to outsiders is put but rather grudgingly. The 'Marxist themes' (Trotskyite left) problem was real - in the absence of possibility for orderly meeting/communication structure and amid a sense of helpfulness pied pipers are dangerous. That is quite independent of their sincerity or commitment to what they suppose to be in the best interests of those they set out to give heightened consciousess. (The academic left in Tanzania had the same self anointed band of apostles syndrome but weren't suppressed because regular discourse and consulting base were possible and because JKN was basically very sympathetic to academicians in particular and discourse in general and could readily afford to be in an open, easy communication context. SWAPO's leadership could not be equally confident.)

Page 3 - focusing on primary goal and goal with broadest support base is not self evidently wrong policy nor anti-democratic. Little evidence majority of SWAPO members/firm backers disagreed.

- not quite "greater share in internal decision taking" but write an internal agenda which was independent of external guidelines which in war context could be dangerous and would be used by South Africans.

Page 3 - Vedder as a basic source on internal African systems is breathtaking! The Ovambo systems were (like Ashanti and many other African) hierarchical and frequently lapsed into authoritarianism. But there were fora for discourse and procedures for removing unacceptable rulers which sometimes operated.

- Township resistance was hardly characterised by great processual democracy, tolerance of dissent or room for deliberative discourse! (Nor could it have been.) Romantic outside intellectual perception of it was (and apparently still is!) so characterised.

Page 4 - Para 1.

- Partly generation gap and partly that activists asserted they spoke for masses without speaking with them. Senior leaders had done latter in earlier phases when easier to do.
- Systematic non consideration North/South issue. Majority of members were North of Red Line. Activists predominantly Centre and South (the editors two-way division is very confusing: North/North Centre/Centre/South (Mariental on)/Coastal would be more helpful possibly with Caprivi another zone). No national meeting could readily include North. Were people speaking - at best - on behalf of what their perceptions of need of 40% of people or meetings basically leaving out over 50% of people likely to be democratic in the sense of responsive to/reflecting majority? That issue needs to be faced squarely. (SWAPO never overtly put it in those terms for fear of being accused of/causing ethnic confrontation.)

Pages 4/5 - the initial rather vague process of founding/constitution writing-adopting is made to seem sinister. Pre-history of any organisation tends to be fuzzy much more so when borderline legal and subject to harassment.

Page 6

- The portfolios probably were nominal, the holders were not always inactive but not specifically on portfolio topic.


- all branches cited as overshadowed were inaccessible. (Tsumeb-Grootfontein-Otavi were in "operational zone" and war command centre was at Grootfontein.) Some, e.g. Oranjemund were active locally (in that case confused by mutually convenient De Beers/SWAPO understanding that SWAPO could and would operate but would not give its name a high profile).

Page 7

- Fair comment up to point of not indicating snag on getting inaccessible (Northern/Grootfontein-Otavi-Tsumeb/Oranjemund) branches represented. As these represented majority of members a very serious snag. (As authors indicate the 1982 meeting at least was quite unrepresentative in that sense.)

Page 9-10- 

- Mass mobilisation (if that means mass meetings) on a systematic basis (versus one off) was not possible in early 1970s (look at Church and Student chapters). Rather ironic that re NC SWAPO is implicitly criticised for seeking too much to be part of a more inclusive anti-South African/pro-independence front it did not control.

- Certainly true internal leadership was averse to courting martyrdom. Most people are. External SWAPO also felt some - e.g. Tjongarero as authors note "these soft guys" - leaders were too cautious but also felt it didn't know detailed contexts and allowed a good deal of internal/individual decision on that.

Page 11

- Bishop Auwala? Is it not usually spelled Aula?
The perversion of traditional justice systems was hardly new, unique or even unusual. Shepstone in Natal before Zulu war developed it to a fine art — once Governor was "traditional chief" on basis he couldn't understand Western law! Afrikaners borrowed and adapted (rather more nakedly, coarsely and brutally — thereby a trifle less hypocritically) this British colonial administrative innovation.

First Para. 1974 Ovamboland elections demonstrated impossibility of mass organisation/demonstration/operation in North. Also impossibility of Northern participation in normal political structures including national conferences.

Last Para. Generation gap problem plus the fact new younger activists had not been deeply involved in earlier period mass mobilisation of/communication with workers and peasants. Latter point is never touched on by editors but is relevant on many occasions (and has parallels much more widely than Namibia — notably in Tanzania albeit in that case while resident there one co-editor didn't see the problem then although more acute as educated radical activists could have been in contact with 'masses' as they, in fairness, could not in early/mid-1970s Namibia).

Para 2. Both wanting Congress and fear as to how it would go were probably present; not necessarily exclusive even in a single person's perspective.

On the whole the Walvis Bay Conference endorsed NEC rather than radical activist positions — a point not made as such. Oddly editors here apparently criticise co-opting intellectuals though elsewhere non-inclusion of student or immediate ex-student activist intellectuals is criticised. "Social base"? Reaching out was for inclusiveness whether to Nama, Herero, Coloured or White. "One Namibia. One Nation" even if borrowed from UNIP/Zambia was a slogan which had an operational meaning for SWAPO. It is distinctly misleading — as editors do — to criticise co-option Wittbooi, etc. as ethnic leaders. A non-ethnic body bringing in new leaders with new local constituencies and maintaining an inclusive leadership is not fairly chargeable with ethnicity. The Wittbooi decision to join SWAPO (merge organisation he led into it) was quite specifically a rejection of parochialism/ethnicity into nationalism/one nation ethos. (p.17).

That none of activists survived in Namibia suggests they did have poor grasp of limits of possible. And internal SWAPO had to survive for legitimacy by physical presence in Namibia reasons. Its mass martyrdom (to exile, prison, death, dissolution) would have been disastrous to morale abroad as well as international credibility. As noted on p. 18 — even so radical youth were welcomed and given posts when went into exile.
- misuse of "ethnic leaders" term again.
- Para 3. Why was rise of SWAPO at Gibeon a different tendency than bringing Wittbooi onto NEH? For that matter why was co-option of activists different than rise of Windhoek/Rehoboth branches?

Page 19

- "No one seemed to demand more". Indeed. If mobilisation was acceptable core strategy to 'masses' and kept SWAPO visible in Namibia was there any strong case for attempting more/riskier activities risking survival as open organisation? Maybe there was but case needs to be argued not subliminally assumed.

Page 21

- Shipanga after return is a very problematic figure. He was quite prepared to discuss deals with RSA but had sense (until TNG) to recognise those on offer were kiss of death. The electoral judgement on SWAPO (D) rather endorses view it was neither SWAPO nor democratic.

- SWANU was always seen by SWAPO as legitimate (except for brief dalliance with TNG process period). But SWAPO's criticism was (correctly) that SWANU had never built a mass base but remained intellectuals talk shop except for some Herero groups who followed traditional leaders into it. (Re Herero the latter criticism applied to SWAPO too but not elsewhere.)

Pages 21/22

- Unclear whether BC (concept) or BCM. In either case a problem as SWAPO was in principle and practice anti racist (albeit some leaders, e.g. Muyongo, disagreed). It hardly takes BC for young educated activists to feel inadequately recognised by older established leaders especially when limits on activity obscure their own lack of links to mass base.

Page 23 - Para 3

- Yes. Tjongarero was a bit too clever. Dissolution rather confused government but also confused much of membership!

Page 24 - Para 2

- Totally inadequate exploration of fact that internal movement could not represent majority of internal population. To some analysts that might raise doubts as to how representative, democratic or accountable it could be! The problem of integrating internal-diplomatic-military strategy was very real and not usefully discussed in terms of "wholly subordinate". Luanda was unsatisfactory venue to do so but infinitely less unsatisfactory than Windhoek!
- Unless one reads NANSO and late 1980s trade unions as puppets (unusual view) SWAPO was not opposed to popular, mass based, independently organised action per se. It was opposed to non-coordinated action in name of SWAPO and could not solve problem of coordinating on a day to day basis between Luanda and Windhoek. (Similarly, it strongly backed The Namibian even though Gwen Lister was always an independent, critical supporter.)

- Suggests substantial tactical disagreements among both activists and NEH.

- Fair comment. But see previous comment and the dilemma of electing NEH with over half the internal membership under-represented. (That pertains to why branch approach of South/Centre could not be replicated nationally.) As to action and accountability the risk of annihilation argument does apply and so does evident need not to keep the type of written records usually rather basic to accountability. (The point is not that NEH or Luanda dealt with real problems optimally but such problems existed in acute forms and authors fail to present them squarely.)

- In context of "Hearts and Minds" plus external NGOs and EEC who were pretty naive, there was a real danger "development work" would end backing wrong side. When it became practicable to vet the groups via CCN, SWAPO was much less negative. It did feel limited time and resources were better directed to direct political action and was rather myopic to cover and visible results potential of local group development work. (There was substantial dialogue/debate on this issue among external leaders and between them and internal.)

- Women's Voice was perceived as a divisive organisation for class reasons - i.e. elite women's group for elite women. (See comments on it in Chapter 5 section.) May have been unfair perception (albeit at least two major SWAPO feminists shared it) but objectively it (that perception) was basic reason for disenchantment.

- SWAPO strongly supported resurgence of unions. E.g. Lubowski - a co-opted NEH member very close to external leadership - spent most of his time assisting them.

- The belief no useful micro action is 1970s/early 1980s. Arguably true then. When context changed so did SWAPO perception. In 1989 the style may be open to criticism but SWAPO was quite correct any action endangering arrival of UN in Namibia was exceedingly unwise and should
be halted/postponed. Strategic view did need to override tactical even if the case could have been put in more reasoned way than appears to have occurred.

Page 33 - Para 2

- Parents Committee was heavily manipulated by RSA and its external allies. Some of its leadership pretty clearly were parties to this. Who is less clear, leading to general suspicion. (The Parents Committee was very unlucky in its backers and naive in accepting them. It should have gone to Amnesty or ICRC from the start. In context of systemic disinformation, the noise of who backed them drowned out their message.)

Page 33 ff

- Militants' commitment to democracy and accountability to broad base of members is open to serious question. NEH - from earlier years - has more 'ordinary person' contact experience than activists had or could get and the activists more or less by definition couldn't get to North.

Page 34 - quote.

- This is rather naive (even if doubtless genuine):

  a. African traditional democratic tendencies are based on broad consensus not majority. A vote is a last resort or a formal endorsement. Real discussion is before any definite "motion". And not always in formal meeting at all. President Nujoma rarely "made up his mind" by himself - he canvassed suggestions made to him. He believes - as does JKN - consultation/reflection before formal motion is more consensually democratic and African than formal motion - limited (by time) debate - quick vote on winner take all basis;

  b. functional bodies anywhere rarely take decisions without consultation and coalition building long before formal debate. Results usually (not always) quite predictable before debate. (Less true of most student and intellectual political groups who don't have opportunity/obligation to implement.)

There are criticisms to be made of the approach at "a" and the fact at "b". But to make them requires stating the alternative processual model and the real nature of large meeting decision taking processes.

Page 34 - Para 4 -ff

- Indeed. No evidence majority of members would have backed militants had a national consultation process leading to a representative national meeting been possible and been held.

Page 35-36

- If CCN took no action on political front without SWAPO clearance (as argued convincingly in Chapter 5) either:

  a. SWAPO backed /Ai//Gams or
b. SWAPO accepted CCN initiative (i.e. allowed it to take independent political role).

Page 36

- External leadership also felt SWAPO internally was too passive. More active mobilisation and visible presence were wanted.

Page 36 - Final Para

- A bit odd to write as if Land Conference and 1991 Party Conference had not been held. By and large on side of dialogue-consensus-openness even if not 'pure' (as no known major party process is!) Direction is clearly toward more openness, consensus, construction, accountability. Some consideration of yardstick for actual governing party - not subliminal New Jerusalem - might be helpful to have a less rubbery yardstick for measuring.

Note 11

- Confuses matters. A number of "Acting" posts were "real" jobs. That cannot have been the distinguishing test - especially as many of portfolios were not "real" jobs at least so far as specific topic went.

Note 14

- Meaning? 6 of 18 is 1/3 whereas if membership totally proportionally distributed across groupings 9 of 18. Clearly shows effort toward inclusiveness. While these 6 were gone the non-ethnic makeup of executive remained.

Note 21

- NC had limited possibilities. Given limited membership - relative to SWAPO - NUDO certainly and SWANU probably would never have merged. SWAPO was rather careful at this period to stress other NC parties were legitimate in Namibia but international front required a single spokesperson/voice. Clearly this did serve SWAPO's organisational interests but it is not an implausible argument.

Note 31

- Indeed so. Who after all did they (or had they ever) represent(ed)? The core of older leadership came out of a period of mass mobilisation and on the ground contact with "ordinary" Namibians.

Note 32

- Perhaps but Clemens Kapuo had been moving to a deal with RSA before then.

Note 40

- Lubowski was seen as a traitor to Volk and Jewish (contradictory I know but not my contradiction). Parallel to attempted assassination of Albie Sachs.
Note 41
- In practice Wittbooi was perceived as senior (and treated with great deference) by external leadership.

Note 43
- Alternatively co-optees who could not demonstrate/build a base after independence were dropped as a result. What is undemocratic about that?

Note 45
- Not very democratic but typical of "elections" at large, brief, limited preparation conference where many delegates do not know most of others before coming. Indeed in that context probably unavoidable and less likely to produce non representative results than free for all - if floor can reject particular nominees.

Note 68
- Class issue greatly underrated by co-editors. The North/South is as much that as ethnic. NWV did have Ovambo members but Southern ones with limited remaining roots to North (in contrast to - say - Libertine Amathila).

The independent women's organisation issue - in 1991 - was not an issue of autonomy so far as SWAPO was concerned. It wanted one on basis of merger and newly elected leadership. Nobody else did because believed SWC membership would return a straight SWAPO ticket. SWC was willing to compromise in practice (agree a representative ticket at price of less than transparently democratic election) but not principle of merger and election by merged memberships.

Note 76
- The documentation is real (in sense not forged) but not necessarily true (in sense of actual fact). There were some spies/saboteurs. There also was hysterical response and - more serious - totally unacceptable treatment of detainees (whether guilty, implicated but unclear or wrongly detained). All three points - not just the last - are relevant to serious critical analysis. Using RSA propaganda/disinformation operation documents as sources hardly helps rational discussion.

Note 84
- NB - suggests NEH (and external leadership) happy to have branches operate. No suggestion Windhoek (NEM) tried to block initiative - responded by sending somebody to help/bless local initiative.

This critique of the Chapter is doubtless on balance too favourable to SWAPO. That is result of Chapter being far too much a "case for the prosecution" so that to have a serious critique what needs adding is "case for the defence".
Chapter 5

This is a sound chapter. The author has a tendency to be somewhat uncritically critical of all uses of power but he is consistent in that. Slightly more worrying is the relatively low degree (depth) of analysis — this is basically descriptive. And if this is primarily about churches the absence of any exploration of theology/tradition and church governance is an odd omission.

Page 1

The pre-1960s history of church - state conflict is ignored. From German days on there have been tensions — especially with Finnish missionaries and Anglicans but also Rhenish and Catholic. More of the churches had the same view of the nature of Africans and of appropriate education as the state. And — perforce — they believed in congregations and congregational community activity. When the state began to consider uses of education and to plan to fund more it was horrified at inherent subversiveness of church schools and — to a degree — medical services and promptly coerced, co-opted, took and, closed. The classic case is St. Mary's Odibo, secondary school closed, nursing school discredited, theological school harassed into closure, sabotage, search raids because seen as one of birth places of the radical convictions of SWAPO (Anglo-Catholicism as communism!) True neither state nor church chose to play these conflicts as public political conflict (and churches may not have realised what they were — state probably did).

Page 9

SWAPO's aid not largely east. Don't doubt perception. Not a fact. About 50% East/50% Nordic-Netherlands-UN-WFP with military in first half and educational/services and food for exiles largely West/UN family.

Passivism

Whole discussion on why churches as such harder to close down and even their limited freedom illustrates why SWAPO's formal legality did not mean they could after 1960s and before 1980s operate as a mass political party. And also shows from 1987 SWAPO did seek to use mass mobilisation/meetings.

Page 19

Basically fair comment. Probably underplays limits to knowledge and revulsion at (at the least) manipulation of parents' committee and release of false (or at least inaccurate) names of detainees/missing (or even who left but never arrived who presumably died at Koevet, SADF, Unita hands).

Also overlooks (e.g. p. 22) or underlys that there were spies. As with Marley's prior death in Christmas Carol nothing makes sense without that.

Four broad groups detainers:

a) spies
b) believed spies who weren't
c) suspects

d) inconvenient blokes

The numbers game is unhelpful (p. 22). Quite possibly 1,500 briefly detained and cleared and 500 for longer periods of whom at least 200-250 long term. Of these probably 25% - 33% actually RSA agents. Equal number reasonable grounds suspicion. One third were to a degree critics conveniently put out of circulation. Unclear last third was officially approved of or realised to exist by most of senior SWAPO until suddenly late (1987?) horrified vision of being next in queue. Thus for up to 2/3 detention reasonable. For more serious was Hawala's treatment - which SWAPO must in part have known and from what it knew should have investigated/cracked down - justifiable.

Churches very lax in not checking and not being very forceful at least in private. Continue to be pretty inert in either reparation or investigation today.

Page 15 1/6

Churches had no history of development projects and especially not of autonomous ones by people basically organised outside church hierarchy even if Christian.

SWAPO position (in practice) turned on dangers state 'front' groups would get funding plus problem of vetting to avoid this. Thus the de facto approval followed by formal CCN/Internal SWAPO vetting. May have gone too far, but danger outsiders would have ended helping 'hearts and minds' (especially as Geldenhuys - probably atypically - really believed it had to make Namibians better off to be of politics - military use) was real enough.

The Beukes' - apart from gross impropriety using CCN address for Parents Committee - were seen as having because (however unwittingly) objectively pawns of RSA and its overseas allies. (There German 'human rights' backers are an arm of right wing alliance which is lucky world isn't flat. Their involvement did tend to discredit genuineness of complaints because tarred with 'sponsors' brush).

The Rossing Foundation was a PR exercise (re last lines p. 27).

Page 28

Well damned if do or don't. SWAPO/CCN sought to send food aid to hungry in politically hostile territory. Accused of trying to co-opt. If had refused to do so, even greater outcry of seeking to starve into political submission! That is quite separate from top down issue which is typical of all aid provider (not excluding external NGOs!), most churches and - by reporting requirements of donors - most 'wholesale' recipients.

Page 31 - line 4 - para 2

"Progressive". True but also many non-progressive ones!
Except on opportunities of (elite) women NWV was not progressive. Not so very clear it claimed to be. As a grouping of elite women necessarily apolitical on broader issues because included DTA supporters. Only agreement on rights of elite women (regardless of race so in some respects anti-South African).

- very problematic body - especially in respect to class and broad participation. Not a reason to suppress but a reason why neither SWAPO nor CCN had any evident obligation to help fund or to endorse.

- I do not believe NWV was ever very seriously operationally committed to emancipation of poor, illiterate women. useful, (especially internationally!) to claim to be and some members as individuals were so committed.

- what authoritarian and male dominated mean re SWAPO needs clarification. Probably less so than - say - Tory or Labour parties. Certainly tensions and struggle in SWAPO, but on whole women steadily gained ground.

Because of decentralisation, struggle in long run has probably speeded up democratisation of churches (a concept needing much more theological explanation than is present in this chapter!) In short run need to avoid opening cracks for enemy levers to pry into and to present a clear message against the predominant manifestation of evil did delay democratisation and open dialogue/freedom of discourse. (That war does that seems to me self evident - the 1970s new left views to the contrary always struck me as willful romanticism which any serious empirical observation would demolish.)

Line 6 - what are "female clergy" in the Catholic church?!

Note 29

Documents are "authentic" - yes. That is not to say they are necessarily true. Some are, some are very dubious. Certainly the one cited in text here is exaggeration.
Chapter 6

This chapter is rather shallow; analysis and interpretation are not its forte. However, competent description and key issues raised. Also uniquely in this manuscript it is by a black Namibian who seems to have at least some knowledge from participation of what he is writing about.

Page 2 - Para 2

This is an odd reading of Freire. He certainly assumes that correctly used his education leads to one correct political stance. "Non-partisan" is abhorrent to him. Indeed aimed only at deeply oppressed though how far that reaches depends on context and user of the approach. Freire would define fairly broadly but in most users' hands "education for liberation" is an exercise in heightening contradictions against outsiders and authoritarian manipulation into homogeneity of insiders who are not "teachers". (This is not Freire's intent, but parts of it are in his method).

Page 5 - Para 2

SYL was hardly "creation" of student movement as such. Student movement experience plus SWAPO objectives certainly influenced it.

Page 6

The BC link explains problematic linkage with SWAPO which - like ANC - views BC as, at best, in grave danger of being "mirror image racist". How BC (in substance) NABSO was is not very clear - integrated schools and especially seeking white/coloured/Rehoboth members are not orthodox BC.

Page 10 - Para 1

Again unusual reading of Freire.

Para 3

NB evidence of limits of peaceful mass mobilisation even by formerly legal body. Relevant to argument SWAPO did not mobilise/meet/develop accountable internal structures adequately.

Page 11 - Para 2

Genuine problem of all secondary/tertiary groupings. Secondary level is not politically sophisticated. Division of local issues to secondary and national to tertiary led joint bodies is, I believe, normal compromise not just NANSO.

Page 11 - last Para

On women SWAPO is an exception to "most of liberation movements". Women's struggle to have separate attention to female oppression and exclusion dates to 1970s in SWAPO. The (often heated) ongoing dialogue has been acceptable to SWAPO, women have gained ground, two (Libertine, Pendukini) are in Cabinet - interestingly not in traditional 'women's ministries'. On that NANSO much more conservative than SWAPO.
Quote is not very elucidatory. As note 28 shows externally audited accounts in one sense substantial accountability for funds. And very few bodies succeed (even if Finance Officers want to which is less than usual) in making accounts intelligible or interesting to members.

But Freirian approach presumes, and result of "education for liberation" is precisely, "radical mass confrontation"! (Certainly Freire assumes that except in unusual context of a liberated state - in his sense not merely post-colonial).

Alternatively clear why SWAPO opposed NWV as apolitical (except on elite women's concerns), non-confrontational, narrow elite base. BCP more problematic. In that case clear enough SWAPO happy to have National Student body without need to create one. (It had no choice in respect to unions as there weren't any on ground - the later ones grew out of NUNW matrix and local SWAPO support/technical assistance).

- Well "ultra left" problem real and suspicion many of its 'leaders' were opportunist seems justified in some cases by subsequent careers. Certainly NIP was odd verbal ultra-leftism and elite Platonicism (as in Guardian) plus good works in substance on noblesse oblige model of traditional caring doctor.

As author has previously characterised ASO as set up by authorities to divide-depoliticise students not surprising NANSO bitterly oppressed nor evident it was wrong!

Yes. SWAPO never sought to take over NANSO but helped it get funds to act on own. Therefore it didn't mind affiliation but did not take it very seriously. Nor did it seek to block disaffiliation. It was not best pleased because of role of anti-SWAPO students in the process but otherwise might well have accepted that an all students like an all workers or an all women's body was appropriate. (Same problem in women's area. How one weds different past backgrounds and maintains a cutting edge is not easy to see, much less achieve). If that reading is right nothing very "opportunistic" about SWAPO attitude except in sense opportunity of existence of credible, independent national student body meant it didn't need to set up its own.

Two issues conflated:

a. small in group of leaders (rather typical of national student institutions);

b. great jealousy over autonomy vis-a-vis anybody (also rather typical though less so).
One can have a without "b" and vice versa as well as "a" and "b" or neither. No evidence given SWAPO ever tried to exert "significant influence" over "student affairs" - quite the opposite.

Note 19

Text shows why CCN acted! There was no credible body - the RSA based initiative was conceptually problematic and operationally non-functional. CCN saw a political (broad sense) student's organisation as both needed and distinct from a CSM which had a high theological/devotional content.

Notes 20/69

"Mouthpiece" is not a happy term for an official institutional publication. Term is inherently derogatory and at least at Note 20 that is not intended.
Chapter 7

This is an uneven chapter. The in-depth descriptive/immediate applied analytical bulk of it is excellent and genuinely independent/non-presupposition biased investigation/exploration. The conclusions/suggestions on what to do have practicability (especially in short term) problems which are not adequately explored. The general theoretical introduction however is reification/mystification/obscurantism/overkill with precious little serious linkage to rest of text. Whether it is an attempt to appear deep and erudite or "politically correct" is unclear - especially as basic text is free of such cant.

Page 1 - policing was done by other agencies, some state and some not. Function is not new. The boundary between crime prevention/law enforcement and administration/social and morality control is very blurred. Dispute mediation and social work are (or can be) part of crime prevention. A most unhelpful pseudo theoretical pseudo analysis.

- near end. Namibia was precisely not "starting again from beginning" because of reconciliation compact and holdover personnel.

Page 2/3 - rather apocalyptic on demise of policing by consent. (Are adapted systems in Africa which work moderately well, e.g. Ghana, Botswana, Tanzania and ones which are very different and much more authoritarian arms of state, e.g. Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda.) Ironically in conclusion author is rather optimistic about easy/fast creation of policing by consent and of support base for it in Namibia. Somewhat contradictory, especially given Para 1 on page 3.

Page 4 - statement on pre-independence Ovamboland seems unlikely - area in which police most feared and hated! But if date were 1960s and crime in question totally apolitical (at least as perceived by community and police) then quite plausible. Is true of much of rural Tanzania.

- bottom of page - text evidence is that there was some thought on other aspects but all required studies, complex new creations whereas police existed and - in principle - replicating Botswana/Tanzania looked rapidly practicable. Lack of legitimate local government another constraint, e.g. re informal mediation, formal non-criminal recompense fora, "representative" committees to advise/hold accountable the police.

Page 5 - Eh? Homeland tribal police are at least quasi documented. And worse than SWATPOL - neither competent nor honest, based on consent nor trusted. Unclear national policy sought to delegitimate community policing indeed cites one case relevant Minister called for study. Had not worked out proposals for acceptable forms. Arguably in absence of legitimate local government it couldn't work out much less implement them.

Pages 6/7 - the 'police property' presentation has core of truth but so overstated here as to lose credibility. Not same country to country, e.g. Netherlands very restricted free hand (with truncheon) and Sweden (interestingly) very wide. Rather irrelevant to Namibia as pre-independence was massive, habitual, reflex action violence while after independence so weak doubtful any capacity to harass systematically.
Page 10 - Tanzania trained police would know no approach other than policing by consent. Also would be rather well trained. (Zambia – p.11 is another matter at least on competence.)

Page 11 - "bias". How could policing by consent use ex-Koevet personnel? Not selecting them perfectly rational.

- "Guard" and "Border Guard" not mainline police. Head of "Guard" (Brune) hardly ex-PLAN. (Judging by independence ceremonies performance nor is he very competent). The PLAN "Guard" personnel were German Democratic Republic trained which rather explains their heavy handedness.

Page 12 - most "Guard" units anywhere are high handed. (Tanzania exception relates to personal views of JKN.) Namibian rather nutty and prone to overreact but in fact did not kill or (perhaps with one or two exceptions) beat anybody. I'm not sure "Guard" component of RCMP could say the same. NB this is a case SWAPO's reaction to public criticism largely made by white community in very anti-government (and shamelessly 'partisan' on facts) press by changing policy not ignoring or cracking down.

Page 13 - top - "proper training". Seems to have been very uneven.

- the total of 4,400 is very high by SSA standards. Tanzania has 20,000 odd for 25 million people or about .8 per 1000 vs 2.8 to 2.9 per 1000 in Namibia.

- quote. Perceptions not necessarily reality. No Tanzanian trained policewoman was illiterate, Tanzania police couldn't train illiterates and wouldn't accept.

Pages 14/15 – understates or overlooks "keep head down" response of many ex-SWAPO who believed high profile active policing or seeking to train (including criticising) ex-PLAN recruits would lead to outcry while going through motions at desk or in station would result in being left in peace. (Same problem in Zimbabwe.)

Para 2 – SWAPO was idealistic and most camp police had not been armed (nor are most Tanzanian). Forgot realities of context of many armed criminals which force police to have equal firepower and create a public acceptance of armed police if they do pursue criminals not a political brutalisation agenda.

Page 17 ff – impression text gives is not so much "much less attention" but much more uncertainty into how government could/should proceed compounded by absence of legitimate, elected local government bodies. This surely explains why police named PPRAC's and why limited number (pp. 1718).

Page 19 – Well, AG's knew inadequate numbers of magistrates and did seek to deploy all trained in Zambia (uneven quality) and train more. It also sought to train more prosecutors. Given quality of police training (and its own capacity to train inspectors to prosecute) it was understandably very doubtful about using police to prosecute. (Again Tanzania problems with technically botched police prosecutions with a much better trained/more experienced force played a part given advisory role of former Tanzanian AG.)
Page 20 ff. The "homeland" courts and police are not traditional. Post Odendaal apartheid creations. Did take over compensation from previous (and more legitimate) traditional system but they were not a natural evolution of that system. Compensation can be handled in quasi-judicial/quasi-mediatory fora parallel to formal courts (e.g. Tanzania) but only if these fora have legitimacy no ex-homeland structure has in Namibia. Need is to rebuild from ground up. Absence of legitimate local government a problem as is the "thoroughness" of law reform process which with limited AGs personnel and fairly wide consultation and review of drafts is painfully slow (e.g. p. 20 top).

Page 22-23. "Head down" syndrome illustrated by quote.

Page 23-24. In absence of legitimate Katatura (or Metro Windhoek) local government and of Home Affairs guidelines worked out with police chaos was inevitable.

Page 25. All becomes easy to fix contradicting both opening apocalyptic overtones and main section record of problems.

Note 19. Pre-independence cases could not, in practice, be taken up.

Note 33. NB Brune very much neither ex-PLAN nor competent at new job.

Note 51. Public side of Council does have plausible spread and majority are at least accountable to broad membership bodies. In absence of elected Local Government to name police committee how much better could anyone have done?

Note 60. Was % reported constant or falling? If it fell in Windhoek from fear or belief 'no use' may not be safe guide. Coetzee on any issue has one aim - to undermine image and authority of state (or at least government). Similarly blatantly sought to scare off foreign investors at time of conference. However, to suggest that robbery level in urban areas has fallen is not very convincing as nobody thinks so whether poor Kataturan, SWAPO leadership or white community (or for that matter police).
Chapter 8

Despite some rather turgid pseudo Marxist new left (or Humboldt University) jargon, especially at the beginning, this is a good chapter.

Page 4 - Para 3 - Damara Chiefs Council also resisted albeit in a different way by seeking to co-opt the homeland structures.

Page 5 - Para 2 - Strong base from 1961 among worker/peasant households of North strongly suggests SWAPO in practice was a joint project. That initial drafters and majority of leaders were more educated is true but trivial. Workers/peasants do select leaders with above average education if they can find ones. Example of New Left utopian pseudo Marxist revisionism polluting substance as well as style (luckily on substance that problem is rare).

- Para 3 - Why shouldn't OPC have addressed concerns of all its constituents? Even Chairman Mao argued for "all boats float higher."! This is an ultra New Left position if it is meant to imply campaigning for freedom of access to commerce as well as abolition of contract is proof of dangerous "bourgeois tendencies".

Page 6 - Para 1 - Confusing. German's ceased to be majority in late 1920s or 1930s and never were thereafter.

Page 7-8 - very good on "Black Middle Class".

Page 10 - It was also due to:

a. absence of any living tradition of trade unions

b. belief significant change at contract/workplace level required macro-political change.

- Where negotiation was thought practicable it did happen, e.g. Oranjemund where regular negotiations from mid-1970s with nominally ad hoc committee which was in fact SWAPO/NUNW/NNUM and known by De Beers to be so; but for own reasons neither side chose to highlight this.

Page 11 - Para 3 - SWAPO was worried (especially by mid-80s) mine and government wages were at levels which could not be generalised with problems for equity/distribution.

- But from 1976 programmes of SWAPO endorsed "independent" trade unions for independent Namibia.

Page 11 - "Petty Traders" is oddly titled as in fact a rather sketchy discussion of Northern war economy. Need a section that is on PT and a fuller presentation of the militarised economy.

Page 12 - Para 3 - "social dislocation" seems odd way to describe clearing of border zone and continual violent harassment of villagers. A "free fire zone" (as cited Note 32) is not exactly what social dislocation conveys to ordinary reader.

Page 13 - last full para - a highly concentrated cattle ownership pattern among Herero predates/leads to the commercialisation drive.
Para 2 - more detailed studies suggest degree of mass participation in 'traditional' communities varied widely even over short distances. Some did have strong village wide participation and were to a substantial degree peasant bodies albeit not acceptable as such to Eurocentric analysts.

Page 15-16 - phraseology in Political Programme rather carelessly used, e.g. "land to the tiller" which is a bit odd for ranches. At least one of drafters said done very fast lifting catch phrases with only topic list actually SWAPO's.

Page 11 - like most SWAPO documents exact standing of PP not clear. In any case the stance dated here to 1981 was present in President Nujoma's TV interview and negotiations with German representatives (settler and DBR) on occasion of 1981 Geneva (non) Implementation Conference.

Page 16 - certain irony in the Abrahams' writing this. To a substantial degree true but Abrahams' very much part of 'independent' professional fraction of that elite (and politically rejected by voters as such).

Page 17 - Paras 2/3. Not very analytical:

a. unless top posts stay white/foreign (or incredibly narrow wage/salary range) citizenisation/Africanisation by definition increases intra black differentials.

b. reconciliation (and probably Constitution) prevented cuts in serving officer salaries.

c. (seriously canvassed) option of lower rates for new entrants was problematic because old almost all white and new predominately black.

Page 18 - Para 2 - is it seriously meant that 15% of adults with post-secondary training is low? By what standard? The artisanal skills were not necessarily rudimentary as anyone who visited courses or vehicle maintenance shops could see.

Page 18 - Last Para - who characterised it that way? SWAPO usually very careful to say not basically white/black. And always sought white members with some (limited) success.

Page 20 - general caution not just on these issues. Partly considerable lack of policy formulation/legal drafting capacity and partly real confusion on practicable/enforceable minimum wage. NUNW tends to want wage levels small employers/ranchers could not afford (using Oranjemund as their measuring stick) while employers say "nothing" leaving conflict and confusion. On "affirmative action" the number of senior black civil servants suggests there has been some! Beyond that foreign and white citizen advice that AA was basically process of excluding white (rather than including black) was distinctly unhelpful (as well as inaccurate).

Page 21 - what evidence of "progressive decline" in traditional agriculture? Drought cycle related and land shortage but output pre-1991/92 drought looked to be at near record levels.
Page 21-22 - the informal sector in virtually all countries sells primarily to wage earner sector, tertiarily to small family farm households, secondarily to itself. Unusual bit in Namibia is very low sales to rural family farm sector because it is so poor. Informal sector is not a useful analytical category, but in general it is a sponge (for those left out elsewhere) not a dynomo (to drive economy). The reverse characterisation is romantic (usually bourgeois romanticism but sometimes participatory populist or syndico anarchist).

Page 24 - Para 1. Perhaps but police in general are ineffective. Few experienced black professionals and most white personnel "keep heads down"/avoid possible criticism of racism by doing virtually damn all (analogous to but worse than Zimbabwe experience).

- Last Para. Eh? What are congregations and traditional village bodies? Fully participatory no (nor are Windhoek 'modern European import model' NGOs!) but broad base, yes (unlike almost all of the 'meim' NGOs!). In general Africans have to be very angry indeed to demonstrate.

(One does get spontaneous (well... unofficial) demonstrations in Tanzania but - except in university where clearly European import model - few, e.g. anti-Soviet after Czechoslovakia, anti-Micombero Regime and French para strike arm after attack from Burundi into Tanzania, demand state go for "head of great snake" not limited base destruction in Uganda after Kagera invasion. In first case government rather agreed but didn't want Soviet buildings/people stoned. In second sympathetic but felt unable to close transit route against treaty obligations. In third changed intentions and did go for Kampala.)

Page 25 - NB the acceptance of pretty harsh published NUNW criticism by government suggests rather more tolerance of organised dissent than author credits to government.

Page 26 - Para 3 - SWAPO/Government damned if do or don't. If appoint trade unionists to key national posts accused of weakening NUNW. If do not accused of excluding worker leaders.

Note 50 - Meiring is difficult source. He was - somewhat slowly, indirectly - pushed out of FNDC and University as ideologically irreconcileable and of very suspect loyalty. He is viewed as having helped promote negative result he notes here.
Chapter 9

Basically sound and at times incisive. Has significant gaps, as to post 1976 and pre-transition economic policy statements. Over-estimates how much detailed policy there was before 1980s. In general treats openness, responsiveness as exceptions whereas another author might view as more basic and suggesting general commitment to openness when – after independence – it was possible. Also overlooks possibility limited changes in policy or personnel may reflect limited cases in which majority of grass roots members do oppose present aims/office holders.

Page 2

- Non-binding statements were very much negotiable as were speeches to particular audiences. But independence was not only point that was a constant – less inequality, equal access, broad provision of basic services were always present.

- 1976 documents are not all that radical in content if read carefully.

- Post 1977 UNIN series of conferences/monographs is overlooked. While not basically SWAPO written papers the conferences and broad parameters of documents were in fact dominated by SWAPO – nothing of which they seriously disapproved went into them. They show a good many areas were left open depending on context on ground. As the exercise was as an input into SWAPO policy formulation – not pure academic research – the SWAPO role was appropriate. The one snag is that the possibility of a reconciliatory an outcome as achieved was not reasonably foreseeable at time of writing so some options which would have appeared in that context do not appear, e.g. the Personnel (Manpower) chapter assumes desperate juggling and gap filling after major exodus of whites but also addresses how to limit that exodus.

- Not clear how diplomatic front was at expense of armed struggle. It financed it and was, in turn, assisted by it: a.) evidence real support; b.) raising costs of non-negotiation to RSA especially in money but also in casualties.

- The scope for mass mobilisation from mid-1960s through late 1980s was very low – c.f. Church, Student chapters. There was a structure with members and communications. Mass protest rallies were not practicable nor was a national Congress (quite apart from fact SWAPO leaders based abroad could not have come).

Page 3 - last para

- 60% to 40% hardly suggest 40% "paled" in comparison with the 60%! By late 1980s 50-50 East and UN-West. The notable point is that one 50 was overwhelmingly military and the other civil so SWAPO had to keep both flowing.

Page 4 - para 2

- Is WFP food (large item) seen as solidarity or cold war? Incidentally WFP had a very high opinion of SWAPO's efficiency in using assistance (in comparison to SSA in general and Angola in particular) as did several other donors.
Page 6 - last para

- And some of SWAPO leaders vehemently and others to a degree wanted it because they felt clearer policy in less generalistic form needed and had firm views on some of desirable components.

Page 7

- The Political Programme is not Marxist-Leninist nor does it assert that it is. Look carefully at Hamutenya quote.

Camp political education was a - predictable - disaster. Not very well trained cadres regurgitated poorly understood official GDR/USSR/Cuban nominally Marxist-Leninist rhetoric which was in no real sense party policy in an majority of cases.

(There were exceptions - when no overseas taught cadres results often better!) Apparently SWAPO with no other teachers available and failed to see unsuitability of those it had... as did Tanzania at Kivukoni College in 1970s!

Page 8

- National programme was widely distributed by SWAPO even if semi-officially. One problem was that several portions did not have support of all leaders and another that there had been neither time nor personnel to do depth studies as a basis for serious strategic summary.

- Doubt 1976 documents had much foreign input and they pre-date UNIN. UNIN released documents were academic (majority foreign written) but SWAPO vetted - more on a nihil obstat than detailed affirmation basis. Style and tone shows several hands/minds, e.g. from chapter to chapter in Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development which was intensively debated (with SWAPO rather open on considering new perspectives and with much of dialogue among SWAPO participants who were by no means monolithic).

Page 9 - Top

- Surprising that no mention here (or in other chapters):
  a. RSA still in business and destabilisation business in particular.
  b. Mozambique/Angola showed costs of wholesale foreign exodus.
  c. Angola oil showed uses of MNC -
  d. Angola showed how "a" was much more dangerous if domestically based conflict to be exacerbated/manipulated.

The 'Zimbabwe highway not Angola pot-holed lane' influence on SWAPO thinking was a major one - and in conversation often came out.

- Middle/bottom

All of these speeches (the Business International one by supposed Marxist-Leninist hardliner H. Hamutenya!) were "horses for courses".
But in broad terms President Nujoma said same in 1981 at time of Pre (non) Implementation Conference and negotiations with German settlers/government began during that Conference (in corridors).

- The apparent shift from Namibia: Perspectives... is one of options as much as ideology. By 1988-89 chances of reconciliatory/broadly accepted settlement appeared good as they had not in 1984/85. In fact foreign advisors used on some of chapters and some of speeches were same ones reassessing new potentials and constraints in drafts submitted and (with changes) used.

Page 13

- The "Provisional Investment Programme" was written by UNDP experts vetted by neo-liberal MacHenry who then headed UNDP-Windhoek (and was forced out before his normal tour would have expired). Not a safe guide to policy.

Page 14/15

- Mudge by then playing elder 'statesman' role. Not very accurate - the education/health/rural development/mining (albeit not easy to work out policy from expenditure there) budgets (at least in uses) could never have been TNG proposals!

Page 17 ff

- Understates government's dilemma:
  
a. most Namibian family sector farmers wanted small mixed farms - say 5 ha arable and 100 grazing. Except for Otavi Highlands no such land existed;

b. to divide large ranches into small was self-evidently a road to ruin for technical reasons;

c. the labour force on ranches hardly wanted to be pushed off by new small black owners and as ranches were in ex-Herero/Damara/Nama areas and largest number of workers were Ovambo a serious conflict was/is likely between "My grandfather's land..." and "Hand to the tiller" (rancher);

d. the most strident voices for 'reform' (?) were would-be large black ranchers who wanted cheap funding (a la German/Boer predecessors) with the strongest groups associated with right opposition parties (not all - Dr. Z is a large black rancher who bought before independence and favours replication of himself);

e. the Constitution made acquisition (even of externally owned - and probably of abandoned - land) very expensive.

Page 18 - Para 2

- E.g., of querulous surprise at all participatory, listening, dialogue on ways forward actions by SWAPO.
- the "social justice take precedence" is sectorally related. The ranching sector is not profitable though it generates foreign exchange and employment. For that reason it hardly matters to GDP or investible surplus growth how it is organised so long as neither employment nor exports collapse. SWAPO had accepted that view from about 1980.

- NUNW is not attacking SWAPO here but emergent black rancher class.

- Oddly it did not address problem of its own constituency, i.e. 40,000 ranch employees in context of who was to get land and what was to happen to workers who did not.

- Note that Conference ended to right of SWAPO and Geingob. The state leasehold option was the radical one.

- SWAPO did convene reasonably representative conference quite soon after independence. It did not rig it to shut up rank and file. The querulous grudging tone recurs - SWAPO could have delayed or rigged much more had it wanted to do so.

- Two China's and no USSR?

- Conflict. If standard "official history" it would have had to discuss socialist principles. As it didn't, either: a.) the "socialist principles" are overstated by author or, b.) the presentation was revisionist or (most plausibly) a bit of both.

- The Political Programme certainly does not, in tone or content, suggest an authoritarian/anti-participatory bent to leadership who (rather non-participatorily!) drafted it. Nor does labour relations bit suggest hostility to independent trade unions who criticised (indeed the independent trade union movement had been endorsed as far back as 1976).

- Only reconciliation of controversial areas showed basic strategic or ideological disagreement. Others were issues (some quite important) of detail, implementation or different perspectives from different vantage points.
- Was there actually a majority for view "Reconciliation could not work ...". For government being too cautious, yes but for jettisoning policy? And if so for what alternative?

Page 31

- Fails to consider that perhaps most delegates really may have wanted most of CC returned to office. Clearly did select up or down list or out when they disapproved!

Page 33

- Same point in respect of resolutions - perhaps on balance most strategies had general level support and main criticisms were of how they operated to date (especially how slowly!).

Page 35

- The dialogue/dissent (as cited) is much more on practical actions and speed/detail of policies than on either institutions or strategies. (The Constitutional constraints don't seem to have been centre stage. Perhaps as well as a 100% Yes vote in Assembly and Referendum could not alter them! In that respect a very illiberal constitution indeed and dangerously rigid as inability to amend legally leads to temptation to overturn whole when only a small part really at issue.)

Note 46

- Perhaps. But land shortage means real land hunger in North. And plurality of ranch workers are Ovambo. Two added problems are that "land to tiller" (ranch-hand) would conflict with Herero/Nama/Damara "before the Germans came" claims and that Northerners want small mixed farms which outside Otavi Highlands are technically impossible.

Note 59

- Times is poor source on "moderates", "militants" in SWAPO! Much of differences - as author notes - of tone and style more than content. Any working committee will have a propinquity bias (capital not urban). 15 non-Windhoek to 12 Windhoek is not self-evidently unusually high if the 15 were active.

Note 60

- Note that "dictate" which was most top down was that to name 1/3 women. Rather inconsistent with view SWAPO male chauvinist.
Chapter 10

This chapter is uneven:

a. the semi analytical description of events to date is good.

b. the disquisition on the pure theory of democracy may be all very well but hardly suitable at this point in this book.

c. the evaluation of changes from late Luanda to early Windhoek is interesting.

d. the doomsday scenario is less than plausible (partly because it turns an accepting Chapters 3 and 4 as written).

Page 1

- A 5% per annum growth rate in an area of out-migration is not possible. 3% is a guess - Zambia/Zimbabwe/Malawi albeit RSA 2.6% and Tanzania 2.75% (Angola, Mozambique nominally 2.6% but probably 1.5% because of indirect war related death toll.)

- Very few households are unemployed in sense of no earned income. (Can't stay alive that way.) Doubtful if 20% of adults (16-64) are unemployed and certain over 50% in horribly low productivity activities. The 60%-67% in absolute poverty estimate is in fact less contentious. General unclarity where "employment" means formal sector wage and where earned livelihood. The Agrarian Reforms efforts of rural development department of agriculture could create up to 50,000 earned livelihoods.

- Shift to game ranching (whether for tourism or game meat export) dates to second half of 1980s and five year drought. It is continuing but now nearing a decade old, not a 1992 phenomenon. Tsumeb is problematic - they may or may not have an extension worth ten years of life which can be exploited. Mining has never been a major employer - probably 23,000 and 8% of households at peak. Its relevance is to fiscal and forex flows enabling livelihood generation elsewhere.

Page 2

- Personal taxation is unchanged but also relatively high and progressive. One problem with Namibian inheritance is that SWA was a high tax territory. The bottom line problem is that reconciliation blocked payroll saving of - perhaps - R 250-400 million in pruning useless white staff and on having differential scale for new employees.

- Not clear Constitution protects all terms of service. In any case with 12%-15% inflation imported from RSA there is an unprotected erosion if salaries (not wages) are de facto frozen.

Page 3

- Also development division (Agrarian reform/poor farmer livelihood support). Problems here as extension and water do not have same strategies.

- Para 2 Here and later element of waiting for old RSA to be gone is relevant. E.g. in Walvis Bay joint transitional admin. with both sides de facto agreed transition is to formal transfer months (not years) after legitimately elected government takes office.

Page 4

- Probably 5% and perhaps 8% of gain in vote is result of SWAPO's ability to reach Africans in 'white' ranching areas and their dorps. In
practice it couldn't in 1989 election. Also as apparently less votes part is also that more of opposition supporters didn't feel worth voting. (But that SWAPO's votes did is a positive point.) Even so - yes a result suggesting continued, moderately increased support. (Some but not most observers projected about this result. SWAPO 'ran scared' but how worried it really was is unclear.)

Pages 4/5
- "Horses for Courses". The key cabinet posts needed more highly education personnel. The hard/soft line division (perhaps because personal style/rhetoric more than ideology) doesn't run on founder/newer more educated lines. And some persons - e.g. Libertine Amathila (the most astronomic ascent from Deputy of Health to key Local Government Ministry) who on 'feminist' issues is very hard line in style/rhetoric but is not so more generally are hard to classify.

Page 7
- last para - "wrongs were not to be redressed" is overstated. Not rapidly and not by purges or confiscations but more slowly by erosion and allocation of new resources. The civil service racial inequality was rather radically changed with new top level appointments and a significant number of white departures. And - as policing chapter notes - most of white senior police officers did in fact leave. Also vast changes in, e.g. TV.

Page 7/8
- The oddest appointments were continued SWA securocrats, e.g. Bruning (like Flower in Zimbabwe). Why desire for continuity in technical ability was seen as over-riding record in such cases is not clear. And it is those continuities (not genuinely technical/professional 'bureaucratic holdovers) who created space for 'mutual' burying record on atrocities.

Page 8
- The Constitution is very peculiar. 100% of Parliament plus 100% of voters in referendum cannot amend key articles. So how is it either "liberal" or "democratic"? Seems more like Plato's or More's utopias which whatever else they may be are hierarchical and anti-democratic. Also far too brittle - at some stage overwhelming majority for change on an issue not eroding democracy (e.g. multi member constituency PR instead of national list - arguably would enhance democracy) will run up on no constitutional change possible rocks. The Constitution will be violated. With no fall back (e.g. 67% majority of MP's/60% in referendum/General Election/Reratification by 67% new MP's) the floodgates are then open to 'tinkering' which is far less benign than initial breach.

Page 8
- The theoretical aside on "Pseudo democracy" doesn't fit here. Nor is it adequate for any reader not into new left literature. The point is not made forcefully that this is the only known, modern, functional form of democracy for large units. The imperfections are real but in the absence of a clear, cogent statement of a practicable option it is not helpful to criticize a system, because it adheres broadly to the only veridical (as opposed to speculative) system available. If an alternative is to be used as a litmus test it needs to be set out at some length (3 or 4 pages plus a 3-4 page contrasting explanation of "liberal" democracy and its limitations). Concluding chapter is no place for that - Chapter 1 might be. Incidentally it is not clear "liberal" is usually used in strict 19th Century sense and not in 20th Century "mildly progressive" one. (Sometimes
used in latter - SWAPO at the moment is operationally more like a cautious variant of early Nordic social democracy than anything else and that is not helpfully styled as "liberal".

Page 9
- Para 3 - Doubtless there is such a tendency by external writers and liberal (in strict traditional sense) white/black elite. The government and SWAPO are by no means so complacent - clearly they do want to clear white salary incubus from budget to free resources for health - education - water - urban services to townships - agrarian reform/rural development. Fear budget constraint will undermine ability to act, public confidence, re-electability.

Second Page 9
- Para 2 - This is a rather odd reading "Unease" on disaffiliation (without trying to block) of former major components - e.g. workers, students - is not surprising. But no evidence of seeking to blocking powers. (The Ovambo Students Union doesn't appear to be a SWAPO - at least at national level - creation.) The SWL was perfectly willing to have a merged membership body with an elected leadership (and a negotiated first ticket to ensure not a wipe out for others). Most others wanted - in practice - a confederation of separate bodies with majority of leadership at apex from the much smaller groups. Unclear why former stance is undemocratic or latter liberal. On the face of it SWAPO is quite willing to see independent group interest bodies for students, workers, women. Equally it is no longer searching to set CCN policy because the reasons it did so (use of CCN as on internal organisational proxy and a supporting voice internationally) have ceased to exist. And the country is awash with western import model NGOs and a fair number of local more traditional action projects (e.g. some congregations).

Second Page 8
- Congress as described showed delegates except in particular issues rather less adventurous on new ground breaking than they were quite free to be. SWAPO and Government reports were separate. Used freedom to drop some holdover CC and elect others low on list (interestingly basically securocrats) suggesting broadly happy with rest (plus newcomers).

Second Page 8 (and first page 8)
- In the first place SWAPO is not "neo-liberal" it is interventionist (as liberals can be and social democrats tend to be). It also clearly has a short/medium agenda:
  a) consolidate to be sure a functioning economy and polity
  b) postpone or finesse boat-rocking issues vis-a-vis RSA until old RSA is gone (and with it destabilisation risk).
  c) seek to get growth mileage out of private sector (i.e. emulate Botswana).
  d) move - hopefully with speed-up - on health, education, water, ex-township urban services and housing, agrarian reforms out of resources from "c".
  e) use time and affirmative action to ensure greater Namibian control in sense of proportion key posts held by black and clearly progressive white Namibians.
  f) hope for a more propitious international context for interventionism (which the Japanese assault on "neo-liberal orthodoxy" in OECD, World Bank and East Asian/Southern Asian economic successes may well provide).
g) see where one is with what options in 1995 or so - sooner if a crisis over "c", later if "c", "d" go well.

One can indeed argue this creeping social democracy with caution is inadequate or too cautious but it is hardly a commitment to classic liberalism let alone Hayek-Von Mises-Thatcher-Reagan "neo-liberalism".

Second Page 9
- "market democracy"? In standard (then West German) use of that term this is not what SWAPO or government are trying to be. Cautious, early social democrats are closer analogue.

- the plane is a very odd folly. It is part of a French aid package. Whether plan plus rest of package is economically a good deal or whether plan could have been bargained out (or downsized - as presidential turboprop carrying 15-20 was needed) is not determinable from the outside. From a PR point of view an uncovenanted disaster.

Second Page 9/10
- What do Ovambo words used ("eliminate puppets") actually translate into English as? "Eliminate" in an election context does not always mean kill. Ovambo word may or may not be word implying physical elimination. Certainly overall speech neither responsible nor needed in Ovambo context. To see a knockabout stump speech as an exercise in "defining meaning of radical alternative" (or any other strategy) seems building a remarkably sand foundationed edifice. Few parties or candidates use those as serious strategic/philosophic concept defining exercises!

Page 10
- "crack along ethnic and other fault lines". Well yes but that is a truism given "and other". The Security Apparatus reign of terror/coup attempt as set out in Chapter 3 looks more securocrat/other fault line than ethnic.

- what "pragmatic" liberalism is I have no idea. "cautious social democracy" would better describe SWAPO's stance (albeit perhaps present international context makes overt use of last two words unwise/unpragmatic for SWAPO though not for an analyst). Also it is a bit more evident what it means.

PS - One of worst costs of reconciliation was that resultant freezing in both of salary structure and incumbents made a "grandfather clause" gap between old and new appointments (which was canvassed in Party/Government from 1984/1990 - Tapscott notes 1990 consideration) almost impossible because it becomes white/black divide. But with no grandfather clause and no cuts, top new civil servants and ministers slot in at very unfortunate (high) salaries. (That might best come from a Namibian - a UK or Canadian Professor gets as much as a Namibian Minister so the problem is a relative, to other Namibians and to Namibian EDP, more than an absolute one.)

Note 7
- This is an eccentric reading of outcome. Not consistent with Tapscott's chapter at all. And as the state aid to rich blacks to replace rich whites was (much to majority of ministers and SWAPO leaders' relief) rejected the "At a stroke ..." (sentence is simply wrong.)

Note 8
- As indication white oligopolist response fine. But it might have been useful to note Government has not dropped the issue. Last half on
"neighbouring South Africa" connection deserves mention in text as a perceived constraint on action until President Nujoma can talk to President Mandela not Theo to Pik.

Note 10
- 63 is not possible, they'd all be dead. Granted 60% absolute poverty and actual consumption 30% below that line (about $240/per person per year in Namibia marking up Mozambique cost by a third for higher prices) $170 would be more realistic (that would include old age pensions and other transfer payments). This isn't directly comparable to EDP data both because of coverage and valuation problems in Namibia and because of internal logic of National Accounting (EDP was never intended to measure purchasing power at household level). The $14,560 may well be right.

Note 18
- Interesting because Gwen Lister is independent and a critical outside supporter of SWAPO. But there is a catch in the posing of alternatives in that most of calls are not for trying Hawala and his Cabal but for independent/public/published inquiry. No legal nor constitutional barrier to a post Pinochet style Human Rights inquiry into both RSA/SWA and SWAPO "security systems", i.e. Koevet-SADF-Intelligence and SWAPO Security. Also shows a democracy problem - among those concerned enough to write letters (logically victims would be most concerned group) "overwhelmingly" anti investigation (by implication). One can argue Human Rights should override popularity with AG advising PM advising President to set up inquiries. In practice only chance of achieving that is a joint inquiry. Human Rights concerns demand Koevet inquiry too even if realities preclude prosecution. (The Chilean case would appear to be analogue - barred from prosecuting Pinochet and Co. new government did set up serious, independent investigation quite literally digging up the corpses.)