FROM EMERGENCY TO REHABILITATION TO DEVELOPMENT:
Some Institutional Considerations

1. The transition from Emergencia Survival to Rural Livelihood (and National Food Production) Rehabilitation needs to begin in 1993. Given fiscal, forex and personnel resources general PDP type development must be phased to come after RLRP is well advanced (say 1996?)

2. For such a transition and prioritisation to be effective we need institutional changes.

3. There are now three National Commissions: Emergency, Rehabilitation and Planning. That is no way to achieve overall integration and prioritisation. The simplest solution would be to make both Emergency and Rehabilitation sub-commissions of National Planning Commission. However, I realise there are political snags to that. Therefore, I suggest that DNP become Secretariat For All Three Commissions at National Level and Provincial Directorates of Planning play same role at Provincial level.

   a. As Rehabilitation has no staff and is Chaired by PM I see no obstacle to the proposal being accepted for them;

   b. But Emergencia does have staff and DPCCN is in some sense its operating arm. Therefore "takeover" will be harder but, in my opinion, is virtually essential. (May be easier at Province level where Emergency/Calamities Commissions and CPPs seem to be same members with same back-up staff already).

4. The Annex sets out some content, design and logistics comparisons between Emergency and Rehabilitation which are relevant to all participating institutions.

5. DPCCN - despite its limitations has logistical capacity and experience to distribute food and inputs nationally for both Emergency and RLRP. Nobody else now has and a parallel RLRP operating institution in this field would be wasteful and would take 2 to 3 years to make even reasonably functional. But this means DPCCN needs to be responsible to
merged Provincial Calamities/Planning Commissions with Regional Planning Directorate as Secretariat. At National level it (CDPCCN) needs to report either to both Emergency and Planning Commissions via DNP or to a combined Commission with Emergency as a Sub-Commission.

6. UNDP coordinates external relations of Emergency. Bank coordinates external relations of Development. Rehabilitation is intermediate. We do need to interest Bank and win its support but I would think Emergency links that UNDP should be induced to play same coordinating role as for Emergency.

7. UNHCR should be involved in Rehabilitation. The problem is their mandate – not, I think, their willingness in principle. The following is a possible agenda:

a. repatriation of refugees (and perhaps inter-provincial movement of deslocados?);

b. contribution to initial food requirement on basis UNHCR puts in same per cent of total as refugees are of RLRP participants and helps with logistics on same basis not that it has a separate system for returnados only;

c. a similar approach to kits (i.e. tools, household equipment, seeds, etc.). If 20% of RLRP are returnados then UNHCR puts up 20% of cost.

d. that it contributes to rural infrastructure rehabilitation on that basis – the returnados will use it so arguably within UNHCR mandate.

This may well be acceptable to them. Largest African – and I believe South – return programmes they have ever had have been in 50,000 to 100,000 range not 1,500,000. They may well wish to merge inputs (other than "a") with others on the 12 to 18 month initial equipment, food, follow-up phase they normally undertake. A direct UNHCR involvement has a key advantage. It would give us a much better chance of getting Japanese bilateral money for RLRP and Demobilisation as UNHCR Director General is a Japanese who has been influential on aid policy and Japan is looking both for novel bilateral projects to spend on and for ways to expand role of UNHCR.
8. NGOs need to accept a bit of coordination and prioritisation if they are to be given major RLRP roles. We cannot have 50 odd (some very odd!) wandering around "doing own thing" within RLRP.

a. the approach of doing a lot in a few districts would be optimal (especially for DAs and CPPs);

b. the acceptable alternative is many districts but one theme - e.g. rural water and sanitation or labour intensive works or participatory rapid rural appraisal which does allow DA/CPP to slot into overall priorities;

c. but doing different things in different places all over the map is not compatible with being integral part of RLRP.

It is of interest that Action Aid does operate on model "a" and that their Africa head accepted my suggestion that if they expand, it be to 1 or 2 more, preferably adjacent, districts. In principle if NGOs don't like this but are doing something useful let them go ahead but don't try to include in RLRP. In practice a problem exists with some US NGOs which are in effect conduits created by USAID to shovel out food aid. They will be a menace once RLRP gets production up unless we can induce them to shift focus and as both their present resource base and personnel experience are primarily or wholly in chucking out food, I'm not sure that can be done. Special problem re World Vision which can do rural development but doesn't like governments (not just ours) and is detested by CMC (as indeed by main churches in USA!) because of their brand of hard sell right wing "gospel" (which neither CMC nor I would see as particularly Christian!)

9. UN Specialised Agencies - liaise with NDP on overall, with 'their' Ministry on 'their' sector and with Provincial Directors on operational programme input into RLRP. That is more or less the way UNICEF operates, now but I have the impression most others do not place an equal emphasis on Provincial level.

10. Bilaterals -

a. get them to understand this is a programme not a series of large projects;
b. the operational level is Provincial;

c. unless they wish to accept putting funding in with very few specifics they will need to work with CPPs.

(I would prefer their money for RLRP go 'direct' to Provinces, i.e. to Finance but only or dominantly for inclusion in Provincial budgets. For reasons I've set out before I think this also applies to their capital budget/project money and start-up recurrent cost support where once they leave the project it is Provincial responsibility.)

RHG
Falmer
March 1992
ANNEX

**RLRP**

**Content**

1. Food for initial survival.
2. Rehabilitation seed, tool household goods, etc., kits
3. Rural Infrastructure ■ By Labour Intensive Methods
4. Basic Services
5. Commercial Infrastructure

**EMERGENCY**

1. Survival Food Rations
2. See plus limited amount of others
3. Very little ■ Nil or Near Nil
4. In Camps Only (except NGOs)
5. Nil

**Logistics**

1. To where people wish to be. Probably 1,500 distribution points needed.
2. Scattered because of people’s choice and ecology.

1. To camps - about 750 distribution points (excluding non-camp NGOs).
2. Relatively - but less - scattered because of small camp size, locations where deslocados have arrived.

**Characteristics**

1. Oriented local needs and concerns.
2. Need for input from participants on needs and priorities
3. Basically via Provincial Directorates and DAs - NDP/CPP on strategy overall, Ministries on sectoral strategy and priorities.

1. Centrally planned, basically same everywhere.
2. Minimal deslocado input
3. Via special agency (DPCCN) outside main line government structure. Ministries and Provincial Directorates at most sub-contractors.
To: Natl. Director Antonio Franco

From: RHG

30 March, 1992

1. See three attachments.
2. The first was basic paper on Mozambique food security at a major working conference on "Conflict and International Relief in Contemporary African Famines" involving major UK NGOs plus academics, journalists and ODA people. I think a quick glance will tell you why I was alarmed. It is off the wall and could - it seemed to me - do us serious harm.
3. I had no authority to speak for Mozambique nor time to brief you nor am I proper person to speak for Mozambique (but doubt Embassy has anyone who could do so convincingly based on own knowledge). So - formally as IDS faculty and with a disclaimer - I did the second. I believe these tables put a very different light on matters especially Table 2.
4. The third is brief note on the Workshop.

It went rather well in the event. Everyone accepted 75% 'loss' of food aid was wrong. ODA, while agreeing 75% was clearly wrong, pointed out it felt 25% still too high (true) though their immediate concern was late and bad accounting on counterpart funds (which seems a valid criticism though we may need to make clear lateness in recovery is result of wholesalers-millers-retailers having no access to adequate bank credit so have to use the counterpart funds as working capital which does delay paying over to Treasury).
5. We do have a problem. The outsider estimates of leakages/losses are getting to be absurd but they believe each other. We do, I fear, need an official variant of Table 2 (or to use mine citing as academic study). Then we have to be more open about problems:

a. We cannot pay enough for DPCCN and other government employees to be free of pressure to steal from need;

b. In many contexts we are sending grain for the, say, 15% of people in a district who are deslocados. But 60% to 70% - affectados, army, local militia, "pauperised in place" - are very hungry and there are no (or very few) alternative sources even if the hungry had money. In these circumstances trying to prevent leakage is like trying to transport water in a sieve;

c. The number of independent de jure or de facto foreign actors on own or holding posts in our apparatus but largely seeing themselves as responsible to funding agency, fragments our knowledge, prevents an overall strategy and erodes our ability to control.

The first problem can only be solved when we can pay living wages. The second requires more food - initially more food aid. The third
requires a donor commitment to support (including by TA personnel responsible to Mozambican superiors) strengthening or complementing Mozambican capacity not eroding and fragmenting it by a plethora of independent foreign actors and TA personnel who are effectively not accountable to the Mozambican heads of the units/Directorates in which they work, and are sometimes - e.g. CARE - not competent (as AID's own commissioned evaluations show).

6. There is, of course, another problem. But how one can deal with army officer based theft in public I do not know. Flat denial is so unconvincing as to leave impression we are naïve, remarkably uninformed or liars. But publicly accepting fact while saying we cannot act so long as war continues is not very convincing either - at least to outsiders. I cannot answer this dilemma but it does need consideration. (You'll notice I do not break down "abnormal losses" nor mention army officer centred theft.)

- RHG
Falmer
26-III-92
CPP Data Collection For RLRP

To: Natl. Dir. Antonia Franc
From: SSPA R. H. Green

1. The basic source of data for RLRP should be Provincial for three reasons:
   a. detailed data is not, in fact, available from Ministries;
   b. Districts do not have the personnel to run a reliable data collection exercise;
   c. Provinces should operate RLRP and therefore need to be involved in planning it. Data base collection is key to the planning process - DNP can provide a strategic frame articulated by programmes but not numbers.

2. This approach is set out in “Priority Districts for Rural Livelihood Rehabilitation Programmes” memo (14-II-92)
   • The CPP should give full priority to data on 2 to 4 priority Districts
   • When it updates that data in 1993 it should broaden collection to cover other Districts in Province.

3. The list of transparency map overlays needed is:
   #1 Base map of District - towns, villages, key topographic features (swamps, ravines, lakes, large ponds, rivers, streams)
#2 Population currently estimated to be in district by location (excluding desloc. camps).

#3 Numbers of present population pum- perised by war (both affected off home/farm and pumperised but still on old farm/home).

#4 Number expected to return to di- strict (evidently a guessimate) by location and numbers likely to move over 20 km within it.

#5 1980 Census population/locational dis- tribution for comparison purposes.

#6 Desloc. camp/site locations (as indicator one set of accessible points for RLRP distribution).

#7 Useable land (some categorizing by quality and by suitable use.

Crosscheck with #5 to identify apparant discrepancies.

#8 Land not available. For sector Familial use: Functioning empresas

Private Farms

Plantations

Special marking for "concessions".

While company has monopoly purchasing power but does not farm.

#9 Present main crops by location (not over 6 to district. Guide to seed procurement/distribution).
10. Main pastoral areas, fishing sites (evidence as to need for small stock and fishery lines - nets - hooks in RLRP household kits).


12. Roads/bridges/collector - present position with categorisation: Fully functional, state of disrepair, serious damage (whatever the cause), destroyed.

13. Education units (by type) as of 1980. (Parallel to #11.)

14. Education units 1992 - categorised: functioning, abandoned but not seriously damaged, damaged, destroyed. (Parallel to #11)

15. Health units (village health worker, post, centro, district hospital) as of 1980.


17. Water projects as of 1980 (protected springs, improved wells with hand or diesel pumps, boreholes, rural village piped systems).

18. Water as of 1992 - condition categorised as with #17.

19. Agricultural service units as of 1980 (extension bases/officers, nurseries, demonstration centers, etc.)

20. Agricultural service units - position 1992 (same format as #19).
# 21 Administration Facilities 1980 (District HQ building, etc).  
# 23 Market Facilities 1980 (traders' stores/godowns, Agricov stores/godowns, etc).  

* These transparencies should have appended note as to number of lorries/vans by sub-district.  
Data simple but not readily mappable.

** Security position should be presented in qualitative, verbal form.  Mapped data would be hard to interpret and might prove useful to bandits.

Land Situation

5. Key data are at least rough estimates and location:  
# 25 Sector Familial land as of 1980.  
# 26 Sector Familial land as of 1992 including what is in use or abandoned, with notes on how seriously overgrown and whether cassava survives.
27. Sector Familial Families on Former "Freehold" Land - private, plantation empresor with estimate as to when occupation/use began and when these families are affectedly forced to flee their homes or returnees (from abroad) displaced camp or affected area.

28. Vacant (that is not in use and with no permanent residents) ex-Freehold land.

29. New (post 1980) private and concession land and whether:
   a. on sector Familial land
   b. in operation
   c. sector Familial households are on and using it.

5. This set of data should:
   a. identify 'vacant' land for RLRP
   b. protect sector Familial land from alienation
   c. perhaps protect sector Familial households on ex-Freehold land for several years
   d. perhaps lead to revocation of allocations of previously sector Familial land.
Resettlement Status/Experience
6. There are a substantial number of resettlement areas/villages. Their experience should be studied to give guidance as to what RLRP should and should not do.

7. Key data include:
   - number of resettlement villages and of households in terms;
   - makeup by origin: same district, adjacent district, same province;
   - % in each category of origin intending to stay in resettlement areas and to return home (need to know how many affected and of those resettled will probably take up RLRP and move);
   - where those planning to leave resettlement areas plan to go.

8. A qualitative and analytical assessment of resettlement project strengths and weaknesses is needed. One element is relationship between households from same/adjacent districts and households from greater distances.

(Also discussed in "The Land Question and Rural Livelihood Rehabilitation")
Review of Resources - Requirements - Bottlenecks

9. A final cluster of data relate to provincial/district institutional capacity.
To know what to do where needs to be complemented by knowing what capacity to do if it exists.

10. Key elements include:
- Commercial Infrastructure
  a. number and capacity of private rural-oriented traders/transporters;
  b. within "a" - access to adequate bank credit, supply/turn capacity, storage capacity,
  c. similar review of Agricem and Co-op traders.
  d. degree (if any) of competition
  e. estimated rural prices to growers for main crops and the prices retail for same goods in provincial capital and/or nearest town of over 50,000 people. (Test or "a" and/or capacity limits.)

- Transport
  a. adequacy to district towns;
  b. adequacy beyond to large villages;
  c. main bottlenecks eg missing bridges/culverts, disintegrated roads, vehicle numbers, repair facilities and spares, and/or Fuel availability.
Provincial Staff / Equipment
a. CPP;
b. Bookkeeping (in all directorates – Directorate of Finance can probably provide overview);
c. Agriculture (especially extension/veterinary);
d. DPECM;
e. Agricon;
f. Works.

District Staff / Equipment
Parallel to Provincial.
(While numbers by post type are useful, a qualitative judgment of capacity – including ability to do more than at present is needed)

Labour Intensive Works Capacity
a. Works – knowledge of key damaged or destroyed works
b. „ – simple design capacity for repairs, small scale labour intensive construction
c. „ – foremen and artisans
d. „ – tools
e. „ – inputs (eg. bitumen, cement, metal sheet, poles and planks etc)
f. „ – equipment (eg. road scraper, cement mixer, wheelbarrow)

Concluding Note
III. If all of the above data were produced to a high quality it would be a miracle. Completeness and quality are likely to vary widely by Province and Directorate.
That, in itself, will give guidance as to where special attention to trainings and to strengthening staff are needed.

II. The process of collecting—evaluating—organising this data has two uses: as laying a data base for Provincial and national use, b. being a major part of training/reactivating Provincial Planning Commissions.

—Reginald Herbold Green
SSPA—DNP
Lewes, UK
March 1992
1. The meeting was co-sponsored by Save the Children Fund and London School of Tropical Hygiene and Medicine. About 45. Majority NGOs plus. academics, ODA, Joe Hanlon.

2. The Vines presentation was different from text in two ways:
   a. one half attack on Renamo;
   b. but harsh criticism of evacuating sector familial households from combat zones (especially in Zambia).

3. Discussant was Hanlon. He had put in a two page paper from his book. Termed Vines on 75% losses "this drivel"! Perhaps a bit too vehement and demonised donors a bit too much to be effective. Cited my Table 2 as corresponding to what he had felt to be true on less systematic study.

4. In discussion group on Mozambique nobody would touch the 75%. ODA agreed 25%, but said this was a problem as over 10% to 15% range did raise question. (True - I can't say I blame them.) But their # 1 concern is late and opaque reporting of counterpart funds. (True again - alas.)

5. I challenged Vines' statement that evacuation of sector familial households in Zambesia was a starvation or 'protected village' tactic. Pointed out both Gersoney and Vines say Renamo treats any war zone (or one linerated by government) or local militia as a "destruction zone". So why was he sure peasants' safety could be assured unless moved to deslocado camp? I said perhaps military were wrong in judgement, but it was a plausible judgement and was evidence of concern for sector familial lives. He said there was "something in that" [sic!] and I believe most of group at least saw and rather sympathised with case as I put it.

6. The 75% 'stealage' slander is direct from USAID. It is based on saying all sales are diversion - which is a bit much as they know very well
urban grain is to be sold! Also they know basic abasticemento network, whatever it may be, is not relatives (except in very extended family sense) of senior politicians and officials! They may not realise most of parallel market grain is "border trade" and Inhambane/Gaza/Maputo private trade in origin (well... in normal years... not this year I fear).

7. Pushed drought again. My memo had been read by several already. Christian Aid has sent to EEC contacts and EEC related NGO coordinating office. World Council of Churches (who have it and the tables) is convening a special working group either next week or week after.

8. I think I should see the FAO/WFP mission in mid-April. (I rarely do want to see missions in order to keep time to think-analyse-look ahead but this is an exception.) Even if we get full 800,000 plus tonne 1992/93 initial request plus 200,000 additional we've now asked, I fear we are still short by at least 200,000 tonnes (and to be at all safe 400,000).

9. Feedback S. Maxwell got in private from donors/agencies on my 17-II-92 memo to you which (not from me by the way) they have seen was that I was too harsh on them and too unkind but the memo was useful. They hadn't realised how bad things were and had been on "business as usual" slow track. Tried to claim no reason for alarm before end of January! (What are early warnings for? WFP - but very low key - had flashing red light by November.) Some asked Maxwell (because he's at IDS I suppose) why I had gone to you/govt. and not to them privately! (I did brief UNICEF and Bank verbally.) Rather symptomatic they see a problem in Mozambique civil servant (me) reporting to his National Director (you)!! Innocent as I am, I suppose that to be normal, proper channel...

- RHG
Falmer
March 30, 1992