THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

And

THE ECONOMIC STAGNATION

In

NAMIBIA

by Professor R. GREEN
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NAMIBIA: From Terminal Decay Toward Independent Reconstruction

By Reginald Herbold Green

...fragments of our lost kingdom...
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a dead man's hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star...
Shape without form, shade without colour
Paralysed force, gesture without motion;...
What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
Out of this stony rubbish?

- T. S. Eliot, 'The Hollow Men'/
'Gerontion'

If South Africa is ready to hand over power,
SWAPO is ready... We have been fighting
for Namibia and we are ready to rule it.

- President Sam Nujoma, 1986

Now it the time
To seize the future
Which belongs
To all people.

- Augustino Neto

I. Namibia's Economy: Downward Spiral to Recovery

A Wasted Land: And Its Transformation

The territorial economy of Namibia has since the late 1970s2 steadily deteriorated and is now one of the weakest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The colonial political economy has disintegrated from one of profitable (for South Africa, settlers and TNCs) exploitation at 'acceptable' costs of repression to a bottomless well of red ink for South Africa, a debt ridden, disintegrating quagmire for many of the settlers and an increasingly marginal - and uncertain - proposition for the major corporate actors now held in place only by massive
levels of repression (perhaps 100,000 'security' forces to hold down 1,500,000 Namibians) and increasingly frenetic attempts to buy some fragments of Namibian acquiescence.

Humpty Dumpty clearly cannot be put back together again. Even South Africa and her various circus acts (such as the current so-called 'Transitional Government of National Unity' - a typical example of South African "doublespeak" since it is neither a government, national nor unified even among its members) see no alternative to an independent, internationally recognised Namibia and the sooner the better from an economic point of view. The bottom line is government by whom, for whom, accountable to whom - questions to which SWAPO on behalf of the overwhelming majority of the people of Namibia as well as the National Council of Churches in Namibia (30% or more of Namibians are practising Christians) give very different answers from South Africa, the settlers and their black camp followers (not that South Africa, the settlers and the camp followers are in full agreement with each other).

Major companies have of late tended to a discrete public silence punctuated by ambiguous hints presumably intended to placate SWAPO, South Africa and the settlers (a manifestly hopeless endeavour) in order to ensure their future against all eventualities. While most probably would like to see the status quo ex ante of the late 1970s restored, the more perceptive are well aware that it is impossible and the actual status quo of uncertainty and strife is not - except in the very short run - seen as in their interests. Nor do they show much enthusiasm for any alternative even nominally in sight: South Africa's fiscal policy of buying guns and backers threatens both higher taxes and continued war; the settler bitterness at the major companies (particularly Anglo/De Beers whom they suspect - quite correctly - of viewing its own survival in Namibia, notably that of Consolidated Diamond Mines and Tsumeb, as of primary concern and settler interests as of tertiary importance) is arguably greater than that of SWAPO; SWAPO's commitment to democracy, to development oriented to the basic needs of Namibians and to transition to socialism (despite living with independent, progressive governments in Angola, Botswana and Zimbabwe) is seen as sure to require major changes and major after tax profit reductions.

The purpose of this paper is not to analyse the economy or political economy of Namibia now or at independence in detail. That has been done by UNIN in
its forthcoming *Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development*\(^3\) and inter alia by the present author and Caroline Allison in *Political Economy and Structural Change: Namibia at Independence*.\(^4\) Nor is it to review South Africa's "total strategy" in respect to Namibia which is done from a South African perspective in Deon Geldenhuys' *The Diplomacy of Isolation*\(^5\) and from a Southern African Liberation perspective in David Martin and Phyllis Johnson's *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa At War*.\(^6\)

Rather it is intended:

a. to sketch the 1977-85 disintegration of the economy and the political economy; and

b. to underline certain key requirements for reconstruction and transformation at independence.

Similarly the proposals made in this paper do not - unlike those of the first two works cited above - constitute an economic or political economic strategy for independent Namibia. Rather they are intended:

a. to relate to practical measures concerned outsiders can take now to assist Namibians in preparing themselves for undertaking economic reconstruction and transformation at independence and in that context to stress;

b. personpower (human resource), institutional and knowledge base development.

**Economic Decline 1977-1984**

In 1977 considered purely from a territorial, settler and/or enterprise point of view Namibia's economy was relatively satisfactory with an output of the order of $800 per capita, a positive trade (including non-factor payment invisibles) balance, a recurrent budget surplus, a diversified mineral sector with a major addition (Rossing Uranium) about to come on stream, a financially viable and apparently technically scalable white ranching industry, some signs of recovery in the overcatch damaged fishing industry and an historic real
output growth rate of the order of 5%. The political economy of exploitation and of inequality (or more bluntly of theft) was stark and clear but for its masters the Namibian economy paid.

By 1985 output per capita was of the order of $600 in 1985 and $240-250 in 1977 prices. The external trade balance had swung into serious deficit as had the recurrent budget while drought and war had sent the white ranching sector reeling to under half its 1977 real output and renewed overcatching had further eroded and threatened to wipe out the fishing sector. Base metals had not recovered from the slump which began in the mid-1970s and diamonds had gone into deep depression (with a 50% cut in Namibian output) and Rossing Uranium while contributing about 10% of GDP had also fallen on relatively hard times. The physical growth trend from 1977 on was about minus 1.5% a year (minus nearly 5% a year on a per capita basis) with no recovery in sight and even bottoming out by no means assured. The per capita output fall in constant price rand terms of about 33% understated the impact because of the marked negative terms of trade swings. The fall in constant price dollar terms of about 70% probably overstates as the rand was arguably overvalued in 1977 and fairly clearly undervalued in 1985. But given the massive influence of terms of trade swings in a territorial economy in which about 90% of physical goods produced are exported and 35% odd of physical goods used imported plus the very large increase in 'security' and administrative expenditure which was worse than nugatory in value to the majority of Namibians, a 50% fall in per capita territorial command over real resources over 1977-85 is a reasonable estimate. The causal factors are clear enough:

1. the general impact of the post 1973 global recession on SSA economies in general and of the post 1975 mineral recession on SSA mining economies in particular;

2. the impact of a seven year 1977-84 drought on a ranching sector already at stocking and pasture utilisation levels probably beyond prudent estimates of ecological capacity;

3. the price of sustained plundering - rather than harvesting of - fish and crustacean stocks;
4. the direct and indirect costs of the war to hold off the Namibian people's struggle for national rehabilitation;

5. dependent integration into the relatively stagnant (albeit not actively declining) economy of South Africa;

6. gross fiscal and economic mis-management, largely but not wholly related to desperate attempts to create and 'buy up' a black middle class elite to give credibility to South Africa's attempt to create a 'federated banstutans' type of 'independence' behind a white government (and economy) with black shopwindow faces.

More detailed presentations of the last year for which relatively complete and 'final' data have been pieced together appear in Annex 1.

The Political Economy of Exploitation and Inequality

While taken as a territorial unit Namibia no longer 'pays' its masters in direct economic terms and indeed represents a drain of up to $600 million a year on the South African economy after offsetting private sector profits and remittances, this has not been the result of lessened exploitation or any serious attempt to reduce inequality or absolute poverty. Rather it has been the result of territorial economic decline and of war.

Namibia's territorial budgets (outlined on a consolidated basis in Annex 1) have ballooned since 1977. However, while there has been substantial expansion in the quantity (not quality) of black education and of black functionaries, the main causes have not been developmental but part of the politics of continued repression and facade creation.

Much of the increase relates to police and military bills transferred from the South African budget (and steadily increasing over time). Other transferred items include external debts incurred by SATS (South African Transport Services) and ESCOM (Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa), assertedly in respect to their Namibian operations and to operating deficits incurred by the overstuffed, ill (or at any rate non-economically) managed
Namibian fragments of SATS and similar items 'devolved' to the pseudo Namibian administration. The largest single element relates to wage and salary increases to hold white employees and to create a black elite. The bulk of the balance relates to servicing of so-called 'external' (dominantly in South African financial institution portfolios) 'debt', illegally incurred by the Administrator General because South Africa was unwilling to finance the full gap between the territorial expenses required to sustain its policies in Namibia and the eroding real yield of the revenue base hit by economic - and especially mining profit - decline.

Historically Namibia has had one of the lowest gross national to gross domestic product ratios in the world because of the very large proportion of corporate profits in territorial product (see Annex 1). While this drain has declined as a share of gross output since 1977 the reason has nothing to do with any change in state or enterprise political economic orientation. Rather it results from falling profits leading to reduced profit transfers (and even sharper falls in enterprise gross fixed capital formation - see Annex 1).

Household income distribution in Namibia is probably the most unequal in the world. In 1977 average white household income was of the order of R 11,100 and black of R 600 for a ratio of the order of 18.5 to 1. As of 1983 the position was R 20,875 white versus R 1,300 black for a ratio of about 11.5 to 1.

The cause of the decline is integral to South African divide and rule tactics. In 1977 white households (45,000) received about 71% of household income, black elite households (then perhaps 20 to 25,000) 7% and black worker and peasant households (280 to 285,000) 22%. In 1983 the shares were white (40,000) 58%, black elite (50,000) 21%, black worker and peasant (310,000) 21%. (See Annex 1.)

The black elite has been created partly as a result of large employers realising that higher real wages were prudent for economic efficiency and future survival and, more particularly, government attempts to create a black middle class and to buy its loyalty against the liberation movement. The black elite while receiving under a third of white income per household receives on the order of 5 times that of the average black worker and peasant household. For the latter the disparity with white household incomes has
remained at about 20 to 1 and indeed average real purchasing power has declined over 1977-85 as a result of general economic decline, drought, war and repression. By 1985 absolute poverty probably had risen to about 65-70% and open and disguised unemployment to the order of 40% (see Annexes 1 and 2).

The attempt to create and to buy a black elite has not worked well for South Africa. It has created a budget deficit, but the loyalty of the genuinely skilled or professional members of the elite has certainly not been bought. That of the non-functioning members of multiple administrations and their homeguards and of the myriad pro-administration political leaders without followers probably has, but to what point is another matter.

However, for independent Namibia the results of the policy will pose real problems. The wages of semi-skilled and skilled black mine (and some other large employer - e.g. banks) workers and of nurses, teachers, secretaries and technicians are objectively too high in relation to Namibia's per capita output to be consistent with universal access to basic services, developmental expenditure oriented to raising productivity and incomes of the main body of black worker and peasant households and of levels of net fixed capital formation adequate to restructure and expand output.

Some Implications for Reconstruction and Development

No significant recovery - let alone transformation or structural adjustment - can be expected in the Namibian economy before independence. The cost of the war and the 'buy a bantustan' policies, the uncertainties preventing long term investment by settlers and companies and the longer term impact of the drought, the destruction of the fisheries and the prolonged world mineral market depression guarantee that. In any event, while such a recovery could increase the productive resource and import capacity foundations of the economy and perhaps redress the shambles to which reckless mismanagement and the shoring up of apartheid has reduced public finances it could hardly be expected to have any significant positive impact on the political economy of exploitation and institutionalised inequality.

The most reasonable assumption is that the economic and political economic characteristics sketched in the previous sections will pertain at independence.
and will be exacerbated by the exodus of settler and South African human resources, institutional capacities and financial resources - as witnessed in other settler colonies in the run up to, at, and in the first years after independence whatever the policies of the independent states. From this a series of implications as to priorities at independence flow:

1. the rehabilitation of agriculture - including shifts of output toward food and domestically needed raw materials, of structure toward small peasant farms and worker self management or co-operative ranches - is essential in terms of rural incomes and employment, national food security, development of non-agricultural sectors and averting unmanageable tidal waves of migration to urban areas;

2. the stabilisation of the mining sector (in production terms) and its integration within a Namibian policy context is equally essential in respect to public finance and export earnings as is the revival of prospecting, proving and development to halt the ongoing erosion of the base metals sub-sector's output and reserves;

3. the maintenance of critical existing public services and utilities (e.g. water, power, agricultural extension and support, transport, posts and telecommunications, education and health) needs to be combined with re-orientation toward Namibian development including broadening access to and raising quality of basic services (including health, education, water and productive sector extension), cutting back on high cost/limited access elite services and reducing the levels of waste now existing in public expenditures.

4. reducing both absolute poverty - now affecting up to two thirds of all households - and inequality of household incomes (especially racial but also intra-black) which is among the highest in the world (exceeding that of South Africa itself) as preconditions for human welfare, for building up capacity to work more productively and for any viable social and political fabric;

5. increasing the human resource base of Namibia and of Namibians in respect to skills, institutional capacity and knowledge to provide a less dependent, more reliable, less costly and more stable base for
reconstruction and development than the present very heavy dependence on settlers, expatriates, externally based enterprises and foreign (at present South African) governmental agencies. The detailing of requirements flowing from these implications at independence is beyond the intended scope of this paper. The recommendations which follow focus on how Namibian capacity to cope with them at independence can be enhanced by external cooperation now and throughout the remaining - rather indeterminate - period before independence.

II. Some Practical Proposals For Today

The Pre-Independence Context

To predict the date of Namibia's independence would be rash. Any particular year from 1987 through 2000 can be argued to be least plausible and at least unlikely. One objective of SWAPO and its cooperating partners is to alter the contexts in which South Africa acts in Namibia and abroad to bring the probable date closer. That is one area - perhaps the most important area - for immediate action but one dealt with by other papers and presentations.

On independence Namibia will - as a result of colonial and occupation rule and the struggles to maintain and to overcome it, as well as of the impact of the 1979-198? global economic and African ecological crises and of the limitations of what physical and output development was achieved - require substantial initial external assistance. Certain skills - embodied in high and middle level personpower, project finance for rehabilitation and transformation, programme assistance to meet transitional external balance, fiscal source, physical supply and external reserve problems inherited from South Africa; institutional competence and experience in a number of sectors and locations (i.e. externally as well as in Namibia) will be required urgently and the longer the lag, the greater the costs of transition for Namibians and the larger the cooperation requests Namibia will need to make of its friends. Until the timing of independence is clearer, more work can be done on the spot, micro data is more available, drawing up the details (or even the ballpark scale and breakdown) of these needs is literally impossible. Even if they were to be drawn up, major programmes in Namibia cannot be implemented
before independence. Pre-independence aid agreements with the South African occupation authorities or their client 'governments' and agents in Namibia cannot constitute a head start toward economic rehabilitation and transformation; rather they can only delay independence and raise the ultimate human costs to Namibia's and the economic obstacles confronting those responsible for rehabilitation, reconstruction and transformation upon independence.\(^\text{19}\)

The areas in which immediate action by cooperating partners with the people of Namibia are both practicable and urgent today include:

1. **Personpower development** directly related to Namibian requirements and presently forecast availabilities at independence;

2. **More general educational expansion**, e.g., distance learning, English, primary-secondary-vocational education in SWAPO's education system;

3. **Institutional capacity development** in key areas for which either no present Namibian institution exists (e.g., central bank) or in which present institutional capacity would be likely to exit with South Africa (e.g., perhaps electricity and railways);

4. **Knowledge development**, e.g., harbour development, agriculture, ecological damage control in respect to mines;

5. **Immediate survival and learning needs** of Namibians in Namibia.

Responding to Namibian requests and formulating programmes with and for representative Namibian bodies is needed - freenand institution of a melange of purely 'donor designed' initiatives - let alone ones in collaboration with the occupation regime and its camp followers - is not. Practically this implies:

1. Government and official intergovernmental or international assistance should be designed in collaboration with and channelled through SWAPO and/or the United Nations Council for Namibia's Nationhood Programme;

2. and should be based on inquiries as to what is seen as of top priority by
SWAPO, not on donor guesses or random programme developer preferences;

3. voluntary organisations - especially church connected ones - may find it practicable to relate to the programmes of the National Council of Churches in Namibia (basically Lutheran, Anglican, Catholic and Methodist) and its member churches as well as to SWAPO and the Nationhood Programme;

4. and the NCCN and its members appear to be virtually the only plausible channels for Namibian liberation oriented development activity in occupied Namibia now or in the foreseeable future;

5. so that if governments and official agencies feel a need to provide programming for Namibians in occupied Namibia, the channel least likely to be manipulated by the South African occupation regime and its collaborators is via northern ngo's which develop support for NCCN and member programmes;

6. the changing kaleidoscopic nature of collaboratoinist entities, the limited information available to most ngo's and agencies on Namibia, the desirability of Namibian coordination of support and the need to avoid arousing suspicion on the part of Namibians committed to liberation in the context of the ongoing wartime situation strongly counsel discussing all proposed projects, programmes and cooperating partners in Namibia with SWAPO and the NCCN before detailed identification design, negotiation and implementation. 20

Some examples

Personpower development in respect to Namibia is not a tabula rasa on which any input a donor wishes to put down will be as useful as any other. A substantial body of data on occupations, skills and supplies/requirements exists (see Annex 2). Even if it is necessarily somewhat imprecise it has provided SWAPO's education secretariat with a basis to begin checking the priorities and levels of its training programmes with a view to gap filling. Substantial work in providing assistance in meeting training needs has been provided by UN agencies, the Commonwealth Secretariat and a number of
governments with very partial coordination and prioritisation via the Nationhood Programme.

What is most urgently needed now are discussions with the SWAPO education secretariat and/or the officials of the Office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia administering the Nationhood Programme to identify priority skills and skill levels in which existing training places and flows are clearly very inadequate. Examples appear to include, inter alia, mining engineers, geologists, veterinarians, agronomists, auditors and accountants, electrical engineers, hydrologists and - in most of these fields - middle level technicians and para professionals.

Certain specialised educational programmes overlap personpower development and institutional capacity buildup. Examples include distance education (in which SWAPO and UNIN have built up a significant programme), English language teaching to make the national language designate more widely accessible and useable (on which SWAPO and the Commonwealth Secretariat have carried out substantial preliminary research and exploration toward programme design), textbook development (also begun by SWAPO and UNIN) and retraining and upgrading courses for existing teachers (a massive problem at independence requiring early attention then - preferably without suspending the educational system while it is done following course and trainer development now).

Institutional capacity development requires and allows for more than identifying needs and potentials and setting down more or less elaborated models on paper - useful as that may be as a start (an endeavour begun in the UNIN study). Further steps - following joint identification with SWAPO of priority areas in which the would-be cooperating partner has competence - could include:

1. studying analogous institutions in relatively similar contexts (e.g. veterinary services in Botswana, rural health programmes/structures in Zimbabwe and/or Tanzania, base metal smelting and refining in Zambia) and from these working out first approximation designs for Namibian use;

2. using these findings in connection with training programme priority development and - where feasible - identifying Namibians for in-service as well as formal training for key positions;
3. when a probable independence date is more readily discernible setting up 'shadow' institutions - with if SWAPO desires some expatriate training and operational personnel - to work themselves toward initial operation takeover.\(^{21}\)

4. in cases in which key expatriate personnel are likely to be required to replace departing South Africans and in which even short term personnel gaps could be disastrous (e.g. the Ruacana Falls hydro and Windhoek and Walvis Bay thermal stations which supply the bulk of Namibia's electricity) identifying and agreeing to provide personnel if and when needed and taking steps to be able to act promptly on that commitment.\(^{22}\)

A survey of key institutional requirements is provided in the UNIN study. One very obvious example - on which some preliminary work has been done for SWAPO - is a central bank. An institutional capacity related area is economic legislation - both as to design and as to drafting. Much of the occupied territory's existing economic legislation is archaic, ill adapted to a developing country, non-existent (because South African institutions and legislation apply) and/or integrally tainted by the incorporation of apartheid. Evidently new legislation cannot be adopted until after a Namibian body to enact it exists but the identification and drafting of bills for laws should start now in order for bills to be available for the legislative to consider, amend, adopt. A substantial body of relevant economic and legal experience exists and SWAPO is known to be concerned with modalities for avoiding a legal vacuum following removal of South African and apartheid tainted territorial legislation and decrees. Discussion toward providing applied economic, legal, and drafting technical assistance to Namibia through SWAPO (directly or via UNIN) would appear to be an important general institutional development agenda item.

In all institutional capacity development work a key - but often overlooked - point is to involve Namibians in the exercise. That will develop their capacity to go on to do applied research themselves and/or to run the new institutions.

Inadequate knowledge has been at the root of many failed development efforts - not only in Sue-Saharan Africa. In Namibia the problem is particularly acute
especially because official information (on vehicle registration or agricultural research or railway rolling stock as well as on makeup of imports and energy consumption) is either not readily available (least of all to Namibians committed to the liberation of their country) or is actively concealed/restricted. Further, field research and micro data collection are in many cases quite impossible to carry out except on the spot - a Catch 22 precondition in respect to Namibia today.

However, more knowledge exists than is generally realised - or catalogued and summarised in an accessible form. The UNIN study and Tore Linne Eriksen's annotated bibliography *The Political Economy of Namibia* both represent important steps toward identifying, making accessible and synthesizing what is known and giving indications of what additional knowledge is urgently needed.

A brief paper does not allow anything like a complete enumeration of areas, nor are all practicable prior to independence (or a transitional administration) allowing on the spot access. However, a number of examples can be cited:

1. desk and archive based studies of port potential and costs at Swakopmund, the mouth of the Swakop River (oddly not the same place by some miles and a hill) and Luderitz, since in the medium term Walvis Bay is not a satisfactory port and in the short severe operationality problems may arise;

2. agricultural research drawing on surveys of Namibians in exile, studies of comparable zones in Botswana and Angola and applied field testing (linked to production enhancement) among the rural Namibian refugee communities in Angola and Zambia;

3. desk, available Namibian data and comparable case research on mining, health and environmental pollution and ways to minimise them with special reference to sulphur emissions at the Tsumeb smelter and dust/radiation pollution (direct contact, downwind air borne flows, water table contamination) at Rossing;

4. systematic development of available food and morbidity/mortality data into a form providing inputs into nutrition, agricultural development and
Immediate needs of Namibians in occupied Namibia - as noted - may in part be met by assisting the NCCN and its members. The Welfare Unit of the Council has a substantial drought relief food programme. The Lutheran, Anglican and African Methodist Episcopal Churches have supplementary feeding programmes for children in kindergartens they support and the Methodist Church a child feeding scheme in Katatura (literally "the place we do not wish to be" - the black 'location' of Windhoek). In addition a number of literacy, English language, vocational and adult education, basic health, craft, self help, farming and co-operative projects are sponsored by the NCCN, its member churches and associated Christian action groups. In some cases these receive support from external church organisations. Most as the NCCN has stated require more resources to develop into less crisis oriented or pilot project orientations.

Conclusion

The proposals above do not amount either to a strategy for the economic reconstruction of Namibia nor do they cover all the areas of cooperation relevant today (e.g. political, diplomatic, continued support for UNIN, the UN Commissioner for Namibia’s Office and the Nationhood Programme as well as ongoing SWAPO programmes are not covered because they are the topic of other papers and presentations). What they do seek to do is to identify:

1. how action today can assist Namibians in enhancing their capacity to rebuild and develop their country on independence;

2. some ways of cooperating with Namibians in taking such action; and

3. a number of the readily identifiable areas in which exploring with SWAPO (and/or the Nationhood Programme, UNIN and/or the NCCN) as to possible programme and project support deserve early attention.
Notes

1. Professor Green has been a student of the political economy of Namibia since 1975. Although he is from time to time a consultant or advisor to the United Nations Institute for Namibia, SWAPO and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, the analysis and suggestions of this article are his personal responsibility and are not necessarily those of SWAPO, SADCC or UNIN.

2. UNIN, 1986 - in press.


5. Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986 (June) - see especially Peter Manning and R. H. Green, "Namibia: South Africa's 'Total Strategy' for Domination and Exploitation".


8. Data problems in Namibia are severe. This is in large measure a general SSA problem with weak sources and weaker statistical units. In Namibia it is compounded by overt coverage exclusions notably of Walvis Bay which South Africa purports to be part of the Cape Province and of peasant - and other - household production for own use (i.e. the subsistence sector in standard national accounting terminology). The Annex 1 Tables are adjusted for these factors as far as is possible.

9. For a more detailed macro and sectoral analysis see UNIN, op cit and for a series of annual snapshots of economic regression see the Namibia chapters of Africa Contemporary Record 1975-77 to date.

10. For fuller discussion see UNIN, op cit.

11. For example, the 1985/86 South African budgetary transfer to Namibia rose by R 169.5 million from 1984/85's R 306.6 million to R 476.5 million. But of this R 126.3 million related to transfers of South African police, railway deficit and external debt costs to Namibia. The remaining R 42.7 million was 13.9% in nominal, and probably negative in real, terms. (Data in Windhoek Advertiser '8-III-86.)
12. For 1985-86 even the South African regime's front government in Namibia admitted that of R 31 million borrowed R 53 million had been long or medium term from South African financial institutions and R 23 million from a territorial bank overdraft facility with none external to RSA. (Statement by 'Finance Minister' Dirk Mudge reported in Windhoek Advertiser 17-II-86.)

13. For fuller analysis see Green, Kiljunen and Kiljunen, op cit; UNIN, op cit.

14. For example in Zimbabwe - despite an economic climate which has on the whole been consistent with their continued prosperity and a near total absence of reprisals or discrimination - the number of residents of European ancestry is now at a level of about 100,000 in contrast to a peak of 250,000 under the illegal regime in the late 1970s. The large number of South African expatriates in the Namibian white community (of the order of 40%) may well occasion an even more rapid exodus. The experience of non-settler colonies which came to independence by peaceful transition with basically small, high skill, specialist expatriate and resident communities which subsequently combined a high turnover (in individuals and lines of activity) with relatively stable - or even growing - size is much less likely to be relevant in the Namibian context than is that of Zimbabwe. This is particularly true because meeting basic human and developmental needs for the majority of Namibians, removing institutionalised racial inequality of incomes and preservation of present white average standards cannot all be achieved within the resource constraints imposing on independent Namibia. It would be whimsical - as well as against SWAPO policy - to give the last priority over the first two and very surprising if a majority of even relatively unprejudiced white residents were willing to accept substantial and potentially recurrent declines in their income standards. As Zimbabwe experience suggests, relatively young professionals, managers and technical civil servants in globally scarce fields are the most able and likely to leave.

15. For a more systematic and analytical presentation, see Allison and Green, op cit and for one containing a rather taxonomic articulation of items within priorities, see UNIN, op cit.

16. This is practicable in Namibia in a way in which it was not in non-settler colonies because of the very high proportion of spending directed to the white community.

17. The causes include the multiple and incompetent parallel administrations and services required by 'separate development' (Namibia may not rival South Africa's 19 different departments of education but has at least a dozen and - indeed - was the model and laboratory for the South African 'development'!) as well as posts and pay scales designed to buy allegiance (usually unsuccessfully) with little regard for performance or fiscal prudence, the 'security' costs inherent in occupation regimes with or without puppet facades and more standard maladministration and corruption. Ironically the regime's Thirion Commission of Inquiry has made these points even more caustically albeit from a different human and political perspective.
18. For a much fuller discussion, see Allison and Green *op cit* and especially - UNIN, *op cit*.

19. As SWAPO made very plain in the context of the February 1986 Front Line States/EEC Member States Foreign Ministerial meeting in Lusaka, pre-independence development aid agreements with present official entities in occupied Namibia necessarily amount to giving aid and credence to the illegal regime and its collaborators. However intended, they therefore increase the obstacles to and tend to delay progress toward independence.

20. There are no easy solutions to the issue of how - if at all - Namibians in occupied Namibia can be assisted prior to independence (or an internationally supervised transitional period). SWAPO has a national membership and organisational structure in Namibia but the degree and scope of repression it faces mean it cannot operate as either a governmental or a large scale unofficial development agency in occupied Namibia today. To some extent the National Council of Churches in Namibia and its member Churches, as well as associated Christian bodies, can - and do - undertake relief and developmental work in respect to food, agriculture, vocational training, literacy, adult education, English, mother and child care, health and informal sector co-operatives. It can hardly be contended - and is not contended by SWAPO - that these programmes are other than in support of the liberation of Namibians or that they do not respond to real needs. Real problems of capacity, logistics and profiles attracting undesired attention do, however, arise. There may well be other unofficial bodies of Namibians doing useful work. The problem of identification and of separating them from bodies created primarily to promote their leaders/founders and from collaborationist entities is, however, very difficult, especially from outside Namibia. Further two facts are as real as they are cruel: not very much developmental work even at small group level is possible so long as the occupation regime remains in power and the quickest way to expand access to health and educational opportunities for Namibians in Namibia is to take action resulting in early independence.

21. 'Shadow' institutions are not a new idea. Several central bank creations - e.g. Botswana, Tanzania - in independent Africa have involved creating the core structures and staffing up to a year and a half prior to the actual operational date.

22. Normal posts need identification technical assistance procedures and time lags are clearly inappropriate to such cases. An emergency situation is virtually certain to exist and its gravity can be reduced now by sketching in the parameters of key probable gaps and of sources and timing of replacement personnel.

24. Each of these problems is known to exist and on each some data (including aerial photographs and wind patterns) is in the public domain. Comparable cases exist which have been more systematically researched and made public. How serious the Namibian direct worker and broader downwind/stream effects are is not clear. It is unlikely that they are negligible but probable that they are containable (but not now contained) within limits affected Namibians would accept. But to make any informed judgement beyond that requires systematic data development.

25. See, e.g., "Children In Namibia Face Hunger and Starvation", Namibia Communications Centre (Box 236, London WC2X 0EL), April 1986. The Red Cross programme also cited therein is an example of a possibly objectively useful effort deeply tainted by the official associations of its territorial executing agency.
Sources and Related Readings


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