The conquest of the earth, which mostly means taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly fatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look at it too much. What redeems it is the idea only ... and an unselfish belief in the idea — something you can act up, and bow down before and offer a sacrifice to ...


The black man certainly has to pay dear for carrying the white man's burden.

- George Padmore (1936)

The first raising of the metropolitan flags in the name of civilisation and their last lowering in the name of freedom were both attempts to make respectable "the simple plan, That they should take who have the power, And they should keep who can".


We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal, we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded.

- Arusha Declaration (1967)

I

Three apparently methodological problems arise in treating the colonial integration of Africa into the world capitalist system. These relate to coverage, timing and stance. In fact they are more than methodological because the choices made do carry implications as to what degrees of uniformity and homogeneity exist in substance and importance (as well as appearance and artifactuality).

Over the period 1800-1945 a strong case exists for including Mediterranean Africa as well as sub-Saharan. In this period the previous unities and interactions of the Mediterranean region were
ruptured and the colonial patterns introduced bear more than a superficial resemblance on the two sides of the Sahara. It is perfectly true that colonial political economy required breaking the earlier long distance trade links between North and West Africa and between East Africa and the rest of the Indian Ocean region and the supercession of Egyptian and Zanzibari colonialism with European. However, it had the same pattern of destruction and supplantation within sub-Saharan Africa at the long distance intersociety, intercontinental, and even "short distance" levels e.g. in Sahel/Savannah-Coast trade in West Africa and interregional trade in East Africa; in the suppression of the Senegalese, Ghanaian and Malagasy merchants' import-export trade with Europe; in the implantation of new retail networks both of European firms like Unilever and CFAO and of new intermediate strata like the Lebanese community in West Africa and the Indian in East. Further, where the same colonial power ruled territories in both North and Subsaharan Africa (or on different shores of the Indian Ocean) new trade patterns among these units (e.g. Mahgreb-AOF, AEF and India-East Africa) were not inconsiderable. From a political economic perspective, therefore, a continental frame seems at least as appropriate as a Subsaharan one.

The problem of timing is one common to all models using analytical "stages" or categories and then applied to different social and territorial units to examine the same time period. First, the evolution of capitalism in the different colonial powers was not uniform in time; therefore their demands on African territories varied at any point in time. Further, because their domestic sub-class and production structures varied even over time no 1:1 homogeneity of uses for colonies could emerge: e.g. Belgium was never a major consumer goods exporter and this fact, reinforced by the Congo Basin Treaty uniform tariff and market access provisions, led to rather earlier attention to industrial production there than in other non-settler colonies. Second, at a second level the precise nature of the colonial relationship (and especially the number of expatriates) affected what type of production in colonies was perceived as producing a surplus for particular capitalists and the metropolitan power. Third, the objective conditions - both social and physical - of African territories influenced the timing, nature and degree of their incorporation.
The problem of stance is a very real one. To centre on and from the micro-level of an African society certainly puts Africans at the centre but tends to lose an African and, much more, a world perspective. To centre on and from a continental level has a danger of superficiality (or lack of portability) and of treating Africa as either separate from or merely an object of global dynamics. To centre on global models of history tends to lose Africans and reduce Africa to a minor case study both because since the decline of the Islamic dominance of the Mediterranean region global power centres have not been located in Africa and because - with the exception of the period of the slave trade - Africa has been far from being the most important geographic region of the political economic periphery.

These problems are compounded by the racist element in the colonial heritage. The denigration of Africa in most pre-1960 historical writing available in the metropolis' or in Africa has led to a necessary countermovement to prove Africa, African societies and Africans were not inferior nor radically different from other continents, societies and people. On the one hand this can lead to rather over enthusiastic evaluations of a type largely defunct in serious historiography elsewhere and to misreading warped and basically dependent African states (e.g. the Abomey Kingdom) as a flowering of African genius and on the other to taking Africa quite out of world contexts except in the mechanical sense of a victim to unexplained or facilely explained predatory forces. The historic fact that capitalism (at least industrial capitalism) first emerged in and has subsequently been centred on certain European and European settlement societies plus Japan is as relevant to the actual course of African history as the equally valid historic fact that African societies and polities not only could but did undergo transformation and change prior to and during the period of massive external intervention.

The difficulty lies in striking a balance and can be resolved only in the context of a specific piece of analysis. The title of this paper requires that a global model of capitalist metropolitan expansion to the peripheral non-capitalist (or dependent capitalist) societies serve as an underlying framework and that the main body of material relates to metropolitan colonial (industrial) capitalist penetration of Africa in terms of its effect on Africa and Africans.
Portability and time both prevent detailed analysis of differences among African societies and sub-regions.

II

By 1800 external penetration of Africa - basically European capitalist or European capitalist dominated at one remove - had already created a combination of dependence, disintegration and/or instability. It is true that because the mercantilist relationships had not required large territorial bases (nor their African articulation been seen as justifying conquest on the scale of the "East Indian" chartered companies) the African physical presence was scattered, tiny and apparently fragile. That situation indeed was to pertain except in parts of the Mahgreb and Southern Africa until nearly the end of the 19th century. However, the nature of the penetration was much more pervasive and much stronger than it appeared - a situation which in some of its variants is perhaps usefully emphasised by the evocative term pre-colonial neo-colonialism.

The penetration had several aspects:

a. the slave trade had shattered some African societies, strengthened and warped others and generally reduced the level of productive forces;

b. the aftermath of the decline (or post-1800 abolition) of the slave trade had further altered African political and society power and production patterns;

c. the sale of arms had significantly improved the relative position of the purchasers (whether in their own society or vis a vis others);

d. the coastal nature of European direct contact had in some cases disintegrated coastal states (e.g. Kongo) and in others been used by them to resist growing interior based states (e.g. Farti-Ashanti conflict on Gold Coast);

e. imports from Europe had both debilitated craft industries on a local and an intraregional basis and weakened traditional long distance links creating a degree of dependence on European trade for the purchasers and seriously weakening groups producing partly for, or involved in, the supplanted trade (e.g. some Savannah societies in West Africa);

f. European knowledge and technology had come to be seen as superior at least in many lines and there was a growing
demand for imported education, artifacts and production methods as well as arms. However, the imports tended to be artifactual and partial, increasing dependence rather than in a form readily incorportable into the African societies;

g. European direct long distance trade with the Far East and the shift of the main global gold source to the Western Hemisphere had similarly weakened the Mediterranean states and partially reversed their evolution in either productive capacity or state structure terms.

By 1800 two eras in which Africa had been of more central concern to the European economy lay in the past. Before 1500 Africa (via North Africa) had been the source of the bulk of Europe's gold—a pattern relevant to the emergence of Italian mercantile and financial capitalism. Even after the opening of New World sources, West Africa had been a significant secondary source for a time but in 1800 that period was past and the South African gold production centre was not yet established. After 1500 the slave trade had been critical to European mercantile capitalist expansion and to the accumulation of capital for the industrial and financial capitalist base. Especially in the Caribbean and Brazilian plantations and some Latin American mines, production depended on labour imports because the local population either could flee the affected areas or died under the work regime. The triangular trade was one critical to Europe with West Africa and the Caribbean very critical parts both of the periphery and of the centre's dynamic of growth. By 1800 the slave trade was very far from abolished (indeed the East African variant centring on the Arab ruled Zanzibar state and that practiced by Mohammed Ali's Egyptian state against the Sudanic societies had not yet begun) but it was no longer of central importance to European capitalism.

From the point of view of most elements in European capitalism Africa had become a relatively minor part of the periphery. Indeed on balance the first half of the 19th century was a period in which European capitalist relations with the periphery were to centre on existing settler colonies and ex-colonies and, to a lesser degree, on Caribbean-Indian-East Indian plantation/mercantile colonies rather than on large scale opening up or acquisition of direct control over new areas in Africa or Asia. It would, however, be a mistake in 1800 or at any other point to treat world capitalist or even
national capitalist interests in and attitudes toward Africa as homogenous. At the lowest level the "legitimate trade" houses opposed the slave trade because it both damaged the labour power and social organisation capacity for producing (e.g.) palm oil and offered "unfair competition" by being more profitable to African intermediary states or merchants. More generally capitalists directly involved in long distance trade with Africa or with some particular market or supply connection there took a very different view of the costs of pre-colonial neo-colonial support or colonial unit creation and maintenance than did others. Until the latter quarter of the century the "African lobby" was rarely composed of the dominant capitalist interests and what state support it secured was both limited and probably more a transfer payment to consolidate capitalist class solidarity than a reflection of a real perceived interest in Africa by the dominant capitalist groups.

Under these circumstances, many African societies and states still retained a significant degree of autonomy and freedom to manoeuvre in 1800. The high point of the Ashanti state's advance toward hegemony over the Gold Coast and Savannah zone areas adjoining its forest base came in the 19th century as did the attempted transformation of Egypt into an autonomous capitalist economy with its own colonies under Mohammed Ali and the creation of the Kwazulu empire in Southern Africa. Even the more penetrated and dependent states often adapted to "intermediary" roles rather than collapsing or becoming abjectly dependent - the Panti Confederacy and its member states' attempts to play off the European powers and the Ashanti, the Merina monarchy's long sustained attempt to use "modernisation" and an "open door" policy to keep French colonialism at bay, and the new "Oil Rivers" trading states of the Niger Delta are examples. It is true that in retrospect the first group of states and state building attempts were foredoomed because they came too late to halt the globalisation of a Eurocentric capitalist system and too early to be fitted into it as intermediaries and that the latter group of adaptations had set out upon a course of change in which the options open to them became steadily narrower but this was not evident to either the African takers or European decision takers at the time.
III.

If one accepts that mercantile capitalism had dominated a growing share of Africa's long distance trade by 1800 and continued to increase its share and absolute volume over 1800-1850 and at the same time takes note of the fact that the direct integration of Latin America into the industrial capitalist world system came largely subsequent to its political independence three questions arise:

a. Why was there a shift in the form of European penetration from dependency and its neo-colonialist variant to colonialism and its settler variant?

b. Why was this shift concentrated in the period 1850-1910?

c. Which metropolitan capitalist sub-classes (or formations) benefitted from the shift to colonial rule? To what extent were their gains met from increased exploitation of Africans (absolute or relative) and to what extent by internal "transfer payments" within the metropolitan economies?

d. What were the main results of the shift for Africans of different social strata, classes and formations?

Three reasons for the transition to colonial rule appear to have been dominant:

a.) the imperialism of free trade (i.e. the freedom of stronger economic powers and units to enter freely into the territories and societies of weaker) was compatible with neo-colonial trade patterns and with the metropolitan interests of the leading capitalist economies (primarily the UK in the relevant period\(^9\)). However, the imperialism of exclusive neo-mercantilism was more appropriate to the interests of the capitalists of the less advanced capitalist economies (basically France in this context) and could not be so readily pursued via client states because these would tend to be penetrated by the leading capitalist state's traders who could establish new contact points to leapfrog existing trading posts and forts. Free trade could be
imposed on really weak colonial powers e.g. Belgium and, to a degree, Portugal but not against a stronger one (Britain, France or Germany). Therefore, the weaker capitalist metropots were under some pressure to secure exclusive colonies to maintain or expand their dependent trade links and short of a European war over African trade the only countermove for Britain was a combination of colonial acquisition fanning out from its client states and societies plus enforcement of access to Belgian and Portuguese colonies;

b.) the client states and their (once removed client) neighbours had been very severely dislocated by the slave trade and its ending. They were, therefore, in many cases not seen as able to maintain patterns of stability and order conducive to penetration by trade. Attempts to make them more "helpful" sometimes led to breakdowns and sometimes to involvement in (often ill understood) intra-African conflicts (e.g. in Uganda, the Sudan, the Gold Coast). Thus the first neo-colonial system came to be seen as incapable of much expansion and subject to irritating uncertainties beyond the cure of punitive raids;

c.) in the case of areas seen as suitable for larger scale European settlement or requiring large investments (e.g. mining operations) direct metropolitan rule was perceived as essential (with the temporary exceptions of the Afrikaaner Republics and Mohammed Ali's Egypt) both because settlers would simply not accept African rule, nor investment markets loans to ventures situated in such doubtfully stable or predictable politics, and because the social and political transformations necessary for most African client states to have played intermediary and compradore roles to these types of penetration were beyond their capacity over 1850-1900 (as exemplified by the Merina Kingdom and the Egyptian state which sought to do so).
This pattern was not unique to Africa. It was paralleled in Southeast Asia and, probably, in the US acquisition of the Spanish colonial empire (both in the 1850-1910 period).

Given this set of reasons why the increasing rapidity of colonization from 1850 to its "completion" in 1910? It is possible to explain this pattern in terms of the reasons given for the colonial shift itself:

a. French reassertion - both political and economic - from the 1850's onward was directed to Africa (as well as the Middle East and Indochina) and forced a delayed response by the United Kingdom (and in a different way Portugal) if it was not to be shut out;

b. the gradual decline/abolition of the slave trade placed severe strains on some dependent states as did rather needlessly clumsy chartered company and smaller merchant or trading fort commander adventures leading either to polity breakdowns or hostilities leading to intervention followed by colonization;

c. the success of settler colonies in the North and South and the identification of mineral deposits and/or the markets and technology to make them relevant to European capitalism created a more general capitalist interest in colonial (as opposed to simply mercantile neo-colonial) penetration.

This is not an "empire acquired by inadvertence" model. Had the colonies been clearly unsuited to the needs of European capitalism or uniformly dubious investments the pattern might have begun but would have been halted or reversed. Prior to 1875 many military interventions did seek to chasten an African polity and make it a useable dependent trading partner (e.g. the Wolsey dash to Kumasi,
the expedition against the Emperor Teodoras in Ethiopia).
It is to say that the rise of industrial capitalism created
a situation in which penetration was more consistent with
ruling group - and especially some sub-elements within
some ruling group - interests, certain cases in which pre-
colonial neo-colonialism was inadequate to exploit these
interests, and an unstable situation in other cases such
that an initial shift from neo-colonial to colonial by one
metropolitan state would set off cumulative responses.

Broader elements of capitalist evolution in Europe
and its geo-political elements are also relevant. Britain's
main interest in respect of Egypt was securing firm control
of the Suez Canal; German and Italian colonies were pawns
in national ruling group geo-political and global economic
strategies; France's colonial empire was "sold" on the basis
of reasserting a world leadership position as much as of
economics (especially since near wars with the UK and Germany
on the periphery were easier to reign in before a major clash
ensued than any European expansionist policy would have been);
Portugal's colonies were seen as the symbol of its nationhood,
its raison d'être for not being a Spanish province. However,
these aspects, while almost always of some and an occasion of
central significance to the metropolitan political decision
maker's, were probably fairly secondary in their impact on what
happened during or after the actual conquest of colonies on
the ground in Africa.

In examining gains and costs to capitalist subclasses
it is necessary to specify the assumed alternative. Neither
a "vanishing" of Africa from long distance trade nor an
African participation on a basis of "mutual inequality" of
exchange seems a reasonable choice. The alternative pattern
of Latin America was also not objectively open in 1850
because Latin America's institutional and dominant socio-cultural
pattern was already European in origin in a way rather more
akin to Africa of 1950. However, a continuation and intensifi-
cation of mercantile pre-colonial neo-colonialism gradually
driving deeper direct contact routes into the interior and
carving out additional limited concession zones and infra-
structure routes (as in Thailand or Haiti or - nearer to home - Liberia and Ethiopia) was a possible alternative and one which at least some metropolitan capitalist formations, e.g. the bulk of those backing the British Liberal Party, favoured not primarily for moral or isolationist reasons but out of their perceptions of economic self-interest.

A short list of formations gaining includes:

a.) bureaucrats and army officers - dominantly drawn from aristocratic or landlord capitalist sub-classes;

b.) direct African trade participants to the extent their share in colonial trade was higher than it would have been under neo-colonial, their costs were lower (e.g. companies could offload administration and policing costs on the colonial state or the metropolitan taxpayer), or they traded with settler colonies which clearly offered broader opportunities than client (non-settler) states would have done;

c.) inefficient export manufacturers who would have been frozen out under a "free trade" regime - not least by trading companies based in their countries but wishing to remain competitive (CFAO and SCOA did not stock similar proportions of French goods in Senegal and the Gold Coast);

d.) domestic manufacturers who secured supplies of raw materials at lower cost than they could have bought them under other patterns of penetration (i.e. users of metals and settler produce) or who could buy from domestic currency sources and pass on the higher costs under conditions of national external balance weakness and high protection.

Prior to 1945 it is difficult to argue that these gainers constituted the leading capitalist formations in the United Kingdom. Even in the case of France it is doubtful that they could be so characterized although they were clearly more influential and more numerous and benefitted by their class
linkages with other domestic capitalist sectors and firms. Portugal was a metropolis but hardly a central capitalist economy so much as an intermediary ("relay station"?) of the United Kingdom. Only in Belgium can a clear case of the main colonial gainers being more or less co-terminus with the dominant metropolitan capitalist groups be made convincingly in respect of African colonies. However, this is not to make state support for them inexplicable - capitalist ruling coalitions are rarely monolithic and any significant coalition member can win some backing for its interests from the state and, less certainly, directly from other coalition members.

To "sell" colonialism, the Africa (or Asia) lobbies had to argue that the gains came totally from the colonies and benefitted all or almost all members of the national political decision taking coalitions at home or to fall back on "gloire", "realpolitik" (e.g. naval bases to keep the seas open for non-colonial trade), or "self" sufficiency in raw materials. Their analysis should not be accepted at face value - certainly major capitalist state leaders hardly tainted with anti-imperialism e.g. Gladstone, Bismark, Lincoln and Clemenceau did not accept it as more than marginally and selectively valid.

At one level, this debate is somewhat irrelevant to the impact of colonial expansion on Africa. Even if France (as "symbolized" by its GDP), French capitalists and even (taken as a group) French concessionary capitalists in the French Congo acquired negative net investible surpluses from the French Congo over 1890-1930, the impact on the Congolese, the evolution of Congolese society and the heritage of the independent polity are not thereby altered. Colonialism could be (in the case cited probably was) a negative sum game both for metropolitan capitalism and subject peoples. At a different level there is some relevance. To the extent that colonial integration not only yielded an enhanced surplus
to the periphery oriented capitalist units and formations but also covered the governmental infrastructure costs of colonial operations and allowed net lower costs to other capitalists (and/or some labour strata) than a continued mercantilist neo-colonialism would have done, it necessarily involved extraction of more surplus from Arica. While a part of this could - and did e.g. in Egypt and settler colonies - flow from reducing the absolute standard of living of Africans (i.e. driving socially necessary subsistence toward, or below in certain cases, physically necessary) much of it must have come from increasing relative exploitation involving expansion of the level of productive forces. Since the chief posthumous claim to "respect" of colonialism is precisely that it did raise per capita productive force levels and thus lay a foundation on which African societies and polities could build, evidence of "loss making" colonies is more a criticism of colonization as an effective capitalist instrument than praise of it as an "humanitarian enterprise".

It is difficult to strike a balance for three reasons. First, how continued neo-colonialism would have evolved is a matter of conjecture. Clearly it could not have provided structures adequate to the Rand, Katanga or the settler colonies. Whether it could have been molded and adapted to build-albeit more slowly-the groundnut economy of Senegal, the cocoa economy of the Gold Coast, or the cotton-coffee economy of Uganda is less clear. A flat negative answer is not self evident. Second, the distribution by metropot would have been different. The UK, USA and German shares would have been larger, the French smaller, the Italian and Belgian negligible and the Portuguese vanishing. Third, the balance of gains and losses is hard to estimate because of the exploitative nature of colonial trade pricing (which probably was more exploitative than would have been possible under the imperialism of neo-colonial free trade) and the paucity of detailed national accounts on a class and formation basis. However, some tentative comments are possible.
British Southern Africa paid handsomely for the UK capitalist system as a whole once the conquest was completed. Taken together, the rest of British colonial Africa yielded surpluses to the "colonial interests" and settlers, covered its own administration and infrastructure debt service costs (thus providing some transfers to the administrative bourgeoisie sent out to administer), and provided moderate surplus gains on markets and supply sources for British industrial capitalist units not directly involved in the colonial trade.

Algeria, and to a lesser extent Tunisia and Morocco, benefitted the overall French economy and capitalist groups beyond those directly involved. The sub-Saharan French colonies as a group almost certainly imposed a net cost on the overall French economy (excluding price gains at least logically achievable by neo-colonial trade) and especially on the French state. The colonial budgets were heavily subsidized to the benefit of the bureaucratic and military services and of the more inefficient French manufactured goods exporters.

The Belgian Congo was not merely a source of surplus to Belgium but probably a critical one, especially after the adventurist Leopoldian* colony of open pillage phase ended. The linkages between colonial surpluses and metropolitan expanded reproduction were closer than in any other case partly because of the very highly cartelized and intertwined nature of Belgian capitalism.

Portugal's colonies did not over the period in question give large net surplus flows to the Portuguese metropolitan economy nor stimulate an industrial capitalist sector of real significance in Portugal. This was partly because Portugal lacked the resources to exploit them (or indeed govern them to the same degree as France, Britain or Belgium) and relied on foreign firms, concessionary-corvee adventurism and near peasant level colonization to an exceptional degree. After 1945 the balance - at least in terms of foreign currency earning - may have changed and at all times the pricing policy on trade with Portugal was of an exceptionally surplus
draining type for Mozambique and Angola.

The German colonies did not on balance benefit the German Empire economically despite a methodical and ruthless growth policy but - excluding Namibia - that probably is a feature of their early loss as much as of the rather marginal and geopolitical role in which Imperial Germany's ruling coalition saw them. Certainly German efforts at raising production in Togo, Cameroon and Tanganyika exceeded subsequent British and French in both resources devoted and medium term results.

The Italian colonial empire - to the extent it was not a self delusion - was overtly seen in geopolitical terms and especially as a starting point to more extensive and lucrative colonies (on both counts including the reversal of the verdict of Adawa).

The overall African record is thus not very impressive for colonialism as a tool of capitalist growth and purposive systemic change especially if the two main settler colonies (Algeria and South Africa) are excluded. Liberia on the face of it had about as much (or as little) growth as Dahomey. Ethiopia admittedly modernized (in any sense) later and expanded its productive forces more slowly than most colonies. It had a very limited capitalist presence and a dominantly tributary system which did not set major emphasis on accumulation. However, it is not clear than colonial rule would in fact have produced greater change than the 1930-1970 imperial efforts (albeit perhaps over 1900-1940) - Ethiopia had very major natural barriers to either export oriented or "naturally" integrated raising of productive force levels. Certainly the dependent growth of Egypt under Mohammed Ali was more rapid than for most of the British period and even probably more lucrative for European capitalists.

A capsule summary of the economic impact on different
formations is subject to a rather inadequate exhibition of the specificity of situations. Certainly the general impact was most damaging in settler colonies and least so (probably positive in narrowly economistic, short run terms) in the colonial trade enclaves with the highest levels of productive forces e.g. the Gold Coast after 1890, Buganda after- say - 1910, the Gezira from the late 1930's albeit the caveat must be entered that Gold Coast cocoa and Buganda cotton and coffee could probably have been produced to almost the same extent, if at somewhat later dates, under a neo-colonial pattern.

Broad formation economic impact seems to have been:

a.) traditional aristocracies were reduced in economic status by the conquest, sometimes partially restored (or even created) under indirect rule (e.g. in both the British and French West African Savannah colonial areas and in parts of Uganda), and fatally weakened, both by conquest and use as compradores, in respect to the post-colonial neo-colonial phase;

b.) bureaucrats with "modern" education did achieve a higher economic status relatively and absolutely than in the actual pre-colonial neo-colonial states but both a quite low absolute one until after 1945 and probably a lower one than they would have occupied in an evolving neo-colonial/dependent pattern as illustrated by their significant share in renewed neo-colonial gain sharing;

c.) modern productive sector roles were largely limited to a handful parallel to the bureaucracy and (except in settler colonies) a small proportion of the labour force in unskilled, low wage employment almost certainly not appreciably above pre-colonial domestic agricultural or artisanal incomes. In the case of settler colonies they were dominantly "land clearance scheme" or tax "induced" on the supply side and even more disadvantageously placed economically;

d.) medium scale African businessmen - who were significant at least in many parts of West Africa until near the end of the 19th century - were systematically squeezed into
bankruptcy or back into petty trading (a partial reversal did not occur until the post-1945 late colonial period); Small scale African businessmen were tolerated so long as they either filled the bottom rungs of hierarchies in which European firms and petit blancs - or more often non-European compradore immigrants - could not operate with adequate returns or filled interstices in the dominant system's structure. Even so the increased penetration of imports and, to a lesser degree and later, of locally produced manufacturers tended to erode the economic status of traders and a forti'arl craft producers to a significantly greater extent than would have characterized a continued neo-colonial pattern; peasants who were advantageously placed to produce "export crops" often achieved absolute gains (but ones related to dependent trade not colonial rule per se) but only the proto-kulaks among them were able to generate adequate surpluses to sustain growth in (or even hold constant) these gains. Food farmers were usually weakened especially if they lived in non-export crop zones and forced to pay levies. Settler colony peasants suffered most evidently from near total loss of desirable land (to Europeans) land and partial enforced proletarianism, a case perhaps most totally and starkly exemplified in Namibia, Botswana and the Bortustan in the south and the Mahgrebin tell in the north.

Modern politicians are a class which did not become prominent until after the relevant period (with partial exceptions in Liberia, Egypt and, on a very limited scale, Senegal). They were to become the main intermediary (and beneficiary) class in the subsequent neo-colonial phase but until 1945 were still inchoate within the public service and modern educated elements of the modern productive, small business and traditional aristocratic formations.
It may be asked how within this frame of reference one can explain rising African populations from 1900 onward. The answer can hardly be health services nor improved standards of living for the vast majority of Africans. Rather it lies in the fact that the end of the slave trade, the dislocations caused by earlier penetration and reactions to it, the halting of intra-African state wars of conquest, the completion of the colonial conquest, and the phasing out of the brutal, uneconomic (for the metropolis and its capitalists as well as Africa) concessionary adventurist phase did lead to a pattern of relative law and order which reduced deaths by violence and by famine following dislocation. Further the break-up of African social patterns (whether by urbanization, migration, or evisceration in situ) seems to have led to higher birth rates because African societies' elements of birth spacing and family spacing disintegrated with the destruction of the social order of which they were part.
The colonial variant of the peripheral capitalist mode of production has not been homogenous in Africa. At least six sub-variants can be identified. However, it is not, on the whole, analytically useful to use these to "classify" regions or even in many cases whole territories and, indeed, sub-variants could and did coexist in the same territory albeit usually with one dominant. 

a. **subordinated African producer** based trade (Amin's colonial trade economy) utilised penetrative "equal", unequal (in Amin's sense) and oligopolistic trade to extract local produce at prices allowing the merchant to achieve a surplus and to inject relatively over-priced (in world market terms) manufactures. In its commonest form the African producers were a mix of small peasants and proto kulaks but larger non-capitalist (e.g. the Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal, parts of Ethiopia), proto-capitalist (e.g. the Sudan plantation ancestors to the present private pump schemes), state capitalist (e.g. Mohammed Ali's Egypt) existed;

b. **concessionary company** allocation whether to chartered companies during the transition to colonialism or to purely commercial adventurers within a titular colonial framework was a transitional phase. The chartered companies usually found the costs of administration too high to be offset by even a trade monopoly, the adventurers - with the notorious exception of King Leopold of the Congo - on balance failed to extract much surplus and - most assuredly including Leopold - operated a system of pillage which was quite incompatible with stable, sustained exploitation;

c. **foreign plantation** based production tended to be dominant as a replacement of concessions and of mercantilist slave colonial structures pre-dating 1800 (e.g. the Cape Verdi Islands, Fernando Po, Reunion, Mauritius) but was common for specific crops (e.g. sisal and sugar and at one period bananas and tobacco) and as a favoured (but usually non-competitive) parallel to subordinated African producers (e.g. in AOF, Nigeria, Uganda) in countries in which it was either secondary or co-equal with other production patterns;

d. **foreign non-agricultural enclave** production was dominant in mining and in secondary industry (local market or export processing).
The former did dominate some territorial economies, the latter - while not uniformly negligible by 1945 even outside the settler economies - was very much secondary and concentrated in a few cities;

e. **European settler based production** on a broad front was dominant only at the Northern and Southern ends of the continent (including Zimbabwe) but pockets of settler agriculture were scattered throughout British East and Central Africa and the larger Portuguese colonial territories (where it became dominant supplanting plantations and a primitive cross between subordinated African production and state mn concessions after 1945);

f. **labour reserve** areas appeared to remain "traditional" "subsistence" economies to the casual (and in many cases the not so casual) observer. In fact whether they had been created by settler expropriation (e.g. Lesotho, the non-settler rural areas of Algeria, the Kikuyu reserves) or by the destruction of earlier economic relations with areas more intensively directly exploited under colonial rule (e.g. Upper Volta, Mali, large areas of Southern Tanganyika) they were very far from being unaffected or irrelevant to the colonial system of production. Their impoverishment - augmented where necessary by taxation - made them labour supply depots and their remaining agricultural potential allowed their migrant workers to be paid at less than family physical subsistence wages because the family, perforce, remained in the reserve. While usually described in relation to labour supply depots for settler, enclave or foreign plantation agriculture the labour reserves have also been critical to some subordinated African producer based economies (e.g. Voltaic labour in the Gold Coast and - admittedly after 1945 - far more centrally in the Ivory Coast). To a minor extent the Mahgrebin labour reserve areas were serving European labour market unskilled labour requirements by 1945 but their major role in the "exporting" "guest workers" began significantly later as did the significant (albeit numerically and as a percentage of territorial labour force lower) flows from some AOF regions (e.g. the Middle Senegal basin).

To apply this analytical frame to one country is not always easy, to apply it regionally or continentally leads to a danger of a loss of portability and of salient parallels and divergences. Coastal
West Africa through the Cameroon was dominantly a series of subordinated African producer territorial units with secondary foreign non-agricultural enclaves and diminishing foreign plantation elements. French conquered West African savannah (through Chad territories and parts of the Gold Coast and Nigerian Savannah zones were basically labour reserves. Gabon and the Middle Congo (now CAR) were dominantly foreign forestry enclave plus plantation economies while in the French Congo limited foreign plantation, logging and non-agricultural enclave units were perhaps about co-equal. The Western Belgian was dominated by foreign plantation and the Eastern by mining enclave production with internal labour reserve areas surrounding them and two relatively large industrial enclaves at Leopoldville and in Katanga. Angola and Mozambique had a shifting balance of plantations, settlers, labour reserves (for export to South Africa as well as domestic use) and subordinated African producers. In South Africa the settler dominance-linked to African labour reserves - was so great that it would perhaps be inappropriate to treat the plantations, mines and non-agricultural sector separately except for the fact that they were largely owned by external and settler groups who had distinct secondary contradictions with the Afrikaaner dominant settler group. Southern Rhodesia was a smaller and somewhat diluted South Africa. Northern Rhodesia was dominantly a mining enclave economy with a significant settler sector and labour reserves while Nyasaland was perhaps balanced between labour reserve and plantation roles. Madagascar and Uganda were basically African subordinated producer in their territorial economic pattern as were the Sudan and Ethiopia (albeit the pattern of subordination was more complex in the last case). Rwanda and Burundi combined subordinated African production with a labour reserve (for both the Congo and East Africa) role. Kenya was co-dominated by a settler enclave in the "white highlands", a plantation enclave on the coast and industrial enclaves in Mombasa and Nairobi plus labour reserve areas to serve them and to a lesser degree Tanganyika and Uganda. Tanganyika had a large plantation and small settler enclaves balanced by subordinated African production and a peripheral labour reserve role in respect to Southern Africa despite being a heavy net labour importer. Egypt probably had a dominantly subordinated African producer based territorial economy in 1945 albeit, if one lumps the Suez Canal with the other external non-agricultural enclaves, that sector was more important from the Metropolitan optic. Algeria
was a settler colony with labour reserves in which separating settler-plantation-non-agricultural foreign elements probably would be pointless for 1945 (though not after the rise of the oil sector). Morocco and Tunisia while settler and enclave dominated had much more significant subordinated African producer components than Algeria. The older ex-slave plantation colonies (Cape Verde, Fernando Po, Sao Thome and Principe, Reunion and Mauritius) became foreign plantation dominated and the former Arab slave plantation based states (Comoros, Zanzibar) subordinated African producer centred economies with an Arab intermediary layer over the share cropping (de jure or de facto) tenants. Spanish Sahara, Eritrea, Libya, British and Italian Somaliland, mainland Equatorial Guinea and Portuguese Guinea were economically almost non-existent from a capitalist point of view - subordinated African production, foreign plantations (with the exception of the Italian Somaliland banana enclave) and settler implantation were all unsuccessful. French Somaliland was - economically - a foreign enclave in the Ethiopian territorial economy.

The impact of these elements on the growth of productive forces, the structure of production and the distribution of output was critical. The most disastrous role from all points of view was that of labour reserve since in that case net transfers had to be earned by temporary outmigration with serious territorial economic as well as social corrosive effects. Intensive settler colonisation had the most positive effect on territorial average levels of productive forces and on the balance of production (as the territorial accounts of South Africa and Algeria demonstrate). Its economic impact on Africans - at least so long as the territory remained a colony - was, however, destructive. Plantations where dominant tended to raise the average levels of productive forces but not to improve the structure of production nor African incomes. Non-agricultural enclaves were rarely dominant but did tend to raise average output per capita, create a small above average income African "proletariat", and in the domestic market oriented cases (but not mineral or forestry extraction nor export processing) create a slightly less imbalanced structure of production and use. During the colonial period subordinated African production gave the highest incomes to Africans (and probably also the greatest broadly based inequalities among them) but in most cases relatively low average levels of productive forces and radically imbalanced structures of production and use.
The economic roles of penetration were not basically altered by the transition to colonialism nor during the colonial period. They remained:

a. to secure at costs allowing a surplus to the acquiring commercial house (whether a producer or not) on their export and sale in a capitalist metropot or another colony;
b. to provide opportunities for commercial units to sell imports at prices which yielded a surplus;
c. to open outlets at surplus yielding prices for metropolitan producers;
d. to make available opportunities for profitable investment of capital in production for metropolitan or colonial markets;
e. to provide a vent for settlers and temporary migrants from the metropolis.

The first of these was dominant in respect of Africa as a whole and for metropolitan capitalist powers as a group. It did not always mean "cheap" produce in terms of world market prices. If the metropolitan decision takers placed (for whatever reason) a premium on own currency sources and de facto or de jure protected their suppliers (not if they were African their producers) then the products might well be quite "dear" e.g. Somaliland bananas, AEF cotton in the interwar period, German East African rubber. Even the United Kingdom in the late Second World War and 1945-50 period provided support for, and indeed massive state investment in, production seen as "cheap" in foreign exchange shadow pricing terms not those of the world market. A related variant involved subsidies to sellers to buy from colonies and sell to earn other metropolitan currencies.

For most major trading units, the second goal was linked to the first. A balanced trading operation required a two way flow of sales and purchases. For this purpose the sources of the goods was irrelevant. However, metropolitan producer micro and macro concerns were fairly central to the metropolitan coalitions perceptions of colonial gains throughout the period except in the case of the United Kingdom up to the mid 1920s. From then through 1945 the UK did practice imperial protection with Japan the chief competitor to be kept out.
By and large investment opportunities were a minor goal of colonialism in Africa - the most significant profitable directly productive investment was in mining and in that case the production was critical to securing the export product. Plantations were seen in similar terms as a fortiori was infrastructural investment which was, indeed, usually both metropolitan state financed and not directly surplus generating. Secondary industry colonial market oriented investment (in the colony or the metropolis) was quite minor both relative to the metropolis and to the total "colonial interest" group with the partial exceptions of Algeria and South Africa.

Vent for settlers and temporary migrants (administrators, merchants, managers) was perhaps central to Italian colonial economic strategy but was a secondary element in the case of other metropolises.

The evolution of penetration over 1800-1945 falls into three periods: 1800-1850 was characterised by the decline of the mercantile neo-colonialism of the slave trade and its partial replacement by that of legitimate commerce; 1850-1914 was marked by the establishment and initial organisation of the colonial system; 1914-1945 saw a slackening of general momentum because the global capitalist system and especially its periphery were almost continuously involved in crises.

Over 1914-1918 the First World War partly isolated the colonies from the metropolises and involved campaigns against the German colonies which used a considerable portion of what attention and resources were available in Subsaharan Africa while drafts of men (especially in the French case) and resources (e.g. on Egypt for the British Middle Eastern campaign) affected Mediterranean Africa as well.

1918-1930 was marked at the broad periphery level first by the short lived commodity boom and then by a longer period of commodity price depression and the strengthening (as e.g. at the Ottawa Conference in the British case) of the drive for partially closed trading systems to strengthen metropolitan external balance positions. In Africa the boom led to a burst of public investment - e.g. Governor Guggisberg's Seven Year Plan in the Gold Coast, the completion of the basic East African railway network, the buildup of Dakar and the Dakar-Bamako link in AOF. Most o. this actually came after the boom had passed and colonial territorial revenues were once again shaky. The increased operating and debt service
costs of this wave of investment contributed to the wave of late 1920s and 1930s retrenchments which pulled colonial governments back to a much more limited law and order role than had characterised their consolidation and initial developmental phases. It was not any general objection to interventionism nor devotion to Smith's invisible hand which held colonial governments back - neo-mercantilist intervention by policy and precept was, on the whole, enhanced and multiplied so long as it cost little to promulgate and administer. The constraint was finance.

The commodity slump on the periphery (and the special British crisis related to its over-valued currency) were exacerbated in Africa as well as in the metropolises over most of the 1930s by generalised industrial economy unemployment. Metropolitan budgets were strained, metropolitan investors were in retreat, metropolitan firms hardly needed rapidly rising imports. Indeed the intensification of the "cutthroat competition" - "price ring" cycle in Anglophonic West Africa bears witness to the colonial firms' group need to enhance the surplus on a given volume of business by lowering costs and raising the import/export price ratio in the colonies and, at the same time, their contradictory individual drive to increase surplus through expanding volume via competitive bidding away of each other's business.

Under these circumstances the periphery's least central region was certainly not the object of any general development drive. Three classes of exceptions can be identified:

a) the gold sector boomed - costs fell and the terms of exchange for gold against currency rose - with special territorial significance for South Africa;
b) protectionism against foreign currency sources to protect the franc led to major attempts to raise commodity production in francophone Africa but to do so without putting in new investment or public services - an approach which had distinct limits (e.g. the opening up of the Ivory Coast or Guinea was not possible under it because major infrastructure could not be financed) and special characteristics (e.g. a greater emphasis on subordinated African production to lessen calls on colonial state and metropolitan money market resources). A settler variant of this "strategy" operated in the Mahgreb with somewhat more real resources devoted to its implementation;
c) import substitution in Algeria, South Africa and the Belgian
Congo to preserve local consumption capacity in the face of disappointing export earnings. This variant of the Latin American first round defensive import substitution was limited—at least on any significant scale—to a few territories because colonial structure was, by definition, not one in which colonial state initiatives for closing markets against the metropolis were likely to be begun much less allowed to go very far. South Africa, however, was de facto an independent state. The Belgian capitalist group was able to find investment opportunities in the Congo by substituting against non-Belgian imports thus melding metropolitan macro-monopolist micro- and colonial territorial macro interests into a less self evidently contradictory temporary working synthesis than was possible in other sub-Saharan colonics. Algeria was seen as a French province and thus in terms of regional policy.

The partial metropolitan economy and global commodity market recoveries of the late 1930s probably would have led to more activist colonial development of productive forces policies backed by more infrastructural investment and a more substantial capitalist firm concern in trade and selected production enhancement with and in African colonies in the early 1940s had they not been followed so closely by the Second World War—e.g. British Colonial Development Planning thinking and legislation shows an upsurging from 1938 onward. The direct impact of fighting in Africa was extreme in the North and Northeast but the resource calls (especially in terms of both African and colonial administrator/manager manpower) were much more widely spread.

The economic impact was, outside battle zones, on balance stagnationist (or worse) but highly unequal. Import starvation was uniform because of shipping constraints. Exports were affected in the same way unless they were raw materials critical to military production, e.g. the Belgian Congo’s copper, cobalt and uranium, in which case they boomed. Mercantilist intervention by the colonial states did seek to raise local market oriented production in both food and light manufactures. While more widely spread than the 1930s manufacturing sector growth that of the war years was relatively limited in coverage and depth both because market size was limited and because adequate equipment and intermediate goods imports were not available.

At the end of the Second World War the majority of African
colonies probably had lower real per capita levels of productive forces than in 1914. Colonialism centred on crisis wracked metropolitan capitalism had not proven a dynamic means to development of production. The major exceptions were Algeria (seen as a province of France), the Belgian Congo ("benefiting" from the rather special metropolitan production and corporate structure) and South Africa (with a state independent enough to follow its own neo-mercantilist Keynesian political economic strategy along lines more similar to the larger Latin American states than to those of colonial territory administrations). African colonies and Africans had indeed been exploited and because of lack of resources to carry out exploitation in any other way subjected to a high degree of overt repression. But more than either they had been disregarded - increasingly treated as the periphery of the periphery; a reserve army perhaps, but not of labour power that it was in the metropolis' interest to exploit nor to its danger to allow to become increasingly pauperised.

In 1945 it was not clear that the colonial era in Africa was moving to its close. Africans would have been almost as startled as Europeans at an assertion that by 1965 only the Portuguese and Spanish colonies and the Southern redoubt would remain or that by 1975 the former would be in the last stages of dissolution and South Africa seeking to buy a temporary détente by jettisoning Rhodesia and Namibia. Indeed the late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by the most energetic attempts at colonial territorial development since the initial conquest; efforts which were not then seen as laying the base for a new neo-colonial relationship but for a long continuation of colonial rule.

In retrospect the circumstances and elements which led to a metropolitan transformation of capitalist relationships with Africa to a new neo-colonialism gradually evolving into more complex forms of dependence can be seen more clearly:

a) the Second World War had - in complex ways - shaken both metropolitan self confidence and will and African belief in the invincibility of Europeans;

b) the early dissolution of the Asian empire reinforced beliefs and doubts tending toward running down colonialism in Africa;

c) the changed balance among the metropolitan capitalist economies.
strengthened the USA which had a continuing ex-colony's general objection to colonialism and a "free trader's" self interest in the substitution of less tightly focused patterns of dependence.

d) the enhanced power of the socialist industrial economies both (in 1945-1955) required concentration of effort on "stabilising" the European political economic and territorial balance (thus putting a higher opportunity cost on large scale colonial repression) and influenced African aspirations and concepts of the attainable in ways which made direct colonialism harder to sustain without rising repression;

e) the success of the colonial system in creating a pattern of infrastructure and institutions adequate to sustain a new neo-colonialism meant that - if the training of Africans to operate them, already begun on cost saving grounds, could be stepped up - the economic ends of colonialism could apparently be furthered without continued direct rule;

f) the failure of the colonial system to yield high and growing surpluses over 1914-1945 on the one hand provided a case for re-equipping it in physical and personnel terms to meet anticipated expanded metropolitan import and export needs and, at the same time, for cost and risk cutting especially on the overhead side. The former strand was not necessarily inconsistent with guided neo-colonial states and the latter positively favoured them over colonies;

g) both the successes and failures of colonial rule had created African formations intensely frustrated in social, economic and political terms, increasingly unwilling to accept the myth of European omniscience and omnipotence, and - critically - in the case of many elite and some producer groups perceiving independence in terms of taking over the colonial state and production strategy so that Africans could run it for themselves and at a brisker pace but not in a radically different manner. There were African formations who had a very different view of what independence should mean but far more metropolitan energy was put into seeing that they did not become the inheritors, or that they were socialised into the patterns and objectives of the colonial territorial political economic model by "transitional rule" participation, than in root and branch resistance to independence of non-settler colonies. "Who" and "When" came to be seen as crucial to maintaining the
benefits of metropolitan - peripheral relations with Africa and "whether" in respect of formal independence an increasingly dead issue;

h) the increasing oligopolisation of international economic transactions (including in respect to African territories where it had always been at a higher level than for intra-metropolitan transactions) and the growing importance of soft technology (e.g. marketing, purchasing, financing, organising) and hard technology (e.g. machines, processes and the ability to operate, maintain, reproduce and adapt or develop them) steadily reduced the actual and the perceived danger of political independence leading to effective economic nationalism of the early 19th century USA or turn of the century Japanese varieties. (In Latin America this was to mean a metropolitan reconquest of the control lost during 1930s first wave economic nationalist import substitution, in Africa and Asia a generally easy shift from colonial to post colonial economic supremacy patterns.)

This schema is deceptively simple in four senses. First, it arbitrarily abstracts from non-political economic and non geo-political factors which were of significance in Africa and in Europe. Second, it is retrospective in the extreme, nobody analysed in these terms and with this degree of articulated foresight in 1945-55 although variants of most of these considerations can be identified in policy statements and actions of that period. Third, because of the lack of any clear decolonisation model the process was - at least at the secondary level - both particular to territories in Africa and to metropolitan powers and marked by false starts and dead ends e.g. the French drive for integration (impossibly expensive if carried to its Cartesian logical end and self contradictory if stopped part way) and the Belgian for colonial maintenance by technico-economic bolstering and intellectual isolation of the peoples of the Belgian Congo. Finally, wherever large numbers of settlers or a belief (as in the Portuguese case and a fortiori the South African) that empire and nationhood were intertwined were at stake, the transition from colonialism to dependence began later, was characterised by much higher levels of violence and, therefore, in a majority of cases (not all, e.g. Kenya) to result in a successor state more altered from its colonial predecessor than in the "easy transition" cases.

The basic themes remain. Colonialism in Africa was on the
verge of retreat in 1945 not because the metropolitan powers did not possess the power (in absolute terms) to maintain it (vide Madagascar in the late 1940s) nor because economic dominance had become less desirable. As the burst of late colonial, transitional and early neo-colonial capitalist state and private investment in Africa bear witness, the latter was the reverse of the truth. African production and trade were, and were seen to be, about to become of more importance to the central economies than at any point in the previous thirty years. Rather, the potential now existed, and was increasingly perceived to exist, to substitute dependence for direct colonial rule at a net political economic gain to a majority of the central capitalist economies and their dominant decision taking groups and a significant number of African leaders and formations saw such a shift as quite consistent with their own interests. The foundations for the 1945-1965 transition to neo-colonialism as the dominant political economic relationship between Africa and the world capitalist system had been laid.
NOTES

1. The territorial dimension of this paper therefore diverges from Samir Amin's of "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa - Origins and Contemporary Forms" Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 10, no. 4, although not from his overall body of work which does analyze Mediterranean Africa at the case study level. Territorial frames of reference are not exclusive: the Mediterranean Region or the Arab World are also potentially useful and partially overlap each other as well as Africa. Similarly Mediterranean Africa, West Africa, East Africa as well as Black Africa can be useful territorial frames at a more limited but still cross territorial level. The case for using Africa, continentally bounded, in this context is that over 1800 - 1945 its penetration by the metropolitan capitalist powers had enough basic elements in common to make it a useful reference frame.

2. "Stages" in this sense are analytical or methodological tools not temporal sequences, inevitable points of arrival of empirical categories. Marx's stages are of this type; Rostow's and - in a different way - Kuznets' are not.

3. The Congo Basin Treaties' "free trade" provisions are not an adequate total explanation. France circumvented them from the beginning in AEF and the UK avoided (or secured exemptions from) them whenever this was relevant to its East or Central African economic integration objectives.

4. On and from are not identical in this context. A study centered on Tanzania's international economic relations could be from a metropolitan economy perspective. One from a Tanzanian perspective would place central emphasis on the meaning of the relations for and to Tanzania and (groups or classes of ) Tanzanians whether or not it was informed by an explicit or implicit global model.

5. Japan is not of significant relevance to the economic penetration of Africa over 1800 - 1945. Its attempt to break into the African market in the 1930s was blocked by hastily erected tariff modifications. Except for Liberia the USA was also only marginally involved after the decline of the slave trade.

6. An interesting discussion of some of these issues appears in Kate Neale "Marxism and African History", AFRAS Review, no. 1, Summer 1975.
7. E.g. the Oil Rivers states or - much later - Mohammed Ali's Egypt and its Sudanese colony.

8. The ramshackle nature of the European presence is perhaps most vividly portrayed in European novels (e.g. Conrad, Cary) and its terrifying face in African fiction.

9. In the case of Latin America the interests of the USA and the UK coincided. Keeping the Western hemisphere open to UK trade required making clear that the British fleet would block reconquest and thus de facto providing the military shield for the Monroe Doctrine's geopolitical, Caribbean trade and contiguous territorial expansionist oriented rejection of a revived Spanish, or any alternative new European, colonial dominance. Therefore, 1800 - 1945 Latin American integration into the world capitalist economy was through the mechanisms of dependent penetration not colonial rule.

10. For example, the British misread the Fanti-Ashanti state conflict. Logically they should have backed Ashanti, established coastal forts with Ashanti authorization and dealt with Ashanti nominated intermediaries and pro-consuls over the Fanti not backed Fanti resistance to establishment of Ashanti's hegemony.

11. This is not intended as a normative justification. It is a critical element in understanding Lusitanian imperial policy. Of course a political economic element does enter because Portuguese state decision takers obviously stood to lose by the reincorporation of Portugal into a single, centralized Iberian kingdom.

12. In Asia the congruence of colonial oriented and dominant metropolitan interests was greater especially in the Indian subcontinent and the East Indies. However, the main trade and investment thrusts of capitalist global economic integration in its Eurocentric phase were focused on the periphery's areas of European settlement - the Americas and Australasia and to a much lesser degree Algeria and South Africa.

13. State support could be changed to taxpayers who were, in part, not members of the capitalist coalition.

14. So too, at times, could intra-coalition support e.g. selling Latin American infrastructure bonds to middle class savers in Britain.

15. Jules Ferry was driven from office for twenty years when a minor skirmish (literally) in Tonkin went wrong, General Gordon was not effectively supported or extricated nor very promptly "avenged". The imperialist coalition has a narrow care base, an unstable body of loose associates and anything but consistent, firm control over the commanding heights of metropolitan state policy.
16. Cocoa in the Gold Coast owed almost nothing to the colonial state. Relevant agricultural advice and support was negligible, rail transport was secondary to cocoa (even if critical for gold mining), the critical market provision function was played by coastal based merchant firms using up country African and Lebanese intermediaries.

17. "Modern" African neo-tribalism and titles are by no means simple descendants of pre-colonial peoples, social groups and aristocrats. The new political class has often skillfully manipulated the geographic-cultural solidarity elements of the "traditional" system to create a new clientelist base but there is far from a direct correlation between this type of political strategy and traditional aristocratic background, much less world-view. The Kabaka of Buganda and the Kiganda aristocracy failed to establish national hegemony in Uganda precisely because they sought to recreate pre-colonial "national tribalism" and failed to manipulate "neo-tribal localism" with the skill of Dr. Obote.

18. This analytical frame draws on the divisions made by Amin (op. cit.,) but is far from identical. Regional classification appears unsound even in the Amin matrix and concessionary company colonialism was a brief phase, which certainly influenced but did not totally dominate the subsequent evolution of colonial penetration in the territories in which it was applied.

19. Unequal in this sense relates to terms of exchange more unequal than the productivity of the underlying labour force and not flowing solely from particular oligopoly or ologopsony positions. It is basically similar to one variant of the Prebisch-Singer deteriorating terms of trade for primary products case.

20. To that extent Amin (op. cit.,) appears to oversimplify. Concerns as to stability of supply, "self" sufficiency as a geo-political strength and external account balance were at times dominant and seen as justifying colonial trade in political economic terms even when lower cost sources of supply in the simpler sense clearly existed. For the colonial trading firm "cheap" related to costs versus selling price attainable irrespective of whether the latter were artificially high (or low).

21. Neo-colonialism is used here to relate to the form of dependence in which the role of domestic intermediaries is very limited especially in the fields of technical personnel, organization of production and management of medium and large scale enterprises. It is likely to be a phase in dependence not a stable pattern for any extended period because the metropolitan presence is too overt and the base and mass of the intermediaries too narrow. Either more mediated (but by no means
necessarily looser or weaker) forms of dependence or a reaction against dependence (e.g. the Arusha Declaration and its implementation in Tanzania, the 1972-74 political events in the Malagasy Republic) are likely to ensue. In this sense it is not accidental that the main body of analysis of dependence in Africa as neo-colonialism does date to the 1960s and early 1970s with more recent work tending increasingly either to speak of dependence or to treat neo-colonialism explicitly as one phase of the development of dependence.

22. The more "advanced" forms of dependence typically include a sharply reduced visibility of the expatriate presence; a much more substantial African business and professional group and an expanded African public sector critically linked to, and sharing at least some political economic interests with, the dominant foreign economic interests; some diversification of external economic relations among industrial economies and a lesser unilateral concentration on the former metropolis. Where these conditions are not readily met, neo-colonial retrenchment may lead to increased stagnation and instability (e.g. probably Dahomey, Niger). Where they are readily fulfilled a regional intermediary role vis a vis smaller or "mere recalcitrant" dependent territories may be promoted by central capitalist interests as well as local political coalition members (e.g. Kenya).

23. A clear example - albeit well after 1945 - is France's trading a large proportion of the cost of providing infrastructure for dependent growth in Africa against a portion of its preferred position in francophone African markets in the original EEC Association arrangements.