

1. ORGANIZATION

This may be the greatest practical contribution of European Marxism. I am not thinking of the single party state as such—that does not necessarily have anything much to do with Marxism (e.g. Tanzania) and unless one wishes to say the constitution of the Fifth Republic is (was?) Marxist in nature it is quite as easy to argue that Francophonic Africa's model has been Gaullist in its move to one partyism and its management of the process. (I argued this in print once in re the Cameroon—evidently the Francophonic African states can go further and be more ruthless than their mentor.)

The clearest case is Francophonic West Africa. The old RDA was nurtured, protected (when PCF was in government), advised, indoctrinated by PCF. It was organized as a separate affiliated party for a number of reasons. (The French Communists in West Africa organized cercles to study Marxism and included selected Africans as students in them but never—except perhaps transitorily in Senegal at an earlier stage tried to get PCF cells including Africans). First, the Africans both emotionally and tactically wanted a separate party. Second, the danger of repression was less. Third, the PCF was very French and very Paris centred and did not really feel African cells would be "proper".

The RDA up to 1950 was a very close ally of PCF indeed. This included the men who presently emerged as evident conservatives e.g. H-B. The Secretary General was then Gabriel d'Arb. At the 1950 (I think) Conference the RDA broke with the PCF, junked G d'A, and installed a H-B candidate (I think Ouezin Coulibally—Upper Volta but of Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire by residence and membership.) over the opposition of PDG (not then at all well organized—the Fulani chiefs and coastal old elite—a la Wallerstein's terminology—then had a very workable "parti d'administration" going) and the Union Soudanais (somewhat similar case—Fili Dabo Sisseke was still riding high). The reasons for the break were brutally pragmatic. PCF affiliation left the RDA permanently in opposition in France and permanently subject to repression at home. To switch to a policy of always or almost always supporting the man who was to make a government in return for being given a moderately free hand to organize and some reforms looked likely to pay better. So did stopping mass demonstrations and strikes and calls for immediate independence in return for being allowed to win territorial and Grand Conseil (the AEF assembly at Dakar) as well as French parliamentary seats. The thinking was most subtle in the PDCI. H-B (and I think by then already perhaps Rafael Saller) had decided that the way to prosper was to argue in France that the Ivory Coast was really a backward French province and must be helped to come up to standard a la Corsica.

The decay of the mass organization of the RDA probably can be dated to the break with the PCF and the end of repression which had acted as a stimulus in some respects. (Guinea and Mali are exceptions to this rule.)

Senegal doesn't fit this pattern very well. Because of the old ~~French~~ cities (from Louis Philippe? or Napoleon III?) there had been French politics in Dakar-Rufisque-Goree-St. Louis for a very long time. The old dominant party was French Socialist which had branches. Its leader was Lamine Gueye. (En passant I suppose what his presence in govt. and his securing the electoral and status reforms of Loi Lamine Gueye influenced the RDA decision to break with PCF and join the cabinet-government forming game.) Senghor was certainly influenced intellectually by French Marxism but he was always a Marxiste, mais. In Senegal he ousted L.G. by use of mass organizational tactics on the so-called citizens (old communes)—subjects (newly enfranchised) issue with the backing of the great Marabout leaders. Possibly Mamadou Dia is the most promising Marxist leader in Senegal spectrum but I think his influences are also heavily French gauche Catholic. The totally Marxist parties have been either regional splinter groups (Casamance) or university centred intellectual cliques. The former had a mass base but one unrelated to Marxism and the latter did not want to have dirty hands and thus had little real trade union success. (UGTAN was never dominant in Senegal.)

Guinea and Mali do fairly consistently fit in with Marxist organization. It is perhaps not irrelevant that the party bases and inter-territorial positions were more consistent with being Marxist! Mali was desperately poor, needed federation, felt oppressed by the Metropot at Dakar, had no real old elite (of a modern kind at any rate) and only a very petty new elite. The PDG was trade union based. The PDCI per contra grew out of a much older Baule regional group of large African planters originally formed to protest that during the depression French planters received corvee and prison labour free and African planters did not. (Perhaps not a *raison d'etre* Marx would have found any too promising as the mortar for the foundation of a Communist party!)

In the Cameroon one again has a Marxist organized and indeed Marxist party--the UPC. However, it was successfully repressed and never either broke with PCF nor came to power. The RDA was very weak in AEF partly because it was less educated (relative term) and partly because De Gaulle had an appeal there stemming from fact that his first armed forces to move into successful battle were those of LeClere from the Cameroon (a fact the names and statues in Yaounde and Douala constantly remind everyone) and as a result the Brazzaville Conference marked a promise by De Gaulle to reward Francophonic Africa which was more immediate and believed in AEF. Also Felix Eboue (sp) had been Governor General there during the war and he was black giving greater assurance that an African could be Governor General of AEF. In Cameroon Louis Aujolat (a creole I believe) came to power with Bloc Camerounaise (perhaps not exact name) representing French and old elite votes with Ahidjo representing new elite and Northern chiefs (more the former) as junior partner. Ahidjo used popular reaction against war on UPC to take over. He then split UPC by offering amnesty and legal status if they would come out of the woods. Half did. Ruben Um Nyobe was by then dead and Moumie (expelled from UPC by Nyobe for choosing to fight war from Zurich) in exile. UPC (legal) ended in a sad alliance with remnants of Aujolat group parties and shared final banning with them. Ahidjo has never been even verbally very Marxist. He is left Catholic influenced in some respects (no--he is a Moslem) but hardly PCF.

In Niger (like Senegal a non-RDA state) Djibo Bakary was probably PCF influenced. Once RDA was anti-communist PRA tended to sound more radical because it was the minority party except in Niger and Senegal (Senegal special case--not always PRA anyhow) and needed a radical appeal. PRA (Bakary led Niger PRA ie Sawaba) tried for a non vote and was broken and pushed out by French-Hausa chiefs-Diery (RDA). In opposition Bakary certainly became Marxist influenced but not very effectively on guerilla tactics it would seem. (This may be unfair--Niamey has had to call in French troops several times.)

In Chad one might argue that David Dacko was moving to a communist type party structure before Colonel Bokassa ousted him with the cry "Vive de Gaulle! Vive la France libre!" on his lips (literally). He had moved up Marxist (at least verbally) intellectuals and tried to create a strong youth wing and a party education unit. In part this was probably Maoist influence.

In Congo (B) Pascal Lissouba and his bit of the trade unions did use Marxist tactics and organization. The backbone of the coup against Abbe Youlou was Army-Catholic Trade Union. The army was--at that point--eased out and so were the Christian trade unionists. The youth wing was built up as a radical power center. Massamba-Debat seems to have been much less Marxist in power building until after the army coup beaten off by his Cuban guard when he turned to youth wing militia as well--in the end unsuccessfully.

If Patrice Lumumba was working on a Marxist organizational model (or a tactical one) it must have been by pretty remote thought transference. Anicet Kashimura perhaps. In his later stages perhaps Thomas Kanza but he never did create a base. Soumailat and Mulele are more surface Maoist-Gueveralist based on tribal loyalties but there certainly was

a clear class struggle line to the organization and a probably directly influenced use of Marxist guerrilla tactics. (Not that Marx was a theoretician of guerrilla warfare to the best of my knowledge!)

Anglophonic Africa seems rather dud. Nkrumah's "Circle" does suggest modelling on BCP. "Towards Colonial Freedom" ditto. (And Padmore was a Marxist even if he had broken with CP.) The trouble here is that the organizing genius of the CPP was not Nkrumah but Koula Gbedemah and it is a trifle difficult to think of K.A. as following Marxist principle even in party organizing. By the time Marxists were running the CPP it was no longer a mass party and was deliberately being kept from any real hold on power levers. (I am assuming that one accepts that Tawai Adamafio and J. K. Tettegah were never Marxists.)

Siaka Stevens in S. Leone may be a better example of a Marxist influenced organizational pattern. (This is to a large extent another trade union based party a la the PDG.) I am not very well acquainted with S.L. politics on the organizational detail level.

In the Maghreb Majoub ben Seddek (sp.) and the Trade Union Movement in Morocco have been Marxist in organization (though with some of UGT weaknesses) and have tried to graft on peasant and unorganized labour affiliates. I'd think they were well ahead of more verbally orthodox Marxists like the late Mehdi Ben Barka in that respect.

In Algeria and Tunisia the PCF was badly hampered by its very late arrival at supporting independence. There were CP's in each country quite separate from and more pro administration than the ultimate nationalist parties. Thus the direct organizational impact was rather low.

II. RHETORIC

Here one has a field day. Rather simplified Marxist terminology is common coinage. Liberia and the Ivory Coast are about the only consistent exceptions (IC since 1950). Even Kenya and at one stage Malawi use the phrases.

This has a rather curious result-Marx often ends as the objective hondservant of neo-colonialism with the use of his words to hide reality and-more than incidentally-sometimes to delude those who use them. In Congo (B) when Lissouba was still PM the Finance Minister could say perfectly seriously in answer to a question on the effects of French policy on Congo (B) "But if it were not in our interests they would never do it."

It isn't clear that the false use is deliberate. The phrases came into general circulation in the context of anti-colonial, anti-imperial struggle and thus entered the vocabulary. Further they are a good deal catchier than Plato and J.S. Mill (or Talleyrand and General MacMahon for that matter though Jules Ferry was phrasemonger enough...but with an offputting content for Africans!)

The phrases are dangerous to the user. They have a good chance of deluding the external auditor. (Part of Ghana's incredibly bad external PR related to rhetoric. West African rhetoric in general is of course extreme by any standards which again predisposes to Marxist rhetoric.) But it can also lead to the speaker mistaking the substance for the reality. (Again Ghana...there is some reason to think that Nkrumah mistook a speech or a book for an implemented programme of action to carry out ideas of same...)

III. OBSTACLES

Marx has suffered very much because his early disciples in/to Africa were Europeans who were not much less Eurocentric and superior than the typical Europeans concerned with Africa. I have already mentioned the case of the Cercles.

The BCP advisers in Ghana were incredible. Their ideas of organization and policy did not bear examination for one minute but by using rhetoric they got a number of them accepted. (I used to argue with Ron Bellamy that if he believed the laudatory articles he wrote and got people to believe and act on it he was both violating the Marxist

principle of looking at objective reality and doing a tremendous disservice to both Ghana and Socialism,) Granted the BCP has the special problem of never having been a mass party nor near power so it has little idea of how to organize to win, hold, or use power but its people did strike me as feeling "anything is good enough for Africans" and seeing Parliament House in Accra as a subway stop to Whitehall.

In South Africa the same problem has repeatedly arisen of Time Longer Than Rope re the ICW, the gingerly relations of ANC with Congress of Democrats, the PAC denunciation of CPSA. ANC may now be Marxist (albeit both the ANC and PAC people I know strike me as very bourgeois indeed) but its organization owed little to CP.

The Algeria-Tunisia problem ever independence was mentioned earlier. PCF was very French indeed on that issue until quite late in the day. (I'm not sure they changed before Mendes-France on Tunisia.)

Aime Cesaire's "Open Letter to Maurice Thorez" resigning from the PCF is fairly typical of the reaction (Padmore's break with Comintern is Anglophonic parallel). It denounces the PCF in no uncertain (and very Marxist) terms as the new imperialism, as culturally and morally and intellectually Eurocentric as the old, trying to force Africans (including Martiniqueans in this case) into France-Colony straightjacket, denying opportunity of unity of all Tiers Monde and all progressive forces.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF MARX ON COLONIES

Marx himself is a basic problem re the above. He most certainly was Eurocentric and didn't believe in independent colonial revolts against the center ushering in socialism.

More serious-Marx believed in trade and colonialism as engines of growth. He did not, of course, believe they would lead to a satisfactory capitalism but he most certainly did believe they broke the traditional culture and society (which he saw as gádáto break) and would by say 1960 bring India et alia to the state of the UK in 1860 when one could get down to serious business.

I suspect this lack of any relevant biblical passages when coupled with the stage approach leads to the rather dithery European Socialist prescriptions on and views about Africa. They can turn out to be quite pro some, controlled foreign capital to create a controlled capitalist stage under a national unity front including the elite. On the other hand they can also be quite pro a state rather than a private capitalist phase. (In Ghana they argued a mixed line.)

Presumably also this lack of guidance leads to the recurrent fears that African would be socialist states are trying to go too fast. This was true in re Ghana and seems to be here.

An even nastier problem arises from Marx on surplus value. By any literal reading (even of Vol. III albeit one can get almost anything out of that-I once had a Marxist colleague who got an early and inferior version of Hayek on business cycles out of it. I fancied that a rather poor compliment to Marx!) of surplus value-labour theory any exchange of industrial products for primary products necessarily results in expropriation of what is rightfully the primary producer's. BUT in trade with primary producers USSR sells industrial goods. Worse, it sells them at world prices and buys primary products at world price (and charges interest on loans if we want to catalogue more blasphemies). Poor Professor Potehkin was always rather frightened when asked that one..... Per the next section Lenin on Imperialism much less Rosa (on the same) is also booby trapped. (Professor Szentes also dodges on this type of question by the by. I think he could be pinned down to admitting that in a peripheral sense in terms of Socialist Europe-Tiers Monde trade relations Socialist Europe was on the exploiter side of an industrial world-underdeveloped world contradiction. The whole logic of his analysis of underdevelopment says this.....)

V. ON IMPERIALISM

Marx had little to say and re the economic development effects, as noted, it was wrong. The weltanschauung of class struggle is OK if applied to world scene with whole countries in proletariat class but Marx did not so apply.

Lenin is rather near straight Hobson. Apart from a problem of fact in getting the emphasis on capital export and in seeing the colonial system as critical to whole national bourgeois the book is still very Eurocentric.

Rosa Luxemburg is a good deal more to the point. (How many Africans have read her is quite another matter. None at CP urging one would suppose. A few Francophonic ones have done so e.g. Senegalese.) She has proletarian and bourgeois nations. (How she would have seen a Germany captured by CP avoiding being a bourgeois nation in this context had the Spartakists succeeded I don't quite see.) Further she has the core of the process dependent on trade not on investment. (The one case that would seem to hold well for investment is Malaysia and that won't do as what one needs is a mass of outlets enough to stave off final crisis.) This has the advantage of making the bourgeois nations a little less integrally dependent on the continued existence of the proletariat (good at least from a self reliant point of view as if centre really depends on international proletariat then nothing much can be changed until the center's armageddon and per contra the best way to work at the center is to go out and manipulate the periphery to increase metropolitan tensions. Neither of these is anything but Eurocentric.) and of showing that the economic self interest of the proletariat in the bourgeois economies can be the same as that of the bourgeois so far as relations with the proletarian nations go. (Not a useful point for CP however as by extension the interests of socialist industrial countries are bourgeois re tiers monde....)

The neo-imperialist analysis of international economic relations does not-it seems to me-owe terribly much to Marx. (I am thinking of Part II of Unity or Poverty as a sample of the analysis on academic level and Jamal's speeches at last tee IMF's and at last week's Congress in Italy and before Pearson Commission in Kampala as political spokesman examples.) The relevant economic school of thought includes rather diverse figures from Furnivall and Myint to Prebisch and Furtado to Seers and Streeten. Of these only Furtado is a Marxist. Seers and Streeten are Marx influenced but in terms of Weltanschauung not economic analysis where they view both Marx and debates on Marx vs Keynes (or Ricardo) as rather irrelevant bores. (By the by, my co-author would have a fit over the forgoing. Granted she wrote most of that section but the theoretical frame dropped around it is mine and while it is influenced by Lenin and Luxemburg and a Malayan Marxist-James Puthucheary- the dominant influences are Furnivall, Seers and five years in Africa and SE Asia.)

President Nyerere's MacDougall lecture is a case study. This is an early and brilliant statement of the international class system in the international economic system interpreted and presented in coherent economic terms. I assume the technical assistance and drafting there was by John Scott and Joan Wicken..... The result could be viewed in the abstract as being from Lenin and Luxemburg but I doubt it..... (Equally Amir's presentations are largely his own reflections plus reading the President plus some technical assistance and ideas of mine ### he has accepted. Granted that a number of normally sensible economists e.g. Dharam Ghai, Phil Ndegwa think me a left Marxist economist.....)

VI. POLITICAL THEORY/POLITICAL ECONOMIC THEORY

This falls into a number of not always easily separable classes.

- A.) Clearly Marxist/Marxian influenced but Marxiste mais
Senghor, Bourguiba
(Bourguiba is rather an oddity because he uses more of the substance than most but far less of the rhetoric.... This is misleading. Far left individuals with open eyes are usually exceedingly pleasantly surprised by visiting and studying Tunisia.)
- B.) Orthodox Marxist written with careful rote application and forcing of facts into frames
Any amount of stuff! Presence Africain has printed quite a lot as articles and volumes. Senegales left is "good" at this
- C.) Reasonably creative Marxian writing which is either not heretical or only heretical on secondary issues
Toure, Sydou Badian Kouyete, perhaps Samir Amin, Keita (if his speeches are published in collected form)
- D.) "G" attempts which really do not come off
Nkrumah of Consciencism (though it isn't really as bad a book as it is usually rated as being--this was an attempt at being an African Lenin)
- E.) "Faux Amies" which appear to be heavily Marxist influenced but are not--
Mwalimu-"MacDougall Lecture", Arusha Declaration, etc.
probably Nkrumah Africa Must Unite
J.H. Mensah Ghana 7 Year Plan (this might be in class A)

There is a special problem here in that most political figures who write books and speeches do use either ghost writers or drafters. If redrafting is not carefully done by the author one can get very odd results e.g. Paul Bonani discoursing on "the inherent contradiction...."

The case to end all cases (not that the author would necessarily have disagreed violently but would have reworked and coherentized had he reworked it) is Nkrumah's Neo-Colonialism. (Consciencism is not.... Professor Abraham certainly did write a draft but he made the mistake of thinking that was final text when preparing remarks for "Grand Launching" and had to drop his text remarks and end very nearly summarizing by reading a line from each page.) That book began life as a set of somewhat random notes prepared as background material for a draft book to be worked out by Michael Dei Anang and H.M. Basner. By some transmutation it appeared with a bit at the beginning and a bit at the end but still very largely undigested and unamalgamated notes (e.g. the long, not directly relevant or at least not made so, and factually not very accurate bit on the Patines and Bolivian tin). Yes, I have indicated who wrote the notes but also that they weren't written to publish as such. (I think the attempt to get Unity and Poverty -earlier draft- turned over to appear under K.N.'s name may have fouled up the timing on revision and reworking of Neo-Colonialism albeit my refusal to play on that didn't seem to lead to much ill-will, at one point it had an introduction by K.N. and was to come out from Heineman. Introduction dropped on quite pragmatic grounds that it would have limited influence of book--it was not particularly good as it was a collation of snippets from other K.N. books and speeches.) Who collaborated on the earlier--and much better--Africa Must Unite I'm less sure. Possibly parts are Padmore drafted and parts J.H. Mensah but I think there is a good deal of Nkrumah in it. I have introduced this discursion because I do see problems in dealing with political leaders' writings when none too sure how much of it they internalized as well as cleared. E.G. Sessional Paper

and both political leader statements to Kenya Plan are very close in basic substance to Ed Edwards drafts. However, they are after discussion of and internalization of the drafts by those in whose names they appeared so I'd be quite willing to credit them to Mboya-Kenyatta-Kibaki (to a degree and with a somewhat different reading of some parts).

VII. INTELLECTUALS

Marxism is fashionable in intellectual circles in most countries. Thus that it is so in Africa is hardly surprising. What is perhaps surprising is how undigested and unAfricanized a good deal of it is.

It is also a rather handy form of escapism. It provides an excuse for failure to have any impact on government and for failure to take part in reformism. One can easily keep ones hands as well as ones ideology clean that way. The French African Student Federation (FEANF) strikes me as a wonderful example of that. (They have at times driven the International Union of Students mad by how hard a line they take, they certainly nearly broke up the Tunisia international seminar on students and economic change in 1961, even though UGET and Ben Salah were clearly wanting a neo-Marxist, international class system orientation. The Yugoslav and Polish academic participants and I had rather similar views on the irrelevance and escapism being displayed and that it prevented any useful discussion or work so long as it went on....) It is perhaps significant that when they go home FEANF members are not notably radical if they get good positions (if not they sometimes are). e.g. Albert Tevoedjre (sp) went from President of FEANF by stages to be a senior official in Dahomey (how I'm not quite sure, he once headed a party in Senegal but that wouldn't mean he wasn't Dahomeyan-the name seems to me to be) to Secretary General of OCAM. Sic transit gloria Marx.

In a number of cases the Marxism seems more an expression of rage against the dying of the light than an internalized faith or intellectual creed of much specificity. In the Sudan for example the student-graduate choice has usually been between the Communist Party (or its various fronts) and the Ikhwan Musselman (The Moslem Brotherhood). And the assassinated Tunisian opposition leader (name escapes me) was always swinging between Moscow and the Moslem Brotherhood. This may of course simply hark back to the problem of Marx in Africa being too European in prophets and presentation. One could argue that Marxism's appeal in the Sudan is in being more logical and modern while the Moslem Brothers appear as the legitimate heirs to the radical nationalism of the Mahdi and thus the students swing between the two because they want what each has but are repelled again by its gaps.

VIII. TRADE UNIONS

Morocco and Guinea yes. These are perhaps classic cases of a Marxist political action oriented trade union. The Moroccan case is somewhat marred by UGT syndicalism but this can also be read as pragmatism.... if the unions could not seem deliver political power it was best to be able to deliver economic gains to the workers in the interim and thus keep a satisfied power base.

Tunisia's unions before the ouster of Ben Salah (1959?) were another case albeit Ben Salah was never all that close to UGT so far as I know.

UGTAN was certainly Marxist but not very sensibly so outside Guinea. It didn't really get its interior power bases in order and tended to clash violently with RDA units which is hardly the way to a popular front.

TUC-Ghana. NO. Unless one wants to take the crassest Stalinist manipulation of Trade unions as devices to hold down workers as Marx. That there was of course but not much in the way of either indoctrination or Stahkanevism to make the system work.

Nigeria-not in the effective unions. The 1964 general strike would have brought down the government in short order had its leadership been even normally politically conscious much less thinking Marxists.

AATUF....well but did it ever have an independent reality? I think not.

IX. GWERRILLAS

1. UPC-yes.
2. South Africa-I think not. Spear, Poqo, ARM simply weren't organized by Marxists. Spear is the question mark here depending how one evaluates the operating ANC leadership, especially Nelson Mandela. ARM was the "violent" (despairing) wing of the Liberal Party. Poqo tended to be the channelling of blind anger and Populism (which is perhaps why it seems to have continued better-
less organization is needed....)
3. Mozambique-this is in part another case of faux amies. Dr. Mondlane did not get his basic set of views from Marx. Final terminology yes but not basic substance. Dos Santos is much more a Marxist intellectual.
4. Guinee de Sud-possibly. Certainly Cabral is Marxist influenced both as a politician and as a strategist (though not it would seem as an agronomic development economist). Indeed he is the inverse of Senghor in a sense-a Marxist mais who has developed an independent intellectual stance which builds from selected elements of Marx-Lenin as a base rather than building by subtraction.
5. Angola-GRAE-no. Holden Roberto is certainly no Marxist nor is he Marxist influenced (partly I think because he would view Marxism as European). MPLA-well yes but in a rather destructive way. The MPLA's varied splits have had a good deal to do with rather abstract bits of Marxist theology and strategic theology derived from Lenin. (Virato da Cruz was the most well known case but there have been others.) UNITA-probably not. At least when I knew him (then leader in Holden's youth wing) he could hardly be described as Marxist. Assuming his present reports of totally Angolan centred and based operations with no significant foreign support are true then he may have been influenced by the writings of Che Guevara.

X. POLICY

Here the problem really is "Which Marx?" There are after all quite a number. For example Marx of the Herald Tribune on socialism under certain circumstances by progressive taxation, death duties, etc. would certainly fit Tunisia-indeed they are rather more radical than that-they nationalize things. Ditto Zambia I suppose, more slowly.

Marx as seen by the authors of the Soviet and Yugoslav revolutions no. Marx as seen by People's China-which did make significant use of national capitalists during the revolution and for some years after one could claim to see in Tanzania.

Guinea and Mali have certainly tried to follow what they considered proper Marxian policies and at some points Ghana did as well. All three have been notable for making rather amazing botches by not using common sense in organization and timing. All three also suffered from over-bureaucratization and-at least in the cases of Ghana and Mali-the creation of a "New Class".

The tendency of verbal Marxists in power in Africa seems to be to preach slogans to the masses. This works rather better before independence (then a la Danton seeing a mob run by #there go my people, I must run ahead and lead them now I know where they are going#) it is rather easy to lead by slogan and to give the impression that the slogan and the success are integrally related.). After independence it is harder and harder to keep finding new slogans to show why failures are totally the result of colonial period and not at all that of incumbent leadership. Genuine mass involvement after taking power is perhaps not something one is likely to learn from European Communist parties. They tend to be very bureaucratized and either never to have held power or never to have had a mass party base from which they built. (Yugoslavia might be a more useful model in that sense or North Vietnam.)

One seems to get a number of strands-

1. Marxiste mais leading to quite un-Marxian programmes and policies combined with political stances highly Marxian in verbiage and partly so in ~~principle~~ e.g. Senghor
2. Initially non-Marxian positions developing into Marxiste mais and then into independent neo-Marxian African positions e.g. Cabral perhaps Ben Seddek
3. Fairly orthodox Marxian positions with some modifications on the political stance level to meet perceived reality and (but) with a mix of non-Marxist and very ill localized Marxist programmes and policies e.g. Keita, Toure
4. Marxiste de convenance leading to ultimately conservative policies, programmes, and stances e.g. Houphouet-Boigny
5. Marxist hard line leading to destruction e.g. Um Nyobe perhaps Bakari but there I think destruction came first
6. Positions perhaps describable as neo-Marxian but not basically arrived at from Marx with "appropriate" (to stance) policies and programmes usually very much pragmatically oriented to perceived constraints (sometimes too much so) and rather varied verbal formulations e.g. Bourguiba, Kaunda, ~~Ngũgĩ~~, Obote, ~~Nasser~~, Kibaki (?)
(Nasser by Madi (?))
7. Clearly neo-Marxian stances, programmes, policies but not ones primarily derived from Marx although the formulators in general have read Marx and Marxians and are to some extent influenced by him/them e.g. Nyerere, Mondlane, Nasser
8. Cases of apparant self confusion-Marxian elements scattered in programmes, policies-but usually rather oddly or badly done- and usually dominant in verbal stance e.g. Nkrumah, Masekela-Debat, Karume
9. Probable Marxiste terminologique de convenance (or in some cases frauds) e.g. Mobutu, Gbenye (fraud), various Dahomeyan leaders, Ojukwu

XI. RELEVANCE AND RELATIVE FAILURE

1. Relevance in terms of weltanschauung should be high....but highest in writers like Luxembourg not very acceptable to orthodox European CP.
2. Relevance of historical approach to economics potentially high but largely vitiated by economic theology approach often used by one school of Marxist economist and ever-cautious apologetic stance of the practicing economist school of Marxists from Europe and also shadowed by the fact clearcut use of this places Socialist Europe in bourgeois camp in international economic system analysis.
3. General sense of history-taken flexibly-relevance high in the sense that if one believes in the long run (even if not necessarily in historical inevitability and the wave of the future) one should be more willing to take two steps forward, one to the side, one back and repeat and less fearful that one must leap on seizing the crest of the wave and trying to pull it after one before it does a Dover Beach.
4. But to acquire this relevance requires:
 - a. a willingness to look out from an Africa-African polity centered viewpoint;
 - b. flexibility as to strategy and tactics while keeping the overall frame and aims in mind;
 - c. clear-sightedness in perceiving what the objective reality actually faced is and not a theological exegesis of what it must be or a metaphysical speculation of what it were oughting to be
 - d. from "c" insight and commonsense in using "b" and not propounding "solutions" which in effect say explicitly, say implicitly, or when tried turn out to say "you can't get there from here"

5. None of the above has been particularly common in Marx as presented or as perceived in Africa. If one argues that President Nyerere has arrived at a basically Marxian orientation and stance by roads other than Marxism this is an argument for the potential relevance of Marx in Africa and a rather damning comment on his (M's) missionaries to Africa. To generalize a comment made to me by several Ceylonese when I inquired why the three Marxist parties (Communist, neo-Marxist Populist, "Trotskyite") did so badly despite being well organized and in the "Trotskyite" case having a leader who was felt by plenty of people outside his voters to be the most nationally oriented (Tamil as well as Sinhalese) and intellectually able of the political leaders- Marx in Africa is too Western. He is presented as part and parcel of the world that Europe made and made in its own interest and with little concern for its meaning to the Tiers Monde even if with a paternalistic arrogant assurance that it was for the welfare of "lesser breeds without the law" as well. (In that regard the Chinese should have a considerable headstart. On the other hand lack of a cultural and intellectual superiority complex has not been a notable Chinese characteristic in China's great eras although they have normally not been so sure it could be exported lock stock and barrel).

I hope the above may be of some use to you. (It has been interesting to note and write to see where I would come out and why.) If you want elucidation or partial references I'll try to oblige.

RHG
28-IV-69