A. Population (South)

Poverty, rapid population growth and ecology interact in ways destructive to the human environment. Responsible stewardship must face their inter-relationship squarely.

High infant mortality, low female literacy, chronic malnutrition and endemic economic (and especially old age) security lead to high birth rates. In the absence of war and epidemics and the presence of even very modest preventative and curative primary health care they result in very rapid population increases. In a context of poverty, high birth rates contribute to high maternal and infant mortality, household food insecurity and financially constrained access to education, especially for girls. That constraint is both at governmental level - many children, few resources - and at household - many mouths to feed requiring that many hands work.

Population growth in poor countries has a devastating impact on ecology. Land is farmed continuously when the only proven sustainable technologies in most of SSA and of highland Asia and Latin America require long fallow periods. Trees and bushes are wiped out for household fuel and house construction. Water and atmospheric pollution are raised by human and animal waste, loss of vegetation cover and artisanal mining technology. In turn the ecological damage makes this generation and especially larger future generations inexorably poorer. When the choice is between doing ecological damage to survive now, or not doing it and starving now, there is no choice. Because massive population growth, itself largely poverty driven, poses that diabolic choice, creating a context for responsible parenthood and family size is vital to local, national and global ecological protection.

To identify the interactions is to illuminate some of the answers and more of the questions. Lower infant and young child mortality can be achieved - 50% lower in most South countries within a decade. Implementation of WHO's Health for All by the Year 2000 including UNICEF's more narrowly posed maternal, infant and young child life and health protection programmes would cost 1% to 1½% of most southern country nation product or 5% of their total government budgets. Universal primary and adult education (for girls as women as well as men and boys) is also attainable over a decade -
several South countries of different cultures, systems of governance, size and economic attainments have come close to that goal. Food security - for households, not just countries - is harder and more expensive to achieve but some poor countries and some states in India have virtually reached it.

The linking of very high population growth to high absolute poverty and especially to high infant mortality and high female illiteracy is amply supportable by empirical evidence. But it is not simply an abstract social science correlation. Nowhere has this dynamic - and the ways to reverse it - been more clearly stated than in the recent report of the South Commission.

Old age security poses the greatest problematic for implementation. Family solidarity and access to land to retire to are the traditional patterns. Increasing strain on family resources and on availability of land - both related to rapid population growth in low economic growth contexts - have frayed these safety nets as have modernisation, individualism and erosion of traditional safeguards over the land or land use rights market. Because economic expansion and productivity are far from reaching industrial economy levels national social - and especially old age - security systems either cover a very small portion of the population or are so low as to leave recipients in abject poverty especially if other household and family members are also poor.

To concentrate solely on enabling poor households to produce and to earn more would provide more security for the aged members of their immediate and extended families. But it would not meet the needs of those old people whose families were late to benefit - the 1,000,000,000 persons (over 150,000,000 households) now living in absolute poverty (WDR 1990) will not all be enabled to reach minimal decent incomes in one or even two decades. Nor would it benefit those who have few close relatives or whose family solidarity has eroded.

To seek solely to create South analogues to North state underwritten safety nets is also a slow - for financial reasons - and problematic - for human reasons - course. If benefits are to be fiscally bearable, administrable and accessible to all old people, they must be pitifully low. This is illustrated by Namibia where they are about $25 a month for an aged black person in an economy which by South standards is not particularly poor. In a really poor country like Mozambique, $5 60 $8 a month, urban only for
aged persons appears to be the maximum practicable and then only if externally supported. Further, the experience of the North is that such benefits both meet the weaknesses caused by and accelerate the growing trend for the working generation to reduce or even to deny its sense of intergenerational human solidarity and responsibility. Isolated or institutionalised aged people in the North may be kept from physical misery by state safety nets but they are often humanly marginalised by selfish individualism and/or institutionalisation of care and formal kindness without human involvement.

The answer that efforts on both fronts are needed is doubtless correct as far as it goes. In rural areas in particular greater ability to meet basic household needs would lead to renewed action on a continuing feeling of intergenerational responsibility. And even limited - in amount and coverage - state systems can save lives in the literal and the human sense. But how to proceed is far harder to see clearly than in respect of reducing infant and young child mortality, strengthening food security and achieving universal female as well as male access to basic education.

In an environment of hope and modest social and economic development child spacing and broader demographic education and technology become increasingly desired and effective. It is no accident that educated, non-poor households in the South both desire and achieve lower complete family sizes than poor households and that for the not poor these sizes decline fairly steadily over time.

Education relates to attitudes not only to techniques and access to facilities. In particular it must face male attitudes to family size. Literate women confident their children will live and concerned with their feeding, schooling and clothing far less frequently wish to maximise their numbers to demonstrate their personal importance or sexual dignity than do men. Male domination is a cause of high birth rates independent of poverty and one which needs to be recognised and countered. But the essential first step is to remove the context of social, human, economic and life insecurity, ignorance, death and deprivation which ensure high birth and population growth rates.
B. Population (North)

In the North population growth rates - especially excluding immigration, of new residents and 'guestworkers', are low and declining. However, as a human being in the North uses on average about ten times as many scarce resources as one in the South the pressures on ecology and on distribution of scarce goods like energy, wood and metals are still very severe from a global perspective. A 1% annual increase in USA population requires about as many real resources as one of 3% in India and in fact USA population growth is rather faster and Indian rather slower than these rates.

Within the North, poor and marginalised households do tend to have larger family sizes than those integrated into society and production. The reasons are comparable to those of the poor majorities of households in the South. And in the North lack of resources is no excuse - the real reason is lack of human concern and social priority. It is easy to call this lack of "political will", but what that means is that politicians (one fears correctly) believe that enabling and assisting marginalised poor minorities of 10% to 25% to reintegrate into society and production is not a serious priority of the majority of their non-poor constituents.

Unfortunately declining family size in the North has often not led to greater concern for children as might have been expected. The increased participation of women in the waged labour force (however desirable from other perspectives) has frequently lessened human contact with, or even physical care of, children. Even more humanly alarming, children - in both non-poor and poor households - often appear to be viewed as amenity consumer goods and attention to them as a competing time use with earning more money for other consumer goods and/or for devotion to personal leisure pursuits. The increased identification of continuing high levels of child neglect and abuse is an extreme and extremely alarming element and symbol of this unacceptable face of individualistic consumerism.
C. Ecology (South)

The overriding global ecological dangers are climatic change (global warming) and atmosphere alteration (e.g. decomposition of large portions of ozone layer) or a combination of the two (e.g. massive injection of dust into upper atmosphere from volcanic or atomic disaster). These certainly endanger the South as well as the North and for two sets of reasons are likely to be more damaging in the global warming case. The first set are technical - global warming would reduce rainfall and productivity in most of a wide band on both sides of the equator and raise it in much of the more northerly and southerly areas; the probable rise in sea levels would inundate more (up to all) of many Southern countries than of most Northern. The second is that poverty reduces the ability to contain damage (e.g. Holland can raise its sea defences whereas Bangladesh cannot, primarily because one is rich and one poor) and to absorb loss (or as the African proverb puts it "Give a rich man less food and he will grow thin. Give a poor man less food and he will die").

However, the most immediate ecological crises in the South turn on destruction of productivity through reduction of tree, bush and shrub cover and over or mal- use of crop and pasture land. These - especially deforestation - do increase the future risk and intensity of climatic change, but have very serious economic and human consequences at households and national levels now. Their dynamic is more complicated than is usually supposed. Neither lack of knowledge nor greed is the single most important - let alone the only - driving force in that dynamic of ecological destruction.

Population, poverty and need interacting in a context of economic injustice are the main causes of natural ecological damage and human environmental degradation in most of the South. As Adam Smith warned that no nation could be great and prosperous the majority of whose people were poor and miserable, so a modern ecologist/moral philosopher should recognise that no ecology can be healthy and sustainable if the majority of the people inhabiting and adjoining it exist in a human environment of poverty and misery.

Poverty - as set out in more detail under population - leads to high birth rates and rapid population growth. Because resources - in most of the
South primarily land, but also wage employment and knowledge - are scarce, increases in population raise the numbers in absolute poverty and the pressure on the ecology. When that happens - and especially in the context of natural disasters (e.g. Sahel drought cycles) and human crafted catastrophes (e.g. the destruction of the economies and societies of Mozambique by South Africa's armed bandits) - survival now requires using and abusing resources including ecology even though it is clear to the user that doing so will make her/his future life and especially that of future generations harder and more precarious. Without survival there is no future so there is no choice not to abuse the ecology.

To recognise that need (as well as greed) can be, and is, ecologically devastating is crucial to seeing how to confront the dynamic of ecological degradation. In most of Africa the primary cause of deforestation (including bushes and shrubs) - with its climatic, soil fertility and erosion consequences - is need, not greed even though the later is important in some cases. Poor households must have land to grow crops and cannot afford to preserve or manage forests. In cropping or grazing areas they must have fuel to cook food and poles to build homes and cannot afford to abstain from cutting live trees or bushes if the supply of dead ones is inadequate. Similarly, even if the only known forms of sustainable agriculture require long rotations and up to five-sixths of the land fallow (the perjoratively misdescribed "shifting cultivation" traditionally, and often ecologically sustainably, practiced in most of SSA), when land becomes scarce poor households must practice short rotations or permanent cultivation to eat even though they know full well it degrades the land and increases the underlying problem of growing enough crops to survive.

Pressure for off-farm income to augment declining household production for self-provisioning and sale can have parallel results. The stone rice terraces of Banue in the Luzon Cordillera are a masterpiece of construction, of creating the context for sustainable agriculture in a hill context and of responsible stewardship. The modern slash and burn, flimsily or unterraced cultivation on hillsides prevalent in much of adjacent Benguet province is a monument of soil mining, of unsustainability, of stewardship that buys present survival at the price of short term destruction of the ecological base for future survival. This shift does not flow from rural forgetfulness but from need - the need to
use non-cropping time of most household members and migration to urban jobs of some to earn cash to survive.

Nationally too, poverty and need - to service external debt, to import - eat up the ecological as well as the human environment. Certainly greed is involved - especially among the worst slaughter cutting loggers (who are at least as often nationals or domestic firms as TNC's). But the fact remains that the Philippines, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Brazil - to cite a few high profile cases - need exports to service debt and to pay for imports without which their economies will collapse. Given the prices of several of their traditional exports, e.g. cocoa, coffee, sugar, it is inevitable that rapid increases in timber and wood product exports have been pushed with inadequate, or at best patchy and lagged, attention to forest management and ecological concerns.

To identify need as a source of ecological devastation is not to condemn needy people and countries. Frequently they have no choice. But nor is it to condone their actions - ecological degradation increases poverty for present and future generations.

To protect the ecology requires enabling poor people and poor countries to make themselves less poor in ways consistent with ecological sustainability. That in turn requires that they receive more access to knowledge and to material resources.

The knowledge point should not be misheard as an assertion that poor people and countries are in any general sense unaware of or insensitive to ecological damage resulting from their present actions. But they frequently do not know what practicable actions would improve sustainability - indeed often that knowledge does not exist because resources for research and development have not been directed to it. For example, in Ghana few permanent cultivation, bearable input cost, soil fertility sustaining systems for forest zone cropping are known, while at national level lack of data on ecologically sound and economically sustainable means to long term forest management (as well as resources to implement what is known and to experiment with new approaches) limits what a genuinely concerned body of professionals and ministers can achieve.

The resource reallocations needed will be large. To be politically viable domestically they must be within the context of overcoming absolute poverty
and of effective political mobilisation to that end. Internationally mobilisation for basic livelihoods and services needs to be seen as encompassing specific ecological protection programmes and the latter as contributing to the former - a connection which in practice remains very much the exception today.

Ecological management and protection is best seen as an exercise in responsible stewardship. That means responsible use not simple preservationism. Increasing sustainable production of food and of forest products is responsible stewardship; declining to do so to preserve forests as they are in the face of absolute poverty, hunger, land, fuel and building material shortages is not.

For that reason economics and ecology are not inherently inimical either at analytical or practical level. Village forestry in SSA has thrived when it produced dependable flows of fuel, building materials, food, fodder and sometimes cash income to villagers as well as protecting watersheds or reducing erosion. Eastern and Southern Africa's wildlife is at least marginally better protected now than seemed likely three decades ago because of recognition (nationally and, less uniformly locally) of its economic value. Certainly tourism is a mixed benefit and too great access to wildlife has negative consequences but management of access is achievable (including low density visit and closed areas) and tourism - like industrialisation - is better managed to avoid or minimise negative and to accentuate positive effects than rejected as inherently life destroying. How to allocate scarce resources to achieve sufficiency today and to be able to continue to achieve it in the future is a significant part of good stewardship and of technical economics.
First, ecological issues usually focus on future costs or risks which are real but uncertain as to level and require choices among courses of action all of which are second bests and all of which impose present costs. This is a context in which it is bad stewardship to take no action until perfect data is available, but also risky to make major resource allocations and to mobilise support for particular courses of action when the size of the future cost is unclear and the total costs and results of the actions even more so. For example, excluding catastrophic risk and taking in all stages of production, atomic electricity has the second lowest temperature change (to hydroelectricity) and lowest total deaths, injuries and health damage impact of sources practicable on a significant scale over the next twenty years. But one can neither calculate nor ignore catastrophic risk (especially after Chernobyl).

Second, the origins of Northern ecological movements were primarily upper middle class and their overriding concerns the personal quality of life of their members. The Sierra Club in respect to wilderness and the World Wildlife Fund in respect to animals are examples. This history has left a residual concern among ordinary working women and men, and by organised labour, that ecological action cleans up and preserves the world primarily for the rich with the primary costs in employment, prices and taxes falling on the lower middle classes and the poor. The negative implications for the present breadth of the social base behind environmentalism and the necessity for clear, cogent explanation of why ecology matters to poor as well as not poor Northerners are fairly clear. This may also suggest a need to separate urgent, high danger issues such as global warming from more contentious, lower immediate risk ones such as vegetarianism since conflating them reduces support for the potentially broad base ones.

Third, too little use is being made of market mechanisms to make enterprises accept that pollution does not pay and therefore to act to reduce it. The higher the fines or charges for atmospheric and water pollution, the more resources enterprises will devote to reducing them. The higher the taxes on hydrocarbons the greater the economic attractions of fuel saving technology (and the greater the fiscal resources potentially available for initial ecological protection measures).

The failure to act seriously and generally on such managed market measures does not lie with technical economists. The concepts of external costs
(borne by someone other than the individual whose actions cause them) and the desirability if practicable, of charging them to the user by market intervention are standard in neo-classical micro economics. Similarly, external economics and methods to reward those who produce them - e.g. cost contributions to tree planting and forest management - are well within the bounds of standard economic technique and economists' discourse. Nor can one blame conservative and neo-liberal thought as a whole. It has frequently put forward tax and fine or charge burdens as a way to raise costs of (disincentives to) pollution and to enhance profits of (incentives to) conservation.

Certainly those causing - and not now paying - ecological costs oppose such market instruments. That is not surprising. But in general ecologists and non-conservative thinkers and mobilisers for ecological concerns have refused to take market instruments seriously and given them at most fairly grudging lip service. This is neither logical nor likely to be ecologically productive. Market instruments cannot do everything - e.g. Korea's high automobile and gasoline taxes have financed low cost urban public transport but have not slowed the vertiginous rise in Korean private car ownership and traffic jams. That is a very different thing from saying they can do nothing or should not be among the instruments used - Seoul would be a far less liveable city for poor Koreans if it did not have its car/gasoline financed underground railway and bus system.

Finally, much of Central and Eastern Europe and certain zones in newly industrialising countries (e.g. Greater Sao Paulo, Seoul and Mexico City) are environmental disaster areas. The types of centralised planning practiced in the former and unrestrained enterprise freedom to pollute in the latter cases have created massive and massively escalating problems greater in degree than, and perhaps different in kind to, those of high income capitalist economies. Their global impact may be fairly low, but their spillover effect in rivers and blowover effect in the atmosphere (e.g. acid rain) are severe. At least as urgent, they reduce the quality of life and life expectancy for everyone living in these disaster areas and particularly for people working in and living near particularly polluting activities. The combination of protection against spread effects and human solidarity should provide a firm base for mobilisation to secure knowledge and resource transfers to deal with these specific environmental crises.
E. Life and Development Indicators

Debate on and perception of poverty and ecological damage (or restoration) as of perceptions of progress and prosperity do depend on which indicators are widely known and used (or misused). That choice is largely political and social - not technical and professional. The belief that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an unambiguous, all-purpose indicator either of human welfare or of development is not particularly common among national accounting specialists.

The over-attention to GDP flows first from a belief that material output (of goods and services) is the main determinant of the quality of life and second from the belief (or unexamined assumption) that income (command over material resources) is either acceptably distributed or will automatically become so with growth. These are politically, philosophical and social beliefs based partly on assumptions as to fact and partly on value judgements. Their connection with technical economics and most schools of political economy is very tenuous. Examination of the empirical basis for factual assumptions suggests both beliefs are flawed at that level and of the Gospel that both are normatively unsound, or at best incomplete. The need for a more comprehensive set of indicators - and a better understanding of what they do and do not represent - is very real but consumerism, greed, lack of concern for others, inattention to future generations, acceptance of existing social and economic inequalities and inequities and certain schools of political economy are the main obstacles to achieving the values and outlook needed to accept such a shift. To do verbal battle with technical economics or the national accounts profession is to tilt at windmills; an exercise more rewarding to the defenders of the status quo than to its critics.

If the purpose of the indicator debate is to achieve a presentation of main material aspects of the human condition, then whatever indicator or indicators are used should be intelligible to non-specialists. That is a very good reason to suspect any single indicator. Of necessity it will be a combination of several elements constructed by a professional with specialist knowledge and presented by an expert or a leader who wishes to make a point as well as (or more than) to illuminate reality in an objective way. As a result, single indicators must either be accepted on faith or their assumptions and techniques rigourously examined to
understand their strengths and limitations. Few people have the time or skills to do the latter.

In that context UNDP's Human Development Indicator averaging GDP/capita, life expectancy and literacy is welcome in broadening the aspects of life covered. However, unlike the text of the Human Development Report (1990) in which it is presented, the single HDI figures are not readily understandable to ordinary people and, if they are taken on faith as true and total representations of the average human condition in different countries, are almost certainly misleading. Further, like GDP, HDI does not address the issues of distribution and inequality within countries.

What set of indicators would be better? One subset should relate to poverty (the ugliest face of distribution). % in Absolute Poverty, % in real but less severe poverty, % with moderate or severe malnutrition are three possible indicators which, given priority by statistical services, could be compiled for almost all countries with a degree of inaccuracy or doubt no higher than for GDP.

A second subset would be social or human condition. Examples include % literate, % with access to basic health services, % with access to pure water, life expectancy at birth, infant and young child mortality. Again these are all standard series which - with modest resource upgrading - could be as commonly and accurately provided as GDP.

The third subset would relate to production - which does matter. GDP - the sum of goods and services produced in a territorial unit during a year - is a starting point. After adjustments for non-national earnings outflows and non-resident national earnings inflows one arrives at Net National Product - i.e. the earned resources available to the country. Adjusting for depreciation (wearing out) of human created assets, depletion of unrenewable resources and ecological damage (which would raise severe but not insuperable estimation problems) a measure of Net Sustainable National Resource Production can be identified. Adding or deducting net external resource flows (grants, loans, direct investments) would show Net National Resource Availability. The last two are measures of resources available for private consumption, public services, physical investment above the level needed to sustain the capital stock and environmental protection/rehabilitation. Especially at a per capita level (national
amount divided by population) they do have real meaning, however partial and ambiguous it may be especially for cross-country comparisons.

Such indicators cannot measure the quality of social or political relations. In any particular context, additional indicators will be needed to identify specific material aspects of the quality of life. They certainly cannot answer when basic needs become modest amenities become acceptable levels of comfort become either unacceptable inequality or crass consumerism. But they can provide more understanding of certain aspects of quality of life accessible to more people than either GDP or any other single indicator.
r. Power/Governance

Power is the ability to take, to cause or to enforce action. Some methods of exerting power are inherently bad - e.g. blackmail, torture. Equally, no use of power can be justified unless the resulting action is justified. But acceptable action - whether ploughing a field or enacting a minimum occupational health standards statute, negotiating a wage contract or marketing an automobile - pursued by acceptable means cannot rightly be condemned simply because it involves the use of power.

In respect to economy and poverty the two main sources of power are economic and political. The power of ideas, of values and of ethics are relevant but usually by influencing persons or organisations of persons with economic and/or political power.

Empowerment of poor people (and secondarily exercise of the power of others in solidarity or alliance with them) is central to overcoming poverty. Empowerment can mean, e.g. education - to get and hold a job - or self-organisation - to bargain with municipal Authorities for a clinic or bus route, or with employers over wages. What exactly it requires cannot and should not be spelled out in detail outside of specific contexts or the perceptions of the poor people concerned.

Economic power - whether by capital or by labour - is usually exercised by markets or by inducing political power to set limits on or manage markets. Free markets tend to be desired for others not oneself. Both enterprises - e.g. by advertising to differentiate their products, by sole supplier contracts to exclude competing sellers, by backward integration to produce raw materials to assure supply - and organised labour - by collective bargaining on wages, other benefits and employment security and/or loss of job compensation - seek to protect themselves from the uncertainties of markets and of competition. Similarly, both seek to ensure that political power will intervene in markets in ways beneficial to them. Because poor people are not proprietors of large enterprises, usually not influential in trade unions nor well organised and effective politically they are frequently disadvantaged by both these means of economic or political management of markets. Countervailing power (alone or in alliance with not so poor actors) appears a more practicable corrective than attempting to ban all market management. The conditions of uniformly small enterprises...
and direct contact between employers and small labour forces neither of which can afford seriously to injure the other necessary for perfect competition are quite unattainable and without them market management by foci of economic power is inevitable.

Political power - in respect to the poverty and the economy more generally - is most usefully seen as a complement to market power. There is no disagreement that only the state can set a context for economic activity, provide law and order, extend certain public services (albeit there is disagreement on scope) and act on the basis of a socio-political compact or covenant to organise and order social as well as economic relations. In practice there is no disagreement that some market management and intervention is desirable - only over how much, by what means, for whose benefit. For example the debate on environmental responsibilities of the state is not over whether state action is necessary (it is) nor whether enterprises acting in a market with no state intervention can achieve environmentally satisfactory results (they cannot). It is over the balance among market intervention (fines, taxes, subsidies), market management (e.g. specific technical requirements for natural polluters such as automobiles and power plants, bans on the use of disastrous ingredients such as chemicals severely ozone destructive in nature) and direct action (e.g. planting trees in government projects, building power plants harnessing renewable energy enterprises decline to undertake on risk or cost grounds). Also of course, it is over the relative importance of environmental protection and the appropriate levels of resources to be diverted to it by market and direct action mechanisms and how the costs of this diversion should be divided (e.g. tax-payers, consumers, enterprise owners) but these are no more (and no less) economic issues than defence, police, courts and other security priority and funding questions.

Churches have relatively limited institutional economic or political power. However, how they use that power matters. If they do not practice what they preach and pronounce (e.g. if they charge high rents to poor tenants and lobby to be exempt from minimum wage legislation in respect to lay employees) their understanding of and operational commitment to what they say will be open to grave doubt. However, in many countries church positions on social issues when well argued and stating problems, principles and directions for change clearly and cogently do have substantial political influence especially if they are part of a process of
convincing their own members of the validity of these positions and the need for them to act on them as individuals. The likelihood of such pronouncements for responsible stewardship - e.g. in respect to poverty, ecology and economic justice - being taken seriously by holders of political power and by church members is much greater if the churches are demonstrably practising responsible stewardship within their own houses.

Governance

For power to be exercised responsibly it must be accountable. In respect to economic justice this means that market power must be accountable to society via the state both through market intervention and management and through direct action (ultimately financed by taxes on incomes derived from the market) to offset, or at least mitigate, socially unacceptable consequences of market power.

But for market power to be accountable in this way it is necessary that there be good governance. The details of good governance vary by time, place and culture; it is the broad principles which are universally applicable.

The first is accountability. Members of society must have the right to select, to scrutinise the actions of and to replace holders of political power. Multi party Western electoral systems are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for accountability - real ability to select, review the actions of, and reselect or replace holders of political office is.

Real accountability requires transparency. The government's business is its citizens business and they have every right to know what it is doing, why and with what result. Otherwise there is at best a very imperfect basis both for evaluating actions and for re-election or replacement.

A third linked principle is freedom of expression (including critical expression) and of self-organisation on the basis of that expression to influence the selection (or deselection) of leaders. As with transparency order and social interaction do require limits, but these are on styles of expression and tactics of organised groups not on the principle. For example, the right of exploited tenants to criticise governments (e.g. the Philippines) repeatedly using power on behalf of their exploiters and to organise to exert countervailing power versus landlords or to secure
different elected officials is basic. But it need not be seen to include
the right to make statements inciting physical elimination of landlords or
politicians nor to organise collective action to do so.

Order and law are essential principles or elements of good governance.
Both can be used (misused) to preserve injustice or to oppress. By
themselves they are inadequate to achieve good governance, but without them
there most assuredly cannot be good governance. Order in the sense of
acceptable patterns of social relations (including of dissent and solutions
to conflict) and of freedom to go about ones daily life without fear of
forcible intervention by state, market actors, bandits or foreign invaders
is important - especially so to many poor people. That order is ultimately
based on formal and informal, constitutional and unwritten compacts within
and among communities and societies. Its maintenance (like that of
accountability, transparency, freedom of expression and organisation which
are - or ought to be - among the compacts) is to a significant extent
dependent on a legal system with the independence to deal impartially, the
authority to have its decisions honoured and the complementary services
(e.g. of police) to see they are enforced.

Good governance requires two more basic principles or qualities: honesty
and competence/capacity. Corrupt or incompetent states even if validly
elected (and perhaps defeated for re-election) governments, allowing
freedom of expression and organisation, and providing both order and a
legal framework can hardly attain good governance. Further, corruption and
lack of capacity rapidly corrode and erode all the other aspects of
governance. Bribe takers rarely welcome transparency and those unable to
act can neither provide order nor look with confidence to the electorate's
judgement on their performance and will be tempted to shut up the critics
and shut down the electoral process.

"Thou shalt not steal" is a principle of good governance. However, steal
needs to be interpreted broadly to include all misuse of public office for
personal or personal group private benefit. Conflict of interest and
looking out for the interests of only selected actors among those to whom a
political power holder is accountable can be quite as socially divisive,
corrosive of good governance and inimical to economic justice and the
interests of poor people as literal theft of government funds or property.
But if one's list of principles or requirements of good governance were to close at this point it would fail to address a vital aspect of performance. That aspect is competence or capacity. Understaffed, underfunded social services cannot and do not deliver adequate health, education, economic counselling and training services. Poor countries bowed down beneath external debt, external aggression, unfavourable global market trends, high levels of absolute poverty and a history of economic unsuccess (however caused and whether during their or a previous government's term of office) do not have the capacity to provide good governance in general nor to address and act adequately to empower poor people to produce more nor to give them access to basic services and infrastructure. In both cases good governance requires additional resource (knowledge, personnel, finance) injections domestically and, for poor countries, internationally.
G. HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS has become and will increasingly be a human environmental disaster - economically, socially, medically and personally - at all levels from individual through household and family to national and global. That much is certain even though present knowledge tells little about present HIV or AIDS incidence or growth of incidence, about what proportion of HIV positive persons will develop AIDS or how rapidly, about future rates of increase (or levelling off in incidence) or about when vaccines and long term control drugs for HIV, the prevention of HIV progressing to AIDS, and/or for AIDS will be available and at what cost.

The entire topic of HIV/AIDS has been obscured, and attempts to create a knowledge base for reducing its spread and developing vaccines and treatments hampered, by a series of very real pseudo-moral prejudices and reactions against them.

The first documented death from AIDS was in Africa thirty years ago. The victim was a European. However, the development of the African and North American pandemics have been parallel, not sequential, and have followed quite independent trajectories.

AIDS and less certainly HIV are probably the result of the mutation of long existing viruses into more virulent forms. Such mutation is not uncommon and has been recorded on several occasions in the case of influenza. Some mutations across species, e.g. from trypanosomiasis in bovine animals (wild and domesticated) to human sleeping sickness and from scrapie in sheep to mad cow disease and a related human degenerative brain disease are apparently convincingly documented. To suggest that HIV/AIDS may be a mutation of an older disease endemic to African monkeys is not evidence that Africans are monkeys, or have sexual relations with them, any more than the apparent mutation and species transfer of scrapie is evidence that English persons are, or have sexual relations with, sheep.

HIV is transmitted through contact of the bodily fluids of an infected person with the blood of a previously uninfected one. The commonest way globally is through heterosexual intercourse. While initially, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia, particularly associated with prostitution or casual sexual liaisons (and linked to transport routes and sex tourism) HIV
can result, and increasingly frequently does, from monogamous heterosexual relationships.

HIV can very readily be transmitted through homosexual intercourse - a mode very common in its early phases in North America but very uncommon in Africa. It can also be transmitted by contaminated needles - frequently but not exclusively in connection with use of illicit drugs - and by contaminated blood or blood derivative transfusions. As the number of HIV affected adults - and especially of undiagnosed ones - rises, transmission before birth from mother to child is an increasingly frequent mode. Other modes of transmission appear to have been documented (e.g. from vaporised blood spray during operations and accidents) but are much less common.

Factual description of the uncertain origins and multiple, changing patterns of transmission is important to reduce levels of scapegoating and of blind reaction against it which hamper knowledge build-up necessary to map, understand, contain, control and develop preventative and containment treatment. It should also demonstrate the folly (not to say blasphemy) of terming HIV/Aids the wrath of God unless one supposes the dominant characteristic of divinity to be random, unselective malice and vindictiveness. Creating racial and moral stigmas against victims can only be counterproductive.

What can be done to control spread, reduce (or delay) progression from HIV to aids and provide humane life extending or death supporting treatment for persons with AIDS is harder to state and is in a state of change as more knowledge becomes available and supposed knowledge is put in doubt or demonstrated to be erroneous. There now seems to be broad medical agreement that an HIV vaccine and an AIDS controlling (life extending) drug can be developed. That is a good reason for giving these areas of medical research significant priority in personnel and resource allocation (in the South - where Kenya is an example of real if limited advancement of control drugs - as well as the North - where the Franco-American squabble over the academic kudos and financial rewards of initial research is exceedingly un-edifying). But it is unsafe to assume early breakthroughs in these fields so that present action must proceed on the basis of present knowledge.

Changing patterns of sexual intercourse is potentially the most effective means to limiting transmission. Together with universal HIV testing (initially of blood donors, before marriage and of long distance travellers
nationallly and internationally) it could reduce the new infections to low and declining levels. Combined with the universal sterilisation of needles used for injections (of any substance), these measures could, in principle, eliminate HIV/AIDS in fifty years.

However, the cultural changes necessary are very radical and the educational task of creating the thousands of millions of altered decisions necessary to achieve them immense. This is no reason not to begin the task but one for being prudently cautious in projecting the speed and scope of results.

Except in respect of blood banks (where contaminated blood can be screened out) and international travellers (who can be refused entry or allowed entry on specified conditions because they have a contagious disease), HIV testing will reduce transmission only to the extent it results in altered actions by those who learn they are infected. Thus its success is basically dependent on education.

Control of other sexually transmitted diseases can reduce HIV transmission because their presence makes HIV infection more likely. So can improved prevention or treatment of any disease resulting in open sores or breaks in the skin. Treatment of AIDS to date is primarily palliative and secondarily relatively short term control and life extension. It is also remarkably expensive. Hospice or home care for a humane death is in fact the dominant form of treatment now possible.

In poor countries, universal testing is often quite impracticable financially and would serve limited purposes. In SSA the cost of universal testing would be greater than that of universal preventative and basic curative health care for all other major diseases and comparable to or greater than most public sector medical services budgets. By itself it would not extend lives. Present control treatment is totally financially inaccessible and care for the dying must be delegated to households, families and community bodies if the public hospital system is to serve accident victims, those recovering from surgery and victims of curable diseases. The only clear way forward - beyond education - is a vaccine and its universal provision. In terms of health enhancement and life saving any additional external resources should be directed to primary preventative and curative health care generally, STD treatment and

This is not to endorse the fallacy that HIV/AIDS is less serious in the South than in the North. In several African capital city hospital systems AIDS related deaths are the commonest single group and for the 15-50 year old group of educated, middle and high income persons may be the largest single cause of death (surpassing motor car related accidents). Scores or perhaps hundreds of thousands - often un- or wrongly diagnosed - are dying annually and the numbers are rising. In some cities, HIV infection may be of the order of 10% to 20%. Some rural areas along main lorry transport routes have been virtually depopulated and more decimated.

The human suffering is compounded by economic damage. Those dying are disproportionately of working age and above average productivity. Those who tend them lose not only the afflicted person's income but also time they could otherwise have devoted to earning a fuller livelihood. Household members of victims are often shunned as likely to be infected (all too often true) and likely to transmit their infection by casual social or work contact (untrue). National output is decreased and calls on public medical budgets increased. Nationally these burdens are somewhat less in the North because margins above survival are greater, but for the households and individuals directly affected the difference is less because treatment and dignified death costs are ruinously high for all but the very rich.
H. Poverty (North)

Poverty in the North is different from poverty in the South. In the first place it affects minorities - usually 10% to 30% - and in the second it is rarely absolute poverty in which the minimum necessities of life and frequently life itself are constantly at risk. But it is poverty and needs to be seen and challenged as such.

Northern poverty does have a material aspect. Most poor people have enough money to survive but not at standards of diet, clothing or - especially - housing that non-poor Northerners would consider acceptable. Any expenditure - whether a newspaper or repairing a TV, a bus journey downtown or a beer, a 'new' second-hand coat or a child's school books - requires effort to meet. Because poor people are clustered together their neighbourhoods are visibly poor in housing, in infrastructure, in services, in security. Rarely are they communities in the sense of close human relations - in marked contrast to many pre-World War II poverty stricken neighbourhoods.

In the 1980s the proportion of poor people in the North, which had fallen since 1945, increased. Further, they became an increasingly marginalised, isolated group (or set of groups) locked into that condition with limited possibilities of regaining the social, political and economic mainstreams. It is this increasing isolation and separation with a poor minority becoming absolutely and relatively worse off while a majority became better (or at least no worse off) that explains the coincidence of increasing poverty, relatively democratic and competitive political systems and decreasing sympathy with or support for poor people. That pattern is very unlike the 1930s experience because then every household knew poor people - often relatives - so that there was much broader social and political understanding and concern.

The marginalisation, exclusion and isolation have several distinct but reinforcing aspects. One is exclusion from employment. A high proportion have been unemployed for several years and many young poor persons have never had, and have poor prospects for, achieving permanent employment. Another is physical isolation - poor people increasingly exist in urban and rural ghettos or slums which the ordinary non-poor person rarely, if ever, even sees. That isolation is frequently compounded by limited - or no -
access to affordable public transport. A third is marginalisation of public services - education, health, refuse collection and housing in poor areas are usually sub-standard. The combination of these factors limits ability to participate in society - even within the poor areas much more with non-poor people. Politically, poor persons - even when organised for self-help or to press for specific state action - increasingly see themselves as excluded from mainstream politics which concerns itself almost totally with the concerns of non-poor majorities.

An additional marginalisation should be of particular concern to the ecumenical movement - from organised religion. Churches exist in poor areas but many as underfunded external relief agencies rather than real living congregations. And even the latter - which do exist - have limited interaction with non-poor congregations (which, in turn, usually have very few poor members) and influence on the central governance and vision of their churches.

Poverty in the North is also increasingly a minority phenomenon in the sense that many poor people are members of groups ("categories") who are subject to discrimination and/or hostility. While women are not a minority, female-headed households are. They face both prevailing attitudes toward women and special problems because social and service structures are not conducive to a woman heading a household and earning a living at the same time. Predictably a higher proportion of female-headed than of all households are poor. Persons of minority ethnic groups (indigenous or immigrant) and religions are also disproportionately represented among the poor.

It is true that many poor people - especially in countries with relatively strong social safety nets such as the Netherlands and the Nordic countries - have specific personal handicaps or problems. Physically or mentally handicapped (including chronically ill) are one such group. So are alcoholics and drug addicts and persons for some reason personally unable to relate to society in ways most persons can and do. It would be foolish to say full employment could do much toward enabling these poor people to emerge from poverty. But - setting aside the fact that there is an interaction because poverty increases handicaps as well as the reverse - there is a human imperative for more priority to more sensitive concern with these human beings needs. How is less clear - social welfare support
can do something but is not enough by itself and can be chillingly bureaucratic and marginalising as can voluntary groups (with the same reservations). Human contact and concern is frequently a missing factor and one which might seem to be one both potentially available from and an obligation of churches and church members.