Study Seminar 126

Seminar on Policies For Structural Adjustment and Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa:
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by

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A. Introduction

1. SSA Record: Uneven 1970s/Disastrous 1980's

2. Features Include:
   Falling Output Per Capita (only slightly, unevenly and fragiley slowed in the past four years)
   Falling Earned Import Capacity (Real Exports/Deflated by Terms of Trade)
   Falling Food Production Per Capita (dating to mid-1960s)
   Falling Real Government Service Expenditure Per Capita
   Rapidly Rising Real External Debt Burden
   Substantial Decrease in Real Income of Poor Households, and Increase in Percentage Living in Absolute Poverty
   Increased National and Household Economic Vulnerability to further shocks

3. Whatever the causes, the generality of these features since 1979 indicates need for structural adjustment:
   Of production
   Of investment
   Of scarce resource allocation
   Of budget structures (sources and uses)
   Of import/export levels
   Of access to basic services
   Of income and production distribution

4. The reasons for present weakness are relevant, but primarily for assessing how to design structural adjustment not in casting blame or asserting that adjustment can be avoided or achieved by a re-run of 1974-76 or 1976-79 policies.

5. Structural adjustment must be grounded in national contexts and based on national analyses, decisions, commitments and personnel or it will not last. The "possession" of a Fund/Bank approved programme is neither a sufficient or a
necessary condition for an operational national structural adjustment strategy.

6. Macro-economics is not the whole of structural adjustment. (Indeed this seminar seeks to cover some key sectoral institutional and distributional aspects). However, macroeconomics is important because macro-economic strategy and policies have a major impact on overall resource allocation - through prices (including exchange and interest rates, wages and - at least for export crops - grower prices), institutional structures, taxation and public expenditure.

7. The record of countries adopting either national "go it alone" or internationally backed structural adjustment programmes is uneven. There have been some spectacular failures, a number of long running cases of "bumping along the bottom" and a handful of much more promising performances. Why the marked divergences? Do the programmes vary? The contexts? The external and/or domestic credibility and staying power of the governments? The patterns of negative and positive external shocks? The change in levels of net external resource transfers?

8. In the 1988-1989 period a series of themes - "Eradication of Absolute Poverty", "Basic Needs" - dormant since the late 1970's have re-emerged. ECA's Khartoum Conference on the Human Dimension (1988) and African Alternatives/Transformation (1989) study are key examples in and from SSA and the Bank's Long Term Perspective Study (1989) from the external analytical and advisory community. What is the meaning of this shift?

9. What is transformation as distinct from, or following after structural adjustment? Is it simply a generalisation of short term stabilisation and medium term adjustment to the long term building up of institutional and human capacity, the creation of an enabling climate for government and
enterprise sector flexible response to problems, the attainment of equitable distribution of growth (enhanced production by and employment of poor people - especially women - as well as not so poor) and access to public services? If it is more than that what are its additional key characteristics?

B. From Adjustment to Transformation

1. See Section A.

2. Structural Adjustment has usually been a response to sustained economic unsuccess including the failure of attempts to replicate 1974-76 adjustment strategies and to regain balance and growth through standard austerity (e.g. import compression) measures.

3. Structural Adjustment is designed to facilitate regaining balance including:

   a. external balance (including resource transfers)
   b. general domestic balance (including - as an indicator - an end to massive inflation);
   c. fiscal balance;
   d. savings/investment balance (including external resource transfers);
   e. food balance.

4. But it is also designed to do so while: a. restoring positive per capita growth of output; b. averting pauperisation of poor and vulnerable groups; c. avoiding such drastic compression of personal consumption and basic public services as to rend the fabric of society.

A counter factual case that without structural adjustment negative trends on these would have been still worse does not demonstrate the adequacy of the programme. That
requires positive outturns as well. Massive absolute poverty, inadequate food output especially by poor peasants, deficient or inaccessible primary education and health care - these are basic failings whose rectification is just as much a priority as is raising output growth rates which are below those of population and closing unsustainable trade and budgetary gaps.

5. Structural adjustment is not revealed truth. On some elements reasonable people can disagree particularly in specific country contexts. The derivation of actual programmes from general principles requires close attention to specific structures; imbalances; historic records; physical, financial and political potentials and constraints. In particular structural adjustment is not a patented, off the shelf nostrum (or poison) available from the IMF and/or the World Bank. Unless structural adjustment has a local factual, analytical, understanding and support base it will not succeed.

6. Structural adjustment is concerned with prices, incomes, incentives, budgets, external and budgetary balances and other monetary aggregates because (and to the extent that) these affect levels of real resource production, allocation/distribution and growth. Its ultimate concerns are real as opposed to narrowly monetary. In that sense it is supply side while IMF Stabilisation taken alone operates largely on the level of monetary aggregates, is demand reduction focussed and is seen as restoring the conditions for renewed growth rather than itself providing a growth dynamic.

7. Because many SSA economies suffer from extreme imbalance, Structural Adjustment will be painful. It will require some significant cuts to free resources to provide incentives, restore production, rehabilitate existing and invest in new fixed capital, restore or create adequate policy or non-policy. The choice for most SSA economies is
to devise and act on viable structural adjustment programmes (alone or with the Bank) or to have adjustment of one variety or another (including economic collapse) imposed on them.

8. Because structural adjustment is widely supported internationally, adoption of national structural adjustment programmes have been the most plausible way to secure the additional net transfers of resources to SSA which, for most economies, are necessary to halt economic decline and disintegration and create a foundation for renewed development. Unfortunately net increase in real transfers per capita have by no means always followed adoption of structural adjustment programmes promptly or - in some cases - at all. With the changed situation in middle (eastern) Europe it is likely that increased levels of export credits, commercial loans and direct investment will flow there. Even if absolute flows to the South are maintained the prospects for increases are limited. Recent OECD/DAC estimates are for, at best, a 2% a year real growth of net concessional resource transfer, over the 1990’s - that is about a 1% per year per capita fall measured against SSA population growth.

9. Structural adjustment was originally envisaged as requiring up to five years from programme adoption. The time span now envisaged seems to be up to seven years after up to three years of initial stabilisation. In longer running, more successful programmes projections suggest that even that time span is unlikely to be adequate to restore external balance consistent with continued 4 to 6% growth without continued high levels of net soft resource transfers and/or massive debt writeoffs.

10. Structural adjustment has been seen as a bridge from crisis and initial shoring up (stabilisation) and renewed development on moderately changed lines. With some structural adjustment efforts (eg Togo, Madagascar) well
into their second decade questions on how to design the transition from adjustment to transformation are becoming urgent.

11. What do we mean by transformation? How does it differ from continued structural adjustment? How does it diverge from development - or at least the commodity export maximisation (eg Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia) and the structural diversification and modernisation (eg Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya) development approaches of the 1955-75 era?

C. The Analytical Framework - Macro and Sectoral Balances and Interrelationships

1. What do we mean by balance and/or balances?

2. How can balances and imbalances be set out in national accounting equations? In monetary magnitudes? In real (physical) quantities? How can the monetary and real equation systems be linked/related to each other?

3. Which balances are crucial (and why);
   a. external payments
   b. food
   c. basic consumer goods
   d. basic services (health, education, water, agricultural extension)
   e. transport
   f. income and goods available (i.e. condition for low inflation)
   g. government fiscal
   h. savings/investment
   i. incorrect distribution
   j. accountability/participation in governance
   k. gender
   l. other?
Are all equally easily handled by national accounting equations? What are the interactions among imbalances?

4. How can these imbalances (or some of them) be reduced by:
   a. cutting demand (e.g. reducing real public expenditure or consumer incomes or imports); and/or
   b. raising supply (e.g. increasing intermediate goods, imports, increasing real incomes to augment incentives, raising taxes)?

5. What are the limits of national accounting equations e.g. as to data presentation, determination of causation, policy result projection? What are the special limits of monetary magnitude equations for use in medium terms; real supply increase oriented strategies? Of real (constant price) formulations in evaluating or projecting external account, fiscal and monetary balances?

D. Macro Policy and Structural Transformation

1. What are the costs of rapid, classical stabilisation in a weak economic structure characterised by rigidity in resource use (hard to switch production from one output to another)? Do they shift or merely reduce expenditure? With weak infrastructure, human investment, institutions does stabilisation by cutting resource use lay a foundation for renewed growth or only for stabilised further contraction?

2. How does structural adjustment with growth complement or conflict with stabilisation? What is the range of results of saps? Why is it so wide? Is performance of SSA economies with internationally approved saps significantly better than for others? Is "others" a useful category ie do the policies of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone have enough in common to make them a common group of strategies? To the extent economies with internationally
endorsed saps do perform better how much of this gain relates to increased aid inflows and reduced debt service outflows?

3. How can SSA economies reduce their present ratio of imports to production and consumption? What does this imply for industrialisation? Food and industrial ran material agriculture? Consumption patterns? Capital and labour intensities in construction?

4. If present unprocessed commodity exports have poor prospects and cannot be expected to meet minimum import needs (even with import substitution) how should SSA transform its export structure?

5. What are SSA's priority human investment needs? How do these relate to production potential? To income distribution?

6. How are accountability, transparency of policy and public resource use, free selection of leaders, popular participation in governance wider than elections alone, related to enhanced development? To what extent has their weakness contributed to the poor record of the 1980's? If governance failure has been important why has decline in growth been fairly uniform since 1980 whereas it was not in the 1960's or 1975-79?

E. How to Generate and Use Financial Resources for Economic and Social Development

1. In what ways can government raise resources?
   a. direct taxes (including income, export, royalty)
   b. indirect taxes
   c. licenses
   d. user fees and charges
e. investment income (eg from Central Bank, other public sector enterprises)
f. domestic non-bank borrowing
h. external grants
i. external soft loans
j. external quasi commercial loans (eg World Bank, export credits, IMF)
k. external commercial loans?

2. What are the implications of different sources for:
   a. non-government demand?
   b. non-government after charge/tax income?
   c. income distribution?
   d. macro economic balance and inflation?
   e. external balance?
   f. resources for investment available to enterprise and household sectors?
   g. collection costs (financial, personnel, institutional) relative to revenues?

3. How are resources allocated:
   a. recurrent
      • wages and salaries plus related costs
      • manitenance
      • "working capital" (transport, drugs, textbooks, etc)
      • debt service
   b. capital
      • infrastructure - rehabilitation
      • infrastructure - extension
      • investment in public/joint venture enterprises
      • lending to private sector enterprises

4. What are the implications of different resource uses for:
   a. present total and public service output levels?
   b. future output and revenue growth?
   c. income and access to public service distribution?
   d. import levels?
5. Are greater efficiency and reduced expenditure synonymous? If not, how does efficiency (achieving more output per unit of resources used) differ in practice? How can it be measured?

6. Are there useable guidelines for maximum and minimum ratios of recurrent (tax and charge) revenue to total output? For domestic borrowing? How can these be estimated? What about similar expenditure (recurrent, capital) spending targets? If the revenue maximum target is below the expenditure minimum how can reconciliation of these contradictory requirements be sought?

F. Part I - Expenditure (and Revenue) Programmes: Recurrent, Investment, Maintenance

1. How can budgetary and fiscal balance be defined? Is "deficit" a good synonym for "financing requirement"? Do all financing requirements have comparable short and long term impact?

2. Are SSA recurrent and capital expenditures relative to GDP excessive? Too low? In what sense? In what sectors (e.g. Debt service? Defence? General proportion of expenditure, cost/benefit ratio, importance of intended output, efficiency of resource use)?

3. What are the macro economic management effects of central government budgeting (on the revenue and expenditure side) and how can they be used/planned more actively?

4. What are sectoral and distributional effects?

5. What are sub-sectoral and micro effects?

6. In what ways are SSA budgets distributive/redistributive on the revenue and on the expenditure sides? Are the sharp
divergences within the overall impact evidence of articulated management, administrative constraints or incoherence?

7. In general is revenue (supply) raising or service provision (demand) cutting a better general approach to budgetary balance restoration? Within what limits? With what exceptions (e.g. improved output for resources used type of demand cutting)?

8. What are the efficient ways of increasing revenue relative to GDP? Which (e.g. export taxes) are likely to have serious negative production incentive results? Which (e.g. many fees) have very high cost/revenue ratios and pose massive administrative problems?

9. Is there a case for basic service fees other than net revenue raised? For similar charges on extension services? If so, is central or local collection more likely to maximise gains and limit negative side effects? Are communal contributions (including in kind) likely to be as effective, more equitable than centrally posited individual user fees? In either case how are genuinely poor people to be exempted from fees to avoid major loss of access and service coverage?

10. What are the macro economic implications of government financing requirements? (Domestic? External?) To what extent do these vary with the sources of credit used? To what extent is there evidence of "crowding out" - or "crowding in" - of enterprise (overall and/or private) productive use borrowing by government domestic credit raising?

11. When should balance restoration focus on expenditure cutting and when on revenue raising? How much in terms of cost savings can be expected from programme redesign? Or is the most effective use of such redistribution (e.g.
raising preventative and primary health service spending relative to hospital services) primarily in terms of allowing restoration of service coverage at lower incremental costs?

12. If real government wages and salaries are too low to motivate personnel, allow them to work full time and to prevent attrition of the most competent ones, what practical steps are open to financially constrained governments? What action is appropriate if staffing levels are above numbers who can be supplied with adequate fixed (e.g. vehicles, medical equipment) and working (e.g. petrol, spares, drugs) capital? How common are significant levels of "ghost workers" (i.e. real payroll entries not representing real people)? How can they be exorcised?

13. Are capital budgets usually too high or too low relative to recurrent? Why? Are capital and recurrent budget interactions adequately coordinated? Why not? In what areas is non-coordination most evident? Are PPI's (Priority Programmes of Investment) suitable overall SAP (Structural Adjustment Programme) designing of funding foci?

Part II - Investment and Maintenance

1. How does one relate public investment programming to overall - government, public enterprise, private enterprise, household - investment planning? How does one avoid over-ambitious targets at both planning and programming level? In what ways do such targets raise costs, lower efficiency, reduce output and effective investment? How can a PPI avoid being bogged down in an excessive number of underfunded, behind schedule projects?

2. What micro, sectoral and macro criteria (beyond project level cost/benefit at probable market prices) are theoretically, analytically, administratively usable/
useful? What are their actual strengths and limitations? Is the bottom line problem usually primarily unsophisticated analysis or inadequate (incomplete, inaccurate, imaginary) data?

3. Why are so many projects not subjected to any serious evaluation - including especially of operating period output, scarce resource requirements and cash flow results?

4. How can the risk of/sensibility to radically altered macro economic contexts be taken into account in project evaluation? (e.g. if import capacity allowed fuller capacity utilisation – as expected over 1976-80 – overall ICOR's for 1975-85 in much of SSA would look much healthier. Would conventional sensitivity analysis have been usable to limit the losses resulting from actual as opposed to project import capacity? How?)

5. Why is maintenance a preferred category for government (and less uniformly public enterprise) expenditure cuts ahead both of other recurrent items and also of new fixed investment? What is the logic of creating more capacity when budgetary or import constraints prevent reasonable maintenance and capacity utilisation levels for existing assets? How could shifts from new projects to maintenance and rehabilitation increase GDP? Economic efficiency? Ease fiscal and external balance constraints? At what medium and long term costs?

6. How can capacity utilisation, maintenance/rehabilitation, bottleneck breaking, general new capacity creation trade-offs be taken into account more explicitly at enterprise, ministry, sectoral and macro levels?
G. Institutional Issues: Public Policy and Performance

1. What is public policy? How does it relate to "governance" more generally?

2. How can/should/are public policy decisions (choices) made? By whom? On the basis of what information and dialogues or debates? How can/should/are those taking decisions held accountable? For what (honesty? reasonable judgement? results?)? To whom (external agencies? civil society? political leaders? pressure groups/elites? broadly based organisations? social groups eg peasants - family sector agricultural households, unionised workers, women, armed forces?)

3. How are accounting - reporting - transparancy of budgets, economic surveys, programme and project reports related to accountability in the broader sense?

4. Can the capacity (personnel, institutional structure, financial resources), efficiency (use of resources for intended purposes with some positive results), probity (avoidance or corruption/limitation of conflict of interest) and political accountability ("democratic") aspects of public policy, and its results be separated analytically? Operationally? To what extent do they interact?

5. How can the governmental process be institutionalised to improve public policy in respect of:
   a. data used?
   b. decisions taken?
   c. efficiency of resource use?
   d. prompt/relevant efforts to act on decisions?
   e. evaluation of outcomes (lending to revisions)?
   f. accountability?
6. Is the current equation of multi party democracy and development a serious analytical breakthrough or a passing 'development community' fashion? What are its implications for SSA? If it is an analytical approach, why is the old semi-authoritarian, nationalist, national interest, interventionist model (eg Bismarck's Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya according to proponents) so little mentioned? How does one avoid repeating 1960's and 1970's history of multi party, democratic constitutional orders rapidly collapsing and often doing so repeatedly when serious efforts were made to restore them (eg Ghana late 1960's, late 1970's; Nigeria late 1970's)?

H. Institutional Issues: Public Service and Public Policy Implementation

I. Public Service Roles and Responsibilities

1. How can one define the public service? What are its responsibilities in respect to public policy?

2. Why do public policy decisions fail to be acted on by the public service:
   a. decisions not possible to carry out?
   b. public service personnel and institutional capacity too low? (If so why - more and more trained/experienced staff than in 1960's or 1970's in a majority of countries -)
   c. public service low morale (material rewards? non-material terms and conditions of service? other?)?
   d. public service misinterpretation or confusion as to what decisions call upon them to do?
   e. public service objections (own interests? public interest? other?) to acting as instructed?

3. What can be done about problems/problematics identified at "2" above?
II Management of Civil Service Reform

1. What are the basic goals of civil service reform:
   a. institutional
   b. personnel competence
   c. programme capacity enhancement
   d. priority alteration
   e. personnel motivation enhancement
   f. cost reduction
   g. other?

2. What are the major barriers to achieving them:
   a. knowledge
   b. practicability of proposals
   c. vested interests - civil servants
   d. vested interests - other
   e. social consequences
   f. financial cost
   g. personnel availability and motivation
   h. other?

3. What is meant by overstaffing:
   a. relative to work to be done
   b. to available fixed and working capital
   c. to financial resources
   d. other?

4. Why in proposals for reduction of staff is so much emphasis placed on "redeployment" (meaning sacking) and so little on using genuine redeployment plus non or partial replacement of normal turnover (usually 3 to 5% a year) to achieve significant reductions over 3 to 5 years?

5. Are attempts to turn the majority of "redeployed" civil servants into independent entrepreneurs realistic? If not (or, indeed, if so) what training or experience over what period would best serve their needs? What do they think?
6. Why do most civil service reforms suffer from standard problems of increasing complexity, setting too short a time span for implementation (followed by open ended date slippage), making palpably impracticable proposals or procedures, increasing personnel required to do a given amount of work? Would greater use of local and particularly experienced public administrator inputs assist in avoiding these snags? How and why?

7. How can civil service reform planning be coordinated with other aspects of policy change? (e.g. user fees tend to increase the number of collections to be made several fold, to be bookeeper intensive and to have high collection cost/gross receipts ratios - all features most revenue and treasury administration reforms seek to reduce).

I. Public and Private Enterprises: Role, Reform, Management, Privatisation

1. What is a public enterprise? What are appropriate public enterprise goals? How - and when - should these diverge from those of private enterprises?

2. What form of relationship is appropriate between the shareholder (state) and the enterprise? To what extent should overall shareholder goals determine its directions to the enterprise? Is the TNC-subsidiary relationship relevant to this question?

3. Why do most public enterprises in SSA not have clear budgets (recurrent or profit and loss, capital - or investment - and cash flow) even when governments want them to do so? Why are other - including real output - targets even less frequently specified (or checked against results after the event)? Is the basic problem overcontrol
or anarchic, unaccountable autonomy? Or both? Does direct foreign intervention lessen or increase these problems?

4. Why is public enterprise performance so uneven in SSA - among countries, among sectors, within sectors? What are the basic obstacles to improving average performance?

5. When can privatisation (including joint ventureisation) yield significant gains? Is it likely - given the capacities of private sectors and the poor average rate of return on assets in SSA - to be a general solution to any substantial portion of overall enterprise sector problems? If it means sale to foreign owners what economic and political issues does this raise? Is it better to sell an enterprise before rehabilitation; to turn it into a joint venture with a post rehabilitation full purchase option to the partner; to rehabilitate before sale? When and why?

6. Why are subsidies and other resource transfers to most public enterprises handled ad hoc and ex post? Are the negative effects of this failure to budget and pay pre-set transfers and to achieve a clear capital structure significant?

7. Are public enterprises in SSA too rigidly state controlled? Too anarchically autonomous with no effective accountability to their government owners? Or both? Can user or client (e.g. consumer, peasant farmer) accountability be built into their structures and processes? Should it? Why? How? Does direct accountability to external agencies help or hinder? In what ways and for what purposes?

8. Are joint ventures with minority external (or domestic) equity/management partners generally more efficient than pure public enterprises? Why? Can they in practice be held accountable? Why or why not? When and how?
9. What are the basic, remediable weaknesses which recur frequently in SSA public enterprise management?

10. What are the potentialities and limitations of indigenous small, medium and private enterprises? Are the answers different if they are minority community owned?

11. What roles can foreign enterprises play? Do these necessarily imply wholly or majority owned subsidiaries?

12. What relationships should government develop with small, medium and large scale private enterprises? What information and capabilities does it need to do so? Why do so few governments identify or acquire these capabilities?

J. Exchange Rate Policies

1. What has been the evolution of the SSA external balance position since 1970?
   a. What management tools have been used? (e.g. exchange rate, import compression, export subsidy)?
   c. How has exchange rate policy affected external balance and growth?

2. What is meant when SSA economies are referred to as suffering from "import strangulation"? Does this imply a need for more exports, more import substitute production or both? On the basis of what criteria? What are the uses and limits of altering foreign exchange prices?

3. What considerations are relevant to management of the price of foreign exchange (exchange rate)? What are the costs of a significantly overvalued rate? What approaches - size, speed, determination of change, predictability - are likely
to avoid severe under or overvaluation arising and/or facilitate return to a roughly plausible price?

4. What interactions (positive and negative) exist between the foreign exchange price, other price instruments (e.g. tariffs, subsidies) and analytical (e.g. prioritised import capacity allocation) or administrative (e.g. routine exchange control) instruments for external balance management?

5. How can a transition from:
   a. extreme overvaluation, import strangulation, export stagnation, de facto default and massive trade arrears, negative growth and low capacity utilisation toward
   b. an external balance position which is sustainable (and manageable) consistent with real per capita growth be initiated and continued?
   c. In particular what exchange rate adjustment approaches (e.g. large discretionary devaluations, managed floats, auctions) are likely to be most effective when and why?

6. What are the potential gains, risks and costs of attempted once for all ("short sharp shock") and phased ("sequential, incremental") approaches to adjustment in general and devaluation in particular.

7. What is meant by overvaluation?
   a. appreciation on the basis of nominal exchange rates vis-a-vis SDR, or major trading partners and/or competitors adjusted for relative changes in cost of living or unit labour costs? How can a non-overvalued base period be chosen?
   b. relative costs of a basket of goods? Domestic or export?
   c. if non-overvaluation as defined at "a" or "b" still results, as it does in a substantial number of SSA economies, in a large current account deficit (excluding official grants) what then? Will further devaluation
improve the current account balance? When, why, over what time span and at what costs?

d. do negative terms of trade shifts result in overvaluation? In what sense? Is devaluation (raising the relative domestic prices of goods whose relative world prices are falling) an appropriate remedy in this case? Or does it represent perverse intervention in the market which hinders reform of production structures? If so what alternative courses of action can limit or finance resulting current account deficits? For how long and at what costs?

8. What is meant by a "sustainable exchange rate"? In the context of structural adjustment or transformation how - if at all - can such a rate be estimated without positing or projecting levels of net external resource transfers?

K. The Special Programme for Africa

1. What is the SPA? What role does the World Bank play in it? Other UN Family agencies? Bilaterals?


3. What results has SPA attained:
   a. toward increasing understanding of SSA contexts and problematics?
   b. in augmenting total soft resource flows to SSA?
   c. in responding to SSA priorities through genuine dialogue toward "donor fuelled" not "donor driven" programmes?
   d. through coordinating source and user institutions to strengthen national strategic formulation, financial allocation and control?
4. What are SPA's prospects following 1990 Paris review and recommitment meeting?

L. SSA: Some Debt and Aid Issues

1. What is the total of SSA external debt? Debt service? What difficulties exist in arriving at even approximately accurate answers? What is the position in relation to your country?

2. Why did SSA external debt rise so rapidly in the 1970's and early 1980's? Was this borrowing arguably prudent at the time? In retrospect?

3. Are typical SSA external debt/GDP and debt service/exports ratios high or low compared to other Third World regions? If they are high, why has this not been perceived until quite recently?

4. Is debt/debt service relief a desirable way of halting the decline in net real resource transfers to SSA? What alternative measures could produce the same result?

5. Why are Peru type unilateral debt service limitations less likely to serve most SSA economies' interests than they would those of several Latin American and Asian economies? Are Brady type commercial debt reduction schemes potentially relevant? For which economies?

6. What are the basic parameters of the Paris Club (government creditors - including government guaranteed export credit) debt reschedulings? Have they altered since 1984? If so how? What are the positive implications and limitations of the Toronto Summit statement and Baker/Brady Plan approaches?
7. What goals should an SSA government seeking external debt negotiation set? How should it negotiate? When? When is negotiation inappropriate or ill timed?

8. How practical is it for how many SSA economies to seek to reallocate foreign exchange now to reduce external debt (and debt service) significantly by the early 1990's?

9. What has been the recent trend in external resource flows to SSA? In nominal, real or real per capita terms? For structurally adjusting and for other economies?

10. Is there a resource gap? How can it be estimated? For what types of resources in particular? Are the Wass Report estimates of $5,000 million a year realistic? Are the ratio higher ones of the LTPS more likely to be correct? How can they be filled if ODA (aid) growth in the 1990's is - as expected - low?

11. What impact does under financing have on stabilisation/adjustment programmes:
   a. speed of change required?
   b. degree of initial demand cutback needed?
   c. adequacy of structural change related fixed investment?
   d. human investment and social costs? Speed of attainment of offsetting benefits?
   e. political and social implications of interaction of previous answers?

12. Are non-concessional resource flows likely to be usable in SSA:
   a. For what purposes?
   b. in which countries?
   c. what kinds of flows of direct equity investment, IMF drawings, World Bank "bank window" loans, Northern government guaranteed export credits are safely usable and likely to be available? Are investment codes,
investor protection and tax concessions central or peripheral to the answer?

13. How can the separate accounting formats required by donors/lenders be made less incompatible with achieving national accounting/reporting systems which are timely, transparent, accountable? Is the problem one of principle or of the extra data preparation/presentation load placed on limited public sector accounting - reporting - auditing institutional capacity and personnel?

14. Can both new external resource inflows and debt service outflows (including rescheduling) be operated on a rolling 3 to 5 year projection basis? Would this facilitate medium term strategic budgeting, resource allocation, planning? What are the obstacles to achieving it?

M. Agriculture Price and Non-Price Issues

1. How responsive to price and non-price incentives is total output from the agricultural sector? Do price and non-price incentives influence mainly the composition of agricultural output and not the aggregate supply? How much do we know about actual food prices to growers even (especially?) when official prices and supposedly single channel marketing exist?

2. What is the SSA production record? Since 1965? Since 1980? Since 1985? Why - especially in the 1970's - have there been both relative shifts from export and industrial to domestic food crop production and growing food shortages? What does this imply as to the limitations of price incentives? The reality or otherwise of supply expansion constraints?

3. What do we know (or think we know) about relative and absolute (real purchasing power) grower price trends for
exports, industrial and domestic food crops? Why are there combinations of "dear food" (consumer prices rising faster than wages and often than COL) and falling farmer real incomes eg Nigeria 1970's and 1980's? And the apparent reverse - "cheap food" (sharp falls in nominal food price/COL ratios) and sustained food production growth (e.g. Ghana 1984-1989)?

4. What do we know (or believe) about nominal and real price supply elasticities - both cross elasticities among crops and overall output elasticities? Do these vary for peasant farmers, larger individual producers, corporate farmers?

5. How do official prices, single channel marketing and overvalued exchange rates affect grower prices:
   a. for different types of crop?
   b. for different types of producer?
   Do they significantly affect domestic food retail and grower prices and marketing channels? When and why?

6. What are the roles of agriculture in SSA economies and structural adjustment:
   a. rural household income (including production for own use)
   b. urban household income (cash or own use) supplement
   c. food supplies
   d. 'urban' goods markets
   e. inputs for industry
   f. foreign exchange
   g. tax revenue?
   How do these complement, conflict with each other?

7. Why have large scale, capital intensive approaches to agricultural production (usually with special forex, input price or purchase price concession or incentives) received priority attention in SSA agriculture? How well do they fulfill the roles noted under question five? When are they
8. Do large scale schemes, via input and capital cost recovery, depress the net grower prices for tenants? If so what incentive effects do they have? Why?

9. What are workable:
   a. grower price
   b. marketing structure (and cost)
   c. user price
   d. food security
   e. export revenue
   f. land tenure/land reform goal patterns in SSA economies and how can price and other market management tools contribute to achieving them?

10. What physical constraints limit effective agricultural production in SSA:
    a. access to/cost of transport
    b. access to buyers
    c. timely availability
    d. access to basic health and water services and to household fuel
    e. storage losses
    f. access to land
    g. access to complementary inputs (labour, tools, working capital, etc
    h. war or civil disorder?
    i. weather
    j. other?

11. What incentives other than price have limited production:
    a. ready access to buyers
    b. prompt, effective (cash or cashable cheque) payment
    c. access to basic services
    d. availability of basic consumer and construction (i.e "incentive") goods at places accessible to farmers
12. What knowledge barriers limit output increases:
   a. basic research data
   b. local technical testing and adaption of data
   c. testing for grower economic viability and 'user friendliness' of proposed techniques
   d. extension service ability to extend (either because of lack of knowledge or of extension personnel and transport)
   e. faulty teaching approaches by extension personnel
   f. lack of basic and relevant continuing education available to farmers (and especially to the majority who are women)
   g. failure to integrate knowledge creation, testing, adaption, extension (and consequential physical requirements) into overall agricultural strategy
   h. basic lack of agricultural data (e.g. total and per hectare yields, marketed output, marketing flow patterns)
   i. other?

13. Is 'traditional' land tenure a barrier to investment? To higher productivity? Why? When? How general and rapid is transformation of indigenous tenure systems? In what directions? Why are state initiated "freehold tenure" and "title registration" systems usually ineffective? How could land law and the civil society led transformations of indigenous tenure systems be made more complementary?

14. What can be done to relax the constraints set out at Paras 12-13? What resources would be required over what time sequence? Why do approaches to these issues feature much less prominently in most structural adjustment policy formulation than price (nominally real but in practice largely nominal) increases? Is this imbalance a relative
misallocation of resources when price differentials appear to explain only a tenth of differentials in output trends?

15. Given the high (relative to wages) and rising (relative to cost of living) food prices at consumer level in most SSA economies - especially over 1979/1985 - can approaches to issues posed in 1, 2 and 3 provide higher real farmer household incomes while avoiding yet steeper real user food price hikes? How?

16. Should extension services be expanded? Improved in quality? Cut back to the levels present knowledge, supporting inputs (e.g. vehicles, fuel), user takeup and output results would justify (which might mean 75% cuts in some cases)?

17. Should agriculture and related research spending be raised first or existing finance and personnel redeployed to raise productivity (how defined?) before expansion? Is the 5 to 20 year lag between initial research design and resource use and substantial production pay-offs a justification for high or low emphasis on research in structural adjustment programmes?

N. Targetting Research for Agricultural Development

1. What should be the relationship between/among agricultural strategy, programmes, targets, extension services and agricultural research? What are the actual relationships in SSA?

2. How can one reduce the lead time from conceptualising research through attaining results, field testing and extension to farmer use and (hopefully) output gains?

3. Why is it often argued both that SSA is too dependent on European (former colonial metropoli) research design and
personnel and makes too little use of the network of international agricultural research institutes? What is the contribution of the present international institutes in Ibadan (root crops) and Nairobi (insect pathology)? What potential have sub-regional research coordination, data exchange, joint projects (as emphasised by SADCC)?

4. How can the social science aspects of research results when put into practice be taken into account better in research design and field testing?

5. Are the main problems in SSA research lack of professional staff and financial resources? Absolutely or relative to agricultural production? (Recent data suggest that relative to agricultural output, resources devoted to research and - especially - extension in several SSA economies are comparable to Asian levels). Or is it efficiency ie useable/tested results achieved per unit of resources devoted? Or communication ie failure to communicate results effectively to an extension service and/or from it to farmers?

0. Industry's Role In Structural Adjustment, 'Policy and Capability Building Issues'

1. What roles can present underutilised capacity play in:
   a. choking off inflation
   b. increasing supplies of incentive goods to farmers
   c. reducing net import requirements
   d. providing inputs into other industries and sectors
   e. generating domestic incomes (of employees, suppliers, etc.)
   f. increasing government revenue (e.g. via sales tax)
   g. increasing investible surplus
   h. providing more dynamic markets for farmers and artisans?
   i. other?
2. What are the key requirements for doing so:
   a. operating inputs
   b. spares
   c. rehabilitation
   d. altering production (and/or input) mix
   e. more high and or middle level personnel (in what skill areas)
   f. more dependable supplies of power, water, fuel, etc.
   g. greater availability of domestic maintenance, spares and simple capital goods
   h. augmenting and diversifying exports
   i. other?

3. What are the principal barriers to progress on meeting these requirements? Why do both public and private sector enterprise managements appear slow to respond to new problems and possibilities? Are enterprise managerial structures weaker than in 1960's and late 1970's? Or are they overwhelmed by much higher demands? In either case, how can they be strengthened?

4. To what extent will increased production be self-financing at present real prices (i.e. lower unit overhead costs and present unit prices on a greater volume restoring or augmenting cash flow viability)? What other price or price related policy steps are needed:
   a. modification (e.g. to annual efficient cost plus), reduction (e.g. to 15-25 basic commodities) or dropping of price controls
   b. reduction in real input costs - Which? How?
   c. greater and more flexible access to foreign exchange
   d. other?

5. To the extent that full or normal late 1970s (say 70% of nominal capacity) utilisation rate restoration cannot be achieved in the short run, what allocation priorities should be used for scarce capital or imported input flows:
   a. ex factory value/foreign exchange requirement ratio?
b. relevance to reducing key input and/or incentive goods shortages?
c. short or medium term financial viability?
d. short or medium term export potential?
e. positive linkages (external benefits) to other manufacturing sub-sectors and other sectors?
f. other?

Or are direct allocation (the commonest SSA model) and managed market direction (the South Korean model) inappropriate and market/short term ability to pay the best allocational model?

6. What data are required for rational short, medium and/or long term industrial strategy, policy, resource allocation decisions? How (to what extent) can it be acquired?

7. How can industry be used to reduce the national import/GDP ratios (especially in respect to fixed investment)?

8. Can industry increase the export/GDP ratios by:
a. processing/manufacturing present raw exports?
b. facilitating additional export oriented natural resource exploitation?
c. increasing intra regional (or broader South-South) trade?

9. Are these two goals (import substitution/export promotion) best seen as alternatives or complements? What role can a protected home market play in promoting (or deterring) exports?

10. What price, forex allocation, credit, tax, infrastructure provision and other incentives are needed to encourage capacity utilisation/rehabilitation/capacity creation along lines needed for 7 and 8? How can probable results (and costs) of such incentives be projected and monitored? Why are many which are at least nominally available not taken up?
11. In view of input and incentive goods considerations should selective restoration of manufactured goods output lead, go parallel to or lag targeted increases in agricultural production?

12. How can realistic manufacturing sector lags and output recovery targets be built into structural adjustment strategies and annual goals? Why has output recovery in most programmes been slow (relative to at least nominal unused capacity) and below projections?

13. In a situation of multiple and complex market and non-market constraints of present unit costs provide a good guide to underlying static or dynamic comparative advantage? Can plausible estimates of unit costs of rehabilitated recapitalised operations at plausible capacity utilisation be made: How?

14. How can initial sectoral and product protection be used to build up a capacity base, cost structure and market perspective compatible to moving into exports (as Brazil and South Korea have done and Zimbabwe has begun to do)? What policies to complement (or limit) protection are consistent with achieving such a transition?

15. Do structural adjustment programmes place a disproportionate burden on the informal sector and small scale industries? Can measures be identified which will minimise the costs of adjustment for small scale industries and encourage their growth?

P. Restructuring Regional and International Relations

1. What exports can be encouraged, how, by what measures with what results, e.g.:
   a. traditional primary products (price elasticity issue);
b. processed forms of present exports (market access issues);
c. natural resource based products (viability, identification, finance issues);
d. selected manufacturers (identification, promotion issues)
e. why has so little specific work been done on analysing potentials?

2. What are the terms of trade trends and prospects for:
a. hard minerals?
b. hydrocarbons and hydrocarbon products?
c. beverages?
d. other tropical agricultural and silvicultural products?
e. potential manufactured exports?

3. In the case of SSA's major raw material exports will SSA's stepping up output growth increase or decrease total export earnings? Does this apply at country level? If the two answers differ how can the inherent contradiction be solved?

4. The UNCTAD sponsored Fraser Report advocates greater priority to exports and their promotion and makes five major points:
a. diversification of exports;
b. greater participation in pre-export processing and manufacturing as well as in post-export trading;
c. import substitution - especially in food;
d. aggressive promotion of higher export volume and value;
e. including from present major export commodities.
How practicable is this agenda? Are d and e consistent for - eg cocoa - with a price elasticity of .1 to .25 and an SSA share of exports of over .5 (indeed Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana nationally are over .1)?

5. If transformation of export structures (efficient export promotion) and of import proportion reduction (efficient
import substitution) are crucial. What immediate action to create an enabling climate of knowledge and incentives is needed? Why is so little systematic attention paid to country by country viable export diversification prospects?

6. What roles can economic regionalism/sub-regionalism play in:
   a. broadening export diversification potential?
   b. strengthening manufacturing sectors in respect to import substitution and global exportation by providing broader markets (economics of scale) and initial export business learning/experience (capacity building)?
   c. reducing regional dependence (as a proportion of output) on extra-regional imports?

7. What instruments/actions are needed for establishing viable regional/sub-regional economic transformations beyond trade preferences (lower tariffs among partners than against outsiders) and standard short term clearing payments arrangements:
   a. enhanced knowledge of markets/sources backed by better communications infrastructure?
   b. improved transport infrastructure?
   c. export orientation by enterprises beyond traditional commodity producers?
   d. mechanisms to encourage partners to import as well as export because i) the purpose of exports is to pay for imports and ii) large and growing bilateral trade imbalances within a region often tend to render its continued advance politically impracticable and economically polarising?
   e. encouragement of trade in services (eg finance, commerce) and special "visibles" (eg electricity, construction) especially where this would increase the regional exports of structural deficit countries?
   f. coordinated strategic planning of infrastructure, communications and production to create an enabling set of availabilities for export, requirements for import
and ability for enterprises to communicate needs, make transactions, get the goods from point of production to that of use promptly and cheaply?

Q.-R.-S. Poverty, Vulnerability, Employment and Basic Services
- Production by Poor People
- Informal Sector Industrialisation
- Human Development Report

Part One - Employment/Self Employment

1. What is a workable definition of employment (including self employment) in SSA?

2. How is employment (in proportions) divided among formal wage and salary, informal wage and salary, non-agricultural self employed, agricultural self employed? What proportion of households derive a substantial share of income from more than one of these sectors?

3. How can unemployment, under-employment and pseudo (extremely low productivity) employment be defined operationally?

4. To what extent (and under which conditions) are 'high' returns to labour a serious limitation on employment? In which is the basic problem low (average and/or marginal) productivity? To what extent do approaches to solving these two problems differ? Converge?

5. In what senses and in which (sub) sectors are African wages 'high'? To what extent are typical non-agricultural household incomes (measured in consuming power terms) higher than typical (say middle 50-70%) peasant household incomes? What has been their real and relative evolution since 1970? Since 1980? Is the image of an urban wage
elite with real consuming power far above that of the typical peasant household still valid or largely obsolete? If the latter do urban real income falls or peasant income changes account for narrowed (or reversed) differentials?

6. Are wages and salaries in SSA too low for productive efficiency (i.e. so low that major disincentive effects and 'parallel' or 'multiple' marketing of labour time result)? Does this imply a need for higher real wages? If so, does it also imply a need to aim at a much smaller, less ill-paid formal (and especially government) sector labour force? In that case how are the persons retrenched to escape a rapid descent into absolute poverty?

7. What are the limits to the small scale agricultural "sponge" effect? That is, what is one to make of estimates (FAO) that in half of SSA rural population is above stable land carrying capacity at plausible technology and input projections or that 500,000 rural residents of Kenya are estimated to be scratching out livings on sub-marginal land? To what extent can the productivity frontier on relatively low potential land be raised? Or should one concentrate on output increases on high potential land and abandon the households in low potential areas to their fate on macro-economic triage principles?

8. Does the rapid apparent growth of informal urban sector employment and self-employment represent a healthy growth pattern? To what extent and in which sub-sectors - e.g. in commerce does it re-divide existing rather than augmenting total sectoral income? What is the potential for increased reasonably productive employment/self employment in this sector? What state action (or deliberate avoidance of particular actions) would facilitate such growth?

9. Can the stagnation or decline in private sector formal employment in most of the SSA be halted and reversed? Is this primarily a cause or a consequence of more general
economic unsuccess? Why do many private entrepreneurs with profits, cash balances, access to credit, apparently promising home and export markets choose not to invest? Or in at least one case to invest primarily in government stock?

10. To what extent do training and education programmes relate to employment opportunities/needs? Why are open and de facto unemployment at all levels below university graduate (and sometimes at that level) combined with real shortages of qualified personnel at middle and high levels? What additional training is needed? In what ways can the state provide or facilitate its provision?

11. What research, extension, training and supporting services would facilitate expansion of, and raising productivity, in the informal sector? Why is there little in the way of effective policy or programming in these fields?

Part Two - Poor People and Vulnerable Groups

1. Why are standard structural adjustment programmes perceived as placing disproportionate burdens on poor people, vulnerable groups? To what extent is this a valid perception? Does the introduction of SDA (Social Dimensions of Adjustment) into the Bank's standard sectoral mission menu alter this? Why or why not?

2. To what extent can particular burdens on poor, dangers to vulnerable groups be identified in structural adjustment programme design? Can programmes to minimise, offset, insure against key elements in these costs/risks be identified? Costed? Financed?

3. Why are government expenditure cuts - whether in structural adjustment or other contexts - regularly biased against poor people and remote areas? What can be done to reverse that bias?
4. Is it reasonable to view basic health, education, water, extension services as amenity consumer goods? What is their relation to present ability to produce? To future potential for productivity gains? To incentives? To social and political stability? Why does LTPS like AA sharply alter the priority given to these sectors?

5. Is more production by poor people economically practicable (especially in terms of scarce resources)? Cost efficient? Likely to reduce import intensity of production and consumption? If so, why is it rarely specifically identified as a goal and why are articulated policies/programmes for achieving it still more rarely designed and implemented?

6. If basic services are critical to production and production by poor people is frequently cost efficient (especially in foreign exchange terms) why are these points (and employment/productive self employment generation) so rarely treated as integral to structural adjustment strategy as opposed to being seen initially as inconsistent with and now as secondary elements tacked on to it?

7. If highly unequal income distribution, inadequate basic services and pauperisation of substantial groups of people characterise an economy is it an adequate defense of a particular structural adjustment programme to say that without it they would have been even worse? Or should targets in respect to these challenges (socio economic inefficiencies) be built into structural adjustment programmes? What are the social and political consequences of brushing aside "human condition" and "fabric of society" issues? If these lead to disorder and/or programme collapse what are the direct economic costs? How can one broaden accountability and participation in contexts of slow growth and high absolute poverty proportion consistent
with achieving practicable policies and resource use targets?

**Part Three - Informal Sector Industrialisation**

1. **What do we mean by "informal sector"?** In particular how can the "industrial informal sector" be defined?

2. **What range of household (family sector or micro), artisanal (mini) and workshop/small factory (small/medium) scale enterprises are involved?** How important are they in producing goods? Achieving increases in sectoral value added? Providing adequate livelihoods for significant numbers of people? Do different types of enterprise or divisions by product or activity have radically different present and potential levels of contribution?

3. Beyond avoiding or removing discrimination against, and bureaucratic over administration in respect to, informal sector enterprises (including well intentioned support measures which end as "smother love"), what state interventions, if any, are appropriate? What are the minimum appropriate health, safety, employment, product quality standards, regulations needed and practicable?

4. Should present **de facto** exemption (by policy and/or avoidance) of such enterprises from direct and indirect taxation be continued? What are its costs/benefits to informal sector, formal sector, state, economy? (eg if "invisibility" allows avoiding collecting 15% sales tax and paying 5% to 10% of gross sales license and related fees plus 40% to 50% profits tax, then arguably informal sector enterprises are net recipients of favourable discrimination - genuinely benign neglect?).

5. **What are common problems for informal sector industrial enterprises:**
   a. lack of access to modern sector (bank) credit?
b. high cost of (or lack of access to) indigenous credit sources (eg tontines, savings and credit societies, moneylenders)?
c. limited availability of raw materials and spare parts (especially when imported)?
d. inadequate managerial and bookkeeping/accounting skills - especially for expansion?
e. weakness in skills training of available employees and lack of relevant vocational training courses?
f. market limitations - especially lack of access to wholesale/retail outlets if production is expanded?

6. What actions by whom would help overcome these problems?

Part Four - Human Environment and Ecology

1. How does need force poor households to damage the ecology? eg over-cultivation, deforestation. Why do they commit this damage even though they know it will increase their and their children's future problems?

2. What ways of tackling the ecological damage caused by need are practicable and humane? eg in relation to trees, wildlife, erosion.

3. Is the growth of population and especially of numbers of absolutely poor households, a serious ecological threat? A barrier to enhancing per household output of poor people and access to basic services?

4. Is the basic causation population growth to poverty or poverty to population growth? Or are both important?

5. What is meant by "having a population policy"?

6. Do the following constitute a practicable set of areas for policy and programme interventions toward a population strategy:
a. reducing infant mortality
b. increasing female education
c. reducing levels of moderate/severe malnutrition (especially among children)
d. broadening safety nets for aged and disabled to reduce 'need' for children as personal social security schemes.
e. presentation of case for "family spacing" in terms of improved child and mother health
f. presentation of case for reasoned (chosen) family size taking into account household's probable resources and welfare of children (with special attention to male audiences)
g. provision of effective access to family planning services (including birth control technology) on the same basis as pre-natal, post-natal, well child growth monitoring and vaccination programmes?

7. What measures/goals beyond those at 6 above are desirable, practicable - at present? over the course of the 1990's?

T. Gender and Development

1. What are gender issues/relationships in relation to development? At household, community, sectoral and national levels? Why and how are they important?

2. Is there now a general awareness that in SSA women participate fully in production as well as doing almost all watering, fuelling, tending of sick household members, care of children, washing and cleansing, cooking and household maintenance? Are the implications of the resultant 12-16 hour typical working day recognised e.g. negative health impact? limited ability to produce more unless major time savings can be made in respect to some present tasks?

3. What are some of the main aspects of gender division of labour in rural SSA? Is it true that men do almost no work
in respect to food crops? Or does the gender division of labour run between different tasks? And vary between production intended for sale (i.e. cash crops - the largest of which in terms of numbers of household dependent on for basic cash income is probably maize with coffee second and yams/cocoyams/sweet potatoes third) and production intended primarily for household self provisioning?

4. Do most SSA households have single budgets or separate male and female household budgets with gender division of income sources (including production for household use) and of expenditure (including use of household production) obligations? What are some common divisions?

5. How are household labour time allocations determined in SSA households? What are typical required inputs of women to activities whose income goes to male budgets (and vice versa)?

6. Can one understand who will benefit how from specific productivity improvements or service provision without a working knowledge of gender divisions of budgets and labour allocation obligations and of total present workloads?

7. Why is so little known in detail about these intra-household relationships? Why is still less use made of what is known in policy design?

8. Why are women and especially female headed households so often "invisible" in policy design (e.g. in advice on rural and low income urban water programmes even though watering falls squarely on the female side of the gender division of labour as does maintenance) and in programme articulation (e.g. failure of extension services to address instruction and demonstration to women on "female" tasks or to address special problems - including labour shortages - of female headed households)?
9. What practical programmatic responses are possible e.g:
   a. more accessible basic health services and pure water supplies (reducing present women's workload)?
   b. training women in community facility (e.g. rural schools, clinics, water units) maintenance?
   c. pushing primary and adult education toward universal access (most now excluded are female so that most beneficiaries would be female)?
   d. addressing special labour power shortages (especially in respect to land preparation ploughing) of female headed households?
   e. requiring public works and supplementary employment programmes to hire a minimum proportion of women (e.g. 35%)?

10. What institutional structures are needed:
    a. a "Women's Ministry" with a set of projects?
    b. a "women's unit" to catalyse discussion and action by all government units and to carry out relevant research plus "pilot" and "demonstration" projects?
    c. specific attention at analysis, policy formulation and operational levels of all ministries and local governmental bodies to gender specific issues and to providing effective access for women to all programmes and services?
    d. encouragement and support for (and listening to) domestic women's NGO's from community through national level including listening to them and sharing in resource mobilisation for projects priorotised and designed by their members?

11. Why in the 1980's have Ministries of Health in many cases been able to "see" women; to identify their particular requirements; to design increasingly relevant programmes? What can one learn from this atypical (of other ministries) case?
U. Role of Donors in Structural Adjustment

1. Why are donors concerned about structural adjustment?

2. How can donors acquire the data and analytical base to make appropriate structural adjustment proposals? At what level of detail?

3. How can donors relate to (in criticism, suggestions for alteration, support to) nationally designed structural adjustment programmes?

4. How can consistency among donors, speed of donor response, initial flows of funds be speeded up in respect to structural adjustment?

5. How can alterations in levels, makeup flexibility of donor financial transfers increase the ability of SSA economies to continue structural adjustment programmes and to achieve their targets?

6. How can unified national accounting/reporting systems be reconciled with diverse donor/lender requirements?

7. What ways exist to reconcile SSA government accountability to its own civil society and to external resource providers? To what extent can/should the external bodies seek to respond to/protect civil society and social group need, and interests of low priority to the lost government?

8. To whom are external non-governmental organisations actually accountable? How can host governments increase NGO accountability to local communities? the consistency of their projects with coordinated, domestically determined district and national priorities?
V. The IMF's role in Structural Adjustment

1. What is the IMF's basic macroeconomic model? How does it relate to real (physical) output variables? Or does it?

2. Can short term programmes actually achieve an adequate balance between monetary demand containment and real supply enhancement?

3. Is the IMF's propensity to seek large initial changes ("shock treatment") wise?

4. Why do so many IMF programmes in SSA break down? Does this suggest faulty specification and projection on the part of the IMF?

5. Is heavy borrowing of relatively hard, short duration finance from the fund a prudent way to finance structural adjustment? If not, why has it become so common in SSA? If so what routes to financing genuinely short term foreign balance crises (superimposed on a longer term structural problem) are open to SSA economics permanently in the upper credit tranches of their IMF quotas? How does the newly expanded SAF of the IMF relate to these questions?

6. How compatible are the Fund stabilisation and Bank structural adjustment models (in theory and in actual practice in SSA)? If they are becoming more so whose approach(es) is(are) changing, how and why?

W. The Internal Politics of Adjustment

1. Who benefits from structural adjustment? Who looses? Over what time period?
2. How can an effective political coalition in favour of initiating and sustaining structural adjustment be built up?

3. Is a transparent "social contract" setting out short and medium term cost and benefit division practicable? Desirable? When? How can it be evolved/negotiated domestically through the political process? How can it be negotiated/reconciled with international financial institution goals/conditions?

4. What are the tradeoffs between technical efficiency and speed and political supportability and sustainability? Does democratic discussion and participation speed or slow initial decision taking? Subsequent implication?

5. What are the economic costs of politically failed and/or abandoned structural adjustment efforts? Are these adequately taken into account in programme design: by SSA governments? By the IMF? By the World Bank? By bilateral resource transfer? If so why do the same apparently avoidable problems arise repeatedly - eg early, massive, uncompensated increases in staple grain prices?

6. How can "adjustment fatigue" be limited or contained?

7. What are the politics of bargaining for external resources? What are the key determinants of the outcome of negotiations and of the sustainability of that outcome?

8. How can the reality of domestic political requirements (and the economic, as well as human and social, costs of ignoring them) be made clear to the Fund, Bank, bilateral sources of funding? How can a reasoned dialogue on what is politically and socially (and therefore ultimately economically) practicable be entered into with them?
9. What does the record show about the performance of countries with strong and widely based political decision taker commitment to Structural Adjustment and those without? What are the benefits, costs and risks of quick decisions (overriding significant decision takers) and a longer process of dialogue to reach near consensus? Of fairly open versus closed circle pre discussion and dialogue? Of ongoing evaluation of results with at least some candour as to failures and setbacks as well as progress and breakthroughs?

X. Question and Answer Session - World Bank

1. What does the World Bank see as the primary elements of Structural Adjustment Programmes? Of longer term transformation? How do these relate to each other? To short term adjustment?

2. How does the Bank view its role in/relationship with SSA governments in policy formulation, institutionalisation and phasing?

3. Why have so many SSA structural adjustment programmes failed to meet their targets or even collapsed:
   a. failure to implement - SSA government?
   b. failure to provide minimum necessary external support (especially import support) by external government and institutions?
   c. inadequate easing of external debt interest and repayment burden?
   d. continuing export terms of trade and access declines?
      Inadequate export diversification promotion and investment?
   e. inconsistencies in policy packages and in implementation (i.e. faulty design) by governments and/or bank?
f. inadequate easing of external debt interest and repayment burden?
g. bad choices of initial steps (eg urban grain price boost)?

4. What does Bank see as scope within structural adjustment programmes for employment creation, basic service restoration initiatives of PAMSCAD (Ghana) and/or Mozambique SDA types? Why is PAMSCAD a rather late starting, special programme approach and Mozambique-SDA earlier in the national rehabilitation/adjustment process, more closely linked to macro goals and major programmes? Does it matter?

5. What can be done to reduce the "front end loading" of costs and lagged appearance of benefits? This bias in structural adjustment - a temporal bias which is socially and politically damaging, deters entry into programmes and can lead to their premature abandonment).

6. What action does the Bank view as needed by SSA governments, Paris Club creditors, commercial bank creditors, bilateral development assistance bodies, itself in respect to reducing debt service burden to increase the quality of performance and reduce the incidence of collapse in SSA structural adjustment programmes? How can high opportunity costs of unpredictability of future payments actually to be made rather than rescheduled and of massive use of scarce high level personnel inherent in present one to two year, multi stage rescheduling process be reduced?

7. Does the Bank see significant further progress on concessional resource mobilisation for SSA as likely?
Y. **Phasing and Timing of Structural Adjustment - Political Economy**

1. What constraints do (should) real income levels, vulnerable group protection, regional balance, vested interests, preservation of morale place have on timing (how fast) and phasing (relative timing of costs and gains) of structural adjustment programmes?

2. Is the case for sharp (high cost) initial changes followed by gradual (moderate gain) recovery socially and politically viable? If - or when - it is not, will not such programmes either collapse or create damaging frictions overriding their nominal economic gain potential? Under what conditions is that contention valid? Too pessimistic?

3. Can gradual adjustment - with lesser imposition of costs at any one time but over a longer period - be sustained politically and in terms of participation and morale? If not, will the lesser shock impact cost be cancelled out by not sticking to the adjustment strategy long enough to achieve lasting gains?

4. What structural adjustment of the phasing of structural adjustment can increase early gains to provide tangible (socially and politically) evidence of success?
   a. Restoring capacity use (e.g more incentive goods, better rural access to transport and markets) before restoration of general fixed investment levels?
   b. Early provision of low cost, mass benefit programmes, e.g in the field of extended immunisation?
   c. Restoration (especially in rural areas) of basic education, health and water services to increase productive capacity, incentives, morale, acceptability of costs of adjustment?
   d. Special programmes (possibly including limited transitional basic food subsidies) to shield vulnerable groups during the initial stages of adjustment?
e. In short should programme elements like Ghana's PAMSCAD (primary education and health care, relocation for retrenched, seasonal employment, specific attention to poorest rural regions and urban slums) be "up front" and not (as in Ghana) four years "down the road"? Is Mozambique's focus on maintaining real minimum wages, expanding productive employment, rehabilitating basic services and restoring rural family sector livelihoods a practicable one?

5. To the extent that measures like those at No. 4 would on existing resource availability projections reduce the pace of return to fiscal and external balance how can they be financed? Are there bilateral and UN agency sources willing to provide additional funding to this end? Is the EEC?

6. Can full scale structural adjustment in SSA be instituted, sustained, succeed in its own terms without substantial initial and interim net real resource (import capacity) transfers? If so what strategy for securing them is likely to work?

7. Given the at best marginal funding to date of most structural adjustment programmes in SSA relation to projected minimum requirements, what is the likely overall and per programme implication of a sharp increase in the number of programmes? Of additional concessional resource flows to central (eastern) European middle income countries?

8. Why have rapid output growth increases proved elusive even in relatively long running, moderately successful programmes (e.g Ghana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania)? In particular why is reactivation of idled manufacturing capacity usually painfully slow?
9. How can phasing of governance improvement on technical efficiency/accounting and an accountability to civil society/broader participation in governance and production fronts be coordinated with other economic and social adjustments/transformations?