TOWARD RURAL RECONSTRUCTION IN MOZAMBIQUE:
Some Reflections Toward Namibia

By Reginald Herbold Green

Why is an expert like a farmer?
Each is a man outstanding in his field.

- Technical Assistance Joke

Too often many governments, my own included
have thought they knew what was best
for peasant farmers.

- Mwalimu Julius Nyerere

I.

INTRODUCTION - THE PDP AND MOZAMBIQUE

This is primarily a paper sketching the broad goals, strategies and some of
the components of Mozambique's Priority District Programme. The PDP is one
of two main priorities in the reconstruction of rural society, restoration
of rural services and rehabilitation of rural livelihoods in Mozambique.
The other is the return of internally and externally displaced war-affected
households to their homes and the restoration of livelihoods and civil
society for these returnados and for the rural families who have not fled
but whose homes and production base have been devastated by the South
African instigated and managed war of terrorist aggression against
Mozambique. In the 40 districts to be included in the PDP, these two
priorities interact in principle and will do so in practice but
rehabilitation for human and political reasons has to have national
geographic coverage while economic, personnel and security\(^1\) constraints
render extension of PDP to all 130 odd districts impracticable for at least
3 to 5 years.
The PDP approach is perceived as central in six senses:

1. creating an opportunity for absolutely poor households (60 to 65% in rural Mozambique including displaced persons) to produce their way to less humanly and socially disastrous levels;

2. parallel to and sustained by rehabilitation and broadening of access to basic infrastructure and productive services;

3. restoring (achieving) national and rural household food security by increases in both household self-provisioning and commercialised production;

4. reflating the severely depressed urban and industrial sectors by expanding rural markets for their potential production;

5. contributing to rebuilding of Mozambique's industrial raw material and export bases;

6. strengthening rural sector familial (small household producers) participation in governance both by involving them in decisions on programme design in each district and by recreating a significant set of public services in rural areas for them to be involved in governing via district and provincial assemblies/councils.

Economic - Human - Equity - Political Foci

It is therefore an economic (production and productivity oriented), human investment (health/education/agricultural knowledge), equity (reduction of absolute poverty/increase in effective access to basic services and political (involvement in governance and increase in public service provision) oriented approach. It is not perceived as either an alternative to, nor an add on decoration for, the ongoing Structural Adjustment Programme (PRE - Economic Rectification Programme in Mozambican terminology) but as integral to it.

Selection is by district not - in general - by social group or degree of poverty. This is partly a matter of realism - differentiating among absolutely poor, poor and not so poor sector familial households would be very difficult and targeting most programmes on such divisions well nigh impossible. Another factor is common sense logic - basic infrastructure
and basic services are needed by all human beings and (at least in Mozambique) their provision as widely as possible is perceived as a basic responsibility of government. The practical way to achieve access for absolutely poor households is to move rapidly toward universal access and to avoid fee or administrative patterns which exclude poor people. Third is a pragmatic consideration - even Chairman Mao defined the goal of a responsible, effective rural economic strategy as "all boats float higher". This is particularly true in respect to recreating a rural commercial network to sell consumer goods and production/construction inputs, to buy produce and to transport the goods sold and produce purchased to and from points accessible to rural households.

However, the orientation of the programme to the sector familial is a social, political and economic one. It is doubtless ideological in the sense of believing "no nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people are poor and miserable". However, since the source of that quotation is Adam Smith and the basis of PDP's production enhancement is to be from private household production to describe the PDP as inherently statist, let alone Marxist-Leninist would appear somewhat obscurantist. It is an economic decision because it places the main focus of renewed rural production on small family enterprises not larger private farms nor private or public sector corporate production units. These are perceived as being too capital, foreign exchange, skilled personnel, technology and middle or high level entrepreneur intensive to be viable/practicable main ways forward despite their uses as complements or in specific crops (e.g. sugar, tea). Separate programmes to encourage and support them do exist or are envisaged but ones secondary to the PDP in political attention, proposed personnel and intended resource allocations."

Organisational Challenges

Organisationally the PDP is intended to avoid four failings of past rural development efforts in SSA:

1. providing a reasonable package of infrastructure and basic services but not, in fact, enabling households to produce and to commercialise significantly more than before;

2. anarchically independent programmes by different ministries so that water, education, health, transport, credit research and extension
programmes did not coordinate with each other and, as a result, the whole tended to be less than the sum of its parts;

3. creating separate multi purpose project or area administrations outside normal governmental structures to by-pass coordination and other bureaucratic problems but creating insoluble accountability, sustainability and conflict with government problems as well as greatly impeding any overall improvement of the excluded main line service provision administration and governance institutions;

4. failing to ask the intended rural beneficiaries about their needs, possibilities and practices before design, to secure comment and approval of programmes from them or to involve them in monitoring with serious operational attention to their criticisms and suggestions.

Coordination at national, provincial and district levels; use of existing institutions (with strengthening) and creation of a special central institution only for the agricultural production enabling aspects as well as pre-consultation with the sector familial are being stressed. How successful PDP will be in resolving the weaknesses cited is problematic - at the least it does see the problems and the questions relatively clearly.

II.

AND NAMIBIA ?

The primary interest of Mozambique's rural policy to Namibians is in what insights they may provide for how to (or how not to) tackle Namibia's rural reconstruction and development. Quite clearly Namibia is not Mozambique historically, ecologically, politically or in terms of present and potential output mixes. However, there are a number of parallels which may make Mozambican experience since independence (sketched in the next section) and the PDP initiative to transform that experience (outlined in the fourth section) of interest to Namibians.

These common factors include:

1. lack of any historic orientation of research and extension services to small scale farmers in respect either to crops, livestock or forestry
with a resultant lack of adequate knowledge of African rural household income and expenditure, gender, intra household budgetary, time use, seasonal and other characteristics (slightly alleviated in Namibia by non-governmental studies);

2. devastation of large portions of the small scale rural household sector by war;

3. weak basic service provision in rural areas worsened by war;

4. pre-independence settler sector dominance in commercialised production with a substantial, specialised network of public and private support service and marketing structures (since collapsed in Mozambique);

5. lack of state capacity to hold together the medium and large scale commercial agricultural sector if proprietors left (e.g. the North Central abandoned ranches in SWA as it then was);

6. the near total immediate post-independence dependence of the agricultural support, service and marketing structures on middle and high level personnel of European ancestry and - therefore - the importance of the proportion of these personnel choosing to remain as citizens (catastrophically low - at most 10% - in Mozambique);

7. the need to achieve social, physical and economic rehabilitation after war for rural households comprising a substantial proportion of the total rural population (300,000 dislocated persons in Namibia according to CCN estimates plus perhaps 40,000 of the returning refugees or 20% of Namibia's total population of 1,750,000);

8. the lack of food security for substantial numbers of rural households and the fragility of national food security (initially because of domestic factors in Mozambique and because of heavy external sourcing in Mozambique and Namibia today);

9. severe limitations on initial numbers of, and training capacity for agricultural (including livestock) extension and support personnel for broad access, small farming household service provision (and of field and user tested knowledge and techniques for them to extend);
10. limited state resources available for rural development as a result of the patterns of transition (albeit specific costs are flight of settlers and war in Mozambique and reconciliation costs, e.g. not cutting bloated pay-rolls and pay-levels and servicing inherited debts of the illegal administration in Namibia’);

11. restoring physical security in rural areas (which apparently still remains at risk in parts of Namibia even if not comparable in extent or degree to large areas of Mozambique);

12. an initial state administrative and bureaucratic structure of great complexity and formalism which - even with altered policies and personnel - relates and communicates with great difficulty to scattered households with low levels of education especially because historically it was not concerned with their well-being and interpreted governance in respect to them as meaning only top down rule.

These common factors do not cover the whole of agricultural, rural society and the rural development challenge as perceived by rural households engaged in small scale production in either country. A similar, equally important, but equally partial, list of common factors can be constructed between Namibia and Botswana and a slightly narrower one in respect to Namibia and Zimbabwe. All three are relevant and most relevant when considered together in the Namibian context (or more accurately contexts, e.g. Eastern Caprivi is not the Oshana country is not Bethanie is not the Otavi Highlands).

III.

THE SECTOR FAMILIAL FROM PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA TO 1989

Colonial Mozambique

Colonial Mozambique's agriculture had three distinct sectors: plantations; medium and small scale settler farmers and the sector familial (ranging from moderate sized commercial to tiny sub-subsistence units). Further, it was divided geographically into North-Centre-South by crops and by balance among the sectors.
The North (Cabo Delgado, Niasa, Nampula Provinces) was the least significant in commercialised output. Export crop production (especially cotton) was mixed plantation, settler, compulsory sector familial while food surpluses were partly sector familial and partly settler. Overall the sector familial was dominant and probably most similar to the 'normal' Sub-Saharan African household self-provisioning plus secondary sales model.

The Centre (Zambia, Sofala, Tete, Manica) was the dominant export crop producing zone (especially sugar, tea, cashew) and also had substantial commercialised food production. The plantation sector (a heritage of the near sovereign company era in many districts) was dominant with settlers important in Tete (a grain basket) and the sector familial relatively weaker than in the other two zones. As in the North (and unlike the South) grains and root crops are both significant staples albeit usually in different districts with grain more highland and cassava more lowland/coastal in concentration. Many sector familial households were dependent on wage income (usually from plantation or settlers) to augment inadequate household production. Because of tax induced and de facto forced labour at low wages impact on sector familial labour power, it is likely that this dependence on wage earnings was in most cases determined by the laws of colonial political economy not of ecology and technology.

The South (Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo) had relatively few plantations, the largest number of settler farmers and the most diverse sector familial sub-sector. Its commercialised output was primarily food (plus sugar from plantations which was partly for export) because of the concentration of urban population in Lorenco Marques as it then was. While some sector familial households had local wage dependence patterns similar to those of the Centre, the predominant source of wage incomes was the Rand. These wages tended to be higher and, in fact, the correlation between household purchasing power/farm size and a household member working in the South African mines was strongly positive. These remittances made not only a substantial contribution to consumption but were the chief source of investible surplus for the minority of the sector familial households which expanded to medium size with substantial commercialised surpluses above household self-provisioning.

The colonial government did not provide services to the sector familial. Extension, research, credit and rural education, water, health were not
among its concerns. It did provide roads where plantation, settler, strategic or Lorenzo Marques food supply considerations pertained, albeit this produced a pretty broken and sketchy network.

The rural commercial network did, indeed, exist and provided supplies of consumer goods and agricultural/home construction inputs, markets for produce, transport to and from locations accessible to the sector familial and some credit. That sector consisted of primarily Portuguese merchants some with shops and warehouses in cities or district centres, virtually all with lorries and sale/collection routes. That they were racist and exploitative (in the normal use of that term not simply the Marxian technical one) is incontestable. What is also incontestable is that they did respond to market demand (by the sector familial and for its products) and were a vital component of the rural cash economy. Most, quite literally, drove off to South Africa, Swaziland, or Rhodesia (as it then was) before, at, or soon after independence leaving a near vacuum which has yet to be filled.

The sector familial was not technologically static - any more than its counterparts in Malawi or Tanzania. The methods of identifying, selecting, testing and mastering new technology are unclear - the inputs (e.g. metal hand tools, ox ploughs, improved seed, fertiliser) came via the rural commercial network quite readily once demand baked by cash existed. Work on plantations and - more particularly - settler farms was probably the main source of exposure to new opportunities with a bias toward picking the smaller and simpler possibilities based both on conservatism (major risk avoidance) and limited resources which, in the event, was consistent with knowledge constraints and economic viability. The high correlation between mine work remittances and farming modernisation/expansion strongly suggests that for a not insignificant proportion of sector familial farmers, lack of access to credit at non-extortionate rates was a constraint.

**Transition and Partial Transformation: 1975-81**

Mozambique's transition to independence was - from a skills and production perspective - chaotic. 90% of Portuguese settlers had left by 18 months after independence. Since most posts from crane and lorry driver up had been filled by them, the traumatic impact on production as well as government operations was acute. Particularly over 1975-78 this was exacerbated by the terrorist and sabotage activities of the bandidos
armados launched by Rhodesian intelligence as a counter-insurgency strategy.

The rural sector was hit by:

a. departure of the vast majority of settler farmers;

b. run-down of plantation operations;

c. driving off (literally) of rural commercial network;

d. falls in number of households receiving domestic and South African wage income remittances.

The initial state priority was to keep the modern (settler/plantation) sector functioning to preserve urban food supplies, export earnings and Mozambican jobs. This was seen as requiring state intervening (takeover ad interim) of abandoned or mismanaged units because the technological, import and input, financial, managerial and personnel requirements were beyond the capacity to cope of the sector familial. The shortage of state resources - especially personnel - led to regrouping settler farms into much larger units than had been the case in the colonial period.

This initial emphasis was reinforced by technocratic, bureaucratic and ideological factors. Initially independent Mozambique's leadership took an unrealistically negative view on the potential of (and indeed the existing contribution of) the sector familial because of a somewhat ill thought through commitment to modernisation and economies of scale. Administratively it was easier to concentrate agriculture on a few large units and projects and to raise external finance for them than to design broad front household extension and support services programmes. The concept of individual peasant households as incompatible with social and socialist as well as production level transformation somewhat vaguely held by the liberation movement was reinforced by its central and eastern European (especially German Democratic Republic) and Cuban technical advisers.

With no sector familial oriented extension or support tradition to inherit, the income side of rural society was perceived as centring on rural employment on large enterprises and large modern communal production units. The sector familial oriented agricultural strategy nominally focused on communal villages. The Liberation Movement had some experience with these
during the war in northern Mozambique. Its relevance to peace-time, commercializable surplus generating, technologically dynamic production throughout Mozambique should have been questioned more than it was in prospect (as it was in retrospect from 1978 onward). The foreign technicians (especially from the GDR) may have had some large scale co-op experience but neither in establishing them from scattered smallholdings nor under Mozambican ecological, infrastructural, educational or technological constraints. In any event, the large unit strategy ate up virtually all the resources available and few went to the communal village front.

The exodus of the rural commercial network was initially welcomed - even by many in the sector familial. Nasty most of its members had been and it was supposed the new public sector wholesale, retail, transport and produce buying enterprises would fill the needs for goods to buy and buyers to purchase at least as effectively, probably more cheap and certainly more civilly. Unfortunately the nature of the vacuum and the absence of personnel to design (much less to staff) replacements beyond the import/export and wholesale levels was not recognised at independence nor fully perceived until well after 1980.

The lorries, drivers and mechanics did not exist. Rural retail trade in Africa is rarely efficiently carried out by large centralized chains. Incentives to sell produce depend significantly on access to buyers at convenient locations and to virtually simultaneous access to desired goods to buy. In respect to village operations, specialisation in selling or buying or transporting is often uneconomic or at any rate cost inefficient.

A Deceptive Dawn

After the initial dramatic falls in rural output of 1975-77 there was a partial recovery. Over 1977-81 most of the output fall was clawed back. With goods to buy moderately available, sector familial (virtually all household, communal production being negligible throughout) commercialised production shared in the recovery. A few of the new large scale production schemes appeared on the road to becoming successes.

At the same time, the massive extension of primary education, basic health care and drinking water provision to rural areas and the removal of colonial administrative oppression improved sector familial morale and
sense of participation in governance as well as welfare. In addition policy was revised to call for additional resource allocation to sector familial agricultural services, to allow a free choice between communal and household production and to reduce barriers to small scale co-op and private participation in rural commerce and transport.

Whether the 1977-81 rural production trend could have continued and the parallel policy evolution been adequate under favourable circumstances is problematic. The large scale sector was not recovering on a sustainable basis – its gobbling up of personnel, subsidies to cover losses, imports and inputs was growing cancerously and 'deferred' maintenance was eroding the underlying capacity of most units. The apparent initial success of new units - such as the Nordic backed Chokwe Irrigation Scheme near Maputo - was deceptive as output, while real enough, tended to peak at a quarter of target levels and thereafter to fluctuate. And no operational strategy to support sector familial production development was ever designed much less launched, partly because of lack of finance, personnel and knowledge; partly because of bureaucratic inertia but partly – it appears – because Ministry of Agriculture personnel (including one or more subsequently dismissed ministers) did not give it the priority the Party or President Machel did.

In the event these questions became moot - circumstances were anything but favourable.

The Price of Pretoria

From mid-1981 through late 1986 over three quarters of Mozambique was swept over by a tidal wave of armed aggression and sabotage and burnt up by a holocaust of mass terrorism - the regional expression of the Republic of South Africa's "total strategy" to render apartheid safe and profitable. From December 1986 the tidal wave was halted and from 1988 on substantial reduction of the forces of aggression has been achieved in a majority of rural districts. The terrorist fires have been harder to quench because rural households, hamlets and villages are "soft" targets indefensible by a state with limited financial and technical resources facing a mercenary force with substantial external logistic and safe base support (as remains the case in mid-1990 whatever President de Klerk's formal policy or even actual wishes). Further, the very breaking of ba units and the disruption
of their communications, logistics and command over slave labour food producing enclaves has increased foraging raids.

There is no need to outline the overall human, social and economic costs South Africa has imposed on Mozambique for resisting apartheid and pursuing the dream of independent equitable development. That has been done in UNICEF's *Children On The Front Line* and UNECA/UNARP's *South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid.* What is relevant here is the impact on the rural condition and the creation of the context which as it pertained over mid-1989-1990 when the PDP was formulated.

First, the progress toward provision of basic services was badly damaged although a significant core of rural health posts and centres, water provision and primary schools has been kept in being and the first two, at least, have been re-establishing themselves in newly secure areas since mid-1988;

Second, in most of the countryside rural infrastructure from bridges and culverts through shops and godowns has been devastated both by terrorism and sabotage and by lack of maintenance;

Third, outside a few areas (Zonas Verdes in peri urban areas, a number of protectable large scale settlement areas and some rural districts little touched by war) no rural extension programme or systematic supply of support services has been possible;

Fourth, the loss of vehicles and godowns and the shortage of goods to sell has crippled both the public sector wholesale and produce purchasing sector and the co-op and private small scale commercial enterprises which had emerged over 1978-81;

Fifth, even in some relatively secure areas with local infrastructure and transport functional (e.g. the Mueda Plateau in Cabo Delgado) the cutting of main transport links has devastated commercialised output because of lack of effective market access for sales or purchases;

Sixth, the war and the consequential lack of resources have reduced civil governance in many rural districts to very attenuated levels (and in a few to virtually nominal existence);
Seventh, by limiting personnel development and, to some extent, draining skilled personnel the war has prevented any sustained increase in public (or for that matter private) sector human capacity especially in rural areas quite as much as it has blocked institutional and normal functional experience development;

Eighth, the macroeconomic consequences of war have crippled government finances so that almost all of the capital and of the emergency (survival of war displaced persons) and about a half of the basic (excluding defence and debt service) recurrent budgets are externally financed;

Ninth, the collapse of urban-rural trade has created a (only half met) need of 1.25 million tonnes a year of grain and other basic food imports and crippled demand for urban manufactured goods a well as constraining expansion of the domestic raw material oriented artisanal (micro enterprise) sector;

Tenth, perhaps two-thirds of the rural populations have been forced to move at least once; two-fifths are now displaced (in camps or in unsuitable, overcrowded, hopefully temporary re-settlement areas; about a tenth are refugees outside Mozambique and up to two-thirds are absolutely poor with rural child moderate and severe malnutrition at about the same level.

Eleventh, macroeconomic stabilisation and partial recovery (1987-1990 GDP growth will average between 4% and 5% a year and commercialised agricultural output increase at least as much) has by-passed most rural districts and households who are unable to respond to higher prices either because of lack of resources to enable them to produce more. Gains have been substantial for a minority of households with safe access to land, at least minimal basic services and accessible markets stocked with goods. Indeed the speed of recovery in certain areas - e.g. coastal cashew producing zones and the northeastern cereal and potato basket district of Tete province followed improved general security, access to transport and/or access to goods to buy has been remarkable.

To The PDP

It was against this background that the political decisions to conceptualise the Priority District Programme, to give it high profile presentation at the 1989 Consultative Group (of donors) Meeting and to move
rapidly toward articulation and budgeting for resource mobilisation in 1990 have been taken.

The commitment to struggle for the liberation of Mozambique and Mozambicans from absolute poverty required priority attention to the rural sector familial which comprises up to 75% of the population.

The need to raise production and especially food and export production required that increasing production and productivity be central to the programme - raising rural welfare and incomes by subsidisation was financially not on and, with perhaps 30% urban absolute poverty, would hardly lead very far toward eradicating absolute poverty.

The past experience with large enterprises and with communal units in agriculture demonstrated that for this reason the sector familials' income and production increases had to be won at household level not by increased agricultural enterprise employment.

Political priority for basic service extension interacted with the importance of better health, education an water in increasing present as well as future productivity and saving time (e.g. from long distance water collection and tending sick persons) and also with the institutional vigour and tenacity of Health and Water to make these central to the overall approach.

The manifest needs for infrastructure rehabilitation and for initial augmentation of sector familial cash incomes (together with the presence of food and import support aid counterpart funds and the extreme shortage of import capacity) led to or at least facilitated the incorporation of a - slightly ill articulated - labour intensive, seasonal and part-time sector familial household members employing public works component.

Realisation of the lack of adequate knowledge about the sector familial led to a greater readiness to seek information on and from it before designing programmes and similar realisation of the cost of the private rural commercial network's near absence to the adoption of a highly positive attitude toward enabling it to recover and expand.

The clear impossibility of many rural households rehabilitating their own livelihood bases without an initial injection of grant or soft loan resources (and the hellish problems of tiny loan extension and recovery)
have led to inclusion of initial grant provision of tools, production inputs and household goods (plus, if practicable fiscally, "starter" livestock) as a part of creating an "enabling climate" for household initiative and production.

The genesis of the attention to gender issues - especially women's workload and female-headed households - is less clear. Politically there has been a commitment to equal rights and equal access for women at senior political levels in Mozambique, but one attenuated in practice by pre-colonial and colonial social norms and by bureaucratic inertia and myopia. There is a realisation - partly generated by Mozambican women's groups, partly by the Nairobi Conference at the end of the 'Women's Decade' and partly by a handful of expatriate advisers - that women are overburdened, central to food production, head a substantial proportion of households, and are disproportionately absolutely poor. This appears to be prompting a more positive (if not always well articulated) response at various levels and interacts with Health's long standing prioritisation of mother and child preventative and curative clinics and vaccination programmes. However, in respect to agriculture and to employment this is a priority which has become real in principle with a very limited data base or technical knowledge fund for its actual implementation.10

IV.

PRIORITY DISTRICT PROGRAMME: TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION

Goals and Outline of Content

The goals are to restore rural production - primarily in the sector familial - and economic viability as well as rural civil society. By so doing, PDP will both constitute a major component of Mozambique's economic rehabilitation and make other components - notably urban food security and resuscitation of domestic demand for manufactured goods - practicable.

To restore civil society requires that the 80% of rural households in the sector familial (as well as the 10 to 20% in agricultural and non-agricultural employment or commercial farming, medium and small scale non-farm business and the self employed, non-farm artisanal) take part in the restored/increased production and have effective access to basic social,
human and economic services. Basic needs and means to meeting them must be central to the PDP if it is to be a social and political success or even - given the impracticability of massive large scale public sector and implausibility of large and medium scale private sector agricultural units producing on the requisite scale - an economic one.

Sector Familial Requirements and Programme Emphases

The need to focus on revival of familial sector output and access to services (including economic services) has six implications:

a. broad base programmes - e.g. access to improved seed and basic tools - are more important than limited access, capital intensive projects, because neither technically nor in the light of financial and import constraints can there be enough of the latter to allow the majority of the sector familial households to produce more;

b. commercialisation is crucial - the SF households have basic needs meeting which requires cash - and requires rehabilitation of the enterprise/entrepreneurial as well as of the physical/infrastructural elements of the rural commercial network;

c. however, because food security will for most households depend primarily on their own production, specific attention must be paid to facilitating expansion of own use or household provisioning (so called subsistence) production and its more efficient household level processing, storage and preservation;

d. because they have direct links to quantity, quality and effectiveness of labour for direct production - as well as because they are basic to political and social sustainability - primary and adult education, basic preventative and curative health and pure water supply (for human, and secondarily livestock, use) are crucial to the PDP;

e. so to is specific programme by programme attention to women's needs and the actual gender division of labour in order to allow women to produce more while lightening - or at least not augmenting - the very heavy workload characterising sector familial women when production is possible;
f. integrating (but also articulating for specific differences in needs) programme components relating to sector familial households whose direct production capacity is relatively undamaged by war or is already substantially restored; those formally non-deslocado/affectado households (especially in newly liberated districts) whose household production and social bases have been wrecked by war and also resettling/rehabilitating economic base of affectado, deslocado and returnado families.

The central aims of the programme relate to the absolutely poor - and on the verge of absolute poverty - sector familial households. This does not mean other social and economic sectors should or can be ignored:

a. rebuilding the rural and small town commercial network is crucial to the sector familial and requires substantial strengthening of the private (as well as the public) commercial sector;

b. the interests and concerns of the non-agricultural artisanat and of employees of enterprises producing for local (or broader rural) sale are symbiotic with those of SF households - they provide production enabling inputs and production incentivating goods to be available as well as a market for agricultural (including livestock, fish, artisanat and forestry) products;

c. except in cases of serious land (or good land accessible to transport) shortages, private farmers (small capitalist or large family farms with hired labour) have interests more compatible with than in contradiction to those of the SF households e.g. they provide some seasonal employment and encourage traders to serve areas they are in. Their success will harm the SF only if it drains a disproportionate share of services or engrosses scarce land the SF needs/could use;

d. basic services (i.e. health - education - water - agricultural extension - commercial access) should be available to all PDP households not only absolutely poor ones (albeit the less poor ones can be expected to pay for - e.g. - agricultural inputs whereas initially the absolutely poor cannot). Access to them is a basic right of all human beings and meeting that right is a duty of the states as responsible to all Mozambicans;
e. the social systems of rural Mozambique are not purely on class, much
dless income level, lines so that a strict means (lack of means) test
for core services would be very divisive. This would be especially
true in the period of reconciliation - helping poor ex-bandidos and not
less poor households who had stood with the state would be politically
implausible and excluding all ex-bandidos by saying "non poor" (even
when palpably they were destitute) would abort reconciliation;

f. empirically separating absolutely poor, in danger of becoming
absolutely poor, slightly less poor households would be tedious, slow
and probably impracticable.

But the preceding paragraph is a complement to and an elaboration of the
basic commitment to increasing sector familial household capacity to
produce, to sell and to buy, and access to services. Therefore, programme
design should be based on what sector familial households see as their
basic needs and on ways in which they believe they can satisfy them.
Programmes not meeting that test will not have much chance of success on
any criterion.

Sector Familial Household Priorities

The priorities of poor sector familial households can be summarised under
five heads:

1. Security
2. Economic and Social Survival Safety Nets
3. Livelihood
4. Basic Services
5. Infrastructure for the above

These priorities have rarely been studied systematically and operationally
- and almost never at national level nor in the context of a planning
exercise whether in Mozambique or elsewhere. However, a substantial number
of micro surveys and a body of - often rather unsystematic - knowledge by
politicians and others who are (or act as if they were) responsible and
accountable to poor rural Africans do exist. These can be refined if doing
so is made a priority a) in research - e.g. by the Centre for African
Studies and b) in the pre-adoption presentation of the PDP to district populations as well as in annual progress reviews. The ongoing political process, while essential to back up and provide a context for such work, is not by itself adequate even including District and Provincial councils and assemblies. First, in many cases it does not provide specific enough ex ante needs-requirements in adequate detail to inform strategic programme and project design. Second, it is a rather slow and inexact monitoring device except for actions so widely and deeply resented or so ineffective that any competent observer can also see they have gone wrong. Third, it does not usually operate in a way allowing clear choices among alternatives on the basis of rural household preference within actual resource constraints.

As a result very ill designed and/or cost inefficient (in the sense of benefits to rural households per unit of resources used) programmes and institutions can be designed, launched and continued with apparent rural support (or at least without major disapproval in terms of clear advocacy of specified alternatives) even with a participatory political process responsible to a rural majority. A clear example of this weakness is Tanzania. Tanzania's political process has a clear pro-rural political bias demonstrated by resource transfers to the rural sector from the urban sector and external sources on a large scale, by systematically raising crop prices much more rapidly than even minimum wages (let alone salaries) and by reversals of programmes, policies and structures which roused broad, sharp rural criticism. But this has guaranteed neither efficiency in resource use nor a close correlation between rural household priorities and patterns of resource allocation to rural areas.

The Necessity of Security

Security is a necessary condition for meeting other basic needs as well as a human need in and of itself. It has four aspects - physical/military; social and political setting/administration; access to land and receiving a fair return (absence of gross exploitation in the colloquial sense).

Physical security means both the achievement and maintenance of peace and the functioning of the police and army within enforced guidelines which mean honest, peaceful rural households need not fear them and can, when necessary, go to them confidently for assistance. In the context of the
PDP this means that coordination with the Armed Forces is crucial to ensure that the selected Districts are (or become) and remain physically secure.

**Socio political/administrative security** means achieving a context in which there are known, broadly acceptable, relatively stable legal, administrative and political frameworks. That context allows people to act in confidence that they will not be messed about with and can expect support if they go about their business/livelihood/family life in ways which they consider socially and politically acceptable. In the PDP context this requires retraining/re-educating District Administrators and their staffs to give top priority to communication with and service to rural households (or poor urban ones in primarily urban districts).

Unfortunately many DA's and staff members (judging by rural criticisms not least during Presidential visits) view their primary duties as filing reports and telling (ordering) people to do what the DA believes (not always correctly) Maputo and/or the Provincial capital wants them to do. Many are averse to involving themselves in the hard work of helping the people and technical service providing personnel to develop the districts. Furthermore in some - not all - districts rural households do say they view administrators as outsiders interested only in their own welfare. That this criticism can be made of rural administrators in almost all countries and that in part the pattern has been caused by war (and the absence of any historic model of rural administration to copy except the very unsatisfactory Portuguese colonial one) do not reduce the need for change if the PDP is to work.

**Land security** means, to poor rural households, stable use rights over enough land of good enough quality to produce a decent livelihood. It may or may not mean any widespread desire to own the land in the Western individual, saleable, freehold tenure sense. It usually does mean a desire that use rights can be inherited. In Mozambique there is, in general, enough land for this goal to be met - especially if some empressa and state run/peasant farmed scheme land is to be redistributed to the sector familial. However, there are exceptions. Some peri urban areas are - as the result of war - hopelessly overcrowded. War moved households in these areas can have land security only if they can be helped to move back either to their home areas (probably their normal preference) or - if that is impracticable - to other areas with adequate land. Similarly in peri urban zonas verdes and limited zones of high quality land (some river margins in
otherwise dry areas) there is not enough land for sector familial land security and freedom of access for private plus plantation use. In such cases land security means giving the sector familial priority (e.g. in the Ville de Tete Zona Verde where the issue has arisen).

Communal land use and communal villages may or may not be consistent with land security as seen by the majority of sector familial households and rural attitudes to them probably vary widely. In general only if a broad pre-establishment support base exists (or communal production is one option and household another one without discrimination in support and service access provision against those who choose the latter) will communal initiatives be perceived by rural households as consistent with land (and social) security. Further, if large scale social (work team) production has not been practiced there are grave reasons to doubt grouped or combined units using existing methods will, in practice, raise output in more than a minority of cases. (Ex-employees of larger units - especially if allocated the same area and producing the same products - may be exceptions.)

**Villagisation** in the social and residential sense, if properly explained and supported by provision of better water, health, education, commercialisation and communication/transport access to villages, will frequently be popular and objections will not turn primarily on land security. However, compulsory villagisation in Tanzania, although decided on after a democratic process and with a sector familial majority in the Party Congress taking the decision (largely, but not wholly, because of serious communication and implementation debacles at Regional and District political and administrative levels), was strongly opposed at the outset by perhaps 25% of rural households. This was the case even though access to education, health, water and communication were in fact improved. 15 years later support is much broader - the villages remain and there is in reality no barrier to people leaving them, so their survival is evidence of broad acceptance.

Given both the limited capacity of Districts to communicate and to implement and of the state to provide resources, the PDP should not make compulsory villagisation a priority nor seek as a uniform priority to encourage rapid villagisation. However, it should locate services in clusters which encourage village development and in the cases of internal or external returnados seek to achieve settlement patterns focusing on -
say - 100 to 500 household villages. On land use tenure the principles should be security of tenure to the user and priority to the sector familial in allocating scarce land. Communal production - both for technical and historic bad experience reasons - should not be a PDP priority. That is not advice to decline to support voluntary cooperative agricultural or non-agricultural commercial or production initiatives. It does include not seeking to prefabricate a co-op structure without prior rural households demands for and, at least as crucial, capacity to operate one. Furthermore, rigid rules as to what constitutes a co-op, however well intended, are often rather unhelpful. Genuine cooperation on selected areas by several farmers or part-time artisans (e.g. women gardeners in Zonas Verdes or garment makers) may well merit support if they appear to be viable and potentially stable even if their forms are neither traditional nor standard co-op in nature.

Security from exploitation (or security of fair returns) implies price, fee and tax policies, which are broadly perceived as fair. This does not mean no profits for traders and transporters, but it does mean household terms of trade which are seen as providing a fair days work earns a fair reward and that a fair year's work provides a decent household income.

Nor does it mean no user fees and service charges but it does forbid ones, which - as operated - effectively deny access to large numbers of poor households. (In some districts the present rural health consultation and drug fees are seen as fair but in others - with much lower cash incomes - they are perceived as unfair and exclusionary.) Nor are taxes as such viewed as unfair - at least not if services including security are being provided. However, for historic reasons, high crop or poll taxes are likely to be seen as exploitation and should be avoided in favour of indirect taxes on urban goods purchased by rural household. For example, sky high taxes on beer and cigarettes are, if anything, popular in rural Tanzania but objectively less burdensome local level crop levies are, with few exceptions, grossly unpopular and often deeply resented. They also have substantial potential for distorting patterns of commercialisation either to more distant lower levy markets or to non-transparent parallel systems. From a purely revenue administration point of view they are high personnel and cash cost to revenue ratio sources whereas indirect taxes have much better ratios. And, in terms of incidence, levies are unpredictable as to progressivity whereas - especially in rural areas and
for farming households - sales taxes exempting unprocessed food and artisanal goods are unambiguously progressive for up to 90% of households.

Survival Security

Survival safety nets relate primarily to access to food, to ability to stay on the land, to access to medical services and to avoidance of crushing debt overhangs. These are crucial for survival in crises situation priorities. They can in part be met at household level (e.g. food reserves and cash reserves). But for absolutely poor households emerging from a war context, household resources and reserve building capacity are very low and for the 50% of rural Mozambican households who are destitute (deslocados, afectados, retornados, amnestados, newly liberated area residents) present capacity to provide them is basically nil. Therefore, concentration in the PDP must be on the public sector provision with improved household storage at this point relating more to normal year food self sufficiency enhancement (by reducing losses or forced sales at harvest time to avert them) not intra-year reserve holding.

Food security requires that food be physically available and affordable. In deslocado camps that does mean free ration distribution. Generally it is more complex. The PDP should seek to increase local purchases and fair (not subsidised) price commercial network sales reducing dependence on food aid and food handouts and helping rebuild the commercial network. To do that, it needs to use its rural works programme to augment rural household incomes seasonally, for very low income households and during crises (e.g. drought, flood) periods and their aftermath to the next sound harvest. Whether the work is paid in food, in cash or in a combination depends on local and national contexts (especially whether the rural commercial network has food to sell) and (unfortunately) on donor preferences since many have a bias toward paying in food not meticais to buy it. In the case of destitute households free food is needed until the household can re-establish its production base i.e. 6 to 15 months if the first harvest is sound and 18 to 27 if it is drought (or flood or insect) ravaged.

Nominally employment on rural works could always substitute for free food. However, because such households have non-food cash needs and the labour demands of reconstructing their own homes and firms, because an infinite volume of rural works cannot be undertaken by reason of design, supervision, and skilled labour and material input constraints and because
the initial rural commercial network capacity is low, in this case free food distribution appears preferable.

**Ability to stay on the land** is separable from food security for survival. (It also has a physical security aspect treated above under security.) If food is available but only in towns or at camps, households must leave their farms. The social and economic cost of such forced moves (including loss of life) are high and relocation problems inevitably delay post-drought household rehabilitation bases. In a peace time context large scale migration to relief food is evidence of inadequate food security programming. In the PDP this means ensuring that free food, commercial food supplies and rural works employment are where the people are not scores of kilometres away. This does give an additional priority to restoring rural transport infrastructure and vehicle fleets.

**Access to medical services** is needed to avert crisis caused by deaths e.g. epidemics and common, simply curable life threatening conditions requires availability of vaccination capacity, some simple techniques/supplies (e.g. for oral rehydration) and - in some contexts - certain specialised drugs (e.g. snake bite serum). APE's (community based auxiliary health workers) and dispensaries plus backup, mobile crisis services (e.g. for vaccinations) are needed for this security; access to full Primary Health Care (postos, cenetros and mother/child clinics) probably is not an immediate necessity as opposed to a high 3 year priority. PDP programming on health and especially APE's and enhanced mobility of District level medical personnel are directly relevant.

**Averting crushing debt burdens** leading to loss of livelihood is a future more than a present problem in rural Mozambique. For PDP it means avoiding commercial network exploitation via high interest pre-harvest loans and low post harvest repayment in kind and including *de facto* crop insurance provisions in familial sector credit i.e. in a poor harvest year interest on input loans is waived and repayment rescheduled over the next 2 to 3 years and in a no harvest year principal is also waived.

**Livelihood Building**

**Access to a decent livelihood** for the sector familial means primarily ability to produce for household use and for sale. Secondarily (in varying degrees of importance) it includes access to wage employment for some
household members. It comprises security because without ability to go about ones daily work in safety from violence and arbitrary interference there can be no ability to earn a decent livelihood. Similarly secure land use rights are basic to ability to produce. Further it comprises the existence of survival safety nets - one cannot earn a decent livelihood if one is no longer alive (and one death can devastate a whole household's economy). However, it goes beyond these necessary, but not sufficient, elements.

Livelihood Restoration/Strengthening

Livelihood falls into two analytically separate (from a sector familial household as well as a social scientist's perspective) but inter-related components:

a. household production of food, housing and fuel for own use (plus local, de facto barter exchange);

b. cash income (from sale of crops, fish, livestock, forest produce, processed foods and artisanal products or services and also from employment incomes of family members who may or may not be resident in the rural household i.e. it may and historically often has included remittances).

The mix of these components varies widely. In much of Southern and Central Mozambique remittance incomes from household members working in South Africa, on plantations or in Lorenco Marques (as it then was) and Beira has traditionally been crucial to rural household economies. To a lesser extent (and ending in the 1960's rather than eroding in the late 1970's and 1980's as is the case with the plantation and South African labour remittances) a substantial number of Northern Mozambican household economies were crucially dependent on remittances earned on Tanganyika (as it then was) sisal plantations and in domestic service (particularly as watchmen).

Similarly the nature of cash crops varied - in the South sector familial production for sale was predominantly food for the Maputo market; in Tete food for Beira; in the central coastal provinces cashew and cotton; in the North (where cash sales were lower) food for Beira (via the ports of Pemba and Praia and/or the Lichinga tramway line). The extent of artisanal
and processed food production is unclear. (Fuel and pole wood and charcoal were not insignificant but are perhaps better lumped with crops as is artisanal fishing). If there are Portuguese records on this they do not appear to have been studied systematically (a possible priority topic for Institute of African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University). And one fairly significant product - local beer and spirits - was illegal or at least alegal so that hard data presumably do not exist.

Given the low level of education of any kind and low rural cash incomes it is probable that masonry, carpentry, tool making, blacksmithing, well digging, furniture making, vehicle repair, tailoring and other artisanal services were limited in extent and volume and, probably, largely within the household (i.e. clothes making, construction, etc. by household members for household use). Part time, seasonal wage employment by sector familial household members primarily engaged in agriculture does not seem - on known data - to have been common in the past (either absolutely or by comparison with other African countries such as Malawi and Tanzania where for a significant number of households it accounts for - say - 25% of cash and kind household income). Its development (partly but not only by seasonal, labour intensive rural infrastructure rehabilitation and development) should be a PDP priority.

Multiple Budgets and Gender Roles

In speaking of household livelihood it is necessary to avoid the European social science assumption of single household budgets either on the income or expenditure side and also to recognise that intra household but inter budget labour input obligations (e.g. wife to weeding crops for sale by husband; husband to clearing and sometimes ploughing land for wife to raise household food and marginal sale crops) are often significant.

In most African sector familial households there were and are at least two budgets - male head of household and wife. The former includes wage (and remittance) income, artisanal income of the man and sale of "man's" (i.e. produced primarily for sale) crops - large livestock - fish - main forest products. From it are paid the man's personal expenses (clothing, tobacco, etc), housebuilding and major repair cash costs, most farming inputs, some 'gifts' (semi-obligatory) to wife or wives and children (e.g. cloth, sometimes certain purchased foods), usually (but not always) school fees and less uniformly medical (including transport) costs. The woman's budget
includes food, fuel produced for household use plus marginal cash sales of those crops, small stock (especially chicken, eggs) and livestock byproduct (e.g. milk) sales, processed food and other female artisanal products. The expenditure (cash and kind) obligations are household food and supplies, fuel, women's and children's medical costs and some school fees. Complexities doubtless arise in the case of polygamous households. Virtually the only single budget cases are likely to be female headed households and more specifically these without a male member providing regular remittances. Like all sketches this is oversimplified because budgetary patterns are not identical among regions or cultural groups nor static over time. (Again research by the Centre for African Studies would seem a priority.) What is clear is that the impact of added incomes, costs and labour requirements cannot be understood adequately without regard to gender divisions of labour and of income, expenditure and time budgets.

The PDP needs to take gender issues on divisions of labour, of income and of expenditure into account because adequate livelihood requires balance of each time and income/expenditure budget. Surpluses on one are not automatically transferred to meet deficits on the other e.g. more male cash income may not significantly improve nutrition if food for the household is a women's obligation and neither inputs nor time saving techniques (whether in food production, preservation or preparation or in fuelling, watering, health improvement) are made accessible to women. Similarly because cash is needed and the potential for getting it from agricultural sales is frequently low (especially for initially destitute households or in physically isolated areas) both labour intensive, seasonal (at low agricultural work periods) infrastructure employment and facilitating expansion of artisanal activity are needed. And both should pay specific attention to women's cash incomes as their budgets also have outgoings requiring cash (not least for tools, seeds, other inputs to produce crops or small stock and fowl for household nutrition).

Own food - housing - fuel production is likely to account for 60 to 75% of the total income of a poor but not absolutely poor sector familial household. (Converting own use production to cash at small town retail prices i.e. what it would cost to buy.) That assumes a combined set of household budgets made up:
The cash 40% of household income of the less poor, less war affected households probably varies widely as to makeup both by district and by household. At a guess nationally it might be 17½% agriculture-fishery-forestry sales, 21½% artisanal sales 2½% local wages, 2½% intra-Mozambican remittances, 15% remittances (official or parallel) from RSA.

That sketch demonstrates that PDP must pay direct attention to facilitating sector familial household ability to produce food, building materials and fuel. Especially because household budget divisions mean crop sale money may not be available to pay for inputs into own use production, at least initially (and especially for destitute households) free distribution of basic inputs is desirable. These include:

a. seeds, core animals (to being herd rebuilding) and seedlings (e.g. fruit and fuel trees);

b. hand tools for farming, for fishing (including shovels, pickaxes for pond building) and for artisanal forestry;

c. basic household equipment (bucket, utensils for cooking/eating).

Together with these should go competent advice and education by extension officers which is district (or ecological zone) specific; provided largely through demonstrations at frequent intervals (just before the technique needs to be used) and to those who will do the work (predominantly women for many - but not all - of the tasks in own use production). In the case of livestock, core stock (including chicken) need to be provided to restore the wiped out livestock capital base and basic veterinary drugs (preventative e.g. vaccination against anthrax, dipping against East Coast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Own Production</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>12½</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisanal Products</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Manufactures</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed/Tools etc</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport etc</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60-75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
fever and curative e.g. salt and other basic oral rehydration drugs against animal diarrhoea following the rains ending droughts).

Cash (i.e. intended to be marketed) agricultural production requirements for inputs and services are broadly similar to own use. However, the appropriate audiences may vary (e.g. in more activities men do most of the work). Further, because the crops or livestock or fish or forest products, are sold and the proceeds go to the grower's budget, more purchased inputs are possible. A one to two year free starter pack (analogous to Zimbabwe cotton seed plus fertiliser free packets in early small farm cotton development) is appropriate but, thereafter, sale via the rehabilitated rural commercial network with flexible fair price limits on charges would appear desirable. That is especially true if some public sector and co-op shops exist to "keep prices honest". Note, however, that prices will skyrocket unless supplies are adequate to meet basic input requirements. For certain crops - e.g. cotton, cashew - specialised authorities are the presumptive input and extension service providers but Rural Development should coordinate their parts of input-extension as well as providing-coordinating general crop, veterinary artisanal fishery (sea, river, pond) and artisanal forestry (including planting and processing) extension and input supply.

Including Non-Agricultural Employment

Other (i.e. non-agricultural) cash income development is a PDP priority but is likely to be one which varies widely by district. A uniform component should be seasonal infrastructure rehabilitation and development employment of one to three months per household with preference to destitute and female headed households and a minimum (say 33%) of jobs to go to women. There is a body of Botswana and India experience on this at macro (Indian states have populations larger than Mozambique's) level and several projects in Mozambique to use in design. WFP would probably be interested in at least the rehabilitation of deslocado-affectado-returnado aspects and ILO plus IFAD more generally. The World Bank is now cautiously favourable to well designed programmes of this kind. UNICEF and UNIFEM are certainly supportive and could be used as catalysts and perhaps pilot programme organisers, but neither has the in house personnel and experience to do overall design or monitoring except in a cluster with ILO-WFP-IFAD or by hiring specialised consultants.
How much employment can be promoted in rural areas is unclear. (Raising opportunities for one family member to work in a city or on a corporate farm and send back remittances falls outside the PDP's scope. (i.e. Cidade do Maputo is not a PD. The Carbomac coal mine is not a PDP concern but a national one, even though Moatise district is a PD, because the considerations of what to do at Carbomac are necessarily primarily national and actions to rehabilitate/expand it require specialised knowledge and resource mobilisation/infrastructure creation very far removed from PDP's.)

Artisanal sales can certainly be increased - to varying degrees. In part this will be self generating as demand (sector familial cash income) rises. But PDP inputs may be appropriate e.g. extension/adult education; assistance to co-op formation (where SF artisans want it) for input purchase, output sale and - less frequently? - production; ensuring input and tool supply at fair prices (perhaps with initial small, soft loans for tools and basic input inventory). What inputs for what crafts is likely to be district specific with studies needed in year 1 and action from year 2. However, there are exceptions where action in year 1 should be possible. NGO's and UNICEF have experience of cases in which by supplying (selling) raw materials they immediately generated not inconsiderable net cash incomes (especially for women in garment making) and districts should be alert to locating and acting on such opportunities.

**Basic Human and Production Services**

Access to basic services is a SF need and priority goal as perceived by rural households. This cluster comprises economic services as well as human/social ones and marketed plus community financed as well as Central/Provincial budget ones. The concern is that the services be there and financially as well as physically accessible.

If there is to be universal access that means either no charge for basic human services or simple, point of service waivers of charges for - say - 25% who are so poor they cannot afford them. In present rural conditions no charge may be better because absolute poverty and inability to pay must be 75%-90% in many rural districts when deslocados, affectados, returnados, amnestados and newly liberated households are taken into account. It is possible to exempt these categories and make allowance for 25% of other users to be exempted individually but that seems a misallocation of scarce personnel for very little money unless collection is on a community support
buildup basis with fees payable in cash, food, building materials or labour
and staying with the primary service unit. The revised APE (community
health worker) agreement with World Bank is on these lines - perhaps 3% of
cost recovered from community and payment in cash or kind worked out
between community and the primary service unit which then keeps the income.
This is apparently a first in a government programme receiving World Bank
funding. Christian, Muslim and NGO medical and education cases certainly
do exist and work moderately well, but these are not directly comparable
with state programmes. Thus it may be prudent to see how it works before
generalising it everywhere for all services until a workable rural hospital
model and experience in operating it have been proven in practice.

Human services comprise primary health (APE-posto-centro-rural hospital),
primary and adult education, pure drinking water. PDP needs to have worked
out components for each district programme aimed (for 3 years) at restoring
past highest levels (usually in 1981-1984 period) and drawing up
perspectives for - say - 95% PHC and APE, 80% primary education together
with + 65% adult literacy and 60% access to pure water by 2000. This needs
to be done by the relevant ministries but in a PDP coordinated frame.
Health has a strategy and first steps; Education has seen the need for one
(at least at primary level) but is just beginning to consider what that
will require; Water has a number of projects and pieces but not (it seems)
an overall strategic or medium term perspective (at least for rural areas).
The previous paragraph applies directly to "cost recovery" in these
services. There is more room for community inputs of labour, materials and
perhaps cash into water (especially where there is an absolute shortage of
any nearby water as well as pollution problems with current sources). But
how much and in what form needs to be worked out district by district by
Water in dialogue with GD's and village councils - it will not be uniform.

In exploring community based service support schemes - and even more in
setting fees - it is crucial to look at total contribution levels proposed,
not to treat each service in isolation. All of the costs (in time,
material, food or money) come from the same, predominantly poor,
households, even if the recipients service providing institutions have
separate budgets. This may appear so self-evident as not to require
mention but because fee and contribution proposals usually are devised and
put forward independently by would-be recipient institutions it is a caveat
often ignored in practice.
Extension services should be broadened from crops, livestock, fishery, forestry (assuming all of these now exist at least in principle) to encompass artisanal skills (e.g. building, blacksmithing, tool making, tailoring, furniture making, charcoal, water facility maintenance, vehicle and equipment repair, food processing) plus humanly, socially - and by time saving economically - key topics (e.g. environmental sanitation, water source protection, nutrition). This cannot be done overnight and needs to be a joint operating ministry - adult education - community programme (e.g. APE) effort. (There is some experience in Tanzania and by UNICEF.)

Commercial Service Provision

Commercial services are no less basic, no less crucial and no less desired/needed by the sector familial because they are sold. The Portuguese colonial rural merchanting system was racist and grossly exploitative. But it did provide inputs, credit (however usurious) and "incentive" (i.e. desired consumer) goods to the sector familial. Therefore, its collapse (literally flight) and the failure of Agricon ever to achieve a comparable replacement was a tragedy for millions of Mozambicans. PDP must give priority to reversing that tragedy (evidently without reintroducing racism and with guards against gross exploitation).

The vacuum left by the rural commercial sector disappearance is the main reason that even in 1979-81 sector familial cash sales were (nationally and in most - not all - districts) sharply below 1971-73. Until that gap is addressed neither urban food security from domestic sources, input supplies for agro-industries (including textiles), demand reflation for urban manufactures nor rural cash livelihood problems can be overcome.

The issue is not public versus private in any ideological sense. The public sector is not likely to provide flexible, efficient, small scale, multi product commercial services. Still less can the personnel as well as finance constrained Mozambican empressa sector be expected to do so. And as Oscar Lange - one of the pioneers in articulating market oriented socialism - pointed out, the small trader, independent artisan and large family farmer do not determine the mode of production and cannot (indeed will have little reason to) undermine an otherwise economically viable and humanly caring socialist, mixed or transitional political economy. This was also Chao en Lai's position and the periods in which it prevailed in the People's Republic of China appear to have shown more rapid basic
services advances and poverty reduction as well as higher growth rates than the others including the present one.

There is a strong case for multi channelism i.e. a public sector presence especially at wholesale level; gradual build up of co-op (or village) enterprises as perceived demand for and capacity to operate them rises; some "fair price" monitoring analogous to that of the abasticionamento/Commercio food network of private retailers and co-ops for limited ranges of basic inputs and consumer goods; a large small to medium size private retail, sub-wholesale and up to provincial level wholesale enterprise component (including buying, storing, transporting and selling).

For the PDP the priority is rehabilitation of the private sector (including the "fair price" safeguards). That is because this is the biggest gap and the area in which - except for a shelved Commercio study which should be found, dusted, modified and put to use - there has been the least articulated thinking.

Private capitalist traders will not appear simply because they are allowed to do so and welcomed verbally when (if) they do. They need access to:

a. shops and godowns;

b. an initial stock of goods to sell;

c. reliable flows of goods to sell;

d. buyers (including Agricon) for what they buy;

e. a reasonably dependable and gradually growing amount to be bought (because their turnover on the sales side depends on their providing cash by buying);

f. transport (i.e. vehicles and repair capacity plus usable roads and bridges/culverts).

PDP needs to articulate how these can be supplied. One component is credit (for inventories of goods for sale and goods purchased, for restoring premises and godowns, for buying or rehabilititating vehicles). In respect to vehicles who bears war risks is a related issue - the one or two lorry fledgling or reviving enterprise cannot afford to do so. Another is Commercio/Empressa priority in supply of inputs and basic consumer goods at
the right time (i.e. tools, seeds and fertiliser are time specific for planting and cultivation seasons and basic consumer goods are most needed and saleable at harvest time). The Agricultural Fondos and the external donors/lenders who want the private sector strengthened are the logical sources of credit (especially as this sidesteps IMF bank lending ceilings albeit the Commercial Bank/Banco do Mocambique might handle loans as an agent). The goods supply strategy needs to be coordinated with and operated by Commercio and its Empressas (as does vehicle and spares supply). The infrastructure rehabilitation and the agricultural supply (for the traders to buy) aspects relate primarily to Works and Rural Development activity.

Small scale and artisanal goods and services businesses are analogous to commerce proper. Here particular attention needs to be given to avoiding exclusion of women e.g. women and women's co-ops should be favoured not excluded from garment making and food processing input and tool supplying and credit. As with commerce that a service is vital or at least important does not necessarily mean that the state is the best channel for providing it, nor that even where it should be a provider for poor households it should also produce it. (This is illustrated by the funeral business.) The need for a decent funeral is basic in many cultures including most Mozambican ones. Whether - outside non Muslims in urban areas - a decent funeral really is perceived as requiring a coffin is less clear (traditionally it did not). Assuming it does, there is no clear case for the state providing free coffins on demand. It is a service which arguably should be available in main urban areas to absolutely poor households and (deceased) isolated individuals with no available families. Even in these cases there is no reason the state should remain the major coffin maker as opposed to buying from carpentry artisans or small workshops. This example is probably not a PDP concern. State coffin provision never reached rural areas. However, the principles it illustrates are relevant to PDP and the related morgue project proposals in district towns, however meritorious on other grounds, are not among its more evident priorities.

Infrastructure Rehabilitation

Infrastructure (beyond that for specific services) is also a basic need as perceived by the sector familial. Because water supply, schools, clinics, shops, godowns and vehicles have been covered above the dominant component
is transport works and the second - where relevant - is infrastructure for small scale (i.e. SF used) irrigation. Roads, culverts, "boxes", bridges, ditches, drainage pipes like security tend to be underrated - until their absence when once they were present underlines their importance. They - plus the other construction needs for services - can be used to build up SF employment/cash income opportunities, in addition to, and consistent with, their primary purpose of restoring infrastructure. Both roles are integral to PDP's integrating "Emergencia" into, 'Reabilitacao' and 'Developmento' so that one rural strategy and one coordinated approach for each District emerge. That is also needed if rehabilitation and development are to be Mozambican (not donor) driven even though of necessity they will remain donor fuelled (financed) for a period well beyond three years.

**Toward Strengthening Concepts and Perspectives**

In **conclusion** several points need making:

a. the wording above is not what would be used by a sector familial household;

b. the ordering and analysis seeks to generalise beyond the limits the contexts in which they live impose on any one poor rural household or community;

c. the knowledge base used is fragmentary and much is from Botswana, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Ethiopia and Ghana not Mozambique;

d. thus while genuinely seeking to formulate poor rural household needs and priorities as perceived by them in a way usable at macro and sectoral strategic programming level, this presentation is largely from outside the Mozambican sector familial and is based on inadequate data. Its justification is that it is essential to make a start and to do so quickly;

e. therefore pre-adoption discussion of PDP at District Level with SF members (representatives) as well as District Administrators and technicians is important and building in an ongoing monitoring mechanism with direct SF inputs even more important;

f. and research on a number of issues (including those specifically cited above) would be highly useful and would appear to be a priority for the
University and especially the Centre for African Studies as well as - at a quicker, simpler, more short term application oriented level - within Ministry, national and provincial planning units.

**A Programmatic Check List For A District**

Each District Programme should be tailored to that district in its specifics. At the same time there should be a standard set of programme areas for each district serving as a check list and a first approximation for articulating the specific plan for any particular district.

Data and empirical targets should be set up on the basis:

a. what is **present situation**

b. what were **past peak** levels
   
   i. SF and other output - usually 70/72
   
   ii. services (public) - usually 80/82

c. what **resources** needed to restore "b" (or alternative 3 year target)
   
   i. capital budget
   
   ii. recurrent budget
   
   iii. personnel
   
   iv. community mobilised (labour, materials, cash)

d. **Present resources** used;

e. **Resources** needing to be **shifted** in use (e.g. from large scale irrigation or empressa support to extension or input supply to SF and Emergencia survival feeding to Rehabilitacao input supply and food until harvest plus rural works/employment;

f. **Additional resources** (physical and financial to be mobilised). **How to do so needs to be constructed (and done!) nationally not District by District except for community inputs which initially can rarely exceed 2½% to 5% of total resources in cash terms.
(Resources in each case should be specified by quantity in real terms as well as by cost i.e. number of lorries or spares as well as cif price plus freight cost.)

1970/72 is used as a first approximation target for outputs and most infrastructure, because it was the peak period. 1980/82 for public services is chosen for the same reason. The levels of output to be regained are those of the SF and related enterprises and overall output levels where possible. That means higher SF - and where viable ones exist empressa - output to offset lower private commercial farm and plantation. For output, 1970/72 levels are not always restorable in three years. The bottom line is substantial growth in SF output and income on a trend to surpass 1970/72 SF output and sales and approach 1970/72 total output and sales within a finite period after the first three years.

Formally the PDP is for 3 years. In practice just as Emergencia-I (Survival) should be transformed into Emergencia-II (Rehabilitacao) so PDP should move on to PDP-2 i.e. a second 3 to 5 year programme package for districts which have completed the initial PDP. e.g. in phasing it might run:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PDP-I</th>
<th>PDP-II</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>(New Entrants)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991/92</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/93</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly not all PDP programmes discussed below can be instituted in each District during its first PDP year and each should be built up steadily once begun.

PDP is a coordinated (by Planning and Rural Development) multi ministerial and enterprise effort not a parallel government Authority approach. Coordination is needed at all levels from a PDP Commission (e.g. Minister of Planning chairing senior officials from Ministries analogous to SDA Commission) through District (e.g. District Administrators Chairing ministerial officials plus Party-Women's-Youth-Peasant representatives body). Especially at District and Provincial levels GD's and Assemblies
will need to be directly involved in annual pre-approval of programmes, mid-year reviews and annual monitoring of progress (and drawing lessons for programme and project revision by alteration, addition and subtraction). For adequate SF support and adequate early warning of weaknesses and gaps to be forthcoming to render PDP sustainable and for the dynamic begun by it to continue on its own (with normal state support) after the PDP years. A new rural development institution to be responsible for the agricultural component of the PDP and to coordinate with other National and Provincial Ministries/Directorates in respect to other programmes may, in the present context of Mozambique be desirable even though it further compounds the lack of integration within the Ministry of Agriculture.

**Broad Access Programmes**

The 21 items listed as Programmes (Programmes areas) hereafter could be called projects. Programme may be a more helpful term:

a. it stresses need to serve large numbers not just a few people;

b. as well as encompassing policies as well as physical projects;

c. each programme area (e.g. Health) in fact comprises sub-programmes (e.g. posto/centro rehabilitation, APE revival) each of which includes several projects (each posto, centro, APE unit).

This wording is without prejudice to formulating umbrella projects e.g. "Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Employment Project" to sell to 'doadores'(donors). If donors prefer programmes to be called projects and to finance 3 year chunk by 3 year chunk (even though the Programme will need to be longer) that preference probably needs to be accommodated in presentation. But it should not be allowed to dominate Mozambican strategic conception or articulation of what PDP is about or how it is to achieve it.

A checklist of programme areas includes:

1. education
2. health
3. water
4. roads - bridges - culverts
5. agriculture - land allocation
6. agriculture - nutrition/household use production
7. agriculture - commercialised
8. agriculture - inputs
9. agriculture - extension and research
10. agriculture - credit
11. agriculture - projects (narrowly defined)
12. agriculture - livestock/smallstock
13. agriculture - forestry/trees
14. agriculture - fishing
15. agriculture/industry - agroprocessing and artisanal
16. commercial network - buildings
17. commercial network - vehicles
18. commercial network - goods to sell
19. commercial network - working capital
20. Labour Intensive Works/Employment
21. Emergencia/Rehabilitacao

Services

Education. Goals turn on restoration of numbers of primary schools, teachers, pupils and years successfully completed to 1980/82 levels plus parallel restoration of literacy and continuing (practical, extension related) adult education to 1980/82 or higher levels. Whether this can be done fully in 3 years is a question of fact. If it cannot, 3 years at - say - 20% annual average enrolment growth plus a projection for full recovery in 2 more years can be substituted. Programming this goal and
mobilising resources (not least teachers) is an Educao responsibility but, in respect to adult education, content and personnel provision need to be formulated together with Ministries (e.g. Agriculture, Health, Works, Labour, as well as education) who have extension concerns directly relevant to adult education as a means of extending the SF knowledge and skills base.

Health. The goals are analogous to those of Education i.e. postos, centros, mother/child clinics, rural hospitals consultations, vaccinations, APE's. Here a strategy of re-openings (with an initial low profile presence in villages and mobile services from towns) exists and is partly operational and an APE rebuilding "project" (programme) is articulated - financed - about to begin. The main problem is coordination to ensure that Health (nationally and provincially) does include all 40 Districts in its 3 year first tranche. The internal logic of APE rebuilding means that the first 40 Districts with APE's cannot be identical to PDP's 40 but what should be possible is that by - say - 1992/93 there are 65 APE Districts including 36 to 40 of the PDP ones. For both Health and Education the dominant cost item is not capital projects (buildings, equipment, vehicles) but recurrent (drugs, books, supplies, transport operation, wages and salaries). The latter must be built into recurrent budgets not be separate PDP so far as the internal Budgetary process goes but may be estimated and external finance mobilised for first three years recurrent (especially drugs, books, supplies, new personnel - e.g. APE's - wages) if this is expedient fiscally and saleable to donors (e.g. if it unlocks otherwise blocked counterpart funds). Staff training is not per se PDP, but the PDP Commission should satisfy itself that the Ministries (here Health and Education but the point is general to all Ministries) do have training programmes relevant and adequate in quantity of persons taught, content of curriculum and quality of instruction. (If not the Ministries need to think through how to develop them by redesigning existing training institutions and/or securing resources for rehabilitation and expansion. That is more or less in hand at Health and - probably - Education but perhaps less so in - say - Agricultural extension and Works).

Water (for human use and secondarily for livestock) is a rehabilitation exercise where substantial capacity did exist. Where it did not PDP will be entering into 'new development' within the first three years. Water has aims and a not inconsiderable programme, but because of donor driven
projects, and a separate emergencia financial project set, it has no overall strategy nor any articulated medium term targets by Province or District tied to actual projected/medium term budgeted expenditure. PDP gives it a need and an opportunity to develop these. As noted above water is an area in which community contributions in cash and kind to construction and operation can and should be explored. To work they require user involvement in design, user committees (whether special purpose or part of village council work) and training of users in equipment protection and maintenance. Because women and girls will in fact be the primary collectors and maintainers, women need to be consulted, brought on to committees, trained in maintenance.

Infrastructure

Roads - bridges - culverts (and associated drainage ditches, "boxes" for crossing stream beds, in some cases air strips) are the largest single Works programme within PDP. The project components must be identified at District and coordinated at Provincial level - they cannot physically be checked nationally and the sheer number of items sent in would in fact overload and block the articulation and monitoring process at that level were either physical or fiscal monitoring/checking attempted centrally. The method of district level articulation could be:

a. identify previous roads, tracks, bridges and culverts;

b. decide which ones are priority;

c. identify needs for reconstruction, rehabilitation maintenance for these;

d. estimate phased three year input requirements and costs.

This work must be designed to use unskilled labour, handle tools, a few skilled supervisors. That is a priority both to hold down costs and to ensure SF part time employment and income generation. Segments of main provincial roads require more design input but, as demonstrated by Xai Xai ILO/UNDP project, can also be labour intensive. Over three years Transport (Nationally and - especially - Provincially) should build up its Road Directorate's capacity but to date it has no capacity below main highway level. The PDP transport programme cannot wait for Transport to develop capacity. Luckily, initially DA and Works in consultation with
GD's/Councils can identify what transport infrastructure existed and is priority for restoration and Works has capacity to do design and to execute independent of Transport at that level.

Tertiary and quarternary port rehabilitation may have higher design input requirements but is basically analogous. For coastal or riverain Districts such port rehabilitation - including for dhows, fishing boats and small sail or paddle boats carrying people and/or cargo in small numbers/quantities may be important and should be considered as a possible priority. For example, the available access route to Mueda District and its near term 20-25,000 tonnes grain surplus runs via the tertiary port of Praia whose capacity is probably not up to handling such and increase in traffic. As CFM wishes to cut back to main ports plus railways, a new empressa (or instituto) for most ports (excluding Maputo, Beira, Nacala, Quelimane and, perhaps, Inhambane and Pemba) is needed. It almost certainly cannot be fully self-financing for a decade.

Agriculture

Agriculture - land allocation is basically a policy and administration programme, but will have some physical aspects in respect to tree felling, bush clearing and/or drainage which are beyond sector familial household capabilities especially for the deslocado-afectado-returnado-amnestado-newly secure district cluster. The principle should be to ensure that each sector familial household has secure rights of use over enough land for a home, a home garden, staple own use food production, livestock where mixed or pastoral farming is important and crops (including tree products) to be sold which is adequate to ensure a decent livelihood. How much (1.5 ha to 5 ha excluding grazing seems the likely range) depends on crops and land quality. For settled families the first step is to check whether land already allocated is adequate. It may well be, except for present or past afectados/deslocados huddled for security reasons around towns on \( \frac{1}{2} \) to \( \frac{3}{4} \) hectare. The main work is likely to relate to allocating land use rights to resettling afectado, deslocado, returnado and amnestado households and the minority of settled sector familial households who have too little land. This is the first priority - land allocation to private commercial farmers, corporate farms/plantations and in the rare cases of their expansion empressas come after SF needs are met. There is a potential conflict in the case of return of intervened land to former owners - e.g.
coconut areas in Inhambane. If such returns do displace SF households enabling them to re-establish in the same area is crucial to them economically and to their district socially and politically. However, except for empressas, these units should be assumed to keep existing land use rights. In the case of empressas hard judgements should be made on how much land (in some cases all of it!) is surplus to reasonable estimates of use within five years. That land should be reallocated to SF households with preference to empressa workers retrenched as part of the rectification exercise (an area requiring coordination with Finance).

The question of land use right allocation to women needs to be faced squarely. Normally one household should have one allocation - optimally in the joint names of husband and wife. There should be no discrimination in allocation against female headed households and where the woman is resident and the man working elsewhere, the registration should (if at all practicable and locally acceptable) be either in the woman's name or joint. This is consistent with the principle of secure land use rights for actual users.

As noted above, community/SF desire for communal or co-op farms is likely to be low and to be seen as complementing - not substituting for - family lands. When there are such requests, they should (subject to a rough check on feasibility of community or co-op actually using the land) be treated as second priority following SF household land allocations but taking priority over other sectors (e.g. private commercial). In no case should co-op or communal allocations be seen as a general substitute for, as opposed to a complement to, household allocations without the most careful checking of real household preferences and the economic and technical viability of the proposed communal enterprise.

Agriculture - nutrition and household provisioning (own use or subsistence crop) production has been discussed above on production and basic input supply sides. On nutrition, coordination among Agriculture, Health and Commerce is needed. Baseline estimates, however rough, on malnutrition (probably, given actual data available, child malnutrition) should be made and targets for reducing them set and monitored. This is basic to SF well being and food security. The primary tasks of Health - Commerce nutrition people are to estimate what quantities of what foods are needed to avoid/reduce malnutrition (at household as well as district level) and to
carry out education/extension on use and preparation of foods. But if this is to work, Agriculture must provide parallel extension support and inputs to enable the requisite quantities of the relevant crops to be grown. It may be worth examining household categories to see which ones have special obstacles to raising household provisioning production and what can be done about overcoming them. More generally the point of reducing overall female workloads so they have more time to grow food (and, if practicable, providing inputs and knowledge to raise their outputs to hours used ratio) applies.

**Agriculture - commercialised** focuses on crops grown for sale (which may be non-food crops e.g. cotton, food crops not central to CF diets e.g. cashew or food crops which also figure prominently in household provisioning e.g. maize. Evidently (as is also true for household provisioning crops) the priority crops will vary from District to District in the light of ecological and soil conditions but also of access to processing and marketing facilities (e.g. if a District is to grow cotton there needs to be a cotton gin; therefore if cotton is to be introduced to a new district that District's PDP needs to include building a gin as a project). Targets should be set based on 1970/72 peak output, present levels and practicable recovery. At the least, SF output should be geared to regain 70/72 levels (or if very far below now to rise 20% a year on average) over 3 years. Similar targets for per capita production of household provisioning food are desirable but at present baseline data on 70/72 and especially 88/89 production are very thin so that the estimated added food needed to reduce malnutrition targeting approach will at least initially, be more practicable.

**Agriculture-Inputs** comprises an ultra basic core level - seed, hand tools and a somewhat larger but still basic group including seedlings, livestock and small stock, fish lines-nets-canoes, animal drawn implements (including carts and draft animals plus selected agro-chemicals (fertilisers, insecticides, pesticides). In the case of resettled and newly liberated households addition of basic building tools (e.g. axes, spades) and household equipment (e.g. buckets, utensils) are also crucial because their absence will prevent or delay the re-establishment of basic household units and of production. In these cases - and in the aftermath of drought - **food is a basic production input** because it is necessary to enable sector familial labour forces to work to restore production rather than go...
elsewhere to seek alternative sources of income to avert immediate starvation.

PDP's seed and hand tools (plus household and building tools for those needing them) strategy should be complete coverage (with particular seeds and tools varying by District). Indeed these inputs should be provided (along with e.g. some health, education, water, transport infrastructure rehabilitation) in all reasonably secure districts, not just PDP ones. The problems are likely to centre on procurement and distribution more than on finance. In the recent past external finance available for these inputs has run ahead of ability to procure and distribute on a timely basis. Early decisions (based on District estimates aggregated and - if necessary - revised at Provincial and National levels) on how much and what to procure will be key both to building up domestic production and to identifying and ordering from appropriate external sources. It would be possible at this point to use private firms as well as empressas as buyers but only within overall target procurement levels. Distribution faces two quite different problems:

a. physical capacity to get the inputs to farmers;

b. access for poor or destitute sector familial households who cannot pay.

The former is an area in which multiple channels can usefully be used at inter-provincial, provincial and district levels. Private rural traders (and co-ops) should sell inputs as well as consumer goods. But they do not seem easy to use for free distribution which for initially destitute households may be needed for up to three years. Empressas can be used to provincial capitals and perhaps District towns. Beyond that a mix of extension officers, co-ops and NGO's seems the least implausible method of channelling grant inputs unless the conversion of Emergencia to 'Rehabilitacao' includes restructuring DPCCN to distribute free food (in this context also a production input) plus other production inputs on the basis of PDP targets, a direction the exact reverse of the initial 1990 restructuring direction.

The more complex inputs - apart from Authority crops such as cotton and a few location specific cases - require further District level assessment as to priorities to avoid wasteful ordering of low or no priority items. Past use and commercial demand are probably adequate evidence, where
demonstrable, to encourage wholesalers and retailers to stock some of them and for Veterinary to distribute drugs, dips, core stock to rebuild animal herds and poultry flocks. Parallels exist with respect to Forestry and seedlings. In some of these cases - e.g. limited numbers of chicken/chicks and animals and also of tree seedlings - free distribution for 1 to 3 years followed by commercial probably is more practicable in respect to destitute and near destitute rural households than charging (let alone full cost pricing/charging) from day 1.

Agricultural extension is itself a rehabilitation and a development area. A checklist of challenges includes:

a. adequate numbers - ideally 1 technically qualified (certificate or diploma level) person per 500 households or about 25 per 100,000 person District plus perhaps 1 higher diploma or degree level cadre for every 5 basic level ones;

b. building up a part time sector familial based cadre somewhat analogous to APE's ideally 1 per 100 households remunerated largely by provision of labour and/or food by their communities in return for time spent demonstrating new techniques/crops and/or facilitating input distribution (and with the added incentive that their training should raise their own productivity);

c. provision of transport (bicycles for base level and motor cycles for higher level personnel plus 1 or 2 Landrover type vehicles per District) so that extension workers are mobile;

d. ensuring that bodies of accurate, usable data on crops and techniques as well as on sector familial crop, technique, labour load and seasonal task patterns are 'extended' to the extension staff so they have something to extend. This almost certainly implies retraining most present extension cadres; as does

e. shifting to emphasis on demonstration (preferably backed by simple graphic and written materials) with a target of 4 to 5 contacts per farm household in groups of 10 to 20 households (about 250 day long demonstrations per year per basic cadre).

To pose these requirements is the first step toward Rural Development identifying a strategy for meeting them. Present extension service
numbers, training, knowledge and approach are probably seriously inadequate. If, as data suggest, there are substantial numbers of agriculture and agricultural technology trained persons from 'middle schools' not hired (or not hired in agriculture) because of the war they may be the body of personnel who can best be recruited and further trained to increase the extension services' side. A realistic phased buildup should be set out for a 5 year period and projected to 10. The latter should assume that by year 10 (2000), extension will be made available in all 130 Districts.

The figures above relate to generalist crop extension personnel. They will need to be complemented by veterinary, forestry and fishery extension personnel. Numbers of these needed will be smaller and vary among Districts depending on the importance of animals/fowls, fishing and trees/bushes/products in sector familial livelihoods. For the initial PDP years at least, specialised single crop personnel (e.g. cotton, cashew) of authorities and - perhaps - separate irrigation extension personnel should be retained under their present employers but in the context of overall coordination with the other extension channels.

Agricultural research for the PDP cannot in the main be original research and certainly not basic research. There is an inadequate base of work in the pipeline and far too short a time for that. What can be done includes:

a. identifying known and field tested research results and ensuring these are known to extension personnel;

b. seeking to broaden the base of "a" by surveying SACCAR and neighbouring state research and extension results (in use by producers not just at research trial level);

c. conducting selective field testing on domestic research which appears promising as to results but has not been tested under sector familial conditions; similar material from "b" and selected findings on research applied elsewhere but not in Mozambique secured from IITA (Ibadan), ICRISAT, ICIPE (Nairobi) and IFAD.

The aim of the above exercise (for crops, livestock, fisheries and trees/silviculture) is to produce (more accurately to identify) a body of useful knowledge which can be extended. Over 5 years the results should
very substantially increase the value to the sector familial of the extension service and may bring about substantial macro and district as well as household and village level production increases.

Over the same five years a national agricultural research programme needs to developed with clear priorities and targets and with projected resource (especially personnel and finance) requirements and ways to meet them. Specific attention should be given to using materials from and coordinating with the International Crops Research Institute, IFAD, African continental or regional institutes (e.g. ICIPE), SADCC region programming (SACCAR, agricultural, livestock, forestry, fishing) and national work in other states (especially but not only SADCC partners). If basic results requiring 'only' some adaptation and field testing can be secured, the lag between initial Mozambican work and output payoff can be reduced significantly. Discussions should be held with SACCAR on developing project design/terms of reference for such a sectoral study and the possibility of using SADCC's 1991 Conference as an initial step toward securing a financing partner or partners.

Agriculture-Projects

The foregoing agricultural areas are basically broad front, broad access programmes not projects as such. They can be divided and packaged as projects for resource mobilising or budgeting purposes at national, provincial and district levels but are no more discrete projects than is - say - primary education or primary health care. However:

a. some items within programmes may be discrete projects e.g. a cotton gin in a cotton development portion of commercialised agriculture rehabilitation and a district infrastructure rehabilitation programme is necessarily composed of specific projects;

b. the irrigation sub-sector is perhaps more akin to single (large) or package (medium and small) project than to a programme - albeit its extension and maintenance aspects are programmatic rather than project focussed.

Irrigation is a special case because at the large, capital intensive project end of the spectrum too many resources are allocated to it relative to overall resource levels, if the PDP priority is to assist the sector
familial as a whole to produce more and to have better access to basic human, economic and commercial services. Small scale, labour intensive irrigation schemes may well deserve more resources (absolutely and relatively) but both ecology and cost will prevent their being central to PDP's sector familial oriented strategy.

**Agriculture-Processing and Agro Industry**

Processing and agro-industry have variegated roles in output rehabilitation and development:

a. in some cases (e.g. cotton gins, tea factories), without the processing unit the crop is valueless because not preservable nor transportable in the form in which it is harvested;

b. in others (e.g. perhaps oil seed milling) rural value added and employment can be raised and transport costs reduced by siting processing units in main producing districts;

c. in the case of products used locally (e.g. household goods, crafts) processing and artisanal agro-industry can diversify income sources and raise village/district self reliance. In the case of grain and cassava milling they can (especially if owned and operated by women's co-ops) reduce overall female workloads and, at least for some women, augment cash income;

d. by-products of large production units - e.g. bagasse and molasses in the case of sugar plantations - may afford opportunities for sector familial production (paperboard, fuel briquets - by drying bagasse, rum, candy, cattle food) and for integrating plantation and sector familial economics (beyond the more obvious link of SF production of food to be sold to plantation employees).

The particular priorities for processing and agro-industry are likely to vary widely from district to district. Some artisanal opportunities - e.g. grain and cassava milling, fish smoking, charcoal making - are likely to exist in most cases. What - beyond extension advice - they need, e.g. in the way of Fondo credit and provision (for sale) of construction materials and simple tools/machinery, is likely to vary. The number of larger units - e.g. cotton gins, urban market oriented oil mills - needed is likely to be small (and perhaps focussed on rehabilitation).
Agriculture (Silviculture) - trees and artisanal forestry is an area of considerable importance because of its implications for fuel (household use and commercialised) and for conservation. Mixed farming including trees and bushes for food, fuel, fodder, household provisioning and home construction and sale of fuelwood, poles for building and charcoal has proven a means to improve small farming household living standards under many conditions. (A considerable body of expertise and experience including printed materials exists, albeit most is Asian - especially Indian - not African.)

What can be done by the PDP depends on the present data base and extension capacity of Forestry. However, a start can be made quickly in providing seedlings of fast growing indigenous or localised fuel and food crop (e.g. citrus) trees and encouragement of household and village planting. Conservation use of trees (on areas at risk from erosion and lack of wind or water breaks) can be extended/promoted most effectively when the trees are economically valuable as sources of fuel, poles, fodder, food. There is some Tanzanian and Ethiopian experience (including some successes) in this area. Depending on the present state of knowledge and staff a related "Research and Extension Development Project" would be desirable. (As relevant experience includes India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Tanzania the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation might be interested.) Similarly material on regional experience should be sought from the SADCC Forestry Sector unit in Lilongwe as well as - if anglophonic candidates are available - access to forestry training facilities (diploma and degree) in neighbouring states.

Agriculture-fishing is evidently particularly relevant in coastal Districts. However lake, river and pond artisanal fishing has historically been of significance and its potential importance in each District should be examined specifically. If, as appears to be the case, such inland fishing has received low attention from Fisheries, the SADCC unit (also at Lilongwe) and neighbouring state research and training programmes may be useful as sources of initial data and training capacity.

Fishing, like crops, needs inputs (e.g. lines, nets, sinkers, in some cases wood and metal screws/nails plus woodworking tools for canoes or other small fishing boats) and extension advice. Similarly processing facility advice may be important (quality of 'traditional' smoking and drying
technology is very uneven over small distances in many African states) and a commercial network to sell surpluses above local consumption. Dried fish is marketable in at least many smaller towns and provincial capitals so the presence of traders and suppliers to buy, not of potential customers, would appear to be the binding constraint over a 3 to 5 year time horizon.

Agriculture-livestock is in broad terms analogous to crops. In many districts cattle, goats and, less generally, pigs have played a significant role in commercialised production and in most goats and fowl (usually chicken although possibly including ducks in some cases) have been a significant source of household protein requirements. The war has probably been even more damaging to the livestock component of the sector familial economy than to the crop portion.

PDP District programmes should target livestock (and fowl) recovery goals in respect to household consumption and sale. Their relative importance/scale will vary, but is unlikely to be or non-needed or negligible in any District. While the broad input-extension-commercial network requirements for livestock are comparable to those for crops there are also significant differences. The initial capital input on the production side is animals/fowl to re-establish viable core herds/flocks. How to secure and distribute these does not appear to have attracted much attention to date either in Mozambique or in post-disaster (usually drought) livelihood rehabilitation programmes more generally. Further, depending on actual disease incidence and control techniques, a substantial number of dips and chemicals to operate them (e.g. for protection against East Coast Fever) are likely to need to be built or rehabilitated. Veterinary extension traditionally (probably appropriately) has a higher disease prevention and treatment component than does crop extension. Another point is that in at least some African states where traders do stock tool, seeds, fertilisers they have been less willing to stock veterinary drugs (including chemicals for dips). Therefore, it may be desirable to envisage the Veterinary Service as the main distribution channel (charging some fee from year 2 or 3) until the interest of traders in carrying these items can be assessed. Again the SADCC unit (in Gaborone) may prove a useful data source on programmes under Southern African ecological and resource scarcity conditions.
Commerce

The **commercial network** rehabilitation programming of PDP has four main sub-components:

a. buildings;

b. vehicles;

c. working capital;

d. goods to sell.

These need to be backed up by the infrastructural rehabilitation noted above in respect to roads, bridges, culverts, etc. if the vehicles are to be able to move moderately expeditiously, to avoid recurrent breakdowns and to have plausible (to users) costs of operation and repair.

It is impossible to over stress the importance of this sector to the recovery of sector familial cash incomes (or to domestic provisioning of towns and cities). Equally crucial is recognising that at rural retail level small and middle sized private and cooperative enterprises are likely to be much more effective than large public or large private ones. It is that retail level which is of direct concern to the PDP in that the wholesale network and Agricon already exist at provincial level. Leadership in this programme area should be the role of Commerce.

In respect to **buildings** - shops and warehouses - the key word is access. Whether the traders own or rent the premises is secondary so long as they exist, are in usable condition and not so high cost as to cripple the renter (or owner). At village level, village built and owned warehouses with shop rooms rented in part to several traders may be more efficient than numerous separate buildings. However, at that level a trader can probably initially use his lorry as a mobile store if facilities are not available so that the immediate need may be for space in which sector familial households can safely put goods for up to two weeks until a buyer arrives. Given damage and destruction of buildings, some credit mechanism for traders to finance buildings and/or their repair is needed - perhaps, as suggested above, through one of the Rural/Agricultural Fondos.
Vehicles are even more crucial than buildings as are spare parts and maintenance facilities (garages). Commercio and Finance should be able to negotiate 'aid' supplies of vehicles and spares and - e.g. via EEC - for building up decentralised, private maintenance facilities. However, in some towns and districts garages do appear to exist and the return of many mechanically skilled miners from the Rand suggests the skill position may not be as bad as is sometimes supposed at least in the southern Provinces. The PDP's problem is in identifying and setting in operation a system allowing traders to buy (or rehabilitate seriously deteriorated) vehicles. The Maputo recreation of urban private transport is atypical and does not indicate that most rural traders have access to own funds or credit. The alternatives would be for the 'doadores' (especially those belligerently calling for a larger private sector role) to allow the vehicles provided by them to be sold on - say - 5 year, 20% interest hire purchase terms with the Banco do Mocambique/Commercial Bank serving as an agent or for credit to be channelled through a Rural/Agricultural Fondo and with war risk covered either by the donors (especially on loaned funds), the government institutions or jointly since small enterprises cannot cover it themselves and premium costs would be a major barrier to early year enterprise viability. In respect to spares the basic problem is not likely to be credit but seeing that regular supplies reach provincial capitals and district towns.

Commercial working capital is often misunderstood. It is not an "unreal" phenomenon composed solely of account book entries as often supposed in national plans. It consists primarily of inventories of raw materials, goods in process and finished products; secondarily of liquid resources to make purchases; tertially of spare parts and supplies. Unless a trader has goods to sell and cash to buy produce he cannot operate even if he does have a store, a warehouse and a vehicle. The two options in respect to goods are credit from wholesalers and from the commercial banking system out of its own resources or as agent for a Fondo. For the initial cash to buy crops, livestock, fish, forest products, etc., financial institutions are the only plausible source other than the merchant's own capital. Turnaround of payments for purchases should be fairly rapid if the rural trader has the right goods to sell; sector familial households will usually sell to him in order primarily to buy from him. Many rural merchants after years of low turnover and war losses do not have the funds to restore or re-expand their operations without credit.
Commercial goods supply is a separate issue from working capital because there are physical shortages of goods—especially in the less easy to reach provincial capitals and secondary towns where rural traders (including co-ops) will procure their stocks. What Commerce can do within the PDP frame is to project rural commercial network requirements for—say—30 to 40 basic consumer and house construction items and work out an allocation system through Provincial wholesalers to rural merchants. The EEC backed programme underwriting goods supply to cashew growers may be of some value as a 'model'. Because access to goods to sell is valuable to traders, it is likely that adherence to a requirement to sell in rural areas could be secured, enforced as abasticimento/commercio food price controls are, and largely accepted and implemented by retailers.

Labour intensive public works have been sketched above on the programmes to employ them. As stressed they have an equal importance in raising poor sector familial household incomes particularly for destitute (newly resettled or liberated) and female headed households and during drought years. To serve the second (income augmentation) purpose requires not merely labour intensity, but also seasonal phasing with peak employment potential at times other than these in which farm labour requirements are highest.

Ideally a target of an average of $30 per household wages (say 6 weeks at $5 or Mt 5,000 per week at probable 1990 average exchange rates) would be set. That would come to about $600,000 per district (2,400 person years) or $24 million a year for all 40 Districts. That may be too optimistic a target on two counts:

a. ability to mobilise resources;

b. ability to deploy skilled and supervisory personnel, tools, complementary equipment and construction inputs (albeit by year 3 of the PDP that constraint could surely be broken).

If that is the case a fallback target of $20 per household per year—$16 million overall would be plausible. The per household sum is very meagre indeed, but for many rural households it is above total present cash income.
In one sense such employment will be self targeting. Households with reasonable cash incomes and economically profitable on farm (including land improvement and crop processing or artisanal production) labour opportunities will not seek work. However, priority should be given to returnado, former (resettling) affectado and deslocado, amnestado and newly liberated households who tend to be in the main destitute groups now and to female-headed households who historically, today and in the medium term have had/will have the lowest average cash incomes in the sector familial. Judging by Botswana experience the last priority may require setting a minimum of 35% of all person months of employment aside for women. Social pressures are unlikely to be so uniform or strong as to deter women coming forward to seek work but past habit (especially by Works) and the "invisibility" of women to many functionaries can lead to their being 'overlooked' in hiring.

Finance can probably best be sought from counterpart funds (food and other) or cash Emergencia-II ('Reabilitacao') pledges. Alternatively (or complementarily) part can come from funding for specific programmes e.g. Primary Health Care Facility Restoration, Rural Water, Secondary and Rural Road Rehabilitation. The problem with Food Aid used as wages in kind is that it is inappropriate if most households are at or near self provisioning, for households receiving direct food grants as part of a rehabilitacao package and more generally in Districts in which a commercial food sale system has been restored. These difficulties can be avoided if 'donors' allow the physical food aid to be commercialised and the proceeds used to pay wages. A second best would be to pay 50% cash and 50% in not over 3 foods (e.g. a staple grain, vegetable oil, sugar). That method is used on the Inhambane Road project (albeit without the oil/sugar emphasis).

Resettlement - Reestablishment - Rehabilitation

Emergencia to Rehabilitacao transformation and integration into normal, mainline governmental processes is of wider coverage than PDP. However, it is crucial to PDP so that a series of check points for transformation can usefully be noted here:

a. procurement and movement of grant food aid to provincial level should remain primarily with DPCCN/Emergencia albeit as capacity rises contracts with other transporters could be explored;
b. distribution to persons/households in camps, relocation centres etc., should be via Emergencia or ngo/local administration channels;

c. while rehabilitacao food grants to resettled/livelihood rehabilitated households could be handled either by Rural Development (extension) or District Administration or - perhaps - DPCCN;

d. the same applies to free tools and seeds, as well as household equipment at the beginning of rehabilitacao - like food they should be channelled to the commercial network when sold;

e. tools and seeds as well as household equipment may - if convenient - be mobilised from external sources by Emergencia, but as part of national (including PDP) targets and subject to national allocation. In fact, 1990 experience suggests that neither UNDP nor donors prefer that (Emergencia) channelling;

f. while Emergencia/Rehabilitacao fund mobilisation for - e.g. - health, education, water may, on a decreasing basis, still be useful as certain 'doadores' may classify emergency and rehabilitation outside (above) normal "country ceilings", these resources should go to the relevant Ministries to support these parts or units of their independently designed national (including PDP) programmes, which can be described as serving primarily deslocados, affectados, returnados. Separate collations of such projects outside sectoral Ministry components of the PDP and 3 year plan should be phased out by 1992. In the case of NGO's direct liaison with sectoral Ministries should be instituted even if they first go to Emergencia/Rehabilitacao and select their own project sites. This would at least allow the Ministries to have a clear overall picture of what is ongoing and to switch resources to Districts or locations left blank by the NGO's. There is doubtless a balance to be struck between utilising ngo creativity and initiative to complement main line government activity and to support the growth of their Mozambican civil society analogues and ensuring that there is an adequate degree of frame setting and coordination by Mozambique and Mozambicans to ensure that national and sector familial goals are served. At the moment there can be little doubt that there is too much freedom of manoeuvre (sometimes misused) for ngo's and too little coordination and guidance by Mozambicans (including not least Mozambican ngo's and sector familial);
g. donors should if possible be convinced that in the Rehabilitacao phase being destitute and needing special support to achieve livelihood rehabilitation was the qualification for a household not a physical move within Mozambique or across a border. The sector familial households in newly secure areas in Zambesia, Niassa and Manica are in many cases just as destitute and have just as appalling malnutrition rates and loss - by bandidos' destruction - to health, education and water as those households who actually fled. (A related point is that they too should be eligible for Emergencia food-tools-seeds-utensils aid now as well as in Rehabilitacao. That point is taken by many NGO's and some UN agencies - e.g. UNICEF.)

h. therefore, Emergencia should - along with DPCCN - be on the central PDP Commission and DPCCN on the Provincial and District level coordinating committees because for certain purposes they do still remain funding and operating units analogous to the key ministries and departments (Agriculture, Planning, Finance, Health, Education, Water, Works, Commerce, Fisheries, Forestry, Transport, Industry, Energy, Agricon and - in certain District Crop Authorities - and at the national level the Banco do Mocambique's commercial banking section).

NGO's - treated with Emergencia because historically their upsurge is related to it - pose special coordination problems as well as (in some cases) special advantages of flexibility, speed and suitability for small scale operations with Mozambican communities, NGO's (e.g. church groups) or quasi-NGO's (e.g. Mozambican Red Cross). There are a very large number; they prefer to relate to specific small projects; they normally wish to be their own implementing agencies; they frequently phase out their support before sustainable community or state substitutes are in place. At best this is creative disorder; at worst near anarchy. But NGO's are useful, increasingly popular with national and international agency 'doadores', valuable external publicity and public support mobilisers for Mozambique and potentially a source of experience and support for Mozambican ngo's (civil society groups). A way forward might be to create a Mozambique-NGO Commission chaired by External Cooperation with Finance, Planning, SDA Commission representative, RDP representative, Emergencia as members and a small secretariat to keep indexes of NGO proposals/capacities/records and Ministerial plus Mozambican NGO or quasi NGO programme components, projects, partners suitable for NGO's. NGO's and partners could then be
'introduced' to each other with a potential project agenda. Sub-commission meetings among sectoral Ministries and NGO's interested in that sector could also be useful. This approach is somewhat similar to the Community Development Trust in Tanzania albeit that is more narrowly focussed on external NGO/Tanzania NGO or community project partnerships.

V.

TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION

The PDP's formulation began in 1989. It was carried out by an inter-ministerial working group headed by the National Director of Rural Development.

The first stage of preparatory work involved baseline studies of the districts including existing facilities programmes and projects. These were carried out by Mozambican professionals.

The working group worked to articulate a national strategy and programme package based on the basic goals underlying the political decision to give priority to PDP and informed by the data in the studies and contributed by the working group members. Seeking to avoid past debacles when roughly sketched Mozambican concepts had been handed over to expatriate professionals and articulated but also transformed (or distorted) into something very different in structure and priorities from the initial Mozambican goals, and from Mozambique's capacity to implement, the working group used quite limited amounts of foreign advice and kept programme write-up in Mozambican hands.

Following a favourable external cooperating (potential funding) partner response at the 1989 Consultative Group Meeting and an early 1990 World Bank pre-evaluation mission, the preparation process moved to production of a full draft document in March 1990.

In light of personnel shortages, donor preferences (biases) for complete re-runs of all analysis and proposals by their own consultants and general bureaucratic/negotiation inertial factors (on both Mozambican and funder sides) a final programme by late 1990; initial funding commitments in early 1991; implementation beginning in mid-1991 (the start of the 1991-92 crop
year in most of Mozambique) appears the most optimistic temporal projection but also one which is just attainable.

Some Criticisms and Partial Answers

The PDP document and process have been criticised as:

a. too project centred;
b. too bricks and mortar centred;
c. too dependent on foreign personnel;
d. too limited in professional input;
e. too little concerned with programmes;
f. inadequate in attention to training;
g. unrelated to and untested by consultation with the sector familial;
h. too complex and bureaucratic;
i. failing to learn from the shambles of most integrated rural development projects of the late 1960s through early 1980s era;
j. focused on too few districts.

Each criticism is based on an actual or potential weakness. But - especially in the months of expatriate agricultural experts, a community who have shaped the operational form of most Mozambican agricultural policy by monopoly control over finance and an asserted greater technical and knowledge competence which has never been wholly true and has not led to avoiding repeated, egregious technical as well as social and political errors\textsuperscript{11} - they appear rather overblown and often captious.

The PDP is to a large extent centred on programmes including recurrent budget programmes. Certainly it is far more focused on these than most previous rural (or other) planning in Mozambique. However, available data and a donor preference to have proposals packaged as projects (often including recurrent components)\textsuperscript{12} does both to some extent actually - and even more in appearance - give the impression of continued projectitis and a danger of implementation deviating in that direction.\textsuperscript{13}
Bricks and mortar do matter - if they are in a strategic and programmatic frame. How Mozambique's rural infrastructure, basic services and commercial network are to be rehabilitated and expanded without them is unclear. Further, the need for initial, cash injecting rural employment requires substantial public works - as well as more care in avoiding the traditional capital and skill intensive main-line donor/technocrat approach that PDP has yet worked out. Also because to get a "bankable" package on paper, PDP had to use what project (bricks and mortar) data were to hand a number of the micro-components do appear questionable.

On the face of it the complaint of over-dependence on foreign personnel appears to be the inverse of reality. A handful of agro programme technicians with field experience chosen by Mozambique could have speeded up articulation and improved the quality and quantity of detail - especially on programmes, research and data collection, training and labour intensive public works.

But the reasons they have not been secured and used are neither trivial nor fully within Mozambican control. Donors do not provide technicians quickly nor - usually - without detailed discussions of what they are to do. In the past Mozambique has rarely had a say on who was provided and has found its limited numbers of senior personnel facing phalanxes of technical assistance experts united in saying (often, but not always, more subtly) "Leave it to us, we know better than you". The PDP working group was determined to avoid massive delays and, even more, a foreign takeover and Mozambique had limited data and no funds to acquire 5 or 6 individuals quickly on its own initiative.

However, there is a danger of future expatriate dominance precisely because the maintenance of Mozambican control over conceptualizations and initial articulation has built up a back-log of analysis at middle and micro level. This cannot be done rapidly with present Mozambican personnel. Worse, it opens the way (or arguably creates the need) for funders to insist on providing personnel chosen by them to 'guide' final pre-implementation formulation and implementation.

The limits to quantity and cross country experience of professional input, flow from the perceived need to maintain a Mozambican driven (even if donor fuelled) PDP. However, there is a very real problem - how is Mozambique to train both more top and middle level professionals (particularly in
analysis) and more **district and field level** paraprofessionals/administrators. The initial PDP articulation identifies the problem but does not appear to provide adequate means or resources to address it effectively. At district and field level this is particularly vital because, with rare exceptions, expatriates will not be operationally effective (especially in programmes and small projects) at these levels.

A similar query may relate to **baseline data collection** on the sector familial and on adoptive research. However, the former should at least partly be provided by the Social Dimension of Adjustment unit in Planning and - with a lag - by the 1992 Census which is to include a social and economic household survey component.

That systematic **contact with the sector familial** has been limited and formal contact with the elective bodies at District and Provincial level even more so is a fact. But there has been direct contact by both consultants and by PDP staff with sector familial households in several districts including openness to hearing their comments on and criticisms of present projects and programmes. In fact this is a very substantial step forward in terms of Mozambican rural planning exercises. Similarly Provincial and District personnel have been consulted even if not in all Districts or Provinces.

The **structural complexity** is partly inherent in Mozambique's administrative structure and partly in the subject matter of the PDP. A national strategic approach must have a national level. An approach to be close to the sector familial must have a District level. Given the role of Provinces there is a need for a Provincial level especially as the number of PDP districts expands.

The presence of coordinating committees at each level relates to the subject matter of the PDP. While the agricultural components of the PDP can be grouped under a single Instituto nationally and in analogous Provincial and District teams, the Health, Education, Water, Works and Commerce components should not be (and in practice could not be). PDP is clear on the need to avoid "parallel government".

But if at least six ministries (treating the Instituto as Agriculture) are to have mutually reinforcing programmes coordination on phasing, timing and - to some extent - content is needed at District, Provincial and National
levels. The inclusion of Finance and of planning in these coordinating committees is prudent given their central role in overall strategic and expenditure coordination and resource allocation.

The main lessons of the old integrated rural development programme/project model would appear to be:

1. creating parallel multi-purpose administrative authorities parallel to the main governmental structure is undesirable;
2. coordination among parallel ministerial programmes in rural areas is unlikely to happen by itself or by osmosis;
3. expatriate (especially short stay expatriate) designed technocratic rural programmes tend to suffer badly both from inadequate contextual knowledge and avoidable technical mistakes and - even more basic - from failure to relate to actual social and political goals and processes;
4. frequently, while the associated programmes have been sound (and worked), the core agricultural content was so weak as to make significant output gains most unlikely (as indeed ex post analysis shows they were)\textsuperscript{14}

PDP does not create a parallel administration. At field level it is perceived as part of District Administration and headed by the District Administrator. On the other hand it seeks by regular meetings of senior officials at each level to create a climate for coordinating design and monitoring and, by use of Provincial Planning Units and District Administrators, to set up the potential for enforcing it if necessary.

As noted, the PDP process to date has been dominated by Mozambicans, has sought to use contextual data and has been acting on political decisions as to what are Mozambique's strategic priorities.

Whether the agricultural core is, at this point in time, strong enough to enable rapid output growth is partly unclear and partly definitional. Adequate provision of seeds, basic tools, commercial access and transport can in many PDP districts allow at least 50% increases in overall and 100% increases in marketed output over three years.\textsuperscript{15} How much more extension personnel and generalisation of known, tested practices (whether from research or best local practice) can add is unclear and varies by District.
But it can add something, and over three years can be built up by the time the input - infrastructure - commerce fuelled recovery begins to plateau. Whether, in fact, it will be, turns on the training and research problematics cited earlier.

The Year 1 limitation of PDP to 6 Districts is almost certainly unwise. It is a donor enforced decision - almost the only one to date with the possible exception of the framing of expenditures in project form. At political level Mozambique sought a 40 District programme, i.e. the need for selection to allow an adequate mass in each selected district was accepted but synthesized with the need to begin on a broad enough front to have social, political and economic impact at National and Provincial level as well as in the selected districts. At technical levels doubts existed as to whether administrative and professional/para-professional capacity existed to begin 40 district programmes at once or whether a lesser number should be begun in year one with all 40 programmes underway by year 3.

At least some key donors sought at most 4 districts for the first three year cycle. The compromise of a 40 district programme beginning with six in year one and rising to 40 in year three is probably too cautious and risks losing momentum, but it represents considerable Mozambican success in maintaining the 40 target for the third year and is hardly a Mozambican error of over-concentrating staff on a few islands within a sea of inaction.

PDP is not perfect. But it is better conceptualised, more contextualised, better linked to political level goals and decisions, more integrally Mozambique's own work and more likely to be broadly successful in attaining its targets than any previous Mozambican rural development strategic initiative.
VI.

BACK TO NAMIBIA

The PDP relates only tangentially to two central aspects of Namibian agricultural strategy needs:

a. large production units/employment

b. ecological protection.

In respect to large production units this relates to the PDP focus. The general Mozambican record suggests that public sector corporate units - especially hi tech/hi capital intensity ones - are likely to be dead ends strategically and unviable as projects/enterprises outside specialised niches (e.g. the seed company, tea and perhaps sugar). This would appear to be relevant to reviewing FNDC (or successors) future priorities and present portfolio.

Mozambique's private commercial farm sector is now very small and peripheral. Namibia's is not - it is substantial and strategic. Therefore, pushing it to the periphery of attention would be unwise. Certain hypotheses may be derived from Mozambique's experience which are worth testing in deciding on Namibian strategy and policy.

First, if the large ranchers leave, it will be very difficult to keep the ranches operating effectively on their present technology and scale (let alone amalgamating several into one enterprise).

Second, present ranch workers are unlikely to wish to become small scale ranchers or mixed farmers. They are likely to wish to remain in wage employment but not on ranches. Unless wages, conditions of service and access to basic services are radically improved they are likely to drift into peri-urban areas and/or relatives' urban households; creating a fairly evident set of problems to which no easy answers exist.

Third, the least bad way to cut (output and state budget) losses on owner abandoned medium and large scale units is to sell them to other experienced ranchers (if any are in the market) and the second least bad to turn them over to their present employees to reorganise either as co-ops, 'traditional' ranches or household mixed farming units - an approach
recently adopted in Mozambique in respect to a substantial number of derelict units.20

The implications for Namibia would seem to include: maintaining the existing large ranching support services; seeking to use EEC, and other non-RSA markets, access to phase down subsidies (including capital grants and concessional interest rates); creating an atmosphere conducive to present in-place ranchers staying and - consistent with the foregoing - making ranch work more attractive to present employees.

The last might include: wages higher than at present but below urban minima; better housing, water and food; allocation of plots for fowl, small stock and, where feasible (including by limited sized garden spot irrigation), some crop production (by the employee and - primarily - his immediate households); where it has not already happened encouraging reunification of the employee's immediate household on the ranch; providing effective access to basic education and health services to ranch workers (possibly requiring employer provision of transport when there is no common carrier alternative). For this purpose, the Zimbabwean case is likely to be much more relevant than either the Mozambican or (except for provision of services) that of Botswana.

Ecological protection and rehabilitation is not a challenge which is comparable in Mozambique and Namibia beyond the common sense conclusions that overcrowding war displaced persons on tiny chunks of land is environmentally destructive and that the woodfuel requirements of a major city in a low rainfall area have a disastrous and spreading impact on adjacent and medium distance tree population. Mozambique has a much more favourable genuinely arable land/population ratio, much larger (absolutely and relatively) true forest/wood areas and a set of rainfall patterns which makes almost all of it ecologically less fragile. Botswana and Zimbabwe "communal area" experiences are probably more useful parallels to study.

To write out a list of concrete suggestions for Namibia from the Botswana experience and the PDP would be possible but probably not very useful, or even counter-productive for Namibian readers.

The initial list of parallels, the post-1975 Mozambique experience and the content (and perhaps the formulation and proposed implementation process) of the PDP should speak for themselves to the informed Namibian reader.
Doubtless they may say different things in different local contexts and reasonable people will to some extent hear them somewhat differently. But hearing, dialogue on what has been heard, and incorporating the voices into Namibian strategy are primarily for Namibians to do.

Perhaps that last point does justify drawing one conclusion. Especially at conceptualization and broad articulation level the personnel involved should be basically Namibian and the selected uitlanders ones chosen by Namibia on the basis of their experience, known outlook and - preferably - prior knowledge of Namibia. Persons provided by agencies seeking to establish a policy influencing role and especially ones able to use financial and personnel carrots and sticks to "reinforce" their advice should be avoided. At latter stages technical specialists can be useful as, at all points, can selected persons working in the context of a Namibian run institution and/or work team.21 The implications for utilising all trained Namibians (made possible by reconciliation but also requiring rapid substantive involvement of the almost equal numbers who have returned from training abroad) and for a coherent, articulated training strategy may be hard to implement in detail but neither is hard to see nor to act on promptly in general.
Notes

1. The PDP districts have been chosen after consultation with security forces as districts which are now or can in the short run be made secure.

2. Displaced totally dependent persons exceed 12% of rural population and displaced, seriously affected but not wholly dependent are about 30%. External refugees (externally displaced) are about 12%.

3. Colonial Mozambique was only a marginal basic food importer (wheat/rice). However, it also had a very high level of 'ineffective demand' as evidenced by what urban and rural malnutrition data scraps exist.

4. Mozambique has a three tier system with very substantial decentralisation to provincial directorates budgetarily and in policy detail (not broad frame and priorities) autonomous from parallel national ministries. District autonomy is less. Each level has a representative legislative body but Provincial Governors are nationally appointed as are district administrators. Provincial Directors (unlike National) do not have Ministers but form 'cabinet' of Governors. (Status of cities is somewhat confused statutorily and in practice - de facto Maputo Cidade senior directors and most programmes are supplied/financed by National Ministries. Not directly relevant PDP.)

5. This relates in part to fragmentation within Agriculture. Two crops - cotton, cashew - are handled by virtually autonomous Institutes (Authorities) and two Directorates - Irrigation, Forestry - have de facto used donor links plus weak ministry planning/analysis/policy capacity to write their own tickets.

6. 1,750,000 is roughly UNPA/UNIN estimate for 1990 Namibian population. 700,000 plus registered voters - who on known age structure can hardly exceed 40% of population - also suggests roughly 1,750,000. (That assumes eligible but non-registered persons were of the same order of numbers as registered South African residents and registered UNITA plus RSA san auxiliary unit combatant/dependents/camp followers - perhaps 35,000 in each case.)

7. This is not a criticism of reconciliation. It is simply noting the fiscal cost of ensuring a climate in which needed professional, technical, managerial and entrepreneurial personnel would be relatively likely to stay or trickle out over 10-15 years. As contrasting Zimbabwe and Mozambique experiences suggest, that price may be well worth paying. This is not to state that Mozambique had any viable "reconciliation" option open to it after "ultra" settlers attempted a last minute coup against transitional Portugal-Frelimo government. Zimbabwe did have an option and made a choice as has Namibia.

8. The speed with which such a structure can adapt to serving a broadened set of customers should not be underestimated. Zimbabwe's transformation, by broadening outlook of and access to de facto "whites only" Rhodesian personnel and services/institutions was very rapid and far reaching - especially in agriculture to the 20% to 30% of African farming households who had enough reasonable quality land
to take advantage of them. It is not unreasonable to argue that Senator Dennis Norman (as he then was) was Independent Africa's most successful Minister of Agriculture, and his starting point was of necessity largely inherited Rhodesian personnel, knowledge, policies and institutions reconceptualised and reprioritised to serve all Zimbabwean farming households.

9. Which also contain estimates in respect of Namibia.

10. The PDP has recognised that reducing women's workload is crucial to increasing production. But there is, to date, virtually no data on sectoral familial time uses for either men or women and while arguing by analogy from Tanzania and Malawi is adequate for conceptualization it is not a sufficient base for articulated programmes or targets.

11. Mozambicans - at least in print and public - rarely put it this strongly. This is partly a national cultural trait of politeness and of hospitality to well-meaning guests. But it also reflects the distortion of dialogue inevitable when all finance for capital works and much of recurrent programming must be raised externally and many funders have said (or appeared to say) "You play our game or we will pick up the marbles and go home". The private fear, disappointment and irritation of many able Mozambicans and the (intentional or not) arrogance of many external experts is not hard for a sensitive observer to sense.

12. The package project - rehabilitation, maintenance, initial programme operational import content, new domestic personnel costs for several years - has its uses. However, calling it a project has the disadvantage of implying it is self-contained and self-terminating. This deters both serious estimation of post project period programme costs and Mozambican budgetary forward planning to include them post "project". As a result the end of the "project" phase for some rural "projects" has meant radical cuts in provision for extension staff, vehicle spares and petrol and production input supplies because neither the Provincial agricultural budgets nor the national import capacity for non-project goods could accommodate them, especially not without 2 year advance warning of phasings and magnitudes.

13. Mozambique is not alone. World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes are explicitly centred on policies and programmes and include major attention to recurrent programmes. But - except for one to three countries who have used broader external resource and budgetary sources/uses formats - the main document the Bank helps the country present to the Consultative Group Meetings is a Priority Investment Project Plan!

14. Why this was not clear ex ante is not self-evident. In reviewing a series of IRDP "prospectus" and results for IFAD in the early 1980s the author found in a majority of cases that significant agricultural output growth could not reasonably have been expected on the basis of the baseline data and agricultural core. In one case it might have been but the pattern of price (output and input) policies in place at the time of the prospectus was contrary to the proposed crop shifts. (In that case output did increase but entirely in crops not targeted in the IRDP but probably identifiable at the time of the prospectus as more economically attractive to small farmers. For "IRDP crops" output fell.) But, the author must admit he had read one of the
prospectuses just before its implementation began and had not picked out the agricultural vacuum (hidden by hosts of hypothetical yield increases and adaptation rates based largely or wholly on pure desk speculation) at its heart at that time.

15. PDP uses a 6% output target for each District. This is a technical weakness. In the most secure districts with a 1980-88 record of rising output it may be a hard target to meet. In some of those in which as of 1988 war and drought devastated output, the 1992 (Year 3) PDP target is quite likely to be exceeded before the programme begins.

16. The proposals tended to range from 10 to 20 in year one and 25 to 40 in year two. The author suggested a 10, 25, 40 phasing,

17. As noted some selected (by Mozambique) expatriates were consulted - evidently including the author - and a World Bank Mission review took place early in 1990 (essential if funding from the Bank or/and bilateral sources was to be mobilised). But the consultancy phase, the working group membership and the March 1990 first articulated "programme presentation" document were wholly Mozambican.

18. Pre 1989 studies which advised either doing so or organising worker co-ops with maintained state support services were largely built on the assumption that 50% to 75% of 1980 ranchers would have left by the day after independence. (Most of them did not advocate that but treated it as a likely "worst case".) At the time that seemed a likely assumption and one borne out by 1980-86 departures of about 20%.

19. It is true that Batswana and, apparently, European ancestry Botswanan, large ranches are more productive and much more viable in economic terms than Namibian. Indeed the Namibian large ranch sector returns - stripped of direct and indirect state capital, interest, operating and residence subsidies - have rarely exceeded 5% on capital employed and over most of the 1980s appear to have been negative despite appalling and unsustainable wage levels for their employees. But conversion to the Botswana model would be complex and require expertise and experience not held by anyone in either the large or small ranch sectors or the agricultural service in Namibia today.

20. A number of Namibian ranches wholly or partly abandoned since 1980 seem to have undergone this process informally. In these cases attempting an early reversal would appear unwise. If the owner wishes to return there is a problem. Basically it is political - what are the claims of an ex-rancher to abandoned land worth relative to those of persons now (and for some years) using it and what is the balance of macro reconciliation and economic costs/gains of opting for one set of claims or the other?

21. The problem is not expatriate personnel or even relatively large numbers of multilateral or bilateral agency supplied technical assistance personnel as such. At one point on the order of 80% of
Botswana’s public service professionals were expatriates and well over half provided by technical assistance. A rather mild joke on Botswana’s policy then was "Have a headache? Take two expatriates". But Botswana clearly did and does ensure that expatriates (ta or other) serve not run Botswana and that control rests with citizens at both strategic decision-taking and senior official levels. How, has not been studied as closely as it deserves but some elements include:

a. using long stay expats virtually wholly in institutions headed by one or more citizens competent to judge whether technical work is competent and - at least as important - responsive to initial directions as to what was to be done to further what purposes (quite different competences from being able to do the work);

b. use of outside/short stay expatriate consultants to get second readings on in-house analysis and proposals (especially where these have largely been done by expatriates);

c. mixing expatriates from different sources to avoid solid phalanxes appointed by one source (or country representative) with a clear "party line" able to dominate an institution or a sector;

d. being quite willing to ease out unsatisfactory expatriates (including aid or ta agency representatives) politely but firmly;

e. recognising that understaffing with expatriates prevents their having any time to work with or explain to newly appointed citizens and, in the end, slows the process of citizenisation or leaves the successor citizens inadequately on the job trained and experienced;

f. separating provision of personnel from solicitation of funds - possible because Botswana has own resources, access to commercial credit and virtually a queue of would-be aides;

g. giving priority to educating, training and "breaking in" citizens to increase proportion of Botswana senior personnel (not necessarily to reduce numbers of expats if the professional posts needed are growing because the size or nature of the underlying programme requires it) but not at the expense of quality. (Botswana would never in word or fact come up with the words of an African Airline General Manager who said he was meeting a shortage of engineers and senior maintenance mechanics by "A crash training programme".)

h. at least some examination of papers on proposed ta personnel (long term or consultancy), attempts to get multiple candidates offered and - for key posts - insistence on specific persons or on a Botswana right to interview and to reject proposed candidates.

Mozambique has been very different from Botswana because it did not have the personnel to achieve "a", the resources to insist on "d", "e", "f", or the related luxury of "g" - through no fault of its own. Namibia can operate on the Botswana model - indeed it has a far better opening ratio of trained professionals and para professionals to population at independence than any other Southern African country.
except Zimbabwe. But the possibility will not become the achieved reality without a strategic decision to give priority to achieving it and a willingness to stand up to ta personnel providers (in some cases "peddlers") and expatriate personnel who have different ideas about their role and proper institutional modalities for carrying it out.
Author Note

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