REWEAVING THE RENT FABRIC, RESTORING
THE BROKEN POT

Human Dimension, Human Rights, Institutional Actors and Law - A Perspective from Africa

By Reginald Herbold Green

The small boy who breaks a pot goes to tell his mother 'It got broken'. Not 'I broke the pot' but 'It got broken'...
And who did this? We did. We broke the pot.

- Jerry John Rawlings
President of Ghana

Adjustment programmes which rend the fabric of society cannot be sustained.

- E. V. K. Jaycox
Vice President for Africa,
World Bank

Opportunities should be given to women for greater participation in the nation's political and decision-making processes at all levels, especially at the national centres of power. Where necessary, appropriate training should be given to them to ensure this...

There should be greater openness in the process of designing the adjustment package, both within government and beyond. In particular, employers, trade unions and other relevant groups should be closely associated with the process both to improve the design of the programmes and to ensure their fuller understanding and support...

In making the protection of the poor an integral part of adjustment, the primary strategy should be that of enhancing their productive capacity through better access to productive resources and assets...

- Khartoum Declaration
Analysis, debate and action in respect to the post-1979 generalisation of disaster in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, much of Latin America and the Caribbean and some Asian countries tends to be fragmented and also to be couched in macro (whether economic or geo-political) terms. The initial wave of stabilisation and adjustment (whether by forced liberalisation of trade in ideology as in much of SSA, by a pre-Gorbachevian or late Hungarian style rethinking as in Algeria and arguably Mozambique or by a radical or more conservative nationalist consolidation strategy as in Ghana and Nigeria respectively) have stressed regaining external, domestic market (price) and fiscal balance and reallocating resources (out of a smaller total used) to concentrate on restoring production.

The "absolute poverty eradication", "employment", "redistribution with growth" and "basic human needs" strands which had begun to multiply and articulate in the mid- and late-1970s were for a time nearly snuffed out. Intellectually and in efficiency of resource allocation terms this is curious. All of these approaches were designed to reduce import requirements, raise food production (and ability of poor people to buy - provide a market for - it), increase marginal labour productivity and reallocate investment in both created capital and human capabilities to yield more (not less) growth per unit of investment and public services. Thus a context of falling resource - and especially foreign exchange - availability and of concern for "efficient allocation", combined with increasing poverty leading to rising social and political tensions ought to have been conducive to their further articulation and implementation.

That the opposite proved to be the case probably turned on three factors:

1. "what we have we hold" is a deep conviction of elites (governing sub-class coalition members) anywhere, not least in the South. Universal access to basic services, programmes directly enabling poor people to produce/earn more, relative redistribution are all much easier to manage if moderately rapid growth ensures that there need be few absolute losers. In Africa this was compounded by the fact that easy gains from citizenisation of bureaucratic managerial, professional and small entrepreneurial positions following independence had largely been
achieved so that there was no longer a politically acceptable set of losers to be squeezed;

2. the crises were seen in specific foreign exchange, export, fiscal, subsidy, inflation terms leading to specific economic (or at times economystic) attempts to fix them without wholistic evaluation of the crises and problematics let alone of ways to tackle them;

3. the foreign exchange noose on a majority of African economies could - at least in the short and medium term - be loosened only by external cooperation. In the North the confident, crusading ideology was neo-liberalism including a political economic morality that believed greed was good, personal compassion was acceptable but state action to ensure minimum access or standards was bad. Not poverty but the poor were a disgrace and the victims not their victimisation were the appropriate targets for public policy (and the successful greedy its appropriate beneficiaries). Nowhere has this been set out more clearly than in Prime Minister Thatcher's 1988 declaration of faith to the Assembly of the Church of Scotland (whose reaction suggests they viewed it as heresy in a very literal sense) but it has been a powerful, pervasive force since 1980 not only in Northern governments but in the international financial institutions (especially the IMF since the Bank has never been homogenous let alone monolithic, had vested interests in health, education and food security and many of its staff rather resented the attempt to have the neat, stark neo-liberalism of Eliot Berg foisted on them by a few senior officials within and without the Bank).

A Human Condition Crisis?

Since the first third of the 1980s this perception of the crisis (or more accurately successive and parallel crises) has come under increasingly forceful, intellectually persuasive and politically influential attack. The "employment", "production by the rural poor", "human investment", "basic human needs" strands of thought and policy which in the neo-liberal high noon seemed dead and buried have regrouped and in significant ways mutated and coalesced (in the North too - vide the forceful frontal attack on Thatcherism and its moral political economy in the Church of England's *Faith In The City*).
The reasons are again complex:

1. neo-liberalism had won its dominance by force more than by persuasion so that its opponents in most cases looked for ways to reverse the verdict rather than becoming full converts;

2. the re-emergent strands had in fact concentrated on efficient resource allocation, production by the poor and universal basic services to raise productivity and selective state intervention with decentralisation so that (unlike more orthodox - or procrustean - 'left' formulations) they could fight neo-liberalism on its own ground;

3. the claims for rapid turnarounds and trickle down for all of the neo-liberal crusaders clearly did not come true; their initial African paradigmic examples of sound policies and success (e.g. Malawi, Cote d'Ivoire) on examination turned out not to follow the supposed policies and - even more distressingly - performed increasingly badly in macroeconomic terms. Per contra the success cases in Asia turned out to practice detailed state investment, massive human investment and moderate redistribution!

4. the social and political costs of neo-liberalism (or at any rate its rapid, acontextual, insensitive, ill-thought out application) proved severe and - even more crucially for elites - potentially explosive;

5. import model ideologies, weltanschaungs, policies and praxis backed by financial force were deeply resented by most African decision takers creating a fertile constituency for acceptance (and attempts to act on) alternative conceptualisations, strategies and - at the least - social and political tension reducing programmes.

The international spokesorganisations for this counter-attack - it still is not clearly more than that - have been UNICEF ("Adjustment with a Human Face") and - more cautiously - ILO ("employment", "informal sector", "human investment", "basic needs" revisited and jointly reformulated). However, there is a considerably more varied and evident domestic South (intellectual and political-intellectual activist) support for and contribution to the
process today than in the middle and late 1970s when one often had, e.g. African concepts and approaches rephrased and reformulated by "proxy Africans" to the extent that they were - except in Southern Africa - frequently not only unrecognisable but also unacceptable to their original creators and implementers.

This conceptualisation is radically different from the neo-liberal vision. It - albeit if largely formulated by economists (even in the UNICEF case) and overly economistic in vocabulary and initial action justification - perceives the common element in the crises as being the human condition of poor (at the extreme dying) people individually and in specifically identifiable social groups. Human beings are reinstated as the subjects (not objects or targets) of development and their condition (and especially its direction of change) as the measure of crises and justification (or damnation) of economic policy and praxis.

Emerging Foci and Divergences

The basic convergence is among basic human needs as an over-riding target and universal access to basic services combined with more production by/fairer payment to the poor as the main (and economically consistent) ways to achieve them with the human investment for productivity approach (itself originally neo-classical and associated with a fraction of neo-liberalism).

This approach has been designed to refute the claims that while poverty and misery (up to and including premature death) may be deplorable "There Is No Alternative". In the process it has created a politically saleable message (vide the response to Band Aid and its extended family or at both grassroots and establishment level to UNICEF, the only UN agency able to finance steady and rapid expansion of existing and new programmes) and, potentially, a way to convert immediate emotional human concern into longer term backing for rehabilitation, recovery and redevelopment after survival.

There is not complete synthesis of the approaches nor tactical coherence. Production by the poor has encountered much more resistance (intellectually and by, e.g., the World Bank) than universal access to basic services - apparently because the latter can be formulated more generally, elegantly and
econometrically and is consistent with some strands within traditional neo-classical economies. Similarly "human investment" - as a result of its origins and of the fact that middle and higher level personpower who (at least once trained/educated) are not/will not be poor - is not always clearly or self-evidently related to the short run human condition of poor majorities and of fractions within these majorities.

The initial tactical target was people made poorer or more vulnerable by stabilisation and adjustment programmes. This did have the advantage of putting the Bank - and to a lesser extent the Fund and some bilateral agencies - on the defensive. (Rising malnutrition and, a fortiori, infant mortality linked to ones own programmatic advice are somewhat difficult to defend even if one is certain they are unavoidable.) In fact at that level at least verbally (and to a lesser degree programmatically) the battle is being won. Virtually all relevant bodies say that the human condition effects of stabilisation and structural adjustment measures must be seen as important and if otherwise sound policies cause deterioration additional programmes/measures to offset them must be undertaken. (As the Bank collaborated in raising $40-50 million for the initial phase of Ghana's PAMSCAD which was marketed as such a programme, even if designed with a broader human condition backdrop, it is not all rhetoric.)

However, three limitations confront any approach focused primarily on the "victims of stabilisation and adjustment" (or even the poor among them - bankrupted formerly rich parallel marketeers, more pungently describeable as "two-legged wingless vultures", presumably worry few other than themselves and their close associates):

1. it is very hard to link most general human condition deterioration to stabilisation/adjustment programmes per se as separated from the crises which led to these programmes especially as the counterfactual progression in the absence of the programmes is often very hard to formulate credibly except as a downward path;

2. no programme designed to offset costs of adjustment can be expected to address the basic requirements of all poor and/or vulnerable people nor to be more than an "add on" (or Christmas tree decoration);
3. if the human condition is the key test, then how it changes for all people (especially all poor and vulnerable people) - whatever the reasons for their initial poor condition - is the central justification or damnation of any applied economic strategy and the means to passing the test are necessarily integral to strategic design, not add ons.

The Human Dimension and Human Rights

Any approach to development (or any other branch of applied political economy) inevitably has a positive or negative human rights component. Any approach centering on the human dimension has an inherent commitment to human rights. Whether to all human rights, with what priorities and to what extent is a more complex (and ultimately contextual) question.

The standard divisions between individual and communal, socio-economic and civil, hortatory and enforceable and resource expensive and no resource cost human rights are distinctly unhelpful in examining the human dimension approach in relation to human rights. Indeed attempting to do so strongly suggests that these supposed distinctions are objectively misleading and serve the subjective purpose of selective opposition to human rights and regimes opposed on quite different grounds not of supporting or enhancing human rights holistically defined.

Virtually all human rights are both individual and communal, basically for the moderately self evident reason that human beings live in societies and interact with each other. Freedom of speech is usually categorised as individual. Yet it has meaning only in a community context (of auditors and answerers). Food security is usually classified as communal but eating enough to avoid hunger or starvation is equally surely a very individual need.

Similarly, socio-economic and civil rights interpenetrate. Poverty and lack of education have a very negative impact on ability to
exercise civil liberties. Prevention of freedom of speech, of organisation and of political participation frequently cripple socio-economic programme design, mobilizing power, implementation and error correction feedback even if objectives are genuinely related to socio-economic human rights. In this case the categories are not meaningless but the assumption of inherent contradiction rather than of basic (even if not told) complimentarity is wrong.

Whether rights are hortatory or enforceable is a contextual question and one with both political economic (resource availability and allocation) and socio political (political and legal norms and institutions/processes) aspects. In most countries freedom from hunger/food security is in principle enforceable and in practice hortatory with uneven backing to putting the rhetoric into reality. The resource problem is one of priority in allocation plus practicable delivery (subsidy or gift? access to earned income? capacity to grow more?) problematics. The socio-political may either be of norms (how repugnant is the hunger of others? how strong the commitment to a right to eat for each and all?) or of institutions and laws (ie of affective accountability). But the same is true of effective freedom of speech ie the resources and mechanisms for most individuals actually speaking so that their desired audiences can hear them either do not exist or are otherwise allocated. Similarly the norms against and structures to prevent communications oligopolisation or monopolisation appear rather weak in almost all countries even if the precise nature of quasi-accepted monopolists or oligopolists varies.

The resource cost distinction is a variation on the preceding one. Again it does not hold up. Freedom from torture is regularly cited as no cost. In fact very often that is not the case. Properly equipped, trained and remunerated police, judicial and prison systems are expensive. So is unresolved and unsanctioned crime. Torture (no matter how morally unacceptable nor, for that matter, how ultimately disfunctional) can be seen as a low resource cost shortcut. Similarly if freedom from hunger in a given context requires low cost means to enable poor farmers to produce, eat and sell more food and
urban workers to earn more and buy more food the macro economic results can be very resource positive (ie more resources generated than used) even in the quite short run.

The human dimension approach has not systematically addressed human rights questions under that rubric. But it has made specific propositions which demonstrably go beyond the charicaturisation of "bread and circuses" sometimes applied by critics of poverty reduction oriented strategies:

a. the identification of actual groups of actual poor people;

b. on regional, occupational and gender as well as specific unmet needs bases;

c. the repeated insistence on participation and self organisation and expression by poor people.

As even the opening quotations from the Khartoum Declaration show, there are certain problems. The increased participation is sometimes viewed as "given" (a noblesse oblige not a rights approach) and there is evidently a perceived need to sell participation and organisation on productivity (avoiding errors, increasing mobilisation) rather than normative grounds and to smuggle accountability in without actually using the word.

But the contrast to "modernisation" - let alone "neo liberal" (whose main human rights concept is that free markets make free men) - development conceptualisation and declamation is marked. Participation, women, identifiable poor people communally and individually are all to the center of the agenda and at least in principle perceived as having the right to speak for themselves and to be listened to.

Before addressing accountability, external agency roles and the scope for legal processes and personnel it may be useful to set out a more articulated presentation of the human dimension conceptualisation and strategy as it has emerged and evolved in the African context. The
African focus is not meant to imply that there are not parallel trends elsewhere in the South (or for that matter the North) but that contexts are important, and to acknowledge that the author's contextual expertise (or at any rate experience) is primarily Sub-Saharan African.
An African Overview

The human condition - the social fabric of people's lives, the state of their cooking pots - is the ultimate test of development. It is also among the vital means to achieving it. The malnourished, the sick, the illiterate, those worn out carrying wood and water cannot work long, hard or very productively. To waste much of Africa's basic economic factor of production - the work of its women and men - by allowing them to remain locked in vulnerability, enforced overwork or enforced idleness and poverty is not just a human and social failure; it is also gross economic inefficiency.

But the reality of what is happening today is starkly summed up in a 1985 UNICEF poster of a young African girl. "What do you want to be when you grow up?" "Alive". For millions of our infants and young children over the past decade it is a plea which has gone unanswered. They are prematurely dead. Unless the right to live can be made real no other human rights are possible - for the dead there is neither a future nor future access to other rights.

The average human condition of our fellow Africans - women and men, the young and the aged, peasants and urban slum dwellers, the ill and the crippled, displaced victims of drought and of war - is appalling. Worse, it is not improving - as in most countries it was, however slowly, prior to 1980. It is worsening. The rips in the social fabric are lengthening, the cracks in the pots are widening.

These facts are statistically known from a wide range of indicators: infant mortality and life expectancy, malnutrition and food supplies, access to pure water and to sanitation, illiteracy and access to education, income per household and environmental degradation. They are sharply illustrated by the tables and figures annexed to this paper. The stark reality is that the fabric of many African societies - national, regional and local - has been wrent. The cooking pots of millions have been broken. To pretend otherwise is to deceive ourselves and to betray the poor and vulnerable people; the women, the children, the displaced victims of drought and war, the poor peasants and the equally poor urban slum dwellers.
People As Actors - And Scriptwriters

No nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people are poor and miserable. Those words of Adam Smith set out a central truth which many of his disciples now preaching sermons in Africa and at Africans would do well to ponder on and to use as a test of their own proposals.

The human condition of individual people, of families, of communities and of societies is - as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has put it - the only ultimate objective, justification and validation of development. Human beings are ends not objects, actors not things to be manipulated. Of course increased command over material resources - gross domestic product to use macroeconomic terminology - matters for a nation as well as a household. Food and health, education and water, sanitation and environmental protection all require real resources. Of course balancing income and expenditure - closing external and fiscal imbalances - matter nationally as well as individually. Crushing debt and demeaning begging damage the human condition. Of course choices and sacrifices need to be made by states and societies as well as by families and individuals. The need to provide for tomorrow and the duty to the rising and future generations are central to African thought and society. But these things matter because of what they mean for human beings - and especially for poor and vulnerable human beings - not in isolation from, or worse yet instead of, their impact on the human condition.

But if people are actors - participants - then they are also in a basic sense means. Means to achieving improvements in their human condition through economic recovery and development. Labour and land are two of the three basic factors of economic production. From work applied to natural resources the third - capital can be won. Created and embodied in productive assets: tree crops and transport systems, improved fields and power plants or dams, hospitals or health posts and factories, houses and shops, schools and mines. But the poverty, the malnutrition, the inadequate access to education of a majority of the people of Africa increasingly weaken their ability to work long, hard and productively. Their poverty increasingly forces them to abuse and destroy the land so the bone white of ruined, dead and dying land creeps wider across earth satellite pictures like the destroying cancer it is. By rending the fabric of society, growing immiserisation is equally surely breaking the cycles of production, of reproduction and of surplus generation
and creating contexts in which all human rights - however defined - are always in danger of erosion or extinction.

To regard nutrition, health services and education as the fruits of development to be deferred until after high production is self-defeating. Only the well nourished, healthy and literate can consistently and increasingly be efficient productive workers. To see access to pure water, reduction of women's workload and child survival as goals for after economic recovery is to ensure that there will be, at best, delayed and stunted recovery. Women worn out carrying water for miles, tending sick children and bearing replacements for those prematurely dead are not merely denied their rights as human beings but drained of the time and energy to produce more.

Similarly to restore and to expand output requires the fuller participation in production of the poor - not their exclusion from it. To provide tractors and large irrigated farms for the few and to ignore matchets and jembes (cutlasses and hoes) and improved seeds for the many is economic madness. Not only will it not solve malnutrition (the poor will have no means to buy food); it will not even restore a viable trend rate of growth of agricultural output.

Of course there is a need for balance. Production matters. It requires exports as well as textbooks; lorries as well as basic drugs; efficient factories as well as (indeed to produce) jembes and matchets; taxes as well as protected wells. The point is not to argue for basic services instead of production or production by the poor instead of by the not so poor. It is to point out that most present stabilisation and adjustment plans do the reverse: they fail to recognise the vital role of basic services and of production by the poor without which recovery will be limited and development (even in narrowly economistic terms) virtually unattainable.

Stabilisation, Adjustment: And or Instead of Restoring The Human Condition?

Economic malaise, crises and decline have weighed most heavily on poor and vulnerable people. There are several reasons for this - none of which is surprising but, equally, none is inevitable.
When government resources are reduced provision of basic services and maintenance of infrastructure are cut back. They are usually cut back from the periphery - the feeder roads first, the capital city highways last. When health services face resource crisis usually rural health posts and clinics are hit first and central reference hospitals last. It is to the credit of some African states, medical services and communities (and their external cooperating partners) that there are exceptions to that pattern - in some cases the basic rural and low income urban health services have largely been sustained or even, in some respects, strengthened. But in general the greater the distance - geographic, gender, indigenous ethnic, social, economic or political - from the centres of power, the greater the cutbacks.

Similarly when production falters it is the vulnerable who lose their employment, see the product of their self-employment fall, have their entitlement (income) to food torn away. They do not have the resources to ride out a crisis nor to give the flexibility to adjust to new ways of earning a decent livelihood. Most have indeed adapted - without that they would have died. But millions could not adapt; they (largely infants, children and victims of drought and war) have died. For the poor and vulnerable people of Africa death is very close - their margins above survival are often very narrow. As the proverb puts it - give a rich man less food and he will grow thin; give a poor man less food and he will die.

The crises of falling export earnings and import capacity; of eroding government revenues and inflationary deficits; of inefficient policies and under-utilised capacity are very real. But they are not more real nor more important than the crises of rising numbers living in absolute poverty with rising infant mortality; of the re-emergence of killer diseases like yaws and yellow fever virtually eliminated by the end of the 1950s; of school systems near collapse and peasants without tools or seeds. Indeed they are part of the same human crisis.

Therefore, one basic test of all stabilisation and structural adjustment, of all economic recovery and development programmes is whether they will improve the human condition - make poor people less poor and vulnerable people less vulnerable by making it possible for them to produce more and by increasing their access to basic services as well as their control over programme and policy formulation and ability to hold decision takers and professionals
accountable. If a programme cannot pass that test in prospect or in operation it is fatally flawed and itself in need of structural adjustment or total redesign. This test is stronger than that sometimes proposed of whether the stabilisation and adjustment programmes are the basic cause of poverty (of course they are not) or of whether they address the problems of poor and vulnerable people directly injured by some of their components (important but inadequate). It is also a test of present, short term as well as future, long term results. Human condition recovery must go step by step with production recovery or neither is likely to be efficient or sustainable.

Because the plight of the poor and vulnerable is the most desperate and urgent it is useful to indicate more specifically who these people are. Most fall into seven groups:

a. victims of prolonged drought and/or ecological degradation whose previous sources of income have been wiped out;

b. poor - often female headed - households pushed by land shortages onto marginal or sub-marginal land - the pioneers and victims of the "rural sponge" effect which has to date limited the rise of open unemployment;

c. households in isolated or peripheral (to main centres) areas who are physically and institutionally at the end of the line for all goods and services (whether public or private sector) and usually suffer first and most severely from decreased flows;

d. small producers - usually primarily engaged in self-provisioning but also selling food even when they have a nutritional deficit, because it is their basic cash income source - who are unable to increase or even sustain output in the face of declining access to inputs and static relevant technological knowledge;

e. victims of war who are dislocated, like those of drought, with loss of access to health, education and water as well as of land, herds, homes, tools, seeds and foodstocks and plunged into a context of physical insecurity while government resources and physical capabilities are debilitated by war bills and destruction;
f. "informal" urban sector members whose numbers have risen even as the incomes of the formal sector they served and supplemented fell and whose slum or exurb areas have become ever more crowded and ever less well provided with basic services;

g. urban wage earners - formerly above the absolute poverty line - whose real wages have plunged so sharply they and other household members have had to add on "informal" sector economic activities to limit the vertiginous fall in their living standards, indeed in many cases to survive at all.

The Slippery Slope Revisited

How the economies of most African states and the human condition of most African people came to be so debilitated as they are today matters. It matters not primarily to win debates or to apportion blame but to understand how to win clear and "to look our mistakes squarely in the face lest we fall into repeating them" as Rector Rui Balthasar Santos of Eduardo Mondlane University once put it.

The radical, general worsening of the situation dates to 1980. After very low growth over 1970-75, most African states made fairly rapid economic progress over 1976-79 and human condition indicators showed some - even if limited and unequally distributed - advances. Since then most of Africa's economies have been on a declining path in terms of per capita output while poverty and vulnerability have been growing. Why?

One major answer - probably the dominant one so far as output per capita declines in the majority of African states are concerned - is the 1979-1987 evolution of the international economic environment confronting Africa. The 1979-82 recession and slow 1983-87 recovery in the industrial economies have had a disastrous impact on Africa's exports valued in terms of import capacity. Over 1976-81 a World Bank study showed several African economies - e.g. the Cote d'Ivoire and Tanzania - as among the worst affected. Many primary products' real values (import purchasing power per unit exported) are at 50 year lows and the recent slight recovery in metals and virtually all projections give little promise of significant change. At the same time protectionism and industrial economy dumping have hampered export
diversification. The financial flow position has also worsened. Real net concessional finance per capita (grants and new soft loans less interest and repayment on old) declined sharply from the mid-1970s to early 1980s and - at best - have been stagnant since. Non-concessional flows have gone negative. Africa has a debt burden relative to exports greater than that of any other region - payment on present terms is not possible and the attempt to sustain it is dramatically limiting imports, choking off recovery and worsening the human condition. That is not the view of African governments, the ADB, the ECA and the OAU alone, analyses by the World Bank and the British Chancellor of the Exchequer come to the same conclusion.

Drought - on virtually a continental basis - has exacerbated the already unsatisfactory food production trend. After good years in 1985-86, 1987 has seen several localised droughts. Until food production levels in normal years - especially by poor peasants - are much higher and vulnerability of output to drought is reduced, this scourge will regularly derail recovery efforts or put them into reverse.

For many African economies the macroeconomic and human costs of war are greater than those of any other exogenous shock. Nowhere is this as brutally clear as in Southern Africa. Angola and Mozambique production (excluding oil) is about half what it would be had South Africa not waged war against them - directly and by proxy. As detailed in UNICEF's Children on the Front Line by the end of 1986 1,000,000 human beings were already dead as direct or indirect results of the war, up to 12 million driven from their homes, up to 8 million in danger of starvation. By the end of this year the toll will be at least a third higher.

Other wars equally destructive of the human condition - including life itself - are less exogenous. The wars of the Horn of Africa and of the Sudan and the disintegration of Uganda into a Hume (not a Locke, still less Rousseau) "state of nature" have roots which are deeply indigenous and in some cases centuries old. But even in these cases external action and inaction has greatly raised the potential for destruction and made resolution of the conflicts harder. The external actions include those of other African states as well as of great powers - e.g. Libya in Uganda and a fortiori Morocco's colonial conquest of the Sahara Democratic Republic's soil.
Not all causes of economic and human condition decline are exogenous. African governments have made policy mistakes and have been too slow in responding to the worsening external context. In all candour, however, it should be noted that many of these decisions were taken on external advice and are now attacked by those who once pushed them. However, with the adoption of APPER and of national rehabilitation, recovery and renewed development programmes by a majority of African states, there has been substantial improvement on the economic policy front. That again is not the judgement solely of the OAU or the ECA; the World Bank and the United Nations General Assembly have said the same.

However, these economic policies to date frequently do not give adequate attention to the human dimension nor enough priority to improving it, not simply to increase human welfare but also to sustain and accelerate economic growth. That is not a new weakness - it typified most development plans and programmes of the 1960s and 1970s. Then, however, with less constrained resources and a less hostile international economic environment, the old export led, dependent, central city and high income group focused model was consistent with some improvement in human condition indicators in general and in basic services extension in particular. Today and tomorrow no such compatibility is likely to be within the grasp of most Africa states. Either the nature and priorities of development will be re-thought and acted upon on new premises or what economic growth there is will march hand-in-hand with rising levels of inequality and poverty, misery and instability.

One concrete example is health. Life expectancy is much lower and mortality much higher in Africa than in the industrial North. The largest single difference is in infant and under 5 mortality. These are 30% of all deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa but only 2 to 3% in most industrial economies. The main causes are neo-natal tetanus, five epidemic diseases (including measles, tuberculosis and polio), malaria, impure water related morbidity (including diarrhoea), and malnutrition linked diseases and/or loss of resistance to disease. For older children and adults malnutrition and impure water related diseases, malaria, a handful of epidemic diseases and accidents treatable by first aid are the dominant killers.

Urban hospital care is largely irrelevant to reducing these death tolls in Africa - as it was in Europe. It takes 60 to 70% of the typical African
health budget. Primary health care (including first aid), basic drug lists and supplies, extended immunisation programmes, oral rehydration and simple health education (including sanitation) are of proven low cost effectiveness. But they receive 10 to 15% of the majority of African health budgets. The case for rethinking and reallocation is clear technically as well as in human rights terms. The warning of Cheik Amidou Kane is even more timely now than when he first made it in 1985:

Frustrations and failure will mount if we do not immediately summon the courage to revise the ways we think and take action.

What Is To Be Done? Roads Back and Forward

To will an end is - if serious - to will a means or a set of means adequate to achieve that end. To make the human condition integral and central to Africa's economic recovery and development requires a comprehensive political and socio economic strategy encompassing at least eight elements:

a. recognition that people matter and are both the subjects and ends of and the main means and actors to attaining stabilisation, recovery and renewed development;

b. understanding that throwing away much of Africa's most basic factor of production - the labour of its people - as many modernisation and narrow stabilisation strategies do by excluding the poor and vulnerable, is economically wasteful and inefficient;

c. acting on the reality that marginal rates of economic as well as social return from enabling poor people to produce more are often high. The real problem is making small, contextual, poor people centred projects visible to central decision takers and credible to bureaucrats and analysts - and then altering regulations to be compatible with implementing them;

d. comprehension that health, education and pure water are not merely human and social goods (basic as that point is) but are important to maintaining present and raising future economic productivity and to
making possible fuller participation in production by women who are the chief victims of illiteracy and the human beings on whose backs falls the burden of fetching water and caring for the sick;

e. focusing on employment and production, not subsidies and relief; e.g. through public works programmes to relieve drought or seasonal income losses;

f. articulation of short term priorities to lay foundations for long run sustained development; e.g. in applied, field tested, peasant user friendly, producer cost effective agricultural research begun now to make it possible to sustain 5% agricultural growth in the late 1990s. Until then input restoration, infrastructural rehabilitation and generalisation of best known farmer or (more rarely) off-the-shelf research techniques can restore 4 to 5% output growth - but not beyond;

g. political as well as economic awareness that participation in production by poor people is crucial to underpinning their survival and the improvement of their human condition. Without it their social and political participation will remain limited and perpetually at risk;

h. comprehension of the extreme economic inefficiency of rending the fabric of society - strikes and riots, go-slows and loss of morale, steadily growing grinding poverty and recurrent economic disasters without human rehabilitation are devastating in narrow economic as well as social, political and human terms.

The poor and the vulnerable are not amorphous masses; they are groups of human beings. To fail to see what their needs are as perceived by themselves is to exclude them. To suppose their needs and capabilities are uniform is to render many people invisible. In no case have these errors and blindesses been as common or as persistent as in that of women. Most African women are excluded or invisible but also over-burdened and under-assisted. The basic barriers to economic as well as human development posed by the excessive workload most African women bear are rarely recognised clearly. The implications of the gender division of labour in agriculture are yet to be taken account of by agricultural research and extension. These are central elements in any serious effort to improve the human condition. After all over
Half of our people are women and they care for our children and produce most of the food we eat. How to address them is not simple and varies from context to context. But three elements are crucial:

a. Universal access - to literacy, to basic education, to primary health care, to pure water, to agricultural inputs, to fuel - is disproportionately beneficial to women because when access is limited they are disproportionately deprived of them;

b. Serious attention must be addressed to reducing women's workload - e.g. by closer water and health facilities, by programmes (e.g. immunisation) reducing child illness, by improving technologies relevant to female tasks (e.g. food processing, moving water and fuelwood);

c. Women should be centrally involved in planning and taking decisions about projects and programmes which will primarily affect them, e.g. rural water supply and maintenance, sanitation, food crop research and extension.

To will a strategy should lead to addressing questions of method. To cross a river requires a bridge, a raft, a boat, a tunnel or a ford (or perhaps a very good swimmer!). The same is true of economic recovery and development strategies giving central priority to the human dimension.

It should be made clear that the three goals of standard stabilisation and structural adjustment strategies do matter. They are incomplete rather than irrelevant or inherently in the wrong direction. More production is crucial. But in addition more of it must be by poor people. Reduced external and fiscal imbalances are necessary - but priority should go to increasing supply and not cutting uses important to the poor and vulnerable. Bad policies and restrictions inhibiting production and especially poor people organising to better their own human condition should be done away with, but not in any false faith in the perfection of markets or universal goodwill of the powerful and rich.

But those elements are not, by themselves, enough. More are needed. These include priorities in government expenditure which include and move toward universality, e.g. more primary and preventative health care relative to
hospitals and more food availability to poor people (through their own production or earning incomes adequate to buy it). That in turn requires much more emphasis on increased productive employment and self-employment.

The importance of moving to universal access to basic services has already been underlined. With it goes development of basic survival, disaster period support and rehabilitation mechanisms. Disasters will recur; the question is how to minimise their human damage and to speed the progress of rehabilitation - neither of which national nor (a fortiori) international disaster relief mechanisms have done very well to date. Again closely linked is acting on the perception that environmental and ecological protection is vital to the future human condition of poor Africans. Millions are being condemned to life sentences of poverty and to early deaths by the present pace of environmental degradation and destruction.

These priorities require both production and government spending. Budgetary balance should be restored and sustained primarily by increasing revenue. Domestically more production can allow more tax revenue and more efficient and progressive tax systems. But in the short run Africa needs additional external support. Additional support which meets the tests that accepts the primacy of African goals, respects the knowledge and judgement of Africans can be used to meet African requirements for improving their human condition through their economic recovery and development and is provided in a context within which African peoples and states can hold its agents accountable.

This conceptualisation is not - especially in this full-blooded and consistently articulated a form - dominant in Africa today. But neither is it absent or simply the importation of an external intellectual fad. In fragmentary forms, diverse formulations and different degrees of comprehensiveness and forcefulness it is both widespread and gaining ground from farmsteads to capitals, from the excluded to the intellectuals, from the marginalised to the powerful and in commitment and praxis as well as principle and prose. The Khartoum Declaration of March 1988 on the Human Dimension does embody priorities and perceptions which were not equally prominent even three years ago and however wide the gap between affirmation and action the movement is on both fronts not just affirmation.
International Development Agencies As Disasters

It is easy to collect a catalogue of horror stories about international development actors - international financial institutions, bilateral agencies and ngo's. The question is to what purpose. Proving that human beings are often foolish, insensitive and self centered and that actual human institutions partake of these characteristics is certainly possible but perhaps, by itself, somewhat laborious representation of what few would deny.

Three possible uses are: a) reaffirming the "foreign devils" thesis; b) 'demonstrating' that external actors are really engaged in exploitation with or without a human mask (with sub-theses excluding or including socialist country based ones and/or ngo's); c) seeking to throw light on general participation and accountability problems related to external relief and development oriented actors. The present author is incompetent (as a "foreign devil" himself) to deal with "a" and finds "b" either unrevealing or reductionist. Therefore, the present focus is "c".

In 1987 a major bilateral agency's emergency disaster relief mission arrived after a serious drought had broken. (Indeed floods impeded it's movement!) Perplexed as to what to do it sought advice. Restoring a human drug reserve stock was accepted; creating an analogous livestock one which could have reduced animal losses (the central cost of this country's droughts) 30 to 50% was rejected. Rehabilitation finance (to allow rebuilding herds or seed stocks) was ruled out as was rural water (human and livestock) rehabilitation and extension to reduce future vulnerability. In growing irritation, with his 'advisors', the head of mission eventually burst out: "You do not understand ... disaster is our bread and butter".

Unfortunately this was not actually meant callously. But what does it say about coherent conceptualisation of human needs? Of sensitivity to actual, specific interests? Of aid structure and institutional congruence with need structures and relationships?
In 1986-87 an African country on advice from *inter alia* - there were domestic proponents - the Fund and Bank converted its central grain procurement corporation into primarily a minimum grower price (maximum wholesale price) guarantor buyer (supplier, ie importer) of last resort. 1985 and 1987 both produced bumper crops with large surpluses. Predictably the agency ran a large deficit on a cash flow basis and accumulated large stocks. Doubtless when a drought comes they can be sold but unless there is a huge consumer price increase (rather against the concept of basic food price stabilisation) procurement and storage/carrying costs will exceed proceeds. Further interim exports - necessitated by storage limits and the logic of optional reserve calculations - show immediate profit and loss as well as cash flow deficits.

The Fund had an 'easy' answer. It's advice could be paraphrased: don't buy the surplus grain or you'll break your credit trigger clause and will freeze your standby. The Bank rejected that but havered between calling for operating cost reductions (desirable but clearly unable to make an inherently non-commercial function profitable) and allowing sharp intra-year grower price falls (on its own evidence likely to increase instability of grain planting and output). What does this say about the historic memory of these institutions (1979-84 were drought and grain scarcity years in this country)? About their ability to work through the results of proposals (and sudden reproposals for reversing their earlier implemented ones)? About to whom they felt the state was accountable (themselves or small farmers)?

In a third country in 1988 several provinces experienced drought superimposed on externally organised terrorist war which dislocated people and prevented or limited production. A previous grain need target (endorsed by independent evaluators) had been 80% pledged and - perhaps - 70% (of commitment 55% of requirement) delivered. What issues did agencies raise:

a. was there a drought? Meteorology and detailed regional reports said yes. An independent observer hastily sent to one controversial province said he was not technically competent to state whether it was a drought but with one sound ear of grain per
hour of observation in a "grain basket" area it was as bad a crop failure as he had seen in over 25 years in Africa;

b. were flows intermittent and what (relaxed) detailed study was needed before acting? In the province in question 300,000 people were supposed to be receiving (free or at more or less landed cost prices depending on their economic group) 9 kilos a month of grain. Stocks were well under 3,000 tonnes and in 3 months only 500 tonnes had arrived with no more in sight;

c. was 9 kilos a month too much for relief grain as surely some of the recipients could grow or buy some food? The historic background is that 9 kilos is a WHO standard assuming 50% of calories readily available (physically and financially) from other sources. 15 kilos is the comparable WHO standard for refugees. On that basis the valid query was whether 75% of the over 3 million relief recipients should be on the 15 kilo standard. In any case actual delivered pledges for the year appeared likely to come to perhaps 4 to 5 kilos per month!

d. why did capital city ration delivery remain erratic and what institutional reforms (by the recipient country) were needed? Initial stocks had been approximately nil. Arrivals were late and erratic. Many were tied to particular areas and/or to free distribution or sale - not freely useable to maintain continuity of supply. And then there was the "ship of weevils", condemned at another African country's port as unfit for human consumption (and potentially endangering local production if any reached growing areas) and sent on to be recondemned and cause a month's gap in ration supply of that grain in the capital.

What does all this say about how agencies look at problems? Discrete, technical, fragmented or as aspects of a human condition challenge? About the standard of professionalism seen as needed in dealing with Africans and "recipients"? About sensitivity and powers of auto-criticism as opposed to self centredness and blaming the victim? About accountability and to whom? (A furious expatriate consultant remarked "I wish people who want to gamble with human lives would put theirs on the board too." His advice betrayed a
preference to gamble the waste of a few thousand tonnes of grain a
two or three million dollars out of nominal totals of 600,000 and
$350 million respectively and his analysis suggested that the other
approached gambled at least 20,000 lives in one province alone.)

Finally (for this recital) in one African state a grain aid shipment
arrived at the turn of the decade. It came from an area infested
with the greater borer beetle - a maize eater. It was sent to
certain rural districts. The next year two TNC grain marketers who
examined grain at the port of shipment were fined huge sums for
multiple fraudulent certification of infested grain. From that same
year (and from the districts receiving the shipment) the greater
borer beetle flourished until by 1986 it had reached half the country
plus parts of at least five neighbours and was eating perhaps 100,000
tonnes a year. The aid agency did not admit any responsibility nor
did it take a lead in funding either containment or International
Centre for Insect Pathology and Environment (ICIPE)
biological/environmental control research. It's government, however,
floated the rumour (clearly false) the grain had come from Nicaragua!

What does this have to say about accountability? About the ways and
means actually open to a victim for pursuing the probable external
cause of its grief? And taken with the "ship of weevils" about the
'standards' deemed acceptable (or at any rate whose violation is
merely venial) for food for Africans?

This is not a random list in the sense that the selection from a
larger universe has a pattern. But the pattern is not selection of
worst cases but of those which most clearly pose general questions.
The other parallel pattern is that in each case aid agency personnel
even from other bodies tend - with exceptions - to take view that
these things are unfortunate, but mistakes do happen and to view deep
anger at the cases or pattern as somewhat eccentric.

Some Implications
The basic problem does not appear to be ill will, professional
inadequacy in the sense of real inability to think or to analyze, and
any systematic desire (much less plot) to exploit. Three different
factors pertain: a) inadequate information combined with a sloppiness
aid agencies certainly would and do condemn in their clients or at best condone as evidence of their 'objective inability' to analyze or implement without firm external guidance and coordination; b) a belief in Platonic Guardianship by external actors 'free' from local prejudices, pressures and obligations and able to see what states, economies and people 'objectively' need and want better than they do themselves; c) total non-accountability (in any institutional sense and usually, apparently, in any sense of normative obligation as well) to the host state or people and relatively formal and routine own institutional accountability which does not focus on their impact on recipients' human condition (nor, indeed, of performance by and welfare of recipients resulting from their actions or inactions).

Of these arguably the third is the basic problem. Domestic non-accountability ensures freedom of maneouvre for Platonic Guardianship tendencies and blocks effective imposition of sanctions (or appropriate complementary domestic inputs to offset) lack of contextual and historic knowledge or failure to apply normal professional standards of competence, relevance and diligence. Unfortunately, the accountability problem is inherent in large institutional structures in general and even more so in ones financed and staffed from outside the country in which they operate.

Some Practical Issues in Accountability

Accountability nationally is fragmented, uneven and usually incomplete and feeble in SSA. Formal structural examination does not help understand many cases because the actual processes and accountabilities vary widely eg. the single Party states in Tanzania and Kenya afford very different degrees of power to enforce accountability to peasants absolutely and relative to other groups. Similarly ombudspersons, where effective of all, usually tend not to provide access to the poor who would otherwise have none but improved access for diligent middle class members who often could have used political or formal legal alternatives.

Further, severe processual problems arise especially among levels. Eg. a structure in which a political structure is relatively open and accountable from the base up and is explicitly superior to the
governmental structures officially on the face of it should guarantee accountability. But three problems arise:

1. if each Party level can call each government level to account incoherence and wide divergences in praxis are likely but otherwise the base up then across and top down way of holding accountable is very cumbersome in respect to base community level;

2. contextual preferences and accountability and national coherence are hard to reconcile and it is not safe to assume either that the latter is trivial or that the closer to the base political or governmental institutions/personnel are the greater their concern with the human condition or feeling of responsibility to poor people (if anything the reverse seems to be the case on average though with a very wide scatter of particular cases);

3. acceptance of accountability and perception of responsibility does not lead automatically to meaningful acceptance of base level participation in operational policy articulation, formulation and decision taking still less to a guarantee that policies will in fact serve their intended beneficiaries well, cost efficiently or even at all.

The first two problems raise special problems if one seeks to ensure external agency accountability at base level. The third suggests that accountability many not, by itself, greatly increase efficiency.

Further, any external agency genuinely interested in accountability to its recipients/clients and especially to poor people and base level communities is certain to argue:

a. some states favour such accountability but do not have the capacity to make it meaningful and/or likely to improve programme performance;

b. others simply do not accept accountability to poor people or to base level communities themselves and are hardly likely to wish external agencies to do so;
c. even states with technical capacity and a commitment to decentralised accountability themselves may take a dim view of the type of external agency/local community/interest group political relationship genuine accountability implies.

These problems are real and cannot be ignored (especially not if or when the principle of accountability is accepted). Nor can it be safely overlooked that they provide a remarkably good alibi to agencies allergic to the concept, let alone the generalised practice, of accountability to clients. On the other hand – as the list of cases may suggest – the costs of non-accountability are high enough that even partial accountability, to governments at central level (perhaps with central interest group, or independent assessor involvement) in some countries would be a worthwhile achievement in human condition terms.

Especially for External Agencies

External agencies have very genuine problems in respect to accepting and operating client accountability. They already have accountability structures to their governing councils and/or parent ministries. These are usually along standard inter-governmental organisation or national institutional lines. They do not (even when the council does include South governments) result in real accountability to any particular client on any specific issue even at national level. At best there is an openness to listen to client critiques and to try (on at best a voluntary normative responsibility basis) to respond to them. More rarely there is also involvement of clients in programme design and results monitoring.

It is much easier to criticise this pattern than to suggest alternatives. Multiple lines of accountability leading to very different institutions and groups will lead to conflicts and conflicting demands. How these can be minimised, guidelines for weighting different obligations devised and a workable conflict resolution procedure created is by no means self evident even in principle let alone in the context of an external agency in any one host setting and least of all across any away array of widely
divergent host settings. Yet to make the attempt for some agencies in some host contexts is essential if operational progress is to be made.

Platonic Guardianship Revisited: The Bank as Ombudsman

One strand in the accountability debate goes in the opposite direction. Briefly put it contends:

1. most governments are not accountable to poor people or marginal social groups;

2. the bottom line is usually that their dominant decision takers (ruling sub-class coalitions) have no interest in, desire to be or feeling of obligation to be accountable to them;

3. Even if they would in principle accept accountability they lack both technical capacity and length of time horizon to put accountability into practice efficiently and will be unable to defend it against powerful interest groups;

4. Therefore on selected issues (eg. indigenous minorities, environmental and ecological protection, birth rates) selected international agencies (eg. the World Bank) should be forced to be praxies for the poor and excluded and for the interests of future generations of their clients.

This is the Platonic Guardianship argument in a virtually undiluted form. (The dilution, if any, is that the proponents apparently wish to stand as intellectual Platonic Guardians to the Bank - in itself a somewhat implausible goal). Rarely, if ever, is serious direct accountability to the "beneficiaries" (especially, but not only, the future generations!) envisaged much less spelled out in operational terms. It is a positive encouragement if international/external agencies only too evident habit of seeking to bypass or control host channels. Ironically many of the advocates of this approach in selected cases are in general among its most vehement and cogently argued opponents.

A compromise is, perhaps, possible. Codes of conduct - including but not limited to accountability - could be drawn up by non-governmental
international conferences including members of probable client (victim) groups as well as of support groups and technical experts. These could be adopted by the relevant specialised international agencies and forcefully recommended to host governments and external agencies. The latter, via their own accountability channels, could be required to adhere to the codes themselves and to decline to support host project or programme proposals flagrantly offending against them.

Three problems arise with this approach perhaps best exemplified by the WHO code in respect to human milk substitutes;

a. they are very effort and time consuming to achieve;

b. acceptance (and even more implementation) is very uneven; and

c. partly as a result of "b" sanctions for non-compliance are neither certain nor likely to be severe.

However - including in the case cited - there are some gains. One is that the codes do provide a focus, a legitimation and a mobilising force for domestic struggles for accountability. Another is that they may strengthen ad hoc voluntary accountability. A third is that in some cases national accountability structures (eg of certain bilateral and non-governmental development agencies) might take them on board with some degree of seriousness.

These caveats should not be misread as arguing that concerned individuals and agencies should do nothing to promote accountability until (unless) requested to do so by host governments. Several approaches are valid: advocacy; reaching out to and acting as support groups for poor and vulnerable (or excluded and oppressed) groups of people; promoting and challenging internationally "accepted" standards especially those "accepted" by the state or state group itself (especially in this case the African convention on the rights and duties of states, individuals and peoples which can not incidentally be read as requiring accountability and whose mutual obligation and social groups' rights strands are by no means incompatible with, eg. social contract and indigenous minority rights principles and discourse).
In doing so the risks of becoming a Platonic Guardian and of thwarting the process of building internal accountability and/or of misrepresenting those for which one is speaking need to be kept in mind. They are least for individuals speaking for themselves who have only the power (more accurately influence) of knowledge and persuasion. If they cannot convince significant domestic 'constituencies' they will be disregarded. NGO's (especially ones with accountability to principled and/or partly client constituencies), small international agencies and bilateral development cooperation agencies of states with no pretensions to global reach let alone major geo-political power are other moderately 'safe' agents. They are unlikely to have the resource provision/prevention power to coerce and while they may to a degree 'buy' acceptance or testing of their principles this will be rare without there being some significant client constituency for them in the first place. Further, they normally have considerable leeway in selecting either whom they will work with or the balance of support for/nature of cooperation with different clients. Examples might include the United Methodist Church, Oxfam, The World Council of Churches, UNICEF, the ILO, national trade union federations, SIDA and CIDA, NORAD, FINNIDA.

The least 'safe' (and probably least credible) advocates and most dangerous enforcers are the political, economic, technical expertise, resource transfer big battalions. The most clear cut examples are USAID and its USSR counterpart, the IMF and the World Bank. This is largely an objective reality beyond these institutions control whatever their desires. Their own accountability structures and the interests of their dominant holders to account ensure that.

And So To Law?

The foregoing argument has not touched explicitly on the role of law or of lawyers. This is deliberate. Human rights and the human condition are not in their substance legal principles or concepts. The relevant issue is how law and lawyers can make a positive contribution to their gaining intellectual acceptance, mobilising support, formal adoption, institutionalisation, operation and enforcement. These are not trivial points nor can the concept of the
lawyer as translator without a professional and (secondary) substantive role be sustained. There is an equally important role for lawyers in contexts in which these principles are not accepted in using legal tactics, procedures and fragments of law to limit abuses, win skirmishes and cast the dominant normative/power/juridical structure into disrepute. South Africa is an extreme example of such a context. However, that set of roles lies outside the direct scope of this paper.

At the national level three clusters of issues or topics appear to be central:

a.) civil society and its room to organise and to act; b.) accountability and c.) access to channels designed to protect empowerment.

Civil society is used here as a shorthand for freedom of self organisation, self expression and action initiatives especially but not only at base level. It need not mean pluralism in the North American sense and is no more inconsistent (or at any rate antagonistically contradictory) with decentralised, democratic single mass (or just conceivably cadre) party systems than with bourgeois democratic structures.

The necessity of room for manoeuvre for civil society rests on two legs:

1. people in base communities or action groups have knowledge of their own needs and potentials no one else can;

2. unless poor people and marginalised groups are able to participate - in production, in mobilisation, in decision-taking and in calling decision-takers (including their own leadership) to account there will be no objective and especially not institutional power base to protect their interests from counter-attacks by other interest groups who are organised (especially from bureaucrats, a sub-class ubiquitously part of governing coalitions whose interests in orderliness and a quiet life posit cooperation with civil society if and only if it is well organised, significant to the economy and able to inform the political process).

The legal implications apply both to national legal and administrative regulation frames and to the constitutions and procedures of the civil
society organisations. The latter are as much subject to the general considerations applying to constitutional law as are national constitutions and frame setting laws. Administrative regulations/procedures (whether in the form of administrative law nor not) are equally important because they can (and often do) give life or the kiss of death to statute law and political requirements to administrators. Laws and procedures cannot guarantee civil society life - they can protect or constrict, facilitate or prevent its emergence and development.

Accountability needs to be both prompt and effective and direct and decentralised. Dedicated political leaders who regularly go out to hear and listen to people's voices can achieve all four but intermittently and on a fragmentary basis. Formal procedures on the other hand often have so many steps and safeguards as to be non-operational at best and at worst to be readily hijackable by those they are meant to hold accountable by them (e.g. British "police complaints" procedures and processes).

Again serious principle, practicability and practice legal issues arise at all levels from central government (and "leading role" single party) to civil society base groups (whose leaders and managers often show a dislike for accountability and a tendency to abuse power no less than that of their more prominent analogues at larger unit levels). There is a need for checks and balances - a system with no real safeguards or judicial (in the broad sense) for evaluating and resolving disputed charges is all too prone to sanctioning by mistake or, worse, to being used to purge precisely those who are committed to unpopular dimensions of improving the human condition and enhancing or protecting human rights.

Para legal approaches - e.g. ombudspeople and quasi-judical bunals (bi, tri or multi) also require study. In general they do not seem to add much to speed, effectiveness or openness except in the contexts of a broadly educated public, a strong civil society and pre-existing norms favourable to participation and accountability (all of which exist in their Scandinavian heartlands and offset equally entrenched tendencies to bureaucratic rigidities and to judicial processes heavily biased against defendants.

Access is a necessary focus if work relating to the other two is to prove lastingly and growingly operationally successful. The first requirement for
access is a public and in particular base level civil society bodies which know what their legal, paralegal, processual and procedural rights are and how to exercise them. The second is a belief that seeking to exercise them will be substantively successful often enough, long enough to make it worth the bother and that failed good faith efforts (let alone blocked valid ones) will not bring savage reprisals - the ultimate flaw in many "police complaints" systems. The third is that procedures and processes do not have time and resource costs so high as to put well nigh unscalable hurdles in the way of all but the already powerful or the most doggedly committed. A related fourth requirement is availability of relevant legal expertise (whether from lawyers or para legal personnel and whether through traditional professional channels, standard legal aid, support groups or training of civil society group personnel at least to selective para legal level).

To posit these clusters is to identify the need for lawyers to rethink their relationship to human rights. The hired professional lawyer pursuing high profile civil rights cases to the highest appeal courts has a role - vide India. But he (or she) is either the visible apex of an iceberg, the mobilising example to pave the way for broader and deeper action or an isolated and ultimately ineffective artefact playing King Canute. The need for a judicial process (whether in the formal mainline court system or otherwise) as a last resort to achieve redress and to impose sanctions when all else fails is irrefutable but last resorts should rarely be needed and usually serve excessively ill as standard procedures. Similarly the legal requirements for their use are very different from those of base civil society groups or day to day political and administrative accountability processes.

Law and International Accountability

At the international level the challenges are even more severe. Enforcement is usually seen as the main stumbling block but since one rarely reaches the position of having broadly agreed norms to enforce may in fact better be viewed as a last hurdle tackleable only after prior vaults forward have been attained.
The areas for attention include:

a. participatory, accountable methods of formulating standards/codes of conduct for states and state entities and for international agencies and ngos in relation to specific human condition/human rights issues;

b. defining in a coherent, potentially practicable way the duties of external bodies to hosts in respect to host state standards, international standards, host civil society. (Wholesale assertions of extra-territorial powers for national legislation are open to severe criticism. Even when the immediate object and impact are benificent they appear to "do the right thing for the wrong reason" and by the wrong procedure.);

c. achieving mobilisation of civil society and of "converted" governments, agencies and organisations to secure formal adoption of the results of "a" and "b" processes by forums and in ways which will ensure them normative legitimacy, some potential for national and institutional self enforcement and enough publicity to ensure potential users do know of their existence and how to ascertain ways of appealing to them. (The baby milk substitute code does meet these tests as does the quite different Law of the Sea Convention);

d. divising and achieving methods for resolving disputes and enforcing compliance/accountability which are widely enough accepted, prompt enough, adequately accessible and adequately predictable as to results as to be meaningful. (The ICJ process does not meet these tests, at least not beyond test cases in which its decision will have persuasive power to ensure numerous subsequent acts of compliance without further references).

As discussed above the inherent problems of parallel multiple accountability intra organisational, home state, home civil society, intra-governmental, host governmental and host civil society are by no means trivial. However, the issues of conflict resolution, checks and balances, due process and conciliation/equity are ones with which lawyers are familiar and on which they do (or should) have claims to special professional expertise. They are not inherently insoluble if the defined objectives advances from the status quo
and acceptable, workable compromises (as opposed to Armageddon or the New Jerusalem now - both topics on which lawyers have little applied expertise and a rather poor drafting record).

Reflection and Prologue

The struggle for human rights/the human condition is part of the struggle for justice in history. Therefore its victories will always be partial, conditional, contextual and at risk. That does not make them less worth seeking and winning because it is not possible to operate outside or beyond history and the goals of most poor or vulnerable people and their organisations centre on finite, accessible goals, not martyrdom in the name of perfection. The latter like the showpiece test case taken to the apex of the judicial system (to win compliance, force legal reform or discredit the system) has its place but not when willed on the martyr by outsiders nor as a standard operating procedure.

But much the same can be said of the law (as an embodiment of substantive norms and of procedural due process), of particular laws (as means to secure certain objectives - ideally with minimal use of the courts), of judicial cases (civil, administrative or criminal and in mainline courts or complementary analogues) and of the legal profession.

This paper has focused on the human condition in the context of the present human crises in Africa. Unless economic rehabilitation and development as usually defined today are broadened to make the human condition - and especially the human condition of poor people - central and integral, African economic recovery will be stunted and African economic development unsustainable. The challenge of turning around the post-1979 (or earlier for some countries) decline is a heavy one. But it must be accepted, and accepted in a way which makes human rights central and perceives participation and
accountability central to their attainment and defence. A proverb from the Mara Region of Tanzania cited by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere in his opening address to the South Commission is appropriate:

Rabbit, where are you going?
I am going to kill the Elephant!
Can you do it?
Well, I'll try and try again!
ANNEX A

Table 1  Selected Quality of Life Indicators: 1960 - mid-1980s

Table 2  Selected Quality of Life Indicators - Southern Africa 1984 and Somalia

Table 3  Rates of Environmental Degradation

Figure 1  Grain production per capita in 24 African countries affected by drought, 1970-1984

Figure 2  Index of food production per capita, 1961-1965 - 1983

Figure 3  Malnutrition among children in Botswana and Ghana 1980-84
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<th>Table 1: Selected Quality of Life Indicators: 1960 - mid-1980s (a)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Average Life Expectancy at Birth</td>
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<td>2. Infant Mortality Rate</td>
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<td>3. Child Death Rate</td>
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<td>4. Access to Health Facility (b)</td>
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<td>5. Public Health Facility Visits Per Person Per Year</td>
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<td>6. Health Budget as % of GDP</td>
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<td>7. Access to Pure Water (c)</td>
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<td>8. Access to Excreta Disposal (d)</td>
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<td>9. Average Calorie Availability as a % of requirements</td>
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<td>10. Child Malnutrition (Moderate/Severe)</td>
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<td>11. Primary Education Enrolment Ratio (e)</td>
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<td>12. Adult Literacy</td>
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<td>13. Education Budget as % of GDP</td>
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(f) As of 1982
Principal Sources


Notes


b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre radius. May overstate for urban population when facilities available are small.

c) 1970 and late 1970s urban figures may be overstated by failing to relate number of water points to population.

d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural areas overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to supposed user population.

e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted figures. Because of the primary/middle school division Ghana has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.

f) Estimate made by author based on fragmentary data.
## TABLE 2

### SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS - SOUTHERN AFRICA 1984 AND SOMALIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Swaziland</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (millions)</strong></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Under-5 mortality</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (per 1,000 births)</td>
<td>325-375</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>325-375</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>174-210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infant mortality (0-1)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (per 1,000 births)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>146-180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infant and child malnutrition (%)</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average calorie intake relative to requirements (%)</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>(94)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>(108)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>(105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to health services (%)</strong></td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to safe water (%)</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary enrolment (%) (1982)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>76&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>84&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>87&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Adult (over 15) literacy (%) (1982)</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>85&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>One-year-olds fully vaccinated (%)</strong></td>
<td>TB</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>95&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(84)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DTB</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>79&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Polio</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>60&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Measles</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>51&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life Expectancy at birth (%)</strong></td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GNP per capita</strong></td>
<td>490</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>(230)</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>(350)</td>
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</table>

( ) = 1980 (or nearby year). Somalia re-estimated to include unrecorded remittances.

<sup>a</sup> Re-estimated on fragmentary data taking into account impact of war. Standard projections showing 245 under-5 mortality for Angola and 255 for Mozambique assume continuation not reversal of rapid 1975-1980 immediate post-independence period gains.

<sup>b</sup> 1983

<sup>c</sup> Net ratios except for Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

<sup>d</sup> Includes estimates from various unpublished UNICEF studies at various dates 1982 through 1986.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Sand dune encroachment</th>
<th>Deterioration in rangelands</th>
<th>Forest depletion</th>
<th>Deterioration of irrigation</th>
<th>Rainfed agricultural problems</th>
<th>General assessment</th>
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<td>o</td>
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<td>o</td>
<td>#</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY: o = Stable, * = Some increase, ** = Significant increase, NA = Not applicable
Figure 1. Grain production per capita in 24 African countries affected by drought, 1970-1984.

Figure 2 Index of food production per capita, 1961-1965—1983

(1961-1965 average = 100)

MALNUTRITION AMONG CHILDREN IN BOTSWANA AND GHANA 1980-84

**Botswana**

Percentage aged 1-4 years below 80 per cent of the Harvard standard weight for age.

**Ghana**

Percentage aged 7-42 months below 80 per cent of the Harvard standard weight for age.

Sources:
- Background Papers for Workshop on Social and Nutritional Surveillance in Eastern and Southern Africa
Annex B

Excerpts from The Khartoum Declaration

This declaration was adopted by the UN system sponsored, UN Economic Commission for Africa organised and led International Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery and Development in March 1988. It was subsequently endorsed by the conference of African ministers responsible for "human resources" and the 30th Anniversary ECA Council of Ministers meeting held in Niamey in April 1988.

The Khartoum Declaration

PREAMBLE

2... The Conference made a deep and detailed analysis of the African situation, particularly the current economic crisis and all its ramifications on the people of Africa. The Conference is unanimous in its conviction that the crisis that confronts the African continent is one that affects the total human condition of the continent and its people, men and women alike. It is a crisis that challenges the very survival of the African people. It is a crisis of Africa's environment as the desert rapidly overcomes the fertility of the land and the coastlines also recede. It is a crisis of the continent's natural resources exploited more for the benefit of external interests than to meet Africa's dire needs. It is a crisis of the rich cultures of the African people and the cohesion of families broken up by the desperate circumstances of the African reality. It is a crisis that threatens to overwhelm Africa and her people and, in extremis, to reduce them to the helpless gaze depicted in the starving faces of Africa's children in the international media. But it is a crisis that can and must be overcome through the concerted and determined action of the African people and their societies and States, as they develop a clearer understanding of the implications of the current predicament and fashion a decisive and coherent plan of action, with the assistance and understanding of the international community.

3. We are encouraged in this view by the fact that although Africa has been sorely squeezed by the pressures of recent years and millions of Africans have
suffered severely, no objective observer can fail to be impressed by the vitality, and human creativity which strive and flourish in spite of everything. The large cutbacks and constraints of government and urban production have stimulated communities to devise their own solutions to the problem of meeting their own basic human needs. Self-help groups abound in every country; the extended family, though strained, has often provided the means of survival of many of its members; examples of community action can be found in almost every village. It is important to recognize the enormous potential of the human energy and creativity and find ways to harness it rather than ignore it in the total process of national recovery and development. For these and other reasons we repeat that Africa's crisis, though dire, CAN AND MUST BE OVERCOME.

4. As participants in this event, the overwhelming majority of whom come from the African continent, we are moved to place on record our collective voice on the issues we discussed and we accordingly make this KHARTOUM DECLARATION.

A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN CONDITION IN AFRICA

5. Since the human being is the centre of all development, the human condition is the only final measure of development. Improving that condition is essential for the poor and vulnerable human beings who comprise the majority of our peoples in Africa. Africa’s men and women are the main factors and the ends for whom and by whom any programme and implementation of development must be justified.

6. Regretably, over the past decade the human condition of most Africans has deteriorated calamitously. Real incomes of almost all households and families declined sharply. Malnutrition has risen massively, food production has fallen relative to population, the quality and quantity of health and education services have deteriorated. Famine and war have made tens of millions of human beings refugees and displaced persons. In many cases, the slow decline of infant mortality and of death from preventable, epidemic diseases has been reversed. Meanwhile the unemployment and underemployment situation has worsened markedly.
7. Acts of destabilization and aggression, being perpetrated against the countries of Southern Africa by the South Africa regime, have also imposed massive human and economic costs, greatly in excess of military budgets or battle casualties. Of the approximately one million human beings dead in Southern Africa as a result of South African aggression over 1980-86 about one hundred thousand were war-dead, narrowly defined. Of the approximately thirty billion dollars in lost production, most relates to the creation of chaos and the loss of peasants' crops and national production.

8. Production and other economic aspects of development - especially distribution - are of crucial importance. Production by the poor is vital if they are to become more able to meet at least their basic needs. But it is just as important who produces what. Production of food, of basic consumer goods, of agricultural inputs and construction materials, of basic services such as health, education, and pure water, as well as of exports are central to improving the human condition. Unsustainable imbalances do matter.

9. Nutrition imbalances are as crucial as trade imbalances. High infant mortality requires just as immediate and as serious an attention as high rates of inflation or huge budget deficits. Ultimately the trade, inflation and budget imbalances are serious obstacles to development because they are barriers to enabling the poor to produce more; to the vulnerable to surviving and rehabilitating themselves; and to the state and the society achieving universal access to basic services.

10. Therefore, a basic test for all stabilization, adjustment and development programmes is whether they will improve the human condition from their inception or, on the contrary, worsen it. Social services and human resources development programmes have high short-, medium- and long-term payoffs on economic as well as on broader development criteria.

11. They are relevant to the reversal of unsustainable imbalances since survival and rehabilitation assistance to the most vulnerable groups - international refugees and displaced persons, disabled persons, youth, women and children - is an important element in reversing production losses. Similarly, the engagement of Africa's most basic resource - its approximately 250 million economically active people - in production, is essential to restoring growth as well as development.
12. The human-centred strategy to the implementing of the Lagos Plan of Action, APPER and UN-PAERD is vital for reaching out to the aspirations and needs of Africa's people and especially their poor and vulnerable majorities. It is deliverable through the appropriate mobilization, allocation and use of resources. To bring this about it will be essential to restore the strained and torn fabrics of our societies, make popular participation in decision-making processes effective, ensure the preservation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and eliminate policies that discriminate against minorities and vulnerable groups.

13. Progress in advancing the human condition in Africa depends on the structure, pattern and political context of socio-economic development. The problems and weaknesses in these areas must therefore be recognized and attempts must be made to tackle them in order to achieve the objectives of social and human development. This is also necessary because the economic crisis which Africa faced from the late 1970s found fertile ground in the structural and political weaknesses that bred the germs that hastened the intolerable deterioration in the human condition.

14. A fundamental problem is the fast rate of population growth and the uneven and uneconomic distribution of the population in the different age groups. The youthful population makes high demands on educational, medical and other social services while the large number of college graduates and school leavers that enter the labour market each year creates an imbalance between labour supply and demand.

15. A further structural factor is the urban bias and socially unequal distribution of critical factors and resources for human development such as employment, income, food and nutrition and health and education. As is well known, this distribution is biased against the majority of the population living mainly in the rural areas and in favour of the politically vocal minority in the urban enclaves. Economic issues have overshadowed social concerns and have prevented African countries from according the needed centrality to the human dimension and the human factor.

16. Finally, the political context for promoting healthy human development has been marred, for more than two decades, by instability, war, intolerance,
restrictions on the freedom and human rights of individuals and groups as well as overcentralization of power with attendant restrictions on popular participation in decision-making. In such a context, the motivation of many Africans to achieve their best in productivity and the enhancement of their own and society's well-being has been severely constrained. In times of economic crisis, the politically stronger social groups and individuals survive while the weaker ones go under in increasing deprivation, social dislocation, hunger, ill-health or death.

B. THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES

17. From the causes mentioned so far flow the consequences of wretched misery, marginalization and — for millions — very literally premature death. The severity of the African crisis is such that country after country has been putting in place structural adjustment programmes in their effort to halt their economic degradation and achieve a turn-around. Unfortunately, far too many of these programmes — whether nationally conceived or in collaboration with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the donor community — are rending the fabric of the African society. Rather than improve the human condition, some Structural Adjustment Programmes have aggravated it because they are incomplete, mechanistic and of too short a time perspective.

18. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are incomplete because they are often implemented as if fiscal, trade and price balances are ends in themselves and are virtually complete sets of means to production increases. Human condition imbalances as related to employment, incomes, nutrition, health and education do not receive equal priority in attention to macro-economic imbalances. Unless and until they make the elimination of these human condition imbalances central targets, stabilization and adjustment programmes cannot provide Africa's growth and development dynamic.

19. They are too mechanistic in being inadequately grounded in, or sensitive to specific national economic, human and cultural realities. This is aggravated by an incomplete articulation which allows the gaps between macro models and contextual realities to remain largely unobserved. Nor can we evaluate how rapidly production can be expanded; where, by whom and of what. Thus their human condition impact remains inadequately projected.
instead of being at the centre of target-setting, policy formulation and programme or project choice.

20. They are in too short a time perspective. Africa cannot wait for the attainment of external equilibrium and fiscal balance before seeking to improve the human condition, nor can long-term human investment to strengthen the institutional, scientific, technical and productive capacity operating in environmental balance be postponed. That is essential to attaining the more stable and less vulnerable economic position that we aspire to for the African continent.

21. Further, we must place squarely on record that the external context confronting Africa continues to deteriorate. The terms of trade losses of 1986 vastly exceeded net resource transfers to Africa. APPER is not receiving either the new concessional transfer support or the debt burden relief it projects as essential, or which UN-PAERD committed the international community to providing. This is not simply an African view - the World Bank has repeatedly said the same thing as has the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Group on Financial Flow for Africa, a majority of whom are practising bankers.

22. We welcome the increased concern for the human dimension in stabilisation and adjustment programmes, broadly expressed within the international community. But this is far from being enough. The gap between the expression of concern and actual programme implementation remains wide. Human dimension elements are additions, often long after programme initiation, rather than integral parts of their overall design. Those poor and vulnerable groups to be served are often narrowed down to those who are the victims of the stabilization programme, rather than addressing the human condition of all the absolutely poor and vulnerable people.

23. In the light of all the foregoing, we do not hesitate to reiterate the central position that the human dimension should be accorded in the stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, for we are convinced beyond doubt that no nation can be great and prosperous if the majority of its people are poor, malnourished, illiterate, miserable and perpetually vulnerable.
24. Overall, we identify five distinct areas on which greater awareness and action must be focused by the African governments, the international financial institutions and the international community at large. Firstly, all structural adjustment programmes in Africa must be designed, implemented and monitored as part of the long-term framework of Africa's development. These programmes must, therefore, be incontrovertibly compatible with the objectives and aspirations of the African people as outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. Secondly, the human dimension must be the fulcrum of the adjustment programmes. Thirdly, the structural adjustment policies must incorporate the relevant adjustments of the social sector. Fourthly, considerations must be made of the consequences of macro-policies on the poor and vulnerable not only so as to design temporary and independent compensatory additional programmes but to make the alleviation of absolute and relative poverty and the elimination of gender biases integral parts and factors of the adjustment programmes. Lastly, the entire process of monitoring the stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes must incorporate the social aspects and criteria.

25. We regard it as the primary responsibility of African Governments to develop a richer articulation of the total macro-framework within which to reorientate these programmes.

26. Structural adjustment programmes must be made to complement the efforts of African Governments to attain their long-term development objectives. Consequently, they should, through their effects on the economy and the African social fabric, contribute to the preservation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and help to eliminate policies that discriminate against minority and vulnerable groups. Above all, the application of structural adjustment measures should restore, not corrode the dignity of the African as a human being.
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