HARGEISA and BENADIR
Social Capital, Political Culture and
Rehabilitation In Somalia and Somaliland
(An Annotated Outline)

Reginald Herbold Green

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I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: SOMALI NATION versus SOMALI POLITIES

A. Somali Nation

1. Cultural

2. Linguistic

3. Religious/Ethical (Islamic)


5. Pastoral plus Merchant Lifestyles

6. Kinship/Affinity Based

7. Water/Grazing Right Focused (more than land per se)

8. Variations in each e.g. secondary language, centrality of long distance trade

9. Encompasses

i. Core Somali Home Territories (Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Region V - Ethiopia, Northwest Frontier District - Kenya

ii. Old Diaspora - East Africa
iii. Old Oversea Contract Work - "Over the Water" (Arabian Peninsula and Maritime)

iv. New Diaspora/Contract Work ("Over the Water", Europe, North America)

10. Networks/social capital links of varying degrees intensity - strongest lineage or blood (dir) group, weakest Somalis of other clans (other than spousal relations or fellow/merchants. Broader networks, usually shallow, brittle, subject to restructuring.

B. Somali Politics/Politics

1. Last broad confederation the one supporting 1500's advance to Nazaret (against Oromo, Amhara)

2. Sub-clan (or sub-sub clan) alliance based coalitions - pragmatic, limited purpose, unstable, usually brief

3. Highlands (Djijiga, Boramo, Hargeisa) - Red Sea (Zaileh, Berbera) Long Distance Trade/Pastoral Confederal States of NW (Somaliland/Region 5) - up to 9 sub clans, shifting, but relatively quickly reforming after clashes on benefit division

4. Intermediate position Northeast (especially Bari Sultanate)

5. Pre colonial alliances - politics focused on law, order, peaceful pursuit pastoralism and commerce (including across polities except during actual battles).

C. Political Cultures

1. Pastoral/Agro Pastoral Affinity Group based

2. Broadly Sharia based Law (jihad not relevant among Somali groups as mutual commitment to Islam not challenged)

3. Highlands/Red Sea corridor stabler, more trade focused (thus continuing zones of peace and stability with less territorial disputes, looting)

4. Riverain Somalia slave plantation focused (increasingly from - say - 1700) leading to 10% 'Swahili' ('Bantu' in Somali parlance) minority
5. Urban areas multi sub-clan, not fitting well with historic rural/pastoral politics - often quasi external suzerainty (Swahili city states, Omaali/Zanzibari), local non-political merchants' commissions, rural elders' council intervention to halt major disputes but Zaileh, Berbera, Bari ports apparently more linked to pastoral polity structures and had no post 1200 pre colonial external suzerainty unlike Kismayo, Benadir, Merca, Brava

6. Conflicts pragmatic/limited in goals, duration - Usually elders' council appointed and supplied (troops, food) to "warlord" who was in command of war but settlement in hands of "peacelords" elders using spousal links (marriages cross lineage to cross clan) in exploratory stages.

D. Social Capital/Networks

1. Primarily affinity based - strongest lineage/dir, less depth and density in broader network up to clan and cross clan

2. Spousal links (pattern of marriages related to relative 'friendship', solidarity, often to seal end of conflict or alliance agreements)

3. Merchant relationships (cross sub clan especially for long distance traders who apparently emerged earlier and more strongly among Issak of Somaliland/Region V and Mujerteen of Bari)

4. Islam (mosques, Koranic schools, Sharia law - largely intra sub or sub-sub clan because of residential patterns but also broader especially in urban areas). Rarely directly political (al Itihaad is not traditional, while Mosque court patterns are gap filling - 'Secular' Islamic role largely absent in Somaliland with established national/territorial police and court institutions perceived as functioning, legitimate.

E. Colonial Impacts

1. Italian direct rule/settler orientation eroded/suppressed historic political culture in South, less so in (economically uninteresting) Bari-Galcayo-Garowe (present Puntland)
2. British indirect rule/Aden meat and fuel supply/other power (France, Italy, Ethiopia) blocking goals in Somaliland, Haud (occupied until 1947) if anything reinforced political culture and broadened economic opportunity

3. Urban Somaliland on (fascist) Italian pattern, increased divide from Somali rural patterns

4. Colonial Berbera, Hargeisa functional local governance (appointed/merchant influenced) continued previous semi-linked pattern

5. Imperial (including Ras Mengistu) Ethiopian rule in Ogaden more like Italian than British

6. Greater Territorial loyalty/expectation some services (law order, courts, water, veterinary education, health) in return for taxes in Somaliland and Haud than elsewhere

7. Reinforced Highlands - Red Sea economic links in Somaliland and Haud and to a degree rural to Mogadishu (and Kismayo) links to South with no buildup of nearly non-existent interaction Northwest and Centre-South even after URS/Ethiopia border closure.

F. Rise and Fall of United Republic of Somalia

1. Claimed Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Region V, NWFD (Five Star Flag of Irredentism)

2. Occupied Somaliland by force when 3 to 1 "No" vote in Union Referendum (URS troops thrown out again in 1988-91 Liberation War)

3. Waged wars of varying intensity in effort to add NWFD, Region V

4. Unstable melange of sub clan based 'parties' 1960-69 followed by centralised, increasingly oppressive, authoritarian military rule 1969-1990 which manipulated and warped rather than relating to historic affinity, political, social capital structures

5. Brief emergence basic service (water, veterinary, education - less so health) provision 1970-75, decay to 1985, total collapse to 1990 under Barre dictatorship
6. No creation of national/territorial economy. Northwestern suppressed with border closure, khat uprooting, public spending neglect; Southern increasingly focused on Mogadishu. Rise "over the water" work and remittances offset static - or worse - post 1972 domestic output levels.

7. Barre collapse in South with no agreed successor, abandonment of Gallcayo-Garowe-Barri, thrown out of Somaliland by SNM (Somali National Movement) civilian ruled/military operated liberation movement

II.

HARGEISA: Metropole of Somaliland

A. Baselines

1. 300,000 to 400,000 (from 25,000 1960 and perhaps 200,000 1985)

2. Rebuilt (rebuilding) from 1988-89 near total destruction by Barre army of suppression

3. Multi affinity group (up to 13 sub clans and 9 - very small - minority group) population

4. Political, transport, economic (commercial) pole of Somaliland (population 2,000,000 plus)

B. National Setting

1. Territorial/National Political System broadly accepted as legitimate. National Council elected House of Elders (guurti), House of Assembly, President (with appointed Cabinet), Civil Service (with Commission), (independent) Judiciary, national (civilian) police, national army (virtually no sub clan and no faction militias) - Draft Constitution under final dialogue, revision (President-Assembly-Guurti) with intent to have multi, non affinity (cross affinity) group parties and 2002 general election House of Assembly and President

3. Weak but actual national tax collection and service (law, order, security, health, water, veterinary, some education) provision (6,000 non uniformed public servants including, local government, 5,000 police, 500-1,000 prisons service) with health above, water/veterinary at mid 1980's levels. Education 15,000 state, 36,000 private (15% gross enrolment ratio) versus probably 20,000 effective enrolment (7%) 1985

4. Relatively buoyant economy (livestock, crops, communications, money transfer, trade) at or above early 1980's peak (say $600 million) plus $500 million remittances (perhaps double late 1980's peak)

5. Political culture of permanent confederation of sub-clans plus - increasingly - a territorial state beyond sum of parts

6. Substantial business, Islamic, civil society organisation (especially women's groups, social service groups, veterans organisation, mosque and other Islamic groups).

C. Municipal Governance

1. Appointed (by President) Mayor - substantially autonomous once named (1994-97 occupant ran - unsuccessfully - for President, now businessperson)

2. *De facto* council picked on neighbourhood, sub clan, merchant, Islamic representation basis (not women) - apparently influential under past and present mayors

3. Substantial ($2 to 3 million?) revenues from market fees, water charges, trade ('sales') taxes

4. 1,000 odd Municipal Public Servants ($25-50 per month main range) predominately water, sanitation/cleansing, market management, civil engineering

5. Not insubstantial urban planning, land allocation/dispute resolution, reconstruction management/mobilisation

6. Municipal governance seen as outside normal/national political parameters; a service organisation to respond to user concerns with major as mobiliser, designer, chief technocrat.
D. Economy

1. Probably ca $125 million value added (primarily commerce, related services, construction, public services) plus $100 million remittances. Later main source of construction finance.

2. Relatively buoyant - perhaps 20% absolutely poor including minority of demobilised (1991) ex-combatants; majority of households have some remittance income


E. Actors

1. Municipal officials

2. National government/police/courts

3. Guurti (not necessarily resident in Hargeisa) and local elders

4. Merchants

5. Mosques, Islamic renewal groups (anti al Ithad, some are radical in reading of Holy Koran e.g. as condemning female circumcision/genital mutilation), Koranic schools

6. Social sector/social service groups (private, Islamic, community)

7. Interest groups notably women and veterans

8. All - except guurti and local elders - are cross affinity group based. In that respect women and veterans organisations are a new factor in Somali culture/politics. Both relatively effective in getting issues heard and, up to a point for women, on agenda

9. No major outside involvement (secondary INGO, UN agency support e.g. initial UNICEF mobilised water restoration and maintains supply of, logistics for basic health services).
F. Social Capital/Networks

1. Sub-clan and mosque (trans subclan) foundation

2. Additional local governance (trans sub clan and clan) elements at council, public servant/service user levels

3. Substantial non-traditional social capital networks especially in women's and veteran's organisations

III.

BENADIR: Somalia's Metropolis of Conflict

A. Baselines

1. 2,000,000 plus (Mogadishu North 750,000; Mogadishu South 500,000 Afgoi 250,000 plus; Balidogli 250,000 plus) - pre 1990 Greater Mogadishu 1,500,000 plus

2. Very severely damaged by conflict especially 1990-1991 with limited rebuilding

3. Economic centre Somalia but crippled by instability, urban destruction, non-functionality of port and main airport (trade does cross zonal lines)

4. Multi affinity group - myriad lineage up to clan groups. Mogadishu North and South dominated by single sub clans (but with multiple factions) and Afgoi, Balidogli by sub sub clans/factions in tenuous alliances with those of Mogadishu South

5. Not effective territorial capital - nor unified metropolitan area - but powerful symbol for would be restorers of centralised state and base for two largest alliances (Mogadishu South-Afgoi-Balidogli-Middle and Lower Shibelle -Kismayo and Mogadishu North-Upper Shibelle, aka Aydeed and Mahdi Mohammed as well as most powerful merchant faction aka Osman Ato)
6. Key to either unitary, decentralised or "building block" restoration of Somalia economically and (because of size and linkages to other zones) politically, but currently greatest obstacle to political or economic renewal

B. Territorial Setting

1. No national government. Multiple alliances including Baidoa centred, Puntland (Bosasso-Garowe-Galcayo) and several smaller town/rural area factions as well as two - or three or five - based on Benadir

2. Continuing armed conflict, tensions within alliances, between and among fractions. No real trend 1991-1999m, snakes and ladders with - e.g. - Baidoa (third city) changing hands at least six times since initial ouster of Barre (eight counting US-UN occupation and withdrawal). Substantial refugee population now in 'home' areas and substantial forced migration sub-sub, sub clans and one whole klan (Rahnewain Confederation)

3. No meaningful civil governance beyond some order and law, passage of commerce in most areas at most times.

4. Limited revenue collection (import/export and internal trade) by elders, factions, mosques almost entirely devoted to militia to enforce (or to destroy) order and on occasion law. No civilian public service and only even quasi civilian police with most courts mosque organised and in conflict with factional (including merchant) militias

5. Rural economy for household provisioning largely recovered, long distance trade functioning but hampered by loss of main port (and Saudi 1998-1999 livestock ban), remittance recovery but poorer financial and trade transfer modalities than Somaliland (except for Puntland). Below 1985 levels. 'Bosasso Bubble' is an exception based on transit traffic to Benadir, 'mining' of lobster resources and (more sustainably) renewal of (19th Century and earlier) trade with Region V and Ethiopian highlands
6. Political culture fragmented, suspicious, nominally sub klan based (but blurred by factions with additional internal instabilities) producing rapidly fluctuating alliances and power balances, permanent instability, shaky and often disappearing local, overlapping quasi legitimacies

7. Reconciliation, rehabilitation fragmentary and frequently uprooted.

8. Factions (nominally sub klan "warlords" but self selected hiring own militia paid from own exactions so not responsible to elders) and militant Islamic/territorial ravanchist/at times terrorist (largely in Region V) al Itihaad are non-traditional and destabilising. Mosque courts - police expansion of historic Islamic role, sometimes stabilising, nominally trans sub-clan but usually segmented on sub-clan lines

9. Continuous external intervention (initially US-UN) based on poor understanding of Somali Nation or Somalia realities remains widespread/destabilising. Ethiopian determination to block bases for Oromo and Ogadeni armed separatists has led to raids into Somalia and backing (funds, equipment, training, backbone heavy weaponry units) for domestic opponents (notably Rahnewain and some elements of Mahdi Mohammed alliance) against al Itihaad and mosque based courts - police (based in latter cases on misinterpretation) and Aydeed. Eritrea (with no own interests in Somalia) has reacted by arms and training to Aydeed, Puntland for expedition to Kismayo, armed Oromo and Ogadeni separatists, presumably as proxy attack on Ethiopia. Combined result to increase general availability of arms, ammunition radically and to increase levels of conflict over 1998-99 (e.g. fall of Baidoa and fall of Kismayo)

C. Municipal 'Governance' (An Oxymoron)

1. No metropolitan governance. Four to seven zones. Overlapping (and sometimes conflicting) faction, mosque, merchant, elders (Afgoi, Balidogli) attempts to maintain order, trade plus Sharia law (in case of mosques and merchants) Sharia law

2. Except for elders, mosques and - on occasion - Mahdi Mohammed fraction very little legitimacy or participation
3. No professional public service nor public services. Very limited Islamic and secular social service body provision health, water, education, survival services - with substantial but dwindling extent from INGO/UN Agency/EU funds.

4. Faction and mosque revenues from trade taxes almost entirely used to pay leaders, militia, and (mosques') legal system. Revenues dwindling with lower exports and 'protection' payments by external actors. Disproportionate damage to Aydeed alliance with loss of EU banana trade. Ethiopian (only trivially in Mogadishu) and Eritrean injections in non-fungible arms, ammunition, training which disproportionately raise violence capacity, but not general financial viability, of Aydeed faction.

5. Attempt 1997-1999 to create trans faction, apolitical Mogadishu North/South administration to restore order and functioning of port, main airport. In practice limited order for trade, no public services, neither port nor airport reopened until mid 1998 and then collapsed as factions split/multiplied over 1998-99.

D. Economy

1. Perhaps $400 million value added plus perhaps $25 million military 'aid' in kind and $150 million remittances (totalling per capita one third of Hargeisa) primarily commercial including exchange of imports for food with rural areas. (Military and 'security' costs of the order of $100-125 million versus $20-25 million for all of Somaliland)

2. Stagnant or declining because of barriers (surmountable but only at a cost) to both internal and long distance trade and endemic instability (including kidnapping for ransom)

3. Could recover with relative peace in Benadir and among Aydeed, (or his sub-clan elders) Mahdi Mohammed (or successors), Osman Ato alliances and also with Baidoa based alliance even without political unification or with weak confederation, but no present trend toward such an outcome.
E. Actors

1. Faction leaders and key supporters

2. Militias (especially when unpaid)

3. Armed bandits (overlapping preceding groups)

4. Merchants (increasingly in own factions but previously, and to some degree still, financing faction leaders)

5. Elders (Afgoi, perhaps Balidogli, other areas outside Mogadishu North and South)

6. Mosques (via courts/police, welfare services)

7. Al Itihaad (but less so than in several other zones) de facto loosely linked to Aydeed at present

8. Oromo and Ogadeni armed liberation/separation militias from Ethiopia (linked to Aydeed faction and to Al Itihaad)

9. Eritrea (Ethiopia only marginally relevant to Benadir)

10. Social sector service and support groups (community and women's organisation) absolutely weaker than in Hargeisa, but - in absence of governance based service provision - relatively much more important

11. Limited INGO, UN Agency, EU (Echo) presence via Somali personnel/community social sector groups
F. Social Capital/Networks

1. Largely sub-sub clan or small community based (in practice broadest effective level sub-clan)

2. Islamic (mosque) and merchant based somewhat broader but in practice shifting confederations of sub-sub clan segments with frequent tensions/breakdowns on segmental lines. Women's groups provide somewhat more trans sub-sub and sub clan networks but relatively weak (compared to Hargeisa or Somaliland)

3. Much narrower and lower depth of trust (except in respect to purely commercial interest transaction links) than Hargeisa, Somaliland, Puntland or some rural Somalia areas

4. No trend to broadening or deepening since 1990 - probably on balance still eroding.

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