Complex Political Emergencies:
From Relief Work to Sustainable Development?

Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace and Development:
Toward Reconceptualisation

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Summary

Cessation of hostilities or at least the ebbing of widespread armed conflict provides an opportunity for war-torn peoples and countries to rebuild their societies, economies, polities and to start reforms and restructuring. In recent years as increasing proportion of aid is spent on emergencies related programmes, there has been a growing interest in the rehabilitation of societies emerging from war. While the nature and the extent of devastation faced by war-torn societies vary, they all face common issues concerning the macro-economic management of reconstruction, alternative routes to livelihood rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants and the role of different aid instruments, including food and financial aid. Yet there is very little understanding of how conflict-affected societies should be helped to rebuild their countries - socially, politically and economically - or in fact exactly what should be perceived as strategic rehabilitation and reconstruction in the aftermath of complex political emergencies. This is partly because the concept of rehabilitation we have is rooted in the natural disasters, though rehabilitation in war-torn societies often has very little in common with rehabilitation and reconstruction after natural disasters such as droughts, floods and earthquakes.

A fundamental reappraisal of our concept of rehabilitation in contemporary complex emergencies is urgently needed. The concept of rehabilitation in CPEs is different and much broader than that used in natural disasters, encompassing a whole range of diverse and complex programmes ranging from demobilisation and demining to peacemaking and political rehabilitation. In CPEs the state is often contested or incapacitated and the post-war political structures are either very weak and/or lack legitimacy. However, most of the current rehabilitation models treat internal war, in the same way as natural disasters, as an external factor rather than outcome of the political and development process pursued during peacetime. Failure to recognise the importance of political reconstruction and restructuring in CPEs is one of the main reasons why successful rehabilitation is still rare. While in natural disasters normal social and economic activities often resume fully soon after the shocks are over, after wars, which often do not have clear beginning or end, it may take many years for conflict-affected societies to resume normal social and economic activities. By destroying or undermining the social fabric of the society, CPEs weaken their chance of full recovery and they often remain extremely vulnerable even after the war.

Successful rehabilitation for sustainable peace and development requires development of coherent, integrated strategic framework. Yet most rehabilitation interventions in post-crisis situations - especially as perceived by external aid agencies and NGOs - consist of individual programmes that are implemented mainly at the local level and without any links with other reconstruction interventions. This “relief approach” to rehabilitation results from the absence
of national policy frameworks, high degrees of donor dependence on NGOs, the short-term nature of donor funding of rehabilitation programmes, and lack of macro framework and links to long-term development strategy. Lack of the necessary long-term resource commitments in particular means that rehabilitation programmes are conceived little more than “crisis management” interventions.

Because these interventions are externally designed and usually deeply deficient in domestic contextual comprehension, they become party to conflicts and often delay cessation of hostilities and positive, indigenous peacemaking. Re-conceptualising rehabilitation requires accepting that neither rehabilitation nor relief, state capacity nor development aid is or ever can be politically neutral. Resource allocations are by their nature partisan and political. To be partisan for peace and for allocation patterns which reduce the risks of, erode the tensions leading to and provide roads to reconciliation after armed conflict is not the same as blindly refusing to recognise that resources are the objects and means to war as well as to peace and that the consequences of their provision and allocation (or non-provision) can make a significant difference as to how future tensions will develop, conflicts be managed and violence curbed or aggravated.

Given the complexity of rehabilitation in post-conflict situations it is also important to rethink who rehabilitation aid is channeled through. NGOs have been relatively successful in their rehabilitation initiatives in the aftermath of natural disasters such as droughts, but much less so in post-conflict rehabilitation. Yet significant rehabilitation aid to war-torn societies is still disbursed through NGOs, though their operation guidelines are more applicable to intervening in natural disasters than in CPEs. While the importance of rebuilding public administration capable of delivering public services is recognised, rehabilitation aid in post-conflict situations still mostly bypass central authorities. NGOs may sometimes be the right channel for social and economic rehabilitation aid, but they may not have the experience, the political will or the intellectual tools to undertake or be involved in political reconstruction. Their involvement in rehabilitation may increase short-term service provision capacity but at the price of cumulative fragmentation and decapacitation of domestic governance and social sector institutions. It is very difficult to see how they can create a macro economic strategic design, a coordinating framework or a transition to domestic sustainability. Consequently, the process of disintegration and fragmentation started by the war may be re-enforced during the reconstruction phase.

For economic reconstruction in post-conflict situation the primary task is to understand the costs of the war and to establish priorities for economic recovery. At the macro level, priorities for economic rehabilitation should include macroeconomic stability and economic
reform in order to reverse the extreme macroeconomic disequilibria that characterise highly distorted war economies. These arise partly from flawed pre-war economic policies pursued by governments and aid agencies compounded by economic policies during the war. Achieving macroeconomic stability is essential for the transition from highly distorted, survival-oriented war economy to a more household-friendly market and livelihood oriented economy and for providing the basis for sustainable economic recovery and growth. However, models of economic reform in peacetime may be inappropriate and even counterproductive in post-conflict reconstruction unless macroeconomic policies encourage peace building and political rehabilitation. At the micro level, it means providing support to households to rebuild their livelihood systems, paying greater attention to the new role of women in the aftermath of war.

To explore these issues a number of researchable questions need to be studied and analysed nationally, sectorally, locally and for households. These include whether there is a strategy and if so how it is articulated, coordinated, implemented and evaluated. Impact on distribution both as to income inequality and to gender and progress toward domestic sustainability as well as well as relationships with calamity support safety nets and interaction sectors outside (though complementary to) are other crucial research areas.
To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward.
- Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere

1. Introduction

By 1995 fourteen countries in SSA with a population of over 175 million people were facing the challenge of post-war reconstruction after devastating prolonged conflicts that shattered economies and disintegrated states (Green 1995). As of mid 1998 20 of the 34 poorest countries globally either were in or had just emerged from a state of civil war (DFID, FT, 30th June). In SSA armed conflict is now one of the main factors responsible for more the estimated 250 million people, almost half of the total population, who now live in poverty (Colletta, Kostner et al. 1997) and for a rate of absolute poverty which has now passed 33%. In these countries, which are among the poorest in the world, the existing problems of natural disasters such as droughts and poverty, insecurity, underdevelopment and instability are compounded - or indeed dwarfed - by those flowing from the violence of war, creating what are now fashionably captioned as complex political emergencies.

Cessation of hostilities, or at least the ebbing of widespread armed conflict, provides an opportunity for some of these countries to rebuild their societies, economies, polities and to start reforms and restructuring that may have previously proved unattainable. In recent years as increasing proportion of aid is spent on emergencies related programmes, there has been a growing interest in the rehabilitation of societies emerging from war and a parallel (though not adequately financed) priority for accountable and competent governance. While the nature and the extent of devastation faced by war-torn societies vary, they all face common issues concerning social and political rehabilitation, the macro-economic management of reconstruction, demobilisations and reintegration of ex-combatants, alternative routes to livelihood rehabilitation and the role of different aid instruments (Green 1995). Many of these countries such as Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Eritrea are now already in the transition period of post-conflict rehabilitation (Macrae, Zwi et al. 1995; Eriksson and al 1996) albeit the levels of violence still plaguing Rwanda and Uganda and the sudden turning of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute into war demonstrate how fragile "post" is in some postwar states. Yet there is very little understanding of how conflict-affected societies should be helped to rebuild their countries - socially, politically and economically - or in fact exactly what should be considered as strategic rehabilitation and reconstruction in the aftermath of CPEs. This is partly because the concept of rehabilitation now dominant is in large part

1 Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Western Sahara, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia/Somaliland, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi.
rooted in the natural disasters, though rehabilitation in war-torn societies often has very little in common with rehabilitation and reconstruction after natural disasters such as droughts, floods and earthquakes. A second element in that definition is physical reconstruction is from the post World War II experience which is of limited relevance because the physical damage caused by civil wars is very uneven and sometimes low and because restoration of civil governance, basic services and household livelihoods are often more urgent contributions to creating a process of reconciliation and sustainable peace than an overriding focus on physical infrastructure reconstruction. Western Europe had undergone basically external war so that reconciliation was much easier – indeed to a significant extent solidarity had been enhanced.

2. Conceptualising Rehabilitation - A Critical Review

Although cases of at least attempted rehabilitation of war-torn societies have grown rapidly since the mid-1980s, the concept of rehabilitation has not changed equally rapidly (Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997). Rehabilitation after natural disasters involves mainly reconstruction of physical infrastructure and interim food – shelter – housing to displaced persons in peacetime, with limited (by area or by degree) physical damage, only temporary livelihood destruction and functioning states and societies. After these disasters reconstruction involves mainly restoring physical and to some extent institutional structures to their pre-disaster state. In this concept, rehabilitation issues are more about how to rebuild what was destroyed in the disaster rather than what to rebuild. In the rather different case of severe drought food security provision with associated medical services has been crucial with little physical reconstruction needed if drought afflicted households were provided food and were able to stay on their land to resume production when rains returned. In such cases macroeconomic effects have usually not been addressed - even though major droughts can cause multiplier (or divider) effect to the economy as large as the basic agricultural loss and the return of the rains does not restore pastoralists’ dead capital - livestock. Intervention needs after natural calamities are more specific because they are clearer and “there are identifiable communities to rebuild, recognised political authorities in the areas receiving aid, [and] a legal system in place” (Fagen 1995: 27). In post-war situations, however, none of these may be the case, because prolonged conflicts erode or destroy the recognised social, political and economic structures of the affected-societies. Post-war rehabilitation (and especially post civil war) issues are therefore much more complex involving fundamental questions not only on what to reconstruct but also in what way to do so in order not to recreate the unsustainable institutions and structures that contributed to the conflict in the first place. Even more crucial is rehabilitation of governmental legitimacy and ability to deliver basic services and of livelihoods which are usually more urgent than much of the large project reconstruction agenda. There needs to be a fundamental reappraisal of our concept of rehabilitation in contemporary complex emergencies.
There are several reasons why the concept of rehabilitation in and after political emergencies should be different from and broader than that used in natural disasters caused by exogenous calamities. First, in political emergencies the state is usually contested or incapacitated and the post-war political structures are either very weak and/or absolutely or contingently lack legitimacy. However, most of the current rehabilitation models treat internal war, in the same way as natural disasters such as droughts, as external factors rather than outcomes of the political and development evolution during the preceding peacetime. Keen (1997: 74) argues that our interventions in preventing and containing conflict is weakened by treating it as “something that is superimposed on a society ... rather than something that grows out of the political and economic processes at work in peacetime (processes that may propel even ‘innocent civilians’ to take up arms, whether as members of militias, government forces or rebel groups)”. For these societies political and social reconstruction, including reconciliation, become central to any rebuilding initiatives.

Prior to initiation and throughout its lifecycle rehabilitation intervention should involve careful analysis of the root causes and the dynamics of the conflict interpreting “humanitarian crises not primarily as material supply crises, but rather as crises of economic, political, and social systems” (Macrae 1997: 198). (This may not be the first step temporally. If it has not been carried out before a proto peace or proto new government emerges, holding up “grab, dab, jab” - locate, feed, provide preventative/restorative medical care - operations is neither humanitarian, prudent, rehabilitatory nor reconciliatory.) In some CPEs the process of rehabilitation involves reconstruction of essential political, economic and social institutions that are central to the functioning of a society. Failure to recognise the importance of political reconstruction and restructuring is one of the main reasons why “successful rehabilitation is still more of a hope than a reality” (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994: 8). In addition a disproportionately small proportion of external finance is directed to restoring governmental and domestic civil society body capacity to provide basic services which is usually crucial both to communities’ reconciliation and to institutional legitimacy. Foreign NGO’s - whatever their virtues - cannot be a substitute for domestic governmental and social sector capacity and their overuse limits rehabilitation of that capacity and of domestic institutional legitimacy.

There is a need to rethink rehabilitation by “moving beyond a relief-oriented, supply-driven approach to rehabilitation” (Macrae 1997: 192). In countries where the state is contested such as Rwanda and Angola, or has disintegrated/collapsed such as Somalia and Afghanistan “and traditional institutions have re-emerged as an important force, there is a need to think beyond state-defined models” (Macrae 1997: 192). There is also a need to reconsider the somewhat artifactual division between state and traditional authorities resulting largely from analysis of the
colonial era. Political rehabilitation in these societies might on occasion take the form of helping
the rebuilding of traditional authorities rather than imposing western style state structures of the
type which had collapsed. In Somaliland a mix of accountable historic political structures via
councils of elders and of governmental service delivery systems accountable to more a
Northwestern style assembly appear to have some capacity to provide law and order, legitimacy
and economic recovery.

Second, complex emergencies have no clear beginning nor end and the return to “normalcy”
takes a long time. Instead there often exists a situation of uneasy peace in the post-conflict
transition characterised by highly unstable environment. In that context it may be difficult to
identify with any confidence whether conditions are right for serious rehabilitation work. Yet
the timing of rehabilitation is crucial. Its weakness or robustness may make the difference
between consolidation of peace or the return to war. Macrae, Zwi et al. (1995) identify the
signing of peace accords, process of political change, increased levels of security and existence
of opportunity for peace and reconstruction as the features of post-conflict situation, though they
may not all be present at the same time. In some conflicts the earliest “windows of opportunity”
may provide the right timing to launch rehabilitation programmes. In others, however, it may
mean waiting for the cessation of hostilities before any major reconstruction initiative is
implemented. In natural disasters, which are short-lived even if they recur frequently, normal
social and economic activities often continue during and/or fully resume soon after the hazards
are over, whereas after wars it may take many years for conflict-affected societies to resume
normal social and economic activities (Kumar 1997). Many of the recent conflicts in countries
such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Mozambique lasted well over a decade. There is however
only a loose relationship between length of war and length of reconciliation/rehabilitation to a
base for sustained development. Some factors relate to degree of outside intervention in the war
(whose removal may make both peace negotiations and post-war reconciliation easier) and to
history (the roots of the Angolan and Interlake wars are several centuries old while per contra
before 1960 there never was a Somalia-wide state and of the Ethiopian – Eritrean border dispute
to the 1940s British Military Administration’s transfer of some towns, and rural areas of Italian
Eritrea to Ethiopian administration for logistical reasons with no – to the British – political
implications) and still others to the alliances and animosities built in the course of the war. Yet
another is domestic resource base - Angola’s oil and diamonds may well have exacerbated and
prolonged conflict, but they do provide means to bolster even a shaky peace and to rehabilitate
in ways fostering reconciliation and legitimacy which no other African post conflict state can
achieve out of purely domestic resources. Comprehending the causes of conflict is usually a
necessary condition for mastering them (Adedeji and Green, 1997) but it is neither an early
warning system nor a sufficient condition.
Full comprehension may not be needed to have early warning of conflict. Rwanda’s 1960-94 history of failed attempts at cross communal governments and/or efforts to co-opt majority (Hutu) leaders into minority (Tutsi) dominated governments with recurrent Tutsi preemptive violence, up to and including genocide and violent Hutu resistance gave very early warning indeed of the risk of full scale civil war. So did the 1959-94 history of Hutu jacquerie, Tutsi guerilla warfare, fluctuating oppression of Tutsi repeatedly erupting into violence and the 1990 émigré invasion of Rwanda. The murder of the President of Rwanda (and his fellow passenger the President of Burundi) – ironically (as both were Hutu) by Hutu extremists was itself not predictable but the probability of peace talks and transitional cross command governments failing to avert war was very clear.

In Angola comprehension could have warned explicitly against the attempted placating of UNITA (more specifically its maximum leader Jonas Savimbi) by allocating ownership of and the right to staff and guard key northern diamond mining areas. The government had every reason to fear the mines would be no go areas and their revenues used to build up arms supplies for a new UNITA military initiative. Further the northern peoples of the areas are not UNITA backers and had viewed the plateau miners (originally imported by the Portuguese) as Portuguese “carrier pigeons” stealing our resource heritage.

In the Ethiopia – Eritrea case comprehension of the causes of tensions would not have given rise to an expectation that provocative action by low level military officers would lead to escalation into war. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia’s present ruling coalition won sovereignty by a long, bitter war fought as allies. Both therefore are very concerned to maintain that sovereignty. As a result of Italian colonial and British military rule their boundary was in dispute. Parallel frictions – over national currencies and exchange control – did create a poor climate for agreed settlements, but there is no known case of exchange controls setting off a war. Further Italian and 1994 Ethiopian official maps are at one in showing the disputed rural areas and town as on the Eritrean side of the boundary even if partly under Ethiopian administration. That low level Ethiopian trespasses or hot pursuit of suspected cattle raiders would escalate via Eritrean seizure of the disputed areas to ‘mutual’ air raids, a bloody repulse of an Ethiopian counter-offensive and Ethiopia’s opening a new front threatening the usability of Asab (its own key port as well as Eritrea’s second city) was not reasonably projectable. Here comprehension may help master present (by reversing escalation) and avert future (by hot lines and other cut outs to substitute damping down for escalating up) conflict but that is a different role than that of early warning system.

Nor is there any reason to suppose comprehension as automatic cure or to contend it is based on the assumption all (or even most) conflict is irrational from the perspective of at least some key
actors. Conflicts usually arise from self respect (or pride), self identity (or chauvinism), fear (whether from a guilty conscience or a neighbour perceived as evil) or greed (demand for equity). These are not inherently irrational driving forces. Further even if key actors misperceive reality, that misperception is in itself a fact with consequences until changed. For example, it is true that wa Hutu and wa Tutsi need not engage in bloody conflict or be unable to build viable communities (e.g. Kagera Region in Tanzania). But Burundi’s history gives rational ground for wa Hutu to fear wa Tutsi preemptive violence and to believe few of them are willing to share power and – especially since the rise of the CDD (Burundi’s Interahamwe) – for wa Tutsi to fear wa Hutu goals include a final solution (by exile and/or death) to the ‘Tutsi problem of Rwanda’.

Certain groups: warlords – strictly defined – in Somalia, militias and soldiers in most war ravaged countries, some entrepreneurs of adversity (sometimes pungently termed non flying, two legged, featherless vultures) do benefit from war. So too might certain broader groupings if speedy victory over a country with a strong economy – or at least some strong surplus generating sectors – e.g. Angola could be achieved.

Once war is joined the sunk costs already endured and the fear of further loss – of influence, assets, income and/or life – make acceptance of mediated solutions (especially ones which require states to give a role to insurgents and insurgents to accept the existing state in return for more access to and a secondary role in it) hard to accept. The greater the potential gain of total victory the greater the incentive to fight on – a contributory factor to the earlier cessation of hostilities and first steps toward reconciliation in Mozambique than in Angola.

Third, CPEs undermine or destroy the social fabric of the society, weakening the capacities of the communities and their chances of recovery to the extent that even after the conflict they remain extremely vulnerable (Green 1994). Wars do not affect all groups equally: vulnerable groups including ethnic minorities, women and children usually suffer relatively more often with up to 60% of lives lost flowing from high infant and under five mortality arising out of collapsed health services, poorer nutrition and forced migration and perhaps 10% (except for Rwanda and Burundi) actual combat killings. Rebuilding social capital and livelihood systems in such circumstances would therefore be more complex and difficult than restoring physical infrastructure in natural disasters.

Fourth, rehabilitation in post-conflict period is a broad concept encompassing a whole range of diverse and complex programmes ranging from demobilisation and demining to peace-making and political reconstruction. It involves among other things “redefining and reorienting relationships between political authority and the citizenry, revisiting relationships between different ethnic and social groups, creating a civil society in its broadest sense, promoting
psychosocial healing and reconciliation, and reforming economic policies and institutions” (Kumar 1997: 2). Re-conceptualising rehabilitation is also based on the recognition of “a failure of existing models of development to provide the conditions required for political and economic stability” and the need to re-evaluate development goals in fragile, insecure and highly unstable environments (Macrae, Zwi et al. 1995: 680).

Fifth, intervention aid in complex emergencies is often highly politicised as are domestic rehabilitation resource allocations. In some cases this pattern fuels conflicts. Intervention programmes which become party to conflicts are likely to delay cessation of hostilities and peacemaking. This may well be unavoidable in some cases, the general point is to recognise that few interventions are either neutral or simple in their consequences and that non-intervention (as in Rwanda during the genocide) is also not neutral. Reconceptualising rehabilitation “requires acknowledging that neither relief nor rehabilitation nor development assistance is politically neutral” (Macrae 1997: 198). The key challenge in post-war rehabilitation is not only to avoid fuelling conflict but also “to find ways of consolidating the peace and of preventing a slippage back into violence and humanitarian crisis” (Macrae, Zwi et al. 1995: 671). Given the complexity of rehabilitation in post-conflict situations it is also important to rethink through whom rehabilitation aid is channeled. NGOs, for instance, were relatively successful in rehabilitation initiatives in the aftermath of natural disasters such as droughts, but often much less so in post-conflict rehabilitation partly because their mastery of political – let alone macroeconomic and sustainability - complexities is often shaky but more basically because substituting them for government and domestic civil society channels extensively and extendedly frequently prevents the latter regaining capacity and legitimacy. Yet a significant proportion of rehabilitation aid to war-torn societies (other than major infrastructure projects and financial sector restructuring) is still disbursed through NGOs, though their operational guidelines are more applicable to intervening in natural disasters than in CPEs and to complimenting, not supplanting, governments and domestic social sectors.

Finally, gender considerations are – or should be - central to the post-conflict rehabilitation modeling. One of the consequences of war has always been significant changes of women’s role as pre-war gender inequalities and traditions perforce change during war situations (Byrne and Baden 1995). In Rwanda since a substantial majority of those killed in the war were men, women - who in some parts of the country are up to 80 per cent of the adult population - became responsible for rebuilding livelihoods (El-Bushra and Mukarubuga 1995). In other countries such as Eritrea, Tigray and Somalia it appears that the social dislocation in these societies has empowered women (El Bushra and Piza Lopez 1994; Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997). From a gender perspective, post-conflict rehabilitation needs to take into account the new roles of women.
What exactly constitutes rehabilitation or how this concept is linked to relief and development is also a subject of continuing debate in the literature. As (Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997: xvii) point out it "is a fuzzy concept, subject to many different interpretation". Most definitions of rehabilitation used by agencies describe it as activities of limited duration started soon after disaster (European Union 1996; Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997). Such definitions include the one used by DFID which limits rehabilitation to programmes carried out under emergency relief with a particular emphasis on meeting basic needs. It defines rehabilitation assistance as "the provision of aid designed to help restore emergency-affected population to self-reliance in meeting basis needs, and to reduce their vulnerability to future emergencies" (Campbell 1996: 2). In an attempt to link rehabilitation to relief and development (Korner, Seibel et al. 1995; Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997) have used broader definitions. According to (Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997: xv)

rehabilitation overlaps with relief and development. It is part of a process of protecting and promoting the livelihoods of people enduring or recovering from emergencies. It aims to provide short-term income transfers, rebuild household and community assets, and rebuild institutions. Its key task is to help reinforce developmental objectives, notably livelihood security, participation, sustainability, gender equity, and local institutional capacity.

Similarly (Korner, Seibel et al. 1995: 5) explains that "rehabilitation marks the transition from an emergency to a development situation. In an institutional perspective, the core task is a reconstruction of social capacities and institutions for socio-political integration and the allocation of human and economic resources".

However, these definitions are narrow considering the range of activities that rehabilitation in conflict related emergencies should cover, although they are somewhat broader than those used by most agencies. In practice they reflect the operational definitions of NGOs which normally do not include macro and political components of rehabilitation. This partly explains why most rehabilitation interventions in post-crisis situations - especially as perceived by external aid agencies and NGO's - consist of individual programmes that are implemented mainly at the local level and without any links with other reconstruction interventions. This is sometimes less true of national bodies e.g. the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in Ethiopia and the former Planning Commission in Mozambique. The focus of rehabilitation initiatives have often been specific operations that lacked the kind of coherent, integrated framework needed for realistic sustainable macroeconomic and household livelihood rehabilitation. Successful rehabilitation for sustainable peace and development requires, more than anything else, development of an
integrated strategic framework that "identifies priority areas, allocates appropriate resources for them, and relates interventions to the achievement of the twin objectives of peace and development" (Kumar 1997: 34). Part of the problem is "the absence of mechanisms to link donors with a national policy framework, combined with the high degree of donor dependence on NGOs for project design and implementation, [which] tends to reinforce the inclination of rehabilitation programmes to adopt the highly decentralised, unintegrated approaches of relief rather than those of development" (Macrae 1997: 197).

Equally, the short-term nature of donor funding of rehabilitation programmes does not easily lead to achieving sustainable rehabilitation efforts that directed toward sustainable peace and development. Because of lack of long-term resource commitments by the international community many rehabilitation programmes are little more than "crisis management" interventions. "They are neither conceived nor implemented as sustainable programmes" (Kumar 1997: 35). Separate budget lines and a lack of clarity as to what type of projects and programmes should fall under rehabilitation further complicate the problem. For instance, rehabilitation aid in most international agencies comes under emergency relief departments and follows procedures similar to those used for emergency aid. It often has no macro framework, no link to long term development strategy and little or no interaction with development allocations to the same country. A further problem of this type of approach to rehabilitation is that the speed with which programmes are identified and implemented, with the aim to do something quickly, means that they are not subjected to stringent criteria used in the appraisal of development programmes.2 (Macrae 1997: 197) points out that "both USAID and European Commission initiatives rely almost exclusively on NGOs to propose and implement projects. The strengths of these innovations is also their weakness: In the search for instruments that enable fast-disbursing support, the very procedures used to assess sustainability and efficiency are often bypassed". Well-intentioned though they may be, such interventions may even exacerbate existing problems. In terms of timing rehabilitation interventions, it should be recognised that while existence of peace (which is often relative) may be a prerequisite for rehabilitation, some interventions can start even while violence and localised conflicts continue (UNICEF, 1989). Experience shows that it can start early in the conflict making use of "windows of opportunity" that usually exist during the conflict process, albeit doing so entails loss of at least some of the physical and – less certainly – social gains if levels and areas of conflict rise again.3

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2 (Anderson and Woodrow 1989) describes this as the "fallacy of speed" which is not the same as "timeliness".

3 In Baido (Somalia) the whole UNICEF programme described in Green (1995) was – on the face of it – swept away less than a week after it was observed. Whether it laid a social and human base for a future revival remains to be seen.
3. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Until recently rehabilitation has been viewed as almost uniquely a transitional activity on the relief-development continuum. However, the distinction between relief and development has in practice become blurred (e.g. in both Sierra Leone and Somalia) and it is now common to find agencies engaged simultaneously in both relief and development. This is not surprising given the nature of contemporary emergencies. In SSA internal wars, for example, there may not be a clear end to the conflict and therefore rehabilitation may be carried out while the conflict is still going on in parts of the country and pure survival relief operations are continuing in them. In fact, relief, rehabilitation and development may all take place simultaneously within a country where emergency relief or post-conflict rehabilitation may be happening in some areas, while development programmes are in progress in others. These three concepts are now generally recognised as separate but overlapping and complementary. The main objection to the continuum model was the frequency with which it was misinterpreted as implying simple, straight line progress analogous to a Mahalanobis or Domar turnpike model.

The rationale behind conceptual and strategic linking of relief, rehabilitation and development is the belief that relief and rehabilitation programmes will include development objectives. (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994: 2) argue that “better ‘development’ can reduce the need for subsequent emergency relief; better ‘relief’ can contribute to development and especially reduction of future vulnerability to certain types of catastrophe; and better ‘rehabilitation’ can ease the transition between the two”. However, the concept of divisions between and interrelationships among emergency, non-emergency, relief and non-relief assistance no longer exists in the contemporary complex emergencies in Africa (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994). The recent emergency in Rwanda provides an example of how these distinctions have become blurred. Eriksson and et al. (1996: 42) point out that the crisis in Rwanda “does not represent a linear ‘continuum’ from relief-to-rehabilitation-to-development. Rehabilitation efforts necessarily began soon after the new government assumed power in July 1994. Massive relief operations continue, 18 months later, in refugee camps on Rwandese borders”. Ironically that relief and the way it was channeled has both prolonged the war in Rwanda and contributed directly to the war in then Zaire leading to the end of the Mobutu era. Similarly, in the Horn of Africa, emergency has become to be seen as the norm, so a linear sequence of relief-rehabilitation-development may be misleading (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994). In this linear sequence model, rehabilitation is seen as the link between relief and renewed development and it is assumed that the two concepts are sufficiently compatible to allow for this continuum. However, the linearity of the continuum is for some authors conceptual not one of time sequences. For example in many African countries - notably Somalia and Somaliland - severe droughts are cyclically recurring facts making one off approaches based on uniqueness
fatuous (Green and Jamal, 1987). But rehabilitation cannot reconcile what are sometimes asserted to be two entirely different concepts. These distinctions mainly reflect the organisation of aid agencies rather than the reality of affected people (Davies 1994). However, they may sometimes also reflect realities on the ground. If a zone is temporarily at peace (or at any rate semi suspended conflict) local governmental, infrastructural and basic service provision rehabilitation is feasible but can be swept away in (literally) a day if the underlying conflict remains and areas of violence grow more rapidly and unpredictably - e.g. Baidoa in Somalia over 1992-95 and many rural districts in Mozambique repetitively over 1982-1992. Only straight relief (food-basic health) plus education have clear payoffs if the risk of renewed, destructive violence is high.

Nevertheless, the distinction between pure survival and development assistance is an important one both in terms of scale and eligibility. There is the dilemma of the legitimacy of recipient authorities as donors are generally cautious in granting recognition to transition authorities before a legitimate government is formed (Macrae, Zwi et al. 1995) even though they thereby frequently slow and limit any institution’s ability to attain and to consolidate legitimacy e.g. Somaliland and Congo (ex-Zaire). Access to international development assistance depends on the existence of an internationally recognised government, whereas humanitarian assistance (relief and to some extent rehabilitation) are delivered to authorities that do not have international recognition. Thus, “if rehabilitation is seen primarily as a development activity, rather than as a relief intervention, the presence and recognition of a legitimate national government will be a necessary condition for international finance” (Macrae 1997: 187). Moreover, some of the criteria used for determining eligibility for development aid such as political conditionality reinforce the distinction between humanitarian and development assistance. For instance, aid given to countries such as Sudan which do not meet the criteria for development aid is mainly humanitarian. In Rwanda the issue of legitimacy of the new government was one of the reasons why provision of financial assistance to the government was slow (Eriksson and al 1996: 34) despite the fact that its priorities for rehabilitating primary education and health care and re-employing its (largely Hutu) displaced personnel were arguably crucial to reconciliation and domestically perceived legitimacy. There is also a related distinction as to sustainability - rehabilitation, if successful should become self sustaining, survival support by definition depends on outside (external or domestic) funding.

4. Strategic Approaches to Reconstruction

What strategic approaches and policies can be adopted to promote realistic rehabilitation and provide a basis for sustainable peace and development? In the literature (Green 1995; Macrae, Zwi et al. 1995; Kumar 1997) there is a general agreement on the importance of understanding
how local people rebuild their livelihoods in post-conflict situations, the importance of extending local level reconstruction programmes to regional and national level, looking at ways in which rehabilitation interventions can help in addressing the underlying causes of conflict, and how local and regional governance can be rebuilt without restoring the unsustainable, overcentralised and often highly divisive institutions. These issues are explored under the three main components of social rehabilitation, political rehabilitation and economic rehabilitation.

4.1. Social Rehabilitation - Rebuilding Livelihoods and Civil Institutions

In post-conflict environment, rehabilitation of civil society structures and livelihood systems is one of the most important elements of reconstruction. Violent conflicts undermine social network and often leave a legacy of divided societies at all levels from family outwards. Rehabilitation assistance should provide the framework for reviving livelihoods and civil institutions previously suppressed, eroded or rendered powerless by war with the aim of strengthening local capacities to participate in the reconstruction process. Effective civil society structures ensure that local people are represented and have voice in setting reconstruction priorities and that central authorities are more informed and responsive to their needs and priorities. This is particularly important in post-conflict situations in which political participation allows groups to articulate their diverse interests in the formulation of reconstruction strategy. Civil society can make important contributions by providing counter balance to the power of central authorities or by providing basic essential services at the local level (Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997). This is of course true nationally as well as locally. Many civil society networks - religious, women's, trade unions, co-op/peasant operate at local, regional and national levels interacting with each other and with government bodies.

Civil society sometimes plays an important role by acting as a key factor in promoting participation, sustainable development and democracy. Prendergast (1997: 149-150) argues that “the primary objective of interventions in the future should be to utilise and build on the capacity of emergent civil and political structures and institutions, in order to reverse the erosion of civil society and communal cohesion”. While in theory the importance of using civil society as means of encouraging participation and reaching the grassroots is recognised, “in practice building civil society has largely been equated to funding southern NGOs” (Harvey 1997: 16). Unfortunately the basic Christian, Muslim, Women’s, trade union and peasant civil society bodies are usually defined as not being NGOs (as in the NORAD led NGO coordinating forum

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4 It is perfectly true that some social networks and local structures are remarkably resilient during and after wars. But it is necessary to avoid romanticism – they are physically and financially crippled and while often vital to are rarely able by themselves to carrying through rehabilitation. Substituting foreign NGOs for them and leaving them alone to get on with the job are equal if opposite follies.
in Mozambique). Those which are so defined usually have very narrow membership bases and are (each when genuine) more like professional consulting co-ops than peoples’ social bodies. (Chazan 1992) distinguishes two types of civil society in Africa. Primary groups which are traditional ascriptive institutions such as kinship and lineage ties and cultural and religious networks; and social and economic groups which are modern interest groups with voluntary membership such as women’s associations, etc. In conflict situation, it is particularly important to rebuild and strengthen the indigenous dispute resolution systems that may have been undermined by the breakdown of community networks. This “may involve recognising and revitalising the elders council, the role of the traditional peacemaker, the justice circle, the tribal court, representative committees, or the mediating role of women’s organisations” (Maynard 1997: 213).

However, it is important to avoid naiveté and the curious definition of civil society as “angelic groups” only. Civil society bodies reflect and embody the tensions in their societies. They may seek to manipulate as often as to transcend them. The Interahamwe in Rwanda was a civil society body responsive to one set of community fears and concerns. The extreme polarisation into violence - indeed genocide - it exemplified was also present within religious and other civil society groups. Similarly the South African Broederbund was in origin an oppressed majority (within the white community) people’s body seeking cultural, social, economic and political security - that is very much a civil society body. Equally lineage group, sub-clan, clan and clan family groupings are all civil society groups both in Somalia and Somaliland. But their objective impacts on issues of violent or peaceful dispute resolution and ability to perceive ways to transcend armed conflict vary sharply at each level, lead to tension within civil society arenas and appear to have divergent overall balances among groups and over time.

The currently fashionable buzz words in social rehabilitation are social capital and local capacity building, although what these concepts mean is frequently unclear. In particular there is a confusion surrounding exactly what local capacity building means. According to Moore, Stewart et al. (1994: 9) “there is probably no other area of development policy where so much money is spent in pursuit of an objective whose very name, as well as content, is subject to such basic and continuing dispute”. Social capital is defined here as “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam 1993: 167). The literature on social capital and civil society emphasise the importance of trust. However, this important feature of social capital is seriously undermined in violent conflicts or is limited to polarised groups which are actors in, not transcenders of, that conflict. In war-torn societies, the initial tensions and divisions based in widely varying balances of clan, ethnicity, language, history, religion, regional, economic and political differences may be further compounded by new divisions. New tensions and
differences appear such as those who fought and supported the war and those who did not, those who migrated and those who did not, those who received aid and those who did not. Based on these divisions, even ethnic or clan and religious based factions sub-divide into factions within factions. This partly explains some of the serious mistrust that still exists within groups from the same sub-clans in Somalia as well as the divisive or even murderous role of many Catholic and Anglican clerics in Rwanda and the extreme difficulty and fragility of post 1994 efforts to restore trust and reconciliation within these bodies.

Rebuilding trust and re-establishing community-wide interactions may be first step in helping conflict-affected societies to rebuild their social capital. “Renewed trust in a war-torn society includes general belief in the good intentions of other community members, reliance on them for common services, willingness to assume a responsible role in society, and commitment to the joint future of the community” (Maynard 1997: 214). Rebuilding social capital helps local institutions to take on a more positive, less narrowly communal and more politically influential role in reconciliation, reconstruction and sustainable development aimed at transcending, not exploiting or exacerabating, conflict.

4.2 Demobilisation, Reintegration and Resettlement

Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in countries emerging from wars is a critical step in the process of social rehabilitation and a major challenge for authorities and donor agencies supporting rehabilitation efforts. In these countries the presence of a large number of ex-combatants creates a serious threat to peace-making and reconciliation efforts. Thus demobilisation is generally considered as a precondition for lasting peace in war-torn societies. The process of demobilisation is mainly concerned with the disarming of former soldiers and other armed groups and the facilitation of voluntary return of ex-combatants and their families, whereas reintegration involves supporting their reentry into productive civilian life. Generally up to 90 % of combatants - though not necessarily displaced persons including refugees - lack transferable skills and have little or no formal education since most of them are often recruited in the rural areas. Reintegration of child soldiers, women fighters and young people also poses particular problems. The priority accorded to such programmes and how the whole issue is perceived tends to depend on how the war ended. If in a negotiated settlement, then high priority is likely to be given to some measures in support of all demobilised combatants. But where a total military victory has been won there may be little or no direct targeting of defeated ex-combatants beyond whatever general programmes exist for rural returnees.

5 Angola is a partial exception because it had a modern, high technology army and airforce, consuming the majority of graduates and technicians but the generalisation holds for the bulk of its infantry.
Demobilisation and re-integration issues need to be addressed at the earliest opportunity in the transition from war to peace. The timeliness of this is important because demilitarisation in particular is a precondition for reviving civil society, reducing fear and social tension and restoring confidence and a sense of security. Reducing the risks of renewed conflict depends to a large extent on the success of efforts aimed at demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants and the leaders of organisations commanding their trust/allegiance. By making ex-combatants productive members of the society, reintegration and demobilisation programmes also promote economic recovery.

4.3 Political Rehabilitation

This is perhaps the most critical of all rehabilitation efforts. The postwar context in CPEs is not an ideal environment for political reconstruction and restructuring. The cessation of formal hostilities or the signing – and even formal implementation - of peace accords does not mean a return to normalcy as there may still be major differences between the warring groups and - as in Rwanda - even substantial violence. In war-torn societies political rehabilitation takes place in highly polarised settings where there are deep suspicions between warring factions. "The truth is that during transitions, war-torn societies tend to remain extremely polarised. The extremist factions of warring parties constantly strive to undermine the peace accords. The case is even worse in countries where one party emerges victorious and sees little need for making significant political concessions" (Kumar 1997: 4). The last point is not always true - a militarily victorious coalition or party may perceive itself as having the short term capacity to seek political reconstruction aimed at transcending past causes of conflict (e.g. near federalism in Ethiopia) as well as the need to do so to reduce continued violence and avert its full scale re-emergence (e.g. Rwanda political roles for 'moderate' Hutu survivors and general barring of "59er" Tutsi returnee claims for land, buildings, businesses lost in 1959-60). In other cases selective inclusion is practiced reducing many tensions but exacerbating others (as in North Central and Northern Uganda).

A major weakness in political rehabilitation initiatives is that there is a lack of “well-defined framework for political reform and reconstruction that inform its interventions” (Kumar 1997: 4). Social rehabilitation programmes such as repatriation and resettlement, education and health services have been more successful than political reconstruction. This may be partly due to the long involvement of NGOs in particular development programmes in these sectors. However, if this leads to substitution of NGOs for government actors, short term results may be bought at the cost of delaying or blocking political rehabilitation which cannot go far if the state is unable to build a significant capacity to deliver real services to real people. Keen (1997: 74) argues "insofar as contemporary warfare reflects the partial collapse of states, then those designing
interventions will need to think about supporting state structures (rather than, as has been more fashionable, dismantling them)". Perhaps the international community has gained some knowledge and experience in economic and social rehabilitation programmes, but there is still a major gap in the knowledge of political rehabilitation as these have only recently started received the attention of the international community. (Kumar 1997: 34) argue that

those charged with designing and implementing political rehabilitation interventions lack appropriate conceptual frameworks, intervention models, concepts, policy instruments, and methodologies for assistance programmes to rebuild civil society, establish and nurture democratic institutions, promote a culture favourable to the protection of human rights, reconstruct law enforcement systems, or facilitate ethnic reconciliation in a highly unstable political and social environment.

This perception is in part valid but may in part reflect the external (and especially Northern) dominance of academic writing and conceptualisation as well as the fact that many domestic parties to political rehabilitation efforts do not believe that total transparency as to aims and minimum conditions are particularly appropriate approaches to ongoing, incremental negotiating, restructurings and agreed process recreating efforts. Despite a distinct lack of overt, overarching analytical strategic formulations and a certain opacity on many more articulated initiatives the governments of Mozambique, Ethiopia and Eritrea clearly do have, and act on, political rehabilitation strategies with links to most major political and economic initiatives.

There is also the question of appropriate balance of channels for rehabilitation aid. Who should be the recipient partners: civil society, local authorities, regional or central authorities, existing government, transitional authority, new government, unrecognised authority. NGOs may sometimes be right channel for social and economic rehabilitation aid (albeit the result is likely to be to weaken domestic civil society and the state if the NGOs are dominant as opposed to junior joint venture partners) but they may not have the experience, the political insight, the will or the intellectual tools to undertake, or be significantly directly involved in, political reconstruction. Lacking any clear mandates and procedures for financing and implementing rehabilitation programmes, there is major confusion in the donor community as to the responsibilities and objectives of rehabilitation (Macrae, Zwi et al. 1995).

(Macrae 1997) argue that while the importance of rebuilding public administration capable of delivering public services is recognised, rehabilitation aid in post-conflict period mostly bypasses central authorities so the recognition is more rhetorical than operational. These funds are disbursed through NGOs and international agencies that deliver parallel but similar public services during the transition. Also increased number of competing NGOs during transition not
only divert funds from the revival of public institutions but often lead to lack of co-ordination, confusion and duplication. This reflects the reluctance of international community to engage directly with new regimes or transition authorities or with domestic civil society actors other than analogues to Northern NGO’s. For example, in Rwanda as many as 102 international NGOs were involved in rehabilitation in 1995 (Eriksson and al 1996). “This pattern of donor assistance mirrors the experience of Uganda and Somaliland, [SIC]6 where rehabilitation interventions largely consist of NGO-led interventions at the microlevel. While enabling an expansion of service provision, these NGO interventions were not implemented within a coherent national policy framework” (Macrae 1997: 190). A further problem with NGOs is that their priorities may conflict with those of local authorities. Reconstruction process may be delayed by major gaps that appear as some sectors are completely ignored. Moreover, too many uncoordinated actors (e.g. NGOs, UN agencies, local authorities, central authorities, social sector actors) also create fragmentation of institutions and the provision of services, leading to differential access to public services. The experience of massive direct action by too many external agencies particularly in countries such as Mozambique and Ethiopia increased short-term service provision capacity, “but at the price of cumulative fragmentation and decapacitation of domestic governance and social sector institutions” (Green 1995: 1). Consequently, the process of disintegration and fragmentation started by the war is re-enforced during the reconstruction phase.

4.3 Economic Rehabilitation: From War and Survival Economy to Market Economy

4.3.1 Setting priorities for Economic Rehabilitation

Depending on the nature and length of the conflict and the conditions of the pre-war situation, internal wars usually have very high human and economic costs. The primary task of post-conflict economic rehabilitation is therefore to understand the costs of the war and to establish priorities for economic recovery. At the macro level, priorities for economic rehabilitation will include macroeconomic stability and economic reform in order to reverse the extreme macroeconomic disequilibria inherited from the economic policies followed (often necessarily) during the war. This is important for reviving savings and investment, containing inflation and removing regulations and controls which are often introduced during the conflict. At the micro level, it means providing support to households to rebuild their livelihood systems, paying greater attention to the new role of women in the aftermath of war. Macro and micro interact. Small farming (or herding) households are historically central not simply to their own subsistence but to urban food and raw material supplies, urban goods and services markets,

6 The author may have meant Somalia. Somaliland is in large measure and increasingly an exception to this generalisation.
indirect tax revenue and exports. Their revival is, therefore, strategically and macro economically as well as socially and politically important - e.g. in Mozambique, Somaliland, Somalia and Rwanda. However, since any viable macro economic strategy needs to ensure absence (or reduction) of high levels of tension which are very expensive economically even at levels well below generalised war, rural livelihood rehabilitation (including for returning displaced person and ex-combatant households) is important even if the sector is not directly central to overall output, exports, fiscal flows and savings - e.g. Namibia and, arguably, South Africa.

As prolonged conflicts destroy key productive assets, and – often even more crucial – bring new productive investment by states enterprises and households to very low levels, an important priority of economic rehabilitation is to revive the economy through investment in key productive assets and create conditions necessary for the resumption of trade, savings, foreign and domestic investment. For many countries a key priority will be removing the landmines and rebuilding key infrastructure. Landmines which kill and maim innocent civilians remain one of the most tragic legacies of recent conflicts. It is estimated that one in every 230 people is an amputee in Cambodia, one in 470 in Angola and one in 1,000 in Somaliland (Kumar 1997). In several countries, e.g. Angola, Somalia, Somaliland, Eritrea, some of the most productive agricultural area are mined.

Moreover, it is now recognised “that rebuilding institutional infrastructure shattered during conflict is as important as physical infrastructure - if not more important ... Unfortunately, this is an area that has been largely overlooked” (Kumar 1997: 25). For example rural households need market access to rehabilitate livelihoods. That does require road rehabilitation. But it also entails restoration of user friendly civil police to achieve law and order and of financial institutions which can and do lend to rural/small town oriented produce buyers, traders, transporters for vehicles and working capital (stocks of goods). That does not require subsidising merchants but it does require real access to appropriate credit (e.g. lease or hire purchase for vehicles) and financial institutions which limit bad loans by applicant assessment and loan management not by rejecting all small enterprise applications out of hand as has happened in some financial sectoral 'reform' programmes. It may also require initial soft foreign funding for financial sector reconstruction including human and process capital upgrading. The near total denial of access to rural enterprises by the Mozambican financial system over 1993-97 may be central to the IMF’s stabilisation model but is certainly a dominant cause of the feebleness of rural output revival and the tenacity of absolute poverty among small farming households.
4.3.2 Macroeconomic Rehabilitation

Achieving macroeconomic stability is essential for the transition from a highly distorted, survival oriented war economy to a more household friendly market and livelihood oriented economy and for providing the basis for sustainable economic recovery and growth. Governments engaged in post-conflict rehabilitation often inherit bloated military and/or excruciatingly understaffed civil (including police) bureaucracies and serious fiscal and balance of payments problems. Prolonged conflicts also create highly distorted economies. Governments may inherit very high levels of inflation as war economies are often characterised by inflationary pressures as warring factions or authorities either print money or borrow heavily to finance their wars. In conflict situations, authorities also expand their nominal controls and regulations over all sectors of the economy while also rapidly losing ability to influence actual transactions or to collect revenue. Serious macroeconomic disequilibria that characterise war economies often arise partly from flawed pre-war economic policies pursued by governments and/or NGO’s and aid agencies compounded by the conflict itself and by its debilitation of economic activity which is only peripherally reversed simply by an end to fighting.

Economic reforms in the aftermath of conflicts should involve a set of measures aimed at achieving manageable/sustainable balance-of-payments and public sector deficits and achieving structural change to prevent future payments and stabilisation crises. The first set of measures should involve stabilisation programme that combines fiscal and monetary reforms, and usually currency devaluation since the likelihood of an undervalued currency and very low levels of inflation at the end of a civil war is negligible. In post-crisis period, it is argued that governments may not be able to increase their revenue by raising taxes as this might damage economic revival so that they need to rely more on cutting public expenditure to achieve macroeconomic stability. This is a valid argument for cutting military spending (which Ethiopia appears to have done by well over 50%) and, where present, massive expenditure on "air" (to use the evocative Ugandan term for official corruption or total non-transparency). However, in virtually all post war contexts radically increased government spending on health, education, water, transport and communications and paying real public service wages compatible with enhancing productivity and professionalism are necessary conditions for sustainable state capacity and legitimacy and household livelihood and human capital restoration/development. If these cannot be initially financed by improved collection of taxes (usually very poor in war periods in SSA), reallocation of external fund flows is crucial to rapid, sustainable rehabilitation. The second set is medium-term adjustment which aims to reorient the structure of the economy to encourage greater efficiency in resource allocation and investment. This is concerned with “measures including trade and price liberalisation, and institutional and sectoral reforms [with] ... aims to remove a wide range of distortions in production and factor markets”
Adjustment in post-conflict period will aim to reverse the switch from tradables to non-tradables and from production for market exchange to production for subsistence during war.

However, there is no consensus on how adjustment programmes should proceed during the period of transition. Azam and Bevan (1994) maintain that speedy, radical reforms can be undertaken during post-conflict period. But this is disputed by others (Boyce 1995) (Fitzgerald and Stewart 1997). Fitzgerald and Stewart (1997: 7) for instance, point out that models of economic reform used in peacetime may be inappropriate and even counter-productive in post-conflict reconstruction, arguing that “it is necessary to specify the way in which civil society - firms and households - responds to the shocks and uncertainties of war in order to understand the macroeconomic behaviour under conflict conditions”. They recommend an alternative economic reform that take into account these changes in economic behaviour of war economies.

A related point is how perceptions and responses alter (not necessarily by reverting to pre-war patterns) quickly as conflict levels decline. Experience in both Mozambique and Somaliland suggests rapid alteration even during periods before conflict is fully contained let alone eliminated. A related distinction is initial assistance to demobilisation/livelihood restoration versus service and credit/market access provision once livelihood recovery is in train. Arguably food-tools-household equipment to rebuild a home and farm are capital injections but neither practicality nor equity suggests a host of tiny loans is a particularly sound approach to financing them even if loans would be appropriate for a large agricultural or agro-industrial unit.

Irrespective of the model of reform, adjustment policies, though necessary, entail social costs which need to be taken into account. Removal of subsidies and reduced expenditure on public services, for example, may have negative effects on the most vulnerable groups who may have to pay more for food and have access fewer public services (assuming they did have real access to subsidies and services which may frequently not be the case). Similarly, privatisation and dismantling of parastatals may lead to increased unemployment and further fragmentation of essential services. Therefore, during the post-conflict transition period, “the goals of economic policy cannot be limited to macroeconomic stabilisation and conventional structural adjustment but should also promote the adjustment toward peace” (Boyce and Pastor 1997: 287). A flexible approach is required in post conflict situations to avoid past mistakes. For instance, the World Bank has been accused of having “overlook[ed] … potentially explosive social and political consequences when designing and imposing economic conditions for support to Rwanda’s economic recovery” before the genocide (Eriksson and al 1996: 15). Boyce and

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7 Equally it has been argued that significant proportions of IMF drawings and World Bank import support funding were diverted by the ruling elite into arms buildup and arms trafficking – ironically, interalia, to agents of the Rwanda Patriotic Front which was to overthrow them
Pastor (1997) further argue that unless peace building and political rehabilitation are allowed to reshape macroeconomic policies, then both the peace process and economic policy are likely fail. For example in Mozambique as a result of the nature of the war, rural access to primary health care is perhaps 20% versus 90% in urban areas. Attempted externally imposed ceilings would in effect mean recovery to pre-war 50% rural levels could only be at the expense of urban provision - a politically unacceptable (and, as it happens, partisan against the present government) approach. Failing to renew rural services would cripple rebuilding of government capacity to delivery and rural legitimacy - a result both major parties would oppose. As external support to NGOs greatly exceeds the total government (and domestic social sector) health budget and appears to cost up to 10 times as much per health contact, a logical route to explore would be reallocation of external resource flows.

Rehabilitation assistance can accelerate the transition from a war economy to a livelihood and development friendly economy. But the issue is how best to provide economic rehabilitation assistance. International financial institutions, for example, concentrate on macro economic reform processes such as the Economic Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (ERRP) in Ethiopia which was introduced in large part to reach a *modus vivendi* with the World Bank in 1991. NGOs, on the other hand, concentrate on relief-oriented, small scale rehabilitation activities carried out at village, community or household level (Macrae, Zwi et al. 1995; Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997; Kumar 1997). In practice the Bank's macro rehabilitation programmes are little adapted non-war macro structural adjustment approaches which, however necessary, are not adequately articulated to sectoral and household rehabilitation needs nor to restoration of basic public services (including user friendly civil police and magistrates' court structures). With the partial exception of the few cases such as Ethiopia and Rwanda where the World Bank was involved in their design, rehabilitation programmes are carried largely in partnership with NGOs which often exclude macroeconomic rehabilitation from their programmes. Yet success and sustainability of these programmes depend to a large extent on the macroeconomic environment in which they are implemented. However, concentrating attention on IFI's and NGOs can be deceptive. Overall rehabilitation strategy is necessarily primarily domestic driven or doomed to failure. Ethiopia and Somaliland clearly do have strategic rehabilitation (economic, civil, political) approaches into which they seek to fit the external components using their own resources to fill gaps. But the coherence and fiscal sustainability of even their approaches are less than transparent and in other cases - notably Rwanda - the misfit between often overfunded, underdesigned, isolated external initiatives, and underfunded, overoptimistic, overall domestic strategies renders the former inefficient and the latter barely functional.
5. Notes Toward A Processual Reconceptualisation Of Rehabilitation: Implications for COPE

From the existing literature, its gaps and country experiences, which have been analysed above, it is possible to identify a set of potential building blocks toward reconceptualising rehabilitation during and — especially — after war as a strategic process. These fall into three clusters: conceptual perceptions; stages (in practice overlapping) in rehabilitation; programmatic elements within rehabilitation processes. These are set out here as a tentative checklist not a new paradigm partly because the data for the latter are inadequate (and paradigms paradigmatically out of fashion today) and partly because to do so in advance of the field research would risk both giving needless hostages to ignorance and distorting research findings to fit what was in part too procrustean a frame.

**Conceptually** more coherence and holism is needed. In practice most literature — and most projects — concentrate on political or social or (micro) economic and in parallel either on survival during and just after conflict, aspects of early post-conflict resettlement or (more occasionally) overall rebuilding toward a renewed development dynamic well after the end of overt conflict. It is relatively rare to encounter an articulated holistic treatment even at theoretical/conceptual, and still less at national level and nearly unknown to do so at articulated, operationally oriented national level.\(^8\)

This is particularly unhelpful (intellectually or operationally) because the complexity of rehabilitation relates in large part to interactions among political (including civil society and local government as well as central government and state), economic and social components at any one time and over time from the war period through not-war not-peace to early, tentative post-conflict, to a period of a more securely rooted dynamic away from armed conflict and risk of its renewal to a period which is effectively post conflict and post rehabilitation. To describe that period as “renewed development” is in practice misleading because the period prior to war has usually been one of severe tensions, political and economic unsustainability and either of severely deformed economic development or — arguably in all of Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia/Somaliland and Ethiopia/Eritrea - economic stagnation and regression. Semantically rehabilitation need not mean restoring as before nor return to some hypothetical long term growth/development turnpike. In practice any such attempt is almost sure to fail unless it is a symbolic political appeal to a pre-war golden (at least in fading memory) age which does not involve seeking to recreate specific policies, institutions or resource allocations. The evocations of the Nkrumah era in Ghana by both the 1969-71 Progress Party regime and the subsequent

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\(^8\) For a rare exception see Mozambique (1992) — a partially articulated sectoral and micro strategy with costings,
Rawlings governments is an example of the political use of such a rehabilitation symbol and also of how little related it need be to the actual conditions, policies or institutions of the ‘golden era’. In Burundi an appeal to the political heritage of the outsider assassinated Prince/Prime Minister Louis Rwegasore might conceivably play a similar role, but only if an actual articulated reconciliation oriented political-social-economic strategy was available and operational to sustain the possible initial social reconciliation/political suspension of disbelief the symbol might provide. A second and related conceptual weakness is failure to be country centred. This is true in two senses: rehabilitation programming is often written and attempted to be applied as if it were identikit across conflicts and countries or, at least, easily adaptable by fairly secondary changes. The second is that bulk of the writing – both conceptual and operational – is from an outsider not a domestic perspective.

This is a somewhat peculiar imbalance. Reconciliation and therefore the aspects of rehabilitation which contribute to it, is intensely domestic. It cannot in any deep or lasting sense be imposed. While external rule may – or may not vide Rwanda and Burundi – create a territorial loyalty and a habit of living side by side or together (a remarkably general characteristic of British and French African colonies) which form a foundation for a moderately stable state, twenty year trusteeships after civil war are not acceptable to the international community any more than to African states and purely transitory military, civil governance and relief exercises are at least as likely to collapse – vide Somalia – as to create even a tentative basis for domestic renewal – e.g. Mozambique, perhaps Sierra Leone. The now general perception that structural adjustment programmes must be “owned” – and therefore to a substantial extent designed and product differentiated – by SSA (or other) states is logically even more relevant to post-war rehabilitation and reconciliation.

Clearly some aspects of both war and clawing back from its results are general both in respect to causes and their interaction and as to programmes/policy instruments and their implementation/phasing. But the value of comparative analysis and of toolkits of policies, programmes and analysis is likely to dependent in large part on their grounding in case study analysis recognising divergences as well as commonalities. Somaliland’s history and dynamics are very unlike those of Burundi and Rwanda (or Ethiopia and Eritrea) and significantly divergent from those of Somalia. Making use of analytical or programmatic insights from other experiences productively depends on understanding these differences.

estimated multiplier effects and macro sustainability tests.
This weakness probably comes out of the reactive, crisis management – or more accurately in most cases containment – nature of the impetus to most writing and to the fact that states, unlike academics, are not prone to publishing or to formal conceptualisation of deeper analysis and operational strategy.

A third need is for deep, empirical analysis devoted to comprehension of the causes and dynamics of conflicts leading to (and remaining after wars) in order to have a basis for mastering them (Adedeji and Green, 1997). The externally designed, crisis containment approach to war and (apparent) post war situations is usually deeply deficient in comprehension. Perhaps the most serious general gaps are comprehension of history. For example the near five hundred years of violent conflict among three pre colonial states/community groupings which are the lineal predecessors of the three main Angolan political forces is ignored at ones – and especially Angolans’ – peril in designing settlements. The even longer conquest, non-assimilation and rising/repression history of the Interlake Region as well as the very different post 1920 evolution of its former Ankole and Kagera Kingdom components from those of Rwanda and Burundi, both highlight that genocide in Burundi and Rwanda is different in kind from war deaths in Somalia or Sierra Leone or Mozambique or Angola and by the very different dynamics of Kagera that the evolution to genocide of Rwanda and Burundi was not inevitable and – presumably – can be reversed or rechanneled.

The combination of ahistoricism, beyond current or near current events (e.g. the 1961-88 or 1975-1998 war history of Angola as opposed to the 1498-1998 history of the Kongo, Prazeiro confederation and Plateau Kingdoms and their social-political-military successors) and of largely externally vs. domestically based analysis and programming lead to substitution of unhelpful labels – ethnicity, religion, genocide, land pressure. Each label does relate to certain aspects of realities but usually partially and therefore often misleadingly. Conflict in Somalia and Somaliland is within a single ethnic group which perceives itself as such and is not characterised by genocide. Indeed in SSA only Burundi and Rwanda are characterised (not only from 1994) by genocide strictly defined. Further ethnicity, historic state legacies and regionalism are overlapping and interactive but not the same thing. The course of the war in Mozambique and the voting pattern in the election showed massive regional and significant urban-rural divides, but relatively little ‘tribal’ and nearly no ‘religious’ base cleavages. Further ascribed (including in particular self ascribed) identities are often – by no means always – the result of conflict and a tool in manipulating, sustaining, mobilising for it as much as a pre-existing cause. That the wa Hutu and wa Tutsi (or in a high proportion of cases ‘Creole’) people of the former Kagera Kingdom now perceive themselves as first Tanzanian, second wa Haya (a composite regional grouping which is in no strict sense ethnic even if linguistically and socially distinctive) and only third wa Hutu or wa Tutsi is also evolving, self ascribed identity and one
which – as they themselves say – makes Rwandan and Burundian events very hard for them to comprehend. Ascribed identities, once developed, are of course real for evil or for good but as Rwanda and Kagera illustrate the process of ascription and the strategic aims and policies shaping it can erode and transcend armed conflict as well as perpetuate and accentuate it.

The latest labelling ‘resource scarcity’ is similar. There is a paucity of land in Rwanda, Burundi, much of Ethiopia and of Eritrea and in Somalia and Somaliland (albeit in these last two cases it is water rights which are more crucial than those to land per se). Resource scarcities do create tensions which can lead to war. Similarly wars are usually intended to take or sustain control over material resources and the dynamics of war benefit certain actors. The inter sub-clan battles over Merca, Brava and Baidoa in Somalia illustrate the first. The historic and continuing Somali tradition of quite distinct (if overlapping) ‘peace lords’ (primarily accountable elders and merchants) and ‘warlords’ (primarily younger military specialists supereeding the ‘peacelords’ until the war ends) sheds a good deal of light on the war process there – and on the reasons for Ethiopian doubts UN (and recently Egyptian) beloved conferences of warlords excluding elders are a particularly fruitful road to peace. But the process of conflict can cause positive as well as negative shifts – prominent ‘war lord’ associated merchants in Somalia who used war to further primitive accumulation (in the strict sense of that term) have by their success and in their own present self interest become advocates and potent backers of peace.

The again related fourth limitation on the analysis of war and war related conflict in general and rehabilitation in particular is far too monistic an emphasis on short term, ‘apolitical’, humanitarian, survival oriented approaches. These are crucial – for the dead there can be no rehabilitation. “Grab, dab and jab” (safe place of refuge, food, preventative/simple curative medical services) are important. Interventions to halt fighting can save lives – just as the UN forces’ failure to do so in Kigali in 1994 when they were the strongest military presence there cost lives, perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives, as well as permanently shaping the Kigali governments’ perception of at least the political and military aspects of the UN.

But what these interventions (including the military ones) can do is buy time for reconciliation and rehabilitation to be begun, to make progress and provide visible payoffs and to put down domestic roots. They can avert worsening a war situation but not solve it. Indeed used as a substitute for a deeper conflict resolution strategy they can make matters worse. Whatever its actual aims, France’s “Operation Turquoise” in fact provided cover for the defeated Interahamwe/Rwanda Army forces to retreat safely to Zaire with hundreds of thousands of tightly controlled genuine refugees. The ‘apolitical’ feeding, housing, protecting of the IH-Army-Genuine Refugee communities without breaking the genocide makers’ rule over them by force led directly to continued war or near war in Rwanda and to the civil war turning
'Mobutu's Zaire' into 'Kabila's Congo'. The disastrous results of these myopic exercises in apolitical humanitarianism are still at work – IH’s capacity for genocide in Rwanda is curbed, not broken and IH/ex Rwanda Army units have been prominent in the Congo (Brazzaville) and Central African Republic civil wars as well as – perhaps – in the incursive violence in Western Uganda.

Analysis and broader strategic conceptualisation cannot provide easy answers. To cause mass starvation among genuine refugees in Zaire to break IH was not a realistic option while disarming and imprisoning IH-ex Government leaders and core cadres would have meant military action in which genuine refugees died too. The Tanzania ‘solution’ of largely disarming, controlling camp boundaries (to protect Tanzanians and Rwanda) but not going in to seize the IH rulers of the camps also had limitations, among them failing to create conditions facilitative to reconciliation, voluntary return or subsequent peaceful reintegration. It did meet the short term humanitarian and conflict suspension goals and limited IH’s capacity for present or future harm but little more.

Humanitarian short term survival relief and longer term rehabilitation resource allocations are by their nature partisan and political. To be partisan for peace and for allocation patterns which reduce the risks of and erode the tensions leading to armed conflict is not the same thing as blindly refusing to recognise that food, safe residence, vaccines and medicines, access to land and livelihood are the objects and means to war as well as to peace and that the consequences of their provision, allocation or non-provision can make a significant difference as to how future tensions will develop, conflicts be managed and violence curbed or aggravated.

Similarly only an outside focused approach can fail to recognise that a government has duties (including accountability) to its supporters as well as to its doubters and opponents. For example to ask the government of Mozambique to shift Southern urban primary health and education funding to central rural districts when the former are just below barely adequate levels even if the latter are very much lower is asking it to be both non-accountable (to its core support base throughout the war and in the elections) and to treat largely opposition areas more favourably than supportive ones. President Chissano does seek to be ‘President of all the people’ as well as a partisan politician and is well aware that strengthening legitimacy and reducing the risk of renewed conflict as well as restoring a national development dynamic do require special attention to provision of targeted additional resources to service deprived areas. But seeking reallocation from supporters, with not quite minimum adequate access, to opponents is a very different proposition and, if anything, strengthens the hands of government supporting elements who are at best lukewarm to reconciliation through rehabilitation for all Mozambicans.
Four stages of rehabilitation can be identified and distinguished conceptually. These are comprehension, survival support, initial post-war rehabilitation and sustained rehabilitation toward renewed development. The time frame is from full scale war to a situation in which post war is no longer the principle defining characteristic. The stages can rarely be fully consecutive for two reasons. Action cannot wait for achieving full comprehension or full peace and in any case some aspects of comprehension arise from evaluating the results of action and some part of a transition to peace from survival support as well as rehabilitation proper. Further peace is frequently partial geographically, tentative as to duration or both. To do nothing beyond pure survival support anywhere until peace was stable everywhere would doubtless reduce the risk of resource allocations to programmes swept away by renewed or changing patterns of war, but it is neither humanly appealing nor particularly likely to speed or improve the stability of transition to peace.

The understanding and comprehension phase should begin first partly because it can be pursued even while war makes full scale rehabilitation unfeasible and partly because comprehension is a prudent and frequently an essential contribution to designing rehabilitation (as indeed for peace agreements with any chance of success).

However, because in depth studies of causes, historical dynamics and present/contexts trends usually begin late, take second priority (for most actors) to crisis containing and/or peace negotiation/promulgation and humanitarian survival support it will in fact rarely be possible for anyone to have achieved a relatively clear and accurate comprehension. This is especially true for three reasons:

• First, genuinely held perceptions - even if inaccurate - are contextual facts with results flowing from them but unlike objective exogenous realities are subject to rapid change for better or for worse;

• Second, the course of reunification of administration, of reconciliation of peoples and of lenders and their interaction alter the reality being comprehended - sometimes as in Mozambique and Somaliland since 1992 quite dramatically;

• Third, more insights from more actors are available only in the more open (physically, politically and socially) contexts of post-war interaction and of operational programming.

And, as noted earlier, best judgements from incomplete and too shallow studies are often used of necessity because failure to act to meet immediate survival and return home needs during the
run down of and in the immediate aftermath of a war are humanly unacceptable, politically impracticable and hardly likely to improve the context and prospects for reconciliation.

The second theme or state is **survival support** - usually the dominant concern during war and even in the first months of after war or during the no war/no peace suspension of hostilities periods which have been nearly universal in the rundown of African wars.

The overriding mission of survival support is to save lives - and thereby the possibility of future rehabilitation from individual through national levels. The principal means are access to food, to water, to sanitation to primary health services, to safe residence and - slightly less urgently - to primary and continuing education.

The rehabilitation content relates not so much to the resources and programmes but to means of delivery. The higher the degree of refugee self organisation by persons committed, or at least aspiring, to peace and by governments concerned with livelihood, public service and civil society rehabilitation, the greater the potential contribution to subsequent stages of rehabilitation.

The caveat on self organisations is a crucial one. Rwandaise refugee camps (including the “59er” Tutsi ones in Western Uganda for a quarter century as well as the 1994-97 Hutu ones) were certainly been organised from within. But both the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front - the dominant party in the present government) and the IH (Interahamwe) organised to preserve and enhance the capacity to make war to win back what had been lost. The problem of judgement about a refugee settlements' leadership is even more complex than knowing its views on peace. SWAPO of Namibia had effective, recognisable civil governance structures and skills/self reliance related quasi livelihood/education programmes in its main camps in Angola and Zambia. These at that time were conducive to peace and rehabilitation if - and only if - the observer believed peace in Namibia required an end to South African and collaborator hegemony there and a negotiating/electoral/subsequent governmental process in which SWAPO was at the least a major actor. That political 'problem' inherent in refugee self organisation - together with arrogance, a will to power and a desire to be Platonic guardians for refugees and displaced persons - may help explain why both UNHCR and most NGO's do not in practice desire self organised, efficient camp governance and programme guidance other than by themselves. UNHCR did favour forced separation of refugees and IH in then Zaire – the Security Council, following the Somalia debacle, declined to provide funds or forces.

Self organisation of refugees is a step away from dependence and toward rehabilitation of civil society and local government skills. Since many African displaced/refugee camps have at least
moderate proportions of semi skilled through professional personnel, routine administration as well as health - education - water - food access - access to partial livelihood could often be staffed, organised designed and run by them with relatively limited external professional knowledge inputs. This rarely happens except in displaced persons settlements largely under domestic government auspices albeit SWAPO camps were an exception in collaboration with and Interahamwe dominated ones in Zaire nominal conflict but operational complicity with external sponsors and with the Mobutu regime which saw IH as a tool to restore its crumbling control over Western Zaire.

A point relevant to future gender relations is women's involvement in camp organisation and the food system. On the face of it both African divisions of labour (women's responsibility to secure and to prepare food) and reducing gender imbalance (power - even partial - over food is important) argue for distribution of "dry rations" (i.e. food to prepare vs. "wet rations" of prepared meals) to each household's senior female member and to majority female membership of committees managing/operating food programmes. Similar considerations apply in respect to camp resident involvement in water, sanitation, nutrition linked crop production and preventative and child health.

Most displaced persons/refugees do not wish to be idle but to engage in livelihood activities - not least because refugee/displaced person support is almost never adequate in quantity and always (by reason of technically insurmountable obstacles) non optimal in makeup. Camp managers and supporting agencies tend to give this low, or O priority, indeed frequently actively to discourage it. What opportunities exist is a question of fact which varies from context to context. Basic service provision, wages for infrastructure work, handicap/artisanal production for education, community markets and sale would often provide a not insignificant internal income flow. One route to finance would be to hire less expatriates (15 to 25 times as expensive) and another to build a larger infrastructure and household production (e.g. agricultural, construction, household tools and inputs from seeds through cutlasses to water buckets) component into emergency survival relief.

The longer a war - and the resulting set of displaced person/refugee camps - last the more important such elements are likely to be in providing a foundation for subsequent rehabilitation proper. Long stays in refugee camps with limited resources and activities are humanly debilitating and dependency creating; participation in civil society - local governance - service provision - livelihood can have a more positive outcome.

To go beyond grab-dab-jab in emergency survival support does have real costs and risks. First, especially to the extent it leads to infrastructural investment, it both entails more expenditure
than strictly defined survival support and can be swept away overnight if the war is one in which most territory is not securely and permanently controlled by either side. It is enlightening to note that the better organised combatant organisations with clear social and political projects - e.g. SWAPO, EPLF (Eritrea) - and several beleaguered governments - e.g. Somaliland, RPF Rwanda, Mozambique - have taken on those costs and risks rather more fully than external actors have usually been willing to do so.

The third phase of **early post war rehabilitation** - including cases in which a truce and negotiations have greatly reduced violence and seem fairly sure to end in peace - necessarily includes a very substantial survival support component. Demobilisation return home, and housing and livelihood (e.g. land clearing and preparation plus waiting for the first crop) rebuilding all require both food to live and at least partial rehabilitation of elements of health water and education services as much as refugee camps albeit on in more dispersed and geographically moving context.

To deliver in this new context requires both dispersed local (community, civil society and/or local governmental) and national (logistical, strategic, coordinating) domestic capacity. To attempt dominantly donor/NGO operations appears logically - and in practice - to be likely to produce incoherence, gaps and cost inefficiency.

At this stage there is a distinct economic meaning (or category) difference even though food, health and water plus supporting delivery logistics remain dominant. The funding is in fact investment in rebuilding houses, services, infrastructure and livelihoods, not survival consumption transfer payments. (In the case of enterprise rehabilitation - e.g. of a plantation - precisely the same costs would be - indeed are - titled wages in investment projects and capitalised to be recovered from future earnings).

The conceptualisation and, especially, articulated programme design for urban livelihood rehabilitation after war is much weaker than that for rural. This is partly because it is more complex and partly because SSA urban livelihoods are dominated by wages (including 'informal' i.e. non recorded and regulated - enterprise wages) whereas rural are dominated by small farming (or herding) household enterprises. The packages of peace and security (law order) tools - food - basic services - infrastructure - market access needed for the latter are at least in broad outline fairly well identified and agreed. In the urban case self employment, small enterprise employment and large enterprise led macro growth sometimes with supporting interim jobs from infrastructure and housing reconstruction tend to be argued for almost as if they were alternatives and with relatively limited articulation or relevant (successful) cases of implementation results.
The early post-war rehabilitation phase’s economic and political aspects interact in domestic governmental (and usually civil society) thinking but less so in that of external actors. Even in the former case national capital perspectives often overweight coherence, coordination and centralisation versus local level participation, flexibility and pragmatic identification/testing of a range of ways forward. The external perspectives appear to weight instant elections much more highly and both household peace and security (law and order) and governmental capacity to delivery (basic services, infrastructure, law and order, food security safety nets) much less than do domestic actors.

Elections are valuable symbolically to endorse a peace accord to mark the shift from bullets to ballots to dialogue and to create fora for alternative leader interactions. Whether this means they should always be near instant is less clear. Given their very high cost, especially if the voter education and candidate access programmes needed to maximise their symbolic and reconciliatory value are provided, the trade off and phasing relative to capacity enhancement do not appear to be subject to self evident, generalisable answers.

Peace and Security/Law and Order are highlighted by external as well as domestic actors. However, for the latter the emphasis tends to be on a civilian police force and a magistrates’ court system which together provide for peaceful enjoyment of daily life secure from armed or other forceful interference whether by state, ordinary criminals, officials or insurgencies, backed by the power to prevent, sanction and reverse such interventions. External actor concern tends to pay little overt attention to this level and to focus on constitutional and commercial law and the higher judiciary (Green, 1997).

From a rehabilitation perspective almost all post-war states need renewed and larger civil police forces and magistrates’ court systems. Creating a civilian police force has been a priority in Somaliland, Eritrea and Ethiopia (plus via a Muslim civil society route in Mogadishu North) as has renewing and expanding an existing one in Mozambique and Uganda. In none of these cases (with the exception of some DfID funded programmes) have donor governments - let alone NGO’s - shown much support for that priority beyond training magistrates. The justice and reconciliation aspects of the inheritance of a vicious war and/or a brutally oppressive and corrupt regimes raise real conundrums especially, but not only, if the war had a negotiated ending. For example.

1. Rwanda’s new government has sought to avert instant justice/retribution but has rejected overlooking active involvement in genocide. As a result it has over 100,000 prisoners awaiting trial with a massive financial burden despite grievously inhumane conditions. It has
opted for trials according to law, but neither has nor can conceivably create the investigatory, prosecutorial, court or defence legal capacity to process over 100,000 cases in a decade (especially assuming a normal ongoing legal system load). Once second and third level offenders are tried, sentencing poses problems. Mass executions over a long period cannot be conducive to reconciliation; the economic costs of a long term prison population of over 10,000 are unsustainable; cautions and suspended sentences (except for coerced followers and in a clear statutory reconciliation context) for complicity in genocide risk being both open to derision and conducive to outbreaks of private vengeance;

2. The new Ethiopian government’s approach of formal, correct trials seeking draconic sentences for a limited number of leaders and clearly personally vicious lower level participants in the Mengistu regime is perhaps less broadly unsettling, but is open to queries as to whether it is too selective at lower levels and too broad brush political at higher;

3. In Somalia (to a much lesser extent Somaliland) complicity in the late Barre regime (either in repression and violence or in corruption) taints most present leaders and most (again much more universally in Somalia than Somaliland) have engaged in actions during the war which are very hard to justify. Any settlement will require wide amnesties - but how wide? None excluded? Only those who do not consent to the settlement? In this case a history of violent conflicts, mediated on a no reprisal basis and subsequent cooperative coexistence may reduce the contradictions, but has no real past experience with mixed population urban areas;

4. Peace and Reconciliation Commissions are a cause of tension - over whether to create, with what powers and how operating - as evidenced in South Africa (the only operational case), Namibia (which has a hot debate on whether) and - less clearly - Mozambique, where tacit grassroots reconciliation and historic cleansing rites appear to have been more widespread and effective than most observers (including Mozambican ones) would have predicted.

What aspects of these issues fall under rehabilitation rather than state reconstruction or community renaissance is unclear. While the basic dilemmas are probably moral and emotional, the economic constraints (vide the Rwanda case) are very real ones.

Capacity to deliver - especially health, education, veterinary and agricultural extension, water, law and order, survival food security safety nets and local infrastructure - is a basic criterion for judging governance - not only, but also not least, in sub-Saharan African post war contexts.
The fourth stage - rehabilitation from return home, initial reintegration and rehabilitation to a political economy in which post war and putting back are no longer the key parameters is marked by more coherent medium term holistic strategy (grounded on more data and experience) and by conversion of emergency survival support inputs (e.g. food aid) into infrastructural finance/second (wage) income livelihood support/commercial system supply stabiliser flows in rural and - perhaps less generally - urgent areas. The key elements are:

a. toward universal access to basic services - water, health, education, law and order (peace and security), extension, nutrition;
b. toward universal local level basic infrastructure linked to;
c. household level livelihood access with
d. safety nets in respect to natural disaster calamities and to hazards of age and physical/mental handicap not able to be met by households or traditional family - lineage - sub clan mechanisms.

Entry into this phase is likely to be two or three years after the end of war and the mobilisation of substantial resources (usually initially external but on occasion - e.g. Ethiopia - from massive reduction and reallocation of military spending). Ethiopia and Eritrea were clearly in this phase by 1995 and Somaliland is probably entering it. Mozambique should be, but has had massive problems in achieving allocations of external flows to this purpose. Continued instability and outbursts of violence mean that Rwanda and Somalia are in overlapping survival support and initial rehabilitation phases. Uganda is hard to place because most of the country is in a post rehabilitation phase but the middle (Gulu and Lira) and extreme (West Nile and Pokot) North are in, at best, no war/no peace contexts under central military rule.

One problem in analysis at this stage is that the degree of integration and or conflation of rehabilitation and post (at least in the sense of not being in any direct sense related to the previous war or to the specific reversal of its impact on poor households and communities) rehabilitation strategy and/or the labelling used. Ethiopia has dropped Rehabilitation as a generally used rubric (Uganda never used it but arguably also never had a coherent, broad front rehabilitation strategy or programme package as such) while Eritrea and Mozambique have not.

The best test of when rehabilitation ends is probably the point at which reversing war damage - to livelihoods, basic services, infrastructure, markets and institutions is no longer useful as an organising theme for more than a small proportion of public sector and household sector resource allocations. A parallel test would be the point at which - say - 90% of poor and not so poor rural and urban households had regained pre-war personal and service access levels of real income and the per cent of households in absolute poverty was back to pre-war levels. Ethiopia
(taking 1980 as pre-war) and perhaps Eritrea (taking 1961) are at or near those points as is Uganda. Somalia, probably Somaliland and Rwanda are not nor - self evidently given that its war is still on a rising trend - is Burundi.

The third cross sectional approach to conceptualising and organising rehabilitation is Political-Economic-Social. This division has distinct limitations - but also uses - because the three do (or should) interpenetrate and interact. For example law and order/peace and security as discussed above is political in terms of creating a context for reconciliation, social in terms of making positive community and civil society dynamics possible and economic on both sides of the accounts - a necessary and facilitating condition for sustained increases in household livelihoods and one requiring not insignificant allocations of finance, educated personnel, training/retraining and equipment. Similarly it is an area in which institutional construction (where no civil police force exists at the end of the war) or revitalisation (in cases in which it is small and/or debilitated) is crucial to getting value for resources and a reorientation to user friendliness and accountability (vs. repression as an outside - to communities and households - power enforcer) is frequently needed to avoid police ‘rehabilitation’ being positively counterproductive.

Political rehabilitation is probably the hardest to conceptualise because of the risk of being so inclusive as to treat reconciliation and acceptance of functional negotiated compromise in an accountable, popularly selected (and remandated or replaced) political process as sub-aspects of public finance and economic restructuring. The opposite course of seeing political reconciliation and process as related to rehabilitation only in the sense of budgetary funding is equally unhelpful because too narrow.

The elements of political reconciliation and transformation particularly related to rehabilitation include:

1. general provision of finance - elections, parliaments, public services etc. all cost money and if grossly underfinanced cannot be either efficient or credible;

2. rebuilding basic service (including law and order) delivery capacity. Capacity to delivery basic public services is a key to perceived legitimacy as the efforts of certain combatants to sustain or to create such capacity and of others (most notably Renamo in Mozambique) to destroy it demonstrate. One cause of conflict in several cases - not least Somalia where a 1987 UNICEF country review projected complete collapse of health-water-education-veterinary services by 1990 – is the deliquescence of civil governance and service provision. Similar disintegrations predate civil war in then Zaire, Sierra Leone, Liberia and to a lesser degree Uganda - albeit not Rwanda, Burundia or Ethiopia.
3. accountability/transparency (including public accounts) to a degree adequate to limit opportunities for misallocation or arbitrary allocation of resources and to create a recognition of the value of the state and its government (as bolstered under the previous head);

4. participation in the sense of direct household - civil society - community participation in information provision, strategic orientation, project design and prioritisation, outcome review and consequential programme adjustment - a theme which probably requires substantial decentralisation;

5. creation of a forward (from the initial post conflict situation) dynamic of household livelihoods and infrastructure relevant to them plus food security against calamities to create a climate conducive to negotiated non-maximalist political interaction and perceived state legitimacy and of macro economic growth adequate to loosen public finance constraints on state/public function rehabilitation.

The economic aspects of rehabilitation are probably dominant so far as its contributions to households, civil society and the state and certainly so in respect to actual programming whether macro strategic, sectoral or micro household (which is no less strategic from the household perspective).

The twin weaknesses in most actions under this head are lack of a coherent macro economic framework (linked to other macro economic aspects), inadequate coordinated (as opposed to fragmented) decentralisation and weak household participant/intended beneficiary input. There is a distinct tendency to a congeries of tiny initiatives by a host of organisations entirely outside any domestic political, economic or social coordination or accountability parameters, with little prioritisation, less strategic focus and no explicit (or examined) linkage to overall macro political economic policy. This is true of domestic governments, of the World Bank (which does take a coherent view of rehabilitation/poverty reduction as a strategic sector, but simply does not in practice build it into core macro strategy) of external NGO's (most of whom have limited expertise in and massive distrust of both macro economic strategy and domestic state/political coordination and parameter setting) and domestic civil society bodies (with exceptions heuristically of national level and operationally at community level). To each of these generalisations there are some exceptions but not very many.

The macro economic importance of rehabilitation should be evident in any case in which livelihoods, local infrastructure, basic services and law and order have been eroded or destroyed
for a significant proportion of population who, prior to war made significant contributions to national output, government revenue (usually via indirect taxes), domestic food supply (including that to urban areas), domestic enterprise markets and sources of raw materials and to exports. These conditions hold in Somalia, Somaliland, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi though somewhat less in Uganda beyond the general peace and security/basic services/infrastructure/access to user friendly market reversal of the declines of the Amin, magendo (illegal - not merely parallel - economy in command), and civil war years. Restoring (whether on the previous or revised patterns) these contributions is likely to be economically - as well as politically and socially - crucial and to be relatively cost efficient in contrast to massive infrastructure, enterprise and plantation investment (important as that may well be as a complementary element in an integrated strategy).

Potentially macro effective rehabilitation will need to be articulated not only sectorally but also provincially/regionally and at local governance unit level. While a public sector monopoly on thinking and action is neither feasible nor desirable, coordinating bodies operating within domestically determined parameters, for government, local government, domestic civil society bodies, NGO's and external donors and - perhaps more via consultation on particular policies than via more general coordinating - for enterprises. Such coordination is needed at all levels with significant decision taking and/or review roles from national to village. In this sense rehabilitation requires institutional changes which represent reform of, not return to, the past which was rarely marked by either effective coordination or participatory decentralisation.

The broad tools or sub-sectors of economic rehabilitation conceptualised in the foregoing way include:

1. restoration and improvement of basic infrastructure with special emphasis on neighbourhood and rural levels;

2. restoration and extension of access to basic public services;

3. restoration (or creation) of law and order/peace and security for ordinary households and for medium and small scale businessmen;

4. enhancing market access for household and other small producers and for small and medium enterprises primarily through the first three instruments but also by removing counterproductive intervention/regulation and improving access to credit;
5. enabling rapid recovery and advance of household livelihoods primarily through the earlier instruments including using waged labour intensive infrastructure as a means of restoring the outside income component crucial to a high proportion of small farming households in pre-war contexts;

6. creating functional safety nets against calamities especially in respect to food security after drought (or flood) and linking these to the first instrument (e.g. via work for food) both to maximise return on scarce resource allocations and to defend social and household dignity and morale;

7. develop (these usually were too tenuous before the war to make restoration a plausible goal) cooperative and co-financing arrangements with domestic civil society/social sector actors (e.g. churches, mosques, women’s groups, trade unions, small farmers unions, cooperatives, issue groups) engaged in similar endeavours and on a basic relationship pattern closer than automatic matching grants or handouts and distinctly less smothering than de facto take-overs.

The social aspects of rehabilitation programming are basically those designed to ensure equity and social cohesion (or at any rate limited animosity) as they require specific crafting of economic instruments and the impact of an improved economic context and a positive cooperative/co-funding approach on households, communities and domestic civil society.

Rehabilitation in this respect cannot mean only reconstituting the pre-war situation and trends for at least two reasons:

1. economic inequities as perceived within and among sectors of society are among the causes of conflict and therefore economic instruments (as well as political processes) to reduce them are integral to rehabilitation/reconciliation;

2. the course of war often changes what is socially and economically possible e.g. notably in respect to the number of female headed households and, therefore, the centrality of achieving equitable land, and livelihood more generally, access for them.

Two overlapping concerns within social rehabilitation are gender relations and land. Women’s status - and access to land - have been severely eroded by the ways in which historic labour and budgetary cross obligations and family (head of household) land provision obligations have evolved differentially. The massive increase in female headed households as a result of war has increased the need to reform these obligations and rights for both social and economic reasons.
Particular priority changes - as well as means to achieving them - probably vary widely within as well as between countries. Similarly variations arise in respect of the 'land question which is utterly different in Rwanda (where 'rehabilitation' of quasi feudal pre 1959 tenure would hardly be a contribution to reconciliation - a point on which the new government is clear albeit some NGO's do not appear to be), in rural Somaliland/Somalia (where water and herding access is more crucial than 'land' per se) and in Ethiopia (characterised by too little land for sustainable non poverty livelihoods in some areas, e.g. much of Tigre, as well as large, quasi feudal - quasi latifundista patterns elsewhere). As with gender, decentralisation and civil society domestic leadership is desirable both because local situations often vary widely and in ways little better known in - e.g. Maputo than in - e.g. London or Oxford (or Falmer) and because outside (including central government) intervention without relevant civil society partners is likely to be resisted or ignored. For example in Somalia/Somaliland the rising number of Islamic sacral leaders willing to condemn female circumcision as inconsistent with the Holy Koran is basic to any state - women’s group campaign to phase out its practice.

However, much of the social sector impact of rehabilitation is spillover. People who are better fed, clothed, educated with better access to food security and health services are likely to be less hostile to each other and to be willing to work together to expand these gains. Greater security - including prevention of violence - clearly eases living together and of making civil society bodies more for cooperation and communication and less for power struggles aimed at domination.

6. Approaches To Conceptual Articulation and Research

Rehabilitation of livelihoods is broadly analogous to welfare to work programme trajectories in economies not facing post war reconstruction, reconciliation and renewal crisis. Both seek to broaden avenues for those now below the poverty line and/or dependent on welfare/survival assistance to restore their household incomes, economic independence and dignity by raising earned incomes.

Both approaches share two problems:

1. adequate employment and livelihood cannot be accessible to all households (e.g. aged, handicapped) and access will take time for many more - therefore survival support will continue to be needed for households with too high a ratio of mouths to feed to able bodied hands to earn and for those who have not yet completed the transition as well as for victims of new exogenous shocks (natural calamities even if manmade catastrophes of renewed war are avoided);
2. while rehabilitation of livelihoods, like expansion of employment is a virtuous circle on national output, fiscal balance and household income levels on the fiscal (as on the household) level the costs tend to be front end loaded (e.g. grant or loan tools, and/or food while clearing land and rebuilding homes) and the gains back end slanted (e.g. indirect tax revenue from purchases out of added income, decreased welfare/grant food expenditure) so that the initial fiscal impact is negative. The Mozambique estimates (Mozambique, 1992) projected a need to transfer all emergency aid to emergency aid to Mozambique and all UNHCR/WFP support for refugees abroad to rehabilitation for the first three years but also a subsequent decline allowing phasing them out over the next three because of the - largely indirect - tax gains on direct poor household and multiplier GDP boosts.

The main thrust of rehabilitation is to shift aid - e.g. food aid - from survival subsistence to initial working and fixed capital provision. One route is to provide work for food and/or urban products. Under this infrastructure is produced by labour intensive methods with workers - full or part of seasonal time - paid in cash while food aid is sold in urban areas to finance wages, tools and materials. However, in the initial year or eighteen months grant food aid (cash might be preferable but selling food aid to pay grants to rebuilding farming households is not an accepted mode), analogous to plantation rehabilitation wages, many be needed to allow households to eat while reclearing and levelling land, restoring minor irrigation and drainage works and rebuilding homes. Thereafter, a seasonal labour surplus will normally exist and has 'traditionally' been devoted to earning cash wages to augment farm income - often thereby providing the investible surplus for enhancing productivity.

In both the grant and the wage aspects a clear gender issue arises. Historically households have been male headed and off farm labour (especially in construction) largely by men. War has dramatically speeded up the pre-existing rise in numbers of female headed households and - together with increased gender consciousness and the addition of cash components to the female outgoings responsibility sector of household budgets - also the numbers of women seeking paid work in rural as well as urban areas. Therefore, rehabilitation programmes face both a risk and an opportunity. If they ignore women - in respect to access to household grants, land access and waged jobs - they will fail to meet the needs of a quarter of all households and therefore to create a buoyant rural economy to interact (as supplier and customer) with the urban and with the commercial/transport sectors. However if they are gender conscious they can not only have direct economic benefits but also create a socially and politically acceptable and sustainable restructuring of gender relations. The example of Botswana rural works - both normal and relief
demonstrates that setting targets (in this case 35% to women) for allocations (in this case waged part year and/or seasonal jobs) is practicable and need not lead to social or political tensions.

The fact that it is easier to devise and easier to carry out rehabilitation of livelihood programmes in rural areas and - assuming inclusion of universal household access to land allocation, grant food and waged work as well as to operational services as basic goals with substantial early phased progress to toward their attainment - in respect to restoring or raising small farming family incomes to levels above the absolute poverty line has major distributional and political implications. It is likely to reduce overall and urban/rural direct income and income plus services inequalities and to make the rural market more important to producers, transporters and traders and therefore to the overall rate of economic growth and to that of tax receipts. The results in terms of economic and political priorities can be substantial - providing rural basic services plus opportunities for above absolute poverty line household incomes has been a successful political strategy for the governing parties in Botswana and Tanzania and is perceived as critical to future rural support by that of Mozambique. To describe these strategies as "buying votes" is somewhat beside the point - electoral fractions seen as crucial have (or can have) substantial leverage over what is provided, how and in what balance.

The main elements of rehabilitation as well as its phases have been set out earlier. So too have the basic articulations and iterations from macro through sectoral, regional and local to household. What is now needed is more direct observation of the extent and nature of conscious policy at each level, of the interactions among them and of the degree to which different actors (state, domestic social sector, enterprises, households, external NGO's, donors and IFI's) share a common perception, act within a coherent and somewhat articulated framework and coordinate operational endeavours. The need to pose this research requirement so broadly indicates a gap closing which is in itself a requirement for more effective rehabilitation: more managerial and independent monitoring directly oriented to prompt policy and proxis feedback not only by individual actors but also at macro and framework levels.

In carrying out country research it is important not to become embroiled in nomenclature. "Rehabilitation" is a headline with a short masthead life once war is concluded. However, dropping it as a verbal symbol may (or may not) be quite consistent with substantial priority to and resource allocations in support of the main elements of rehabilitation surveyed above and with their being seen together as a major strategic focus - e.g. in practice, though with less than full coordination among agencies either within government or more broadly, Ethiopia.

At least twelve major areas of enquiry are researchable:
1. Whether there is a strategic focus on and an articulated macro strategy for rehabilitation in qualitative and quantitative terms? If so what its main components and (state and non state) implementing agencies are. Whether there is a single coordinating agency and if not how - if at all - major actors harmonise intentions *ex ante*, operations and evaluation *ex post*.

2. The degree of rehabilitation components (by whatever name) by sector and how - and to what extent - national frameworks exist within which national and external, state and non state actors can share objectives, divide implementation and avoid conflicts/overlaps. If such framework building has been attempted, how and to what degree it has been operational in respect to which actors.

3. How much is being spent by national governments, local governments, domestic social sector, enterprises, households, external governments and international agencies and NGO's on basic services (primary and adult education, primary health care, extension, water, police and magistrates courts), basic infrastructural (rural and urban), related items (e.g. recapitalising rural commercial and transport networks), safety nets? What can be said about the cost efficiency within and among different sectors and actors? For example, in the Mozambican primary health sector the cost per service unit appears (on donor data via UNDP and on government budget data) to be ten times as high for external (predominately NGO) actors as for the national health network. However, in Ethiopia some - e.g. Sassekawa Foundation/Global 2000 - NGO agricultural livelihood rehabilitation programming appears to be a more efficient than most state programmes? Why and with what implications for resource reallocations among and within sectors and groups of actors?

4. What is the breakdown of provision of funding, advice, personnel by sector and by actor? How is it changing over time? To what extent are domestic ownership and provision of resources rising?

5. What multiplier and spill-over effects - e.g. on commerce, industry, urban production, GDP, fiscal revenues, exports, national food security - is rehabilitation likely to generate over the short (1 to 3 years) and medium (3 to 6 years) terms? Has this been calculated or approximately estimated? How? If not why not? For example in Ethiopia rural rehabilitation appears to have generated approximate national food balance in good weather years while in Eritrea (partly for ecological reasons) it is more doubtful whether it has yet done so which raises questions as to the timing and/or prudence of the state decision to end food aid. In respect to basic services and infrastructure the (largely indirect) fiscal revenue impact is
crucial to assessing sustainability - a fact many external actor (not least NGO) projects appear to overlook.

6. To what extent and in respect to which aspects by which actors is rehabilitation sustainable? Ultimately this turns on generation of household community and government income flows to take over costs an also to develop full design, operation and evaluation management capability and to merge rehabilitation into less post conflict focused development strategies. Have calculations on moving toward sustainability been done? How realistic are they?

7. What distributional impact does rehabilitation have? Geographically (both government and NGO programming tends to show very massive district and regional clustering)? By income distribution (e.g. basic access oriented programmes tend to reduce inequality while ones upgrading service quality or concentrating agricultural support on either better than average ecology areas or larger than average holdings tend to increase it)? By gender - e.g. access to land, rehabilitation grants, part time or seasonal employment?

8. Has specific attention been devoted to institutional aspects of market access including actual availability of competitive buyers, sellers and transporters? To the extent those oriented to rural areas and poorer urban residents have been among the enterprises/business persons most severely decapitalised by war, what attention has been given to providing actual access to (non-subsidised) working (inventory holding) and term (vehicles, buildings) capital? Are banking facilities actually adequate? Do hire purchase/leasing firms (or comparable bank windows) exist? To what extent does the ‘informal’ (i.e. unrecorded, unregulated) market offer alternative access?

9. What relationship exists - at national, sectoral and local levels - between rehabilitation and other strategic sectors (e.g. high, rapid fiscal and forex payoff projects; arterial infrastructure; superstructure levels to basic services from commercial law and courts to teaching hospitals)? How are trade-offs within resource constraints made? Or is most funding - especially external - largely non fungible and tried to specific projects or to relief/rehabilitation initiatives?

10. What survival safety nets from the pre-conflict period exist and what broad access safety nets to complement livelihood rehabilitation are being put in place? In rural areas are these focused on food ration, food for work and/or work for food? Other than Mozambique’s urban absolute poverty household income subsidy and Namibia’s universal old age pension are there any broad access official urban safety nets? Are extended household/lineage group/community safety nets still functional and for what proportion of households? Has
their weakening been a specific result of war or has it stemmed from more general overload from general and household calamities (natural and economic disasters) as well as catastrophes (notably war)?

11. Relations among actors are likely to be crucial in speed, scope, efficiency (unit cost of achieved gains) and sustainability. Interactions, degree of openness and participation appear to vary widely and in some cases quite pragmatically and specifically (e.g. some international agencies are detested in both Maputo and Hargeisa while others are well liked and the same holds true of NGO's - why?) To what extent do national-local-household ownership (the three may not coexist) influence relations with external actors, strategic designs, operational programmes (and their cost efficiency vis-à-vis rehabilitation delivered) and sustainability? What can be said about inter actor mutual communication, comprehension, respect and coordination? Why do many (perhaps all) of the government in the countries studied perceive most (not all) external actors as intolerably arrogant and incorrigibly contextually ill informed? And why do most external actors perceive most governments as inherently incompetent/corrupt, households as passive putty to be moulded (or at best victims to be helped and manipulated) and the domestic social sector as near invisible? How costly are these perceptions? Are they alterable? How?

12. To what extent is a process of rehabilitation taking place? In which sectors and localities is it strongest/weakest? Why? To what extent do lack of a strategic vision, of coordination, of national-local-household ownership, of financial resources, of baseline knowledge and of monitoring result in less being achieved than would appear attainable?

These issues are not exclusive - others doubtless exist particularly in ongoing war or semi war contexts - e.g. Burundi, North Central and Northern Uganda, Rwanda and Somalia. Nor can all be researched equally or fully in all countries - e.g. Somalia lacks - ex definitio - a national budget and also transparent regional ones; field research in, and arguably rehabilitation beyond preplanning and relief, is not practicable amid the rising tide of war in Burundi. They are intended as themes of importance in each country and ones on at which at least some qualitative and quantitative data can be brought together and analysed, nationally, sub-regionally and comparatively for all seven (including Sri Lanka) countries.

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