

# SOMALIA: TOWARD 1994-96 RECONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION, RESTRUCTURING

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for

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*The bird of time  
Has but a little way to fly -  
And, lo,  
The bird is on the wing.*

- Omar Khayyam  
The Rubaiyat

## A. Introduction

1. This paper is a prologue and contribution to designing a strategic approach to Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Restructuring, over 1994 - 1996, of production, livelihoods, basic human and social investments, supporting services and infrastructure, as well as the involvement therein of Somali civil society and local (through regional) governance.

2. It is not an emergency survival programme prospectus. It *pre-supposes* that the basic survival crisis will have been resolved and some foundations will have been laid for reconstruction during 1993, along the broad lines of the 1993 UNDP Programme

proposals - even if the more reconstruction-oriented elements of that Programme clearly cannot be carried out in full in 1993.

3. Emergency survival is necessarily (to use an immunisation analogy) a "grab and jab" operation. Today, it is necessary to vaccinate as many children as possible against measles and mothers and children against tetanus. It is also necessary to push out as much knowledge and materials on oral rehydration and as much nutritional supplementing foods as feasible. Parallels exist in other areas. Holding back in order to do full assessments (indeed, any beyond approximate numbers at risk), to design medium term procedures or institutional structures, or to operate normally high priority components for user dialogue and participation, would be most inappropriate today. There can be no rehabilitation for the dead (at least not in this world, which is the limit of UNICEF's remit).

4. A parallel component - which does look somewhat beyond immediate survival (even though that is an important consideration) - is tackling projects for livelihoods, nutrition and basic services which are self-evident and quickly implementable. OXFAM (UK)'s two projects for rehabilitation of smallscale irrigated production by farming communities in river basins, UNDP's Mogadishu water supply interim restoration and UNICEF's parallel project at Hargeisa are ongoing examples. FAO's proposal to rehabilitate livestock export quarantine stations (in the 1993 UNDP Programme) is an example of what can be added this year. These initiatives do look to reconstruction and livelihood rehabilitation and do involve more complex analysis and procedural/institutional structures than "grab and jab". But they are limited to what is contextually feasible here and now, and so cannot form, in themselves, an overall reconstruction and rehabilitation (let alone restructuring) framework or strategy.

5. The *assumptions* on the external context for 1994-1996 include:

a. by 1994, relative security and accessibility nationally (comparable to present situations in the North West and North East), and improving thereafter;

b. by 1994 and especially by 1996, increase in capacity of Somali civil society (village, nomadic group, neighbourhood and domestic NGO) and of local governance (town through regional);

c. no functional/operational national government by 1994. No assumption is made on the position by 1996, although emergence of a national government by then would facilitate the design and implementation of the proposed 1994-96 strategic programme;

d. no devastating drought year over the 1993/94 to 1996/97 crop cycles, and not more than one moderate drought year (which is optimistic).

6. As used here, "*reconstruction*" refers primarily to physical facilities and macro balances; "*rehabilitation*" refers primarily to household livelihoods, food security, access to basic services and to institutional/governance capacity; while "*restructuring*" applies to sectors (notably education, health, water) which were already nearing collapse by 1987-89 and would - as structured - have been wholly unsustainable in the 1990s even in the absence of war. All three must be based on a working knowledge of pre-1987 Somali magnitudes, structures, dynamics and weaknesses. In that respect, this report draws heavily on a 1987 *Report for UNICEF* by V Jamal and the present author.

7. The reasons for presenting an approach for 1994-96 *now* are threefold:

a. it can help to provide a framework and reference point for survival support in 1993 - especially for the livelihood, nutrition and basic service project components;

b. it will take time to shift to the more detailed analysis, feasibility designing and consultation/participation required for the rehabilitation-restructuring-planning process;

c. if substantial progress in implementation in 1994-96 is to be achieved, the 1994 component must be ready for the mobilisation of financial support and final implementation design by September 1993 (to allow for a rolling start as of March 1994).

## **B. Population, Displaced Persons: Numbers and Flows**

8. The probable *resident population* of Somalia in early 1993 is **4.5 million** (4.31 - 4.66 million - for details of estimation see Table 1-A). Of this total, about 1.45 million (32%, range 1.3 - 1.6m) are *internally displaced* or with wiped-out livelihoods and homes, though still living in or near ruins (for details of estimation see Table 2-D).

9. Externally displaced persons (*refugees*) probably number on the order of **1.04 million** (range 0.95 - 1.1m - for details of estimation see Table 1-B). Taken together, *internally displaced persons plus refugees* total about 45% of the refugee plus resident population (comparable to 50% for Mozambique).

10. These rough baseline totals are relevant to programming for *food security* and *return home* (a much more accurate and descriptive term than "resettlement"). In particular, total levels of return home which can be achieved in 1993 and over 1994-96 are constrained, and large numbers of early refugee returns will imply delayed return home for displaced persons or long stays in "holding camps" in Somalia on return - neither a very desirable prospect.

11. In respect to *displaced persons*, there are significant intra-urban, urban-to-urban, urban-to-rural and rural-to-rural groups (Table 1-D).

12. Perhaps one third each of total displaced persons were in the nomadic, agro-pastoral/agricultural and urban resident groups before 1988-92.

13. Considering security, transport and livelihood rehabilitation constraints, *a possible (but optimistic) target scenario for returns home* would be:

\* 1993: 250,000 - 300,000 (largely in riverain agriculture)

\* 1994: 250,000 - 350,000

\* 1994/96: 600,000 - 700,000

leaving *still displaced by the end of 1996* (including population increase) some 175,000 - 250,000, consisting primarily of:

a. members of nomadic or rainfed agro-pastoral households who cannot return home because of herd wipeout, leaving no livelihood to return to (100,000 - 150,000);

b. persons from districts/provinces now occupied by different and non-friendly clans/subclans (e.g. Gedio) (25,000 - 50,000);

c. persons in households who have otherwise irrevocably lost land use claims and (at least through 1996) jobs in the plantation sector (50,000 - basically Swahili minority community members).

14. If the 175,000 - 250,000 long term internally displaced group is to be reduced, additional actions will be needed to complement those outlined in subsequent sections:

a. **purchase of core herds** (roughly 60-80 sheep/goats, 25 cattle, 10 camels or a combination thereof - comparable to the recommendation of the Second Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance Group 1 and to other informed estimates), to make return home feasible. Sheep/goats and camels could probably be sourced in the NW/NE but cattle are much more doubtful because the national herd was dominantly in the central and southern areas. The herds in these areas are (as of early 1993) only 30 - 50% of normal (1987/89) levels, so additional purchases for wiped-out households there are not likely to be feasible;

b. **expansion of smallscale irrigation** through increased area and/or conversion

of some former large estate areas to household agriculture. Land availability constraints apply to the first case and cost constraints to both. Given that suitable locations are limited, basically only South and Eastern Hawie in the Shebelle's, South Darod in Lower Juba, Swahili in both, and Issak in West Galbeed/Audal irrigated crescent would wish to (or could confidently in terms of safety) return to or resettle in this way;

c. either **early re-opening of large plantations** or inauguration of full scale **rehabilitation** to generate up to 7,500 jobs (benefitting 50,000 plus household members) - but virtually all in Lower Juba.

15. *Refugees* are predominantly in Ethiopia and Kenya with secondary clusters in Saudi Arabia/Yemen and Italy/Canada (Table 1-A). Probably at least half are from the nomadic group with one fifth to one quarter each former agro-pastoralists/agriculturalists and urban resident group members.

16. It is likely that about 30% of refugees will wish to return as soon as relative security is attained in their home areas; 50% after 1 - 2 years of stability in home areas; 20% later or never. This suggests feasible 1993-1996 targets/levels:

\* 1993: up to 150,000 (largely to the North West)

\* 1994: up to 150,000 (largely along Ethiopian border)

\* 1995-96: 600,000

\* Post 1996 or never: 220,000.

17. The constraints are multiple: objective security conditions; refugee perceptions of prospects for security and stability; feasibility or otherwise of direct cross-border movements (with pioneers going ahead while others remain in "base" camp); mechanics of transport home (given insecurity of passage through hostile sub-clan areas); cost and limits to total return home/livelihood capacity for internally displaced and refugee (externally displaced) households.

18. Unfortunately the above review suggests that relatively few of the refugees now in Kenya (except perhaps those from Lower Juba) are likely to be willing or able to return home prior to 1995-96. If this delayed phasing is impossible (for whatever reasons) then only two realistic options appear to exist:

a. establishing long-stay transit camps for returning refugees in their home districts; and/or

b. reducing internally displaced return home flows, leaving more of the internally displaced to return home later than 1996.

Either of these appears more costly in human and social terms to refugees and internally displaced persons, and in financial terms to programme supporters, than the route leaving roughly 200,000 each internal and external displaced persons to return home after 1996 or not at all.

19. Because it is disproportionately difficult for nomadic (or rainfed agro-pastoralist) households who have lost their herds to return to their previous livelihoods, the *post*-return population pattern is likely to be:

\* Nomadic: 25 - 30% (1987: 35 - 40%)

\* Agro-pastoralist/  
Agriculturalist: 30% (1987: 30%)

\* Urban: 40 - 45% (1987: 30 - 35%)

(See Table 1-C for more detailed presentation).

### C. Minority Community

20. Somalia has two non-Somali minority communities - Oromo (perhaps 40,000) and Swahili (of the order of 250,000 - 300,000). (While both do speak what linguists term technically as "bantu languages" it is unsound to use the term "bantu" to describe the communities because in the Somali context that word has overtones similar to those in the Afrikaner context).

21. The *Oromo* are largely refugees from Ethiopia (up to 35,000 on recent unconfirmed estimates). Almost all could - if assisted - and probably wish to return home to Ethiopia. UNHCR should undertake that exercise promptly.

22. The *Swahili* are in a different position. The oldest group dates from the 15/16th Century when Kismayu was temporarily the northernmost of the Coastal Swahili City States with posts at Brava and Merca. The majority, however, came as slaves in the 18th and 19th Centuries working on Somali cotton and sugar plantations.

23. This community's position was increasingly insecure and weak in the 1980s. Most were river valley farmers without formal access to water (and with imperfect

titles), plantation workers and/or low income urban workers (in service occupations, cap making and - perhaps - fishing). The farmers had some access to water for themselves and limited stock through working for river bank title holders. The plantation workers had plots, water access and bananas as a portion of their emoluments.

24. The war has been catastrophic for the Swahili community:

- a. the plantations are closed and Lower Juba is very insecure;
- b. the irrigation on the Shebelle's is largely non-functional with negative knock-on effects to users upslope from the immediate riverside area and security is (or has been) largely absent;
- c. urban employment has collapsed;
- d. the Swahili have no clan or sub-clan to advance their claims/defend their rights.

25. Unconfirmed estimates suggest 250,000 Swahili persons in Lower Juba and the Shebelle's, of whom 200,000 are believed to be displaced or pauperised near ruins of former homes.

26. Except in respect to encouraging the rehabilitation of plantation employment, no desirable programme would be disproportionately beneficial to this minority. However, return home, agricultural reconstruction/livelihood rehabilitation and restructured basic service programmes can benefit them equally with other river basin residents of Somalia. It is important to ensure that Swahili households do, in fact, have equal access to these programmes.

#### **D. Food Security - National and Household**

27. Somalia is very food insecurity today both nationally and for most households. The assumption that this was true prior to 1990 is, however, basically inaccurate.

28. As of 1987-89 Somalia (excluding refugees in Somalia) was *basically-to-fully self-sufficient* in maize, sorghum, bananas, meat, milk, fish, fruits and vegetables (80 to 85% of calories). It was *largely self-provisioning* in beans and vegetable oil (6%) and *basically import dependent* in respect to sugar, rice, wheat (including flour and pasta) and miscellaneous items (squash, margarine, tinned goods, etc) with imports totalling perhaps 10-12% of calories (6 to 7% in the dominantly import categories and 4 to 5% in grain/wheat products, beans and cooking oil). Table 1-A, B present more detailed estimation. Coffee and tea (joint items in use with sugar) were also imported.

29. Somalia's main exports were livestock and bananas (over \$ 100 million and \$ 25 million respectively) and its secondary ones included fruit (watermelon, mangos, grapefruit to Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia) and fish (presumably to Djibouti and perhaps Hodeida/Jeddah) and were largely unrecorded (perhaps \$ 5m fruit and \$2m fish). These very substantially exceeded food imports in value (if not necessarily in calorie terms). Arguably therefore Somalia was relatively food secure nationally, with non-refugee commercialised food aid more a contribution to government revenue and overall import capacity (like petroleum aid in kind) than to food security per se.

30. 1980-1987 estimates from surveys suggest *15 - 20% rural and 12 - 15% urban moderate and severe child malnutrition*, and a *poverty incidence* (at a somewhat higher cutoff point than absolute poverty line) *perhaps one third for the nomadic and agro-pastoralist/agricultural groups and under 10% for urban groups*. (Up to 60% of urban consumption was financed from remittances; 20% from wages and fringe benefits including decentralised, privatised user fees; 5 - 10% from commerce at barrow trade level and above; and 10% from informal sector activities including pavement trading, domestic service, artisanal fishing). Substantial regional, provincial, drought-related and seasonal diversity existed, but was poorly documented. The fragmentary (and contradictory) evidence is reviewed in some detail in the *1987 Report for UNICEF* by V Jamal and R Green.

31. *The position in 1993 is very different* (see Table 1-C) with domestic food production unlikely to exceed 20% of 1987/89 levels (excluding meat for domestic consumption and milk which may stand at 30-40% of base levels). The March 1993 UNDP projection of WFP/ICRC confirmed grain commitments of 337,000 tonnes, if augmented by 38,000 - 63,000 tonnes from other agencies, would probably allow approximate balance of grain requirements/uses (Table 1-C). However, additional commitments for beans, vegetable oil, sugar and supplementary feeding mixes (e.g. UNIMIX) would appear to be needed. The commercial imports estimates relate largely to Bosaso (NE) and Berbera (NW) and appear consistent with fragmentary data on port use (largely by dhow), sheep and goat exports and possible remittance inflows. To date, the NE and NW (the least insecure and - excluding secure areas in Mogadishu - most accessible, albeit also the regions with least interference with production from drought and current conflict) have received minimal food aid even though there are several hundred thousand internally displaced persons and externally displaced persons (refugees), to whom food aid could serve as working capital toward livelihood rehabilitation and return home.

32. By 1994 it is possible (see Table 1-D and also the agriculture section below) to aim for non-meat/milk domestic output of around one third of the 1987/89 base. Food aid requirements would appear to be of the order of 200-250,000 tonnes of grain and 15 - 17,000 tonnes of other commodities (with UNIMIX in addition) for free distribution or (literally) food-for-work. Some 100,000 tonnes of grain (especially rice and wheat) and 40 - 42,500 tonnes of other commodities (sugar, vegetable oil, beans)

would be needed for commercialisation and as part of rebuilding Somali quasi-autonomous institutions and local governance finance capacity (as discussed in the revenue sub-section of the section on governance below).

33. The basic 1996 food production target can be set at 70% of 1987/89, again excluding milk/meat for domestic market which should be able to reach 80% (over 100% in the NW-NE and 60-65% in the Centre and South). By then, food aid for free distribution could be reduced to 57,500 - 60,000 tonnes but there would still be a need for 160,000 tonnes for commercialisation for budgetary and import support uses (Table 2-E).

34. Overall, the targeted 1996 availability levels would *restore the average per capita supply to about the 1987 position*. However, because of the remaining displaced persons and households whose livelihoods have not been fully rehabilitated, there is likely to be a somewhat higher level of household poverty and perhaps of moderate child malnutrition compared to 1987.

#### **E. Agriculture: Livestock, Crops and Fish**

35. Agriculture in 1987 was based on 114,000 hectares of irrigated and 565,000 hectares of rainfed cropping (albeit the latter varied sharply with rainfall); over 29 million sheep and goats; over 4 million head of cattle; over 6 million camels; a small artisanal and a smaller inshore trawling fishing industry. In 1987/88 these produced of the order of 1,100 tonnes of crops; an offtake of the order to 6 million sheep and goats, 800,000 head of cattle and perhaps 400,000 camels; and 25 - 47,500 tonnes of fish (Table 2-A; Jamal and Green). Together they provided livelihoods for 60 - 65% of Somalis.

36. The 1993 position (as shown in Table 2-c) is very much worse:

- \* Crop production is down 80%;

- \* Most of the irrigation system is out of production with silted channels and looted, broken down or fuel-less pumps. The banana, sugar and rice estate plantations are out of production with central pumping stations and factories destroyed;

- \* Outside the NW/NE (where herds may be 60% to 75% of 1987 levels) stock herds are probably well below the 50% level and in some areas approaching the 30% level below which full recovery in less than 6 or 7 years of good weather (a decade's worth or more in Somalia) is virtually impossible, and traditional coping mechanisms (loan of stock repaid in kind from progeny) to allow a wiped-out family to claw back to an adequate herd (60 to 80 goats, 20 to 25

cattle, 10 camels or a combination) are unable to function;

\* None of the four quarantine stations (Berbera, Bosaso, Mogadischu, Kismayu) is functional, leading to export proceed reductions of up to 60% (no direct access to the Saudi market);

\* The public sector livestock borehole system (rapidly nearing collapse in 1987) is nearly derelict and the nomadic and merchant spring, birket, well and borehole ones have suffered heavily from war damage and non-maintenance;

\* Mines - especially in parts of Northwest and near Bardhere and Baidoa - limit safely accessible areas;

\* Rural security (to till, herd, move herds or commercialise products), although currently improving, remains fragmentary and on balance barely adequate (e.g. Lower Juba, Gedo) outside the Northeast and Northwest;

\* No trawlers or chilled fish stores appear to be operating and artisinal catches are limited by worn out or repairworthy boats, plus lack of adequate nets, spares and fuel.

37. In one sense the list of disasters is the basis for selection of priority reconstruction projects. It is, however, a partial basis, because priority must be given to elements with quick livelihood rehabilitation, output and export pay-off. In addition, certain institutions - notably estate plantations and much of the veterinary infrastructure - require evaluation and, probably, at least partial restructuring rather than straight reconstruction.

38. *Irrigation rehabilitation* for *smallscale* farmers is a priority on which OXFAM(UK) and SCF(USA) have made a start which demonstrates feasibility. The requirements are:

a. mechanical clearing of main canals;

b. tools for clearing of secondary canals by farmers now on their farms;

c. probably food or cash for work to support clearing of secondary canals by internally displaced or refugee farmers returning home;

d. initial free access to seed (backed by hiring some farmers to replicate selected local - not hybrid - seed), followed by an agency or NGO supplier of last resort backup to household saving from harvest and buying from merchants;

e. a buyer of last resort (logically WFP) to buy up pockets of surplus (which are already appearing) until the commercial system is restored;

f. provision of initial fuel supplies (until a reliable commercial network exists again) as well as pump spares and replacement pumps. (In Lower Juba a majority of hectareage is pump irrigated, in the Shebelle's a majority is gravity fed, with Upper Juba intermediate). Surprisingly many - though by no means all - small pumps are operational.

39. Once irrigation capacity is restored (80% or more in the household sector should be possible by end-1996) irrigated farmers should renew access to human and animal water in return for labour contractual agreements with upslope farmers. Such access rights are crucial to enable upslope farmers to restart production.

40. This sub-sector produced about 700,000 tonnes in the late 1980s - well over half the total output.

41. *Plantation* irrigated agriculture will be slower to rehabilitate. Basically, it comprises a banana complex (perhaps 15,000 ha) and a sugar estate (about 5,000 ha). The former was irrigated by one main high-lift pumping station and produced over 100,000 tonnes of bananas (three quarters exported to Italy), while the latter was at least partly gravity-irrigated and produced 7,000 - 12,000 tonnes a year in a 50,000 tonne capacity plant. The banana complex in Lower Juba and the Jowhar sugar estate in Middle Shebelle accounted for about 10% of crop output. A rice estate (2,500 ha, pump) was nearing completion in 1990 but never entered production.

42. The banana plantation would require some \$ 100 - 125 million to restore the pumping station and packing material plant and to replant the groves which died after irrigation stopped. Production could begin 24 months after a decision. Italy - under new EC banana import arrangements - has the right to rehabilitate SomaloFruit and provide a premium price market. If for historic or aid-to-Somalia reasons it wishes to do so, it should be encouraged. If it so decides in early 1994, production could begin by late 1995.

43. The ex-sugar area poses different issues. To rehabilitate the sugar estate whose factory is totally destroyed would cost \$ 250 - 300 million. For 10,000 tonnes a year that would be absurd; even for 50,000 tonnes the value of annual output of \$ 10 million appears grossly unsatisfactory. There is no doubt that the land should be rehabilitated but an agronomic study in 1994 is a priority to survey potential use alternatives (e.g. rice for the domestic market, fruit such as grapefruit, mangos, pineapples for the Djibouti and Arabian Peninsular markets).

44. *Rainfed* agriculture (which has typical yields of well under a tonne per hectare except in unusually good years) produced about 30% of total crop output. It is located

primarily in Bay and the Shebelle's and secondarily in west Galbeed, Gedo, the Jubas, Bakool and Hiraan.

45. Very special rehabilitation needs exist because all such farmers need to be agro-pastoral. Only in one year of two can decent crops (by Somali rainfed standards) be expected so that a significant livestock and/or milk output are needed for income and food security. Many of these farmers are now displaced and have lost most or all of their stock. The potential for core herd loans is considered below.

46. Setting the herd problem to one side, the key needs are seeds, handtools and restoration of water supplies (usually boreholes or birkets) for human and animal use.

47. *Pastoralism* has three main sub-categories - nomadic, agro-pastoral (dryland farmers) and agro-pastoral (wetland farmers). All face the need for restoration of access to vaccinations against a known list of diseases and to a limited list of veterinary drugs and the first two categories for water point network rehabilitation. Their problems in respect to herd size restoration are quite distinct with the Northwest/Northeast a special sub-case because herd sizes there are adequate to allow natural regeneration and traditional intra-household cluster loans to allow wiped-out members to restore their herds.

48. While there was a massive veterinary/livestock infrastructure in the late 1980s, it was collapsing from lack of maintenance and funding and should not be replicated on the same lines, but rather restructured to achieve sustainability. Actual services were limited to: vaccination; a referral laboratory/vaccine production unit; and four port quarantine stations. No drugs were available via the veterinary sector (nor via the private commercial market legalised two years earlier) and the state borehole system was on its last legs.

49. Items of strategic importance for 1994-96 include:

a. reconstruction of the four *quarantine stations* (Berbera, Bosaso, Mogadishu, Kismayo) more or less on their pre-war lines. They can raise exports (and therefore farmer receipts up to 100% on direct exports to Saudi Arabia which requires certificates) in 1993/94. About 60% of all movements will be via Berbera and Bosaso (higher through 1996), 20% Mogadishu, 10% Kismayo and 10% minor dhow ports. Cattle however are largely through Mogadishu and Kismayo;

b. creation of a *basic vaccine and veterinary drug stock* (including salt), analagous to that previously held by WHO/UNICEF for basic human drugs;

c. *training village or nomadic para-veterinary personnel* (chosen by herding groups) as Village Veterinary Health Workers to vaccinate and to treat common

animal diseases. This could be done by hiring former veterinary officers as trainers. The VVHWs would be paid in kind by their villages/groups (as Village Health Workers and Koranic teachers were) and would provide a channel for selling vaccines, drugs and associated equipment perhaps via 20 ports staffed by former veterinary officers;

d. drilling of a limited number of *strategic boreholes* where access to water renders reasonable pastures unuseable and the wells and birket technology of nomadic groups is not adequate to reach water. These should be sited only after consultations with nomadic groups (water engineers are not experts on pastures).

50. A special problem exists in respect to wiped-out pastoralists and dryland agro-pastoralists. A core herd for the former would cost about \$ 2,000 and for the latter about \$ 1,200 (60 and 40 sheep respectively). If traditional kinship group coping mechanisms of loans in kind are not feasible because overall group stock levels are too low (below 30 - 40% of normal) then there is, at present, no way back - and the only way forward is to town and a most uncertain future livelihood.

51. An analogue to traditional loans in kind could be set up:

- \* loans to kin groups (perhaps in kind);

- \* re-lent to and repaid in kind by pastoralists and agro-pastoralists out of progeny over five years to the kin group;

- \* with half of kin group collection going into a revolving herd recovery fund of their own, and half into projects jointly agreed between the agency and the kin group.

52. Sheep and goats can be bought from the Northwest and Northeast, as can camels. Cattle would probably need to be purchased in Kenya.

53. The problem is cost. To rehabilitate 25,000 nomadic and 25,000 agro-pastoralist households (350,000 - 400,000 persons including family members) would cost \$ 80 million. If, however, the alternative to this is 400,000 internally and externally displaced persons whose livelihoods cannot be rehabilitated, this (at \$ 200 per person) may be a good bargain.

54. *Fishing* has two sectors - artisanal and commercial - of which the large-scale sub-sector of the latter has long been dead (adequate, accessible fish stocks have never been proved - indeed experience suggests they are not there). The small-scale commercial sub-sector is dormant. It is just possible that a small programme making

loans to rehabilitate small trawlers and associated cold rooms would be worth doing if any agency is particularly interested, but it is hardly a high priority.

55. Artisanal fishing is a priority for food security and livelihood reasons. The needed inputs are materials for rehabilitating boats, nets, small inboard and outboard motors, tools for boatbuilding, etc. The commercial sector could and would supply these if the artisanal fishermen had funds. Loans (say, 20-year) to artisanal fishing associations on-lent by them for shorter terms to members creating a revolving fund might be the most practical route forward, since direct external agency loans to artisanal fishermen will be hard to target, costly to manage and almost certainly will not be repaid. (Fishermen - like most Somalis - feel no moral obligation to large, strange, alien institutions domestic or external, but do to their own ethnic, business and other closely-knit groups. Further, repaying to a revolving fund has clear pay-offs which repaying to an external agency does not). Perhaps \$ 2 - 3 million would be sufficient for a relatively large programme.

56. However, a precondition for success is effective market access. The two main artisanal fishing centres - Adale and Merca - have, at least until recently, suffered primarily from lack of physical access to the dominant Mogadishu market. While effective demand today is far below 1987 levels, it should have recovered fully by 1996 (and may perhaps be higher given the 1980-87 trend) if the other elements of this R-R-R strategic approach are implemented.

#### **F. Commerce and Industry**

57. In the case of *commerce*, Somali businessmen are in most respects able to look out for themselves. For promotion of nearby Indian Ocean markets for livestock, fish, fruit, frankincense and myrrh, no-one outside their group now associated with Somalia has the knowledge or experience to give them useful advice.

58. However, merchants do need access to some specialised infrastructure and services - as well as to rather more peace and security than now exist - if they are to prosper. Two cases - ports and quarantine stations - are mentioned elsewhere.

59. A third is a limited (probably UHF) telecom net for phone and fax from Berbera, Bosaso, Mogadishu, Kismayo and perhaps Hargeisa to Djibouti, Jeddah, Hodeida, Nairobi and perhaps Aden. What are needed are a limited number of lines for public commercial use (charging full cost or above). Commerce requires sight and signature of documents (e.g. letters of credit, contracts) and up-to-date data on price and potential for deals. Having to go physically to an external city for this purpose is expensive in time even more than in money. A similar business phone/fax domestic net linking the five main commercial towns (Berbera, Hargeisa, Bosaso, Modagishu, Kismayo) would also be useful (and will be able to pay its way) but is less important than the international.

60. An interim partial response might be for UNDP or any other agency with surplus external phone/fax capacity to sell time on an "as available" basis to Djibouti and Nairobi.

61. *Industry* in Somalia has rarely been successful. The sugar and tinned fish factories (for which there is talk of resuscitating) are glaring past examples. There is little reason to suppose they would do better now. Given reconstruction needs, the cement plant (if rehabilitation could be quick and low-cost) may be an exception. The logical operator/owner would be a foreign one or a joint foreign/Somali consortium. The snag is that the plant is a state asset which cannot very well be sold by the international community. Possibly a trustee could be appointed, empowered to lease the plant for 3 - 5 years in return for the new operator rehabilitating and reopening it. The same problem, incidentally, applies to Jowhar sugar, the fish tinning and most (not all) other factories in Somalia.

### **G. Livelihood Rehabilitation**

62. Somali household livelihoods in 1987 came dominantly from livestock, crops, mixed crops-and-livestock and remittances. The programmatic initiatives proposed above will do much to restore the first three sources. The remaining one is remittances.

63. In 1987, remittances from migrant workers via clan-linked traders (who used the riyals to buy goods for importation) were probably of the order of \$ 200 million and by family members in business abroad (particularly Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) also sent as goods, over \$ 100 million (see Jamal and Green for a much fuller discussion). Most appeared to be consumed in urban areas and constituted up to 60% of urban income.

64. Present levels (with the possible exception of the North) are believed to be very low. But the *earnings base* for remittances remains - perhaps \$ 75 - 100 million in Saudi Arabia, \$ 25 million in Yemen, \$ 10 - 15 million each in UAE, Italy and merchant shipping, \$ 100 million from East African Somali businesses - for a potential total of perhaps \$ 250 million. Why is it not flowing? How could it be encouraged to do so again?

65. The simple answer is "by restoring trade" with the Arabian Peninsular and East Africa. Without traders, no channel for remitting exists (and nor would it have in 1987, when only 10% of estimated total flows came via Somali banks). That requires greater safety of persons and goods, better communications facilities, and relatively normal functioning ports at Mogadishu and Kismayo as well as Berbera and Bosaso (which are already at or near that level). It also could be said to require greater urban

Somali effective demand, but the remittances would go far toward providing that.

66. It is especially important to women and female-headed households that remittance flows build up again. Whereas in value terms, most remittances were to men, in numbers of recipients women may well have been ahead. And clearly remittances were a higher proportion of female and female-headed household income than of male.

67. No direct policy is needed. The indirect requirement is restoring security and supporting services for international commerce conducted by Somali businessmen.

#### **H. Macro-Economics: Currency, Credit, Prices and All That**

68. The Somali shilling has both of the attributes basic to confidence in and use of a currency:

- \* there is a finite (indeed, slowly decreasing) stock - no-one can issue any more:

- \* there is a regular major purchasing group which has no option but to buy large amounts (i.e. the international presence in Somalia).

The fact that no government backs the shilling is irrelevant - after all, the Spanish Reale (dollar/piece of eight) and Maria Theresa thaler (dollar) circulated in parts of the Horn well into the 20th Century although neither was the current currency of its state and Maria Therasas had arguably long ceased to exist.

69. Competition by local authority currencies will continue to fail. They have neither of the above attributes. Indeed, it is self-evident that local authorities would issue them as a simple way of acquiring resources. It is no accident that a glass of tea costs SoSh 500 in South Mogadishu and 15,000 North Mogadishu shillings in North Mogadishu.

70. By 1996, something will need to be done because the currency will literally be falling apart. An Institute of Emission will be needed, initially simply accepting (exchanging) the present SoSh for a New SoSh. Later it may wish to sell the New SoSh - at the market rate - for foreign exchange and vice versa - in fact becoming a traditional currency board.

71. Complaints that prices vary widely should not be directed at the currency, which shows signs of stabilising around 5000 to the US dollar. Divergences between North and South are closed rather quickly by shipment of notes back and forth. Sudden lurches upward appear related to UN system bulk purchases in Djibouti and would affect any currency with a volume which was quite small relative to a single bulk

purchase. Divergences in prices of goods are high - as evidenced by the continued use of 100 and even 50 SoSh notes in the North because they will buy something there. But again that has nothing to do with the currency. It flows from different demand/supply balances in North and South which markets cannot readily close because of high transport costs. Improving communications and reducing transport costs is relevant to price equalisation. Monetary tinkering is not.

72. Banks in Somalia were only tangentially relevant to Somali commerce and credit in the 1980s. While they did handle letters of credit (their own were widely acceptable) this was not necessary to businessmen who received precious little credit from them. Basically they accepted and paid out cash and transferred balances between accounts. The depositaries (ex banks) in the Northwest do that, albeit they charge a fee for holding notes safe (thus going back perhaps 7 centuries to the origins of deposit banking). As with currency the present situation is one in which "don't just do something, stand still" is the relevant policy advice.

73. One *credit institution* might be worth testing (beyond the nomadic herd rehabilitation one and in a sense complementing it). That is a Women's Credit Fund to make small loans to women's savings and credit associations (which do exist) to onlend to their members. So long as the collector/lender was a group to which the woman felt personal loyalty (which an externally-funded and established body certainly would not be), repayment rates are likely to be high.

74. Since females - especially heads of households - need small capitals for livelihood development and have very limited access to them through male business networks (which do lend/borrow among themselves), a good case can be made out.

75. Perhaps the most fruitful way forward would be to hire a manager from a successful Asian female (or largely female) clientele small loan institution for a 6-month feasibility and design study, carried out with a Somali professional woman and in association with a Somali women's organisation. If the findings were promising, a 3 (+ 3) person team could be hired to begin work with/via women's savings and credit societies.

## **I. Transport and Power**

76. These sectors' needs are relatively straightforward and fairly modest over 1994-96. In order of urgency they are: ports; roads; airports.

77. All four main *ports* are in basic working order. However, each needs some repairs to mobile cranes, forklifts, warehouses and pilot boats/tugs. In addition, they need functioning port authorities meeting recurrent costs from port dues and benefitting from some initial technical assistance (perhaps 8 persons of which 2 at Mogadishu,

1 each at Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo and 3 specialists serving all four).

78. On *roads*, three quite different clusters exist: main roads (especially tarmac ones); secondary roads; city streets.

79. For the former, a prioritisation study followed by a set of ILO-led labour intensive reconstruction projects should work if followed up by creating mobile maintenance units (perhaps 5) from reconstruction personnel and equipment (Somalia has never previously maintained roads).

80. Secondary roads (with a few exceptions including some bridges) could be reconstructed by even more labour-intensive approaches (work projects paid from commercialised food aid funds) with a foreman, hand tools and perhaps a bulldozer. Maintenance might well be entrusted to local governance units with 50% of costs covered from counterpart funds and the balance from local levies (e.g. annual lump sums from main road users and communities on the line of road).

81. City streets can be reconstructed by largely labour intensive methods (as under the World Bank supported urban renewal project in Mozambique). The priorities are Mogadishu, Kismayo and Hargeisa.

82. *Power* poses problems. The pre-war system (which at least in Mogadishu was overloaded, unreliable and in bad repair at both generation and distribution levels) was heavily damaged and looted in the war. A survey of what remains and what could be restored to working order at what cost is a first priority.

83. Full rehabilitation over 1994-96 is not practicable on cost grounds. But individual generators are expensive and unreliable. Phased restoration of at least unserviceable generators plus some distribution lines should be feasible, especially as distribution capacity and demand will also recover slowly. Once present urban generator users believe power will be available reliably (at a rate structure fully covering recurrent costs including maintenance plus depreciation on new investment), they are likely to be willing to pay a substantial portion of distribution system reconstruction costs as connection fees and deposits. As with ports, autonomous authorities should be set up initially with significant technical assistance support.

#### **J. Basic Services: Health, Education, Water**

84. The basic problem with basic health, education and water programme design is not technical/professional. Relevant components of programmes are relatively well known, tested and seen as user-friendly in many South countries.

85. Nor, at this level, do the problems really relate to personnel. Trained Somalis exist,

are now scattered in all regions and could - with limited, temporary technical assistance leadership - be rehired and retrained.

86. The problems centre rather on sustainability (of funding) and on access for nomads (to education and health). Somalia's history gives no useable answers. Education and water were success stories up to the late 1970s (although health never was, especially outside the four largest towns). They rapidly declined after this. By 1987 the Ministry of Health purported to operate over 350 hospitals, clinics, Mother-Child Health clinics and specialised institutions on a budget of \$ 1.5 million. Education and water were little better. The system plainly was headed for collapse which would have occurred on the then-prevailing trends by 1990 even in the absence of war (see Jamal and Green for more details on this situation and process).

87. And yet if capital budget funds which were wasted on new structures without operating funds are added to duplicative foreign government and external NGO systems (especially in health), the funds for proper basic health and education services and water supply were being expended, but with little to show for them.

88. A possible way forward lies in two long-standing community based service networks: one in nomadic primary health care and one in Koranic schools. both depended heavily on user payments in kind and cash. The former benefitted from central provision of training (central budget), specialised inputs (at cost to users) and supervision/advice (central). The latter had no such central Islamic body, and as a result had weak training and limited performance (although high enrollment) by the standards of more developed Islamic education systems.

89. The nomadic primary health approach dates to the British Administration in the then Somaliland Protectorate. Nomadic groups chose members to be trained in simple diagnostic, dispensing and first aid skills in 6 - 12 week courses. They then served their groups (part time as needed) in return for payment in milk, meat, smallstock and herding time. Basic drugs were provided via District Medical Officers at cost (with each tin literally returned with the right number of coins in it to secure a replacement!). In principle, the DMOs provided a referral and monitoring service but distances meant that both were effective only when groups were at dry season base camps.

90. This system never died out totally in West Galbeed. From the late 1970s it was revived and expanded under UNICEF auspices (hiring time from District Health Officers paid very little and with almost no drugs, furniture, linen or food to operate with in their nominal hospitals). In this version, it was spreading rapidly in the mid-1980s, attracting growing community support (including among agro-pastoralist and river village communities) as well as backing from a growing group of donors and medical professionals, with tacit consent or benign neglect by the then government. If this had continued, a rural primary health network would have been in place by 1990. The

revolution from 1988 on destroyed this approach, as it did its younger sister programme to train traditional birth attendants as basic MCH workers (which both they and mothers welcomed).

91. The Koranic schools were similar, except that they were national and, because most teachers were illiterate, they taught over 95% Koranic memorisation. In urban areas, fees were partly in cash, and in rural areas dominantly in kind. Nomadic payments were highly incentivising - a goat per term studied, a cow when a given number of verses had been memorised, a camel when the whole of the Holy Koran had been committed to memory. Interestingly, a tiny but growing minority of schools taught Arabic, reading the Holy Koran and arithmetic as well as Koranic memorisation. Preliminary contacts had been made with regional Islamic education bodies to see how this trend could be strengthened and broadened (Jamal and Green suggested an approach to Al Hazar Islamic University in Cairo). Another interesting feature was that nomadic group Koranic teachers travelled with their students by camel (they too were nomads).

92. These two cases surely point the way forward for at least rural primary health services and primary plus basic adult education. Education lagged health in this respect in the 1980s because until 1980 there had been a dynamic, growing government system internationally perceived as one of the best in Africa and until 1985 community contributions were legally forbidden. However, contributions to books, equipment, classrooms, teachers houses, fees - up to \$ 0.60 a month per pupil or \$ 18 - 24 a month to top up a basic salary of \$ 7 - 10 per month) were becoming less uncommon especially in West Galbeed (including Hargeisa) and the Shabelle Valley. This suggests that the approach is viable in education as well as in health and in urban as well as rural areas. No nomadic cases existed but the Koranic education parallel suggests nomads trained as teachers might well be willing to travel with their pupils (a camel can carry a blackboard and a set of teacher's manuals as well as the other, quite austere gear of a Somali nomadic household).

93. The central inputs needed in this approach are: training, material distribution, monitoring, programme design and preferably correlated distance learning materials, radio programmes or cassettes (on health as well as education), and referral (e.g. district health clinics/provincial hospitals; vocational/secondary schools). Past experience in Somalia indicates that many communities want the services and will pay. Given present cash income collapse, payments in services and goods should be maximised and at least some salary payments should be made from the centre.

94. In respect to education, this approach plus the UNDP 1993 Programme's substantive heads - with the addition of teachers' houses which at this level are a more crucial priority than classrooms - form a basis for 1994-96 as well as 1993. Indeed, the 50,000 primary enrollment target is very ambitious - in 1987, of a nominal enrollment of over 110,000, spot checks suggested that under half were actually in

class and over 25% of nominal schools were totally silent.

95. To a more limited extent, the approach can help in respect to vocational and high schools. Radio programmes and cassettes could also be used to supplement "on the spot" teaching in the latter.

96. Similar considerations pertain in health. Central/regional laboratory and medical stores/drugs facilities are needed as are district health centres (headed by, say, Medical Officers with specialised training but not full Western doctor training programmes) and provincial or regional hospitals.

97. In addition, when "grab and jab" can be run down, and acute malnutrition has been, new surveys will be needed. Present 25 - 95% moderate and severe malnutrition rates (and some 1992 surveys showing under-five mortality at over 1,000 per year) are no guide to the conditions of a return to normalcy. In particular, Vitamin A Deficiency diseases (e.g. night blindness) and those of massive malnutrition (e.g. kwashiorkor, marasmus) were very rare indeed. Measles, diarrhoea, malaria, anaemia, tuberculosis, tetanus, typhoid and acute respiratory diseases were the main contributors to morbidity and mortality.

98. Two old Somali health problems now lost to sight in the emergency will need to return to the agenda:

- \* khat: a mildly narcotic leaf (analagous to coca) whose heavy use consumes money, reduces capacity to work while under its influence and can lead to violent conduct;

- \* female circumcision with infibulation (even Somali women who oppose it do not call it FGM) which is near-universal and interacts lethally with anaemia and traditional birth attendants with limited or no training.

99. Unfortunately, both are deeply rooted in Somali culture and then President Barre's (only partially successful) ban on khat seems to have made it an icon for many of those who fought to overthrow him. The strength of the cultural support for female circumcision is underlined by the fact that the March 1993 women's workshop (a group of daring and forward-looking women) called not for its abolition but for its replacement by the least intrusive form. In both cases, studies of possible cultural bases to use to encourage change and long discussions with Somalis who oppose the practice or are willing to consider options (easier to find in the case of khat) will be needed before broad educational work can be begun. Instant root-and-branch denunciation would be counterproductive and undermine the trust needed for a community-based approach.

100. *Water* poses somewhat different issues. One special point is that in Somali law

and custom, all water sources belong to some group. If it does not need all the water, it will gladly trade some for water rights elsewhere or accept a cash or kind payment for it. It will not give any substantial amount free to anyone outside the kinship group. This point applies to residents of urban well-field areas. There is no need to provide jobs as guards (quite untraditional!) but jobs in maintenance, a clinic, a school, a road - something - need to be negotiated as payment, or the water authority will have a very troubled life.

101. Urban water in one sense is straightforward: gradual improvement of the patch-up jobs at Hargeisa plus (when possible) a parallel exercise at Kismayo. Unfortunately, that approach has a limited life expectancy - probably not beyond 1996 if that long. The Mogadishu distribution system has been on the verge of collapse since since 1985 and some wells need redrilling; Hargeisa is only moderately better placed. The cost of total renewal however is daunting: probably over \$ 100 million for Mogadishu.

102. Rural water in nomadic areas (and implicitly dryland agro-pastoral ones) has been treated under livestock - strategic boreholes plus community shallow wells and birkets.

103. Irrigated area water supply is a problem of purity, not access. The Shebelle and Juba cannot be made safe to drink. Therefore encouragement for shallow well digging is needed - and widely acceptable. In respect to displaced persons/returnees, a food for work (or cash from commercialised food) labour intensive well digging programme would seem appropriate.

104. If the implicit central costs of these programmes seem daunting, a look at the revenue section may be partially reassuring. Commercialised commodity aid and a very simple customs system could by 1996 produce very substantial revenues.

## **K. GOVERNANCE**

105. The de Facto present structure of functional civil governance in most of Central and Southern Somalia is UNISOM coordinating UN Agencies, the ICRC and some external NGOs directly with other NGO's acting as subcontractors. Somali civil society including user groups are involved to greater or (usually) lesser degrees and significant numbers of Somali staff are employed but relations with local governmental authorities tend to turn on their "removing obstacles" (notably their armed personnel) to UN led civil governance/emergency operation in return for bits of resources (including bits of de facto recognition) from the UN led structure. In the Northwest and Northeast the UN civil presence is lower and there are local authorities which recognizably seek (with few resources or personnel) civil governance operations. However, again relations with the (relatively few) UN

agencies/NGO's present is not a partnership nor even a systematic dialogue. Neither mode is satisfactory logically, politically or operationally now and would be still less so for reconstruction, rehabilitation and restructuring. To a Somali the present international presence system in Somalia must appear as opaque, shifting and ultimately irritating as the Somali claim system and its dynamics do to outsiders.

106. A top down partnership approach based on relations with a national government cannot be attempted because there will clearly be no operationally functional national government by January 1994 and it is far from certain there will be by January 1997. The levels on which less abnormal partnership relations can be built up are:

- a) Civil society bodies e.g. villages. nomadic family clusters, local river basin farmers groups.
- b) Somali women's and professional NGO's.
- c) Local governance units from urban through - say - five regional groupings (Northwest, Northeast, Mogadishu extending North and West, Mogadishu extending South and West, Kismayu/Lower Juba).

In each case initial Somali side capacity will usually be low (but not non-existent) and mutual confidence will usually be low (in both directions). Building these up will be iterative and time consuming and will require capacity building including supporting resource and personnel bases on Somali side. This implies providing external transfers of Finance, training, specialist personnel. It is circular to assert Somali bodies are very weak because they have exiguous financial and expertise bases and then to deny them transfers because their present capacity is low.

107 A limited number of autonomous Somali (but initially expatriate managed) institutions will be useful.

Examples include:

- a) Mogadishu, Hargeisa and in future Kismayo water
- b) Port Authorities
- c) Quarantine Units
- d) VHF-telephone, fax proto telecom authority

- e) A company to wholesale/auction commercialises food aid and other commodity aid (e.g. petroleum products).
  - f) By 1996 perhaps an Institute of Emission to replace the then disintegrating Somali Shilling notes.
  - g) A Customs Authority.
108. Except for e and f all the bodies should move rapidly to meeting recurrent costs from charges but over 1994-96 will need to seek virtually 100% of capital expenditure funding from external donors.
109. Each institution should rapidly build up a cadre of Somali skilled workers, technicians and managers and provide training for its staff. Qualified Somali personnel in most cases do exist in Somalia or abroad.
110. At some stage these institutions would need to be made accountable to a functioning Somalian government (or in cases such as a (a) and (b) perhaps to Municipal/or provincial government. However, that will be post 1996.

### Revenue

111. Apart from user charges by - e.g., water, ports, quarantine, proto-telecommunications, the main potential local revenue sources for joint Somali - internal system programmes and for Somali civil society bodies would appear to be:
- a) Commercialised commodity aid - Food aid plus (if approaches to traditional donors - Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait - are successful) petroleum aid.
    - ◆ Food aid could yield perhaps \$25 million a year and petroleum products aid at 200,000 tonnes a year about as much.
    - ◆ The products would be wholesaled at market prices (say commercial cif plus or minus 5%) and the funds placed in a pool for allocation to joint programmes and Somali bodies;
  - b) Customs collected or a variant of the old Franco voluta system
    - ◆ imports taxed or declared value or reestimate if clearly seriously under declared.
    - ◆ commodity aid for commercialisation is dutiable.

- ◆ three rates - 0% on human and animal drugs, vaccines and or paper for books, 40% on petroleum products and tobacco, 60% on everything else. (capital aid projects would be issued exemptions).
  - ◆ The system would be simple, could yield up to \$65 million or \$200 - 300 million commercial imports (out of export remittance proceeds and \$15 million on food and other commercialised commodity aid).
  - ◆ Rates would need to be low enough to avoid massive incentives to smuggling across land frontiers or through minor ports. Staff pay would need to be high enough to reduce incentives to ask importers to pay customs officer rather than Customs Duty to containable levels.
112. These two sources could by 1996 yield up to \$130 million or \$22.5 per capita - distinctly more than the domestic revenues plus commodity aid revenues of the former government. That could finance very substantial joint programmes and Somali civil society and governmental authority capacity. Allocation should increasingly shift toward the latter and should increasingly be negotiated. Presumably a large share of customs would ultimately (1997?) go to local authority of port region which creates a special allocational issue in respect to Mogadish Port which will serve two regions (an excellent reason for its being an independent institution).

## PERSONNEL

113. Increasingly technical assistance in training and personnel should be provided to Somali civil society, autonomous institution and local governance bodies to assist them in capacity building. In the interim joint programmes should hire, train, promote competent Somalis.

The purpose is to create a relationship and a national personnel development policy analogous to what exists in normal countries with functional national governments.

114. It is also a way of ensuring that the skills of the not inconsiderable numbers of Somali technicians, nurses, teachers, professional and managers neither rust in disuse nor flow abroad and that some of those in the diaspora are drawn home. Otherwise the very large loss of Somalia's stock of human investment in middle and high level personnel which has occurred over 1987-1992 will continue and ultimately prove a graver barrier to moving to development than the physical and economic system damage inflicted by the war.

## **CONCLUSION**

115. This paper sketches a coherent set of strategic programme initiatives toward reconstruction, rehabilitation and restructuring over 1994-96 to lay foundations for a transition to sustainable, Somali led development thereafter. It articulates this to the level of selected key programmes, projects and institutions.
116. Clearly it is not fully articulated, has not carried individual items to the 'bankable prospectus' stage and may well be incomplete. But until there is broad agreement on a framework for 1994-96 such refinement would be both premature, and rather arrogant on UNICEF's part.
117. Back of envelope calculations suggest an annual cost of \$250-300 million (including commodity aid). That does not include core external agency staffs although it does include personnel in particular joint programmes and projects. Evidently it does not include security costs. Nor does it include major capita projects most of which do not, in any event, seem suitable for or practicable within 1994-96 period.
118. What the initiative is intended to do is:
- a) to restore overall consumption, production and livelihood levels to 80% - 90% of 1987 with a forward dynamic which will broadly complete that process over 1997-8;
  - b) to restructure basic human, social and extension services on a sustainable basis which by 1996 will provide more access to basic education, health services, rural water and veterinary services than in 1987;
  - c) to assist in the recapacitation of Somali Civil society, autonomous public institutions and local government;
  - d) to lay the foundations for a 1997-2000 transition to development.
119. The words "lay the foundations" are deliberate. Certain key areas e.g. higher education would remain to be restructured/rehabilitated. Moreover no attempt has been made to identify the parameters of the structural economic transformation Somalia must begin to make over 2000-2010 if per capita output and consumption are not to be eroded. These parameters:
- a) are - with one probable exception - readily identifiable;
  - b) the exception - Bardhere Dam/irrigation Scheme/Power Plant - would

cost over \$500 million, require an institutional and knowledge context not now existing and take at least six years to design, articulate and build;

- c) and furthermore, long term structural transformation decisions cannot properly be taken by anyone but Somalis acting through well established, functioning Somali institutions.

120. Clearly this paper is not a proposed UNICEF programme of action. Its scale is far beyond UNICEF's capacity and many components fall well outside UNICEF's area of expertise. However it is written from the perspective of enhancing the economic and social welfare of women and children:

- a) livelihoods matter because ultimately household income (or lack of it) is crucial to child survival, welfare and development (or lack of it);
- b) enhancing the livelihoods of poor households requires economic actions and provision of access to services directly relevant to them e.g. irrigation restoration;
- c) but it also requires an enabling context e.g. quarantine stations and VHF telephone/fax commercial links to raise export proceeds, customs revenues on return imports, thus livestock prices paid and the resources for financing sustainable services access by poor rural households.
- d) therefore UNICEF needs to take a macro perspective on reconstruction/rehabilitation/restructuring in Somalia today as it has done over the past decade on Structural Adjustment.

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Table 1/1

Toward Population EstimatesA. Total Population in Somalia

1986 Census <sup>1</sup>	5,500,000 - 5,800,000
Refugees in Somalia <sup>2</sup>	750,000
	<u>6,250,000 - 6,550,000</u>
1987 - 1990	
◆ Normal Growth <sup>3</sup>	600,000 - 625,000
◆ 'Excess' Deaths <sup>4</sup>	(150,000 - 180,000)
◆ Refugees From Somalia <sup>5</sup>	(400,000)
	<u>6,270,000 - 6,625,000</u>
1991 - 1992	
◆ Refugees leaving from Somalia <sup>6</sup>	(740,000)
◆ Refugee from Somalia (Net) <sup>7</sup>	(640,000)
◆ Excess Deaths <sup>8</sup>	(750,000)
◆ Normal growth <sup>9</sup>	170,000
	<u>4,310,000 - 4,660,000<sup>10</sup></u>
(UNDP late 1992 estimate 4,900,000)	

NOTES

1. Pre cooking preliminary estimates by Swedish team.
2. Almost certainly inflated. By how many unclear. Government estimates as low as 250,000 - 300,000 exist but are probably too low. See note 6 which averts need to attempt serious re-estimation.
3. About 3% a year
4. Largely in Northwest. 50,000 - 80,000 killed in Morgan's failed 'Pacification' efforts; 100,000 war related deaths (probably over 60% under 5's) relating to famine, forced migration, loss of access to health services and pure water.

5. Largely From Northwest - conservative.
6. Fragmentary data suggest perhaps 35,000 Oromo and 50,000 Ogadeni remain (versus 825,000 including normal population growth)
7. Late 1992 probably conservative UNHCR estimates total 919,315. A working global total estimate as of early 1993 may be of the order of 1,040,000 (see section B this table) less 400,000 through 1990 gives 640,000 net additional outflow.
8. UNICEF conservative estimate of 1992 under 5 loss of lives is 300,000. Adding war, famine, dislocation, health service/water dearths global total unlikely to be less than 500,000. 1991 assumed 50% of 1992.
9. Nominal estimate. Wholesale dislocation presumptively reduced birthrate. 4% used as pro forma.
10. If a least unlikely point figure is needed 4,500,000.

#### B. Refugees

August 1992 UNHCR	
◆ Ethiopia	375,000
◆ Djibouti	20,000
◆ Kenya <sup>1</sup>	270,000
◆ Saudi Arabia <sup>2</sup>	150,000
◆ Yemen <sup>2</sup>	44,000
◆ UAE <sup>2</sup>	3,000
◆ Egypt <sup>2</sup>	4,500
◆ Syria <sup>2</sup>	4,500
◆ Europe <sup>2,3</sup>	30,000
◆ Canada	11,500
◆ Other Countries	<u>6,315</u>
August 1992	<u>919,315</u>
Adjustments <sup>4</sup>	
◆ Kenya <sup>5</sup>	150,000
◆ Ethiopia <sup>6</sup>	( - )
◆ Note 2 Countries <sup>7</sup>	(75,000)
◆ Other Countries <sup>8</sup>	15,000
◆ 'Hidden' (with relatives) <sup>9</sup>	<u>30,000</u>
March 1993 <sup>10,11</sup>	<u>1,040,000</u>

Notes

1. Probably underestimate then - certainly increased in last months of 1992.
2. Probably includes some normal migrants workers.
3. Largely Italy.
4. Post August 1992 changes and coverage adjustments.
5. More recent registered refugee estimates 400,000 plus 20-30,000 floating urban located refugees.
6. Some returnees (Northwest) as well as new refugees (Centerwest). Basic problems is treatment of families in process of return sending out scouts/pioneers to assess and to begin process of return while keeping women/children in camps.
7. Rough estimate of normal migrant labour - basically in Saudi and Yemen but also not insignificant numbers in Italy - probably categorised as refugees.
8. Rough guess. Small numbers are hard to cover. Tanzania has not insubstantial number.
9. In Kenya and Tanzania (perhaps also Saudi, Yemen) several thousand Somalis are living with relatives and actively avoiding identification as refugees. Could be up to 10,000 in Tanzania and 15-20,000 in Kenya.
10. Highly approximate. Basically 950,000 - 1,100,000 probable range.
11. Probable breakdown by prewar group:

Nomadic	550,000 - 650,000
Agro-Pastoralist/Agricultural	200,000 - 300,000
Urban	200,000 - 250,000

C. Population Composition by Group - 1987

◆ Nomadic Pastoralist	35% - 40%
◆ Agro Pastoralist/Agricultural <sup>2</sup>	30%
◆ Urban	30% - 35%

- ◆ No 1993 estimate is possible nor, given number of displaced persons, would it be a meaningful guide to future.
- ◆ Post 'return home' makeup might be:

Nomadic	25% - 30%
Agro-Pastoralist/Agricultural	30%
Urban	40% - 45%

because reestablishment of wiped out pastoral livelihoods is very difficult.

Notes:

1. Some do grow crops and have permanent base camps for women and younger children.
2. Most of these households are mixed crop growers/stock raisers. Proportions vary with crops usually more important in river basin (especially irrigated) zones and livestock coequal or more important for rainfed province (e.g. Bay, Upper Juba) agro-pastoralists.
3. 1987 of order of 1,750,000 - 2,000,000. Mogadishu (about 1,000,000) Hargeisa (about 500,000), Kismayu (about 150,000) dominated total with other towns perhaps 200,000 in all.

D. Displaced, Persons within Somalia - Rough Estimates.<sup>1</sup>

Intrametropolitan (Mogadishu) <sup>2</sup>	100,000
Urban to Rural <sup>3</sup>	150,000
Rural to Urban <sup>4</sup>	500,000
Rural - Rural	<u>200,000</u>
Sub Total	950,000
'Invisible/wiped out' <sup>1,7</sup>	<u>500,000</u>
Total <sup>8,9,10</sup>	<u>1,450,000</u>

(32% of probable population in Somalia) are internally displaced. With refugees - 1,040,000 - total of 45% internally and externally displaced in 5,540,000 total of in Somalia plus refugees. This is not an inherently implausible figure. The comparable Mozambique estimate - including "pauperised in place"/wiped out after a slightly less devastating - if longer - conflict is 50%.)

1. UNDP'S March 1993 estimate is "as high as one million." This excludes "wiped out" and "invisible". It includes firmer estimates for Mogadishu (300,000) Belet Wain/Upper Shebelle (57,000), Afgoi/Baido/Bardhera (61,000), Kismayu (50,000) totalling 467,000. Not formally estimated are some secondary towns e.g. (Merca, Adale, Lugh, Kalkayo) and rural areas (especially Middle Shebelle, Lower Shebelle, Lower Juba) in the South plus the entire Northwest and Northeast. The 950,000 sub total above of the same order, and lack of precision, as UNDP's 1,000,000.
2. Dominantly North Mogadishu. South Mogadishu total perhaps one quarter of Metropolitan.
3. Urban persons (predominantly non-Hawiye) returning to home area of their sub-clan for safety.
- 4/5 Division depends how far down in size one defines town and how far out one goes in designating those huddling around towns for what (limited) food and physical security they provide as rural to urban rather than rural to rural. Further the two categories probably subsume up to 100,000 urban to urban.
7. 'Invisible' are displaced persons living with/dependent on relatives and those living in houses they have occupied and existing without substantial relief or

family transfers. Could total 250,000 or more (especially in Mogadishu, Hargeisa). 'Wiped out' are households not in refugee 'camps' and more or less on sites of old urban or rural homes but who have been pauperised and stripped of most of their livelihood by the war. Probably concentrated in Southern/Southcentral/riverain cropping areas and Northwestern cities/towns (especially Hargeisa). Likely to be of order of 250,000 or above.

8. Excludes 35,000 Oromo refugees from Ethiopia. Presumably return home and livelihood rehabilitation for them means to and in Ethiopia rather than Somalia.
9. The 1,450,000 total is basically a 1,300,000 - 1,600,000 range estimate.
10. Probable breakdown by pre-war group:

Nomadic	450,000
Agro-pastoral-Agricultural	500,000
Urban	500,000

This does not imply all of first two groups will or can return to rural livelihoods. Probably of the order of 250,000 - 400,000 will not/cannot depending in part on scope and resource backing of 'return home' programme. In particular, given the gender division of labour, a female headed household is a virtual impossibility in a nomadic arid, perhaps in a rainfed agro pastoralist context.

TABLE TWO

TOWARD FOOD BALANCE ESTIMATESA: 1987 - 1989 (Excluding meat/milk)<sup>1</sup>

Product	Domestic (in 000 tonnes)	Imported	Total
Maize	250	27.5 <sup>2</sup>	277.5
Sorghum	500	10 <sup>2</sup>	510
Rice	5	50 <sup>3,5</sup>	55
Wheat <sup>4</sup>	1 - 3	97 - 99 <sup>5</sup>	100
Beans	40	10 (?) <sup>3</sup>	50
Vegetable Oil (Oilseeds)	30 - 35 (112.5) <sup>6</sup>	15 (?) <sup>3</sup>	45 - 50
Bananas	65 <sup>7</sup>	-	65
Sugar	9 - 10	115 <sup>3,8</sup>	125
Fish	25 - 47.5 <sup>7,9</sup>	2.5 <sup>10</sup>	27.5 - 50

◆ Probable grain requirement at 60% of calories/6,750,000 population

● Basic	742,500
● Wastage	77,500 - 123,000 <sup>11</sup>
● Consumption Above Basic Requirement	<u>50,000 - 75,000</u> <sup>12</sup>

TOTAL 870,000 - 940,000

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## ◆ Grain Supply

● Domestic	755,000
● Imported	<u>187,500</u>
TOTAL	942,500

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(In 1987 there was evidence of an excess supply of maize and, especially, sorghum. Food aid sold at prices based on an exchange rate 60% of free market was both shifting consumption toward wheat products and depressing grower prices.

## Notes

1. Largely derived from 1987 - 89 official agricultural statistics and secondarily from V. Jamal and R.H. Green Somalia: Paradoxes of Private Prosperity, Poverty Pockets, Volatile Vulnerability and Public Pauperization: A Report for UNICEF (1987, UNICEF Somalia, Mimeo).
2. Dominantly food aid.
3. Dominantly commercial.
4. Includes wheat flour, pasta.
5. Food/aid commercial breakdown varies by year.
6. Tonnes of sim sim (sesame seed) 109,000. Assumed extraction rate about 30%.
7. Excludes exports. Adjusted for probable underestimate of household of farm output.
8. Wierd variations in recorded figures explained by shifts from paying customs duty to paying customs officers which apparently oscillated.
9. Very rough estimate. Assumes 50,000 members fishing and associated families at 100 to 150 Kg a year plus 2,000,000 in consuming area (Mogadisho, Kismayo, Hargeisa plus smaller coastal towns and villages) averaging 10 to 20 Kg a year. In 1987 Mogadisho had 8 fish markets (versus 1 in 1970) believed to handle up to 80 tonnes a day (480 a week) which would imply 25,000 tonnes a year or 25 Kg per capita.
10. Tinned sardines, tuna, etc.
11. 10% - 15% of domestic plus 2% to 4% of imported volume.
12. In most African countries beer brewing would use a substantial quantity of sorghum (say 10,000 tonnes per 1,000,000 people). However, in Somalia this was not the case. Somalia Muslims (99.9% of population) drank very little beer (bottled) in towns which suggests rural (sorghum) beer consumption was very low albeit probably not zero.

**B. 1987 - 1989 Dietary Makeup<sup>1</sup>**

<u>Item</u>	<u>% Of Calories</u>	
Grain <sup>2</sup>	50 - 60	50
Sugar	6 - 8	
Vegetable Oil	3 - 5	(4)
Fruit/Vegetable <sup>3</sup>	5 - 8	6
Beans	2 - 3	(2)
Milk <sup>4</sup>	15 - 18	16
Meat <sup>5</sup>	9 - 12	10
Fish <sup>6</sup>	2 - 3	2
Other <sup>7</sup>	<u>1 - 2</u>	

**Notes**

1. Roughly estimated from part A above and Jamal and Green Op Cit. Composition of diet varies widely among nomadic, agro pastoral/agricultural and urban groups. Milk is up to 40% of nomadic household calories. Fish and meat are predominately (although not only) urban consumed. Grain is much lower proportion of nomadic diets. Banana consumption is basically urban plus producing areas (Lower Juba plus Lower and Middle Shebelle).
2. While used in part A above the 60% estimate is unconvincingly high.
3. Largest component bananas. Other significant items are watermelon, grapefruit (usually drunk), mangoes, onions, a relative of spinach and tomatoes.
4. Based on V. Jamal's calculations as largely corroborated by several household consumption micro surveys.
5. Includes eggs and poultry (a very small component).
6. See note 9 Part A.
7. Miscellaneous, largely imported items in urban consumption.

C. 1993 Food Supply Projection <sup>1</sup> (000 tonnes)

Product	Domestic <sup>2</sup> Production	Food Aid <sup>3</sup>	Commercial Imports	TOTAL
Maize	125 - 150	<sup>6</sup>	negl - 40	<sup>7</sup>
Sorghum		375-400	negl - 10	575- 650
Rice	1		15 - 20	
Wheat	Negl		20 - 30	
Beans	8	(10) <sup>8</sup>	10 - 15 <sup>9</sup>	28 - 33
Vegetable Oil <sup>4</sup>	3 - 5	(10) <sup>8</sup>	15 - 20 <sup>9</sup>	28 - 35
Bananas	13	-	-	13
Sugar	Negl	(10) <sup>8</sup>	25 - 50 <sup>9</sup>	35 - 60
Fish <sup>5</sup>	10 - 17.5	-	negl	10- 17.5
Supplementary Feeding (Unimix, etc)	-	12 <sup>10</sup>		12

◆ Probable grain requirement at 60% of calories/4,500,000 population.

● Basic	525,000
● Wastage	55,000 - 80,000 <sup>11</sup>
● 'Excess'	
Consumption	<u>10,000</u> <sup>12</sup>
TOTAL	590,000 - 615,000
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◆ Grain supply

● Domestic	126,000 - 151,000
● Food Aid	375,000 - 400,000
● Commercial imports	<u>50,000 - 100,000</u>
TOTAL	551,000 - 651,000 <sup>13</sup>
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Notes

1. Necessarily very rough estimates/projections. All figures exclude expatriate consumption assumed to be over 95% imported and outside food aid/commercial.

2. Assumed to be 20% of 1987/89 base unless otherwise noted. Irrigation system damage and dislocation make this a relatively optimistic estimate for 1992/93 Der plus 1993 Gu crop despite good weather. The Northwest outturn - especially in rainfed areas - could exceed 50% of base but is a small proportion (8% in 1988) of 'normal' territorial grain output.
3. UNDP March estimate of WFP/ICRC grazing commitments is 337,000. Other providers might total 33,000 - 63,000. No data on commitments on other items appear to be available.
4. Production constrained by loss of crushing capacity (including artisanal) as well as general irrigation system damage, dislocation seed supply factors.
5. Estimated at 35 - 40% of 1987/89. Present binding constraints are barriers to transport (less true Northwest/Northeast) plus collapse of effective purchasing power in Mogadishio and Kismayo and drastic decline in Hargeisa. Fishing towns - eg Adale, Merca - apparently have a surplus of fish leading to low prices and below typical malnutrition estimates (Adale 28%).
6. No breakdown by grain type readily available. Probably 65 - 75% maize, 15 - 20% wheat, 10% rice, under 5% sorghum.
7. Total commercial estimated at 50,000 - 100,000 - breakdown somewhat hypothetical. Predominately by dhow to Berbera, Basaso.
8. Desirable minimum target. No estimates of commitments (if any) exist.
9. Very rough estimates. Dominately Berbera/Basaso by dhow, secondarily across the Ethiopian/Kenyan land borders, perhaps some by dhow to smaller ports up to Adale.
10. UNICEF estimate of requirement.
11. Unfavourable conditions suggest 20% loss on domestic and 10% on imported.
12. Nominal. Not all Somalis go hungry.
13. Same order of magnitude as requirement total but dependent on top end of food aid range actually arriving on time (a typical of food aid) and on highly uncertain domestic estimate being attained.

D. 1994 Food Supply Projection (000 tonnes)

Product	Domestic <sup>2</sup> Production	Food Aid <sup>3,6</sup>		Commercial Imports <sup>7</sup>	TOTAL
		A	B		
Maize	125 <sup>4</sup>	185-235 15	25	25 - 50	360- 435
Sorghum	125	-	25	5 - 15	145-155
Rice	2	-	50	10 - 15	37 - 42
Wheat	1	5-7.5 5	5-7.5 <sup>8</sup> 10 <sup>8</sup>	30 - 40	80 - 90
Beans	13	-	-	5 - 10 <sup>9</sup>	28 - 38
Vegetable Oil	10 - 12	-	-	15 - 18 <sup>9</sup>	40 - 45
Bananas	22			-	22
Sugar	negl			50 <sup>9</sup>	80
Fish <sup>5</sup>	12.5 - 25			-	12.5 - 25
Supplementary	9 <sup>10</sup>			-	9
Feeding					

◆ Probable grain requirement or same basis as A, B, but 5,000 population.

● Basic	577,500
● Wastage	70,500 - 74,000 <sup>11</sup>
● Excess consumptions	10,000 <sup>12</sup>
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Total	657,500 - 661,000

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◆ Grain Supply Projection

● Domestic	253,000
● Food Aid - A	200,000 - 250,000
● Food Aid - B	100,000
● Commercial Imports	100,000
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Total	650,000 - 700,000 <sup>13</sup>

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Notes

1. All best 'guesstimate' projections or targets. Excludes expatriate consumption.
2. Projected to be one third 1987/1989 base unless otherwise specified. This be reached if reconstruction of irrigation and security proceed reasonably well in 1993, and 1993/94 weather not disastrous. (If all three are favourable it could be exceeded - eg 40% would not be impossible).
3. Targets. A is food aid for rations or literal food for work and B is food aid for commercialisation.
4. This breakdown is assumed because of trend toward maize and probable better seed availability. In rainfed areas such a switch is undesirable from a food security perspective.
5. 50% of 1987/89 probably possible with security and effective demand improvement.
6. Breakdown somewhat hypothetical for grain in A.
7. Total commercial/grain import estimate 100,000 tonnes (assuming B met).
8. Targets
9. Increased proportions via Mogadiscio, Kismayu.

10. UNICEF estimate
11. Improved conditions allow loss reduction estimate to 15% domestic, 7 1/2% imports.
12. Nominal
13. Roughly in same range as requirements. But dependent on meeting at least 300,000 tonne grain food aid target and domestic production target (see Note 2 above). Population estimate 4,500,000 + natural increase (100,000) returning refugees (400,000) is possibly conservative (high)

1996 Food Supply Projection<sup>1</sup> (000,000 tonnes)

Product	Domestic <sup>2</sup> Production	Food Aid <sup>3,6</sup>		Commercial Imports <sup>7</sup>	Total
		A	B		
Maize	200 - 250 <sup>4</sup>	40	25	10 - 25	275 - 340
Sorghum	250 - 300 <sup>4</sup>	10	-	5 - 10	265 - 320
Rice	4	-	35	15 - 25	55 - 60
Wheat	1	-	40	50 - 75	90 - 115
Beans	28	2.5	10 <sup>8</sup>	5 - 10 <sup>9</sup>	45 - 50
Vegetable Oil	25	2.5	10	7.5 - 12.5 <sup>9</sup>	45 - 50
Bananas <sup>5</sup>	45 - 50	-	-	-	45 - 50
Sugar	negative	2.5	40	50 - 75 <sup>9</sup>	92.5 - 117.5
Fish <sup>5</sup>	50	-	-	-	50
Supplementary Feeding	-	5	-	-	5 <sup>10</sup>

◆ Probable grain requirement on same basis as A, B, C but assuming population 5,800,000

● Basic	660,000
● Wastage	90,000 <sup>11</sup>
● Excess Consumption	<u>20,000</u> <sup>12</sup>
Total	<u>770,000</u>

◆ Grain supply projections

● Domestic	530,000
● Food Aid - A	50,000
● Food Aid - B	100,000
● Commercial	<u>125,000</u>
Total	805,000 <sup>13</sup>

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Notes

1. All best 'guesstimate' projections or targets. Excludes expatriate consumption.
2. 70% of 1987/89 projected unless otherwise noted. Given restoration security and non-plantation irrigation system by late 1995 and reasonable 1995/96 weather this can be met or exceeded.
3. Targets. A - rations or literal food for work, B - commercialised.
4. Combined total projection 525,000. Makeup dependent on degree of encouragement of sorghum in rainfed areas and access to seed.
5. 100% restoration of household farming and small estate banana production (but not large centrally pump irrigated estates) and 100% restoration fish production projected. Both feasible.
6. Grain targets are 50,000 A and 100,000 B.
7. Projected total commercial grain imports 125,000. Makeup somewhat problematic.

8. Targets.
9. Probably about half Mogadiscio/Kismayu, 30% Bebera/Bosaso, 10% minor ports, 10% land.
10. UNICEF estimate.
11. 15% loss on domestic, 5% on imported.
12. Nominal. Increase to note rise in non-poor proportion of population.
13. Balance dependant on achievement of food aid and domestic production targets, (see Note 2 above). Population estimate of 5,000,000 + natural growth (300,000) + returning refugees (500,000) may be on conservative (high) side. It would imply of the order of 220,000 non-returned refugees (1,040,000 plus 80,000 population increase less 900,000 returnees).