The future of South West Africa is inextricably linked to that of South Africa. Nothing except war can alter this association between South West Africa and South Africa.

- Prime Minister Jan Smuts

The people of the territory will have to get independence sooner or later. This political momentum has been set in motion.

- Foreign Minister Pik Botha

We do not believe in a system that sells people.

- Namibian Strike Leader

It must be borne in mind that the Namibian people are shedding blood to liberate each and every inch of the Namibian soil, thus each and every inch of the Namibian land must and will belong to the Namibian people.

- SWAPO President Sam Nujoma

The first two quotations do not-as it might seem-represent a change of basic goals or strategy but merely one of form. South Africa's determination to dominate and profit from dominating Namibia and to use it as a base for dominating (and/or destabilising) its neighbours remains basically unchanged.
'Independence' for Namibia to South Africa means something akin to the 'independence' of the Bantustans. Therefore Pik Botha's 1979 statement is no more compatible with the goals of Namibia's people enunciated in the second pair of quotations than was Prime Minister Smuts' 1947 declaration precisely because SA sees no contradiction between them and, therefore, the Namibian people see a continued denial, not a grudging acceptance, of their rights and aspirations in the evolution of South Africa's Namibia politik.

South Africa's 'total strategy' in Namibia has had a different form from that in Angola, Mozambique or other Southern African states because Namibia is a South African colonial territory and has been for seventy odd years. However, South Africa has abandoned its earlier goal of literal incorporation of SWA as a 5th province so that its Namibian strategy and tactics are increasingly an integral part of the regional rather than the national front of its total strategy.

Domination and exploitation remain the central themes but South Africa's tactics have varied - partly as a result of deteriorating results in Namibia - partly because of international constraints and partly because the failure of the Smithorewa exercise in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia (as it then was) indicated to it that its initial neo-colonial solution strategy was not viable. As a result the details and even some of the main features of the present South African design for consolidating and preserving domination and exploitation in Namibia are by no means clear - probably even to the South African decision takers. Further, Angola and Namibia are clearly interlocking elements in South African regional strategy, with policies in respect to each partly dependent on, and partly determining, these in respect to the other. For example, an independent Namibia with no foreign troops, no ANC bases, a quiet Orange River
border, substantial economic relations with South Africa and using a South African occupied Walvis Bay would meet many of SA's goals in respect to Namibia as such, but would also virtually end South Africa's option to back UNITA to the degree necessary to secure a change of regime in (or a guaranteed oil supply from and export market in) Angola and therefore is not a decision the South African regime can opt for until - and unless - it determines whether it sees domination of/ensuring economic links with Angola as a crucial objective to be pursued via armed force (SA or proxy) or not.

The elements in RSA strategy in respect to Namibia turn on:

A. War and Repression (i.e. use of force)

B. Politics and Negotiations

- Internal 'SWA-Namibia'
- International in respect to 'SWA to Namibia'
- Domestic - avoiding 'Who Lost Namibia' as an effective Conservative Party battlecry at next election -

C. Economic

- The gains and costs of exploitation and occupation
- The cost of the continuing war.

In the process of its Namibian policy since the late 1970s South Africa has - whether with strategic foresight or as a consequence of its tactical actions or both - created an ominously impressive infrastructure for destabilisation of an independent Namibia without major direct intervention by South African troops. While not impregnable, that infrastructure for destabilisation will require substantial diversion of resources and of policy attention by an independent Namibia to limit its impact and even so will significantly reduce the room for manoeuvre open to Namibia at independence. Because what South
Africa's rulers see as their 'bottom line' in respect to Namibia is not totally clear even to them, speculating on under what circumstances massive destabilisation would be practiced is an exercise in problems. This is especially as South Africa has no incentive to be specific on what it would, as opposed to what it definitely would not, allow without major destabilising initiatives.

'THE FIFTH PROVINCE'

The roots of the present South African position on Namibia go back to its 1915 military occupation of what was then known as German South West Africa. The South African delegation to the Conference at Versailles argued vigorously that the former German colony be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. The result was that South Africa was granted a Class C mandate as a compromise, which was seen, in the words of a British delegate sympathetic to the SA Government position, as "the equivalent of a 999 year lease as compared with a freehold".¹

The Pretoria Government was quite evidently not seriously displeased with the arrangement. General Smuts, then SA Prime Minister, argued in the SA Parliament in 1925:²

"I do not think it is necessary for us to annex South West Africa to the Union. The mandate for me is enough and it should be enough for the Union. It gives the Union such complete sovereignty, not only administrative, but legislative, that we need not ask for anything more".

¹

²
Pretoria has consistently regarded Namibia as effectively a 5th province of South Africa. This fundamentally remains South Africa's attitude up to and including the present, even though in recent years it has been forced to present its claims in different forms. But what has remained true is that under no circumstances does Pretoria envisage genuine independence for Namibia.

Soon after the UN was set up in 1945, General Smuts again presented South Africa's case for annexation of Namibia before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, arguing that the territory was de facto part of South Africa and that it should therefore be formally incorporated into the Union of South Africa. The Fourth Committee, however, rejected South Africa's claim and drafted a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the 14th of December, 1946 calling on South Africa to place Namibia under the international Trusteeship System.

In 1947 SA rejected this. Later that year (1st November) the General Assembly again urged SA to place Namibia under the Trusteeship system as it was to do as many as ten times in the course of the next eight years.

In 1949 the General Assembly (GA) sought, and in 1950 obtained, an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which the GA accepted in December, 1950. The ICJ found that South Africa still exercised the mandate and in effect was under obligation to submit reports to the UN on its administration of the territory. SA refused, as it did not recognise the competence of the UN to take over from the defunct League of Nations as the body to which SA had to report. 3
The wrangling continued until in a landmark GA Resolution, 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, was passed by the GA on 14 December, 1960, setting the framework within which the UN would seek to advance the issue of Namibia's independence.

A measure of South Africa's total disregard for the international moves being made, was the fact that in 1962 South Africa set up the "Odendaal Commission" which, in its 1964 report, detailed SA's plans for a bantustan division of Namibia.

Pretoria totally disregarded the UN General Assembly's demands and the advisory opinion of the ICJ. Consequently, the GA through Resolution 2145 (1966) found that South Africa had "disavowed the Mandate" as it had "failed to fulfill its obligations in respect of the mandated territory" and that "henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations".  

The UN Security Council (SC) which had remained aloof from this issue due to the attitudes of the Western powers, entered the fray in January 1968 by unanimously condemning the trial of the 37 Namibians in Pretoria. SA ignored the SC's demand that they stop the trial, free those involved and repatriate them to Namibia. Instead it proceeded with a second trial and began implementing the bantustan policy by enacting the "Development of Self Government for Native Nations Act", No.54 (1968) and the "South West Africa Affairs Act", No.25 (1969).

Not even South Africa's allies in the SC could defend this, so on 20 March, 1969 the SC adopted Resolution 264 declaring South Africa's presence in
Namibia to be illegal and contrary to the principles and decisions of the United Nations. Five months later, on 12 August, 1969 the Security Council reiterated the position expressed in Res. 264(1969) but this time injected a time limit demanding that SA withdraw its administration by the 4th October, 1969. During this debate the British representative stated what became the regular position of the three permanent western members of the Security Council: that they "could not and would not contemplate an economic war with South Africa and sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter..." which relates to clear and present threats to peace. On numerous occasions in subsequent years, Britain, France and the USA would use their veto to block the passage of any resolution that called for action, or even threatened action, in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter.

In 1971 the ICJ delivered its advisory opinion confirming the validity of the revocation of the Mandate and, therefore, the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the obligation incumbent on all member states of the UN to "refrain from any acts" and in particular "any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration". Later that year both the GA and SC accepted the ICJ opinion, the latter in the form of UNSC Res. 301 (1971).

The then UN Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim went to South Africa and Namibia in March 1972 and in September 1972 Waldheim sent a special representative, Dr. Alfred Escher, to further extend the contacts with South Africa. This too, initiated a technique that SA has since used of seeming to negotiate in good faith while simultaneously proceeding undaunted with their own programme no matter how inconsistent with what is supposedly being
negotiated. In this instance it declared that "Ovamboland" and "Eastern Caprivi" would be granted "self-government" in the immediate future as the next step in advancing the bantustan division of the country. Later, Pretoria was to give the appearance of negotiating seriously regarding UNSC Res. 435 (1978), while at the same time going ahead with their own long term programme designed to retain and consolidate control over Namibia.

THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP, THE U.N. AND NEGOTIATIONS

The buildup of pressure for coercive action against South Africa came to a head again in June 1975 when the Africa Group at the UN presented a draft resolution to the Security Council proposing an arms embargo against South Africa because its continued illegal occupation of Namibia constituted a threat to international peace and security. While on this occasion the three Western permanent members of the Security Council, Britain, the United States and France, again abused their triple veto to block the resolution, they were concerned by the apparent unwillingness of Pretoria even to contemplate a neo-colonial solution in Namibia. Without an internationally approved solution the Western members of the Security Council could expect increasing pressure for sanctions against South Africa.

As a result, UN Security Council Res. 385 was adopted with Western support on 30 January 1976. It demanded that South Africa withdraw its administration from Namibia and that elections under the supervision and control of the UN be held, leading to independence for Namibia. In the wake of South Africa's invasion of Angola, Henry Kissinger launched his so-called diplomatic peace shuttle in April 1976 as an effort to deflect mounting pressure on the West
over developments in South Africa. Later in 1976, Britain, France and the United States again had to exercise their triple veto to block a resolution calling for an arms embargo against South Africa. They could not allow this untenable position in which South Africa had placed them of constantly appearing as its protectors by veto to continue.

The Ambassadors of the then five Western members of the Security Council (United States, Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany and Canada) met with South African Prime Minister Voster, Foreign Minister R. F. Botha, and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie, on the 7th April, 1977 for talks on the future of Namibia. During the course of the next year the 'Contact Group' (as they began to call themselves) held many meetings with the South African Government, SWAPO and the UN. During this period, Pretoria, with typical hypocrisy, declared a willingness to co-operate with the Contact Group's effort to find a solution within the context of their proposals but at the same time proceeded with their bantustan policy by setting up a "Damara Legislative Council" and arranging elections for the Rehoboth Gebeit. They also sought to promote their puppets in Namibia by insisting on Western recognition of them.

Major General J. J. Geldenhuys was appointed commanding officer of the military occupation of Namibia and was instructed to begin building up tribal armies with the objective of eventually forming a supposedly independent Namibian Army. Pretoria appointed an "Administrator General", Marthinus Steyn, a Judge of the Orange Free State Division of the Supreme Court, to act as a one person colonial government on behalf of the South African Government. He took office during September 1977, supposedly in accordance with the western proposal that Pretoria make such an appointment for the purpose of
ultimately facilitating the implementation of the proposals still being formulated. Steyn initiated a review of laws on Namibia, streamlining the so-called security legislation and repealing some bits of apartheid legislation. Although this was portrayed as a demonstration of South Africa's goodwill, it did not alter the overall effect of Pretoria's oppressive legislation, or the fundamentals of its highly exploitative apartheid system. The exercise was undertaken simply to portray an image of reform and deflect growing criticism of the regime's repressive legal structure.

South Africa's declaration that it would not proceed immediately with implementing its Turnhalle solution, was hailed as a victory for Western diplomacy and a clear demonstration of the progress that was being made in spite of the fact that Pretoria permitted the Turnhalle conference to continue with its farcical deliberations aimed solely at an internal settlement.

In early January, 1978, 'proximity talks' were held in New York with the Contract Group shuttling between delegations from SWAPO and South Africa, who refused to talk to SWAPO directly. Again, as had consistently been the case during the preceding months of negotiations, SWAPO was pressured to accommodate the demands which Pretoria continuously made. The argument was that if SWAPO did not make the concessions, then the whole process would break down. The "proximity talks" resumed in early February, 1978 but lasted only three days because Pik Botha suddenly left New York, warning that aspects of these proposals "would be totally unacceptable and so dangerous that there is a serious danger of people in the territory being overrun and being governed by a Marxist terrorist organisation...." by which he meant SWAPO.

What became clear from this and other statements by Pretoria was that they
would under no circumstances accept a SWAPO government in Windhoek. They sought to delay a solution and would only ultimately agree to a settlement which provided the Pretoria regime with what they perceived as a clear opportunity to install a puppet government but with international approval.

On 25 April, 1978 South Africa declared their acceptance of the Western proposals but on the basis of an interpretation South Africa claimed they had received from the western Contact Group. SWAPO and the front line States had, of course, been left with a different understanding from that which was offered to, or at least understood by, South Africa. This served to illustrate once more a tactic of the Contact Group; they consistently present ambiguous proposals capable of being interpreted in diametrically opposite ways. Chester Crocker in particular has been termed "the master of deliberate ambiguity". Agreement to the text of a particular proposal was then hailed as an advance no matter how different the interpretations by the two sides were.

In a savage attempt to dissuade SWAPO from accepting the Western proposals and thereby to appear as the intransigent party, Pretoria ordered the bombing of the SWAPO settlement at Kassinga in southern Angola on the 4th May, 1978. Nearly 800 Namibians - virtually all non-combatants - were murdered in the course of that one day by SA forces. However, on 12 July, SWAPO accepted the proposals.

Towards the end of July the Security Council considered the Western proposals and requested that the Secretary General appoint a "special representative" to take the matter further. Martti Ahtisaari, the then UN Commissioner for Namibia was appointed to this post and left within a week for Namibia with a 50 strong UN team in order to determine what arrangements would need to be made
in order to implement the Contact Groups's proposals.

No sooner had the Secretary General reported back to the Security Council than South Africa raised objections to the proposals. Botha in a letter to Dr. Waldheim objected to the size of the 7500 strong military component of UNTAG, to the inclusion of a civilian police unit and also insisted that the election would have to take place before the end of December 1978, even though, or more probably because, this was impossible in terms of the timetable contained in the Western Proposals and the Secretary General's report.

In contrast, SWAPO's President, Sam Nujoma, wrote to the UN Secretary General on 9 September, 1978 and offered to sign a ceasefire with South Africa as required in the proposals. This offer was promptly rejected by South Africa.

A few days later, on 20 September, Voster announced Pretoria's intention of going ahead with their own internal settlement elections in December 1978, effectively rejecting the UN Secretary General's proposals for a settlement. Then on 29 September, the Security Council adopted Resolution 435 (1978) which formalised the Security Council's acceptance of the Secretary General's report as the universally accepted plan of action for bringing Namibia to independence.

The five Contact Group countries, concerned that South Africa's refusal to cooperate in the implementation of Res. 435 would bring a sustained demand that they agree to mandatory sanctions, took the unprecedented step of sending a delegation made up of the foreign ministers of Britain, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of France to South Africa to dissuade Pretoria from proceeding with its "internal
settlement". The "five" had begged and pleaded in the Security Council that they be given the opportunity to persuade South Africa to cooperate in the implementation of Res. 435. At the end of their meetings in Pretoria they had quite evidently not succeeded but they made great play of the fact that Pretoria had not explicitly rejected Res. 435. The logic of this position was that there was still hope of South Africa agreeing to implementation of the Resolution, and that, providing no one rocked the boat by demanding sanctions against South Africa, that objective could still be achieved.13

SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACHES TO A NEO-COLONIAL 'SOLUTION'

It is clear that Pretoria has never had the remotest intention of allowing Namibia to become genuinely independent. But the evidence suggests that their regime was at this point seriously considering the offer being made to it at the time by the Contact Group. They were, it seems, considering the possibility of Res. 435 eventually offering them a means of securing continued domination of Namibia but with the UN off their back and SWAPO's struggle seriously undermined for years to come. To achieve this Pretoria believed it needed further time: (a) to build up what they hoped would prove an attractive alternative to SWAPO, (b) to establish an administration, army and police which was ostensibly Namibian but loyal to the South African regime, so that when the time came for independence they would be able to leave a state apparatus in place on the ground, creating major difficulties for any incoming government opposed to the South African regime and (c) to experiment in literally buying out a population during an election process.

This last element took the form of the December 1978 "election" in Namibia and
the carbon copy of that election in Zimbabwe in March of 1979. SWAPO boycotted that December election. Pretoria spared nothing - lavish parties were laid on for everyone who came to DTA rallies with free steaks and beer available for all. This was meant to signal to the masses of the population how life was going to be different with a DTA government in Windhoek.

As a result of coercion, legal compulsion, plain bullying tactics, and an enormous propaganda drive, Pretoria achieved the results it was looking for. The regime claimed a 92% registration of voters and an 80% turnout of those registered to vote. The DTA took 41 of the 50 seats, AKTUR (the National Party) won 6 seats and one seat each went to three smaller groups. Pretoria was well pleased.

The "election" in Zimbabwe in March 1979 was quite evidently heavily influenced by South Africa with very much the same style and lavish expenditure everywhere. This Zimbabwe experiment produced the same sort of pleasing results for Pretoria.

Judging from the inspired articles which appeared in the press in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe at that time, Pretoria was working on the theory that the prestige of holding government office would enhance puppets' chances of victory in any later election. Thus when the Lancaster House settlement was proposed, Pretoria agreed to put the pressure on Smith and Muzorewa by threatening the withdrawal of supplies from South Africa. They had convinced themselves that the March 1979 Zimbabwe election results could be repeated in the independence election. Indeed they were so sure of the outcome that they made arrangements for their 'Chief Minister' in Namibia, Dirk Mudge, to fly to Salisbury (as it then was) to meet 'Prime Minister' Muzorewa the
morning after his election 'triumph'. The actual outcome stunned Pretoria not simply in respect to the future of Zimbabwe but also in its implications for Namibia.

Throughout 1979 and 1980 South Africa raised one objection after the other to Resolution 435. Pretoria objected to the presence of SWAPO bases in Namibia and demanded the monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighbouring states. They demanded that their puppets, the "internal parties" (defined to exclude SWAPO - which existed as a legal party in Namibia - and any other party - e.g. SWANU, Damara Council - not willing to appear under a South African/Turnhalle umbrella) be included as parties to the negotiations and that all UN funding should stop going to SWAPO. They also had the arrogance to propose that UNITA, their clients in Angola, be included in the negotiations. Time after time it was SWAPO which had to make concessions in the hope of being able to begin implementation of the UN election plan. During August 1980 the South Africans wrote to the UN Secretary general claiming that they now only had two remaining difficulties preventing implementation: one was the partiality of the UN towards SWAPO and the other that their puppets had not been consulted sufficiently. The Contact Group then proposed that an all-parties "Pre-implementation" meeting take place in Geneva. This meeting took place in January 1981. It was apparent from the start that the South African regime had only agreed to the meeting because they believed that they could turn it into an international exhibition of their puppets. SWAPO immediately declared its willingness to cooperate in the implementation of Resolution 435 and sign a cease-fire as the first essential step. South Africa refused to do so, failed in its attempt to turn it into a propaganda coup for themselves and caused the meeting to break down before its scheduled end.
The breakdown of the Geneva meeting was only to be expected. The Pretoria government knew that the incoming Reagan administration would be considerably more sympathetic to the maintenance of the existing apartheid system and state at home and to the conditions it would demand for a settlement in Namibia. From the start the new US administration sent all the signals Pretoria was hoping for. Reagan in a TV interview not long after his inauguration described South Africa as a "friendly country" and then took up a theme much favoured by Pretoria: that SSA was "a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have". Five senior SA military officers were permitted to visit the US during March 1981 (the first known to have done so in several years) despite the mandatory arms embargo and established US policy disallowing such visits. That same month a DTA delegation visited Washington, senior State Department officials met with Jonas Savimbi, leader of Pretoria's client Angolan army and the administration attempted to repeal the Clark Amendment which applies only to Angola and expressly forbids CIA support for anti-government groups there - a repeal they finally achieved in the summer of 1985. The signals to Pretoria could not have been stronger or more pleasing to that regime.

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN OPERATION

During the course of frequent discussions in the ensuing months between SA and the US, the US Government sought to identify and accommodate SA's "bottom line", a comprehensive statement of all demands, which, if satisfactorily met, would make it possible for Pretoria to agree to implement a suitably revised Res. 435. The essence of the US position was that: Res. 435 needed to be so changed as to make it be seen once again by Pretoria as a vehicle for
attaining continued domination of Namibia. It would need to have fundamental aspects changed and Pretoria would need the opportunity to re-shape internal circumstances so as to make nonsense of key aspects of the Resolution.

Confidential State Department memoranda relating to the April 1981 visit of R. F. Botha and Magnus Milan, SA's Foreign and Defence Ministers respectively, which were leaked to the American press in May of 1981, offer a valuable insight into the direction of the new US administration's Southern Africa policy. They appeared to accept Pretoria's ideas about Namibia and Angola giving the US (with South Africa's enthusiastic assistance) the opportunity of "rolling back Soviet influence in Africa". It fitted neatly into their cold-war analysis and offered an issue, getting rid of Cubans from Angola, which would have electoral appeal in the US. They were also proposing changes in Res. 435: SA wanted to avoid elections for a constituent assembly and to get rid of as much UN involvement as possible. They made it clear to the US Administration that they did not want an effective SWAPO government in Windhoek. Only a puppet administration would do.

Open campaigning for "changes" in Res. 435 was short lived because formally "changing" it presented political problems to other members of the Contract Group who otherwise supported the US approach and welcomed the US taking the lead of the Contact Group. A State Department briefing written for Chester Crocker referred to a "semantical" problem: the alterations they sought should be referred to as "attempts to complement rather than to change 435". In the event they referred to these attempts to undermine Res. 435 as "strengthening" the resolution. No longer was reference made to a settlement in terms of Res. 435 but rather on the basis of Res. 435 suggesting that the Resolution should merely serve as the basic guide to a settlement, and could
be altered by further agreements and interpretations.

The argument was put forward that if Pretoria was to be persuaded that Res. 435 should be implemented, then South Africa's "concerns" with the Resolution and with "regional security" would have to be met. There was no question of forcing an intransigent South Africa to agree to implementation. On the contrary, the whole direction was toward making Res. 435 once again acceptable to Pretoria, which meant so altering it that it would again be perceived by Pretoria as providing it with a means of retaining effective control of a nominally independent Namibia.

The logic of this approach was that all concessions would have to be made by SWAPO. The other aspect was that re-opening negotiations would provide Pretoria and her allies with the legitimised delay which SA needed to reshape circumstances within Namibia. Pretoria's objective was to make nonsense of fundamental aspects of the Resolution and lay the foundations for continued economic and political dominance and/or massive destabilisation in Namibia and for its use as a base for continued coercion and aggression against Namibia's neighbours in the future.

At the end of March 1981, the US State Department announced that it had completed its Southern Africa policy review. This initiated a flurry of diplomatic activity, a significant feature of which was that Pretoria confined its discussions on Namibia to the Reagan administration, abruptly ceasing direct contact with the Contact Group as a whole. The consistent pattern was for all negotiations with Pretoria to be conducted through the US State Department. The other four members of the Contact Group acquiesced in this. Further evidence of this compliance with US demands by the other contract
group countries was demonstrated when Britain and France joined the US in vetoing four resolutions calling for sanctions against SA in the UN Security Council at the end of April 1981. Britain and France were reportedly unhappy at the US refusal to work out a compromise resolution reaffirming a commitment to Res. 435. They were nevertheless ready to support the US with their vetos so that the US would not be isolated. The truth of the matter is that in spite of the niceties of diplomatic style, the rest of the Contact Group remained committed to the US line of appeasing the Pretoria regime and protecting the profitability of their own economic involvement in racist exploitation in Southern Africa.

During the visit of William Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State, and Chester Crocker to SA in June 1981, the US offered SA an extra condition for the implementation of Res. 435, namely the removal of Cuban troops from Angola, the so-called "linkage" issue. Naturally Pretoria jumped at this, and together with the US have since insisted on this condition. The remainder of the Contact Group have justified their support for linkage by saying that while they do not support a formal linkage, it is vital to recognise the reality of SA's security concerns in the region. Without satisfying these demands, SA will not agree to Res. 435. The introduction of the "linkage" issue has since been condemned in the Security Council Res. 539 (1983) in which the US abstained. The Resolution passed through the Security Council because of the enormous opposition among the vast majority of UN member states to delaying Namibia's independence through the introduction of an issue quite extraneous to Res. 435 and inherently contradictory since were South Africa not illegally in occupation of Namibia no event in Angola could significantly affect SA security. It appears the diplomatic pressure was such that the US felt unable to use its veto, apparently much to the alarm of the SA delegation.
observing the proceedings in the Security Council. It has been quite clear that the US has wanted a Cuban withdrawal because of the domestic appeal it would have in the US. The Reagan administration knows perfectly well that the Cubans were invited to Angola during the 1975/6 South African invasion of that country and that they have only stayed, at the request of the Angolan government, because of the continuing direct and proxy (UNITA) acts of aggression by South Africa. They know that the Angolan refusal to agree to linkage is entirely justified. Yet President Reagan himself was drawn into the issue as a signal of prioritisation by the United States. In September 1981 he wrote to President Nyerere, as chairman of the FLS, insisting that the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola was a necessary prerequisite to the implementation of the UN election plan.

During October 1981 the US, with the rest of the Contact Group in train, began their "phased approach" to achieving implementation of Res. 435. The whole exercise amounted to an outrageous attempt to squeeze further concessions from SWAPO and to undermine Res. 435. On 26 October, the Contact Group produced their "constitutional principles" which, quite apart from details of the content, was an attempt to limit the freedom of the Constituent Assembly to be elected in terms of Res. 435 in deciding a constitution for an independent Namibia. It also introduced a new factor, the need for the constitution to be decided by a two thirds majority of the Constituent Assembly, whereas the need for a simple majority had previously been understood, although not specifically defined in the Resolution. One of the basic principles of Res. 435 was that it should first be established who the true representatives of the Namibian people are, so that they could then be given the opportunity to agree on a constitution. This was clearly an attempt to undermine a fundamental aspect of the Resolution. SWAPO/FLS responded by reformulating
the Contact Group's proposal from which the five interpreted SWAPO's
greement. In effect, the reply also re-affirmed the principle that the
Constituent Assembly was ultimately responsible for whatever decisions were
made regarding the constitution. Notably, a reference to "regional"
administration, evidently included by the Contact Group to satisfy SA that its
bantustan division of the country will be maintained, was excluded from the
response.26

Likewise, the Five's attempt to float the idea of a "non-agression" treaty
between SWAPO and SA was ignored as a non-starter.27 Pretoria's response to
the Five's proposals were never made public. On 17 December, 1981 the
Contract Group issued their revised proposals28 and in them suggested a
relatively complicated two votes per person electoral system with half the
constituent assembly being elected on a constituency basis and half on the
basis of proportional representation. This proposal was rejected by SWAPO29
and by the FLS30. It was eventually agreed by SWAPO/FLS in June 1982 to
shelve the voting system for later resolution.

The Contact Group eventually leaked their "summary of points" in early June
1982 in preparation for "proximity" talks in New York during that period31.
This document included a paragraph on "other regional issues" which, without
using the terms "linkage" or "Cubans" or "Angola", gave unmistakable
endorsement to the US/SA demand for linkage.32 It clearly provided Pretoria
with a legitimisation of its linkage demand as being a necessary prerequisite
to a settlement.

It is this issue which has remained the ostensible stumbling block to a
settlement, the excuse regularly used for the delay in implementing Res. 435.
RESHUFFLING THE PUPPET SHOW

By September 1982, the then "Council of Ministers" and "National Assembly" reached the end of their terms of office. Although the SA regime is adept at extending terms of office when it suits them, the level of corruption and chaos of its excessively expensive government bureaucracy was becoming too much even for Pretoria. In addition Pretoria was having to deal with a rising level of complaints from the ultra-conservative National Party in Namibia, that the DTA administration was not representative enough as it did not include themselves. Attempts were made administratively to "broaden" the "Council of Ministers" but when that failed Pretoria declared at the beginning of 1983 that it was going to return Namibia to the one person rule of the colonial governor (Administrator General).

In July 1983 Pretoria announced with all the ceremony of an official gazette their intention of setting up a "State Council". It was to have the function of drawing up a constitution for an independent Namibia which would then be put to a referendum, of course, under SA control. This "State Council" never materialised because of the advent of the "Multi-Party Conference" (MPC), a group of small political parties which included the DTA and the National Party. By the end of 1983 two of these eight parties (the Damara Council and the Christian Democratic Party) had withdrawn from the MPC declaring that they did not wish to collaborate in what was basically an anti-SWAPo front funded anonymously by the South Africans through a West German source. During 1984 SWANU also withdrew for the same reason from the MPC.

Pretoria initially took a low profile with the MPC but by January 1984 it had
declared a public position. The colonial governor, the Administrator General, declared in his 1984 New Year's message that the SA Government was "pinning its hopes" on the MPC. A couple of weeks later the MPC was summoned by P. W. Botha to Cape Town to be told that they were to agree a concrete alternative to the implementation of Resolution 435.

During 1984 Pretoria attempted to persuade SWAPO to become part of its puppet government in Namibia. The idea was floated at the May Lusaka conference between SA and SWAPO (each accompanied by Namibian groups) hosted by President Kaunda and again at a meeting on Cape Verde in July 1984 between SWAPO and the Pretoria regime. The argument was presented by Pretoria as follows: South Africa, like the rest of the world, would like Res. 435 implemented, but it seemed impossible in the foreseeable future due to the unfortunate presence of the Cuban forces in Angola. The Namibian people should not, however, continue to be frustrated in their political aspirations and so the SA government wished to see the establishment of a "Government of National Unity" which would include SWAPO's participation. SWAPO would, of course, have to lay down its arms while South Africa's military forces, police and administration would remain in place. In other words they were proposing to SWAPO that it become part of their puppet government in Windhoek thereby legitimising their continued illegal occupation.

Pretoria's proposal seems so arrogant, outrageous and inherently unlikely to attract SWAPO, that to the outsider it may appear that they could not have meant it. This is not the case. Consistent with their racist attitudes, Pretoria thought that SWAPO may fall for their tricks and that it was worth a try. If they did not succeed, they would lose nothing. They would simply project SWAPO's refusal to cooperate as SWAPO rejecting their offers of peace
and a "negotiated settlement". If they could persuade SWAPO to participate, they would effectively legitimise their illegal occupation of Namibia, neutralise SWAPO's ability to continue the armed struggle and have SWAPO functioning as their puppet government in Namibia.

By the end of 1984, Pretoria had the MPC threatening to "negotiate a settlement" with South Africa with or without SWAPO knowing perfectly well that SWAPO could not and would not be drawn into their game. In January 1985, the existence of committees of senior SA civil servants working on a "settlement proposal" was leaked to the press and eventually on the 26 March, 1985 the MPC flew to Cape Town to present to P. W. Botha, now SA's President, what were ostensibly their own proposals for an "interim government of national unity". In "response" P. W. Botha announced on 18 April the establishment of an "interim government" made up of an appointed "Council of Ministers", "National Assembly" and "Constitutional Council". Those in these bodies would all be members of the MPC.

Remarks made a few days later by Pik Botha in the so-called "House of Representatives" underline Pretoria's true intentions:

"...South Africa has made it clear to the West and the world that it has the right to, unilaterally, terminate its presence and administration in South West Africa. I don't say we will do it or that it is under consideration at this moment, but it is an option."

From the substantial circumstantial evidence that has accrued, particularly that relating to the establishment of specifically "Namibian" state
structures, it would seem that this is the solution Pretoria is now aiming at. It is going through the process of establishing an undeclared, creeping UDI in Namibia. It may well announce at some future point that the entire world has got it wrong and that South Africa simply no longer occupies Namibia. This would avoid an antagonising declaration such as Ian Smith's declaration of UDI in 1965 but rather present it as a fait accompli. Proposed transfers of major economic assets including the loss making railways and the shareholding of the South African Industrial Development Corporation in Rossing, also point in this direction.

Ultimately Pretoria's capacity is severely limited by the fundamental weakness of its position. The regime may entertain all sorts of ambitious schemes to ensure its survival but lacks the capacity to carry its schemes through. Without either a means to discredit SWAPO by inducing it to collaborate or to build/buy a countervailing black Namibian client base no neo-colonial structures can be made to appear credibly non-SA.

FROM POLICE PRESENCE TOWARD NEO-COLONIAL COMMAND

The primary vehicle South Africa has used to impose and retain its domination of Namibia has been the use of force. Armed suppression has been a constant feature of life in Namibia during the past century. It has had as its primary objective the establishing of the white settler community as the indisputable rulers of Namibia. While SA is now much more concerned about SA (than settler) white interests it still requires a 'local' white presence to operate them. German colonisation was marked by the extermination of some 80% of the population of the central and southern regions. The South Africans have been
equally ready to use brute force in an attempt to stem the rejection of their control. It was in response to this violent suppression of its efforts to mobilise the Namibian people that SWAPO decided to take up arms against the Pretoria regime.

As a result of a decision of the 1961 National Congress of SWAPO held in Windhoek, cadres were recruited and sent abroad for military training. The Congress took the view that armed struggle was compatible with and complementary to the political struggle. But it was not until 1966 that the armed struggle was actually launched. On 18 July that year the International Court of Justice announced that it did not recognise the competence of Ethiopia and Liberia to bring a case before it on Namibia and therefore would not pronounce itself on the issue. That same day SWAPO issued a resolute statement from its provisional headquarters in Dar es Salaam, declaring that the ICJ's inexcusable refusal to act "would relieve Namibians once and for all from any illusions which they may have harboured about the United Nations as some kind of saviour in their plight". The statement then declared that SWAPO had "no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our liberation". A little more than a month later on 26 August 1966, SWAPO fighters engaged South African forces in battle. From then on SWAPO has consistently escalated the armed struggle, forcing the South African regime to commit an increasing number of men and arms to retain its colonial occupation.

In spite of the undoubted gains of the armed struggle and the influence it has had in focusing world attention on Namibia, without which there would never have been negotiations, it is not the objective of this study to examine these gains but rather to look critically at how Pretoria is preparing Namibia for destabilisation in the future and how the SA regime thus constitutes a threat
to the region. The focus is quite deliberately on the negative - the threats and dangers which Namibia is likely to face through future destabilisation.

During the first years of the conflict, the SA Police were formally responsible for attempting to contain SWAPO's military wing. Although the SA military had three major military bases and five airports at its disposal in Namibia at the time SWAPO launched the armed struggle, it was not until the crushing of the 1971-1972 general strike in Namibia that the military took over formally and embarked upon a massive military buildup so that by 1974 SA troop strength in Namibia had grown to some 15,000, then 45,000 by 1976 following the SA defeat in Angola, 80,000 by 1980 and between 100,000 and 110,000 by 1985. These figures, especially in later years include mercenary, UNITA and SWA Territorial Force Cadres which are in fact - if not necessarily in name - part of the overall SA military command structure. Since taking overall control of SA's military machine in Namibia in 1972, the SA military has continued joint operations with the South African police, referring to both forces as the "security forces". Over the years, the regime has resorted to nakedly vicious terror tactics in their attempt to suppress the political opposition of the Namibian people to their presence in the country. Torture, "disappearances" following arrest, savage murders and detention are the standard practice of these so-called security forces.

Namibia occupies a peculiar position in South Africa's regional strategy in that, as a colony it illegally occupies, it currently exercises total domination including de facto (illegal) sovereignty but is under considerable pressure to relinquish control. Realising that it will inevitably be forced at some stage to accept some form of internationally acceptable settlement (despite its avoidance tactics over 435) it has undertaken a definite
programme to prepare for its continued domination of Namibia through the establishment of a neo-colonial administration. Should a SWAPO government emerge to challenge its domination, Pretoria is laying the groundwork for Namibia's destabilisation in an attempt to reassert the domination it wishes to exercise in the region. In this context it is instructive to examine how the SA military machine in Namibia has changed in its composition since the negotiations which led to Res. 435 began in 1977.

Within two years of the military taking over control of the occupation of Namibia the first black "ethnic" units were formed in Namibia. In 1974 a San unit, now known as 201 Battalion was established. In 1975 101 Battalion was formed in "Ovamboland" and 202 Battalion in "Kavango". During 1976 "ethnic" units were set up in Rehoboth and Caprivi and in 1979 training courses began for recruits from among the Damara, Nama, Herero, Tswana and Coloured "population groups". In 1979 the SA military Paratus revealed the existence of a unit in Kaokoland.

It was, however, in 1977, that Pretoria's plan to "Namibianise" the war first began to emerge in a coherent form. Major General Geldenhuys was appointed the Officer Commanding the SWA Command. He was charged with the task of building up a "multi-racial defence force" in Namibia and as a result 41 Battalion, now known as 911 Battalion, was formed and included recruits from all "population groups". On 1 August, 1980 the South West Africa Territory force (SWATF) was established bringing these units together with a number of SADF units, battalions, field regiments and area forces.

SWATF was given its own formal command structure: ranks used are a little different from those used in the SADF and SWATF received its own distinctive
informs so as to give it the appearance of a force separate from the SADF. Military communiques issued in Windhoek are now always issued by SWATF and not the SADF. This, however, is an obfuscation of the fact that SWATF remains an integral part of South Africa’s military machine with Pretoria remaining in overall command and retaining control of its entire functioning.\textsuperscript{50}

At the same time SWATF was set up in 1980, the then commander of SA forces in Namibia, Major General Geldenhuys, made it clear that Pretoria envisaged that the time would come when the SADF would no longer be needed in Namibia as SWATF would be capable of taking over its role. He also made it clear at the time that SADF units would be "seconded" to SWATF at the request of the "independent" Government in Namibia.\textsuperscript{51}

SWATF has been set up as if it were and with the intent of creating a fully fledged "SWA" army. It incorporates a command infrastructure, a permanent force infantry component, a citizen force, a commando network comprising 25 area force units, a training wing and an administrative and logistics component. The "airforce" currently consists of a light aircraft commando; the privately owned aircraft are flown by their owners on a part-time basis.

In 1982 the then Officer Commanding SWATF, Major General Charles Lloyd, spelt out how SA saw the position of SWATF in the event of Res. 435 being implemented. The essence of what he stated was that SWATF would be partially demobilised for a temporary period during implementation but not fully dismantled as required by Res. 435. It would retain its command structure, bases, weapons and capacity to be fully mobilised within hours.\textsuperscript{52} By creating SWATF subsequent to the passage of Res. 435 in the Security Council, Pretoria clearly hopes to make utter nonsense of the fundamental principle in Res. 435
that all SA forces in Namibia must be withdrawn, bar the 1500 who would remain confined to two bases for the transitional period. SWATF is an integral part of the South African forces in Namibia. The obvious intention of Pretoria was to have a military force in Namibia which is ostensibly Namibian even if it is commanded, equipped and supplied by Pretoria and owes allegiance to its South African master. In the longer term SA probably did hope SWATF could be virtually totally locally staffed, largely locally financed and backed and run by SA less overtly and ubiquitously than at present. The goal was and is a neo-colonial army for a neo-colonial state.

Apart from SWATF the Pretoria regime has developed a motley collection of "special" unconventional units, some of which are used specifically in Namibia while others are used more widely than in Namibia alone. Although they operate in great secrecy, it is known that the same process of making them ostensibly Namibian is in progress.

Koevoet (crowbar) is the most notorious of these units, responsible for many brutal murders and the extensive use of torture. Recently officially "disbanded", it has basically been transferred from the South African Police to the "South West African Police", with a formal change of name although it seems that it will be unable to shake off the name "Koevoet" in practice.

The person Pretoria - in an extreme case of its standard 'double speak' - calls its Law and Order Minister, Louis la Grange, announced in May 1985 that members of the South African Police who are members of Koevoet or the "security police" would be "seconded or transferred to the South West African Police" and that the SWAP would expand its "counter insurgency" function. This serves to illustrate the method Pretoria is using to "Namibianise" its
name and its identification as a Namibian unit.

While Koevoet is technically designated a police unit, it is in fact the cutting edge of the SA military in Namibia. It functions as a military unit and has never had anything other than a military function, operating in much the same way as the Selous Scouts did in pre-independence Zimbabwe. The obvious reason Pretoria had for technically designating it as a police unit is in order to circumvent a fundamental element of Res. 435, when Pretoria is eventually forced to implement the UN election plan. Res. 435 makes provision for the withdrawal of all SA forces from Namibia, bar 1500, to be confined to two bases for the transition period, the total disbanding of all "ethnic"/tribal units but also provides for "the existing police force" maintaining law and order during the transition period. As a "police" unit, Pretoria can be expected to argue that Koevoet units will remain operational during the transition period. This type of deception by Pretoria should be firmly dealt with by the United Nations. The SWA Special Task Force is also technically a police unit presumably for the same reason as stated above. It too is a brutalised, professional military unit into which it would appear Pretoria is transferring members of Koevoet.

The so-called reconnaissance commandos, the "recces" in the SA military jargon, constitute another element of Pretoria's army of occupation in Namibia. There are known to be six such commandos based at secret locations in South Africa. They are highly trained troops and operate in great secrecy, mainly in destabilisation operations in neighbouring states. The unit ambushed in Cabinda by FAPLA forces on the Jan, 1985, while endeavouring to blow up the Petroangol/Gulf Oil refinery masquerading as a UNITA commando, was a Durban based "recco commando". These units are also known to operate in
Namibia.

32 Battalion is a very large mercenary force made up largely of the remnants of UNITA and the FNLA as well as black Mozambican ex-members of such Portuguese para military units as Fleche (Arrow) but are led by a white officer corps of SA Permanent Force members and mercenaries. It is widely held that they are 32 Battalion while at rear bases or operating in Namibia and UNITA while operating in Angola.\textsuperscript{56} 44 Battalion has its origins in the recruitment by SA of members of the Rhodesian Light Infantry when Zimbabwe became independent in 1980. It is primarily deployed in so-called follow-up operations. The SWA Specialists undertake tracking using San trackers and dogs including pack hounds. They make quite extensive use of scrambler motorcycles and horses in their operations. It can be expected that any of these units not yet falling under SWATF will be transferred within the next couple of years. Clearly Pretoria’s objective is to impose on Namibia state military and police structures loyal to themselves as part of their programme to retain effective control of Namibia even after Res. 435 has been implemented.

\textbf{THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OCCUPATION: FROM BONANZA TO BURDEN}\textsuperscript{57}

From the pre-colonial neoclassical mercantile exploitation of Namibia to the present its economic history has been characterised by intensive and brutal exploitation of natural resources and of Namibians in the colloquial and in the technical senses. While this underlying reality has remained constant, the forms and mechanisms of exploitation have varied substantially and the net surpluses extracted by the exploiting enterprises and the costs of maintaining
that structure of exploitation to the occupying state have fluctuated enormously.

Until the late 1940s Namibia was relatively economically insignificant. Its economy - from early German occupation on - was built around settler ranching, hardrock mining, alluvial diamonds and fishing, but none was large absolutely or relative to global or regional production. The creation of a labour reserve system with sub-subsistence agriculture/ranching in reserves subsidising internal, male migrant contract labour did indeed provide cheap labour, but Namibian ranching and mining still rarely did much more than break even. Diamonds were at times an exception, but until the post war period control of the Oranjemund deposits was used by the De Beers group more as a means of controlling world supply (with Oranjemund the 'swing' mine and on occasion totally closed) than as a source of profits in and of itself.

Both for Imperial Germany and for South Africa until the 1940s the costs of occupation, including frequent military and police action up to the 1930s as well as subsidising settlers - were substantial relative to exports and profits. Viewed from a macro economic perspective Namibia did make a net foreign exchange contribution and provided/protected profits of certain enterprises but was a net drain on government resources. This cost, like the gains, was fairly small absolutely and relative to total German or South African budgets because Namibia was small.

NAMIBIA PAYS OFF

From the late 1940s through the mid-1970s Namibia's economic importance and
contribution to South Africa, to enterprises and to settlers increased markedly. Gross Domestic Product which had varied from R 13 million in 1920 to 3.8 million in 1933, 10.4 million in 1940 and 22.2 million in 1946 in current prices - i.e. at best regaining 1920 (or pre-1914) real levels in the mid-1940s - rose rapidly, if erratically, to the order of R 1,100 million (over R 1000 per capita assuming a true population of 1,035,000) in 1977. Even allowing for price changes, the compound real growth rate for three decades exceeded 5% a year.58

Namibia became very profitable indeed - for settlers, expatriates, large enterprises and the South African economy and state. Estimates on GDP including Walvis Bay and subsistence production show a 1977 GDP of the order of R 1,075 - 1,135 million. Within that expatriate and settler salaries and profits totaled R 300 - 450 million and corporate operating surpluses plus depreciation plus profits taxes R 450 - 675 million or R 900 - 975 million total. The 35,000 economically active white residents averaged R 9,000 - 12,000 incomes. Corporate profits, remittances (R 125 - 300 million according to varying very imperfect estimates) and - to a lesser extent - new investment were high.59

For the South African government the gains and costs - or more accurately the extent of net gains - are hard to estimate because of a plethora of overlapping budgets, conflation of recurrent and capital account and the somewhat odd treatment of the analogue to customs duty as an external transfer payment. By 1977 it would appear that RSA and its public utilities broke even on recurrent account in Namibia (the inward remittance being the analogue to customs and excise), a position which also applies to the 1970s taken as a decade. Public sector capital investment was largely brought in on loan from
RSA (or by reduction of previous reserves) but given recurrent budget balance (including debt service) it is somewhat artificial to treat this as a cash flow 'loss' on South African state 'Namibian operations'.

The main macro economic gain to South Africa from Namibia was on external account. By 1977 exports were of the order of R 750 million. Imports from and remittances to South Africa were of the order of R 550 million. Adjusting for transfer payments on account of customs and excise and capital inflows from South Africa and from third countries still gives a net foreign exchange gain (earnings from exports to third countries and savings of foreign exchange in RSA imports from Namibia - some but not all of below world market prices - rather than third countries) of the order of R 500 million. As South Africa's own growth has consistently been foreign exchange constrained except at the top of gold booms, this was a very major gain indeed - one probably supporting a South African gross domestic product 10% larger than it could have been in the absence of net external balance gains from Namibia.

Throughout this period the political economy of Namibia remained grossly exploitative, unequal and racist. In all probability real per capita African income declined over 1945-75; at best it was stagnant despite the overall, white and enterprise economic booms.

The majority of the African population was confined to 'reserves' in which subsistence could not be earned so that starving and accepting low wage contract (whether formally or de facto) jobs from white employers were the only real options. In respect to ranching, fish and meat processing, domestic service and unskilled private sector government employment (over 80% of African wage employment and taken together with the 'residual' economy of the
reserves accounting for 90% of economically active African persons) low wages - even allowing for payment in kind - remained critical to sectoral viability. Ranching in particular, allowing for implicit salaries to proprietors showed a negligible return on investment at best and a loss in most years even at wages inadequate even for single employees.

In respect to mining - at least in major mines such as Oranjemund (diamonds), the Tsumeb group (base metals) and Rossing (uranium oxide) real wages had begun to rise as they had in other sectors using complex techniques and needing a relatively stable, skilled labour force. With this shift came an erosion of the pure contract labour system, at least in the sense that workers returned regularly to the same employer. However, these shifts in production organisation had not gone far and most of the semi-skilled and skilled jobs not held by whites had in fact gone to the Cape Coloured community so African working class differentiation was still relatively limited.

Namibia as of 1977 was the most racially inegalitarian economy in the world. Per capita white income exceeded R 3000, that for African and coloured Namibians was about R 125 -150 a gap of 20 -25 to 1 (vs. about 12 to 15 to 1 in South Africa and slightly less in Rhodesia). African reserve household incomes have been estimated at under R 100 per year and those of white salary earners/small proprietors in excess of R 10,000 - a differential of 100 to 1. The cleavage on strict racial lines between amenity to affluence and domination of production and work relations on the white side and poverty to penury and subjigation in production and work relations on the block was nearly total. The block proto petty bourgeoisie was tiny, the high wage labour 'elite' barely emergent and the Cape Coloured intermediate stratum narrow in numbers and roles played.63
1977-1983 DEPRESSION, DEFENCE AND DEFICITS

While GDP in current price terms as officially estimated (excluding Walvis Bay and subsistence) rose from R 950 million to R 1679 million over 1977-83, in constant price terms it fell 8.2%. Excluding general government, GDP fell 19%. As terms of trade worsened these constant price (physical) figures need to be adjusted downward about 15% to take account of territorial purchasing power losses. In addition over 1977-83 population rose on the order of 20%.

Per capita GDP in purchasing power terms from 1977 to 1983 fell 35% (42.1% excluding government). Thus real territorial output per capita in purchasing power terms was barely above the real levels of the early 1960s. However, per capita real consumption fell only 3% while per capita wages actually rose 20 to 25% (depending on whether employment was static or fell 5%) over the 1977-83 period, whereas fixed capital formation fell nearly 60% on a constant price per capita basis. As real fixed investment in fact peaked in 1975 by 1983 it was under one third of its 1975 level - the lowest in a quarter century. Meanwhile the Recurrent Budget had gone into massive deficit and real corporate profits net of depreciation declined sharply (indeed excluding Rossing Uranium and Consolidated Diamond Mines had turned negative) and ranching sector surpluses to operators had virtually vanished despite a variety of increasing subsidy payments probably approaching R 50 million a year (or R 10,000 per white rancher).

What had happened? The answer is far from simple and by no means linked solely to the liberation struggle and South Africa's defence of its position
against it. Major factors include:

a. the post 1975 metal price slump (including uranium oxide) which has to date showed few signs of ending;

b. De Beers use of Oranjemund as a swing mine with over 50% output cuts to help stabilise the world diamond market;

c. a late 1970s, early 1980s collapse in the karakul price (only reversed in 1983-84);

d. the heritage of overfishing (probably exacerbated by natural annual cohort size fluctuations) leading to the near collapse of the fishing industry;\textsuperscript{55}

e. a devastating semi-permanent drought from 1977 on which has reduced real agricultural output and livestock herds up to 75\%.\textsuperscript{56}

These are not factors unique to Namibia - they are the common coin of Sub-Saharan African economies since 1979 (and of mineral producers for somewhat longer).\textsuperscript{57} However, Namibia - as the almost totally preserved real consumption and rising real wages per capita (very atypical for SSA over that period) indicate - has been in some ways less constrained but per contra has also seen real fixed investment per capita dip far more rapidly than has been typical.

The special factors affecting the Namibian economy do relate to the liberation struggle and to the response to it of other actors:\textsuperscript{58}

a. major enterprise employers raised real African wages and began to create a stratum of semi-skilled wage elite among them (partly to reduce costs as white workers were much more expensive and partly to
secure an African group 'loyal' to employers);

b. a similar policy in respect to professional and semi-professional (especially teachers, nurses) personnel by the government was combined with what might be termed a "buy a bantustan" strategy of creating 'Representative Authorities' with well paid politicians, clerks and home guards and extending some mobility - socially and economically - to selected members of the African petty bourgeoisie;

c. massive recurrent and capital (camps, cleared zones on borders, roads and road improvements) expenditure was incurred to slow the advance of the guerrilla war south from the northern border;

d. despite this war, associated risks and costs rose, e.g. need to move fuel by convoy, to use air passenger and freight transport in the north, to guard ranches and installations, to repair sabotage damage to transport and power links (as far south as the main Van Eck power station in Windhoek) and to build a new power line to the Cape to supplement the Ruacana Falls dam supply rendered uncertain by the war;

e. leading to increased exodus of ranchers and of other whites - partly bought off by higher wages and subsidies;

f. and a collapse of enterprise investment as the investors viewed the military and political risks of putting in new capital (even out of territorial profits) as too high until an independence settlement and peace emerged.

These factors explain the sharp rise in real wages, the very limited fall in average consumption (including rises for non-rancher white and for black skilled worker and elite sub-classes), the explosive rise in the recurrent budget deficit met partly by RSA transfer increases (largely for a portion of military and police spending) and partly by external commercial borrowing
(largely to virtually totally from South African financial institutions). 59

By the end of the 1982/83 financial year total government spending on 'SWA' account had risen to about R 900 - 950 million of which local revenue plus the analogue to customs and excise covered R 420 - 450 million, South African transfers R 215 million (R 115 million for the 'territorial' army and police) and external borrowing over R 300 million (supposedly two thirds from RSA and one third from third country financial institutions albeit that assertion is open to doubt). Of the R 750 million odd recurrent spending, R 50 million was debt service and R 240 million 'second tier', 'representative authority' - or more bluntly bantustan - transfers to bodies which even the RSA appointed Thirion Commission found to be monumentally incompetent, wasteful and corrupt.

The RSA state policies did represent the Namibian version of the attempts to reorganise production and the sub-class base of the regime and its opponents carried on over the same period in the Republic of South Africa (including its bantustans). These are real changes in political, economic strategy and structure including:

a. creating/encouraging other employers to create a substantial (30,000 odd or a tenth of total wage employment) African/coloured upper wage and salary 'elite' sub-class;
b. partly through the creation of well funded (at least for politicians and functionaries) bantustans;
c. with parallel opening up of professional and business opportunities for 'loyal' black petty bourgeois fragments (they hardly constitute a convincing sub-class);
d. and associated 'liberalisation' of access to services, pass laws, labour
contracts and trade union organisation;
e. and related efforts to consolidate major enterprise support through promises of more incentives and less regulation.

This strategy is not succeeding - partly because of the weakened state of the underlying economy since 1977, but also for more basic reasons. The division - economically, politically and socially - between black and white remains so wide that the 'loyalty' of the professional and skilled wage/salary elite and of at least some business petty bourgeois has not been bought. Further, because many employers do not have productivity/income levels high enough to pay higher wages and are increasingly unwilling to seek to manage large numbers of black workers, both unemployment and differentiation within the African employees as well as between them and the 'residual' economy households have increased sharply. The unemployment 'problem' has led to backdoor reinstitution of residence control. The unwanted energy of labour leaders (especially of the SWAPO affiliated National Union of Namibian Workers) has led to de facto continuation of the ban on independent black unions and labour organisation.

At the same time the perceived shifts are real enough to have alienated a majority of whites in Namibia - especially ranchers and small businessmen hit by economic and weather hard times and/or war risks and damages. They see a sell out of their interests to protect those of RSA and of major enterprises as only too likely and oppose the whole exercise of regroupment.

On the other hand the major enterprises increasingly see independence as inevitable, suppression of genuine labour organisation as counterproductive, the 1985 attempt to reintroduce one channel state control over African
employment as interference with basic aspects of their right to manage, the administration as incompetent, expensive and often corrupt. They therefore are sitting on their hands so far as new investment goes.

Increased state spending and reduced investment have sustained white and black 'elite' consumption - as they did in Rhodesia after 1974 - but are unsustainable at current production levels - as was true of the Muzorewa period black elite buying exercise of 1979 in Rhodesia. Further, because the internal contradictions of regrouping and the uncertainties raised by the liberation struggle have choked off new directly productive investment, the production base (especially in mining where only Oranjemund and Rossing of the large units have reasonable life expectancies) is being eroded and the ravages of drought are most unlikely to be reconstructed (e.g. by rebuilding cattle and karakul herds). Remittance not reinvestment, let alone borrowing to expand, is the overall hallmark of the private sector.

The SWA-Namibia Information Service in Counter-Insurgency - A Way of Life may argue that "war is a costly process... A soldier fighting at the border, threatened by insurgents, provides a safe climate for internal economic growth" but the sacrifices of money, of time, potentially of life are bitterly resented by increasing proportions of the white and black elite populations (and viewed as a waste of time and money by many large enterprises). As a result, the "climate" is not perceived as "safe" for investment and economic growth is not happening, nor as far as the private sector as a whole is concerned - even being attempted.
THE COST OF HOLDING NAMIBIA: WHAT BILL FOR RSA?

In 1984 P. W. Botha restated South Africa's old refrain that it subsidises Namibia but this time with three new aspects: a warning to "SWA-Namibia" 'leaders' that South Africa first had to look out for its own people and in times of recession and resource scarcity those - including Namibians - who were not South Africans could not expect much help and needed to seek to stand on their own feet; a plea to the outside world - especially the Contact Group - nominally to take over financing the Namibian deficit from South Africa and really, probably, to cause them to hesitate to take on the costs of a successful Namibian transition to independence and economic rehabilitation; third a more complete set of cost figures than presented before.

The Botha asserted 1984-85 RSA cost of holding up (in any sense one interprets it!) Namibia was R 1,143 million - Defence R 663 million; Customs and Excise transfer R 250 million; Budgetary Grants R 318 million, South African Transport Services deficit R 95 million. Some of these items are hardly what they purport to be, e.g. Customs and Excise represent a purchase of preferential market access and may well be below what Namibia could get on an independent customs/excise system while the SATS figure appears to conflate capital and recurrent costs (but per contra to exclude Walvis Bay).

A more complex matrix of costs would be:

a. 'defence' expenditure in and on Namibia and Angola - 33% of total RSA military, police, security spending - R 1,500 million;

b. budget grants plus external borrowing guaranteed by the RSA Treasury and most unlikely to be accepted as valid by an independent Namibia R
c. SATS net cash flow loss (assuming capital inclusion and Walvis Bay exclusion cross cancel) - R 90 million.  

That total of R 2,100 million is about 9% of the RSA government budget for 1984/85 or about R 500 per white South African. Even more striking it is only slightly smaller than the likely 1984 GDP of Namibia - R 2,250 million when adjusted upward from official data to include Walvis Bay and subsistence.

Admittedly R 2,100 million is not a net figure. Profit and wage remittances plus capital flight to RSA (offsetting in part loans in the other direction) may come to R 300 - 400 million reducing the net cost to R 1,700 - 1,800 million. Admittedly too South Africa still probably has a slim external balance gain from Namibia - albeit if the direct and indirect import content (equipment, spares, technology, raw materials, fuel) of military spending is of the order of 30%, as it may well be, even that surplus is now negligible.

What is clear is that Namibia from a South African economic perspective no longer pays. Recession, drought, military spending and the costs of regrouping to create a broader base for the total strategy have achieved that turn around. The continued strength of the Liberation Movement - implying rising military costs - and the failure to consolidate a viable socio political (or political economic) base for the "total strategy" - implying no recovery of enterprise and household investment or output - guarantee the continued desertification of the colonial economy.

There is only one remotely plausible contingency which could alter this picture - the proving of a substantial (say 5 million tonne a year average
over 15 to 20 years) oil field. RSA wants a safe oil supply to augment its use of coal, its conversion of coal to oil and its 18-24 month reserve stock. While South Africa probably is no longer paying substantially above spot prices (barring totally incompetent business tactics), this was not true when there was a seller's market. Furthermore, coal to oil capacity is very capital, foreign exchange and operating cost intensive. After pro-rated capital cost repayment and interest a 5 million tonne a year oil field should yield $350 - 600 million (R 800 - 1350 million at recent exchange rates) annual cash flow and foreign exchange saving. That would restore Namibia to the economic asset column from a South African state perspective.

The question is whether a 5 million tonne oil field scenario is realistic. While a current Johannesburg stock broker's study (apparently based on a Mobil reevaluation relating to one of two Soeker "wet gas" strikes offshore Luderitz and Oranjemund) takes a very positive view, Soekor is notably more cautious. No oil was in fact struck in the well, extensive drilling would be needed to prove a field. If Soeker's reticence is anything to go by (it could be disinformation in which case a burst of not very easily concealed offshore drilling will follow) the chances are less than 1 in 10. Previous 'oil booms' have turned out to be false. Some offshore formations as well as a series in the Etosha Basin are potentially oil bearing and - under normal circumstances would deserve further exploration at seismic and probably test drilling levels. But as the investment in time and money could easily run to a decade and $500 million (and as the Etosha field if it exists would lie in a war zone) even South Africa and Soeker (let alone a major oil company) are none too likely to be willing to take the risk.

Natural gas prospects are somewhat better identified. While one well cannot
prove a field, the Kudu (Orange River delta) offshore field probably is large and exploitable. Soekor - after a long period of inactivity - apparently tends too drill further wells to prove and quantify the field. Three to five would normally be needed for this purpose and 12 to 18 months including data analysis.

Were a field proven it would have plausible uses:

a. to provide feedstock for an ammonia/urea plant; or
b. a methanol plant;
c. to produce electricity;
d. to provide feedstock for a SASOL type gasoline production plant.

The second and third options would make little economic sense given South Africa's coal reserves, unless and until technology to use methanol as a direct internal combustion engine fuel is developed. There seems little reason for SA to build a large, vulnerable ammonia-urea plant using Kudu as opposed to Mossel Bay gas.

The last option may be attractive to South Africa. In its most plausible form it would involve piping the gas ashore at Alexander's Bay (in South Africa), converting it into ammonia and running the ammonia through the second half of a SASOL type plant to produce light petroleum products. Even after Namibian independence South Africa could hope to keep this operation - the field and pipeline would be offshore, the land installations in SA and Orangjemund's diamond field a hostage against interference.

The problems are ones of time and cost. Assuming prompt proving of the field,
design of pipelines and plant, raising of finance and construction fuel, production could begin in 1992. Assuming a plant able to meet one third of present oil imports (say 3,000,000 tonnes a year) the cost would be about $5,000-7,500 million (field development and pipeline to Alexander’s Bay $200-300 million; ammonia plants $400-600 million, SASOL ammonia conversion plants $4,000-6,000, pipeline to Cape or Vaal $500-750 million). Even for South Africa these are dauntingly high figures especially with both political and economic prudence leading external financial institutions to limit or seek to cut back on their lending to South Africa’s public - and in some cases private -sector institutions.

SOUTH AFRICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE FOR ECONOMIC DESTABILISATION

South Africa has - whether as a strategic pre-independence design or as a result of the tactics of regrouping - created the infrastructure for intensive, systematic, rapid economic and broader destabilisation of Namibia. To ignore it or assume it will not be used would, given South Africa’s regional strategy of domination and history of practicing destabilisation, be exceedingly unwise. At least seven elements can be identified.75

First, South Africa has created an 'external debt' which by the end of 1983 was of the order of R 500 million with interest and debt service of the order of R 100 - 120 million a year and a rate of increase of perhaps R 250 - 300 million a year. By the end of 1985 it may well be approaching R 1000 million principal (100% of export earnings) and R 200 - 250 million annual overall debt service (20 - 25%).76 To accept that debt would cripple the Namibian economy, to repudiate it - despite the 1971 International Court of Justice
opinion which clearly renders it legally void — could damage Namibia's external financial standing and access to credit.

Second, it has created a budgetary shambles both in terms of actual revenue and expenditure and — even more — in the appearance of total, permanent insolvency. The attempt to make Namibia appear to be a fiscal "basket case" not worth assisting is quite clear in some of P. W. Botha's statements on the cost of the territory to South Africa, as is the warning that instant cut offs of South African funding before a new tax and expenditure system was in place could cause a breakdown of governmental ability to act.77

Third, in the multiple tier, racial administrative arrangements South Africa has created a bureaucratic monstrosity. It is not merely politically unacceptable as an entrenchment of racism; it is corrupt, wasteful and unable to operate competently for any purpose. While these functional weaknesses are a drawback to RSA in occupation, at independence they will threaten the independent state with paralysis; a paralysis South Africa can hope to enhance by sudden withdrawal of key technical, professional and administrative staff.

Fourth, the 'buy a bantustan' policy, and the flirtation of large companies with stable, skilled labour force creation and a less illiberal, less racist capitalism, has in the 30,000 to 50,000 household black proto wage elite/petty bourgeois ("middle class") created a time bomb. The professional and skilled/semi-skilled worker cadres are not politically loyal to South Africa. However, their pay scales of R 5,000 — 12,500 a year pose serious problems. It is economically impossible to generalise these income levels to all workers. Even if it were, the effect on rural-urban income inequality and on siphoning off resources otherwise available for rural development would be
politically dangerous in the extreme. To limit these scales to certain posts would both entrench massive intra-African income inequality and make expansion of basic public services fiscally impossible. To sustain them for present African job holders only, with new entrants on lower scales, would create great bitterness among returning liberation war veterans. To cut them - by direct scale changes or even by a freeze during an inflationary period - would at best lead to loss of morale and resentment that gains "won" from the South African occupiers were promptly eroded at independence. The bantustan politician, clerk, home guard components of this "middle class" pose a different set of problems. Their 'services' - unlike those of the professional and skilled personnel - are not needed. But if they are fired they will provide a custom built core for a political fifth column which could - if the economy goes badly and recreating an effective state service apparatus is halting - provide a wider and deeper focus for discontent than - say - the MNR has ever had.

Fifth, by reinforcing its physical position at Walvis Bay and making plain its intention to remain in illegal occupation of that portion of Namibia after independence, South Africa has ensured that it will have a choke point to 'regulate' Namibian policy if it allows Namibian use of the port or to destabilise either partially or à l'outrance by partial or full denial of access. Until Namibia creates (e.g. by reactivating Swakopmund) or gains access to (via Angola or Zambia) alternative ports, South Africa at Walvis Bay controls its basic access to the outside world and can prevent diversification of trade and transport away from South Africa and the uneconomic rail link to de Aar the Cape and the Vaal.\textsuperscript{78}

Sixth, similar considerations apply to road and rail transport. Rolling stock
is highly mobile and - like many of the lorry fleets - is formally RSA owned. Major repair facilities are in Upington or Walvis Bay not Windhoek. Roads and rail lines without lorries and bogies and vehicle/rolling stock fleets without maintenance and repair capacity do not constitute a transport system.

Seventh, the sea bastion of South Africa’s Orange River line at Alexander’s Bay is within mortar or launch range of Namibia’s premier economic asset - the Oranjemund diamond complex. So too is the Swakop estuary 'boundary' of the Walvis Bay 'enclave' of the alternative port - Swakopmund. The implications are only too clear.

DESTABILISATION LIMITATION: POTENTIAL AND LIMITS

The analysis of the infrastructure for destabilisation reveals two things: it is alarmingly strong and multifaceted but several, perhaps all, of its elements could be rendered less effective by priority attention to their dismantling or neutralisation.

First, in fact very little of the 'external debt' - despite RSA claims - seems to be held other than by South African financial institutions and all is fully guaranteed by RSA. An early repudiation backed by a brief based on the ICJ opinion and the precedents for ex-colonial debts plus a firm commitment to honour any debt Namibia incurred would seem likely to defuse the threat either of bankruptcy or of lack of access to normal credit, especially as the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of State in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debt would - even were the SA administration lawful - ban imposition of colonial debt on Namibia without the independent government's
Second and third, financial and administrative reform plus training/upgrading Namibians and securing replacement expatriates are priorities for independent Namibia in any event. To some extent they can be pre-planned and programmed before independence in the knowledge that an orderly, leisurely transition of the type which characterised most British colonies at independence is a luxury Namibia is unlikely to enjoy. Similarly some professionals will stay if assured as to terms and conditions of service (and indeed have had initial discussions with SWAPO on such issues).

Fourth, an incomes policy and an approach to mobilising professional and skilled Namibians, at the least, not to expect white salaries can be begun even before independence. Frank dialogue on constraints and problems is not hopeless in respect to the middle class fractions with real skills. The bantustan lumpen petty bourgeois elements are not really an economic, but a conversion or security, problem - buying them off would be an economically as well as politically bankrupting approach.

Fifth, interim port facilities can be created - probably by reactivating Swakopmund via dredging, artificial breakwaters (from laid up ships sunk in ballast), lighters, etc - in months and by road links to Angola and Zambia created over the same period of time if the priority is accepted and planning begun before independence. The diversion of resources would remain a severe cost out less of a danger and constraint than seeking to operate via a South African held Walvis Bay. Similarly, sixth, vehicles, rolling stock and maintenance/repair equipment can - if needs are identified early and priority given to ordering - be in place in a limited period of time.
Economic front action cannot prevent border raids - that is primarily a diplomatic and security issue. However, choice of partners, e.g. a continuing De Beers presence at Oranjemund, North European technical partnership at Rossing, a Dutch or Nordic interim port management at Swakopmund would raise the internal and external costs to South Africa of random sabotage attacks.

The implications would appear to be: first, that South Africa has a potentially paralysing economic destabilisation apparatus in place now; second, that to ignore it or hope it will never be used would be dangerous wishful thinking; but, third, that a number of steps could substantially reduce its potential to do harm.

SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMIC 'BOTTOM LINES' IN NAMIBIA: SOME SPECULATIONS

Attempting to work out South Africa's basic economic goals in respect to independent Namibia - and in particular those in support of which it would utilise severe destabilisation cannot be a very precise or definitive exercise:

a. from a narrowly economic perspective, RSA would gain by evacuating Namibia now; but

b. will clearly not make its decision on when and how to leave on purely Namibian (as opposed to Namibian - Angolan and regional) considerations much less purely on narrowly economic ones;

c. Pretoria watching is no more an exact science than White Houseology or Kremlinology;
d. especially as it is doubtful that South Africa's decision takers have reached firm conclusions on what and when, much less on the details of how;

c. and the reasons for their uncertainties do not really turn substantially on Namibian economic cost/benefit accounting.

In fact the basic South African bottom lines for Namibia are much more likely to turn on such issues as "no foreign troops", "a quiet Orange River frontier" than on economic questions per se. South Africa clearly will wish Namibia to accept the AG's 'external debt', continue to use South African Transport Services, stay in the Rand Monetary Union and South African Customs Union Arrangements, source most imports from South Africa, go slow on cooperating with Botswana on building the Transkalahari (a major blow to South African transport leverage over Botswana, Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent Zambia). It will be strongly averse to general confiscation of enterprise and settler assets (the latter as much for domestic political as for economic reasons) and to Namibia becoming prosperous on its own and increasing the room for economic manoeuvre of the SADCC region.

However, none of these - not even the 'debt' - would appear certain to be an economic *casus belli*. The wholesale early confiscation might be because it would reduce external support for Namibia and - given personnel, institutional and financial constraints - might leave the economy and the state apparatus very much weakened. South Africa will certainly try sticks (e.g. blocking access for Namibian beef, recall of key personnel) and carrots (more generous SACUA formulae, technical assistance) to achieve the economic objectives noted as part of a continued strategy to maintain/achieve the economic side of the Constellation of dependent economies circling around and exploited by South
Africa. But to assume it would use (as opposed to threatening) massive destabilisation as a routine instrument may be unnecessarily pessimistic.

WHAT OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE?

What is clear from the earlier discussion is that Res. 435 is not a perfect solution to the problem of SA's illegal occupation of Namibia. From the outset SWAPO took the view that, should the proposals being put to it offer the opportunity for a settlement which would broadly reflect what the vast majority of Namibians want, SWAPO would cooperate in this, even though the proposals make quite considerable concessions to Pretoria. SWAPO has been only too aware of the numerous political risks resulting from all the concessions it has had to make in Pretoria's favour. But SWAPO has consistently urged early implementation because it knows what immense support it has throughout Namibia and believes that in spite of the concessions to Pretoria in Res. 435, SWAPO would still win by a large majority. SWAPO's flexibility and readiness to proceed with Res. 435 arises from a position of strength reflected in its very evident support among Namibians.

However, it is instructive to take a closer look at Res. 435, the possibilities open to Pretoria for manipulation, disruption or total sabotage, and the resultant need to be acutely aware of the immense ramifications this could have in making a newly independent Namibia virtually ungovernable if the process is not sabotaged before completion. Conversely, it is imperative to examine the resolution critically so as to make provision for an adequately "free and fair" election and to project the need for insisting on the implementation of Res. 435 in a way which would reflect the established UN
position on Namibia. It is clear from a close examination that much would depend on the UN officials acting responsibly and in accordance with the UN position incorporated in numerous UN resolutions on Namibia.

Namibia is not approaching independence in a vacuum. The difference between implementing Res. 435 in 1978 and at some future date is not simply a matter of a difference in time. Pretoria seeks to make nonsense of Res. 435 by changing the structures within the country and by setting impossible parameters for the implementation of the Resolution. Without great vigilance on the part of SWAPO and the UN, whose responsibility it would be to ensure that Res. 435 is implemented fairly, Pretoria may attempt to create a situation where the process of implementation could be sabotaged, destroying the possibility of future implementation. They could attempt to wipe out the SWAPO leadership, or create a situation where the government emerging would find it effectively impossible to govern the country. Basically Pretoria is busy laying the groundwork for a massive destabilisation of Namibia if, at some point, it is forced to bow to the pressure to implement Res. 435. The only circumstances under which Pretoria will willingly agree to implement Res. 435 would be those in which it perceives the opportunity of making gains for itself; by using the process to set up a puppet government; by destroying SWAPO; by so destabilising Namibia that the government of the newly independent country would be forced to capitulate to Pretoria's demands. Measures can and must be taken to ensure that Res. 435 is implemented fairly and so achieve the goal of genuine independence for Namibia.

Res. 435\textsuperscript{80} adopted by the Security Council on the 30 September 1978, consists of a plan for the election in Namibia of a constituent assembly and for eventual independence. The Resolution adopts the report of the UN Secretary
General which was drawn up following his Special Representative's survey mission to Namibia during August 1978 and a further explanatory statement of that report. The report is specifically based on the "Western proposals" for a Namibian settlement. Basically it sets out a specific seven month programme leading to the election of a constituent assembly. The seven month period is divided into a four month period beginning with a ceasefire between SWAPO and SA during which the withdrawal of SA forces and emplacement of UNTAG must take place, all those in exile allowed to return to Namibia, all political prisoners released, and all discriminatory or restrictive legislation repealed. The last three months consist of the official election campaign culminating in the election of a constituent assembly. It is anticipated in the "Western proposals" that the constituent assembly will sit for about five months before agreeing on a constitution and Namibia becoming independent.

SA PLANS FOR EXPLOITING THE VAGARIES OF RESOLUTION 435

The UN plan makes provision for the SA administration to organise and run the election with the UN taking on a role of "supervision and control" of the electoral process.

Originally, no specific provision was made in Res. 435 for the nature of the electoral process and it was therefore possible for Pretoria to decide the electoral system and to make it known at only a time of its choice even after the beginning of the implementation of Res. 435. However, this has now been superceded by Res. 539 (1983) which requires that Pretoria communicate its choice of an electoral system "prior to the adoption by the Security Council
of an enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations Plan. While this at least offers some sort of check on Pretoria introducing a convoluted electoral system designed to enable its greater manipulation by the regime, the electoral system could still be open to considerable abuse.

The registration process could be rushed and could take place at a time when the majority of the considerable number of exiled SWAPO personnel are still out of the country. Pretoria would aim at restricting as far as possible the number of SWAPO voters while maximising the registration of voters supporting its puppet parties (including registration of many not qualified to vote such as South Africans or Angolans). By hurrying the process at the beginning of the seven month period, Pretoria would aim at being well organised itself, while hoping to prevent SWAPO from establishing the organisational network it would need to ensure the registration of SWAPO voters. This could already produce a distortion in the results. If Pretoria has decided on a single member constituency system for the whole or part of the electoral process, it should be expected that it would then proceed to delimit constituencies in accordance with the type of provisions contained in the existing electoral legislation. This provision would allow for a "loading" or "unloading" of constituencies by 15% above or below the average number of voters per constituency; there could be as much as a 30% difference between the largest and smallest constituencies. This could then be abused to allow for a relatively small number of voters in constituencies Pretoria hopes its puppets would win, and a relatively large number of voters in constituencies which Pretoria expects SWAPO to win. Already before a vote is cast, Pretoria could have seriously prejudiced the outcome of the election.
Each stage of the electoral process must be completed "to the satisfaction of the Special Representative", and the official election campaign will only commence "after the United Nations Special Representative has satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures". However, there will be enormous pressures on the Secretary General's Special Representative (SR) to declare himself "satisfied"; Pretoria could threaten to abandon the whole operation if it did not have its way, and the governments of the Contact Group countries, all of whom plan to have substantial delegations in Windhoek supposedly to monitor the process, would be likely to lean on the SR, counselling him not to insist on what he seeks for fair implementation, as it could mean the complete breakdown of the whole process. They may also argue that if the system SA is using is similar to their own it cannot be dismissed as unfair. The ultimate "success" of the implementation of Res. 435 could be important to the career of the SR, and if insisting on fairness on the part of Pretoria is likely to result in the irretrievable breakdown of the electoral process, he may be persuaded to turn a blind eye instead of opposing what SA is attempting to do. In these circumstances he may rely on the status of the Contact Group and his own reputation to repudiate any accusation of unfairness.

Pretoria may also decide to go for a system that is constituency based but which also makes adjustments to accommodate a degree of proportional representation. It may introduce such a provision in order to insist on a representation of political groups who may otherwise have no seats by establishing the requirement that a party which obtains 0.5% or 1% of the total vote would be entitled to a seat. With the number of "parties" Pretoria claims exist in Namibia, this could be made to produce a significant number of seats for puppet parties.
There are numerous ways in which the SA administration in Namibia may rig the election itself, and make campaigning considerably more difficult for SWAPO. It could, for example, produce misleading information in selected areas, disqualify candidates, intimidate the population to the extent that it felt it could get away with it, stuff ballot boxes prior to the beginning of the election, or insist that illiterate voters are "assisted" by its own officials. It will almost certainly create bureaucratic difficulties for SWAPO in importing the vehicles it has in neighbouring states which are essential for campaigning in Namibia. Likewise it will prevent or greatly delay campaign materials or paper supplies coming in from abroad. That after all happened to ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe without there being any effective redress and the election was declared "free and fair".

It would thus be possible, though not by any means inevitable, that Pretoria could gain a blocking one third of the seats in the constituent assembly. It is very difficult to estimate votes for pro-SA parties at over 15-20% of an unrigged total. In such a context rigging the total recorded to 33% would be difficult - though not impossible - to achieve without a self evidently fraudulent and unsaleable pattern of actions. In the unlikely event of Pretoria achieving this objective, it would seek the constitution it wants, refusing to agree on a constitution unless SWAPO capitulates to all its demands. This could create an inherently unstable and lengthy delay in agreeing a constitution, or, more likely, a complete deadlock in the process. In such circumstances Pretoria could be expected to seek to send in its troops again to "restore law and order" the breakdown of which it had generated. In this way it could cause an irreversible breakdown in Res. 435 so as to achieve what it wants, the complete re-negotiation of a settlement proposal and the
ditching of Res. 435. This admittedly would pose problems if the SR and UNTAG enunciated a credible intent to resist the SA reinvasion by force if necessary. Previous action by UN military units faced with the threat of force has perhaps convinced SA no such resistance would be likely. Even then the international cost (as well as the resumed war) would presumably be such as to make SA more willing to threaten such action than to employ it.

Assuming SWAPO wins two thirds or more of the seats in the constituent assembly, Pretoria may still seek to impose procedures in the constituent assembly making progress difficult. It may for instance require that the two thirds majority be of all members of the assembly and not simply of those present and voting. A few arrests on trumped up charges of SWAPO members of the assembly could take care of reducing SWAPO's majority to less than two thirds of the whole assembly. It may also insist on the inclusion of its interpretation of the "constitutional principles" drawn up by the Contact Group in 1982 under threat of not withdrawing the remainder of its troops, police and administration, and preventing the eventual independence of Namibia being proclaimed. Nothing in Res. 435 gives SA powers to take such steps and in the absence of any contrary provision, the Assembly would normally be assumed to have the power to adopt its own procedures, but SA cannot be assumed to be willing to accept that position.

Much would depend on the organisational readiness of SWAPO to cope with these eventualities, the adequate training of SWAPO cadres to provide its own effective monitoring of the election, the integrity and independence of the SR and UNTAG and on the proper functioning of the UN Security Council in providing a checking process during the course of implementation. The enabling Security Council resolution required to begin implementation of Res.
435 should provide for reports to be made to the Security Council on the implementation of Res. 435, for example at the end of the first twelve weeks and again shortly before the election date, and should require that the procedure be temporarily suspended pending the acceptance by the Security Council that each stage has been satisfactorily implemented. This would provide some balancing pressure on the SR to ensure that all aspects of the election are implemented fairly. Failure to do so could attract a veto of the Security Council's decision to proceed to the next stage.

CONCLUSION

This chapter comes in the form of a warning, an attempt to explain and expose the intentions of the Pretoria regime over Namibia. It is important to expose the South African regime's probable intentions for Namibia's future, the possible manoeuvres they might attempt to secure their objectives and the loopholes existing in present arrangements. It is, however, our firm belief that Pretoria will not succeed in reaching its objectives. The fundamental character of the political and economic crisis in both South Africa and Namibia lead to the conclusion that the regime will never be able to pull off the neo-colonial solution it is currently hoping to achieve and that its destabilisation infrastructure's impact can be reduced and contained even though not wholly eliminated.

The most critical factor is the continuing mass resistance of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO. The Namibian people's struggle for independence constitutes a dynamic in itself and is part of a greater African and Southern African dynamic. It is the Namibian people who, through their
vigilance and resistance prevent the racist South African regime from imposing a client regime on Namibia. It is the armed struggle and political mobilisation within Namibia supported by the international campaigning abroad to isolate Pretoria and to force it to relinquish control of Namibia which will determine the extent to which Pretoria is able to attain its objectives. Today there are few, even in conservative, anti-SWAPo circles internationally, who would deny the mass support that SWAPO enjoys in Namibia. Certainly South Africa believes SWAPO does have mass support - otherwise it would have held less implausible internal or agreed to internationally monitored elections long ago. SWAPO has also amassed unparalleled support within the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and within the UN itself. The capacity lies with SWAPO successfully to resist the attempts constantly being made to force on it something less than an adequate solution. In the greater context of the struggle for the liberation of the whole of Southern Africa, the Pretoria government faces major problems on virtually every front.

The mass resistance so evident within South Africa itself also serves to weaken the capacity of the regime to retain its illegal occupation of Namibia. The regime is being forced to commit more and more of its troops and police within South Africa and its violence and brutality are becoming more evident to the international community as the regime tries to quell that resistance. As a result South Africa is steadily gaining a reputation among western business investors as being an area of too great a risk for their investment and also as one investments in which have too great a 'hassle factor' in terms of negative image domestically to be worthwhile if they are secondary from an overall business point of view. Coupled with an economy in a state of deep structural crisis, South Africa is not able to attract the external financing it needs.
For SA, as already outlined, Namibia is a fiscal and military personnel drag. If the war in Namibia escalates at the same time as tensions and pre-revolutionary violence rise in SA it could easily become a "black hole" in the astronomical sense sucking in South Africa's finance, armaments and personnel at an ever increasing rate until not simply South African rule in Namibia but the regime's ability to suppress, buy off and manage threats to its survival at home was destroyed.

The gross cost of holding down Namibia, already is one tenth of South Africa's state budget, about half its annual external borrowing and over R500 per white South African. That is a heavy cost now. Since the South African economy is in a prolonged slump, many financial institutions outside SA view it as prudent (for whatever reason) to reduce - not expand - exposure in SA and as the net flow of equity capital is out - not in - this cost is likely to become harder, not easier, to bear in the next few years. Further, any serious attempt to surmount the 1985 pre-revolutionary violence will be expensive in terms of military and police expenditure to suppress violence and of spending on bantustans and townships to try to lessen discontent and buy a black clientele.

Related to this is the narrowly military set of issues. South Africa has over half of its front line infantry tied down in Namibia. Both logistical and military considerations make their speedy redeployment to meet threats to the regime at home virtually impossible. From a military security point of view a much smaller force on the more easily defensible Orange River Line and a substantial home based tactical force available to meet domestic threats would clearly make more sense even now and increasingly so if 1985 is not followed
by a period of much lower physical challenge to the regime (as Sharpeville and Soweto were).

Pretoria's attempt to present a Namibian facade to its military presence in Namibia through the establishment of SWATF has, since its establishment, run into considerable difficulties. The regime's objective is to establish an army in Namibia which it can claim to be 'Namibian' capable of replacing the official South African forces in Namibia. To attain this the force would have to be largely black, would need to be fairly well trained in order to handle the technical sophistication of SA military equipment and would need to produce a reasonable level of morale. On all three fronts Pretoria has problems.

Although Pretoria predicted quite a rapid transfer of its military occupation from the SADF/SAP to SWATF/SWAP in 1979, it has still not reached that objective six years later. It first attempted to raise a "volunteer" force. Those it attracted tended to be largely from a criminal element with "recruits" often being offered the option of a "job" in the regime's forces as an alternative to serving a prison term. They also attracted a number of young Namibians who saw starvation as the alternative to serving with the occupation forces and whose political awareness was not sufficiently developed for them to see the folly of such a move. Some of them have since deserted and joined PLAN. In Namibia today, with the recent drought and a high rate of unemployment, young men would find the relatively lucrative employment with Pretoria's forces quite attractive. A difficulty the regime has faced with these recruits is a lack of motivation really to fight SWAPO. Their prime motivation for joining is financial, in contrast to SWAPO's forces in PLAN who tend to be highly motivated politically, which is critical to maintaining a
The declared intention of the Pretoria regime is to conscript all Namibian males between the ages of 16 and 65. The first attempts, which avoided conscription of those in the northern regions of Namibia, judged by Pretoria to be more committed to SWAPO, brought strong opposition from Namibians in the central and southern regions to being drafted into a military force illegally in occupation of Namibia and set against fellow Namibians. Many potential conscripts chose rather to leave Namibia and join PLAN. The more recent attempt to conscript Namibians began with a sudden order that all males in the Sector 10 area (Tsumeb, Otavi, Grootfontein) would have to register within two weeks. In spite of assistance offered by the companies who forced reluctant workers to register, Pretoria seems again not to have followed through with the process as it had said it intended to do. The underlying problem for Pretoria in conscripting Namibians is the overwhelming support they know SWAPO has throughout the country. They realise consequently, that conscription of the indigenous population in Namibia holds grave risks for the regime of having its forces thoroughly infiltrated by SWAPO sympathisers. Minutes of a SA military intelligence conference held in May 1984 and released to the press in Britain by SWAPO, recognised that "SWAPO internally is organised on a wide terrain on different levels and possesses the infrastructure to collect information over a wide spectrum...". They fear that valuable information could be leaked to PLAN or that trained military personnel might desert in order to join PLAN.

They also realise that morale may ultimately prove to be decisive in the war but that they are unable to maintain the necessary level of motivation and morale among their forces to sustain their military efforts. They realise...
that morale will be that much greater a problem in an army pitched against the very people it is drawn from and which is patently being used by the regime to maintain its illegal presence in Nambia. The above mentioned military intelligence conference also recognised the problem: "What is really disturbing is the damaging of military equipment by military personnel which could indicate sabotage, particularly if the negative attitude of certain conscripts is taken into consideration". Here, "political convictions do play a role". The near paranoia evident in these minutes indicate that the SA military bosses are not at all confident about motivation and the morale of 'their' forces. Even among white conscripts motivated by a racist hate and a belief that they are heroically confronting a very vicious and all consuming monster called communism, Pretoria has had to deal with a serious morale problem.

In an attempt in part to counter this problem it can be expected that SWATF will retain a very large South African and mercenary component. This can already be illustrated by the extensive use of a SA/mercenary officer corps for forces which are otherwise largely indigenous. The process will also continue as illustrated in the recent transfer of Koevoet from the SAP to the SWAP, where South African members of Koevoet were "transferred or seconded" to these supposedly Namibian forces.

The South African regime's presenting a Namibian face to its military occupation is not going to reduce costs to the South African treasury unless, of course, they choose to reduce the size of their military machine, an option which would seriously weaken their current tenuous hold on Namibia. The alternative of retaining the current real levels of military expenditure in a very severe economic climate will become increasingly difficult unless the decline of the South African economy can be reversed.
South Africa's closest allies are finding it harder and harder to defend the regime aboard. This has become particularly apparent in the case of the United States. In spite of the vigorous support for Pretoria by the Reagan administration, the latter is now coming under unprecedented domestic pressure to apply sanctions. The British government while not under the same degree of domestic pressure, is isolated within the Commonwealth in its refusal to apply sanctions against South Africa, and cannot ignore the very strong opinions in favour of sanctions being expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of African Unity.

But the SA regime faces its greatest problems in constructing a political front to its occupation of Namibia. The first attempt failed in early 1983 when Pretoria decided to revert to the one person administration of its colonial governor, the Administrator General. Almost immediately work began on seeking an alternative puppet government which culminated more than two years later with the setting of the MPC’s "Transitional Government of National Unity" on 17 June, 1985, a regime which had demonstrably less claim to represent any significant number of black Namibians than its predecessor.

Not unexpectedly this puppet government immediately began demonstrating disunity, power ambitions and individualism. It appears that its common purpose is confined to maximising financial inducements to its members and their closest cronies. An almost comical row over who should be "chairman" on the cabinet (and paraded as a type of Prime Minister) erupted on 16 June, 1985, the evening before this puppet government was inaugurated. Apparently Kozonguizi objected to the proposal that Katjiuongua be the first chairman of the cabinet. Other "cabinet ministers" also expressed their intense
interest in the position and the titbits that go with it. A compromise was eventually reached which consists of rotating the chairmanship of the cabinet alphabetically at three monthly intervals. Thus David Bezuidenhout became the first chairman of the cabinet. This example is symptomatic of the potential for conflict within the MPC which has been bogged down on such fundamental issues as to whether decisions will be made on the basis of a majority vote or by consensus. These disagreements will continue and ultimately contribute to the breakup of the MPC.

This puppet government will have neither the power nor the will fundamentally to move away from the gross maldistribution of habitable productive land nor will it fundamentally alter the present maldistribution of wealth or control over the natural resources of Namibia. As much as they may parade themselves as a "government", they will be unable to win over the support of the Namibian people but will instead be seen for what they are - stooges of the Pretoria regime. They will continue the internal squabbling over status and privilege that has characterised the MPC from its inception until this "transitional government" eventually collapses.

Whatever antics Pretoria may get up to with the intention of avoiding a SWAPO government in Windhoek, the regime will eventually be forced to capitulate and that the Namibian people, under SWAPO's leadership will achieve the liberation of their country and genuine national independence. It has reached a stage in which it is clearly on dead end roads on the economic, political and military fronts. How fast it can be pushed down the remaining distance - and forced to accept Namibian independence - depends primarily on the Namibian people and SWAPO but can be influenced significantly both by domestic (i.e. internal to South Africa) and external pressures on the Pretoria regime. Similarly how
successful SA can be in perpetuating economic dependency relations by Namibia and in destabilising a genuinely independent Namibia will depend primarily on alertness, planned vulnerability reduction and commitment to continued struggle by the people of Namibia and their government, but also can be significantly influenced by what price South Africa has to pay in terms of external national, enterprise and international actions (not just statements) taken in response to/reaction against aggressive destabilisation.
NOTES

1. Randolph Vigne, "A dwelling place of our own", p.15, IDAF.

2. __________, op cit, p.16.


4. GA Res 2145 (1966) para

5. A. T. Moleah, Namibia, the struggle for liberation, Disa Press, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware, p.143.


7. A. T. Moleah, Namibia, the struggle for liberation, op cit.


12. On the occasion, Voster also announced his resignation as SA Prime Minister.

13. A journalist who had covered the talks in Pretoria stated that he had overheard R. F. Botha commenting to one of his aides at the end of a session that it was obvious that "as long as we keep negotiating we have no fear of sanctions".


15. For more detailed exposure of this farce, see J. Ellis, Elections in Namibia?, London BCC/CIIR 1979.


19. ibid. Memo to Chester Crocker from Paul Hare 13/5/81.

21. **NY Times**, various dates in June 1981. State Department officials have since confirmed that the idea of linkage originated with the US.


23. "Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and The Constitution for an Independent Namibia".


27. Attached to the CG's proposal was a short text consisting of an introduction and three paragraphs.


29. 23 December 81.

30. April 82?


32. *ibid.*

33. The National Party over the years developed strong ties with the Transvaal National Party. Its present position is more akin to that of the white SA Conservative Party. The SWA National Party considers itself (probably correctly) to be more representative of "white" opinion than Dirk Mudge's Republican Party which was going so far as to consider a ne-colonial solution.


35. Pretoria still claims SWANU as part of the MPC. The bulk of the leadership were ousted and replaced in September 1984 (see RDM 3/9/85). The new leadership promptly withdrew SWANU from the MPC although the ousted Moses Katjionugua continued to lead a "SWANU" delegation in the MPC. Probably 90% of SWANU now regard themselves as allied to SWAPO and oppose the MPC.


37. *op cit.*

38. The SA Government had also sent a general, General Pieter van der Westhuizen, head of military intelligence to Lusaka in 1984 to put the idea to SWAPO, *Times*, 16 May 1984.
39. Financial Mail, 7.12.84.
42. BBC monitoring service, 20 April 1985.
44. In June 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia announced at the Second Conference of Independent African States, that they would institute legal proceedings against South Africa, asking the ICJ to require of South Africa that it fulfill the terms of the mandate conferred on it by the League of Nations in 1920.
48. This term may give the erroneous impression that Pretoria wishes to establish a genuinely Namibian army. All that it is really interested in is that this military force has the appearance of being Namibian.
50. Apart from formal control, note, for example, how the Officer Commanding SWATF and other senior ranks are simply transferred between SWATF and the SADF.
51. Windhoek Observer, 8.9.79.
52. Windhoek Advertiser, 13.9.82.
53. BBC monitoring Service 22.4.85, reporting text of SABC home service in English 1900 gmt 18 April 1985.

58. ibid, esp. UNIN, op cit; SER 1983; NLC, op cit Annex Table 13.


60. ibid and "The colonial economy: structures of growth and exploitation", NLC, pp.30-58.


63. ibid and NLC, pp.30-58, Annex Table 15.

64. ACR 1983-84, op cit.


68. See ACR 1983-84, 1984-85, op cit; To Be Born A Nation, op cit; macro economic and income distribution chapters, Namibia: Toward..., op cit.

69. See ACR, loc cit.

70. Windhoek, 1982.

71. See ACR, loc cit; macro economic chapter Namibia: Toward..., op cit.

72. See transport and communications and macro economic chapters Namibia: Toward..., op cit.


74. Based on discussion with fertiliser, petrochemical and process engineering construction firm senior financial and engineering personnel and cost estimates of Tanzanian offshore natural gas - ammonia/urea project.


77. See ACR 1983-84 and Thomas, W., "Namibia 1985: A New Start? Challenge Of A Namibian Nationhood Strategy", 3 June 1985 Speech Mss. - a continuation of his attack on SA fiscal policy as irresponsible and of SA's claim of inherent Namibian bankruptcy as equally so, attacks notable in that they come from the most able economic analyst promoting a 'neo-colonial' (or 'moderate') political economic transition.


79. After all, the only legal act the Pretoria regime can undertake in Namibia is that of withdrawing totally from the country.


83. S/112636 of 10 April 1978, "Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation".

84. Except for 1500 to be confined to two separate camps and the "existing police force".

85. See S/12827; S/12636.


89. S/12636, para 6.

90. e.g. the half constituency, half proportional system - though not proposed by Federal Germany - is the Federal German system and "loading" constituency sizes is specifically provided for in United Kingdom constituency delimitation procedures.

91. Due to the great distances involved and poor public transport.

92. Pretoria's reply, see p.21, has never been made public or available to SWAPO but in view of its usual method of replying, it should be expected that it did not give a straight answer and listed a whole set of conditions.

94. Ibid.

95. See page 31.

96. Ministers are to get between R60,000 and R62,000 a year plus a substantial housing allowance and other perks. Presumably the chairman will get a little extra. Windhoek Advertiser, 12.6.85.

97. Kozonguizi is said to have had an old score to settle with Katjuiongua over a previous struggle for the throne when Katjiuongua was instrumental in ousting Kozonguizi as president of SWANU some years ago.
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