And it is true that the examination of the bases of morality can destroy morality and lead to disintegration. It may even be true that a civilization can remain integrated only so long as its ancient, unthinking morals are stronger than its heat. When men begin to see that nothing is sure they can begin to drift toward the ethics of Hitler or Alcibiades. As Lycon says in the trial (of Socrates) - "no faith will bear examination, a tree cannot live if you look at its roots." Yet freedom can live only when life is constantly examined and where there are no certainties to tell men now far their investigations can go. Human life lives in this paradox and on the horns of this dilemma. Examination is life, and examination is death. It is both and it is the tension between.


All the new states in Africa have drafted economic and social development plans, for varying periods. Everywhere one sees political leaders and party functionaries singing "the popular song of nation-building" while crowds respond with enthusiasm. Thus national planning is increasingly becoming synonymous with nation-building throughout the developing nations of Africa. A common problem facing the leaders of the new nations is not how to draft a brilliant plan or organisational charts; this any state can do by seeking the assistance of planning experts and artists. The problem centres on plan management and implementation. This article raises some of the questions and critical problems implicit in plan execution which have arisen during Tanzania's brief experience of nationhood.

Plan implementation in a new state is conditioned by many variables, some controllable but most uncontrollable. But the most crucial variables in determining plan execution and implementation is the quality and quantity of the bureaucracy and the degree of commitment of the political leadership available.

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What is National Planning?

For the purpose of this article, national planning is defined as a complex yet continuous process of fashioning socio-economic goals and seeking to attain them. Thus defined, a national plan has political as well as economic facets. As for a state like Tanzania, which only recently emerged from colonial status, it is the political aspect which should command prior consideration during the initial stages of a long but slow progress towards modernity. Such a view necessarily puts less emphasis on the economic magnitudes of savings, consumption, and investment. National planning is, as Robert Dahl has asserted, and interrelated social process for reaching and implementing national decisions within the rubrics of the political system.¹

What else could a national plan mean to a poorly endowed country like Tanzania? The masses of Tanzania to date still live in rural areas, where they constitute over 96 per cent of the country's total population; the preoccupation of most rural dwellers is still peasant agriculture and animal husbandry. Tanzania is not rich in mineral resources like South Africa, Zambia, or the Congo (Leopoldville). Because of the low taxable capacity of the nation, the state cannot even mobilise local capital in sufficient amounts to supplement or even to utilise external aid, beyond a certain point. The climate, vegetation, and population maps of the country suggest that certain areas are pre-destined to attract industry while others will never do so.

Under these circumstances, Tanzania's national planning effort should be judged as a means of integrating and mobilising the political system. In this sense, a national plan is partly a statement of political ideology, a kind of doctrinal formula for attaining society's goals. In short, an evaluation of plan implementation should seek to measure not only the economic and social outcomes of the plan but, even more crucial, the extent and degree to which it serves to mobilise the people's energies, bring about national integration, and secure a measure of political consensus, all of which are requisites for nation-

¹ He argues that the politics of planning 'is nothing less than the total behavior of the political order within which planning takes place.' See Robert Dahl, 'The Politics of planning', in International Social Science Journal (Paris and New York), Vol. 16, 1964, pp. 109-118.
building and development.

From this concept of the crucial role of national planning it follows logically that the role of government and administration in Tanzania, as elsewhere in pre-industrial politics, is that of 'development administration'. The term 'development' is here used in its widest sense, to include the economic, social, and political development of all the inhabitants. And, as Merle Fainsod has argued, the most favourable setting for progress in development administration exists where a politically confident and dynamic, modernising leadership strongly desires development and can successfully project this attitude into both the bureaucracy and the population at large. 1

Few students of East African politics would dispute that Tanzania possesses a politically influential and highly committed leadership. However, I would argue that the problems of planned development lie elsewhere. The central focus in the analysis of the planning process in developing politics should centre on the bureaucracy: its quality, quantity, and consequent relationship with the political leadership.

Very often we fail to realise how much influence, both real and potential, the bureaucracy does and can command in any political system. Too often we talk of the political aspects of, say, a national plan, meaning I suppose that the formulation of the broad goals of the plan is normally the responsibility of political leaders and that the sole function of the bureaucracy is to implement what it is told. In actuality, the bureaucracy's influence permeates even the policy-making areas. Normally ministers rely heavily upon the expert advice of the bureaucracy to interpret and spell out the broader implications of whatever policies are proposed. In so doing, the bureaucracy can and in fact does influence the policy makers and indirectly the policy itself.

Furthermore, once broad development goals have been formulated and approved by a country's legislature, it is again the bureaucracy which must interpret and translate policy into

actual accomplishments. This process includes drafting memoranda to solicit capital resources and technicians from possible external donors; working out a priority list of projects to be implemented as funds and manpower become available; collecting taxes and other local monies to meet both recurrent and development budgets; interpreting and implementing the national plan; and constantly evaluating plan implementation so as to maximize results, economic efforts of all sorts, and check achievements against the overall national plan goals. It is because of this critical function of the bureaucracy that its role has been termed 'development administration'.

It follows that should the quality and efficiency of the bureaucracy break down, for whatever reasons, the nation's development efforts would be placed in serious jeopardy. This fact is starkly illustrated by Tanzania's recent experience. During the first year of planned development endeavour, the Government failed to recruit sufficient skilled personnel - both administrative and technical - even to balance the attrition of expatriate staff caused by the termination of contracts and retirement. Partly as a consequence, the existing bureaucracy was overworked and was not able to spend all the Treasury allocations for capital investment in the public sector. It is reported that only about 68 per cent of the development funds issued to various ministries for the financial year 1964-65 were actually spent. ¹

Of course, that is not the whole story. There has been no public- and little or no official-discussion as to whether or not the existing bureaucracy is in a condition to ensure the optimum performance of its administrative functions. The remainder of this article is addressed to this question.

Tanzania's Bureaucracy

In order to comprehend the complexity and magnitude of the problems besetting Tanzania's bureaucracy and to appreciate the Government's efforts since independence to recast the entire administrative structure, one needs to know and understand the state of the bureaucracy in the period prior to independence.

The story must, as it were, start with 'once upon a time'—with the colonial legacy.

It should be recalled that it is only since independence that the African has been permitted to play an active role in the civil service. Throughout the inter-war period, and up to 1945, the African did not even have a chance to reach the higher grades of the civil service. In 1954 the Lidbury Commission observed that the division between the senior and junior services was 'synonymous with European and non-European'.

During 1947-48, the East African Governments appointed the Holmes Commission to study conditions in the civil service, particularly with regard to salaries and grading. The Commission's recommendations, which were accepted and adapted by the British authorities, introduced the following civil service system: (1) all posts were to be open to candidates of all races; (2) economic laws of 'inducement' were invoked to justify different salary scales for Europeans, Asians and Africans, in that order, on the principle that salaries for the higher posts should be determined in the light of the amounts necessary to secure the services of Europeans; (3) non-Europeans appointed to such jobs were to receive three-fifths of the salary paid to Europeans of the same qualifications and doing the same job. This was the beginning of the so-called 'three-fifths rule' in the civil service, which lasted through 1954, when it was replaced by a smaller 'inducement allowance' for civil servants recruited from European countries.

By mid-1960 Tanganyika had 33,000 employees in the civil service, excluding manual or daily paid workers. Of these, 3,898 held senior posts as shown in the official staff list; the remainder, who were exclusively African, held lower positions. Among the senior staff Africans totalled 346; Europeans 2,463; and Asians 618.


3. The 'inducement allowance' was recommended by the Lidbury Commission in 1954, which maintained that this was needed to attract the services of European expatriates, but argued that 'the men must come up to the standards, and not the standards down to the men'; op.cit. pp. 31-5.
A second feature was that under the British colonial regime no government employee could join or participate in political associations - particularly T.A.N.U. President Nyere has said that, in consequence, T.A.N.U. had to be organised and run by uneducated people, with the further result that, on the attainment of independence, the new Government had to be run by politicians who themselves lacked education. 1

With independence, all these things pertaining to the civil service had to be changed. In the Three-Year Development Plan (1961-64), the nationalist Government specifically allocated money for a crash programme for training indigenous civil servants. The pressure upon the new ministers for Africanisation and 'localisation' was both political and practical. The political drive for Africanisation came from trade union organisations and the African members of the civil service who for decades had been subjugated and subordinated; the practical need for localisation was due to the fact that with independence there was likely to be an exodus of expatriates who were not prepared to serve under an indigenous government.

By the end of December 1961, of the total 4,452 senior and middle-grade posts in the civil service, 1,170 were filled by Africans. Three years later, the total number of officers serving in senior and middle-grade posts on permanent terms had increased to 5,389. Of these 3,083 or 57 per cent were local citizens. 2 This was as far as any well-meaning government could go. For Africanisation without drastically lowering standards of performance could only go as far as there were men and women possessed of a minimum education. No matter how much in-service training is given, it is only in very rare, exceptional circumstances, that a man who has had only primary schooling can possibly rise to the senior scale of the civil service hierarchy.

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The problem was vividly summed up by the Africanisation Commission of 1962. Pointing out that there were only 200 Africans entering Form I of the Secondary schools in 1962, the Commission added: 'it will take at least five years before these 200 emerge as University graduates or qualified professionals'.

On the other hand, a survey of high-level manpower needs revealed that between 1962 and 1967 the additional administrative and professional manpower needed for growth and replacement was at least 5,600. The latest government analysis of the situation and needs over the next five years is as follows:

Revised Estimate of Manpower Requirements, 1962-67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Year Requirements</th>
<th>Estimated Supply</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Science/Maths-based occupations</td>
<td>1,437 843</td>
<td>-594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Occupations requiring special training (graduate teachers, social workers, lawyers, etc.)</td>
<td>943 599</td>
<td>-344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Occupations open to non-specialists with general degrees (administration, business administration, etc.)</td>
<td>525 522</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,905 1,963</td>
<td>-941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout 1962 and the first half of 1963, Tanganyika underwent administrative changes on a scale never before witnessed. The first innovation was to replace the former civil-service Provincial and District Commissioners with political appointees. All

3. Source: Speech by A.Z.N. Swai, then Minister of State, President's Office, to the National Assembly on the 1965-66 Estimates.
Provinces were restyled 'Regions' and all Districts, 'Areas', under Regional Commissioners and Area Commissioners respectively.¹

Beginning early in 1963, the local government system also underwent changes. With the abolition of traditional chieftainship, the former colonial-inspired local authorities were transformed into elected councils for rural areas and town councils in the urban areas.² The District Council Chairman is normally (and since the new constitution invariably) the T.A.W.U. District Chairman, while the Secretary is also the Area Commissioner for the Administrative District. The Executive Officer, who is appointed by and is responsible to the Local Government Commission, does most of the administrative work for the District Council. The District was further subdivided into divisions and villages, each under Divisional, Assistant Divisional and Village Executive Officers, respectively. Sub-district officers were appointed by the District Council, but since January 1965 they, too, came under the Local Government Service Commission. Their duties include the maintenance of law and order, the collection of local rates, and the stimulation of local development efforts.³

The Problems

Structural changes and innovations are here considered from the point of view of administrative efficiency and their fitness for tackling the problems of nation-building with the maximum speed but without disrupting society.

1. Regional and Regional Commissioners Act, No. 2 of 1962, and Area Commissioners Act, No. 18 of 1962. It seems that the term 'Area' and 'District' continue to be used interchangeably.

2. The Chiefs were abolished by the African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) act, No. 13 of 1963.

3. Ministry of Local Government and Housing, 'Local Government in Tanganyika' (mimeo, Dar es Salaam, 1965); Ministry of Local Government and Administration, Circular to all Regional Commissioners of 10 July, 1962. For a good analysis of recent changes, see William Tordoff, 'Regional Administration in Tanzania', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, (Cambridge), III, 1, May, 1965, pp. 65-89. The Court system was also re-organised to comprise a three-tier system of High Court, District Courts, and Primary Courts - all under a unified and independent judicial system.
Under the British colonial system, the Governor, as head of the administration, maintained a clear line of command, by way of the Chief Secretary in the Secretariat, down to the Provincial and District Commissioners. These links provided a solid hierarchy of the establishment, performing the same services and sharing a common loyalty. This solidarity was so strong that in the field Provincial Commissioners were in fact identified by the masses as 'the Administration'. It was therefore imperative that, following independence, changes should be made in the structure to ensure loyalty and solidarity to a new government. The politicisation of the civil service commissioners and the subsequent opening of T.A.N.U. membership to all government employees took place in response to this need.

The British colonial civil service was particularly renowned for efficiency and dedication to duty - albeit, duty as defined by the Colonial Office. It comprised men and women who, while priding themselves for being apolitical, nevertheless possessed sound academic training. Those who managed to secure promotion to the level of, say, Provincial Commissioner of District Commissioner were men who had spent many years in public service and had therefore proved that they were capable of assuming major responsibilities. But, as a result of the failure to promote Africans, by the time of independence there were very few local people who had in fact benefited from the British administrative skills and experience.

Thus the politicisation of the regional and local administration was not and could not be matched by complete Africanisation, nor indeed localisation, of the civil service. When, for example, the Regional Commissioner took over, the former expatriate Provincial Commissioner, if he decided to stay, became the Administrative Secretary in the new Regional Administration. At the same time those few Africans who had obtained higher education and/or administrative skills during the colonial era were moved to the capital as Assistant Permanent Secretaries, on their way to the top posts vacated by retiring British expatriates. The consequences - for administrative efficiency, accountability, communications, staff relationships, and morale - would require a separate essay, and space precludes their discussion here.
Tanzania's bureaucratic capacity to fulfil its development role has also been beset by a number of less obvious factors and, paradoxically, by the very changes which were meant to enhance it. Some recent innovations have adversely affected the bureaucracy from a number of angles, especially: (a) the relationship between expatriates, both old and new, and the newly recruited or promoted local civil servants; and (b) the relationship between the bureaucracy viewed in totality and the populace at large, on the one hand, and the political officials and party functionaries, national and local, on the other. The combination of the two factors, compounded by (c) the over-centralisation and monopolisation of power by T.A.N.U., has tended to produce an extreme weakness of the bureaucratic organisation and management, thus adversely affecting the rational and efficient allocation and execution of duties, and harmonious 'line-staff' relationships (the chain of command and responsibility). These factors should be examined more closely.

(a) It is a truism that the interaction between the inherited colonial officials and the newly promoted local civil servants, especially at the regional and local level, created problems of mistrust and suspicion between them. This situation, especially in the early stages, hampered the bureaucracy's capacity to play its proper role in the development administration.

It should hastily be pointed out, however, that this problem is not unique to Tanzania; rather it is a universal one facing all developing states at the same stage of growth and in similar circumstances. One student of political development in other countries has summarised the problem vividly in the following manner:

The relations between the older bureaucracy and the newer echelons were not always easy, especially in the first period after independence when an attitude of district on the part of the nationalist leaders towards the remnants of the older colonial services usually prevailed. In some cases this may have led to an almost complete destruction of the older structure. In most cases some sort of *modus vivendi* developed between the older and the new echelons in which one or the other tended to predominate.

(b) In Tanzania, we have already seen how this situation led to 'an almost complete destruction' of the inherited system of provincial administration and a resultant predominance of political commissioners over the civil service. At the national level, 'some sort of modus vivendi' was developed by Africanising all 'window' posts. The new men who took over the top positions in the administrative structure invariably had less training and administrative skills than their new subordinates. The result has been smoothness and contentment on the outside; but, within the organisation, Max Weber's essentials of 'hierarchy, responsibility, nationality, and professionalisation' are conspicuously absent. 2

(c) The bureaucracy's capacity to play its crucial role of development administration is even more critically affected by the over-centralisation of power and its complete monopolisation by the party-government structure. This phenomenal situation has in turn given rise to a related series of and adverse effects on the bureaucracy. At the local level, the primacy of the party has meant that the populace in general, and party functionaries in particular, have tended to view technical and administrative officials with even less confidence than their colonial predecessors were regarded.

I have seen many cases where farmers in village settlements, who had either disagreed with or misunderstood official actions, felt that the Commissioner for Village Settlement who was there to answer their queries, was not pursuing the government-policy. In consequence, the farmers would bypass the Commissioner and his officials and send a delegation to the relevant Regional Commissioner, or sometimes to the Vice-President or Secretary-General of T.A.N.U.

The absolute supremacy of the political over the administrative structure, and the resultant insubordination of the latter, together could possibly incapacitate and effectively preclude the bureaucracy from performing its administrative and executive functions. That this problem

is a reality rather than speculative theory can be determined by an examination of the recent history of village settlement policy making and execution.

**Village Settlement - a Case in Point.**

Tanzania's massive and bold rural resettlement programme was officially inaugurated by President Nyerere on 10 December 1962. By mid-March, 1963, the machinery had been planned for policy making, administration, and execution. Implementation commenced immediately and continued with dynamism and a sense of urgency throughout the following financial year, that is, 1963-64. By June 1964, there were 11 new village settlement communities in the country, each designed to contain a maximum of 250 families. In the next financial year, however, the rural-resettlement programme, as originally conceived, remained at a standstill.

The reasons for this slowing down of the pace of village settlement are many and varied. A shortage of capital resources; rising costs of local materials; a shortage of skilled manpower; a fall in the prices of some cash crop and overproduction of certain other exportable crops in other parts of the world; certainly all these are sound reasons. However, the most important single cause was none of the above. Rather, it was the failure on the part of the Government to set up optimal organisations, mostly governmental but also administrative and operational, for making policy and stimulating programme execution.

When the village settlements were introduced in 1963, they were to be administered by a Rural Settlement Commission (R.S.C.), a corporate statutory body created by an Act of Parliament for the purpose. 1 As originally constituted, the R.S.C., under the chairmanship of the Vice-President, consisted of five ministers — for Agriculture; for Communications, Power and Works; for Development Planning; for Co-operative and Community Development; and for Local Government — together with the chairman of the Tanganyika Development Corporation.

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The Rural Settlement Commission Act empowered the R.S.C. to 'promote, develop and control rural settlement', and in particular (a) to establish, maintain, and develop rural settlements, and (b) to allocate priorities for the establishment of rural settlements. The R.S.C. was further empowered to hire the staff necessary for carrying out its functions.

The detailed planning and day-to-day execution of village settlement policy was, however, to be done by a Village Settlement Agency, which was appointed by and answerable to the R.S.C. The Chairman of the Agency was the Commissioner for Village Settlement, and the other members were: two Assistant Commissioners - for Co-operative Development, and for Community Development - a land planning officer, a senior executive engineer from the Ministry of Lands and Water Development, an agricultural extension officer, an economist, and the general manager of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation.

The above arrangements reflect a number of assumptions that prevailed at the inception of the programme: first, that village settlement was a top-priority domestic rural programme; and, secondly, that because the programme cut across and touched nearly all ministerial responsibilities, it had to be administered by an inter-ministerial body comprising all the ministers directly involved. Also implicit in the arrangements was a realisation that the R.S.C., as constituted, could only deal with broad policy matters. The day-to-day planning, interpretation, and execution of policy was left to the body of experts headed by the Commissioner, who was in direct communication with the Chairman of the R.S.C. Under these arrangements the village settlement programme was carried out with the maximum speed and efficiency, until it became necessary to reconstruct the administrative structure in June 1964. The immediate occasion for this was the proclamation of a Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 26th April, 1964, and the announcement of the Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development on 12 May 1964, which together necessitated a number of changes both in government policy and organisation.

1. Under the original arrangements the Commissioner for Village Settlement was the Secretary to the Rural Settlement Commission.
In planning the development of rural Tanzania, the Government accepted the 1960 World Bank Economic Mission recommendations on 'improvement' and 'transformation' approaches in the development of rural areas. This distinction is a major theme in the Five-Year Plan.

The improvement approach aims at gradual and progressive improvements in the methods of the peasant farmer 'to induce an increase in his productivity without any radical changes in traditional social and legal systems'. Under this approach Community Development staff and Agricultural Field Extension Officers work side by side with progressive farmers in the rural areas, with the support of other government ministries through village development committees.

The transformation approach aims at 'the introduction of technical, social and legal systems which allow the exercise of modern agricultural techniques based on relatively high productivity and which consequently justify considerable investment of capital'. This will affect mainly zones of average population density, subject to irregular rainfall and 'extensive and shifting cultivation'; and it will involve 're-grouping and re-settling farmers on the most favourable soil, installing there a system of private or collective ownership, and introducing supervised crop rotation and mixed farming that would permit the maintenance of soil fertility'. This approach attempts a planned but drastic departure from the present traditional methods of farming and social organisation. The transformation programmes are administered directly by the central government.

These changes in the policy and administration of rural development began when the Five-Year Plan came into effect, on 1 July 1964. The changes resulted in the creation of three main bodies concerned with problems of agricultural development (1) the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Wild Life, (2) the Ministry of Lands, Settlement, and Water Development, and (3) the Rural Settlement Commission. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development was assigned over-all responsibility for the entire 'transformation' programmes. However, and essential part of the transformation approach in the village settlement programme, responsibility for which had already been assigned to the Rural Settlement Commission. It was the government failure to define clearly the relationship between the R.S.C. and the Ministry of Lands, Settlements and Water Development that caused further confusion.

Throughout the financial year 1964-65, inter-ministerial debates regarding the future of the Rural Settlement Commission occurred frequently. The first suggestion was to abolish it. This idea was rejected, presumably by the Cabinet, which, it is reported on more than two occasions decided to retain the R.S.C. or a body corporate.

However, the Government was either unwilling or unable to take the next step to define the relationship between, say, the Village Settlement Agency and the 'Settlement' Division of the Ministry of Lands, Settlement, and Water Development. The Government did, however, decide to introduce some new arrangements, namely that the Minister for Lands, Settlement and Water Development should also be the Chairman of the Rural Settlement Commission, that the Junior Minister in the same Ministry should be the Chairman of the Village Settlement Agency, and that the Principal Secretary of the Ministry should be the Secretary of the Rural Settlement Commission, with the Commissioner for Village Settlement as Assistant Secretary.

Obviously the above arrangements did not face up to the main problem. The Government in fact reduced the village settlement programme to the same level as any other programme under the charge of a minister. A second implication was to reduce the power and effectiveness of the chief executive of the Rural Settlement Commission, namely the commissioner for Village Settlement.

The village settlement programme was further complicated by still other circumstances. When the new Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development was created in June 1964, it comprised, as the name indicated, three units or divisions. The 'Lands' division was sliced from the former Ministry of Lands, Forests, and Wildlife; the 'Water Development' division was extracted from the Ministry of Communications, Power and Works; while the 'Settlement' division was a new creation. The result of this peculiar origin was that 'Lands' and 'Water Development' had their own staff, commissioners, and rules of procedure. On the other hand, the 'Settlement' division had none of these. In consequence, the Minister, his junior Minister, and the Principal Secretary found it expedient to exert their pressures on that division, which was easiest to dominate. Finding that the Settlement division of the Ministry did not have sufficient personnel and functions, the Ministry began pressing first for the abolition of the Rural Settlement Commission, and secondly for the integration of the Village Settlement Agency with the Ministry. After failing
to effect either of these measures, the Minister for Lands, Settlement, and Water Development ignored the existence of the Rural Settlement Commission, with the consequence that the R.S.C. never met again after June, 1964, either to make or to review village settlement policy.

Thus, throughout the second year of the village settlement programme, there was no official policy to guide the Village Settlement Agency. Furthermore, the Agency's staff became concerned and bewildered about their positions and future - whether they were to become part of the government establishment, with all that entailed or to remain employees of a semi-autonomous public body. This official procrastination and indecision eventually led to the resignation of the first Commissioner for Village Settlement and to threats by other employees of the Agency to follow suit. In December 1965, the National Assembly approved a government proposal to abolish the Rural Settlement Commission and to transfer all its functions, assets and liabilities to the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development, thus confirming the primacy of political over administrative considerations.1

The lessons to be learned and the implications which could be derived from this analysis of the village settlement story are many and varied. One should be particularly noted. Administrative performance cannot be assessed outside the political environment of the bureaucracy. For example, over-concentration and monopolisation of power by the political and the governmental structures can sometimes, if not invariably, incapacitate and demoralise the bureaucracy, thus rendering programme implementation impossible. This problem, especially as it weakens the development efforts of emerging nations, has been summed up by Fred Riggs:

Top administrators become embroiled in continual inter-agency conflicts, while subordinate siddle away their energies waiting for requisite approvals. Moreover, because many personal far from the scene of action become involved in decision making, questions are often referred to persons with only remote interest in them, it becomes difficult to assign responsibility for action, and final decisions hinge on the outcome of power struggles among individuals only indirectly concerned.2

The issues which have been raised thus far are only symptoms of a larger, and in a way more crucial, problem. The problem lies in the upper echelons of the civil service and its interaction with the political heads of government ministries and agencies. What has happened in Tanzania in recent years is that in each case the new Principal Secretary, Assistance Principal Secretary Junior Minister, and Minister have tended to perform - more or less - the same political functions. This tendency to overlapping has in turn enhanced by the injection of expatriate 'advisers' and technical experts in the top levels of the civil service hierarchy, with the consequence that the top-level generalists - the Principal Secretaries - have tended to rely too heavily upon the services of the expatriate, both old and new, who continue to draft technical memoranda and policy papers for an on behalf of them. Thus the Principal Secretaries, instead of acquiring the skills of co-ordinating and running the ever-expanding administrative machine have found themselves with 'extra' time which enables them to get deeply involved in intraministerial politics.

The consequences of all this have been adverse to the bureaucracy's overall efficiency and effectiveness in handling the tasks of plan implementation. First, there is an ever-growing tendency for the administrative structure to split up into antagonistic camps. Those in the lower echelons of the structural hierarchy, comprising mostly the new, and often better educated but inexperienced college graduates, have felt 'left out'. They rest being told by their superiors - in some cases yesterday's classmates - that, despite their newly earned higher degrees, they have not enough experience to qualify them for promotion and good homes. The 'gap' between these two levels, with a consequent breakdown in communication between the two, continues to grow with each day that goes by thus rendering the whole structure of administration precarious.

Some five years ago Francis Sutton wrote an optimistic article concerning the future prospects of nation-building in Africa. He asserted that the African nations are guided by a vision of 'planned development', and that they are characterised by faith in 'government leadership and planning', faith in the 'competence and potential helpfulness' of the industrialised nations, and above all by faith in the 'transferability of knowledge and technique' from the developed countries. 1

One hopes Su to is right. Nevertheless I should like to raise one question, without providing the answer. To what extent, in what manner, and at what pace are the expatriate advisers and technical experts transferring their knowledge and skilful techniques to those who work both above and below them in the bureaucracies and other government institutions? Is it not conceivable that some categories of expatriates are in fact operating to such a manner as to impress their advice with their indispensability? Here I must hasten to add that I am not proposing that the Tanzania Government should dismiss the expatriates. On the contrary, they are needed in even larger numbers, and for some time to come. I simply ask whether the location of advisers in government ministries and public institutions, and the resultant working relationships, are such as to maximise the opportunities for an optimal transference of the skills and techniques that we all assume these advisers possess. This entire area of Tanzania's bureaucracy, including the role of expatriates, would be an extremely interesting and useful topic for further academic inquiry.

I should like to conclude by emphasising that this article has sought to identify and analyse some crucial problems which have tended to inhibit the rational and efficient management of planned development in Tanzania. Of necessity, therefore, it is one-sided. It puts too much emphasis on 'problems' and makes no reference to promises. Another essay could be written spelling out the advantages of Tanzania's innovations. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the problems identified are not confined to Tanzania alone; they may be found often in areas of manner and magnitude in other developing states. Again, given the fragile nature of a polity and economy in the wake of independence, it is obvious that the T.A.N.U. Government, of necessity, had to resort to the aggregation and concentration of power in order to build a new society. Most of the problems which have been analysed therefore are the inevitable consequences of a polity and economy undergoing rapid change, and it is to be hoped that they are transitory.

HR/ta
10th March, 1966.