THE STIRRING GIANT: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON BLACK POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE LATE SEVENTIES

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I. Background to the Seventies:

In the period up to 1960, African political organization in South Africa had been dominated by the African National Congress (ANC), formed in 1912, which stood alone as the voice of politically active Africans until 1959, when an ANC Youth League breakaway led to the formation of the Pan African Congress (PAC). At the peak of its popular mobilization, the ANC claimed a membership of up to 100,000, and the PAC claimed up to 30,000, mainly drawn away from the ANC. These membership figures are often doubted as reflections of formal, paid up enrolment, but they may indicate the extent of committed, involved public interest. In the ANC "Defiance Campaign" nearly 8,600 'pass-law' resisters were arrested at one time, there were fairly successful boycott campaigns of selected businesses in the Transvaal, and certain black residential areas staged well-supported 'stay-at-home' strikes among workers. The Pan African Congress also demonstrated a capacity to mobilize when shortly after its formation there was a march by some 30,000 Africans in Cape Town and numerous other collective acts of political protest. After the Sharpeville disaster, when 69 Africans were fatally shot after a crowd of up to 30,000 had marched up to a police station in protest against pass laws, over 18,000 arrests were made in raids all over the country. These estimates clearly show that political activism was not limited to cliques and factions in the community.

On the 8th of April, 1960, both the ANC and the PAC were declared unlawful organizations in terms of the 'Suppression of Communism Act'. Both organizations went underground; the PAC in the form of the secret organization 'Poqo' (meaning pure) and the ANC under the name 'Umkonto we Sizwe' (Spear of the Nation). While there were fairly extensive Poqo riots in the Cape, leading to some 3,000 arrests; an ANC organized strike in the Transvaal was largely unsuccessful. For some 3 years Umkonto we Sizwe engaged in limited and sporadic acts of sabotage, but clearly, political resistance was on the wane. 1)

In the period from 1963 to 1968, on the surface at least, there was

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a lull, if not stagnation in African political organization inside South Africa. Clearly the collapse of organization was in large measure a reflection of the removal by arrest, conviction and bannings of activist African leadership and other measures in terms of security laws directed against the more activist rank and file followers. Nevertheless, the destruction of these organizations as visible movements was accomplished remarkably rapidly with little popular rank and file reaction. As said before, the organizations enjoyed considerable allegiance, but widespread though this support was, the organizations had failed to gain the 'protection' which would have been offered had they been truly mass organizations with the committed following of large proportions of the African communities.

From the fifties onwards, when mass membership was actively sought, the problem of attracting sufficient rank and file support was endemic. Perhaps the goals, almost always stated in political terms, were too remote for grass-roots sentiments based on the day-to-day realities of life. Albert Luthuli, a one-time President of the ANC, alludes to this in his biography when he cautions activists to consider the implications of the everyday consciousness of ordinary Africans. There was perhaps too much hope that campaigns would gather momentum of their own accord. Economic and security interests of ordinary people were over-shadowed by the perception that self-sacrifice was both necessary and possible in the pursuit of the longer-range objectives. Self-sacrifice requires ideologies of commitment; ideologies found universally more among the young and the well-educated than among the rank and file. There was perhaps not sufficient detailed concern with what was most pressing and immediate in the consciousness of the man and woman in the street. Were the pass laws, for example, of key priority in the consciousness of factory workers who had the right to work in town? Then, for the ordinary member or would-be supporter, virtually throughout the history of the African National Congress, there were demoralising cross-currents of opinion about the desirability of collaborating with white liberals, with white Marxists, with Indians and Coloureds. Should a clearer "African-South African" image of leadership not have been maintained? Finally, perhaps, there was the great weakness of so many opposition movements in South Africa, this being the under-estimation of the strength and strategy of the white Nationalist Government and its control systems. On numerous occasions, a

2) See Edward Feit, op. cit., Chapter 3.
massive turn-out of police was interpreted as panic on the part of the authorities; or as an essential "moral victory" for the movement, when in fact the coercive apparatus of the state was not even remotely strained. 3)

These questions should not detract, however, from the fact that the history of the African National Congress and of related movements is a history of great courage, commitment and endurance in the face of well-nigh overwhelming odds. Anywhere else in Africa, outside of white-ruled Southern Africa, the movements might have succeeded handsomely. Furthermore, for all their strategic setbacks, the African National Congress and Pan African Congress have, for many Africans, left a legacy of pride and an example of leadership which lives on today.

II. The Black Consciousness Movement:

The years of quiescence from 1963 to 1968 were for groups of black students a period of interesting ferment. African students sympathetic to the ANC had formed the African Students' Association, those sympathetic to the Pan African Congress formed the African Students' Union of South Africa, and there also existed a third grouping - the Progressive National Students' Organization. The latter two organizations opposed all co-operation with the multi-racial National Union of South African Students, which was seen to be dominated by white liberals. There was severe conflict and rivalry between these groupings and their strength, which was never large, steadily declined.

In 1968, black students who had become disillusioned with the National Union of South African Students (N.U.S.A.S.), including some who had been influenced by American black theology introduced locally by the non-racial University Christian Movement, formed the South African Students' Organization (S.A.S.O.). The most prominent person involved - in a sense the founder of the movement - was a medical student of the University of Natal, the now famous Steve Biko who died in police detention in 1977. This organization excluded whites, and as such, enjoyed a very brief period of acceptance by the segregation-minded South African Government authorities.

The South African Students' Organization soon established a strong following on the segregated black university campuses. It was to become one of the most influential contemporary developments on the South African black political scene and constituted, with currents of black theology in the churches, the genesis of the modern "Black Consciousness" movement. In 1971, the South African Students' Organization convened a national conference, involving a wide range of black organizations, aimed at discussing unity and common strategy. Out of this conference, the Black People's Convention (B.P.C.) was born in 1972. Also established in 1972, under the umbrella of the Black Consciousness movement, was a labour organization, the Black and Allied Workers' Union (B.A.W.U.).

The South African Students' Organization and the Black Consciousness movement were founded on the central principles of black solidarity, pride, self-confidence, self-help and on the need for psychological emancipation from the sense of inferiority which centuries of white domination and white paternalism have inculcated in blacks. One important aim was to discover sources of black identity in the indigenous cultures of South Africa's black people; a complex issue, perhaps, since some black people in South Africa have cultures of origin other than that of the Southern African Bantu linguistic group. There was also a firm rejection of close co-operation with liberal or even radical whites; the former in particular were seen as an influence which had traditionally weakened the revolutionary zeal of black movements. Co-operation with white radicals was avoided, presumably because of the desire not to become involved in the dissemination of unmodified foreign Marxist ideologies, in a context where they were seen as being not entirely appropriate. The mode of operation of the movement involved broad conscientisation and community self-help projects, which would instil a sense of self-reliance and community solidarity. The movement embraced not only university students, but secondary-school students and black adults. The adults involved were mainly the "intelligentsia" in the black communities - ministers of religion, teachers, professionals and some black businessmen and academics.

Apart from the principles of black unity, solidarity and self-help, the movement was dedicated to the liberation of South African blacks, and, as such, to black majority rule. In its search for a policy for the future, it adopted a range of economic principles broadly typical of African Socialism. As Hanf and Vierdag put it, if one takes both political and economic ideology into account, the Black Consciousness movement seems to stand midway between
the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress positions of the late '50's.\textsuperscript{4)} The stance of the South African Students' Organization as regards the African National Congress-Pan African Congress rivalry was indeed one of "positive neutrality".\textsuperscript{5)}

The major impact has been at the level of "consciousness" and the conscientising of the black people of South Africa. In this, it achieved remarkable success among the youth and among the urban intelligentsia. Fundamental to the type of consciousness which the movement espoused, is the definition of "Black". Black people were defined as "those who are by law or tradition, politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group in South African society, identifying themselves as a unit in the struggle toward the realisation of their aspirations".\textsuperscript{6)} The older inclusive term for Africans, Indians and Coloureds - "non-white", was vehemently rejected because it was seen to imply a negation of identity and dignity - a "non-being" status or a residual status. (It is often used now as a derogatory label to describe blacks who still aspire to being like whites.) An obvious question that arises, is whether or not the Black Consciousness ideology is racist or not. Khoapa, however, has drawn a distinction: "going to the very gate of racism in order to destroy racism". The views on white identity, as reported by Ross\textsuperscript{7)}, suggest that in a new South Africa, whites would be encouraged to remain, but there will be no consideration of minority rights for whites - the ideal is a non-racial society, but one created by blacks. Whites would not be allowed any group exclusivity. No doubt a great measure of anti-white hostility characterised the movement, but that hostility, as Biko had so often said, was a response to white racism. In a society where racial status has been completely re-ordered, blacks would not necessarily display the deep-seated negative stereotyping of people of different colour that has been so typical of white behaviour.

In the space of less than ten years, the organizations making up the Black Consciousness movement had become very influential among well-educated urban blacks, when in October 1977, they were all simultaneously banned by the

\textsuperscript{7)} Ross, \textit{op. cit.}
South African Government. No specific reasons for the banning were given, but it can be assumed that the government, inter alia, was attempting to break the widespread and ongoing resistance to "Bantu education" among African youth. This will be discussed in more detail presently. Black Consciousness as an idea, and as a guiding ideology, has undoubtedly survived the bannings, however, and no African political organization can ignore the guiding principles which have emerged.

Black Consciousness is an eloquent assertion of self-worth, dignity, pride and humanness in the face of dehumanising racism. A measure of its success is that young Coloured people, members of a group which traditionally has displayed colour-consciousness and a pro-white bias within its own communities, have moved dramatically closer to African youth and their aspirations (see later). Yet, for all its eloquence and the sophistication of its thinking, Black Consciousness remains an ideology of reaction; a reaction against white racism.

As we have already indicated, blacks in South Africa are drawn from a wide diversity of ethnic backgrounds; among others, Nguni and Sotho-speaking African backgrounds, Hindu and Muslim Indian backgrounds, Malay Muslim and Christian Coloured backgrounds, etc. The last group, the Christian Coloureds, are simply dark-skinned Afrikaners to any outside observer. To create a sense of intimate unity which lies deeper than that born of reaction to white racism or than pragmatic strategy, is highly problematic. Mayer in 1972, and Schlemmer in the same year, found little evidence of the inclusive "Black" consciousness among non-intellectual, non-student African populations. A detailed political survey among urban Africans in the Transvaal and Natal has shown recently that no more than roughly 6 percent of a cross-section of African adults of all ages could be regarded as clearly defined supporters of the Black Consciousness movement. Yet, the political significance of Black Consciousness is rather greater than these estimates suggest, however, perhaps primarily because it has taken root among an educational elite; a group


from which leadership is typically drawn. One signal illustration of this importance has been seen in the phenomenon of the township youth unrest in 1976.

III. Youth Rebellion in the Townships:

For many months prior to June 16th, 1976, African School Boards, parents' associations, school principals and other bodies like the South African Institute of Race Relations, had warned the Bantu Educational authorities that attempts in the Transvaal to enforce Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on a 50% basis with English, was unacceptable to African pupils. The latter had demonstrated their opposition by sustaining effective boycotts in a few schools in Soweto. Yet the authorities resisted all pleas and enforced the policy. Afrikaans was unacceptable to African pupils, partly because it symbolised the system of Nationalist rule and Separate Development, and partly because their teachers and they were not proficient in Afrikaans and it would constitute yet another handicap to scholars already subject to great disadvantages.

On June the 16th, a crowd of over 1000 school children between the ages of roughly seven and over twenty, gathered and formed a procession of protest. Their placards read: "Down with Afrikaans", "To hell with Afrikaans", "Afrikaans stinks", "Afrikaans is a tribal language", etc. A foolish display in a country with strong language loyalties, perhaps, but certainly not a revolutionary uprising. Their mood was jovial and noisy - they were enjoying their defiance of the system. As cars passed, they shouted, "Power", and raised fists; not so much a demonstration of violent intent as much as an expression of solidarity and determination. These were children imbued with the spirit of Black Consciousness, however indirect their contact with the movement might have been.

The procession continued with no harm to property or passers-by until

11) It has been official policy since 1955 that both English and Afrikaans are used on a 50/50 basis in African secondary schools. The policy had not been enforced. From the beginning of 1976, however, Bantu Education Department officials in some areas of the Transvaal began to enforce the formal regulation.
stopped by the police, fully armed and uncertain, perhaps, about the intentions of the demonstrators. The police ordered the scholars to disperse. They did not. The police fired into the air. The demonstrators, infuriated and frightened, retaliated with stones injuring two policemen. The police fired into the crowd, killing up to four scholars, one as young as thirteen years old. The crowd fled, but violence erupted throughout the township and two white officials were killed. Initially, only government buildings or other symbols of white authority were affected. Then beerhalls and bottle stores were destroyed; many of the rioters shouting slogans like, "Less beer, more education", and, "More schools, not bottle stores".12)

The demonstrations became increasingly focused on political issues as time progressed. Apart from the systematic destruction of government and white-owned property, the burning of liquor outlets, etc. - the demonstrators stoned vehicles on roads outside the township. They began calling upon adults to join their campaign. There was one attempted march towards Johannesburg, and one demonstration in the streets of central Johannesburg, which was quickly stifled. There were calls for general strikes by all black workers. The calls for strikes were accompanied by pickets to discourage workers from catching trains, and workers returning from work were subject to harassment. Workers were told that their houses would be burnt if they went to work, and, indeed, some workers' homes were attacked. The first one-day strike was probably about 75% successful; the second somewhat less successful and the third, in November, completely unsuccessful, partly because the police were better prepared to protect transportation. Some degree of willing co-operation with the youth must have been forthcoming from the workers, however.

By now, the demonstrations had spread to other parts of the country - Pretoria, other areas on the Witwatersrand, the Northern Transvaal, the Eastern Cape, and, significantly even to Coloured youth in the Western Cape, who staged massive demonstrations in the centre of Cape Town, despite formidable police retaliation and many deaths.

As the demonstrations progressed, there were also signs of effective

12) Since a large proportion of the revenue for administering townships like Soweto is derived from the sale of liquor to Africans, these townships have been remarkably well serviced with liquor outlets. The demonstrators were fully aware of the connection.
ad hoc underground organization. Police, naturally, were detaining leaders all the time, yet new figures emerged to lead the students, the body mainly responsible for the co-ordination being the Soweto Students' Representative Council.

Throughout the country, hundreds of lives were being lost. The police could quite easily prevent any destruction of property outside the townships, but in the townships, the unrest continued for some months, with intermittent lulls. The death-toll approached the 500 mark, with over 1000 injured, and many hundreds arrested. Yet the demonstrators appeared to have lost their fear of bullets. They seemed almost inspired by a sense of mission, with wave after wave of new vanguards emerging to lead the action.

Group interviews with Soweto students, planned by the author during October and November 1976, were testimony to the almost superhuman dedication of the young people. In their responses, there were phrases like, "We have no future apart from the struggle", "I no longer fear the gun; when there is some shooting I shout, 'Happy' because it has become the order of the day ..... these police have made Soweto sound like a Christmas place ... their guns sound like crickets on Christmas-time", "We are telling the whites that the days of obedient Bantus are over", "People who have been suffering a long time have now decided to fight and die if need be", "We will get freedom - we shall go on with the struggle until we all get finished", and, "They are not going to let go of us until miraculously we explode inside their hands."

The notion of struggle acquired a near-mystical quality - the flavour of a transcendent mission. "We will achieve freedom. If we are killed, stronger ones will come who will continue with this thing until we achieve freedom." "There is not a future for us (as individuals)." "The struggle is a man's life and should be his joy - defeat or victory is in the hands of God." "We are surrendering all that is ours for the struggle." A young girl said, "The police are trying to wipe us out but we shall fight back until the last one of us dies - there is no retreating - it is do or die." The struggle had quite clearly transcended the frustrations of Soweto and the "poison" (as

13) Undertaken with financial support from the Urban Foundation. The group interviews were conducted by experienced African group interviewers. Fifty young people were involved.
they put it) of Bantu Education: "Our lives and aspirations are not Soweto but humanity." "Our blood will be manure for liberation."

The demonstrations, it seems, were sustained more by inner commitment than by any sense of practical strategy. In the group discussions, some references were made to help from other African countries, but this was clearly not a general expectation. Some discussants took encouragement from the very violence they had encountered: "Another thing that makes us hopeful is the very fact that these Dutchboys are resorting to violence; basically that is a sign that these Afrikaners are lacking their senses .... we are just going to work on their feelings and we will get what we want." In other words, the police action was interpreted as fear and panic. More generally, though, the struggle was somehow seen as self-vindicating and cumulative, bound to succeed in the long run.

Consequences of the demonstrations have been diverse. Firstly, the point has to be made that at no stage was "law and order" throughout the country threatened. Many people were killed, but the South African police actually used only a small extent of their coercive potential. If mass demonstrations had actually threatened the police on a large scale, then the death toll would have been infinitely greater. The demonstrations, if they were a bid for immediate liberation or for the commencement of a violent overthrow of the system, were a tragic failure. Professor Noel Manganyi, the African analyst of Black Consciousness, has termed the demonstrations a "dustbin revolution" - brave, moving, but tragically unable to dent the facade of white physical security and control.

Yet, there was a response from the authorities, who must at least have been concerned about the effects of the disturbances on the economy. A commission of enquiry was appointed, the announcement of improvements to the system of education was hastened (including a decision to drop the label "Bantu" before "Education") and the authorities backed down on the issue of the medium of instruction. Furthermore, the government announced that long-term leasehold purchase of houses would be allowed without the requirement of homeland citizenship, offering Africans more security of tenure in the townships. The Urban Bantu Councils were to be replaced by a form of elected

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14) Some years ago, the government terminated the system of leasehold purchase on the grounds that Africans in "White" urban areas were temporary sojourners. Recently, leasehold purchase was reinstated, but subject to the condition that the purchaser accepted homeland citizenship. It was this condition which was withdrawn.

15) The Urban Bantu Councils were purely advisory bodies and appeared never to enjoy much legitimacy among Africans. They were elected, but percentage polls were usually very low - 15-25%.
representation, giving urban Africans a measure of increased responsibility for their own local affairs - the so-called "Community Councils". It is significant, though, that full freehold ownership rights in the townships in 'white' areas have not been granted, nor have full powers of local government.

Another consequence of the disturbances was a rather ugly event. Some migrant workers, living in a hostel in Soweto, returned home to find that part of their hostel had been set alight. Elsewhere, migrant workers clashed at a railway station with youthful picketers who attempted to prevent them from going to work. Accounts have it that the migrants were joined by police plants who egged the mob on to violence, and that the migrants were given marijuana.16) Events escalated, and about 1000 migrant workers (mainly Zulus, but apparently including others as well) went on the rampage, destroying houses in their search for scholars. Thirty-five young Soweto people were killed in the violence which followed. One should consider that even if there was initial police instigation, this order of violence could not have occurred unless there was a basis of friction and mutual lack of sympathy existing between migrants and township youth.17) In Durban, when black university students staged a march in solidarity with the Soweto demonstrators, some African factory workers assisted the police in detaining the students; factory workers in Durban are mainly migrants as well.

How should these disturbances be understood? Quite obviously, the issue of the medium of instruction was merely the factor which finally precipitated the unrest. Of more fundamental importance was the quality of Bantu Education, and the general view among youth that it is designed to prepare them for second-class status in the society. Yet Bantu Education is also symbolic, for the youth, of the wider system itself. As Hanf and Vierdag point out,18) young blacks are more or less completely segregated from the wider society. Their parents at least have contact with whites through working in white areas. Young scholars and the unemployed youth move in a world which is limited to that of the ghetto-like existence of the urban blacks. Their only contact with the wider system of Apartheid, which creates

16) Chief Buthelezi claims that he has been given reliable accounts of the police intervention.

17) Migrants often complain that they are viewed by townspeople as uneducated, as primitive and as a negative influence in the townships.

18) Theodor Hanf and Gerda Vierdag, op. cit.
that existence, is in their dealings with the township administration and their experience of the school system. Their frustrations become focused on both, but particularly on the educational system, because it is most intimately associated with their life-chances and their chances of escape from the poverty of township life.

There are, of course, other factors which also help to explain the phenomenon of the township disturbances, and which are particularly relevant to an understanding of why the demonstrations were more or less limited to teenagers and young adults. Mid-1976 was a time of rising unemployment and particularly of black youth unemployment. Not only must this to some extent have clouded young people's views and expectations for their own futures, but it was probably aggravated by the fact that the unemployment set in after a period of economic prosperity, when black wages and job-opportunities improved as never before (1970-1975). The disillusionment of seeing so many of their friends unemployed must have been all the worse for the contrast. As Gurr says in his excellent treatise on civil unrest, setbacks after periods of rapid advance are particularly dangerous in any society. 19)

Another factor feeding the flames of discontent was probably the homeland citizenship clauses introduced by the government with regard to the right to home ownership on leasehold. Most younger urban Africans have never even seen the homelands, and a law which coerced their parents (and therefore themselves, if under age) to assume homeland citizenship, must have been extremely ominous in its implications for their future. Then again, events in Southern Africa, like the withdrawal of Portugal from Mozambique and Angola, and much talk of settlements in Rhodesia and South West Africa, may have raised political expectations, or at least produced a climate of optimism; a sense of new opportunities for change.

The school system itself, however, may have heightened tensions. Notoriously overcrowded for years, there was a 52% increase in enrolment in secondary schools in Soweto in 1975. Considering the generally poor performance of the educational system for Africans and the intense anxiety and strain that this must cause highly ambitious young people, a sharp increase in the pressure on the system could very well heighten frustrations to critical levels. 20)

20) According to 1975 enrolment figures, only 0.75% of pupils in Bantu Education were in Forms 4 or 5, and 4.6% were in Forms 2, 3, 4 and 5 combined. *Financial Mail*, June 25th, 1976, p.1112.
It is factors like these which have to be considered in any assessment of why the disturbances should have occurred in 1976. They are factors which operated against a background of more general frustrations, however. Conditions in the townships are generally very poor indeed.\(^{21}\) What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that the townships allow little opportunity for teenagers and young people to develop the kind of diversionary subculture (a leisure and play ethic) which, in more normal societies, tends to depoliticise young people. In South African townships, young people have most of the frustrations of their elders, without the counter-balancing and stabilising influence of jobs to keep, families to maintain, etc. Finally, it should be observed that the way in which ad hoc informal leadership emerged in the situation of the disturbances, suggests that the Black Consciousness movement, and, in particular, the school-based organization, the South African Students' Movement, had succeeded in creating avenues of communication and a sense of cohesion, at least among certain echelons of the youth.\(^{22}\)

The youth resistance continued for a long time after the initial violence. There was an almost complete boycott of certain key schools in Soweto, Pretoria and elsewhere, which broke down only at the end of 1977. Hundreds of youngsters have fled the country to seek a future (or military training) elsewhere and the process continues. The youth in the demonstrations displayed an almost puritanical fervour (opposing the use of alcohol, opposing consumerism among their parents, etc.), which suggests that the commitment to maintain the resistance without immediate reward is powerful. Furthermore, while perhaps a majority of the participants were not necessarily highly politically motivated at the outset of the disturbances, the confrontations with the police and the publicity no doubt have had an almost boundless politicising effect.

IV. Black Labour on the Move:

Another black movement with possible political implications is the non-registered African trade union movement. Africans are not regarded as employees in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act governing labour relations in South Africa, and, as a consequence, Africans may not be members

\(^{21}\) See, for example, the proceedings of the inaugural conference of the Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, November-December, 1976.

\(^{22}\) Hanf and Vierdag, op. cit.
of white, Coloured or Asian unions, nor may they negotiate formally within the official Industrial Council system of negotiation and dispute-settlement. In formal terms, labour relations affecting Africans are governed by the system of "Works" and "Liaison" committees which operate within individual industrial firms. Africans, however, are not prohibited from forming non-registered, informal unions.

African labour activity has a long history. Well-known strikes occurred as early as 1918 and 1919. In 1920, for example, up to 70,000 black mineworkers went on strike. White mineworkers assisted management in keeping the mines going. In 1919, Clements Kadalie formed the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (I.C.U.). Initially, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union was successful in negotiating improvements in wages at government level. By 1928, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union had nearly 30,000 members. Organizational problems and lack of recognition by the registered movement and by the employers and authorities led to its eventual disintegration. The Natal branch, under George Champion, separated from the parent body to form the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (Natal), and was remarkably successful for a time. Champion, a man close to the people, was no ordinary unionist, inasmuch as he attempted to solve a wide range of community problems apart from labour issues. His movement, however, also disintegrated, because of lack of formal recognition and administration difficulties.

After the decline of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, a number of African unions and union co-ordination bodies continued to exist, and the movement underwent a resurgence after the great depression. Difficulties were great, however. While some unions received assistance from registered unions, and whereas the government Wage Boards were not always unsympathetic, no union movement can be guaranteed of success without sufficient recognition from employers to have at least stop-order facilities for union dues. 23) There were also severe problems of factionalism and ideological cleavage. Then the South African Council of Trade Unions (S.A.C.T.U.) emerged as a non-racial body co-ordinating both some registered and some African unions. By 1961, it had 46 affiliated unions and a membership

of over 50,000. It was, in part, politically motivated; a reasonable stance, since the position of the African worker is, in large measure, the result of his political exclusion. However, the political stance had the inevitable consequence of large-scale bannings of leaders and the movement disintegrated. Government action, the unreceptiveness of employers, differences with regard to strategy vis-a-vis the white unions and the hostility of most white unions led to a further decline in African union strength and cohesion. By 1970, only two African unions remained.

In 1972, African wages in industry were lagging badly behind increases in the cost of living. The so-called Poverty Datum Line had become a popular concept. The Urban Training Project, a moderate labour education body, had started to operate in the Transvaal. A resurgence of labour consciousness appeared to have taken place among African workers, and sporadic informal strikes started occurring at an increased tempo.

In 1973, a spate of strikes occurred in Durban and surrounding areas, which left industry crippled for close on two weeks. Over 70,000 Africans went on strike and, here and there, were joined by Indian workers. This combined strike action proved to be a signal event, particularly since small but significant concessions were granted across the board by most employers, and the government ordered a review of minimum wage levels for unskilled workers. The strikes were economically rather than politically motivated, and the strikers displayed remarkable cohesion and self-discipline. The strikes spread by a process of example and active encouragement of one worker group by another.24)

Both the African National Congress abroad and the Black Consciousness movement, directly or indirectly, took some credit for these strikes. The weight of evidence as well as detailed discussions with African labour leaders, however, suggest that the leadership for the strikes emerged within the situation and that the strikes represented the outcome of a groundswell of popular grievances.

After the strikes, a new incentive existed for the establishment of unions. White and other non-African assistance was forthcoming from the Urban Training Project, the University Wages Commissions and from two or three registered unions. In Natal, a co-ordinating body, the Trade Union Advisory Committee, was formed. By mid-1974, 20 African unions were in existence, with a claimed membership of nearly 40,000.

Since 1974, some by now traditional impediments to African union success have become manifestly obvious again. With the exception of hesitant responses by a very small number of foreign firms, employers are unwilling to recognise the unions, and some degree of recognition is essential for success. From 1973 onwards employers have been strongly encouraged by the government to base their labour relations policies on either "Works" or more especially, "Liaison" committees; these committees representing at best a form of "house" or company organisation and at worst, and perhaps more typically, little more than consultative bodies. Both forms of committees, although elected and offering undoubted possibilities for improved communication in industry, fragment an industry-wide labour force, are vulnerable to manipulation by management and, inasmuch as they discourage the recognition of unions, impede the development of bargaining strength. Furthermore, ideological differences, partly symbolised by differing attitudes towards the goals and ideals of earlier labour movements have made co-operation between sections of the African trade union movement difficult. Also, there has been persistent surveillance by the security police. Non-African trade union educators and union leaders in particular, have been banned, including individuals, who were earnestly striving to establish a practical basis of understanding between unions and management, like the Chairman and Secretary of the Urban Training Project. Organisational difficulties have arisen, partly as a result of bannings. Recently, there has been some internal dissent in the African union movement in Durban. Furthermore, the Black Consciousness labour movement, (B.A.W.U.) has at times been unhelpful by accusing white personnel in the black unions of paternalism and exploitation, but without doing much organising itself. The unions in some cases have become somewhat unduly committee-dominated with poorly articulated popular participation. Above all, however, the economic recession from 1975 onwards and consequent mounting unemployment has weakened the confidence of African workers. Despite considerable

25) The author was from late 1973 to 1977 on the council and later chairman of the Institute for Industrial Education, a trade union education body within the structure of unregistered unions in Natal. The comments offered are based on this experience and also on discussions with trade unionists in the movement.
encouragement and concrete assistance from abroad, the African unions appear to be struggling to maintain levels of activity and organisation. At the time of writing, however, it would seem that there is sufficient organisational skill available within the African unions themselves and enough interest among workers to make survival a real possibility, and of great import for the future, if and when economic recovery commences.  

V. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and "Inkatha".

Another development of major significance has been the emergence of Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSiwe, the "National Cultural Liberation Movement", under the leadership of Chief Mangosutho Gatsha Buthelezi. Originally brought into existence by the Zulu king, Dinizulu, in 1928, it aimed at promoting the cultural traditions of the Zulu people, their national solidarity, as well as a wider unity of African people in South Africa. Chief Buthelezi had revived the organisation before 1973, but in 1975, he and other leaders re-shaped the goals of the organisation to make it more relevant to the political and social challenges of the day. Inkatha is clearly a mobilisation organisation with a very strong political flavour. Its colours, songs and slogans are those of the A.N.C. (with minor differences in the insignia), an affinity which should be seen in the light of the fact that Chief Buthelezi is an ex-member of the A.N.C. - he served in the Youth League, and was expelled from Fort Hare University for his associations and activities in connection with the A.N.C. He is also recognised as having been a lieutenant of Chief Albert Luthuli, former President of the A.N.C.

The aims of the organisation are 1) to promote cultural liberation; in other words, to overcome dependency and to instil a sense of pride and independence in Africans - a prominent member, Gibson Thula, its representative in the Transvaal, says, "Call it 'Black Consciousness' if you like." 2) It also aims at promoting community development along lines of self-help and self-reliance, in order to combat problems of underdevelopment and poor morale. Furthermore, 3) it aims at working towards a change in the educational system for blacks in South Africa, and 4) the abolition of race discrimination. Most importantly, however, 5) it stands for the full incorporation of blacks.

26) At present a government commission, the "Wiehahn Commission", is investigating policy alternatives with regard to unregistered unions. Rumours suggest that African unions are to be recommended for official recognition, albeit within a framework of close government control.
into political decision-making or, otherwise stated, majority rule in South Africa.

The precise aims of Inkatha in this regard must be judged from the statements of its national president, Chief Buthelezi, who regards his role in Inkatha as more important than his position as Chief Minister in the KwaZulu cabinet. "Before we do anything, we need to organise ourselves, into a disciplined body. We need to come together to support each other, plan with each other and act with each other." "As this movement (Inkatha) gains momentum, we shall produce a groundswell which will bring about change in South Africa." "It is a movement of ordinary men and women in ordinary walks of life." 27) The strategy is largely reflected in the above quotes - mobilisation and solidarity at the grass roots before any specific political activity is undertaken. Activity should follow upon a "groundswell". It should also follow upon the establishment of political discipline. "With discipline we can stall this whole country a couple of days."

As regards the process of political development, the model is one of the development of interest-based organisations as a means of achieving political articulation: government "does not relate to the masses directly as it does to the organisations and associations which are important to the people." "Blacks should use all available energy in forming associations...... with achievable goals around clusters of vested interests which hang together naturally." "......the governability of a society which has emerged from......rapid and radical social change could easily depend on the kind of organisations and associations which were developed prior to and during the transition period." 29) A problem common in the third world, and one which has contributed to the failure of the democratic accountability of politicians all over Africa, has been the relative lack of organisations at the middle range which both sanction the actions of politicians and provide feedback from the population. 30) Clearly, Buthelezi aims at cross-cutting cleavages of interest which will provide a balance in the influences on government and enable political goals to be fed into effective organisational networks.

With regard to the political goals of Inkatha and Buthelezi, the

picture is complex at this stage, and it is probably premature to draw any final conclusions. Certain basic principles are emerging, however. Firstly, there is an awareness that grass-roots interests should prevail: "It is not the role of political leadership to impose on a people a political system which that leadership considers to be an ideal."\(^{31}\) Secondly, there is a discernable trend in favour of a "one-party democracy" as the basis of policy goals. On the issue of opposition parties in KwaZulu, Buthelezi has expressed doubts, arguing, inter alia, that "poverty is too near the bone", implying that in situations of underdevelopment and inequality, opposition parties can too easily exploit the felt deprivation of people in an irresponsible way; or, alternatively stated, the required basic consensus over the rules of the political game is absent in situations of sharp deprivation, indicating the possibility of instability in two-party or multi-party systems.\(^{32}\) "......the political leadership a la Westminster is the politics of the practical in multi-option circumstances."\(^{33}\) It is not yet clear whether Buthelezi would regard a non-racial South Africa as a situation of "multiple options". A former Secretary General of Inkatha, Professor S.M. Bengu, has questioned the applicability of a multi-party democracy in a non-racial South Africa, suggesting the by now virtually traditional African one-party democracy as his view of the appropriate political form.\(^{34}\)

Yet, one gathers that the final political concept has not yet emerged. "There is in South Africa no blueprint for the society we are striving to establish." "There is a very real need for a Pan Africanist conference in which the nature of South Africa of the future is debated."\(^{35}\) The range of options entertained by Chief Buthelezi has tended to narrow over the past four years. In 1974, he offered a fairly detailed set of proposals, a non-proportional form of federalism as an intermediate stage in a gradualist transition to majority rule.\(^{36}\) The "offer", not unpredictably, was disregarded

\(^{31}\) See Buthelezi, op. cit.
\(^{33}\) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at the University of Cape Town, 8/9/1976.
\(^{34}\) S.M. Bengu, address at the Annual Council Meeting of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Durban, January, 1976.
by the present government, despite calls for a response from government-supporting newspapers. 37) Since then, the climate in Southern Africa has become less favourable for concessions. "I must say now, and I must say with considerable emphasis, that such reconciliatory offers as were contained in my federal formula will be increasingly difficult to offer in the Southern Africa that is now emerging." 38) "It is too late in South Africa's political day to think of the gradualism which was one of the whites' options. Majority rule will have to stand or fall on the preparations already made." 39) "Whether we like it or not, and for good or evil, the generic force of politics in South Africa today is the movement toward majority rule. The rejection of this option is in fact nothing other than the election to solve the country's political ills by violence." 40) Majority rule, then, has clearly and unambiguously been stated as the goal. What of provisions for the protection of minority rights? 41) Dr. S.M. Bengu has been clear in stating his view that the position of "interest groups" should be protected. Very recently, Chief Buthelezi has once again placed emphasis on the possibility of a federal arrangement, but without the gradualism suggested in 1974. "......I stand for majority rule of like-minded South Africans regardless of race, colour or creed (but) I do not know where Mr. Muil (a journalist) gets it that I am committed to majority rule within a unitary state and not within a federal state." 42) Buthelezi maintains that the final form of government in an open South Africa can only be determined at a National Convention.

Indications are available as regards economic ideologies which are emerging in Inkatha. Buthelezi has said that a requirement for a political system in a transitional situation in South Africa "is that it makes radical redistribution of wealth possible, while it facilitates increased productivity." "I am convinced that the requisite degree of state control is essential in both the productive process and in the distribution of wealth......Experience has taught us that when a classical free enterprise model is tampered with to give selective state control, this is no more than political manipulation of the underprivileged by the privileged." 43) "Nowhere in Southern Africa has a

37) Schlemmer and Muil, op. cit., pp. 131, 132.
38) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at the Jabulani Amphitheatre, Soweto, 14/3/1976.
39) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at the University of Cape Town, 8/9/1976.
40) S.M. Bengu, op. cit.
42) Letter by Chief Buthelezi to the Natal Mercury, 20/9/1978, in response to an article on black political views by Tim Muil of the Natal Mercury.
capitalist free enterprise system been able to distribute wealth and power in such a way that political stability has been assured."\(^{44}\) The views expressed by Buthelezi suggest that not only industry, but also other bodies relevant to class relations, should be subject to state control, like trade unions: "......Black unions could well be instrumental in establishing an elitist class of skilled workers who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo." "Trade unionism needs to have a broadly-based responsibility towards the community it serves and it needs to develop a sense of commitment within the overall strategy which has been adopted by a wide range of organisations."\(^{45}\)

There is a welcome absence of superficial Marxist sloganeering which one encounters elsewhere in Southern Africa, but nonetheless, the analysis tends toward the one-party state socialist model. The Secretary General of Inkatha, Dr. Bengu, has been rather more general in his prescriptions, calling for "African Socialism".\(^{46}\)

In one of the very recent speeches by Buthelezi, there is clearly a prescription for an economy based on a mixed socialist and capitalist model, but with considerable state control. In enunciating the principles of Inkatha, Buthelezi said, "......we believe it essential that all men join hands and enter into a partnership with the state to effect the greatest possible redistribution of wealth commensurate with maximising the productivity of commerce, trade and industry whether state controlled or privately owned......state control......(is) essential for the utilisation of land, water and power in the interests of the economy and in the interests of developing underdeveloped areas and populations."\(^{47}\) From this quote, it would seem that state control of basic resources is envisaged, while privately-owned industry would be allowed or encouraged, subject to the state exercising considerable control, particularly in order to achieve an optimal redistribution of wealth. There is also a good deal of pragmatism in the stance, like, for example, an acceptance, albeit critical and selective, of the need for Western investment in South Africa and KwaZulu, on the grounds that the creation of employment is a high priority: "In these circumstances I cannot bring myself

\(^{45}\) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at Oregon. \textit{Ibid.}
\(^{46}\) S.M. Bengu, a-dress at the Annual Council Meeting of the South African Institute of Race Relations, January, 1976 (including contributions in discussion).
\(^{47}\) M.G. Buthelezi, "Living from Crisis to Crisis", speech delivered at Jabulani Amphitheatre, Soweto, 29/1/1978. (my emphasis)
Buthelezi is not racist in outlook. He has strong elements of a Black (African) Consciousness orientation, as we have seen, and Inkatha's membership is not open to non-Africans at this stage, but it is claimed that an open membership is envisaged for the future when circumstances are more appropriate. There appears to be a complete acceptance of the role which whites can play in a new South Africa: "Blacks in South Africa will have to accept my commitment to whites, just as whites will have to accept my commitment to blacks, ... I do not view whites as expendable expatriots. They come from the very soil of South Africa. This is the land of their birth and they have a right to be here. There will be no political solution in which they are not active partners." Apart from this noteworthy idealism, there is also pragmatism: "Another ingredient in a realistic approach to bringing about ... a better society ... is the recognition that whites are not dispensable. Commerce and industry could not come to a near-standstill even for a short period of time."

Inkatha has been effectively operating for only roughly three and a half years, and during this period has experienced rapid growth. Its current membership is roughly 200,000, which makes it the largest black political organisation in South African history. It is also a remarkably cross-sectional organisation: some 29% of its members are under 18 years of age, these being based mainly on the recruitment of groups at secondary schools - it has a growing number of women's brigades and half of its membership is now female, and all occupational groups are represented - subsistence farmers, workers, white-collar employees, civil servants, professionals and businessmen. The growth in its geographical spread can be assessed from the fact that in February 1977 it consisted of 300 branches.

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48) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at the University of Williamete, Salem, U.S.A., 23/2/1977. See also the position adopted by Mr. Gibson Thula in Duff's article in the "Star", op.cit. Recently, Chief Buthelezi sharply condemned a call for sanctions against South Africa by exiled editor Donald Woods, Natal Mercury, 30/1/1978.

49) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at Jan Smuts Holiday Inn on a Conference on Race Discrimination, 3-4/12/1976.

50) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at Portland University, op.cit.

51) The information given in the ensuing pages has been furnished by officials in the organisation itself who are known to the author, or extracted from a fact paper compiled by Toni Tickton of the South African Institute of Race Relations (Information Sheet No. 1, 18/11/1977) or obtained from Mr. Tim Muil, African Affairs Correspondent of the Natal Mercury who is closely acquainted with the organisation.
while today, one and a half years later, there are no less than 946 branches.

It is a predominantly Natal-based organisation. Only 36 of its branches are located outside of Natal. Areas outside of Natal where it is a strong movement tend to be places where large numbers of Zulu-speaking people or people of Zulu origin are concentrated, like Soweto and the Witwatersrand for example (25 branches). Although no details on tribal affiliation of members are available the impression is gained that over 95% of its membership is Zulu-speaking. It is still also mainly a rural-based organisation. Only 203 of its 946 branches appear to be located in urban areas. However, the growth is presently concentrated in urban areas and the organisation as a whole, if it continues to develop, may ultimately have a balanced rural-urban distribution; a noteworthy point in its favour. Another positive feature of the organisation is the rapidly increasing involvement of youth. In mid 1976 only 26 students and pupils attended the annual Inkatha youth-training course; in 1977, 400 and in 1978 approximately 1 000 young people attended.

The structure of the organisation is in some respects fairly typical of party-political organisations throughout the world. The lowest level of organisation is the branch (or in the case of youth members and women, the 'brigade'). A branch must have more than 30 members and it is related to local political boundaries, township wards or headmen's wards in rural areas. Branches and brigades are organised into Constituencies (in rural areas coinciding with a Chief's area of authority), which are in turn combined in a Regional body. At the head of the organisation is the Central Committee, comprising not less than 25 members, including the President, the Secretary General, 20 members elected at the annual General Conference (see below) and three members nominated by the President.

It differs from purely party-political organisations in two significant ways. Firstly, the activities of branches and brigades are not confined to political mobilisation; they are encouraged to undertake self-help development projects and organise community education programmes in family affairs, nutrition, health, etc. Therefore politics and attempts at community development are combined; a form or organisation based on models existing elsewhere in third world countries like China and Tanzania, to name but two. Secondly, Inkatha is formally interlocked with the government of KwaZulu; once again a feature characteristic of some third world one-party systems. Ultimate decisions on policy both for Inkatha
are formulated by the 'National Council'. This is the supreme body and it comprises the Central Committee of Inkatha, the Legislative Assembly of KwaZulu and representatives of specialised functions within Inkatha. Another feature of this interlocking of structures is the fact that the Kind of the Zulu nation, His Majesty Paramount Chief Goodwill Zwelethini, titular head of the self-governing Zulu region, is Patron of Inkatha. The major gathering of the year is the Annual General Conference, at which the really critical broad policy decisions are taken, and which essentially comprises the National Council. A further feature of the interlocking system is the fact that KwaZulu civil servants and teachers can become members of Inkatha (and in fact are encouraged to do so). For a while there was uncertainty among civil servants and teachers about the position, since South African civil servants are not formally allowed to be members of political parties, but in the KwaZulu case the policy of civil servant participation has been formally adopted.

Hence the system is essentially similar to that pertaining in many one-party states in independent Africa and the Third World generally where government, party and mobilisation activities tend to coincide. This has important implications to which reference will be made presently.

Inkatha has experienced spectacular growth, as has already been noted. Its rapid 'take-off' in these early stages appears to have been due in large measure to the active cooperation of tribal Chiefs, establishing branches within their constituencies. The Chiefs, being ex-officio members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, could fairly readily be persuaded at high level to embark on the mobilisation of their constituents. There have been suggestions that some Chiefs felt ambivalent or threatened by the movement, but on the other hand the organisation provides the Chiefs with a way of becoming involved as key figures in a modern political organisation; an entirely appropriate move in a population becoming increasingly sceptical of traditional political processes.

This initial tribal 'take-off' accounts for the strong rural base of Inkatha. Subsequent support appears to have been won on the basis of popular appeal, particularly among women, and on the

52) As is probably known to readers, KwaZulu is a party self-governing 'homeland' established by the present South African Government in its pursuance of its policy of Separate Development.
enthusiasm of some teachers in enrolling youth. Enthusiasm to join among men is less striking but there is considerable support among rank and file African workers for the cause of Inkatha. Chief Buthelezi's own popularity spearheads the appeal of the organisation itself. For some years he has been drawing massive audiences of over 10 000 people at a time when speaking in urban areas, both in Natal and Soweto. In one Inkatha Rally in Kwa Mashu on April 24, 1978, Chief Buthelezi drew a crowd of 80 000. A recent study in Soweto, Pretoria and Durban revealed that Chief Buthelezi, in these three important areas combined, had more support than any other black leader or political grouping, free or imprisoned. Some 44% named Buthelezi as their most admired political figure, and an additional 7% mentioned him as a 'homeland' leader who was also a genuine political leader. Compared with this roughly 50% support, imprisoned or exiled A.N.C leaders gained 22% mention, other 'homeland' leaders 18%, Pan African Congress leaders 7% and Black Consciousness figures 6%. These results have to be qualified. The selection of Pretoria, Soweto and Durban under-represented Xhosa-speaking people who, from the results seem to support Buthelezi and A.N.C/P.A.C leaders in roughly equal measure. Had the Cape urban areas been included, Buthelezi's relative position would have fallen somewhat but he would still have emerged ahead of other groupings in overall terms. Another qualification is that the study, conducted in early 1977 preceded the rise to prominence of certain urban leaders in Soweto known as the 'Committee of Ten'. Since this group's predecessor group, the 'Black Parents Association' also composed of prominent people, did not achieve significant mention in the survey question about the 'most admired leader', the Committee of Ten would not necessarily have altered the results meaningfully as they apply to rank and file support for a national leader.

It needs to be stated here that notwithstanding the dominant position of Chief Buthelezi, the degree of support for the A.N.C is remarkable since the organisation has been banned for 17 years.

The study by Hanf et al also explored responses to Inkatha. Among the respondents of higher socio-economic status, positive and

53) See Schlemmer and Muil, op cit.
54) The lowest newspaper estimate of the crowd has been taken.
negative attitudes toward Inkatha were a ratio of 2 to 3 in Soweto, but roughly 4 to 2 in Durban with Pretoria evenly balanced. Among the rank and file the ratio's of positive to negative responses were some 2 to 1 in Soweto and 6 to 1 in Durban (an insufficient number of rank and file respondents in Pretoria knew of Inkatha at that stage to provide stable patterns). Obviously Buthelezi supporters are overwhelmingly in favour of Inkatha, but what is noteworthy in the results is that roughly half of the A.N.C supporters are also in favour of Inkatha. This seems to suggest that Inkatha has managed successfully to establish some continuity with the A.N.C in the minds of ordinary urban Africans, due no doubt to Buthelezi's former membership of the A.N.C and the symbolism of a uniform resembling the A.N.C.

The strength and coherence of Inkatha received a considerable boost in the February 1978 elections for 55 seats in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. The organisation nominated candidates, held nomination contests and undertook pre-election voter education and campaigning. This activity naturally brought Inkatha into great prominence and led to the rapid creation of new branches.

In 1974, the South African government rejected a request by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly for powers to control opposition parties. The matter has not been pursued since. Nevertheless, no publicly organised opposition to Inkatha has yet emerged, and therefore Inkatha was the only party in the elections. It was opposed by 23 independent candidates in 14 of the 55 constituencies. In these constituencies Inkatha candidates polled an average of 90% of the votes - thus overwhelming what opposition there was. This victory has to be seen in context, however. Only some 50% of the eligible KwaZulu citizens registered for the elections, and in the contested seats, roughly 38% of the registered voters turned out to vote. Allowing for the fact that registration of voters was probably higher in the contested seats, the results on the face of it nonetheless do not suggest an overwhelming active electoral response to Inkatha. On the other hand, for most people the results of the election were probably a foregone conclusion, lessening the amount of popular enthusiasm. Also, a 38% poll among poorly educated people, many of whom are not able to be influenced by the mass media is not insubstantial. On balance, in the context of official black homeland and local authority politics in South Africa, the results should be taken as a demonstration of the powerfully dominant position of Inkatha in the political affairs of the Zulus.
Inkatha demonstrated its capacity to exert political control at the local level in other ways as well during the elections. Most of the independent candidates found themselves constrained to declare their loyalty to Inkatha; one prominent candidate in Durban loudly protested his mistake in standing as an independent, others seemed to withdraw from the elections at the last moment under informal Inkatha encouragement or pressure. There were numerous rumours of other kinds of pressures being brought to bear on independent candidates. All this is variously interpreted, but it seems to demonstrate a capacity on the part of Inkatha to exert control.

This control over local level political action is demonstrated in further ways. Inkatha has moved to exercise sanction over teachers who do not mobilise Inkatha youth groups or encourage what is seen to be the appropriate orientation among the youth. Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government was and still is to some extent responsible for preventing Soweto-type youth disturbances from spreading to Natal in 1976; the disturbances being viewed by Inkatha as an inappropriate and premature strategy. Inkatha members form a security screen round their leader at public meetings and maintain a presence in order to discourage any repetition of a well-reported fairly recent incident in which Chief Buthelezi was stoned by some members of the Black Consciousness Movement at the funeral of Robert Sobukwe, the P.A.C leader on March the 12th, 1978.

Inkatha also is making attempts to instil a greater sense of dedication and service among KwaZulu civil servants.

Broadly then, it would seem that Inkatha has gained very substantial support and recognition, and while by no means all the enrolled formal support is due to spontaneous action, Inkatha in other ways is beginning to show a capacity to control local level leadership and political action, certainly in KwaZulu. Increasingly it seems able to exercise the kind of sanctions it needs to; one of the prime requirements for mobilisation under adverse circumstances.


58) See, for example, report on the Black Alliance Rally at Chatsworth, an Indian area, Daily News, July 24, 1978.
A major point of criticism of Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha is that the Chief and his political movement are divisive in black politics, introducing an ethnic element into a struggle which for decades has been waged by the A.N.C., the P.A.C and recently the Black Consciousness Movement in the name of inter-ethnic solidarity. Another criticism is that by operating from a base of homeland politics, Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha, no matter how critical they may be of South African government policy, lend credibility and substance to that policy; the more critical they become the more they provide the policy with underserved legitimacy. Most homeland leaders are referred to from time to time as 'stooges', and Buthelezi, because he is relatively more successful than others, is regarded by some blacks as the greatest traitor of all.\(^{59}\)

Does Buthelezi's stance ultimately strengthen Separate Development, and does Inkatha mobilise to this end, unintentionally? Is the movement divisive?

Obviously, Buthelezi takes great pains to distantiate himself from the policy of the government and, consciously, is certainly no stooge. The quotes given from his speeches are evidence of this. We can do no better than quote Colin Legum, the distinguished British political commentator, on the rationale for operating within the framework of Separate Development: "Whereas the Congresses (A.N.C., P.A.C., N.I.C.) had little effective grass-roots support in the reserves and only a precarious base in the urban areas, they (African Homeland politicians) now operate legally from substantial political bases within a constitutional framework. Leaders can now legally be deprived of their right to act as spokesmen for their designated constituencies only by an abrogation of the laws designed to establish Separate Development. Therefore, despite their lack of effective political power, they have been given unprecedented opportunities for political manoeuvre in their confrontation with the white establishment.\(^{60}\)

The fact remains, however, that Buthelezi, through his critical and indeed, at times, militant stance, must to some extent have made the homeland programme seem promising as the beginnings of a devolution of power and may even have created the impression in some minds that the

\(^{59}\) See opinions expressed in Hanf et al, *op cit.*, p.315-316, and see also Schlemmer and Muil, *op cit.*

government is busy outwitting itself; that, given time, it would fall victim to its own policies. This would be dangerous complacency for opponents of the government, and therefore this aspect of Buthelezi's strategy has to be assessed very carefully.

An assessment depends to a large extent on whether or not the "room for political manoeuvre" that Legum refers to will be used to achieve more in the way of meaningful change than it will improve the image of the homelands. This question boils down to the issue of the effectiveness of Inkatha. We have discussed the strategy, and judgement can, in part, be based on the assessment of the likely medium and longer-range effects of mass-mobilisation. Yet here the second criticism of Buthelezi and Inkatha is relevant; this being that Inkatha is essentially sectional or tribal in character, being based in KwaZulu. As such, these critics would have it, Inkatha is, at best, limited in its capacity to mobilise, and at worst, divisive and a threat to African solidarity.

How may one assess this critique? Buthelezi retorts that, "In character and spirit, Inkatha is not peculiarly Zulu or even peculiarly Natal." In any event, "There is nothing to stop us having a number of Inkathas which, because their structure ...... and their constitution is similar, can join together in a movement towards liberation." "The bricks of Black Nationalism are many and varied. There are ethnic groups, there are tribes, there are trade unions ...... and many others." "Beyond any divisions which appear to be present in Black society, there is a unity based on a deep-rooted Black nationalism." "There is no Zulu freedom that is distinct from the Black man's freedom ......" "We hope that our brothers throughout the length and breadth of this land will get out from the Apartheid strait-jacket ...... and set up Inkatha as we have done."61) Inkatha is open to membership by all Africans, as we have said, and its officials claim that support among non-Zulus is growing.62) The argument for Inkatha can be based on three possibilities; the first, that other groups may join the movement and transform it into a completely non-sectional programme; the second, that it could spawn other similar movements which could unite or co-operate, and the third, that Inkatha

62) Duff, op cit. (the Star). There is also evidence that support for Buthelezi exists among A.N.C. members in exile, particularly among some in the Dar Es Salaam group of the A.N.C. (African Nationalists) - private correspondence to Buthelezi.
alone, sectional or not, could spearhead the struggle and achieve wider support once success is attained.

Before assessing these possibilities, the issue of so-called "tribalism" perhaps deserves some comment. Obviously, an inward-looking, linguistic group loyalty or a chauvinistic communal identification is divisive, and thoroughly counter-productive of black aspirations outside of certain homelands in South Africa. There are group feelings existing among sections of the South African population, however, which may be seen as nationalisms or at least as being very closely akin to nationalisms. Afrikaner nationalism is one. Zulu communal feeling, *inter alia*, is another contender. Few people are likely to dispute that a Swazi or Lesotho "nationalism" could or does exist. The difference in the nature of group feeling between, say, the Tswana-speaking people of Botswana, and the Zulus in Natal, may not be all that different.  

Looking back in history, it seems obvious that the "Mfecane" of Shaka was a process of nation-building; a process whereby smaller units were being assimilated into a larger group, leading to a wider unity. It is typical of historical processes, described by Ward, of conquest leading to "enlarged areas of cohesion". It is interesting to speculate hypothetically (and no more than that) on the possibility that if a "national" cohesion exists among the Zulus, and if the entry of whites onto the scene in South Africa blocked further expansion of that area of cohesion, a powerful Zulu-based mobilisation organisation like Inkatha could carry the process further today. The South-West Africa Peoples' Organisation (S.W.A.P.O.) in Namibia owes much to the initial impetus it enjoyed among the Owambo group in that territory, yet today it is perhaps dominant as a focus of political identification among all black Namibians.

Another process rooted in "tribal" feeling is an alternative (or complementary) possibility. This would be a "two-step" process whereby the immediate ethnic identification (say Zulu group feeling) provides the morale and the sense of pride and mission, while wider and


more inclusive political goals, like African or black nationalism, provide the focus and aim of mobilisation. This is essentially what Buthelezi appears to be suggesting when he calls for other Inkathas which could unite. This is perhaps the more realistic alternative. We should remember that, unlike Afrikaner nationalism, African nationalism is largely the result of reaction to white domination. Prior to white colonialism, no wider national consciousness existed. It is therefore a racial or political phenomenon, without necessarily having the deep-seated emotional appeal at the grass-roots which springs from feelings of in-group identity and affinity. The Zulus, on the other hand, may have this more "primordial" in-group feeling - as Sundkler says of Zulus: "Their history is an ever-present fact in their lives, moulding their outlook." In earlier research, conducted in 1972, the authors found among Africans in Durban no clash between strong Zulu pride and an identification with the political cause of African nationalism. In fact, the former may, as it were, have added fuel to the latter.

These observations on "tribalism" have been made simply to suggest that those who insist that all forms of ethnic identification among Africans in South Africa weaken the cause of black opposition, may be presenting far too oversimple a view of the matter. An intrinsic black identity, which is more than a reaction to White domination, even though it might differ from region to region, may be very important indeed for mass mobilisation in opposition to the present order in South Africa.

At a more pragmatic level the danger of disunity and divisiveness appears to be somewhat minimised by attempts by Buthelezi and others to forge a unity across ethnic lines. In 1976 Chief Buthelezi, Professor Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister of Gazankulu and Dr. Phatudi of Lebowa met about 50 leading black politicians and leaders in Soweto to establish the 'Black Unity Front', aimed, inter alia, at establishing a disciplined black community and to work for the emergence of true black leadership. The township disturbances and subsequent government action against urban black leadership undermined this initiative, but Chief Buthelezi more recently has entered into a pact with the Coloured Labour Party and the Indian Reform

66) L. Schlemmer, op cit.
Party, in order to strive for unity of purpose among all unenfranchised people. The joint movement called the 'Black Alliance' has subsequently been joined by leaders of the Swazi, Basotho, Qua Qua and Gazankulu homelands.

A problem with these attempts to establish unity, however, is that the lack of power in key decision-making tends to mean that alliances among black groups are little more than symbolic gestures of solidarity. There is little that is concrete which unity fronts can achieve and some tangible gains are essential to the continued morale and solidarity of the movements. Furthermore, there is also, for black unity, the ever-present danger that key homelands like Lebowa or Gazankulu may opt for independence as a second-best option.

The issue of black unity, however important it may be, perhaps should not be the only major criterion by which a black political movement in South Africa today is judged. Potential effectiveness, assessed in terms of bargaining power at the political level, is as important if not more important. No unity front will survive a long period of political ineffectiveness, because the leadership will simply not command resources and power with which to dispense the patronage and impose the discipline which will maintain coherence. Effective unity is possibly more likely to follow a demonstration of effectiveness from a political movement, even if that effectiveness is built on a sectional base.

It is perhaps in this perspective that Inkatha should be judged. The notion of bargaining power is certainly prominent in the formulation of ideas at leadership level. Buthelezi has said "The machinery of Inkatha has provision for discipline. With discipline we can stall this whole country for a couple of days." The notion of 'stalling' is a guarded reference to the potential bargaining power which inheres in the African domination of the labour force. Recently Inkatha has declared a strategy of involving itself in the affairs of industry in encouraging the observance of codes of employment practice (the U.S. 'Sullivan Code', the E.E.C Code and the Urban Foundation/Saccola Code all aimed at encouraging progressive employment practices in South African industry) and of involving itself in African labour. This type of

67) Speech by M.G. Buthelezi at a Shaka Day Rally, September 24th, 1977.
68) See inter alia speech by M.G. Buthelezi at a Black Alliance Rally, Chatsworth, July 24th, 1978.
involvement, which in the current climate of industrial reform, is realistic and likely to bear fruit, holds the possibility of winning very substantial membership or support and commitment for Inkatha among the African working class, and this, more than any other internal strategy, spells bargaining power. But, as will be argued in the concluding remarks, it does not necessarily imply an ultimate confrontation or strategies of disruption.

Perhaps one may sum up and say that the course of black political movements and action in the seventies repeats the lessons of the early sixties, the fifties and earlier decades. Movements and programmes with a high-key political tone and flavour, or confrontationist action simply have not survived the forces of order and constraint. They then have to move underground or the activists have to flee the country, leaving the more cautious members to subsist on political nostalgia. This author does not discount the presence of underground movements - the procession of political trials is ready evidence of the virility of the A.N.C and other underground movements. But their power to disrupt a political and economic system with notably efficient security seems to be circumscribed and their effect on rank and file action, despite widespread sentiments in favour of the underground movements, appears also to be limited. The potential action of refugees, organised by the A.N.C., operating in guerilla action on the borders of the country, in an international climate which offers sympathy and active support for such movements, would be more serious a threat to the system. However, the question of which borders arises - no such action against South Africa as such has yet started and South Africa exercises a powerful influence through a variety of linkages on even those borders which are most hostile and which would otherwise consider playing host to guerilla movements.

Then again, the type of internal action which has made an impact, albeit far short of threatening the system (the 1973 strikes, the township youth disturbances) while in one case certainly not devoid of prior planning and organization, appeared to erupt in consequence of what one may call socio-political factors - critical levels of grievance or anxiety among the groups affected. It is clear that both the government and industry have recently taken cognisance of these causes and a period of strategic although limited reform seems to have been entered.

In a situation of inequality and political alienation such as that of South Africa, the unexpected can always occur - the spectre
of the mass political uprising is ever present. Yet, the stage has been set for the entrance of this spectre (or hero) for decades if not half a century or more without its appearance. If the political scientist or political sociologist wishes to avoid repeating the mistake of premature predictions of internal upheaval, urban terror, etc., the temptation of projecting the objective dimensions of racial inequality onto the anticipated dimensions of black reaction has to be rigorously avoided. In a context of what this author believes to be cautious wisdom, the strategy and consequences of a movement like Inkatha have to be carefully assessed.

If Inkatha lives up to its design (always a problematic question in a situation of constraint) it could, for the first time in black politics, reap the benefit of a strategy of a type proposed by Dr. Xuma of the .AN.C in the forties, a strategy never fully implemented. The strategy is one of enrolment and mobilisation aimed at a longer-term goal without political activism or calculated political risk-taking. Before discussing the goal, two procedural questions arise. The first; is it possible to mobilise and enrol members on a large scale without political drama or flamboyance? It may be possible if a measure of enforced enrolment occurs. This policy will always be criticised by idealists but has its merits. Inkatha, it would seem, has already adopted such a strategy by using the sanctioning power of the KwaZulu Administration to nudge teachers, civil servants and others into cooperating. The second question is will Inkatha survive? Will not the kind of analysis being presented here, and the strategies outlined or hinted at by Inkatha's leader, alert the South African security system to certain longer-term dangers for the system and result in its being banned? This may be so, but if so, the security strategy would reveal a surprising lack of sophistication. Inkatha offers and can continue to offer the South African government a substantial return for allowing Inkatha's continued existence. Inkatha has already prevented the township disturbances from spreading to Natal and counter-balances the influence of confrontation-minded black leaders. Chief Buthelezi has opposed calls for disinvestment in South Africa and KwaZulu confuses the critics of Separate Development. This is a necessary trade-off and should not be hastily or superficially condemned by opponents of the South African government.

This situation of 'trade-off' is likely to continue to earn Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi the bitter umbrage of the radically oriented
black intelligentsia. This group, which quite understandably is self-consciously modern and anti-traditional (its Africanism would be more appropriately termed 'Neo-Africanism'); which is the heir to a long political tradition informed by the unitary state democratic ideal (the reverse side of the coin of British colonial and neo-colonial domination) which has been influenced by the particularly paradigmatic quality of liberal and radical political scholarship concerned with South Africa, which can most easily acquire legitimacy as a leader-group through a spokesman role embodying an unambiguously anti-government stance, and which experiences critical status anxieties as a well-educated mobile group denied social esteem by the racial conventions of the society, will inevitably feel very ill at ease about a leader like Chief Buthelezi. Chief Buthelezi contrasts with this group in many ways. He is a Zulu aristocrat, valuing his high traditional legitimacy, and as such experiences little of the status anxieties of the new intelligentsia; he is using government-created institutions and he does not have to be a spokesman leader\(^{69}\) whose image rests only on the quality and consistency of his criticism of Apartheid; he is both a spokesman and a strategist, blending principle, calculated planning and pragmatism. The conflict between Inkatha and sections of the black intelligentsia is unlikely to abate\(^{70}\) and Buthelezi will probably continue his present strategy of attempting to win cooperation from this group; but where this fails, will simply stake his support against theirs. In this regard one should note that support for Buthelezi does not appear to fall below roughly 20% in any non-Zulu ethnic group and his overall support among the whole emergent African 'middle class' in Soweto, Durban and Pretoria is only some 10% below his support among all Africans in these areas;\(^{71}\) hence his political base in the population at large is extensive.

Finally, however, one must assess the relative viability of Inkatha in the light of the possible outcomes of its strategy. One possible outcome, and the one most commonly feared by those who see Inkatha as radical and dangerous is a mass strike, concentrated perhaps in Natal. This would have far-reaching political implications but even a mass strike could not be sustained for more than a week or two -

\(^{69}\) This observation owes its origin to Professor Heribert Adam, the prominent South Africanist scholar.

\(^{70}\) A recent manifestation of this conflict has even occurred inside Inkatha with an apparent rift between the former Secretary General, Dr. S. Bengu and the Inkatha leadership, *Daily News*, October 17th, 1978.

\(^{71}\) Hanf *et al.* *op cit.*, pp.373-374.
workers have to feed their families, and the reaction of the government, aside from increased strategic reform, would probably be to destroy the organisation by force if necessary. Inkatha may develop a confrontationist strategy along those lines, but it would not be the optimal course.

Another strategy, and perhaps the one which is most congruent with the current tone and stance of the organisation, is that which has been called a 'groundswell' by Buthelezi and which one may alternatively term the 'demonstration effect' strategy. Mass mobilisation, in itself, if sufficiently comprehensive, can be a powerful encouragement to a government to make fundamental policy adaptations and even to negotiate with the representatives of the mobilised mass. No government is likely to court predictable unrest by ignoring massive mobilisation. In South Africa this is perhaps the only peaceful strategy likely to achieve significant consequences. What might these consequences be, at a minimum?

The South African Minister concerned with African Affairs has indicated that the government is prepared to accommodate a homeland which does not wish to take independence, and there have been various government suggestions of a 'confederal' link between such homelands and the South African core area. The degree and type of power-sharing which could be involved in a system of over-arching political linkage must be seen as a variable factor, dependent upon the relative bargaining strength of the contending units. Buthelezi is currently firm in his rejection of independence, but, on the other hand, he is building the 'identity' of a power-centre in KwaZulu alternative or additional to that of Pretoria. Currently, for example, a prestige parliament building is due to be built at Ulundi, and KwaZulu has its own flag. Many critics of Buthelezi see these moves as an indication that he would accept independence if offered a reasonable consolidation of the KwaZulu territory. This is perhaps a possibility, but in view of all Buthelezi's policy statements and the goals and scope of Inkatha it is hardly a probability.

On the basis of these observations, it would seem likely that Buthelezi might aim to take Inkatha into any future negotiating situation (perhaps extended in time) with a fall-back position of accepting a federal state, with an enlarged KwaZulu being the political 'centre'...

73) See earlier discussion of Buthelezi's political goals.
of a federal 'segment'. This 'segment', however, would extend well beyond the geographic confines of KwaZulu, and almost certainly, because of alliances, beyond the ethnic confines of the Zulu language group. This might seem like a mere extension of separate development to some, but given the bargaining power of a mobilised working class, could undoubtedly involve fairly massive influence on central policy.

The South African government on the other hand, probably would press for a confederal arrangement with as little power-sharing as possible, but it too, would have a fall-back position; a position containing certain advantages. The attractions of having a powerful, legitimate black partner in central government to help stave off external and internal pressures could counter-balance a reluctance to share power, provided white political identity could be maintained. Furthermore, a loose confederacy might be a security threat. A Federation could also form the basis of progressive further developments.

To the extent that popular mobilisation could ensure real black influence on central policies, ultimately formalised in a constitution and even perhaps symbolised by a joint presidency, the kind of scenario outlined - essentially a consociational devolution of power - must be seen as qualitatively very different from separate development. Above all, it is a peaceful strategy and this consideration simply cannot be made light of in a situation where an armed struggle would be very much more destructive and long-drawn out than any violence hitherto seen in Southern Africa, with the destruction of an economy of utmost importance to the whole region as but one of its costs. Inkatha may well hold out for a more ambitious settlement, but as a possible minimum and realistic outcome, the implications of the present Inkatha strategy which have been outlined hold considerable promise for the interests of everyday Africans in South Africa.