CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STALEMATE

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1. THE BROAD BACKGROUND : CYCLES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Most observers of South Africa as well as many thinking South Africans have a broad notion that the inequality between black and white in the society and poor conditions in black communities make South Africa vulnerable to massive instability. There have been frequent predictions of pending revolution, or at least of instability, and these warnings continue.

One of the better-known writers on South Africa in the USA, Karis, for example, has very recently argued that a steady intensification of racial violence in South Africa is taking place: "The longer the struggle takes, the more will violence spread and become bloodier on both sides...white black polarisation is almost bound to become more bitter". "Revolution is in the making in South Africa and violence will be part of it". 1) A similar recent view, for example, we find voiced in the New York Review of Books by Uhlig, who speaks of South Africa's "...widening racial chasm..." and "As the middle ground in South Africa has begun to fall away, the field has thus been left increasingly to the two major antagonists — hard-line whites on the one hand, and the growing if underground ranks of the African National Congress on the other". 2) Writing from South Africa, Lodge concludes his analysis by saying that: "The complex combination of social forces present in black resistance have succeeded in igniting a conflagration which no amount of repression or incorporation will succeed in extinguishing". 3)

Yet, by world standards, South Africa has not been a particularly unstable country. Most of the assessments of business risk made by international organisations, for example, place South Africa among the twenty more riskfree countries in the world, at least in the short to medium term.

The past few decades have been characterised by the following broad patterns. After the second world war up to the middle fifties, South Africa was a very well-controlled system with blacks very quiescent, although in a far worse material position relative to whites than today. In the late forties, however, radical pressures emerged in the then legal ANC. Leadership up to then adopted a basically moderate, Christian stance of moral pressure. Boycott resolutions by the youth wing of the ANC led to the adoption of a "programme of action" in 1949, followed in 1951/52 by the well-known "Defiance Campaign" of the fifties, committed to the mobilisation of blacks through mass action of strikes, boycotts, demonstrations and general non-collaboration. An alliance between the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured Peoples Organisation and the S A Congress of Democrats, many of whose members were former members of the Communist Party, resulted in political thinking among black leaders acquiring a much more radical or militant ideological flavour than previously.

When the more youthful Africanists in the ANC broke away in 1958 to form the Pan African Congress an even more clearly militant and confrontationist leadership emerged among blacks. These developments culminated in what was South Africa's first taste of widespread overt political action from blacks. In the late fifties there were stonings of buses and beerhalls, limited marches or demonstrations in the major cities, but the calls for stay-at-home strikes were generally only partly successful. Where developments appeared dangerous, the authorities quelled the action with determined counteraction and arrests. Still the resistance mounted and finally it reached a peak in March and April of 1960, the time of the Sharpeville killings.


2) There had been serious but localised uprisings before that, such as the Bondelzwarts and Bulhoek rebellions. The conflicts earlier in the fifties were also more restricted in scope.
The PAC had prepared for massive nation-wide action, but strictly along the lines of passive resistance. The participation of less-organised youthful elements made the situation unpredictable. While most of the Witwatersrand was quiet, there were massive encounters with the police in Cape Town, the Southern Witwatersrand, where the Sharpeville incident occurred, and in Durban. Elsewhere thousands burned their passes, even in Bloemfontein - a city where blacks had seemed to be particularly passive. A march of 15 000 people to the centre of Cape Town, where the strikes were also well supported, was perhaps the most threatening to whites.

After a short period of uncertainty, the reaction of the authorities was decisive. An emergency was declared and over 18 000 people were arrested - over 25 percent of the 70 000 formal membership of the PAC and ANC combined.

New legislation was passed to control dissidence and the ANC and the PAC were banned. Subsequent calls by the underground ANC for stay-at-home strikes were largely ignored and blacks started queuing to replace their burned passes. As Gail Gerhardt observes, "The myth that the African masses were a volcano on the verge of an explosion had itself been exploded". 1) Two major lessons were learned: firstly, the mass of black people were not prepared to risk their security and meagre privileges in any active political engagement of the authorities, and secondly, the South African state was easily able to control and repress the most determined public dissidence from the radial wings of black society. Following the emergency of 1961, there were some 200 incidents of underground action and insurgency up to the end of 1964, but the police steadily tracked down and destroyed the underground formations responsible. 2)

A period of relative quiet followed over the rest of the sixties and early seventies. From 1968 onward, however, a very overt political consciousness began to re-emerge in the form of Black Consciousness. Originating in the United States (although with Africanist roots) the movement first gained momentum among black theology students and among a black student group which broke away from the dominantly white student organisation, NUSAS. A movement dedicated to all black (i.e. non-white) solidarity, by the mid-seventies had produced a fair number of strongly ideological organisations, including the South African Students Organisation (SASO) and Black Peoples Convention (BPC). The political culture of black solidarity and the spirit of independence from, and in part, hostility towards whites held sway over black students and high school leadership groups. From 1972 onwards, there were numerous demonstrations and the boycotts on black campuses throughout the country. These tactics established a new pattern of open conflict, which was soon to spread outside the campuses.

In 1976, black and coloured educational facilities were becoming increasingly over-stressed as a result of the rapid rise in pupil numbers. The independence of the Transkei created insecurity in regard to citizenship status among the very prominent Xhosa-speaking youth leadership on the Witwatersrand. Growth rates in the economy of 2 percent in 1975 and 1976 (compared with 7 percent in 1974) produced a spurt in black youth unemployment. The imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, despite well-backed warnings from parent-teachers organisations and the South African Institute of Race Relations, created critical anxieties among pupils under stress. This final frustration, against a background of youth political solidarity and mobilised consciousness, resulted in the June, 1976 youth uprisings on the Witwatersrand, which spread to over 160 communities in other parts of the Transvaal, to coloured and Indian pupils, to university students and even to the Inkatha-dominated Natal township of KwaMashu, although the scope was very limited there. 1)

These youth uprisings on occasion led to marches by tens of thousands on Johannesburg and into the centre of Cape Town, where large-scale confrontations with the police occurred. Several calls for sympathy stay-away strikes by adult workers were made. The first was partly successful because of coercion by the demonstrators, the second and particularly the third gained the co-operation of adult workers in Johannesburg and were 50 to 70 percent successful. Later calls for strikes were unsuccessful because of a tougher attitude to absenteeism among employers. The disturbances claimed the lives of 575 people (137 in Cape Town, the rest mainly on the Witwatersrand) with an additional 3,900 people injured. The police made nearly 6,000 arrests over the period.

The disturbances may not have started as a deliberate political confrontation, but after the first clashes with the police, soon took on a markedly rhetorical political flavour. There was clearly organised leadership by students' councils and for a while their leadership was readily replaced after arrests. The focus of violence was generally state property and institutions like bottle stores which the students claimed weakened the political will of blacks.

Perhaps the most important consequence was that many hundreds, if not thousands, of young people fled the country. In June, 1978 the Chief of the Security Police estimated that some 4,000 black South Africans were undergoing insurgency training abroad, and that he expected the number to increase steadily as a result of the "Soweto" uprisings.

These disturbances continued with breaks into 1979 particularly in the Cape. In 1980 there were once again outbreaks of boycotts and demonstrations among school-going youth, with hundreds of arrests and some violent confrontations with police. The school boycotts in 1980 in Natal brought the youthful demonstrators into conflict with Inkatha, the mass black organisation under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi.
In taking stock of the situation, it seems that as in the early sixties, the black political protest from 1976 onward was no match for the controlling power of the state. Indeed, the police were able to cope relatively easily and the army did not have to become involved in any significant way.

It is important to consider to what extent general support from the mass of black adults existed during the disturbances. Hanf and his team from the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute found in sample surveys that overall, 57 percent of urban blacks declared themselves to be in sympathy with the Soweto disturbances. While less well-educated workers outside Soweto generally condemned the disturbances (less than 30 percent were in favour), in Soweto itself, even among the lower working class, 62 percent sympathised with the radical youth. Sympathy, however, does not necessarily imply any likelihood of physical support. It is worth noting, however, that not all the participants in the Soweto disturbances were youths. The S A Institute of Race Relations estimated that roughly one-third of casualties among the demonstrators were over 26 years of age.

We have seen that some support from workers was forthcoming during the second and third calls for mass strikes. This support does not appear to have been very committed, however, since when the authorities warned the strikers by means of pamphlets, and employers threatened to dismiss people who were absent, the support for the demonstrators seemed to evaporate.

There was a quite considerable response to calls by the demonstrators for a boycott of white shops in Johannesburg. The Furniture Traders Association reported a 40 percent decline in Christmas sales in 1976, largely as a result of political "agitation".

2) See also Kane-Berman, op cit., Chapter 1.
This was short-lived, however, and trading soon returned to normal. In Soweto the young peoples' organisation of a demonstration against rent increases in 1976 won them considerable sympathy, but the mass of black adults remained judiciously uninvolved.

It is clear then, that the much feared escalation of mass black political action did not occur, white lives and property were never in danger, and the loss of life, although substantial and tragic, never looked like becoming a bloodbath. Furthermore, serious divisions in black political formations were revealed once again since in Soweto, Cape Town and Durban, there were instances of violent migrant worker action against the more radical youth.

Two Government Cabinet Ministers were able to claim in late 1976 that only 20 percent or less of Soweto had in any way shown themselves to be active supporters of the disturbances. ¹ This, of course, did not take account of widespread hidden sympathies revealed by the attitude research quoted above, but is probably a fair reflection of active and committed support among adults.

At the present time, the situation once more is fairly quiescent. Confrontation of the police is ongoing but isolated and sporadic. We have seen, then, that two major waves and several less prominent waves of active political resistance have built up since the second world war, none of which fundamentally threatened the security of the state. These waves of action have revealed a persisting failure to actively mobilise the majority of black adults. Is this history, which has been very briefly outlined, a cause for complacency among whites and the South African government? We turn to this issue below.

2. THE CONDITIONS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

In order to assess the likelihood of instability, we have to consider the mix of factors which have related to revolution and rebellion in other societies. Much speculation exists as regards the factors producing revolution, but some rigorous attempts to systematise the causal factors have been carried out. It is clear from virtually all analyses that rebellion or instability is virtually never the result of simple deprivation, poverty or inequality.

The analyses considered include Brinton,1) Davies 2) Gurr3) and Muller. 4) The major propositions common to all these four authors and one or two major propositions which while not common to all four are not contradicted by any author and which are consistent with the other propositions have been extracted for examination in the South African setting.

In considering the prospects for widespread or serious political upheaval in South Africa in the light of these propositions, one is faced with the difficulty, however, that empirical evidence is relatively limited. Where possible survey research will be referred to (accepted by both Muller and Gurr as constituting valid data) but elsewhere it will be necessary to draw tentative conclusions on the basis of observation and conversations with black people and other South Africans. In the section which follows, the terminology used is not necessarily identical to that used by the authors referred to above. In some cases more than one specific proposition has been combined into a broader category.

2.1 Relative Deprivation

A crucial variable according to all four authors and many of those whom the four quote, including Marx and de Tocqueville is relative deprivation. This is defined generally as a discrepancy between what people want and what they have, but more precisely by Gurr as the discrepancy between what they consider themselves to be rightfully entitled to as opposed to what they believe they are able to achieve and maintain. It therefore involves both expectations and the prospects of rewards. Relative deprivation is considered below in terms of the factors which are seen to cause it.

2.1.1 Relative Deprivation due to the Stimulation of Expectations or Rising Expectations

Certain of the variables bearing on relative deprivation mentioned by the authors can be grouped together under the broad heading of the stimulation of expectations. Here no direct empirical survey data exists but one must take account of the following among blacks:

- the South African economy has experienced quite marked cycles of growth. The growth cycles ending in 1974/75 and 1982 were periods of rapid absorption of blacks into better-paid and more varied and responsible occupations. Black wages have grown more rapidly than those of whites. In a broad sense these developments must stimulate new wants and expectations;

- furthermore the effect of the pressure of world opinion on the S A government is to some extent to induce a "legitimacy crisis", causing various government spokesmen from time to time to make vague but sweeping promises of reform and development. Here we think of the Prime Minister's statement at the top-level and well known "Carlton" and "Good Hope" conferences as an example.

1) See for example, latest trends discussed by Jill Nattrass, "Social Change and the South African Economy", in Indicator SA., Durban : Centre for Applied Social Sciences, February, 1983
These types of statements also appear to produce raised expectations. Empirical evidence among a sample of black women has pointed to a sensitivity to government statements 1; more generally, one must bear in mind that the government's policy of separate development is not based on a total negation of black political aspirations, but is an attempt to deflect such aspirations into the semi-autonomous and marginal institutions of the "homelands". Therefore, the forms of political participation are offered without the substance of access to the central decision-making process. This in itself is likely to stimulate black political awareness.

2.1.1 Relative Deprivation and "Just Deserts" Frustration

In 1972, in a very detailed, semi-depth survey of black attitudes in Durban (n 300) qualitative responses were assessed and classified in terms of evidence of "just deserts" frustration. Among blue-collar blacks 39 percent spontaneously provided evidence of this particular kind of frustration, and among better-educated white-collar blacks the proportion was 45 percent. 2) In response to more specific items on "just deserts" frustration the proportions with this attitudinal set rose to between 55 and 60 percent. Hence this type of relative deprivation appears to be widespread and has quite probably increased since 1972.

For example, in the research for the Buthelezi Commission in 1981 more than 90 percent of respondents indicated that aspirations to equality with whites were more salient than aspirations for progress and improvements in incremental terms.

1) This effect is implicit in some of the data of the firm Markinor, discussed in L Schlemmer et al., Black Urban Communities, Socio-Political Reform and the Future, Durban: Centre for Applied Social Sciences, 1980.

2.1.3 Relative Deprivation: the Success of Groups with which Deprived people can identify

A few brief points in this regard are sufficient. Blacks would tend to relate themselves particularly to other "non-white" groups and to blacks in neighbouring territories. Nattrass's analysis referred to earlier gives some idea of the relatively greater socio-economic advances being made by coloureds and particularly Indians than blacks. The new constitutional reforms introduced for coloureds and Indians but not for blacks are also very salient, and a great surge of black anger has marked their introduction.

Furthermore, the "liberation" achieved by successive neighbour communities in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and, perhaps in the not too distant future, Namibia, would suggest that rising political aspirations are quite dramatic in the South African situation. In fact the Buthelezi Commission research established that 80 percent or more of blacks sampled had a strong, affective identification with events in Zimbabwe. Whether these effects will increase, be maintained or decrease over time is difficult to say.

2.2 The Salience of Deprivation: low levels of Satisfaction in regard to Benefits which people consider to be crucial

All the authors referred to make the point that absolute deprivation and oppression as such do not stimulate revolutionary consciousness (people tend to become obsessed with day-to-day survival under such conditions). They do however, argue that where deprivation is "relative", one must also consider the salience of the benefits which people consider themselves deprived of.

1) Jill Nattrass, op. cit.
The Buthelezi Commission research probed desires for reform and perceived needs for reform in some detail. Education emerged consistently as one of the top three most highly valued benefits and also as one of the services most basic to other achievements. The demand for improvement in education was also up among the three most salient requirements.

Objectively, however, education is one of the most problematic of issues among the spectrum of reforms. Firstly, the ratio of per-capita expenditure on black versus white education is so wide (1:7) that decades will pass before fiscal equality is reached. Secondly, black education suffers from a vicious circle of deficiencies which mean that improvements in quality will be as slow or slower than funding improvements. Prospects in this area are negative, despite attempts by the government to improve the situation.

2.3 Deprivation: the Scope of Sharing of Perceived Deficiencies

Gurr and others argue that the spread and scope of relative deprivation will influence the degree to which revolutionary consciousness is stimulated.

In a study in 1979 of "Quality of Life" among whites, Indians, and blacks in Durban, it was found that the scope of perceived deprivation among blacks compared to other groups is dramatically more widespread than the objective differences in material circumstances would suggest. A certain threshold of perceived deprivation on salient issues was taken as standard for the three groups. Blacks experienced deprivation in 22 life-concerns above this threshold, compared with 9 among Indians and 3 among whites.

The form of the questioning reduced the effects of a "complaining ethic" and hence the results were very telling. Needless to say, the spread of frustrations among blacks indicates a considerable degree of shared consciousness on this issue.

2.4 Deprivation: Policy Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation

The author Muller in particular makes special mention of the role of political consciousness and political alienation as factors which can stand apart from a sense of deprivation.

In this regard evidence is available from the large scale attitude research undertaken by the Buthelezi Commission. The level of expressed "anger and impatience" or "Dissatisfaction" with "life in South Africa" among blacks is clearly very high, and has been increased rapidly over the five years from 1977 to 1981. (The findings in the Buthelezi Commission research are compared with strictly comparable results for 1977 obtained by Hanf et al., of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute. The results below are for the most extreme expression of dissatisfaction - "anger and impatience".

2) The Buthelezi Commission, op. cit.
3) Theodor Hanf et al., op. cit. Similar samples and the same field work team were used.
"Anger and Impatience" with "Life in South Africa Today"
(based on responses to a 5 point verbal cum pictorial scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Witwatersrand</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All black males</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witwatersrand and KwaZulu</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulu men</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better educated</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witwatersrand and KwaZulu Men</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results tend to speak for themselves. In an earlier study, also nation-wide, it appeared that levels of dissatisfaction with specifically political and legal conditions and circumstances were relatively higher among all groups than dissatisfaction with a range of non-political aspects of life, excluding the specific issue of incomes. 1) In the results of the research for the Buthelezi Commission it was clear that the dissatisfaction was widespread across social classes and urban and rural regions.

A rough index of political alienation can be obtained from the extent of support for available political institutions. In a pre-independence referendum held among blacks of Ciskeian affiliation, roughly one-third of the total number of people who theoretically could have participated did so. In Soweto, the percentage polls in elections for the Urban Councils have dropped from 32 percent in 1968 to 14 percent in 1978, and the participation in elections held this year was no higher. The only regions where formal political participation is reasonably high are either strictly within the homelands (although the latest elections in Bophuthatswana had a low poll) or in Natal-KwaZulu, where the political formation of Inkatha, under Chief Buthelezi, has created fairly considerable political legitimacy.

In another exploration of political alienation, a full range of newspapers for the past year has been perused in order to identify statements from black spokesmen that would indicate political alienation from or loyalty and identification with the system. An insignificant number of quotations or reports came to hand which indicated positive support for the system, no matter how subtly. All statements indicated either highly particularistic commitments, protest, or a complete negation of the system. Generally, this aspect of deprivation must be counted as indicative of potential instability.

2.5 Utilitarian Justification for Aggressive Political Participation

All the authors make the point that deprivation, frustration and political alienation will not stimulate a revolutionary consciousness unless accompanied by social norms among dissident groups which will support the goal of confrontation with the system. These norms must amount to accepted "justifications" of confrontation.

This aspect, however, has not been adequately covered in the research results to hand. Nevertheless, the demonstration-effects of the results of insurgency in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique must have created the widespread impression that confrontation and violence has utility, that it can work. Furthermore, the fact that the government has not been able to disguise the fact that it has re-oriented some of its policies for black urban areas since the 1976-77 Township disturbances is relevant. There are thus, some very broad indications that utilitarian justifications for political aggression may exist.

1) The scan of statements was made on the basis of the press clipping service of the Journal Indicator SA, and covers a full range of both establishment and "alternative" publications.
2.6 Moral Justifications for Political Aggression

Here we will simply take the results of attitude surveys conducted for the Buthelezi Commission as indicative of a climate of normative views. A general indication of the extent of militancy of sentiment in the black population appears from the following series of results:

A statement presented to respondents read as follows:

"It is best for black South Africans to be careful in politics and not get into trouble"  (n 2 600)

KwaZulu/Natal cities:
Agree 49%
Disagree 51%

Witwatersrand:
Agree 45%
Disagree 54%

Another item was as follows:
"If the Government does not introduce changes for blacks in the next 10 years, which of the following do you expect?"  (n 2 600+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;Definitely Expect&quot;</th>
<th>Rural KwaZulu</th>
<th>KwaZulu Natal Cities</th>
<th>Witwatersrand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks will be too frightened by army/police to act</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many more blacks will leave country for military training</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass strikes by black workers</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloodshed/war/revolution (spontaneous addition)</td>
<td>80+%</td>
<td>80+%</td>
<td>80+%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(note: the remarkable figure of 80+ percent in reference to bloodshed above must be seen in a context of the build-up of suggestion in the previous items.)
Items which are somewhat closer to attitudinal indices of possible behaviour, and not merely sentiment, are reflected in the following series.

Paraphrased versions of items used are as follows: 1)

"Would black workers strike for two weeks in response to a call by a well respected black leader?" (N 300)

All KwaZulu/Natal
Almost all 20%
Many 49%
Only a few 29%

"If the ANC (insurgents) were to come in secretly asking people to help it and work with it...what would happen?" (n 300)

All Natal/KwaZulu
Most would try to help 19%
Many would help it 29%
A few 29%
Nobody/almost nobody would help it 8%

"Most or many would help the ANC" (first and second categories above) (n 300)

All Natal/KwaZulu 48%
Rural 46%
Youth: 18-24 years 56%
White collar workers 56%
Skilled/semi-skilled workers 55%

These results speak for themselves. There is an abundance of attitudinal sentiment supportive of confrontation and political aggression. Quite clearly also, the "system" has very little legitimacy at the present time and there is a clear orientation to an alternative order. The normative justifications for confrontation exist in full measure.

1) From research for the Buthelezi Commission, op. cit.
2.7 Availability for Aggressive Political Participation

The author Muller makes the point that no matter what the grievances or justifications might be, political aggression will not take place unless there are sufficient numbers of people whose circumstances allow them to act outside of the framework of convention.

The pattern of unrest in 1976 and subsequently has shown that there is a great number of young adults "available", by virtue of urban youth unemployment and not infrequent school boycotts for public demonstrations or more serious encounters. With the current downturn in the economy, the relative numbers have increased sharply over the past two years.

Counter-indications are available for the settled labour force, however. Although South Africa's incidence of labour-time lost through strikes has increased rapidly in recent years, the short duration and the specifically production and wage-oriented nature of strikes makes it seem that working adults are not "available" at this stage for prolonged withdrawal from gainful employment for political action. This issue will be discussed in more detail presently.

It needs simply to be noted, however, that in a rapidly-growing population, the proportion of more readily "available" black youth in the black population overall is relatively very high.

2.8 Relative Size of the Dissident Group

The authors referred to are generally in agreement that the relative size of the group supporting the dissident cause is an important factor in the mix of factors predisposing to unrest. Needless to say this is a prominent consideration in South Africa in which the controlling minority of whites constitute a minority of one-fifth of the total population.

Yet in South Africa the huge preponderance of potential dissidents may in fact have the effect of increasing the determination with which whites defend their cause, as will be discussed presently.

2.9 Summary to this point

So far every indicator chosen has broadly suggested a very great potential for political aggression or violence. The criteria of Muller, Gurr and other authors not yet discussed, however, all refer to structural and environmental factors which can potentially inhibit the manifestation of such aggression. These factors will be assessed as a group in a general discussion, since the political environment in South Africa contains a number of overlapping and mutually reinforcing features which make it difficult to treat the authors' variables singly.

3. INHIBITIONS IN THE ENVIRONMENT

A number of points which cluster round this theme will be made. The black organisations likely to espouse and actively mobilise for potential aggression have all been banned and are now located externally. The opportunities for mass-mobilisation in South Africa are limited. In the current situation most of the insurgency which does occur is externally planned and organised. In 1979, according to S A Broadcasting Corporation reports, there were 12 cases of violent insurgency. By 1981 there were 55, but in 1982 the number appeared to have dropped to roughly 30 instances, 1) although full records are still not available. This is what Gurr would refer to as "conspiracy" — mobilisation by small elite groups without mass participation.

The correlations with education in the survey data quoted above all suggest, in Gurr's terms, a relatively greater discontent among the black "elites", and therefore a pre-condition for conspiracy exists.

However, here again a strong inhibitor exists at the present time. Police claims in the media are that over 90 percent of underground insurgents who have participated in some act of sabotage are tracked down.

Generally, then, the degree of regime surveillance, control and action against radical organisations as well as the high level of motivation in the regime security service (its white leadership and substantial white personnel ensure loyalty) is sufficient to discourage any organised internal attempts to confront the system. It seems that a build-up of youth dissidence and dissident leadership can occur, but here again, the regime organisations can contain and ultimately inhibit it. This important issue will be discussed further below. One must consider, however, the prospects of unorganised action of a kind difficult to control.

3.1 Political Worker Action

One looks, then, at the prospects of what Gurr called "turmoil" or disorganised, leaderless violence. A particular focus of interest here is that of the potential for politically oriented labour disturbances.

The comments already made above on labour disturbances do not suggest a strong tendency to violent confrontation among black workers, who would be required to support the youth dissidents if turmoil were to take on threatening proportions. Some people consider that the high levels of labour unrest show a tendency in this direction. The earlier comments on labour unrest patterns would counter-indicate this, but further discussion is necessary.

In 1981, the number of man-days lost in strikes was roughly 190 per 1,000 black employees. 1) Comparing this with other countries for 1979, shows that the black strike incidence in South Africa is well below the incidence in the U.K., USA, Australia, Canada, Italy, Israel and other countries in which the economy is highly strike prone. 2)

The pattern for the first six months of 1982, as given by the Minister of Manpower in parliament, shows a slight increase in numbers in 1982 but a decrease in the time taken to resolve strikes. 1)

The pattern of black strike activity over the past years appears worth noting. After years of very low activity there was a sharp increase in 1973 and 1974, in response to inflation, declining real income and poor communication in industry. The ensuing years from 1975 to 1979 once again represented a period of very low labour unrest. In 1980, after the new labour legislation had led to a spurt in union activity and worker mobilisation, strike action increased once again quite sharply until 1982. It was then probably slightly above the average levels for 1973 and 1974. The general impression for 1983 is that it declined again in response to the economic recession (standardised figures for 1983 are not yet available).

One must conclude that strike activity tends to be cyclical in response to organisational, legislative and economic factors. There does not seem to be any burgeoning of labour instability as a consequence of political factors of a direct kind. The official classification of causes of strike activity bear this out - political causes are not mentioned at all.

There are a few considerations in regard to the effect of politics on labour instability which deserve mention, however. An analysis of regional patterns of labour unrest shows that the Eastern Cape is dramatically over-represented as regards labour unrest relative to employment numbers. 2)

There is no logical reason for this other than the well-known fact that blacks in the Eastern Cape tend to exhibit a higher degree of political militancy than elsewhere. It would seem that political consciousness interacts with other factors in labour relations (grievances, wage rates, etc.) - possibly as a catalyst - in determining the level of strike-proneness, without the strikers necessarily taking an overt political objectives.

Secondly, the wave of strikes about pensions in late 1982, reflected among other factors a lack of trust in government and its intentions as regards the handling of workers' pension contributions and benefits. 1) Here, one may argue, is a case of the low political legitimacy of the key institutions in the system inducing a heightened instability among members of the black labour force.

We appear to have evidence, then, of a political factor in labour unrest. However, this does not represent political unrest in the black labour force as such. There is still little or no activity on the labour front which Gurr would regard as signs of incipient turmoil.

Black attitudes to trade unionism seem to support the conclusion above. When asked what trade unions could do for blacks, fewer than 5 percent of respondents in a study in Natal/KwaZulu mentioned a political function of goal (n 300, 1981). 2)

More recently, a group of 65 highly unionised black industrial employees with a history of strike activity were asked in the course of intensive depth interviews how blacks could gain redress for political grievances.


Fewer than 20 percent saw labour power as a political weapon or expected trade unions to pursue political goals outside the workplace. During the introduction of the new constitution for whites, coloureds and Indians recently, certain black trade union movements sought to mobilise black workers in protest. Only on major work stoppage occurred in one company and that was of very brief duration.

Labour is not seen in a political light. Blacks are relatively highly politicised and have quite well-developed militant sentiments, but there is still a very clear tendency for the political and labour spheres to be separated in the collective thinking of the black labour force.

One can argue that this separation of spheres may not continue. Apart from the examples of interaction between political and labour action given above, there are also examples of boycotts of products in solidarity with aggrieved workers. The well-known Fattis and Monis boycott and meat boycotts of a few years ago were cases in point.

These consumer-boycotts reflected a new development of some import which deserves further analysis, but they cannot be classified as the kind of political action which Gurr is referring to, and therefore do not seem to add up to a "political destabilisation" of the labour force.

There is thus very little direct indication of a growth of directly politically inspired activism in the mass of black labour. This, as we see, is in large measure due to the separation of employment and political issues. If ever the separation of spheres were to be bridged, it would introduce political activism right into a domain where blacks have real bargaining power, with quite dramatic consequences.

1) Study in the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, publication forthcoming.
3.2 Coercion and Fear

In part the caution exhibited by blacks which is clear from the preceding section is a few reaction. The security apparatus in South Africa and its activities have a powerful "demonstration" effect on people. It is well-known inside and outside South Africa that thousands of people over the years have been detained without trial in terms of security legislation. Furthermore, the occurrence of deaths in detention are well-publicised and quite understandably create a climate of fear among could-be political activists.

The pattern of security action over the years is difficult to monitor since information is often inconsistent or unsystematic. Generally-speaking, however, it seems that there was a decrease in political detentions between 1980 and 1982 but that the figures for 1983 show a current increase in the numbers of people affected by security action. If one takes political detentions, with or without trials, as one index the following pattern emerges, based on statistics kept by the South African Institute of Race Relations and the South African Council of Churches. ¹)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Detained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980 (up to November)</td>
<td>956 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 (up to November)</td>
<td>630 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (up to November)</td>
<td>264-310* people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>453 people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* Figures given by the Minister of Police were higher.)

There is little doubt, however, that the current action by the security forces is at a lower level than it was in the 1970's. This is also reflected in the much lower current levels of political bannings and house-arrests.

By the standards of totalitarian regimes, the figures for political detentions are not high in the population of 25 million people. Possibly, however, the fear of detention and its consequences and the image of efficiency which the South African regime probably enjoys (relative to the regimes of less-developed totalitarian societies) may have the effect of inducing great caution. Nevertheless, the level of security control is not such as to suggest that it is the only factor constraining the black population of South Africa.

3.3 Dual Consciousness among Blacks

There is, in addition to the fear-coercion factor, considerable evidence of certain kinds of political ambivalence among the black people of South Africa.

The research for the Buthelezi Commission and the Quail Commission, referred to earlier, has shown that, despite the high levels of militancy, discontent and frustration evidenced in the findings, the minimum political demands, in policy-terms, of a wide cross-section of blacks are surprisingly moderate. Broadly, one can say that 60 to 70 percent of blacks declare themselves prepared to accept socio-political arrangements which amount to substantial compromises with white interests. In particular, majorities of blacks are willing to accept "consociational" arrangements in which whites would have equal power with blacks in a future dispensation.

More pertinent to this topic, however, are the following results of a separate study among 150 black adults in Durban in 1979, which in part was devoted to an explanation of more "rational" considerations of strategy. The following examples are relevant:
Percentage endorsement of alternative-choice statements relating to black political strategy (Zulu men, n 150. Sample had higher than average education, hence was fairly highly politicised. Statements are paraphrased, uncertain responses omitted.)

"A leader must act strongly to win support
vs
He should wait in order to form a strong organisation."

22% 76%

"A black leader should never co-operate with the government
vs
He should criticise, but co-operate where beneficial."

11% 85%

"Being patient does not help, a leader must make strong demands now
vs
He must be patient and work with the tools he has."

30% 61%

"There is no longer anything to be gained by being patient
vs
It still pays to be patient and plan carefully"

19% 81%

"Some people say that overseas companies should stop buying South African goods and stop sending money to build factories so as to frighten the South African government into getting rid of apartheid. Others say they should continue because it makes jobs for all people in South Africa."

- Stop (boycott/disinvestment) 20%
- Continue trading/investing 75%
- Don't know 5%
Even among the most militant-group of "black consciousness" and ANC supporters, no more than 33 percent of respondents advocated the dis-investment strategy.

If we add to these results the fact that the Buthelezi Commission findings showed that 70 percent or more blacks not only would oppose discrimination against whites, but also indicated that they valued white participation in South African society, \(^1\) then a complex picture emerges, along broadly the following lines.

Blacks are highly discontented, with an attitudinal potential for political aggression. At the same time, however, it is clear that certain advantages are recognised in living within the system. Clearly, the capacity of the South African economy to generate employment and to create expanding material prospects is one important factor emerging from these results. \(^2\)

Furthermore, the attitudinal results seem to indicate that the "system" may not be perceived as totally inflexible. There appears to be a feeling that patience, negotiation and the building-up of bargaining power will lead to reforms and concessions granted peacefully.

The responses of whites in the system are also sufficiently varied to prevent a rigid stereotyping of the "enemy". There is also (from results not quoted) a clear indication among blacks of an appreciation of the value of white technological expertise.

What is perhaps most important among these factors, is that despite the government's present determination not to yield to pressures for black constitutional reform, a perception seems to exist among blacks that not all non-violent options are closed. This attitude is very closely related to one of the conditions which Gurr mentions as counter-acting the effects of relative deprivation - the perception of opportunities for incremental gains.

\(^1\) The Buthelezi Commission, Vol 1 op. cit.

\(^2\) The figures of Jill Nattrass given earlier on the increasing share of income enjoyed blacks are relevant here.
Therefore, there appears to be a dual-consciousness among blacks of a kind which counteracts the attitudes of discontent and concepts of violent political strategy which so many observers of South African society would expect. In other words, substantial proportions of black rank-and-file people seem to feel able to maintain a practical approach to political behaviour.

3.4 The Resources and Performance of the System of Control

Turning to certain of Gurr's and the other authors' structural criteria, we may note that there is also no loyalty to the dissident cause among regime forces. Whites, while a minority, have absolute population numbers and skills sufficient to control an efficient military-security system. Furthermore, security and surveillance controls are very consistent and have demonstrated their severity, particularly in past years. Virtually no internal dissident organisation capable of operating sufficiently openly to sanction, reward or encourage violence exists or is able to exist for very long. Here we have to take account of a particularly complex and multi-facetted set of controls over political communication and over the activities of organisations and their funding. Inkatha has the organisational strength, perhaps, to counteract these controls but does not support violence. If it were to support violence there would probably be mass defection from its ranks.

Muller speaks of the effectiveness, quality and flexibility of administration as a factor discouraging the build-up of political aggression. This factor can be broadened, and seen as a generalised responsiveness (apparent or real) in the system. In South Africa this has various components.

1) Inkatha now has membership of some 750 000 and is therefore the largest black political organisation.
Firstly, we have noted the capacity of the economy to generate incremental rewards, and to respond to pressures of various kinds for an improvement in levels of material welfare. Not only are Nattrass's figures relevant again, but various (very recent) government attempts to improve housing provision and educational services for blacks are also relevant, as are steady, albeit cautious, moves towards the desegregation of more and more facilities.

Secondly, in part as a consequence of the policy of separate development and the decentralisation of functions to marginal (black) authorities, a very large number of better-educated black people are absorbed into senior bureaucratic and administrative positions in the state system. Even in the police force, there are over 75 black commissioned officers. If one adds all these positions together, it would amount to the effective co-optation of thousands of better-educated blacks. If one adds to these the numbers of black incumbents at similar levels in the private sector, it is clear that there is a considerable drain of talent away from the revolutionary cause, as it were.

One can make this point notwithstanding the fact that there is still massive inequality in the relative occupational advancement of blacks and whites. All that is suggested here is that the system is seen to generate occupational opportunity.

Another factor in this regard is the fact that the administration of black affairs is becoming more and more sophisticated. Particularly since the 1976 disturbances, administrators of higher quality have been put in charge of the larger black urban communities. Currently, although there is legislation pending which may make Influx Control to the cities and in the cities more rigid, there has also been new legislation to create a much more legitimate system of black local government. 1) It is not claimed here that all the myriad frustrations and restrictions for black people in South Africa are being removed.

1) Black Local Authorities Act No 102 of 1982.
What is happening is simply that changes and shifts do occur, and while they are inadequate in objective, quantitative terms, they create the impression of flexibility or impending change in the system.

Finally in this regard, South Africa has one characteristic which most authoritarian regimes do not have — a fairly intense debate about social change in the mass media. This probably has a double effect in raising hopes and expectations but at the same time creating a running impression of the potential for change and reform in the system. Whatever the real flexibility of the system may or may not be, the mass media and public debates certainly create an impression of possibilities.

This real or apparent system responsiveness, coupled with effective security controls and an emasculation of counter-system organisation is likely to continue to protect the established regime functions, at least in the short term.

3.5 Resource Mobilisation among Blacks - the Quality of Dissident Organisation

Basic to dissident organisation is the role of intellectuals who turn away from the regime system to assist the dissident cause. In South Africa, particularly in the Congress Movement in the late fifties and in the development of the re-emergent black trade union movement in the seventies, intellectuals of all races have played a very prominent role. Today, with the exception of the trade union movement, in which the role of intellectuals is impressive, their response in dissident organisations is ineffective for a variety of reasons.

Firstly, white opposition politics in South Africa has a fairly dynamic quality and this activity provides outlets for intellectual skills and commitments. Now that coloureds and Indians are to be absorbed into the parliamentary system, a small but increasing proportion of intellectuals from these communities will be drawn into formal
political activity. The homeland government system has absorbed a number of intellectuals into formal political activity as well. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha, for example, includes a few PhD's, several lawyers and medical doctors and a very large number of graduates.

Secondly, culture plays a role in weakening the effectiveness of intellectuals. The radical white, Indian and coloured and some black intellectuals who are available to support dissident organisation are products of a system of academic socialisation which is virtually identical to that in the USA, Britain and Holland. They are or have pretentions to being cosmopolitan sophisticates. The rank-and-file black organisations, on the other hand, have a different political culture. Firstly they would prefer to use indigenous languages, sing mobilising songs, enjoy symbolic rituals and generally celebrate pride in an African identity. Generally, with the exception of the trade union movement which is of obvious utility to rank-and-file black people, the intellectual role in South Africa penetrates no more than the disaffected black bourgeoisie, who themselves are very western and urban in their political culture.

Thirdly, radical intellectuals in South Africa, once again with the exception of those involved in the trade union movement, display great moral and existential dilemmas which undermine their effectiveness. Many of them seek the approval of or want recognition from the anti-South African exile movements abroad, which include many powerful figures of great significance to the dissident cause in South Africa. The movements abroad, because of their removal from the local situation, have to pursue one of two possible strategies — either a "boycott" strategy or the strategy of armed confrontation. These strategies of the exile movements have been raised to the level of what amounts virtually to a moral dogma of liberation.
From a radical perspective, these strategies make sense overseas but have to be carefully questioned inside South Africa. Yet one finds a very substantial proportion of radicals of all races in South Africa who accept the popular wisdom of the exile movements and refuse to participate in any way in the structures of the system. They seek to maintain the greatest possible moral distance from the tainted institutions of separation and apartheid. They therefore lose opportunities to mobilise within approved black political structures like local councils, regional homeland governments, referenda, etc. etc. This viewpoint has contributed substantially to robbing these government-provided structures of political legitimacy in the outside world and among the black petty bourgeoisie but has also prevented such structures from achieving viability as vehicles through which to oppose government policy. The radical intellectuals would argue that they have achieved notable success through robbing the separate political institutions of legitimacy. On the other hand, however, the structures persist and function to absorb quite a great deal of the energies of many talented blacks who do participate. The political risks attendant upon alternative avenues of grass-roots political mobilisation are so great that very little develops.

Generally speaking then, this author's argument is that radical political organisation has failed and will probably continue to fail to involve the black rank-and-file in large numbers. The latest organisation dedicated to this cause, the United Democratic Front, appears to be enjoying great success among students, academics, coloured and Indian schoolteachers and middle-class voluntary organisations but has so far not demonstrated any success in capturing the imagination of the black rank-and-file except in particular areas for short periods around specific issues like rents.\(^1\)

\(^1\) See "Durban Blacks: Local Government in Crisis", in \textit{Indicator SA}, Vol 1, No 3, (Political Monitor) p 6.
Added to this fact, the government has over the past four years quite dramatically altered its policies with regard to the black petty bourgeoisie. In the fifties, sixties and most of the seventies, the government pursued a policy of restricting black trading, black free-enterprise and black professional activity in the so-called "white" cities. Today it has corporations (like the Small Business Development Corporation) to promote black business, professionals are allowed premises in central city areas and the salaries of fully-qualified black professionals in the civil service have been made equal to those of whites. There is thus less and less likelihood that the black petty bourgeoisie will side with the black proletariat as they increasingly did in the fifties, sixties and seventies.

4. CONCLUSION : THE PROSPECTS FOR UNREST

One has to conclude that in terms of both Gurr's, Muller's and the other authors' attitudinal, normative and availability factors, virtually all the precoditions for an escalation of political violence appear to exist in South Africa. The implications of the results on various indexes given in this paper are obvious and need not be summarised here.

On the other hand, the structural and organisational criteria for revolution or for "turmoil", "civil war" or effective "conspiracy" among political leader figures inside South Africa are not met. The mobilisation of counter-regime resources is clearly no match for the resources which the government can and does mobilise.

In the past two-and-half decades two successive waves of political violence have failed to fully extend the forces of law and order, let alone threaten the survival of the regime. While there have been responses to the violence in the form of policy adaptations and reform, the efforts have been sluggish or unhurried and the effects undramatic. The "Soweto" disturbances have yielded
certain improvements in conditions for blacks in urban areas (the 99 year leasehold system, giving security of housing tenure; an increase in the rate of building of classrooms) but these effects fall far short of what could be called structural change. Hence, a collective and widespread belief that violence will have practical benefits simply has not developed.

Does this conclusion mean that South Africa will be a peaceful society in the longer-term as the 20th Century draws to an end? Not at all. It will probably be a relatively stable order, but the stability of its production and administrative systems is likely to co-exist with a level of contained violence emanating from expatriate organisations like the ANC and perhaps others.

The reasons for this contradiction lie in the fact that South Africa is as yet far from being a fully-developed society, and large numbers of black people will not be included in the economic system and in the network of services and facilities. Here one thinks particularly of the unemployed youth, whose educational level is rapidly increasing, along with their expectations and aspirations. ¹ Furthermore, among youthful migrant workers who are unemployed, the rapidly increasing density of settlement in the black rural areas means that more and more are deprived of the alternative security of subsistence agriculture on small allotments in traditional areas. ²

It is from these categories of people that one may expect a steady stream of economic, if not political, "refugees" to leave South Africa to receive insurgency training abroad. The current and likely future ability of South African forces to destroy insurgent bases in neighbourhood territories as well as the very recent security agreements with Mozambique and Swaziland will probably severely curtail the ease of return of the trained insurgents. However the current pattern of regular but limited sabotage will continue. Furthermore, as the technology of insurgency and the levels of training improve, the sabotage is likely to become more serious in its effects. We must bear in mind, however, that many societies have demonstrated a capacity to accommodate fairly high levels of

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¹ Sixty percent of black unemployment is among people under 30 years of age: The current Population Survey of Department of Statistics, 1982.
² See The Buthelezi Commission, op. cit., p 235 for details of rural resources of samples of blacks in KwaZulu.
sabotage for long periods. Sabotage in itself does not topple governments.

The effects of sustained or moderately increased sabotage will be complex. On the one hand, sabotage probably has a politicising and morale-boasting effect on substantial proportions of the more disaffected blacks. Given the system of control and the dual consciousness of the mass of economically active blacks, however, it is unlikely to encourage open action. It may even be perceived as an excuse for non-involvement in political activity inside South Africa. People may feel that their cause is being taken care of by the insurgents. The effects on whites, provided it does not reduce confidence in the economy, which it has not done up to now, will probably be to increase solidarity and to rally support for the government.

These speculations pre-suppose that insurgency will be contained below a certain threshold of effect on the economy and costs of containment. In a very real sense, the future of South Africa is dependent on the contest between insurgency action and the capacity of the state to contain it below a critical threshold. The nature of the overall political system as it has been analysed in this paper would suggest that, apart from counter-insurgency techniques and strategies, solutions to the problem of black youth unemployment and relations with surrounding states are the most critical factors. The government is certainly aware of this and new schemes for the training of unemployed blacks have recently been launched. The task is daunting, however, since the economy has developed a tendency to capital intensity. The government is certainly moving quite dramatically to reduce the risk of insurgency bases in neighbouring states.

One uncertainty relates to the possibility of a politicisation of labour action (or related consumer action). The scenario above has been sketched on the assumption that blacks will continue to separate the political from the labour and consumer spheres. If not, investor
confidence will be affected, and this confidence is the key to South Africa's stability. A breakdown in business confidence will produce a vicious cycle of declining capacity to cope with problems, increased recruitment for insurgency (through increased youth unemployment), lessened capacity to deal with it, leading to even lower business confidence, and so on. There is, at this stage, however, no indication of such a process occurring.

Given the constellation of factors outlined in this paper, and provided the assumptions and observations in the analysis are valid, the most probable future for the current regime in South Africa is likely to be one of cycles of black youth unrest and a moderately increasing level of insurgency and sabotage. The former will be contained, as before. The latter factor, the level and costs of insurgency, defies prediction, but one thing is fairly certain — it will not topple the regime. It could however drag the whole system down to a lower level of economic welfare in which reforms will be reversed and the state will return to its old role of authoritarian repression and control.