1. INTRODUCTION:

In any talk such as this, limited to an hour, I must of necessity generalise to quite a considerable extent. While this has the advantage of allowing me to sketch in broad trends and processes, it does mean that some of the detail which you may be specifically interested in has to be omitted. It also means that much of what I say about South Africans is true not for all individuals or groups, but only for the main groups and for the broad pattern of events. Individual variations cannot be dealt with here. Therefore, you may be interested to know the main sources I have relied on, and which I commend to you for further reading if you are interested. These are:


In addition, I can commend to you an excellent analysis of the recent position, particularly on the political front, with some speculations about the future, prepared by a colleague of mine at the Institute for Social Research - Lawrence Schlemmer. This is to be published very shortly by the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg.
2. **THE EARLY YEARS:**

South Africa has been inhabited by yellow and black-skinned peoples for many centuries. These peoples were scattered across the country, with greater concentrations in the better rainfall areas, especially along the eastern seaboard. (Refer to rainfall and topo. maps). The black-skinned groups formed the bulk of this population, and stretched from about Algoa Bay northwards in a broad belt parallel to the coast, into Mozambique and beyond. The inland parts of Natal, parts of the present Orange Free State and the Transvaal, as well as the present Republics of Lesotho and Swaziland and Botswana, were also inhabited by the black-skinned tribes. All these inhabitants had their own preliter­ate non-western cultures. The economic base of their way of life was a semi-nomadic pastoralism, with a shifting agriculture, and some hunting. The yellow-skinned inhabitants were of two types - the Bushmen and Hottentots. The Bushmen (or 'San') whom we remember today mainly for their rock paintings, lived in the Cape mountains and throughout the mountainous areas of Southern Africa - in the Drakenstein and Cedarberg ranges, the Ottenique, Camdeboo, Sneeuberg, Winterberg, Stormberg and Drakensberg mountain ranges; along the Orange river, and on to the plateau north of it, and in the valleys of the Vaal, Kei, Tsomo and Tukela rivers. The Hottentots (or 'Khoikhoi') were nomadic herders found from the Swakop River on the Atlantic to the Buffalo on the Indian Ocean, along the coastal belt, except where the coast was barren, when they would be some miles inland.

It is only from 1652, with the founding of a permanent replenish­ment station by the Dutch East India company at the Cape, that permanent White settlement was introduced into South Africa. It has become very popular in recent years for Whites to view the development of South Africa as dating back to 1652, but we must remember the importance of the settle­ment of the country by these non-Whites during the centuries preceeding van Riebeck's arrival at the Cape.

The colonisation of the tip of Africa by Whites was, I suggest, inevitable - given the great expansion of European maritime trade with the east from the 17th century onwards; the half-way position of the tip of the continent between Europe and India; and its temperate climate with absence of sub-tropical or tropical diseases.

During the first 50 years of White settlement up to the end of the 17th century, virtually all Whites were limited to the south-western tip of South Africa. From the 18th century onwards a steady expansion of White settlement took place, slowly at first, and then with increasing rapidity. During the 18th century the spread from the Cape was mainly
in a broad belt eastwards along the coast, as a result of the movement of
the Trekboere. These were Dutch (Afrikaans-speaking) semi-nomadic
pastoralists, who included hunting as part of their way of life. Their
way of life was a successful adaption to the country, with its unreliable
rainfall and the limited fertility of the soils. By the latter part of
the 18th century the Trekboere had reached as far along the coast as the
Fish River north of Algoa Bay, and inland to Graaff-Reinet. (See map).
Small scattered pockets of Trekboere had penetrated deeper than this,
mainly inland. The yellow-skinned inhabitants (the Bushmen and
Hottentots) living in the areas occupied by White settlement were per­
manently affected, and were dropping markedly in numbers. However, up
to the 19th century black and white had had little contact with each other,
and were still geographically separate.

3. THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:

During the 19th century, the tempo and extent of White settlement
accelerated markedly.

After the second (and final) British occupation of the Cape in
1806, the '1820 Settlers' were settled on the eastern frontier of the Cape
Colony, south of the Fish River. They were mainly unemployed, British
workers. Their settlement was undertaken by the British Government in an
attempt to 'kill two birds with one stone' - to alleviate some of the
unemployment in Britain after the Napoleonic Wars, and at the same time to
provide a buffer strip between the so-called 'Kaffir Tribes' driven north
of the Fish River, and the Cape Colony to the south. These settlers
were mainly townspeople in background. While they were settled on agri­
cultural holdings, the majority very soon left the land for the small
towns of the Colony, (especially Graham's Town), and reverted to being an
urban population.

From 1836 to 1854, the Voortrekkers (Afrikaans-speaking pastoralists-cum-hunters in the tradition of the Trekboere) moved with their
wagons northwards into the interior plateau regions, where they encoun­
tered the black-skinned peoples. They founded the rather unstable Boer
Republics of the Orange Free State (north of the Orange River), and the
Transvaal (between the Transvaal and the Limpopo Rivers). Some Voor­
trekkers also took their wagons over the Drakensberg Mountains into Natal
and formed a Republic there, despite conflicts with the Zulu Kingdom.
This Republic was later annexed by the British in 1843.

So it is that by the 1880's South Africa was peopled by Blacks and
Whites, with a few yellow-skinned people left over after the epidemics,
conflicts with the Whites and miscegenation, had taken their toll. Unlike the position in America, in Australia, and in New Zealand, the bulk of the indigenous population in South Africa - the black-skinned peoples - did not die out as a result of epidemics and conflicts, but survived alongside the new settlers. The economy of the country at that stage was 'undeveloped'. Towns were few and small, and both Blacks and Whites, with the exception of the town-dwellers, were almost entirely semi-nomadic pastoralists. Amongst both Whites and Blacks essentially a rural subsistence economy prevailed. Outside the towns, the main difference between White and non-White was not economic, but cultural. The Whites exhibited a form of western culture which was becoming increasingly isolated and static due to geographical isolation from contemporary western influences. Tribal preliterate cultures were characteristic of the Blacks.

At this stage I should mention that because of labour problems, slaves had been introduced into the Cape early on by the Dutch East India Company. First of all West-African slaves were introduced in 1658, but later Malay and other Eastern slaves were imported from the East Indies. The introduction of slaves had the unfortunate effect of fixing very firmly in the minds of the White population the idea that certain forms of manual labour - both skilled and more particularly unskilled labour - were suitable only for non-Whites, and that it was beneath the dignity of the White man to stoop to such labour.

While emancipation of the slaves at the Cape took place under British rule in 1834, this in no way altered the attitude of the Whites towards unskilled labour, which had developed over the preceding century and more.

As South Africa developed, it was possible for this attitude to persist, for the country had large numbers of black-skinned peoples to use as an unskilled labour force. Consequently we do not find South Africa experiencing the large-scale immigration of Whites during the 19th century which was so typical of Canada, America and Australia. These latter immigration waves were largely composed of unskilled Whites - generally it was not the skilled classes who emigrated from Britain and Europe.

Secondly, with South Africa's geographical and cultural isolation from Europe, and the fact that the country was largely by-passed by waves of White immigration, most of the White inhabitants of South Africa during the 19th century persisted in the Seventeenth century view of White/non-White relations in terms of Master/Slave status. This view had developed during the early days of the Company Station at the Cape. The non-
Whites were seen as having a social position akin to that of slaves; and as has happened before during human history, the superior position of the master and the subordinate position of the servant or slave was seen as having something of a divine or biblical foundation, and therefore was intrinsic in the nature of things. Here one is reminded very much of Aristotle's famous — or should I say infamous — defence of slavery. There was a persistence of White attitudes of superordination and subordination, with a clearcut idea on the part of the White of what is right and appropriate in terms of social relations and status between the White master and the non-White serving population. In fact, in terms of what the Voortrekkers themselves said, one of their reasons for their trek away from the Cape Colony was to try to escape from the British, with their new-fangled ideas on the relation and status, and rights and duties, of masters towards their servants, and the right of servants to take their masters to court. Remember, the servants were all non-White. The Voortrekkers felt that the important and fundamental relationship between master and servant was being completely overthrown — and for this and other reasons they therefore escaped into the wilderness to preserve their way of life.

It is tempting to speculate on what the future history of South Africa would have been like, and what attempts, if any, would have been made to organise the White/non-White relations, if slavery had never been introduced into South Africa, and therefore if South Africa had also enjoyed the extensive waves of unskilled White immigration which other British colonies enjoyed during the 19th century. I leave the speculations to you, only noting that some authors (e.g. Vatcher) contend that even today most South Africans still unconsciously see White/non-White relations in terms of the old concepts of master and slave. I leave it to you to judge during your stay whether you can find evidence of this attitude.

We must see clearly the position by the middle of the 19th century: The Trekboere, and their social descendants the Voortrekkers, had successfully made a rural adaption to a climate of uncertain rainfall and unpredictable agricultural production. Their semi-nomadic pastoral way of life, was a successful adaption to a stage in the country's economy where land was relatively cheap, and there was plenty of it. It was essentially the same adaption as the black-skinned peoples had already made. By the start of the century, the Whites (Afrikaners) moving northwards, and the Blacks, who were already in the country and were under pressure to move further southwards, both had the same economic way of life, despite different cultures. Both wanted extensive grazing
lands for their cattle, and were looking for pastures new. Under such conditions, conflict was inevitable, and was to go on intermittently for a century. The Kaffir Wars (so-called) of the 19th century were not, as is very often depicted today, a clash between civilised Whites and a bunch of brutal unreliable savages. Rather they were fundamentally a clash of similar interests and similar economic levels - but a clash between an inferior and a superior technological culture, both cultures demanding more land. The Whites, with the superior technological culture, were the victors, despite the fact that their numbers were very much smaller. We must admit, in all honesty, that both sides in the clash had their treacheries and their deceits, their brutalities, as well as their bravery, nobleness, and occasional generosities.

Therefore, by the mid years of the century, South Africa was embroiled in a series of intermittent and often petty conflicts between White and Black over land. It is important to note that while in some cases the vanquished non-Whites were driven back into enclaves, often victor and subject settled together, the latter serving the former. This was especially so in the Eastern Cape. South Africa also suffered a series of vacillating and uncertain changes in policy by the British, who by this stage controlled Natal and the Cape Colony. It also witnessed unstable attempts by the Burgers of the Free State and the Transvaal to build Republics.

To sum up, by 1867 there were Whites and non-Whites, geographically interspersed, often living in the same regions, both largely at a similar economic level and with a similar economic interest.

4. THE DISCOVERY OF DIAMONDS AND GOLD AND THE CONSEQUENCES:

Into this scene a dramatic change was introduced. In 1867 diamonds were discovered in South Africa. With the introduction of the diamond mining industry we have, in the words of de Kiewiet, 'the introduction of South Africa's first industrial community, namely the diamond fields'. In 1884 the main gold-bearing reefs in South Africa on the Witwatersrand, were discovered. With the discovery of diamonds and gold, industrialisation and associated urbanisation were injected into the South African scene. As de Kiewiet puts it: 'In the midst of a slow-moving rural people there sprang up a startling modern industry'.

(p. 117). South Africa was pulled out of its geographical and cultural isolation, from a subsistence economy into the world economy. Big business, capital and entrepreneurial enterprise were introduced.
Increasingly since that time there has been the development of an industrial economy alongside the rural subsistence economy. This urban industrial economy has been aided by an inflow of urban immigrants with urban skills (largely English-speaking immigrants), and at first it was they who built up the urban areas. There has been a decreasing remnant of the subsistence economy in the rural areas. Today, the country exhibits a dual economy, as Houghton has indicated. There is on the one hand an industrial urban economy, and on the other, a rural subsistence economy. The latter economy is now found almost exclusively amongst the Africans in their rural reserves - the Bantu homelands, which are reservoirs of what is left of the older tribal cultures.

Thus we can conveniently regard 1870 as a watershed in the development of South African society. At about that time the total population of all races was probably somewhere about one and a quarter million people. The Whites possibly numbered only a little over two hundred and seventy thousand; the Coloureds one hundred and sixty thousand; Indians more or less six thousand (most of them had been introduced into the canefields in Natal as indentured labour); and some eight hundred and forty thousand odd Africans. Today, a century later in 1970, South Africa probably has a population of well over twenty million - we will know after the census in May. Probably over three-and-three-quarter million are Whites; over two million are Coloureds; possibly six hundred thousand are Asiatics; and because census counts are apparently under-estimates, perhaps as many as twenty million - certainly over fourteen million - are Africans.

It has justly been said that the discovery of diamonds and gold was of far greater significance for South Africa than the Great Trek. Yet, the discovery of such minerals is not the stuff that heroes are made of. So we hear much of the heroes of the Great Trek, but little of the men of financial stature and genius who organised the early efforts of the diamond and gold-mining industries into the co-ordinated financial empires necessary for continued success. This is because the 'Uitlander' - the foreigner - (usually the Briton) was the person who developed the industry, and he was both at that time and indeed for many years to come, decidedly unacceptable to the ethos and way of life of the Afrikaner who had withdrawn to the wilderness. In a sense the Great Trek - i.e. the development of the interior by Whites - was inevitable and therefore not of especial importance. If it had not been undertaken by one group of people, it would have been undertaken sooner or later by others. By contrast, the introduction of an urban industrial economy into the country was of tremendous and indelible significance.
Diamonds, and later gold, depended on cheap Black labour. Remember, the Whites regarded manual labour as infra dig, so that the Whites were the entrepreneurs and the supervisors, while the sweaty manual labour was done by the Blacks. From 1870 onwards the Whites and the Blacks were both drawn into this industrial economy and laboured side by side - although on unequal levels. It has ever been thus, from that time onwards.

Today, the Whites and the Blacks together as collaborators have built up an industrial economy which would not have been possible on the basis of either the Whites or the Blacks alone. As de Kiewiet has said, ‘what abundance of rain and grass was to New Zealand mutton, what a plenty of cheap grazing land was to Australian wool, what the fertile prairie acres were to Canadian wheat, cheap native labour was to South African mining and industrial enterprise. From this point of view, the real battles of the last quarter of the 19th century were not the native wars or the political instabilities of the South African scene with its two British colonies and its two Boer Republics, all selfishly squabbling for their own interests ... but the struggle between the old and the new, between cattle and cash, between the farmer and the engineer, between the ox wagon and steam, between self sufficiency and interdependence of modern industry and commerce’. (de Kiewiet, pages 107 - 108). There is no doubt of course, which side won the struggle. The irony of it is that South Africans of different colours have all too often seen one another as competitors in this economy. Competition there has been; fear of competition there is, and unfortunately will be for a long time to come; but overshadowing all this, is the major fact which few seem to see - the Black and the White stand together as collaborators, and together have made possible the present economy of South Africa with the existing stage of development.

5. THE CLOSING YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY; ONWARDS:

The closing years of the 19th century led to greater wrangling and bitterness than previously between the two Boer Republics (the Orange Free State and the Transvaal), and the two British colonies, (the Cape and Natal). The discovery of gold and diamonds made the position worse. The fact that at this stage the scramble for Africa was in full swing by European powers did not improve matters. Germany had occupied South West Africa in 1883, and the Portuguese were by this time in Mocambique. Britain, of course, had the Cape and Natal colonies. Willy-nilly, therefore, South Africa was drawn into the intrigue and web of international politics and diplomacy. Within this context, the Anglo-Boer War started in 1899, ending with the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902. We need not go into the causes or the details of this war - it was one of the many
quarrels which South Africa has seen during the past three centuries. Unfortunately, it had one major effect which must not be overlooked — namely the arousal of deep and long-lasting bitterness on the part of the Boers of the Republics of the Orange Free State and more particularly the Transvaal.

In some ways the British rule of South Africa after the Boer War led to something of importance — namely in 1909 the coming together in Durban of representatives of the two colonies and the two ex-Republics for the formation of the Union of South Africa. This may not have happened if the Boers had won the war.

So we come to the 20th Century: The 20th Century saw slowly at first, and then very rapidly after the Second World War, the growth of the South African industry. We should note what de Kiewiet has to say (page 225):

'White industrial society in the 20th Century has preserved many of the habits of mind of White frontier society in the 19th Century. Its inclination to interpret its relations with the Natives in terms of conflict was strong. The emphasis on conflict, therefore, weakened man's ability to discern the truth that in a society so thoroughly dependent on Native labour, the Natives were not merely competitors, but the most important collaborators as well'.

The fact that the Africans were very important collaborators was even more obscured during the early years of this century by a flood of poor Whites and poor Blacks off the land into the towns. What was taking place was what we now realise takes place the world over wherever economic development and urbanisation occur. The driving out of the subsistence economy drives the weaker and less successful off the land. Where do they go but into the towns? — and they go into the towns not as men and women with urban skills and training, but as a rural population who have only their labour, their strength of muscle and sinew, to sell. In this regard the poor Whites (so-called, who were Afrikaners since the rural White population was almost entirely Afrikaans-speaking), and the (poor) Blacks, were economically similar. Their cultures were different, but all they as rural migrants had to offer to an urban economy was the sale of their hands. In this the poor Blacks, as more docile and more willing to work for a very low wage, were potentially the superior competitors. The 'civilized labour policy', so-called, (or as it is often called today, the industrial colour-bar), resulted from agitation from White workers who demanded protection against the economic competition of their fellow workers who were black-skinned. The uprisings on the Reef, which culminated in the largest one of 1922, were essentially uprisings of the threatened poor
White workers concerned with this issue.

The industrial colour-bar is still with us today, but because of its restricting effect on economic development as skilled labour becomes scarcer and scarcer, it is increasingly being overlooked in fact. People of other than White origin are more and more doing jobs reserved for Whites - this is often under the guise of some other job label. Economically this colour-bar is a major brake on present development. Historically the colour-bar is the result of both legal and spontaneous limiting factors. Its roots date back to the Native policy of the Republic of the Free State and the Transvaal, and this in turn goes back to the master/slae relationship and labour pattern of the 17th and 18th Century western Cape. So it is that the roots of present-day issues often go deep, for centuries back in time.

6. **AFRIKANER NATIONALISM:**

Something must be said about the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, which has become of such major political importance in South Africa during the last two decades.

The rise of Afrikaner nationalism has its roots deep in the 19th Century and earlier. More specifically it was given coherence and direction by the Anglo-Boer War. I have already made brief reference to the bitterness, resentment, and sense of minority status aroused in the Afrikaner by the war. The expanding towns from 1870 onwards were largely English-speaking towns, because it was the English who came into the country as urban migrants with industrial and economic skills. The plight of the rural Afrikaner migrant into these towns provided further fuel for Afrikaner nationalism. These migrants had a common language; a common religion (Seventeenth Century Dutch Reformed); a common experience dating back to the 17th Century; a common 'minority status' in the face of English capital and entrepreneurial skills; and common attitudes and aspirations. The increasing number of Afrikaners in the towns found themselves as people without power in this new industrial urban economy. They did not have the skills, and they did not have the know-how, to gain access to the seats of power. In the eyes of the English urbanite their language was a degenerate form of Dutch - often referred to during earlier years as 'kitchen Dutch' or 'Kaffir High Dutch'. They did not have an international language like English. Theirs was not an international culture - but one which the town-dweller saw as 'backward'. It is
understandable thus that both the feelings of resentment and loss resulting from the Anglo-Boer War, and the sense of inferiority and frustration in this new urban environment and the feeling of being discriminated against, formed a powerful drive to achieve, and in the course of time gave coherence and solidarity to the Afrikaner's aspirations and self-awareness. In this the Broederbond has been a key force. It has been consciously shaping and directing the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the achievement of Afrikaner aspiration for economic and political power. Through its extensions such as the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereeniginge - the F.A.K. - it has helped to overcome Afrikaner inferiority feelings.

The Broederbond, particularly through the F.A.K., has attempted to make the Afrikaner conscious of his ethnic identity and more especially develop a pride in 'ons eie'. (Vatcher, page 89). The F.A.K. has been responsible for the excellent use of music, drama, festivals, and monuments - in fact the full paraphernalia of social ritual - to produce a sense of group identity, group coherence, group loyalty amongst the vast majority of Afrikaans-speaking White South Africans. The Voortrekker Monument is one of the F.A.K. jobs, and if you analyse the monument carefully you will see how it plays on certain emotions to achieve its ends. The F.A.K. programme has adopted and enlarged national heroes who were hard-core resisters to British influences. Distinguished Afrikaners who co-operated with the British - men of the calibre of Smuts, Botha, Hofmeyer and today Malherbe are being ignored as being outside the pale.

The importance for the Afrikaner of a common religion cannot be over-estimated. Vatcher has contended 'the D.R.C. is the backbone and heart of Afrikanerdom'. It is calvinistic, and more Old Testament than New Testament orientated, and believes in the divine right of the State. Vatcher further has contended that the D.R.C. has maintained a strict 17th Century puritanism similar to the early settlers of New England. Unlike New Englanders, the Afrikaners have had a long history of isolation from external forces, and their Calvinism has changed little in the later 19th Century and 20th Century. The D.R.C. is composed of three churches. The N.G.K. is the parent church from the Netherlands, and is the largest and most influential. The N.H.K. in the Transvaal broke away in 1859; and the G.K. (Dopper Church) in the O.F.S. with its headquarters in Potchefstroom, broke away in 1859. These churches have been a rallying force behind Afrikaner nationalism.

The aim of Afrikaner nationalism has been quite clearly to build
an Afrikaner people who would have South Africa as their own, and who would avenge the defeat inflicted by the Anglo-Boer War. In 1948 when the Nationalists won the election, rather to their surprise, they had to come into their own. Malan could say 'Today South Africa belongs to us once more'. (Vatcher, page 138). In 1961 with the proclamation of the Republic at Vereeniging, (where the Peace Treaty after the Boer War had been signed) the wheel of fortune had turned a full circle - the Boers had their Republic again, but they were in the middle of the 20th Century - even though some of their ideas and slogans are in spirit from the earlier centuries.

In saying all this I hope you will not think I am implying criticism. I am trying as a sociologist, to see the position without bias, and to describe processes. Value judgements, if you wish to make them, must be yours.

So it is today that Afrikaner nationalism in the shape of the Nationalist Party dominates the country. The splintering away of the H.N.P. from the National Party is nothing new. Vatcher's book published in 1965 before there was any clear indication that there would be a split, pointed out that right from last century, Afrikaner nationalism has exhibited a series of movements where every now and again, as the main wing becomes more and more moderate, the extreme right-wing splinters off.

Moderates in any age do not attract the enthusiastic support which the extremes of right or left do, and time and again in Afrikaner nationalism as the moderates get more moderate, the extreme faction gains power and eventually takes over. So it is that the present National Party in power represents a right-wing splinter group of the 1930's, which eventually gained power over the moderates, who now are left in remnant-form in the United Party. The formation of the Herstigte Nasionale Party is a repetition of this process.

7. OTHER NATIONALISMS - ENGLISH, COLOURED, INDIAN, AFRICAN?

There has been a triumphant wave of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa. So far there has been no similar wave of English-speaking nationalism, nor do I believe we will see any. The English South Africans did not need it. They saw themselves as part of a world-wide culture;
13.

they were in positions of authority and command very much like the English-speaking in French Canada, because they came in with technical know-how and urban skills; they spoke an international language, and displayed several brands of Western Christianity. They did not feel threatened or inferior, and therefore nationalism was not required. Thus, unlike the Afrikaner who has been to a considerable extent organised and ritualised into almost a chosen people, the English have by contrast remained far less enthusiastic about themselves, and heterogeneous in terms of their interests and practices.

South Africa has witnessed significant signs of the rise of non-White nationalism amongst groups who are in a similar position sociologically to that in which the Afrikaner was for many years. Africans, Indians and Coloureds have, as rural uneducated migrants into an urban economy, lacked economic power, and felt inferior and discriminated against. The Coloureds have until recently seen their future as being with the Whites. But now that the Whites are trying to draw sharp lines between themselves and the Coloureds, the Coloured group is turning in on itself and may too also develop its own nationalism. The Indians and Africans have shown clear signs of emerging nationalism. For example, amongst the Africans this nationalism showed through the Pan African Congress, and the Pogo movements. Similarly we find some elements of the South African Indian Congress and the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses showed nationalistic sentiments. These groups were seen as very definite threats by the Whites, more particularly by the Afrikaners in power, and therefore they and/or their leaders have been banned. In some instances leaders of such organisations were imprisoned or fled the country. The wave of nationalism amongst these people has been for the moment at any rate curbed by Afrikaner nationalism.

For the time being then, African and Indian nationalism is largely voiceless and leaderless, but nationalism is rampant in Africa today. Afrikaner nationalism, with its philosophy of 'Separate Development' may ultimately aid in the development of other South African nationalisms because after all it was by clinging to their own separate characteristics that Afrikaner nationalism forged ahead. By forcing the African, and the Indian and the Coloured, to each cling to his own way of life, the Whites may today be unwittingly fostering the ultimate strong growth of 'Black' and 'Brown' nationalisms.
6. PRESENT PATTERNS AND PROCESSES:

While I have been asked to talk on the historical background, the picture would be incomplete without a brief sketch of the major outlines of the contemporary scene as I, as a sociologist, see it.

Industrialisation and urbanisation have been taking place very rapidly in South Africa, particularly during the last quarter century. (See Figure I, showing the rate of urban development in South Africa, and Tables I and II). As I have indicated, these intertwined processes of industrialisation and rapid urbanisation have drawn both White and non-White off the land for basically similar economic and sociological reasons. These processes have produced, and continue to produce, profound social changes in the South African society. In 1904 when the first census in all the four provinces was taken - nearly three decades after the discovery of diamonds and two decades after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand - about one-quarter of the total population lived in urban areas. This accounted for just over half of the Whites, almost half of the Coloureds, just over one-third of the Asians, and only one-tenth of the Africans. By 1960 the percentage of the population living in urban areas had doubled to 47%. Four-fifths of the Whites and Asians, two-thirds of the Coloureds, and one-third of the Africans were in towns. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that the pronounced development of urbanisation of the Republic within the lifetime of the older members of the population, is one of the most important changes taking place in South African society. The rate of urbanisation, has been surprisingly steady, with a slight tendency to accelerate. In absolute numbers, the Africans with 4.4 millions in 1960, (and probably far more in 1970), living in urban areas are the largest urban population. The urban African population has grown faster than that of any other race.

As in other parts of the developing world, South Africa is seeing increasing concentrations of population in large cities. The growth of these cities has been very rapid. For example, after the Anglo-Boer War, at the first country-wide census in 1904, Johannesburg, only 20 years after its foundation, had 156,000 people. Today Greater Johannesburg has well over one million people and by the turn of the century may have two-and-a-half million. Pretoria, the capital of the old Boer Republic in the Transvaal, in 1904 had only 39,000 people of all races. In 1960 it had 420,000, but it has been growing so rapidly that by the year 2000 it could also have two-and-a-half million people. The Pretoria-Witwatersrand conurbation had only a little under half a million people in 1904. In 1960 it had over two million, and by the turn of the century it is likely to have over five million. Durban had 70,000 people at the beginning of
the century. Today, I estimate that Greater Durban has over a million inhabitants, and will have over two-and-a-half million in thirty years' time. In 1960 there were in South Africa ten cities each with a population of 100,000 or more, and these accounted for about a quarter of the total population of South Africa. I estimate that these same ten cities could contain a third of the South African population by the turn of the century.

Changes in occupation have been taking place as a result of all these processes. The appended Tables III and IV show an overall shift in the occupational structure of South Africa. The shift is the direction expected as a result of economic development. There is an increased movement out of manual labour into service and professional occupations - in other words - white collar jobs. There is an increase in the contribution of non-White workers to the economy at levels above the unskilled or semi-skilled levels. This is despite job reservation. Houghton contends that the economy of South Africa had by the 1930's reached the take-off stage for self-sustained growth. He considers that the next stage in economic development - 'the drive to maturity' - commenced in 1945 after the World War II. If Rostow's theory of economic development holds for this country, then the last decade of the 20th century should see us reach 'the age of high consumption'. Britain and America are already at this stage.

Table IV shows that the executives of the economy are mainly the Whites. The Asiatics and then the Coloureds occupy intermediate positions between the White population concentrated more in the white collar occupations, and the Africans on the other hand concentrated in the low-grade jobs. What is important to notice is that despite the slow changes, the trend has been steadily in the direction of shifting from the lower job levels into high level occupations. It has been suggested that the South African occupational structure is about three-quarters of a century behind the present American position, and that it will eventually catch up with the present-day American pattern. Rising standards of education and literacy have taken place as a result of these trends, although there are still important racial disparities. In 1955 to 1958, 28% of the White school-going population were in high school, and only 9% of the Coloureds and Asiatics, and 7% of the Africans, were at this level.

What do these trends mean? Those processes of urbanisation, industrialisation, and the slow but increasing education of the previously pre-literate non-White population, result in the process of modernisation and westernisation. Present-day South African society is seeing rapid and irreversible trends towards the westernisation of all peoples within
her borders. Originally the Whites were the only western group in South Africa. It was not long before the Coloured population grew into a sub-culture of western culture. However, even at the turn of this century virtually all the Indians and Africans in South Africa were non-western in orientation. Their cultural background was either Asiatic or Tribal. Today the rate of westernisation of Indians and Africans is moving apace. The fact that they are involved intimately in an urban industrial economy cannot mean otherwise. Evidence from various surveys throughout the country suggests that all or nearly all of the youngest generation of Indians in South Africa have goals which are unmistakably a local variation of western cultures. There is an overlay of Asiatic influences, but as one writer has pointed out (van den Berghe in his book 'Caneville') this relates more to cultural inessentials than essentials. As far as Africans are concerned, we appear to be dealing with a continuum ranging from the most rural type of person who is still tribally oriented, and sometimes encapsulated within the urban setting, through all intermediate stages to the urbanite who has grown up in the city and whose reference group is the Whites, and who aspires consciously and deliberately to the full acquisition of the western culture. In between there also appear some Africans in a kind of cultural 'no-man's land', who have no clear reference group at all.

I believe that one can scarcely over-emphasise this process of urbanisation and concomitant westernisation of South African peoples, nor do I believe that the full importance of all of South Africa's peoples being involved in a common economy is adequately realised at the present time. We have the Bantu homelands which pose a problem of the undeveloped subsistence economy in our midst. Political considerations apart, these areas have to be developed and the problem is intricate and involved - I could say a lot about that during question time if you are interested. But I believe that in the long run a western urban economy will oust the subsistence economy, and that the present trend will continue whereby all South Africans are increasingly being integrated into what will ultimately be a single and not a dual economy.

What does this mean for the future? I am going to make a few comments, and leave the speculation to you. South Africa has a long history of discrimination on economic and social lines which coincides with colour. I have suggested that in terms of White attitudes this goes back both to the discrimination pattern associated with the master/slave relationship, and also to what has been called by MacCrone, the frontier psychology of the Trekboer. This is the psychology of a small White group moving into an interior which they see themselves as pioneering, who are in competition, and thus conflict, for land with a numerically very much
larger Black population. Under such circumstances, fearing extinction, the Whites developed a basic fear of the non-White which could only be allayed by the Whites dominating the situation. Thus we have both the imprint of the master/slave relationship which sees non-Whites as being appropriate to a subordinate position, and also the frontier psychology with its fear of the 'swart gevaar'. At the same time today we are seeing reverse trends in operation - the increasing demand for the realisation that all peoples of South Africa have a right to status and dignity which is not associated with subordinate-superordinate structures, and that each people have their own values and their own intrinsic value. At present, these trends seem less powerful than the former ones, but at the heart of the position we still have a structure of economic and social discrimination. It has been suggested by some social scientists that this discrimination has been more recently rationalised by the doctrine of apartheid and separate development. If so, this would be ideologically rationalising a process going right back to the very early days of White settlement in the country. Are patterns with as deep roots as this easily changed?

To sum up the present position and conclude: urbanisation with the typical pattern whereby urban values and urban systems increasingly spread through the country as a whole, and the economic integration of all of South Africa increasingly into a common economy - are facts of tremendous importance. Certainly we cannot turn the clock back. We are where we are as a result of various forces, and I believe the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation are key ones which will more and more in the future stamp South Africans in a common mould of urban industrial man. What do you think this will mean for South Africa and its complex problems?... And there, I leave it to you - it is up to you, during your tour of South Africa, to form your own impressions and ultimately to draw your own conclusions.
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