IMPACT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ON CATTLE MARKETING IN SULUMALAND, TANGANYIKA

By

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Few authors have been able to write on colonial Tanzania without making constant references to the impact of the Second World War on rural societies. But conspicuously absent is work comparable to Spencer's 'Settler Dominance, Agricultural Production and the Second World War in Kenya'. Spencer's article makes interesting reading not only because it contrasts settlers' prosperity with peasant impoverishment and reveals increased State intervention during the war but also because it highlights the effectiveness of mobilization for the war efforts. Unlike many authors who understanding only in terms of provisions of labour, food crops and some non-food crops, Spencer also highlights the contribution of cattle owners to the war efforts. This paper has as its object to initiate a discussion on the contribution of Tanganyika cattle owners to the war efforts. And Sukumaland, which is the focal area for this paper, is a natural choice for starting such a discussion. Animal and crop husbandry have been important economic activities in Sukumaland for at least the last century. By the time war broke out in 1939, Sukumaland was the leading livestock-rearing region of Tanganyika. The Sukuma, who by this time numbered about 569,000, were keeping about 1,808,200 sheep and 900,000 goats. The cattle population in this region constituted more than one-quarter of the territorial herd. Before discussing the impact of the war we included a brief discussion of the cattle trade in Sukumaland during the inter-war period. Such a discussion is necessary as it helps to detect the changes that accompanied the war.

**CATTLE TRADE DURING THE INTER WAR PERIOD**

The British economic policy during the inter-war period was to resuscitate the Tanganyika economy which had been dislocated by the First World War largely through military conscription. The dominant approach was to spur cash crop production through 'grow more crops' campaigns which mainly took the form of distributing cotton seeds and coffee trees to burgeoning rural entrepreneurs. Cattle trade never seriously pre-occupied the minds of most colonial officials as was the case with crop production mainly because beef consumption was local. Large herds of cattle abounded in Britain, but tropical crops like coffee and cotton could not be grown under British temperate conditions. Hence the British processing factories had to import these raw materials.
Nevertheless, the Tanganyika government involved itself in cattle trade in Tanganyike to a considerable extent although it considered the responsibility of private enterprise. The government's role in the trade Sukumaland was restricted to organizing permanent official auction markets where cattle owners and traders could meet. The auctions, which were organized and controlled by the Department of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, were introduced in the early 1920s. At the auction, a market master was in charge of the bids, which were often done at a rapid pace. A common pattern of bidding was absent as bids could be made by esoteric signals such as winks, frowning and even sticking out the tongue. The bids therefore required sellers' alertness. But cattle owners were not under obligation to part with their beasts at the price offered at the end of the bid.

Those who were unhappy with the prices could withdraw their animals from the auction and possibly offer them again some other day. By the 1930s auctions were widespread in Sukumaland although the concentration tended to be in principal cattle-rearing districts of Shinyanga, Maswa, and Kwimba. Towards the close of the 1920s and early 1930s auctions were acting as channels through which cattle could be removed from parts of Sukumaland where deterioration of the environment was becoming apparent because of overgrazing.

The success of the auctions depended upon cattle owners' compromise, availability of private enterprise to purchase cattle, and availability of dependable and lucrative re-sale markets. As regards cattle owners' willingness to sell cattle, evidence abounds to suggest that owners were generally eager to part with some of their cattle throughout the inter-war periods. Reporting on the response of cattle owners to the auctions in Sukumaland in 1926, F. J. McCall, Director of Veterinary Sciences and Animal Husbandry noted:

Cattle market as an institution has undoubtedly come to stay, and to-day can be regarded as an economic and social function of importance in village life. The manner in which natives assemble from far and wide when a cattle auction sale is about to be held is to put it mildly, astonishing.
In addition to those interested in the sale of cattle, sheep and goats hither come all who have a basket of grain, a gourd of honey, a pot of ghee, a chicken, a few eggs or even an item of gossip to retail.(5)

This was the observation of a man whose department was responsible for the auctions. In 1929, T. G. Buckley, Acting Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, also noted the turn-out at the auctions. In that year's annual report, he remarked:

During the last three months of the year, cattle auctions were organised in Maswa and Kwimba chiefly to test the people's response to our constant propaganda to call their herds and sell surplus and unproductive animals. Their response was far better than was expected.

As regards markets to absorb the cattle offered at the auctions, some traders who were either butchers themselves or agents of butchers could purchase slaughter cattle at auctions for retail business either within or outside Sukumaland. However, these traders were not restricted to auctions, but could also buy cattle directly from cattle owners. Within Sukumaland, several centres of employment developed. These included the scattered small mines especially the Mabuki Diamond Mine in Shinyanga District and Geita Gold Mine in Geita District, Asian-owned ginneries, emerging towns like Mwanza and Shinyanga, and administrative centres scattered in rural areas. These created demand for meat, and traders laboured to meet the demand. Outside Sukumaland, market for slaughter cattle existed in the sisal plantations in Tanga Province and in Bukoba both among the town-dwellers and the Hays coffee growers whose earning from coffee were significant.(7)

Apart from traders, the Meat Rations Company (hereafter MERACO) was another important buyer of Sukuma cattle. MERACO became operational in June 1988 following the establishment of a meat-processing plant in Mwanza town by several Kenya-based investors. The Company specialized in producing edibles like canned beef, salted dry meat and cooking fat, and inedibles like blood meal and bone meal for the fertilizer market.
The plant was capable of handling fifty head of cattle per day but rarely operated to capacity. (8)

Private enterprise was certainly not dependable in augmenting cattle trade in Sukumaland. The traders and MERACO experienced numerous problems which were reflected in dwindling sales of cattle at the auctions. Again, Buckley gives us an insight in his rueful annual report of 1930:

During the year 5,489 herd of cattle were sold on the auctions sales (in Kwimba District). Many more were produced for sale but buyers' resources were too limited to absorb them. (9)

The auction sales from Shinyanga, another important cattle-keeping district, were ebbing in the 1930s. The sales fell from 18,870 head in 1934 to 10,824 in 1935; to 7,921 in 1936; to 5111 in 1937 and only rising to 8,563 head in 1938. (10)

The declining cattle sales in Sukumaland needs explanation. One explanation is that under-capitalization of private enterprise impeded increased cattle purchases. Traders were mostly men with limited capital, a characteristic which was reflected in their buying but few cattle at a time. Many of them became traders only to raise cash income required to meet a specific objective. (11) MERACO was also undercapitalized as evidenced by its inability to increase cattle purchases even when prices were generally considered low. As W. F. Page, Acting District Officer, Kwimba, observed at Runere auctions conducted on 19 February 1930 and attended by eighteen traders and a MERACO buyer:

229 (head of cattle) sold, 20 bids refused 220 cattle not offered. Meat Rations buyer bought 110 and exhausted his funds. He wired for further remittances, but no reply was received... prices generally lower than at Bungulwa (another auction market) and when Meat Rations buyer dropped out prices fell considerably more. (12)

By the end of 1930, undercapitalization had become so serious a problem that MERACO had to temporarily cease operating until the $16,000 loan from the colonial Development Fund in 1931 revived it. (13) But this revival was short-lived as financial problems re-appeared because of the Great Depression which caused markets for MERACO's products to collapse. And MERACO itself finally collapsed in 1935.

The demise of MERACO should also be understood within the framework of British policy of non-industrialization of the colonies during this period.
There was the fear that if East African governments encouraged the establishment of processing industries, some goods manufactured in Britain would lose market. The East African governments only supported those industries they thought were necessary, and MERAGO was not one of such industries but merely an 'experimental plant in relation to the problems of overstocking and utilization of cattle products'.

The depression equally affected the business of traders. Meat consumption in some parts of Tanganyika dropped. One such area was the sisal plantation in Tanga province where some Sukuma cattle had a market. The world for sisal collapsed during the depression, and so did the wages of labour at the plantations. The consequence was that many butchers encountered difficulties in selling their meat. In the vicinity of Tanga town, for instance, 'one often finds three or four butchers all selling at the same time. These buyers are insufficient for each man to dispose of an entire carcase at his stall'. In Pangani region, butchers could 'only get rid of their meat by taking it in turns to slaughter, each of them slaughtered one beast per month and was given two days free of competition in which to sell meat'.

The other explanation for the low cattle sales in Sukumaland was the frequent outbreak of stock diseases and the manner in which the Department of Veterinary Sciences reacted to these outbreaks. Rinderpest, bovine pleuro-pneumonia and east coast fever outbreaks were frequent in many parts of Sukumaland. The dominant approach to these outbreaks was to quarantine and restrict movement of livestock in affected areas. The officers of the Department of Veterinary Sciences administered serum to reduce mortality in infested beasts. In some parts the Veterinary Quarantine Squads which formed the African intelligence system were effective as agents for the detection of stock disease, breaches of quarantine regulations and illicit movements of livestock. Those caught breaking the quarantine exercise were often punished in courts of law. The impact the quarantine exercises had on cattle trade in Sukumaland was significant. In some parts, the cattle trade either virtually came to a halt or fell to the lowest ebb since those animals declared fit for trade by a veterinary officer could be sold. In many areas, the quarantine exercise made the propaganda to spur increased cattle sales an absurdity as traders were not allowed to enter the quarantine areas for business. As one official noted in 1929:
Stronge propaganda has been and is being made to influence cattle owners to sell. As things stand response can be expected only from Eastern Mwanza District. Maswa is locked and burred by Veterinary restrictions.

The quarantine exercise enforced in certain areas outside Sukumaland also tended to adversely affect cattle trade within Sukumaland. Among such areas those, through which Sukuma cattle were driven to external markets. The frequent declaration of certain parts of Northern Province as disease areas, for example, meant closing down the more direct route to Tanga Province, thus making it difficult for Sukuma cattle to reach that Province's market.

As H. E. Hornby, Director of Veterinary Services and Animal Sciences reported in 1930:

"Although all the markets in the territory are freely open to these animals (Sukumaland cattle) as any others, yet actually it is impracticable for Mwanza cattle to entre Korongwe (in Tanga province) as they would have to pass round much of Masailand to get there. This is due to the presence of pleuro-pneumonia quarantine areas in Northern Province lying across a direct stock-route."

The quarantine exercise were at times applied on the basis of rumours of outbreak of disease in some areas. An interesting case was that which was reported in Mwanza in December, 1929 in connection with livestock supposed to be exported to Bukoba. A rumour circulated that Bukoba was quarantined. The Uganda Marine Superintendent, without ascertaining the truth, cancelled the shipment of stock to Bukoba, only to learn that the rumour was unfounded. But meanwhile the auctions in Mwanza District were wreaked as the Bukoba market was believed to be closed.

The cattle trade was therefore at times full of caprice. The trade generally remained oddly low, but the potential to make it a viable economic activity was high. It was equally clear that several factors, most of them beyond the influence of cattle owners militated against rigorous development of the trade. It also became apparent that for the development of the trade to occur, there was need to create a bigger and more dependable market.
THE SECOND-WORLD WAR AND THE CATTLE TRADE:

The Second World War suddenly stimulated cattle sales in Tanganyika as it did in many other parts of East Africa. During 1940, cattle sales at auctions in Sukumaland rose to 45,681 head, this being nearly double the number sold during the previous year. (21) The busiest markets during that year were Shinyanga markets which sold 24,000 head, followed by Maswa markets which sold over 13,000 of the total. (22) Subsequently years witnessed even a higher off-take from Sukumaland. In 1943, for example, an all-time record of 140,660 head exported from the Lake Province of which 44,160 came from Shinyanga District, 36,158 from Maswa District and 21,069 from Kwimba. (23) During the following year, Sukumaland supplied about 71,000 head, (24) and in 1945, the supply was 82,322 head. (25) After all these sales, Sukumaland was by the end of the war reported to be grazing an estimated 1,728,400 cattle units. (26)

We can at this stage attempt to explore the reasons for this spectacular increase in cattle sales through auctions in Sukumaland. It is undoubtedly true that the outbreak of the war stimulated the British government to mobilize its colonial subjects in East Africa to contribute to the war effort. In Tanganyika, Bowles sees the war as having not only provided a justification for harsher measures to bring an increase in production but also 'demanded a reassessment of the state's priorities and an attempt to plan production in accordance with these priorities'. This is a valid assertion. And among the war-time priorities emphasized in Tanganyika was the production of food crops like rice, groundnuts, maize, and provision of slaughter stock. The Lake Province for instance, became the supplier of increasing quantities of groundnuts and rice. The chief areas of production of rice were Ukerewe and Ukara Islands, Mwanza and central Kwimba Districts. (28) Slaughter stock (mainly cattle) were bought from Northern, Central Provinces, the major livestock-keeping areas in the territory. The production of certain cash crops essential in execution of the war was equally emphasized. Among such cash crops were rubber, pyrethrum, sisal, coffee and cotton. Tanganyika had ceased to be a producer of rubber with the demise of German rule, but production was revived during the war by the government-controlled
Jardin, Matheson & Co. Ltd. Cotton production was maintained 26,000 and 32,000 bales during the war(29).

The Sukuma, therefore, did not only supply cotton and rice but also slaughter cattle. Meat constituted part of the diet of the conscripts stationed in Kenya, Malagasy and the Middle East. Tanganyika alone enlisted about 86,740 askari (African soldiers) during the war.(30) Meat was also supplied to refugees, prisoners-of-war in camps and labourers employed in essential war industries such as sisal and rubber in Tanganyika. In order to rehabilitate the rubber plantation, the government trained a labour force of between 11,000 and 20,000 men hitherto unaccustomed to this form of work.(31) The master and Native Servants (Proper Feeding) Regulations of 1941 stipulated that labourers in essential war industries were to be fed and failure to comply on the part of employers warranted punishment.(32) These regulations were, however, not strictly adhered to. Some workers returning from plantations complained that they did not receive any food as 'rations were then less than half their normal level'.(33) But in many cases, however, some food rations (meat included) were given to the labourers.

The increased demand for food and essential crops during the war called for introduction of efficient and effective ways of marketing the supplies so that the suppliers could be available in specified quantities and at the right times. In this respect, the Tanganyika government re-organised the buying system. The war-time Ministry of Food was charged with the responsibility of purchasing food. As regards the purchase of slaughter stock, the Ministry of food appointed the Kenya-based Liebigs Extract of Meat Company as buyer of cattle in Tanganyika for the military forces. Liebigs moved into Kenya in 1937 from Southern Rhodesia where it had for several decades owned ranches and operated a meat processing plant.(34) In Kenya, the Company established a factory at Athi river in proximity to Kamba and Maasai reserves and the Kenya-Tanganyika border. The plant was capable of annually handling 30,000 and 45,000 head of cattle(35) and like the defunct MERACO, produced corn beef, meat extract, cooking oil, tallow and hides. Like MERACO, Liebigs was originally to absorb 'surplus' African cattle especially in the Maasai and Kamba reserves. But with the outbreak of the war, liebigs' main objective was to extend its operation in Tanganyika to satisfy the increased demand for meat during the war.

One advantage of producing tinned beef in Kenya during the war was that the product could be transported to the consuming centres (military centres) without
much danger of the means of transport being destroyed by enemy forces as was the case with ships leaving British for various war-fronts. Indeed, the fear that ships would be attacked was so rampant among British officials, that fewer ships were released to transport goods to far places like East Africa thereby creating shortage of goods that had earlier been imported by sea from Britain. (36) It is to a large extend because of this transport problem during the war that the British changed their policy of non-industrialization of the colonies pursued in the inter-war period. The new policy involved stimulating big companies (most of them based in Britain) to establish factories in the colonies to ensure a steady supply of goods. In 1940, for instance, Bata Shoe Company which had been exporting shoes to East Africa since 1938, established a tannery and shoe factory in Limuru, Kenya. (37)

The penetration of Liebigs in Tanganyika was thus part of the British strategy to realise increased industrialization of East Africa as demanded by the war. Liebigs enjoyed maximum government support in Tanganyika. Through the Defence Regulations, it became a semi-monopoly in purchasing slaughter cattle. The government introduced various ‘control measures’ which included fixing of quotas of cattle to be brought forward for auction in each of the main cattle-raising districts, and the fixing of maximum price at the auction. (38) The quotas system assured a steady supply of cattle to the company while the system of controlling prices at the auctions was designed to keep prices low to avoid losses on the part of liebigs.

The low prices at primary markets often differed slightly from market to market and from district to district. The prices in 1940, for example, were Shs. 27/94 per head in Shinyanga District, Shs. 23/66 in Maswa District and Shs. 24/08 in Kwimba District. (39) This difference was partly due to the fact that there was no laid down price per head at the markets. Sellers were at the mercy of buyers who took advantage of the war to offer very low prices. Liebigs had war-time buyers like Oscar Dahl who were known for their sharp bargaining with the Sukuma cattle owners. (40) It was partly because of such advantages that Liebigs was able to buy most of the cattle offered for sale during the war. By the end of 1943, Liebigs had increased its purchases in Tanganyika for its plant from an insignificant number in 1939 to about 100,000 head. (41) Liebigs cattle export to other provinces, especially to sisal growing Tanga province and to Zanzibar were also significant. Out of the
140,660 head bought in Sukumaland in 1943, for instance, 31,306 were exported to other provinces and about 48,984 to Zanzibar and Kenya. (42)

Liebig’s effectiveness as chief buyer of slaughter cattle cannot be fully understood without discussing the government's suspension of quarantine measures which had adversely affected cattle trade during the inter-war period. The Company was directed to buy most of the slaughter cattle brought for sale regardless of whether animals came from 'diseased' areas. With the establishment of a canning plant, even 'diseased' and low-grade animals were turned into palatable meat through processing. Besides, under war arrangements Liebig's was due for compensation by government for any cattle that died on the trek routes to the consuming centres or the processing plant. The indiscriminate strategy was partly responsible for the significant mortality rate in purchased head. In 1943, a mortality rate of 15.1 per cent was registered out of 83,478 head purchased in Tanganyika. (43) However, the mortality did not deter Liebig’s from buying cattle as this was a numerical loss rather than an economic loss to the company.

However, this mortality was not the result of disease alone. Drought also contributed significantly to mortality. Towards the end of 1943, much of Sukumaland presented a pitiful picture of a barren waste with staving cattle reduced to browsing on bushes. (44) Cattle may thus have died on trek routes because of their poor physical conditions. The drought may have also contributed to the marketing of 140,660 head in Sukumaland in 1943 (the largest number recorded during the whole war period) as many owners feared to lose most of their animals if they retained them.

The mortality would have been higher had the government not undertaken an ambitious war-time inoculation campaign against some livestock diseases in 1940. Before the war, the government sparsely rationed its efforts against diseases. As a result, the ravages of certain diseases were on the increase. During the war, rinderpest was of particular concern to the government. This disease assumed a more serious character than usual owing to the abnormally large numbers of cattle on the move along trek routes. The Department of Veterinary Sciences responded to the increased threats of this disease by recruiting more qualified personnel to combat it. Special war-time 'campaign teams' undertook intensive inoculations. (45) The 'terms' were under obligation to issue monthly progress reports. Their unremitting effort and energy to control rinderpest was evident by the
large number of cattle inoculated in the territory during the war. Between 1939 and 1943 more than 52 million head were inoculated throughout the territory, (46) a record never attained at any time before the war.

Major emphasis was also laid on improving territorial stock routes in a bid to reduce mortality rate among purchased cattle being trekked to consuming areas. The main stock route from Sukumaland eastwards through Northern Province or via Longilo to Liebig's canning plant, was provided with a number of dips and night camps with drinking water. By the end of the war, this stock route was as good as any other territorial routes, (47).

Native authorities in Tanganyika were equally utilized towards the war effort. It became clear that Native Authorities never worked independently of the central government but were its instruments that enforced its policies.

The Sukuma Native Authorities were not an exception in this respect. As Malcolm has concluded:

Another valid test of the efficiency of the native administrative machine is its capacity to convey and enforce its own enactments under the Native Authority Ordinance, and orders and instructions from Governments. This we must judge by its capacity to carry out that which is unpopular but necessary, like many measures in support of the war effort which had to be enforced in recent years, (48).

The Native Authorities, for instance, enforced the War Revenue (Cattle Tax) Ordinance of 1941 which was a device to force cattle owners to contribute to the 'cattle auction market fund', (49). This fund was set up in order to boost the revenue for the war. Every Sukuma who sold his cattle at the auctions contributed to this fund through a levy on every beast sold.

Native Authorities in Sukumaland were also reported to have 'willingly offered' their 'surplus' balances in their treasuries to the general war fund, (50). Even more interesting is the revelation in 1941 that those institutions offered to His Majesty's Government interesting-free loans amounting to $15,000 to aid the prosecution of the war, repayment to be made after the cessation of hostilities! (51). Such contributions to the general war fund were not restricted to Sukumaland. The Maasai, through their Native Authorities, are reported to have pledged in 1940 to donate annually some
cattle until the end of the war whose proceeds were to be channelled to the 
Native Authorities' treasuries and war fund. In its annual report for 1949, 
the Department of Veterinary Sciences stated:

Mentioned must be made of the contribution of cattle made 
by the Maasai tribesmen towards the war effort. These people 
agreed to supply cattle to be sold and the receipts credited to 
a central fund. One-third of the proceeds to go to war fund 
One-third to be loaned free of interest to Government and 
the remaining third to be utilized in connection with the 
development of water, medical and other badly needed supplies for 
Masailand. (52)

The conclusion that these monetary loans and offerings stemmed from genuine 
patriotism during this time of crisis is erroneous. Rather these contributions 
should be understood within the context of government war-time priorities 
and not in term of generation of 'surplus' in the treasuries of Native Authori­
ties. Several pressing problems which required immediate attention in 
chieftoms remained outstanding during the war. Livestock-rearing areas 
were always experiencing water shortages especially during the dry season, 
and livestock diseases were still a major menace. Native Authorities could 
have directed their efforts in solving such problems, but were expected to 
channel some of their revenue to the war fund for the purpose of 'defending 
the empire to which they belonged' and unity 'in the struggle for freedom'. (83). 
Most of the propaganda during the war was directed towards stimulating interest 
for the war effort.

Then fact that the war was the appropriate time for the government to increase 
cattle sales in Sukumaland is further evidence by the drop in sales at the 
auctions immediately after the war as shown in the table below.

**CATTLE SALES IN SUKUMALAND, 1945 - 1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Cattle Sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>84,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>82,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>74,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>67,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>61,225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA, MF52, Mwanza Regional Book (microfilm)
Widespread acute shortages of meat particularly in sisal plantations were again reported as the war-time privileges the plantations enjoyed were withdrawn. Plantations owners who continued to offer food rations began thinking of finding ways of improving the supply of fish as alternative to meat. (54)

Tanga Province required between 2,800 and 3,000 head of cattle per month, but between 1948 and 1950, the province was getting about 500 head per month. (55)

The production of rubber was discontinued, thus reducing the market for slaughter cattle as labourers had to return to their villages.

The volume of trade of liebigs declined as its market declined. By 1947, the company's operations were greatly affected by the post-war re-organisation it experienced. Liebigs entered into partnership with the Tanganyika government to form Tanganyika Packers Ltd., a Dar-es Salaam-based meat processing plant which became operational in 1950. Traders re-emerged as important buyers of Sukuma cattle, but these could not absorb all the cattle offered for sale. Traders purchased cattle they were sure would re-sale centres. This strategy of purchasing cattle proved disastrous to cattle trade as much of Sukumaland was experiencing a serious drought believed to be one of the worst in the history of the region. In the worst hit districts, like Shinyanga, Kwimba and Maaswa, losses varied from 30 to 40 percent between 1949 and 1950. (56)

Most of the cattle surviving lost much weight. At many auctions, many could not be bought because of their poor condition. As a livestock marketing officer in Maawa District reported in 1949:

Fifty-two markets were held during the year. Trading was seriously hampered by severe drought conditions and many cattle brought for sale had to return unsold as they were unfit for the long trek to the consuming centres and resale markets in other Provinces. (57)

By the end of 1950 a number of auctions markets in the most affected areas closed down for lack of buyers. (58)
Conclusion
The argument in this paper has been that the Second World War was a necessary clout which stimulated the Tanganyika government to adopt a more active role in promoting cattle sales in Sukumaland. The Laisses-faire attitude towards cattle trade which was a prominent feature of pre-war British administration was during the war replaced by obligatory state intervention to ensure increased sales. The introductions of Defence Regulations, imposition of cattle Tax Ordinance and establishment of the quota system were some of the measures to ensure supply of cattle to auctions. At the level of marketing, state intervention was visible in the appointment of Liebig as a major buyer of cattle in Tanganyika. As long as the war continued, market for cattle in Tanganyika was assured. This is a truism which was nullified only by the conclusion of the war when cattle sales ebbed.
1. Sukumaland comprises five districts of Mwanza, Geira, Kwimba, Masura and Shinyanga and an area of 17,000 square miles south of Lake Victoria. Until 1931, Shinyanga District belonged to Tabora Province which included Bukoba. After 1931, Sukumaland fell within Lake Province which included much of the area around Lake Victoria.


7. For Bukoba see, for example, *Annual Report of Department of Veterinary Sciences, 1929*, 61.


11. TNA 18790, H. E. Hornby, Director of Veterinary Sciences to Chief Secretary, 24 September, 1930.

12. TNA 18790, page to Provincial Commissioner, Mwanza, 21 January 1930.


18. TNA 18790, T. G. Buckley to Director of Veterinary Services, 30, August 1929.
19. TNA 18790, E. E. Hornby to Chief Secretary, 24 September 1930.
20. TNA 18790, Buckley to Chief Secretary, 30 December 1929.
24. TNA MF52, Mwanza Regional Book (microfilm). This Regional Book covers all the Sukuma Districts.
25. TNA MF52, Mwanza Regional Book.
26. This figure is arrived at by adding the 1944 totals of 'cattle units' of Kwimba, Mwanza, Shinyanga and Maswa Districts found in a table in D. W. Malcolm, Sukumaland: An African People and their Country (London: Oxford University Press, 193) 63. Malcolm defines a 'cattle unit' as one head of cattle or five sheep or goats. Small stock represented some 14 per cent of the total number of 'cattle units'.
29. Tanganyika Territory, Address by His Excellency the Governor at the opening of the Budget Meeting of the Nineteenth Session of the Legislative Council (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 7 December 1944), 3.
31. Address by His Excellency the Governor, 3.
32. TNA 25535, Meat Suppliers to Sisal Areas, 1949.
33. Iliffe, History of Tanganyika, 371.
37. Van Zwanenberg, Economic History, 126.
38. Lake Province Report, 1940, 19.
40. Tanganyika Standard, 10 June 1950.
41. Address by His Excellency the Governor, 5.
42. Lake Province Annual Report, 1943, 27.
43. Lake Province Annual Report, 1943, 15.
44. Lake Province Annual Report, 1943, 27.
45. Address by His Excellency the Governor, 5.
46. Address by His Excellency the Governor, 5.
47. Address by His Excellency the Governor, 5.
49. TNA 29279, War Revenue (cattle tax) Ordinance: Action under, 1940-1950.
52. Lake Province Annual Report, 1940, 20.
54. TNA 25535, Meat Supplies to Sisal Areas, 1947.
55. TNA 25535, Secretary, Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association, Tanga Branch to Member of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Dar es Salaam, 30 February 1948.
57. Tanganyika Territory Annual Report for Provincial Council of Veterinary Department, Lake Province, 1949 (Unpublished) 10.