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IS A PROLETARIAT EMERGING IN NAIROBI?

by

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Abstract

Are there beginning to be substantial numbers in Nairobi who are wholly and permanently dependent upon wage employment, and whose ties with their villages of origin have become severed?

This paper looks first at the statistical evidence, and then at the evidence provided by sociologists and social anthropologists who have done relevant 'field' research in different parts of Nairobi.

The statistical evidence is at first sight ambiguous. Labour turnover statistics imply that people are staying much longer than a decade ago, when short term circular migration was still the common pattern. The more favourable ratio of men to women also points in the same direction. But the sex ratio, especially in the case of the over 30's is still greatly tilted towards male preponderance, and the proportion of children - another index of stability' - is hardly higher than it was in 1962.

It is only when one looks at the work of sociologists that the statistics begin to make sense. The work of Weisner, Ferraro and Parkin corroborates the statistical evidence of much longer residence in Nairobi, but shows that this in no sense implies any lessening of ties with rural homes. The high proportion of urban pay said to be remitted to families outside Nairobi is further evidence of these ties, as is the exceptional importance attached to having the longest possible holidays in order to be able to visit home.

Those who arrive in Nairobi landless, acquire land at the earliest opportunity, and only a small minority - mostly Kikuyu born in Nairobi - are totally enmeshed in the urban network. These latter could perhaps be described as 'proletarians' were it not for the awkward fact that most of them are petty capitalists in the 'informal' sector.

The short answer, therefore, to the question posed in the title of this paper is 'no'; - but who is wanting a proletariat anyhow?
It is often said that the population of Nairobi has become much more stable in recent years, and that there has emerged a work force, wholly and permanently dependent upon wage employment and fully committed to urban life. Circular migration into and out of Nairobi is said to have virtually ceased. Only young school leavers still swarm into Nairobi and out again, if they have not found a job within a reasonable period of time. Others come and stay. Thus Professor Henry Rempel in his comprehensive survey of recent migrants to Nairobi and seven other towns concludes that "temporary migration still occurs, but it is a minority occurrence which does not involve a majority of the rural-urban migrants in Kenya" (Rempel 1970 p. 115). In the case of these newly arrived migrants, when asked if they wished to stay in the town for the rest of their lives, 59% "replied in a sense which indicates that they consider themselves as a permanent part of the urban labour force" (Rempel 1970 p.p. 84/6). From this it is inferred that Nairobi's working population is now becoming a distinct proletariat whose attitudes, ambitions and interests are purely urban and whose ties with their rural areas of origin have become increasingly tenuous.

(1) Statistical Evidence
This judgement recently received implicit re-inforcement from a sample survey of labour turnover which was specially undertaken for the I.L.O. team that visited Kenya recently. (International Labour Office, 1972). This Survey found that in 37 manufacturing establishments in Nairobi labour turnover from all causes was only 11.2% of the 'permanent' (i.e. non-casual) labour force in the preceding 12 months, and this was thought to be 'normal'. If Manufacturing is combined with Commerce, Transport and with Tourism and Hotel Services, the rate of labour turnover is still only 11.5%. A turnover rate of 11.5% implies that on average employees at any one time have held their jobs for just under 5 years, which is regarded as very satisfactory. Since turnover

(1) I wish to acknowledge the stimulus received from reading Colin Leys' article 'Politics in Kenya: the Development of Peasant Society' (Leys 1972) and from discussions with Ike Inukai and Richard Porter.
is in fact much higher amongst unskilled workers than amongst those in higher echelons, the median period for trained operatives and above is correspondingly higher. The Carpenter Report (Report on African Wages, 1954) had found that in 1953 the median period of employment in the private sector in Nairobi - and the recent survey only covered the private sector - was 1.1 years, considerably shorter than now.

Similarly, in a sample survey of the saving habits of 816 heads of households in low-income groups, the Nairobi University's Housing Research Unit found that 21% of employees had been in employment for 5-10 years and a further 18% for over 10 years.

One symptom of short-term circular migration has always been a marked imbalance in the population between men and women, and also between adults and children, because it made better economic sense to leave one's family at home, where they could continue to enjoy an income from their farm. If it is true that circular migration has largely ceased then one would expect a significant reduction in the imbalance between men and women in the population, indicating that more men had brought their wives with them instead of leaving them behind in the rural areas. One would also expect to find an increase in the ratio of children to adults, indicating that people were increasingly bringing up families in the town instead of in what they had previously regarded as their permanent homes: their villages of origin.

The recent publication of some of the findings of the 1969 Census, supplemented by some tables especially computed for the I.L.O. Mission, provides an opportunity to make comparisons with the previous Census of 1962, and thus to examine what has actually happened.

Looking first at the overall sex ratio, defined as the number of males per 100 females, it appears that this has declined from 187 in 1962 to 159 in 1969, which must seem to indicate support for the thesis of greater stability of residence but it is worth examining these figures in more detail and especially in relation to the age structure of the African population. (see Table I next page).

What Table I reveals is, first, a significant evening of the ratio of boys and girls between 10 and 19 which is irrelevant to our argument. Secondly, although there is no change in the sex ratio of 'young adults', viz. those aged between 20 and 24, there certainly has been a significant improvement in the balance of those aged 25 or more. The 20 to 24 year olds probably comprise large numbers who are not yet married and some of whom are perhaps in Nairobi looking for a job. This is par excellence the age group of the Nairobi job seekers. The increased proportion of females in the
Table 1
Percentage Age Distribution of Nairobi
by Sex.

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>187.3</td>
<td>158.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>102.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>104.3</td>
<td>99.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>140.4</td>
<td>90.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>126.6</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>169.2</td>
<td>169.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>241.4</td>
<td>203.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>391.4</td>
<td>295.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>481.4</td>
<td>359.5</td>
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<td>40-44</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>664.2</td>
<td>395.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>676.5</td>
<td>446.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1962 Census of the Population, Vol III p. 27

Note: The 1962 figures refer to the population of the Extra-Provincial District of Nairobi. Sex ratio is defined as number of Males per 100 Females. The overall sex ratio of 187.3 in 1962 is that given by the General Census, which is somewhat lower than the 203.1 given by the Sample Census.
older age group must at first sight support the hypothesis of
greater 'stabilization', but despite a significant improvement
it is important to notice that the disparity in the number of
adult men and women is still very large. It is smallest (2:1)
in the case of those age 25 to 29, but thereafter rises steeply
and at no age above 30 is the ratio lower than 3:1, which is hardly
what one would expect to find in a stable urban population! More-
over, these figures must be regarded as maxima, since the Census in
both 1962 and 1969 was taken in August, a time of year when wives
and children most frequently visit husbands in Nairobi because it
is the slack agricultural season and school children are on holiday.

Let us now look at the evidence provided by the proportion of
children in Nairobi's population. The 1962 Census gave the pro-
portion of children in the population as 32% (Vol 3 p.24) whilst
the latest Census gives it as 36%, which is no great change. For
the population of Kenya as a whole children constituted 46% in
1962 and 50% in 1969 so that the increase in the proportion of
children in Nairobi is probably no more than a reflection of an
overall trend and lends no support to the thesis of greater stabil-
ity.

The thesis of a fundamental change towards greater stability
therefore receives some but not very much support from the evidence
presented by the Census. More than likely such improvements in the
sex and child ratios as have taken place are accounted for largely
by developments in the middle class. There has been a substantial
increase in Nairobi's African middle class since Independence as
Africanization has proceeded at a rapid pace both in the Civil
Service and in private industry and commerce and in the field of
education. There can be little doubt that in these higher echelons
of the social scale, people regard Nairobi as their homes and live
normal, settled family lives even though this by no means rules

If the evidence in favour of a more stable Nairobi labour
force is a little slender, what evidence is there to the contrary.

Before examining it one must be clear what is at issue.
The pattern which prevailed two decades ago, and certainly until
the mid - 1950's when the Emergency supervened, was one of what
has come to be called 'circular migration'. Employers in Nairobi
found that unskilled and semi-skilled workers rarely stayed with
them for more than a year or two and the reason was that employ-
ment was seen not as superceding farm income but as a way of
supplementing it - often in order to have savings to invest in
their farms and thus enhance their potential for earning a
regular cash income. Consequently people left their families behind to look after their farms and returned there when they had saved out of their meagre wages what they had set out to save. In this way family income was maximized. To have moved their families to Nairobi would have meant abandoning a part of family income. They might have sold their farms and thus capitalized a future stream of income, but before land registration they had no title to land and therefore none to sell. At any rate they could have sold their farms only at prices depressed by the absence of legal title, and the absence of banks whose lending normally enhances the price of real estate above the level that would prevail if all purchases had to be made out of past savings. The conventional wisdom of the early 1950's was that the reason why people did not stay permanently in Nairobi was that wages were low and that available housing was suitable only for bachelor occupation and ruled out any possibility of bringing a family to Nairobi. But this can have been only a part of the explanation and perhaps a less important part than the fact that total family income would have been reduced by a permanent withdrawal from the countryside.

The question posed here is whether all this has changed, and to summarize the discussion so far, it is suggested that the evidence for major structural change so far adduced can hardly be described as overwhelming.

There is however evidence that things have in some ways remained curiously the same, although the much lower turnover figures may indicate a lengthening of the period people spend in Nairobi. Even that cannot be certain without much more detailed information about the nature of turnover. Labour turnover has to be seen as comprising two components: movement into and out of employment as such, and movement between employers. There is every reason to suppose that there will have been a sharp decline of the latter ever since competition for jobs increased. The harder it has become to get a job the more the people who were lucky enough to have one have clung to it until they were ready to leave employment altogether, and at any rate a part of the reduction of turnover must therefore be regarded as a reduction in movement between employers ("inter-employer mobility"). It is therefore not necessarily the case that a halving of labour turnover must represent a corresponding decline in movement into and out of employment as such.

Let us now examine the evidence for the contrary thesis, viz. that the structure of circular migration has remained largely untouched. One salient characteristic of this structure
has always been a high rate of saving. This was characteristic because it indicated the major purpose of wage employment, namely the desire to accumulate a surplus that could be invested in the farms and which would perhaps turn a subsistence farm into one capable of producing crops for sale. Has saving declined? On the contrary: in 1957/8 an official household budget survey of people earning under 300/- per month found that 7.6% of income was either saved, given away or remitted outside Nairobi, and by far the greater part fell into this last category. (Kenya: Patterns of Income, Expenditure and Consumption 1959). Out of much higher wages in 1970 20.7% were reported by G.E. Johnson and W.E. Whitelaw to have been remitted outside Nairobi — a staggeringly high rate. (Johnson & Whitelaw 1972). Joyce Moock has estimated that among the Abaluhya of Kakamega District, migrants away from home — most of them working as domestic servants in Nairobi — remitted as much as half their wages. (Moock 1972). If there was no other evidence at all, one would have to infer from these figures of remittances that the link between town and country dwellers, which the Carpenter Committee of 1954 so deplored, still continues. But the nature of links can change and there is in any case other evidence to be considered.

The link between town dwellers and members of their families in the rural areas need not necessarily be of the kind described earlier in this paper. It is possible that people now have their nuclear families with them in Nairobi and that the remittances are to other members of their extended family for whose maintenance they are responsible, and no doubt in some cases this is the correct explanation. But the continued sex imbalance in Nairobi is matched by an opposite imbalance in the rural areas, and the 1969 Census also shows that over one quarter of rural households were headed by women — though their men folk were not, of course, necessarily in Nairobi.

(II) The Evidence of Sociologists

So far we have looked mainly at statistical evidence. Let us now turn to the more direct observations of sociologists. We have seen that the only solid statistical evidence for the emergence of a stable urban work force and its divorce from what the Carpenter Report described as the "enervating influence of the countryside" is the recent study of turnover. The sociologists' evidence to some extent corroborates that people stay longer in their jobs but casts great doubt on the thesis of increasing specialization between urban and rural households.
In a fascinating study in 1969 of Kisa households in Kariobangi, Nairobi, Professor Thomas So Weisner found that households were constantly changing their membership: "Wives visit, return home, visit again; children come ... for holidays. Brothers come looking for jobs and stay". He argues that it is most misleading to take a "snapshot" census at one point of time and then to consider the results the typical residence pattern. He described his respondents as "an urban colony (who) may live for many years in a town yet always retain their ties with the rural home of origin" (Weisner 1969 p. 1010) and this description accords well with Professor Van Velsen's account of the pattern among the Plateau Tonga in Malawi (Van Velsen 1961). "Every man" says Professor Weisner "maintains ties with his home... Jobs are gained and lost, illness may send men home for periods and so on. As men ... pass through their working lives ... they are continually moving back and forth between employment and (their) shambas ..." (Weisner 1969 p. 1015). Weisner also notices, interestingly, that a sample of men of similar age and education living at home in Kakamega District were similar in virtually all respects to his Nairobi group, even to the point of having spent the same number of years away from home. He therefore concludes that the most useful way to look at the families of town dwellers in Nairobi is to view them as "one family unit, often extended in form with two or more households, one in Nairobi; and one on a rural farm" (Weisner 1969 p. 1016).

The median income of these men was 260/- and all but two (who were unemployed) appeared to have what are now described as formal (alias "modern") sector jobs.* They were therefore typical only of those in such jobs. Many people from Kakamega also work as domestic servants, living in housing provided by their employers, but we have no reason to think that their pattern of life differs markedly from that described by Weisner. What is more uncertain is what light it might throw on the patterns of those in the 'informal' sector of whom there must be large numbers. We know that between 1962 and 1969 the population of adult males of Nairobi increased by some 80,000(1). From the Annual Enumerations of Employees which record numbers employed in the formal sector it appears that such employment did not increase at all. Clearly the major part of the increase of adult men has been accommodated.

* for a definition of the distinction between formal and informal ways of earning a living see International Labour Office (Kenya Report) 1972 pp. 5 - 6.

(1) See Appendix.
in the informal rather than the formal sector - unless we wish to make the wholly improbable assumption that all 80,000 constitute an addition to whatever number of unemployed there were in 1962. The numbers in the informal sector is therefore almost certainly well in excess of the 30,000 or so estimated by the recent I.L.O. Report. (International Labour Office 1972 p.343). But there is no obvious way of determining their length of stay in Nairobi or the character of any links they may have with places outside Nairobi.

In another sociological study, this time of a predominantly Kikuyu area of Nairobi, viz, Riruta, Dr. Gary Feraro found that "the urban and rural sectors are not isolated or discreet populations, but rather are closely interrelated." (Feraro 1971 p. 190). The explanation he advances is, first, that some Kikuyu are "target workers" who stay only long enough to earn money "for specific desired items or for a sum of cash to invest in their rural farms before returning home again". Secondly, for the majority of unskilled labourers as well as the numerous holders of school certificates there is little job security in the face of sickness, accidents, old age or unemployment. "Should a man be suddenly unemployed he always has recourse to his rural shamba or that of his kinsmen". Thirdly he reiterates the point made in the Report of the East African Royal Commission that the retention of ties with the rural hinterland is "the most economic choice" which people can make, and goes on to explain that "only the small Kikuyu elite can afford the luxury of living with their families in Nairobi." Finally he points out that despite the creation of freehold plots in Central Province by the programme of Land Consolidation, much land is still controlled by lineages or sections of lineages, and inheritance of land to a large measure still takes place within the elementary polygynous family. "If a migrant opts to sever all connections with his rural homeland," he continues, "he is in effect relinquishing his rights to the inheritance of his father's land, which in the case of migrants remains his one and only retreat from the insecurities of urban unemployment." (Feraro 1971, p.190).

Failure of land consolidation and continuance of farms that are not large enough to support all the inhabitants, leaves men with little choice but to seek supplemental cash in the form of urban wages. On the other hand urban wages are too low and accommodation too costly to permit the urban migrant to take his family with him to Nairobi, especially as by so doing he would, of course, forego the rural component of his total family income. He interviewed two groups, one (the 'Old Timers') who had been in Nairobi for
5 or more years, and the other whom he describes as 'Newcomers'. Amongst the Old Timers some of whom had lived in Nairobi all their lives he did indeed find that ties with the rural areas had become largely severed. But the majority were self-employed, many of them landlords and owners of small workshops, rather than the more numerous employees or family workers, whether in the formal or the informal sector. Therefore they cannot very well be described as a proletariat. But of the 44 Newcomers he interviewed, only one regarded Nairobi as his home. The other 43 said that their home was either the rural area where they were raised and in which they have some claim to land, or some other rural area where they had acquired land. "All but two wanted to be buried on their fathers' or their own purchased plots." The institution of the National Social Security Fund has clearly not so far had any significant impact on this pattern of existence.

We have looked at a study of Abaluhya residents and at another of Kikuyu. A third study by Dr. David Parkin undertaken in 1968/9 in a City Council housing estate at Kaloleni concentrates on the Luo households. Those who lived there were not typical of Luo in Nairobi as a whole but rather constitute a sort of 'aristocracy of labour' - all "long-settled townsmen in secure and relatively prestigious jobs". (Parkin 1972 p.2.)

Their median residence in Nairobi was 17.6 years and their median income Shs 539/-. Nearly all were married and many had several wives who alternated between Nyanza Province and Nairobi, so that their husband was seldom on his own. These are the real townsmen we have been looking for but, contrary to the expectations of most of those who write about urbanization, they have by no means severed their links with the countryside, and therefore can hardly be described as proletarians. Instead they have been busy investing in their rural homes, buying more land, building houses sometimes of mud and wattle but increasingly of plaster with corrugated iron roofs and venturing into shopkeeping or running a transport service. Dr. Marc Ross had noted the previous year, in relation to another part of Nairobi, that the amount of investment into ventures outside Nairobi was greater the higher the person's socio-economic status and the more securely based he was in Nairobi. (Ross 1968 pp. 73 - 4). The phenomenon is complained of with monotonous regularity in the daily newspapers so that there is no reason to doubt that it exists.

Once this pattern is acknowledged it also becomes clear why leave entitlement plays such an important role in wage negotiations.
It has often been noticed that unions negotiate for an amount of annual leave which would have seemed preposterous in Europe at a time when wages were broadly comparable to wages in Kenya, and this has sometimes been interpreted as indicating an excessive leisure preference. Typically, manual workers have 3 weeks paid leave a year and this is the amount that the Industrial Court regards as its norm. Bank clerks get four weeks, and in addition there are 10 statutory days off a year. But leave is not sought simply as a break from "the routine of daily employment" but, as the Ndegwa Commission noticed, it is something which people do their best to enjoy "having regard to their other commitments"! (Ndegwa Commission p. 254). People need a relatively long leave, because it is essential to the maintainance of the links with rural homes. All of us have experienced the look of disdain which comes over the faces of those whom we wish a restful holiday as they depart on their annual leave. The holiday is more likely to be devoted to the back-breaking task of clearing land than to a rest!

Parkin did find some men who had spent up to 40 years in employment in Nairobi, but they were few and far between. The Labour Turnover study undertaken for the visiting I.L.O. team found that only 12% of employees in the enumerated concerns were over the age of 45 though this is for the country as a whole. But since it accords closely with the 11% which the 1969 Census found to be the proportion of the Nairobi male labour force aged 45 or more, it is probably approximately right (1). 43% of the Nairobi labour force were 20 - 29 years old including no doubt many who were only temporarily in Nairobi at the time when the Census was taken. This is, of course, in part no more than a problem of transition in that if the decline in turnover has only occurred in the last ten years, and most men enter the wage labour force in their twenties, few will have yet reached the age of 45. But it is worth pointing out that the Labour Turnover study also found that in Kenya as a whole 75.4% of those who left their jobs in the previous 12 months were 25 - 44 years old. The deletion of agriculture from that figure reduces it to just under 60%, but it is still high.

(1) The male labour force is here taken to comprise all males aged 15 - 59 and therefore includes some pupils and students who ought properly to have been excluded.
(III) When do people leave?

If people do not stay in Nairobi until what one might call the 'normal retiring age' one must pose the question whether it is possible to identify the time in their life when they are on average most likely to leave. One possibility is that at some point the productivity of their farm rises to a level where the addition of one family worker will lead to an increase in the value of output which exceeds the wage he would forego by abandoning his urban job. One would then assume that it is at that point that they leave town and return home or go to live on their farm. But this is singularly unconvincing: given the traditional division of labour in agriculture, a man's marginal product is likely to be the increased output attributable to his presence during some critical month or two when clearing or planting have to be done. Even assuming that this critical period extends to two months in the year, it must seem improbable that the resulting increase in farm output will exceed a full year's urban pay. Under all other circumstances it must pay him better, if it pays at all, to hire labour for this peak period since the cost of two months hired labour is unlikely to exceed a year's urban pay. Even so, he will, of course, hire labour only if the value of the increase in output exceeds the wage that has to be paid.

If the 'equalization of rural and urban income hypothesis' has therefore to be abandoned, one is driven back to the old explanation of why people do not stay indefinitely in town viz. that there comes a point when people decide that they have invested enough of urban surplus income in their farms and that it is now time to ditch the town and enjoy the fruits of that investment by living on the farm. The trouble with this explanation is that it does not provide a 'determinate' solution. In other words, there is no knowing just when people have had enough!

(IV) Can the conflicting evidence be reconciled?

We have seen that there is some apparent divergence between the findings of Prof. Rempel and of the Labour Turnover study on the one hand, and the Census as well as some of the findings of sociologists on the other. There are a number of possible explanations for this apparent divergence. First, Professor Rempel of course only reported the intentions declared by recent migrants to his interviewers. One knows from experience that what people intend - or say they intend - is rarely what they do, and in this
particular respect it would therefore be mistaken to give too much weight to Dr. Rempel's otherwise very revealing findings.

Secondly a median number of 10 years in a job is not of course a lifetime especially when one remembers that most people are lucky to be successful once in finding a job.

Thirdly all the information we have used relates to 'formal' employment. The informal sector may be much less stable, though Dr. Feraro found that among Kikuyu who had been in Riruta (Nairobi) five or more years, self employment was more common than amongst newcomers and further, that many of these 'Old Timers' were born in Nairobi or had spent most of their lives there. It would therefore be risky to suppose that the urban residence of those in the informal sector was on average, shorter than that of employees in enumerated concerns.

One possibility remains: the Turnover Study was confined to private sector employment. Is it possible that turnover is greater in the public sector? It is usually said that in the civil service and in parastatal bodies turnover is minimal but the public sector also includes numbers of unskilled workers especially in the Ministry of Works and in Nairobi City Council. We know from the Turnover Study that turnover is much higher in unskilled work than in employment as a whole and the public sector may have more than its 'fair' share of unskilled workers; but to lay much stress on that as an explanation is to run the danger of treading on thin ice.

(V) Conclusion

One is left, therefore, with considerable uncertainty. If one were forced to reach a conclusion it would probably be that nothing that could conceivably be described as a permanent proletariat is emerging in Nairobi - if by proletariat one means people who no longer have a farm income and who are totally dependent upon a wage income for their livelihood. It may be, as Dr. Rempel found, that only one third of his newly arrived migrants had land and that they had less actual or potential claim to land than the average Kenyan (Rempel p. 37/9 and 41). But the Urban Household Budget Survey of 1968/9 which covered a random sample of all 'lower and middle income earners', and not just recent arrivals, found that in Nairobi the Proportion who had at least one acre of land was 62%, and in addition many others will have had expectations of inheriting or acquiring land, and this is in line with the findings of the Nairobi Urban Study (Johnson 1971 P. 6). On the other hand, the very temporary migration lasting
typically no more than 2 or 3 years is also probably no longer the dominant pattern which it was in the 1950's. For the great majority the village is still home but this does not preclude them from spending a considerable period of their life in Nairobi, returning home during that time as often as they can. Like the Tonga of Malawi described by Van Velsen, the majority in Nairobi maintain social and economic links with their villages. In that sense they remain migrants. But the rural society to which they intend eventually to return will not be there for them to fall back upon unless they take active steps during the whole of their working lives to contribute to its continuance (Van Velsen 1961). So, a fully committed urban labour force has not come into existence. But if it proved possible, despite much wringing of hands by employers, to get goods produced and services manned within a framework of short-term migration in the 1950's, the problem now must be infinitely smaller. And who is wanting a proletariat anyhow?
Appendix

The 1962 Census gives the Nairobi Extra Provincial District African population as 196,900, the sex ratio as 187.3 and the proportion of males aged 16 or over as 74.5%. It follows that there were 95,680 males of 16 or over. An unpublished 1969 Census table produced for the I.L.O. Mission gives males aged 15 or over as 180,000; from this one quarter of the age group 15–19 has been deducted to make it comparable to the 1962 figure, giving 175,000. 80,000 is the approximate difference between these two shaky figures.
References


Housing Research and Development Unit, Nairobi University (1971) Survey of Saving Habits.


