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In the fifteenth century Portugal was an influential state; and filled with zeal to win souls for Christ, power for their country and wealth for themselves, the Portuguese embarked on a series of exploratory and imperial missions which took them across both the Atlantic and Indian oceans. In 1498 Vasco da Gama reached the tiny coral island of Mozambique, 5 km off the coast of East Africa; and in 1507 it was fortified to serve as a permanent base. During the sixteenth century it became the most important port-of-call between Lisbon and India; a 'rich bustling replica of a metropolitan Portuguese town' (Duffy, 1962) which justified the construction over some 40 years and in stone from Portugal of the massive fortress of San Sebastian. When Fort Jesus, on Mombasa Island, finally fell to the Arabs in 1698 the town of Mozambique became the seat of government and unrivalled centre of Portuguese power in East Africa until, 200 years later, developments in the African interior shifted the centre of growth so dramatically that the erstwhile capital virtually fossilised overnight to survive as a remarkable momento of bygone days.

Delagoa Bay, 1,600 km away at the southern limit of Portugal's East African territory, was the new focus of attention. It was not without a history of its own. Discovered in 1502 by one of da Gama's ships, it was explored in 1544 by Lourenço Marques, a Portuguese trader who negotiated treaties with local chiefs for regular visits to buy ivory. Strongholds were established, at first on islands in the bay (Inhaca and Xefina) and later at Catembe on

*Mozambique, erstwhile colony and overseas province of Portugal, became independent in June 1975 and renamed its capital, Maputo. Previously known as Lourenço Marques this city is essentially a creation of Portuguese colonial settlement; and this essay traces its origins and development and places an analysis of its morphology and character in this historical context. It is therefore primarily an essay on Maputo's antecedents and heritage; it illuminates past policies and processes and their outcome which are not only of interest on their own account but also because they provide the necessary background for any appreciation of Maputo and its future. Some introductory comment on recent and contemporary issues is provided by way of conclusion; but nevertheless even the least discerning reader will recognise that the title is something of a misnomer.
the south bank of the Rio do Espirito Santo. It became a regular port-of-call for passing ships and a trading post with well established connections with the interior from whence there emerged a steady if unspectacular flow of ivory and, later, of slaves; most of the latter probably left on French rather than Portuguese vessels. It was a point of sufficient importance to attract the Dutch in 1721 but their rival settlement was abandoned in 1732. An Austrian trading company established themselves on the bay in 1771 but they were expelled by the Portuguese in 1781. In that year the persistent Portuguese appointed a military governor to this southern outpost and he constructed a fort and settlement on the north bank of the Espirito Santo (Gordon-Brown, 1960). That settlement, Lourenço Marques - sustained by the presence of military officialdom, a church and priest, and with maize and cinchona bark from Portugal's Trans-Atlantic possessions - survived to become a major port and city and the capital of Mozambique.

Its future was not always secure. It was looted and largely destroyed by the French in 1796, but rebuilt by 1800. In the 1820's a British survey ship, with its commander and company vociferously opposed to slavery and the slave trade raised the Union Jack on the southern shores of Delagoa Bay, and thereafter an Anglo-American whaling company operated spasmodically from there. A little later, Boer trekkers in search of new homelands ranged as far north as the Limpopo; and the famous but unfortunate trek-leader, Louis Trichardt and some of his followers died in Lourenço Marques in 1838. Increasingly during the nineteenth century Portuguese East Africa fell under the avaricious scrutiny of other powers, notably Britain and Germany. By then Portugal, politically insignificant and financially weak, 'could only maintain her position by playing off one power against the other' (Warhurst, 1962). The great powers, each as anxious to prevent their rivals' expansion as to pursue their own, were susceptible to such tactics. Consequently, Portugal was able to survive almost continuous hostile diplomatic intrigue and retain control over 2600 km of the East African coastline and over 783 000 km² of adjacent territory. An important factor in this success and in the subsequent development of Mozambique was the role of a new vigorous generation of colonial leaders, typified by Antonio Enes - 'a romantic turned positivist', who dedicated themselves to the revival of Portugal's civilising mission in Africa. Ironically, much of their nationalistic determination was derived from being in opposition to greater powers (Duffy, 1962).
Development in Delagoa Bay was directly influenced by international affairs. The wrangle between Britain and Portugal over territorial rights on the bay was submitted to arbitration in 1875 and President MacMahon of France ruled in favour of Portugal. Had he done otherwise, a British Colonial town, another Durban or Lagos, might have emerged rather than the distinctively Portuguese metropolis of Lourenço Marques. That any city should develop was due almost entirely to needs generated in the interior and notably, in the first instance, in the Transvaal. There, the long-standing struggle for power between Bantu, Boer and Briton - native tribesman, pastoral colonist and urban uitlander, reached new and critical dimensions in 1886 when the world's largest known deposits of gold ore were discovered on the Witwatersrand less than 100 km south of Pretoria. Unlike earlier gold rushes, that to the 'Rand' was clearly destined to transform the economy and settlement pattern not only of the Transvaal but of southern Africa as a whole. Between May and September of 1886 more than 2500 miners had arrived; by 1890 there were 14 000 African employees at work in the southern Transvaal, and by 1900 there were 100 000 (Christopher, 1976). The Transvaal urgently required ready access to ports capable of handling large quantities of goods and to copious supplies of labour. Furthermore, Kruger (President of the Transvaal, 1883-1902) was anxious to reduce the dependence of the Afrikaner republics on British South Africa and, hopeful of retaining their autonomy, he looked to Delagoa Bay for cooperation and assistance. Although themselves heavily dependent upon British goodwill, the new Portuguese aspirants to imperial splendour, entirely lacking resources other than their personal capabilities and their control of one of the finest harbours on the east coast of Africa, were only too willing to share the development and, indeed, the administration of their colonial territory with foreign investors and chartered companies. Kruger was granted a concession to build a railway linking Pretoria and Johannesburg with Lourenço Marques; and it was completed in 1894, within two years of the first train from Cape Town reaching the Rand (Day, 1963). This railway laid the foundation for the 'Mozambique Convention' which formalised relationships between South Africa and Mozambique in respect of three important matters. First, in terms of the 1909 agreement, it secured access to Lourenço Marques for South Africa provided that not less than 50 percent of all seaborne traffic generated by the southern Transvaal should pass through that port. Secondly, it granted the Witwatersrand Native Labour rights to recruit on short-term contracts up to 105 000 natives a year from southern Mozambique provided that a registration fee was paid to the Portuguese administration for each African recruited and payment of half of the employee's earnings was deferred until he returned home. Finally, and of relatively
limited importance, it provided for free trade for the products of the soil and industries of both countries. First signed in 1909 and periodically revised thereafter this Convention remained in force throughout the colonial era (Gordon-Brown, 1960; Hance 1957; and Spence, 1963); it underpinned the growth and prosperity of Lourenço Marques.

Development in Africa accelerated rapidly after the Second World War and required greatly increased port capacity to sustain the trade thus generated. Beira, Mozambique's second port and city, found itself unable to cope with the growing traffic to and from the Rhodesias, Nyasaland and the Congo, (now Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zaire) so a new railway linking the Rhodesian network to Lourenço Marques was planned and completed by 1955. This line not only added substantially to Lourenço Marques's hinterland but also fostered new rural developments within it, notably on irrigated estates in south-eastern Rhodesia specialising at first in sugar production and on settlement schemes in the Limpopo valley within Mozambique itself. The existing port facilities at Lourenço Marques were modernised and extended to include, inter alia, a terminal for the bulk handling of sugar and molasses and another for container traffic. No less important, new facilities were constructed a little way upstream at Matola specifically for the bulk-handling of specialized cargo, notably mineral ores from the Rhodesias and Swaziland, timber, crude oil and oil products; a quayside oil-refinery was built as part of the oil terminal. In short, the port of Lourenço Marques did more than hold its share of trade during the post-war era of growth*; and the city expanded accordingly.

Although primarily an international port, the growth of Lourenço Marques has not depended solely upon seaborne traffic. By 1880 it was evident that the ancient capital of Mozambique was ill-placed in respect of contemporary and probable future developments affecting Portuguese East Africa. The conduct of governmental activity therefore shifted rapidly to Lourenço Marques and this fact was formally recognised in 1907 when the status of

*In 1962 Lourenço Marques handled 1786 ships, receiving 2.9 M tons of goods and exporting 4.2 M tons. At that time approximately 65% of its trade was in transit traffic for South Africa and 17% for the Rhodesias; the remainder was shared between Swaziland and Mozambique (Spence, 1963). In 1970 the port handled 2064 ships, received 4.3 M tons of goods and exported 9.3 M tons (MHRTA, 1971).
capital was conferred upon the new city. The seat of government inevitably attracts other high-order functions and Lourenço Marques quickly became the financial, commercial, ecclesiastical and, inter alia, the educational capital of Mozambique despite its location at the southern extremity of a very extensive territory. Furthermore, once established as the major urban concentration of population and of purchasing power it became the main attraction for all consumer-oriented manufacturing industry which proved to be an increasingly important source of wealth and employment after 1950. Finally, Lourenço Marques was able to develop as a major resort catering successfully for a wide range of visitors including sailors and passengers from ships in port, international tourists and, most important of all, holiday-making White settlers and expatriates resident in South Africa and the Rhodesias. The city offered good value for money in the form of an attractive, exciting and in many ways exotic mixture of 'Continental' and 'African' atmospheres and experiences together with a variety of hotels and guest houses, restaurants and night-clubs close to magnificent beaches with shark-free bathing and splendid opportunities for fishing and sailing around coral islands in a protected bay. However, like its port activities, such resort functions relate more to the position of the city in relation to the regional or international pattern of development in southern Africa than to the not inconsiderable assets of its site; and its reasonably balanced growth during the post-war decades continued to depend heavily upon factors ultimately beyond Portuguese control (Kay, 1969).

Like so many African capitals, once established as the primate city Lourenço Marques snowballed its way into an ever more dominant position within the urban rankings. Available population data allow only approximate comparisons but these are instructive. By 1955 Lourenço Marques had a population of 100,000 which included 28,000 Europeans (or 43 percent of all Whites in Mozambique), 5800 Asians (38 percent of the total), and 8000 Coloured persons (27 percent of the total)*. At the same time Beira, the second city, had a population of 47,000 including 10,000 Europeans, 3500 Asiatics and 2300 Coloureds. In the following five years to 1960 the population of Lourenço

*The 'European' or 'White' population was overwhelmingly of Portuguese stock; the 'Asiatic' population was mostly of Indian origins but included a substantial 'Oriental' or Chinese minority; the 'Coloured' or 'Mixed' population included all persons of multi-racial origins most of whom were mulattos - the Portuguese term for this category was mesticos. Hance (1957) suggests that the population of Lourenço Marques in 1954 was 110,000.
Marques increased by 84 percent to 183,798 including over 40,000 whites. Beira also grew rapidly, but only by 26 percent to 59,329 (including 13,000 whites). However, it did more than consolidate its position as second city ahead of Quelimane (population c. 15,000), a mainland port and regional centre for the northern district of Zambezia, and of the former capital, Mozambique (population c. 12,000). Growth rates slackened somewhat during the sixties but the unequal competition continued. By 1970 the population of Lourenço Marques was estimated to be in the region of 250,000 and to account for 75 percent of the total urban population of Mozambique. Following independence in 1975, new urbanisation policies and processes took effect; but urban growth and concentration appear to have continued and a recent estimate (World Bank, 1979) indicates that Maputo now has a population of more than 500,000 and that 83 percent of the country's urban population live in the capital.

Townscapes and urban spatial arrangements are largely a product of culture and history; they reflect the state of mind, the ambitions and achievements of those responsible for their creation and subsequent modification. Since cadastral frameworks and concrete reality generally are more enduring than the human value systems which brought them into being, it is almost inevitable that at any given time the existing fabric of a town is dated if not obsolete. Therefore, 'modernisation'—adaptation, renovation and even replacement—is necessarily an ongoing process, together with expansion to accommodate growth. It will also be evident that, whether affected from within a society (as, for example, by new technologies) or by transformation of the composition and structure of society itself, any rapid change in the dominant cultural values will cause a dislocation between town and townsfolk; and if rapid modernisation of the former in relation to the new aspirations of the latter is not possible an uncomfortable incongruity may persist.

Within this general context of human factors responsible for shaping urban features, the perception those in authority have of the people to be accommodated is particularly important; and in multi-racial societies the prevalent philosophy in respect of ethnic groups is as influential as that in relation to socio-economic classes. In such matters the general colonial policy of the Portuguese can best be described as one of Laissez-faire. Colour consciousness, though never so powerful as in neighbouring countries, and cultural differences generally conspired to keep the racial groups separate except in circumstances where economic forces drew them together. However,
the Portuguese did not find it necessary to create a network of legislation
to recognise, reinforce and perpetuate racialist behaviour. On the contrary,
with an established history of miscegenation and a substantial population of
Coloureds, many of whom held important positions, it would have been both
difficult and embarrassing for them to do so. Towards the end of the nine-
teenth century, however, the Portuguese authorities were intensely nation-
listic and measured both progress and merit in terms of their culture and
values; there could be no question of equality for Africans until they had
earned it through assimilation of appropriate life-styles. The native or
indigenous peoples therefore remained under tribal law and special regulations
while the 'non-indigenous' population of Whites, Indians, Orientals and
Coloureds - and any Africans able to emulate them - lived under the common
law of Portugal. Everyone, of course, lived under 'economic law'.

It was not the intention of the Portuguese to perpetuate this basic division.
Their expressed hope was that the indigenous population should become 'civil-
ised'; and in the thirties the two categories were re-styled 'Non-civilised'
and 'Civilised' with assimilados, Africans who met difficult and stringently
applied tests relating to cultural, economic and personal attributes, being
admitted to the latter and to Portuguese citizenship. By the mid-fifties
such terminology was proving embarrassing and was dropped; the small number
of 'assimilated Africans' in Mozambique - 4554 amongst a total 'civilised'
population of 55,451 in 1955 - also was embarrassing. Clearly the diffusion
of 'civilisation' had not been particularly rapid. This was partly because
Portugal was never able to afford philanthropy. Poverty ensured an austere
paternalism and the provision of many civilising forces, including education,
was necessarily left largely to churches, missions and other humanitarian
organisations. However, the state did feel obliged to encourage if not
require Africans 'to better themselves by work, to acquire through work the
happiest means of existence, to civilise themselves through work . . .' (Native-labour code of 1899, quoted by Duffy, 1962). This agent of civilisa-
tion, of course, also helped in the development of the colonial economy;
and it provided a place for Africans in the ports of Mozambique as well as
the mining towns of the Transvaal. On the other hand, metropolitan Portugal
- the poorest country in Europe - encouraged and helped poverty-stricken
workers and peasants with limited education and skills to emigrate to her

*In 1940 the Coloured population of Mozambique numbered 15,641 and the
White population, 27,438.
overseas colonies. For example, regulations introduced in 1932 provided drastic restrictions on the immigration to and employment of 'foreign subjects' in Mozambique and required that in every commercial, industrial and agricultural undertaking at least 70 percent of the employees must be of Portuguese nationality (Gordon-Brown, 1960). With the advantages of their cultural heritage, White Portuguese competed successfully for semi-skilled and even unskilled urban employment which might otherwise have fallen entirely to Africans, as it did in neighbouring territories where 'poor whites' were not welcome. Consequently, whereas in a typical British colonial town racial, cultural and socio-economic differences were inclined or even engineered to coincide and thus exaggerate divisions within society, in the Portuguese colonial town historic and economic circumstances and even colonial policies led to a less clearly defined and more flexible social structure which included a substantial White working-class if not a proletariat.

In 1880 Lourenço Marques was a small 'village' less than 700 m in length, huddled between a fortified palisade overlooking a swamp and the riverfront where a small castle defended the jetty and harbour; there was no deep-water berth and ships anchored in the estuary. Half-a-dozen wagonways criss-crossed its immediate hinterland and led to the interior; some few developments - commercial, agricultural or residential - preferred sites along these tracks above the bluff but mostly within 1500 m of the fort. A mission station with its church and hospital was the largest of them; and the new cemetery served well enough for the nineteenth century but it could satisfy neither the needs of the foreseeable future nor the aspirations of the revitalised Portuguese administration. A new town was required; and in 1887, in a style that British Enclosure Commissioners would have recognized with admiration, a new plan for the City of Lourenço Marques was drawn-up literally over that of the existing settlement.

The new plan was for a splendid Portuguese city of the future. A rectilinear network of wide avenues punctuated by spacious squares and circuses, nearly all bearing proud Portuguese names, was designed to cover an area some 2000 m by 1200 m. The probable persistence of the old town was acknowledged but provision was made for its integration with the new at the expense of some of its structure. It would also lose its immediate access to the riverside as a deepwater wharf was pushed out into the estuary across its entire frontage. The port and railway facilities were, of course, the raison d'etre for growth so then and subsequently they have been given priority along the estuary where much land was to be reclaimed. (Fortunately for later
developments, the attractive sea beaches are located quite separately on the shores of the bay). The railway was brought in to the western end of the old town to an imposing Station Square which was eventually and significantly re-named in a more prestigious style as Praca-MacMahon. Praca de Vasco da Gama was planned as the civic centre, with a city hall flanked by government offices and the post office; by a high school, a trades and crafts school, a library and museum; and, strangely, by a reservoir. A whole block in the north-west was set aside for a cathedral; but the existence of the church and hospital was respected. It was to be enhanced by an open square giving direct access to an extensive ornamental and botanical garden and to Avenida Augusto de Castilho which formed the eastern limit of the grid. The cemetery also was respected and allocated a place on the northern side of Avenida da Pinheiro Chagas. Other land uses scheduled for this northern perimeter included the military barracks, the prison, and an observatory together with five armoured bulwarks facing inland. The latter were not to be fanciful embellishments. At that time the Portuguese were under no illusion as to their tenuous control over their East African territory. In fact, in 1894 Lourenço Marques 'suffered a serious assault by African warriors from the outlying areas' but the following year the local region was ruthlessly pacified (Duffy, 1962). This city was, of course, designed for a 'civilised' population. However, the need for Black labour was recognised and adjacent to its western limit, just beyond a large block reserved for the police quarters, a small area was to be laid out with narrower roads bearing local names (such as Rua da Cherinda) as a native quarter.

To plan on paper is one thing: to implement the design on the ground is another. However, having wisely decided to accept, more or less, the old town as part of the new, the Portuguese were able to overcome most other alternative possibilities and to establish the greater part of their plan of 1887. There were some interesting if minor changes. The cathedral was eventually built upon land adjacent to the former church hospital; a magnificent city hall was built, but next door to the cathedral in Alburquerque Square; the municipal market occupied the Praca de Vasco da Gama; and several short sections of the early roadways survived but without seriously affecting the overall plan. Also the municipality found it could not afford to provide all basic services. Thus, for example, in 1895 it granted a 50-year concession for the supply of water to E.F. Tissot Ltd; this was later taken over by the Delagoa Bay Development Company which had an active part in the growth of the city, and it was not until 1947 that the
municipality assumed responsibility for the supply of water. In similar fashion, the city's electricity supply was handled by a concessionaire until 1947. Nevertheless, the administration succeeded during the nineties and later in creating a passable image of contemporary urban developments in metropolitan Portugal. The architectural forms and details were deliberately and distinctively Portuguese; and despite the poverty of the country it became a normal part of planning requirements for all large building projects that a small percentage of the total cost be specifically devoted to some cultural or aesthetic embellishments. The closely spaces multi-dwelling buildings, including tall blocks of flats in later decades, and the mixture of residential with commercial and business functions in the city centre with the consequent down-town street-life were typically 'continental'. The wide, tree-lined avenues; the black and white cobbled mosaics; the neat gardens and nationalistic statues in city squares; the small formal parks; the pavement cafes, numerous bars, wine shops and late-opening general dealers in the city centre; all such details made the Portuguese feel at home and Anglo-saxon visitors aware of Latin culture. Although it may have had little immediate effect in diffusing their civilisation, the Portuguese were reasonably successful in transplanting their version of urban environments.

The principal failing of the planners of 1887, understandably, was their inability to foresee with any degree of accuracy the growth rates that were to befall their city. What appeared to be a spacious layout with ample room within for all possible expansion proved to be inadequate within twenty years. Consequently, the plans for particular land-uses on the periphery of the town mostly were not implemented; and a drawing of c. 1904 showed new extensions. By then it was clear that western extensions of the dock and railway facilities were necessary and land was reclaimed to admit these; eventually, by 1970 the single continuous deep-water wharf attained a length of more than 3000 m. The transfer of the seat of government required a Residence for the Governor-General and this was constructed on the headland where the estuary meets the bay, some 2 km. beyond the limit of the plan of 1887. The grid-iron street pattern was extended that far not only to give access to the governor's quarters but also to open-up the Polana suburb overlooking the beaches. A new hospital and, a little later, a prestigious high school to serve the city region were built in this high-class eastern section of the city. The drawing also shows in somewhat open-ended and diagrammatic fashion, a northern extension of the grid pattern.
to add five more east-west avenues, apparently not so much in the form of a definitive plan but as an indication that the probable need to cater for growth was acknowledged. No recognition of the existence of or need to plan for indigenous African workers was shown, not even beyond these speculative city limits. Eventually, in the course of time, these five avenues did appear on the ground though numerous elements of the early wagonways also survived; and, perhaps in a defiant gesture against future growth and a reminder of the city's origins, much of the outer one - Avenida Caldas Xavier - was constructed in an arc centred on the ancient Fort of Our Lady of the Immaculate Conception. This, however, failed to circumscribe growth, and in spite of considerable infilling within the urban area further lateral expansion occurred, especially after the Second World War.

In particular, expensive residential developments occurred in the Polana suburb and other eastern areas; and resort functions spread along the seafront as far north as the Costa do Sol beach. Inland, in the north-east sector suburbs of high-rise buildings and other more or less anonymous styles of high-density low-cost housing sprang up, some built by developers but much provided by housing cooperatives and government agencies. On the main road to the international airport the Praca de Touros emerged as a late reminder, if any was needed, that Lourenço Marques was an Iberian city; but beyond that tourist attraction and symbol of Portuguese city life lay the vast expanse of largely unplanned, ill-serviced, spontaneous peri-urban growth of mostly self-built shanty housing - the bairros indigenas, more recently styled the bairros populares. Some of the major employers provided at their works large barrack-style accommodation with full services, often including meals, for their single African employees. The municipality also provided some low-cost housing outside the city proper, notably to the south of the airport, for rent to Africans with jobs in town. But poverty and their laissez-faire tradition prevented the government, municipality and, in most cases, the employers from assuming responsibility for housing low-income workers - be they Black, Brown or White though, of course, the vast majority were native Africans. Consequently, most Africans coming to live in the city, whether temporarily or permanently and as employees or own-account workers, had to fend for themselves. Their very considerable contribution to the city was the organic sprawl of single-storey simple buildings with a maze of footpaths and cycle tracks and a few motorable if unsurfaced roads as its circulatory system. Such shanty settlements and the associated informal economy, which includes some elaborate and colourful
markets, were always tolerated by the Portuguese who could afford to do no other. In expounding their grand design for the long-term future they saw no place for such uncivilized poverty; it should pass away. Meanwhile, harsh realities had to be accepted; and provided law and order, health and a modicum of happiness prevailed, there seemed no reason to take action against these bairros indígenas. Indeed they were an essential though not, to Portuguese eyes and still less to British eyes, an attractive part of the city. Some control over their growth was necessary but no rigorous action seems to have been employed against them and it is probable that indirect control was maintained through regulations such as that forbidding any African other than an assimilado from travelling without permission outside his home district. Even so, it seems likely that during the latter decades of Portuguese rule perhaps a half of the population of the capital city lived in peri-urban shanties.

It was a matter of policy and a consequence of generally low standards of living that the city should be compact and population densities high. The whole of Lourenço Marques proper can be encompassed within a radius of 4 km; and economies of space and of movement are thus effected. For example, the population as a whole became largely dependent upon and supportive of the municipal transport system for travelling distances that they could not easily walk; and by the mid-sixties municipal buses carried, on average, 1,685,000 passengers per month. In such matters, as in many others, the Portuguese colonial city offers marked contrasts with the space-hungry sprawl of urban areas developed under British rule. However, greater Lourenço Marques did become a complex city; it incorporates several subsidiary urban areas which, for various geographical and historical reasons, have developed and continue to function largely as independent entities. Reference has been made above to the linear extension of resort functions along the sea-front. Across the estuary some suburban development has occurred at the historic site of Catembe and beyond; but with only a limited passenger ferry service to the city, growth in that direction is severely handicapped. The principal extensive and relatively low density spread of bairros indígenas and, at Vila Salazar and Matola township, of fairly prosperous suburbs lies to the west of the Infulene river and extends to the Matola river. The basic reason for this large addition to the urban complex has been the port and industrial activities at Matola; but this western area is not self-contained and the city does face some problems of integration. In this context it is interesting to note that the very large, prestigious sports complex and football
stadium, built in 1968, is just to the west of the Infulene on a major arterial intra-city road and near the geographical rather than the historical or cultural centre of the city complex as a whole.

When Mozambique became independent in 1975, Lourenço Marques became Maputo, the capital of an African Socialist Republic. It is not the city that Frelimo would have built. The flagrant display of Portuguese culture is particularly irksome, partly because it is foreign but largely because it is seen as a symbol of colonialism. Many of the superficial alien features could be quickly eradicated or modified; and the early nationalisation of all funeral parlours and undertakers was a direct assault on Portuguese culture rather than an important step in an economic strategy. But the layout of the city and its basic architecture, like the Portuguese language, are things that Maputo must learn to live with. And, in fact, in terms of plan, morphology and townscape, Maputo's heritage is much more in keeping with independent Third World urbanization processes than that bequeathed by many colonial capitals. Zambia, for example, inherited more serious difficulties in Lusaka (Davies, 1972). Maputo's most immediate problems lay not so much with the city per se but with the international basis of much of its economy.

First, partly because of the bitter struggle for independence and the dramatic capitulation by metropolitan Portugal without a reasonable transition period and partly because Frelimo policies seemed to offer no place for a Portuguese life-style, Mozambique and Maputo in particular suffered a very rapid and large-scale loss of Europeans; Murphree (1978) estimated that scarcely one-tenth of the white population stayed on after independence. The urban economy had relied heavily upon the managerial, professional and technical skills, and even the labour, of many Whites; and until their loss can be made good the efficient operation of the port and city will continue to be impaired. Secondly, whereas the Portuguese had developed and maintained close ties with South Africa and, in spite of the U.N. call for sanctions, had also continued to support and supply Rhodesia after its unilateral declaration of independence, Frelimo put Mozambique into the 'front line' states of Black Africa resolutely opposed to White rule in southern Africa. This altered quite markedly economic relationships on which the country and Maputo in particular depended very heavily. In March 1976 Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia, and while unable to take such abrupt action with South Africa it adopted a cool hostility towards that country. South Africa's response was reciprocal; while willing and anxious to continue relations that are to her advantage or of mutual benefit, South Africa has no wish to
be dependent upon any Black state. With the construction of a new major port at Richards Bay well advanced and an increasing surplus of labour within her borders, she has been able to reduce traditional links with Mozambique quite rapidly to the point at which she could disengage without serious effects to herself. At the same time, South Africa was able and willing to increase trade with Mozambique and especially to supply gaps left in her markets by the break with Portugal and by declining domestic production, notably of foodstuffs.

The net effects of such changes together with those of rising oil prices and a world-wide recession have had serious consequences for Maputo. By 1978 'with a reduction in the transit trade, total tonnage handled by Maputo fell by 70 percent; ... tourism had ceased; ... and the recruitment (by South Africa) of migrant labour from Mozambique was sharply down ... with the result that earnings from this source fell by about half' (Abercor, 1978). Whereas the average annual growth of the GDP in 1960-70 had been +4.6 percent, in the period 1970-77 it fell to -5.0 percent, and most of the decline occurred after independence; for the same periods, the average annual growth rate for domestic investment shifted from +8.3 percent to -11.0 percent; and inflation rates tripled (World Bank, 1979). The decline continued; but by 1980 there were hopeful signs. Following independence for Zimbabwe steps were taken to re-establish connections with that country and others beyond which could prove to have direct benefits for Maputo and Beira. Also, harsh economic realities had led to modifications of international relations as a whole and Mozambique was actively seeking the cooperation of all neighbouring states and many Western countries in the difficult task of economic reconstruction and development. There were already signs of a slight recovery; in any case conditions could hardly get worse (Abercor, 1980). Maputo, however, faces enormous problems because throughout this period of economic deterioration and decline its population has soared as many emigrant workers, ex-soldiers and rural migrants all sought to maintain or improve their circumstances by moving to the capital. Furthermore, if the economic development of the country as a whole is to be essentially autonomous and 'self-centred' and if confrontation with South Africa is to be resumed sometime in the future, then independent Mozambique might have to ask if Maputo is well located as the capital, the major growth centre, and the principal recipient of investment. The answer must almost certainly be in the negative; but geographical inertia, vested interests, and the actual processes of current and probable future growth suggest that, notwithstanding its extreme southerly location on South Africa's doorstep, Maputo will continue to be the capital of Mozambique.
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