When I first began my researches into Tanganyika colonial history, my aims were rather theoretical — namely, to compare certain British ideas of "indirect rule" to the actual development of indigenous political and social structures under European domination. The following account of the Bukoba district during the "classical" period of colonialism began as a case study in one such development. In assembling my materials, however, I have found it difficult to relate the narrative of events to the original frame of reference. In fact, at my present stage of work, it remains very much a narrative and hardly at all an analytic exercise.

What theoretical framework I have been able to salvage is, as the title of my paper suggests, largely evolutionary. The "political generations" which I wish to distinguish in the various stages of colonial rule are those Africans who were able to mediate spontaneously between the machinery of alien government and the outlook of the indigenous population.

At the beginning of German rule in Bukoba, there was no such agency, and dealings between Europeans and Africans were carried out through the medium of intrigue and violence. Ultimately, the Germans were able to come to an understanding with both the local African chiefs and the Catholic missionaries both of whom performed the actual task of stimulating modernization in the district.

Under British rule, despite elaborate professions to the contrary, chiefs were deprived of the substance of their traditional power and coopted into the colonial bureaucracy. Even missionaries, in their key educational function, were absorbed into the same establishment. The only spontaneous intermediaries remaining were a group of partially educated political agitators, whose efforts to appeal against official compulsion in the name of both modern European idea and popular African feeling achieved only trivial or negative results.

The Bahaya* undoubtedly possessed the most highly developed traditional political system in Tanganyika, and thus offer a very good case study for the relationship of such a system to colonial rule. Ethnologically as well as geographically, their country belongs to the interlacustrine Bantu region, with institutions similar to those of Uganda, Ruanda and Burundi. There are the usual divisions into royal dynasties, and pastoral and cultivator castes; the kings (called Bakama) are surrounded by a great deal of ritual and regalia, and receive administrative support from a hierarchy of sub-chiefs. This degree of organization as well as the ecological luxury of a banana diet allowed the Bahaya to develop rudimentary exchange economy, involving trade with neighboring territories in such items as bark-cloth and coffee beans.

* Bukoba district is named after the Lake Victoria port which constitutes its administrative center, but its inhabitants are the Bahaya and the traditional name for their country is Buhaya.
Its near-conquest by Buganda in the latter nineteenth century emphasized the relative weakness of Buhaya in the general inter-lacustrine context. All the Haya rulers, as well as their Zinza neighbors to the south and southeast, trace their origins to a single conqueror, the semi-mythical Ruhinda, who left Bunyoro sometime between the fourteenth and the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century, however, the Hinda dynasty had split into a number of very disunited kingdoms. The Bazinza (about whom no more will be said in this paper) were divided between complete chaos in their eastern sector and a single stable kingdom. Rusubi, in the present Biharamulo district. Karagwe, the geographically largest of the Haya kingdoms and often regarded as something of a senior entity, had reached a peak of power in the late middle nineteenth century. But before the advent of the Germans, a series of succession crises and the near annihilation of the cattle population through disease had virtually destroyed the entire area. The six properly Haya kingdoms on the Lake coast were also affected by the loss of cattle, but more importantly, the weakening of the pure Hinda rulers had allowed the members of a closely related Hima (i.e., pastoralists, also originating in Bunyoro) family, the Bankongo, to usurp power in the largest of these kingdoms, Kiamtware. The complex series of dynastic struggles had attained, by the German advent, an unstable pattern in which the ancient Kiamtware was divided into four kingdoms, Kiamtware and Bugabo, ruled by Bankongo, and Bukara and Kianja, still ruled by Bahinda.

One result of this instability was the failure of the Haya states to absorb any significant amount of foreign culture or technology previous to the establishment of colonial rule. The country was on the main trade and missionary route between the coast and Uganda, but Arab merchants appear to have made little impact, and despite some efforts by the White Fathers in the 1880's, no missionaries ever gained a foothold.

There was thus little preparation for the coming of the Germans nor was the initial interest of the latter in Buhaya anything more than pure colonialist "scrambling." The Emin Pasha expedition was despatched from Dar-es-Salaam in 1884 to extend as far to the northwest as possible the sphere of influence allowed to German East Africa under existing agreements with England.

As it turned out, this sphere was delimited at one degree south latitude by an arbitrary agreement in Europe even before Emin Pasha reached Lake Victoria. Thus the expedition was left with the simple task of reducing the Haya rulers to submission. Despite the scientific and civilian backgrounds of Emin Pasha and his main lieutenant, Dr. Franz Stuhlmann (they were the only non-militarists ever to be put in charge of Bukoba by the Germans), they were accompanied by a large military force under the more rugged Lieutenat Langheld which had already performed impressively against Nyamwezi, Ngoni, Zinza and Arab opponents. The Haya, far less aggressive than these peoples, offered their would-be rulers to the direct resistance.

Ihangiro, the southernmost of the Haya kingdoms, quickly signed a treaty with the Germans and, because of its remoteness from both European administration and the Bahinda-Bankongo rivalry, was to remain rather on the fringe of political activity for the next thirty years. Kahigi, the Hinda Mukama of the southernmost Kiamtware successor state, also offered allegiance unhesitatingly to the Germans and was to remain their closest ally throughout their administration. In Bukara, the smallest and weakest of the Kiamtware successors, the Hinda ruler Bwogi simply tried to ignore
the Europeans.

But in the immediate vicinity of their chosen headquarters, the Germans did quickly become involved in the warfare of the two Bankongo, Mukotani of "lesser" Kiamtwa and Kayosa of Bugabo. Mukotani, whose kingdom actually included Bukoba, was the first to make friends with the Germans and immediately received their support in retaliation for an attack from Bugabo — whose Mukama thus also saw the value of submission.

The most persistent resistance to the Germans came from Kiziba. This kingdom, because of its close commercial ties with Buganda (where Bahaya are to this day referred to as "Baziba"), already excelled its neighbors in modern sophistication, but at the same time its aging Mukama Muta-tembwa, believed that he could rely on these northern ties to fend off the Germans. However, the failure of any help to materialize and a show of strength by the Germans brought him to the point of also signing a treaty acknowledging the "protection" of the German emperor.

The ease with which the Germans established themselves in Buhaya is illustrated by their subsequent ability to divide their forces: Emin Pasha himself moving off to adventures (and ultimate death) in the farther reaches of western Uganda and the Eastern Congo, another detachment returning to build a station at Mwanza, while Langheld was left to supervise the actual construction of the Bukoba station. Langheld himself describes his policy towards the chiefs as "playing one off against the other", by which process he felt by the time he handed the post over in 1892, that the German presence had been firmly established.

The instructions to this new Stationschef, Campagneführer Herrmann, which were given wide publicity by the Dar-es-Salaam government, specified that he carry on Langheld's peaceful policies and recognize the necessity for "a mediating-diplomatic rather than a dictatorial-military" role. In the next ten years of military administration, the Germans can be said to have followed these instructions generally. All political as well as economic questions were to be a question of dealing with the chiefs. As Hermann himself put it in an article of 1894: Indeed, the still prevailing principle "nothing without the permission of the chief" is, after all, quite comfortable for us — one gives orders to the chief, he commands his people to work, and there are no expenses".

However the Haya chiefs were not yet quite ready to give up their traditional methods of exercising and expanding their power, nor would the German commandants always exert their control through strictly diplomatic means.

The elements of disorder in this first decade of German rule were three: the efforts of the White Fathers to establish themselves securely among the Bahaya; the rivalry of the four Kiamtwa successor kingdoms; and the continued hostility of Kiziba to German demands.
The Emin Pasha expedition had already, on its way to Bukoba, made use of the White Fathers' station at Bukumbi, near Mwanza, both as a resting place for its own personnel and an agency for the resettlement of rescued slaves. Thus, the Germans were quite willing to accommodate the Bishop of the Victoria Nyamza Vicariate, the Alsatian Magr. Hirth, in his request for a refuge from the persecutions and civil wars currently threatening the Catholics in Uganda.

Both the White Fathers and the Military Station agreed that the logical location for the new mission would be the territory of Mukotani, who appeared both a strong and a cooperative ruler. A purchase of land in Kiamtwara was even arranged, but before it could be securely occupied, the Europeans were to perceive for the first of many times the principle that the hospitality of a chief to the missions fluctuated in direct proportion to his sense of insecurity before the secular colonial authorities. Mukotani, already supported by the military station, soon showed, by covert assaults upon the mission, that he did not wish to follow the Buganda example of allowing his traditional power to be undermined by Christian teachings.

In the end, it was Kayoza of Bugabo who offered the missionaries land and promise of provisions and labor, perhaps because he hoped thus to reverse his previous disfavor in German eyes, and more obviously to procure reliable occupants for some territory which he had just won by military force from Kiamtwara. The first of these aims appears to have been frustrated, however, as Kayoza soon also displayed dissatisfaction with his guests and Mukotani's strength, in the years from 1893-1895, began to grow. The Germans even seem to have supported him, at this period, in his opposition to the missions. Langheld, in Bukoba for a second tour, is reported by the White Fathers to have personally ejected one of their catechists from Kiamtwara, possibly in connection with a supply of concubines he is alleged to have received from Mukotani.

In the rivalry over the control of "Greater" Kiamtwara, Mukotani, in 1894, scored an important victory over his fellow Munkongo, Kayoza, when his own candidate, Kishebuka, succeeded to the puppet Bukara throne. But from this point Mukotani, or his brother and chief advisor, the warlike Lwaijumba, seems to have become overconfident and begun stealing guns from the government soldiers, probably for use in a renewed attack upon Bugabo. The Germans, after Mukotani refused to return the weapons, quickly closed in on his capital, the Mukama and Lwaijumba only just managing to escape to Uganda. Another brother, Bwahama, was placed on the Kiamtwara throne, and the kingdom stripped of five sub-chiefstancies, four going to Kahigi of Kianja, one to Bugabo, and a village each in Bugabo and Kiamtwara being added to the White Fathers' mission as a "buffer zone".

This incident seems to have set a pattern for intrigues among the Kiamtwara successors, because six years later Kishebuka also fled to Uganda after the Germans had found guns hidden in his kingdom of Bukara. Kahigi again benefited, as all Bukara was divided between Kianja and Kiamtwara. The unanimous explanation here is that Kahigi actually planted the guns in Bukevu and then told the Germans that Kishebuka had stolen them, possibly out of pique at the latter's refusal to join him in a plot against the Bankongo rulers of Kiamtwara and Bugabo. Even the Germans recognized Kishebuka's innocence several years later.
One month after Kishebuka’s flight, Bwahama of Kiamtwa received word that the Germans knew of guns hidden at his headquarters and he also fled to Uganda. There is still some controversy among the Bahaya as to whether this charge was true, and the Germans did not divide any of the Kiamtwa territory upon appointing a new Mukama. However, the change was still again for Kahigi as the new ruler, Muntu, was never in very strong favor with the Germans and shared Kahigi’s opposition to the missionaries.

Bwahama had received warning of his impending arrest from the then acting ruler of Xizi, Mutahangarwa who remained unpunished for this act, although his representative at the military station was imprisoned. This leniency on the part of the Germans indicates the high regard they had for Mutahangarwa, who was second in their favor only to Kahigi. He had risen to this position from an earlier state of open warfare with the Germans and the change in his fortunes illustrates particularly well the evolution of German relations with the chiefs.

As already noted, Mutahangarwa’s father, Mutatembwa, had come into conflict with the Germans from their earliest arrival in Bukoba. The Kiziba sources place the blame for this on misunderstanding of German aims, inability to meet exorbitant tribute demands, and a plot by a second son of Mutatembwa, Lushabula, to turn the Germans against the chosen heir, Mutahangarwa. The German and missionary sources support most of this, but add that Mutatembwa continually refused to recognize German hegemony and persecuted Christians.

The German treatment of Kiziba in these early years certainly shows their militarism in a particularly clumsy and brutal form. A series of attacks upon Mutatembwa’s headquarters seems to have had little effect on his or Mutahangarwa’s negative attitude. During a plague epidemic in 1897, the German medical officer demanded the corpses of victims for autopsy. When the Baziba, relieving this order to confirm their fears of European cannibalism, refused to comply, they were ordered to send instead a court official and the elderly prime minister (katihiro) who volunteered for this mission was promptly hung.

It was in their support of Lushabula that the Germans finally realized the ineffectiveness of their methods. In 1898, Mutatembwa became so ill as to effectivelv cease ruling Kiziba. Both the Germans and the White Fathers feared that his reactionary policies would be continued if Mutahangarwa were allowed to take over. Against the advice of the missionaries, who realized that only civil war would result, the German commandant Von Richter decided to divide Kiziba in two, giving the larger southern half to Lushabula, who was proclaimed “Prime Regent”. This at least put an end to German participation in the fighting which continued between the two brothers. It also gave them a chance to judge between them as leaders among their own people and negotiators with the Europeans. After less than two years, Lushabula was reduced to the chieftainship of a single sub-region (even this was removed in the following year) and Mutahangarwa declared legitimate heir to a reunited Kiziba.
The following year, 1901, in which Kishebuka and Bwahama were removed, marked the end of Richter's last tour in Bukoba, and with him, the completion of the fully militarist phase of German administration. Whatever their methods may have been, the Germans had established, by this time, an equilibrium among the more troublesome chiefdoms which was to remain stable for the duration of their regime. The missions, if not particularly successful yet in their work, had at least maintained themselves on a politically neutral basis. And without too much attention to economic policy, the Germans had already managed to stimulate the export of a certain amount of coffee from Bukoba.

The decade and a half which followed was to be the golden age of Haya chiefdom, with Kahigi and Mutahangarwa approaching a power which had probably never been equalled in any but the legendary past. Much of the credit for this must, of course, go to their own personalities. Both were forceful men, even ruthless at times, but able to live up to the traditional role of a Mukama while simultaneously introducing their people to European institutions.

But equally important for this success is the fact that the officer in charge of Bukoba from 1902 to 1916, Willibald von Stuemer, was singularly well-adapted to carry out the "diplomatic-mediating" policies which the Germans had so long advocated in this district. Despite his professional military background and unquestioned courage on the occasion of actual combat, von Stuemer's personality and appearance believed utterly the stereotype of a Prussian martinet. Short, fat and jolly, he immediately won over the White Fathers; who found him, in contrast to the forbidding von Richter, "a charming companion, a man who enjoys life".

Von Stuemer's sociability, moreover, was not limited to his fellow Europeans. The White Fathers were even somewhat perturbed at his friendship with Kahigi, and African informants report that the two men were "like brothers". Mutahangarwa was also on close terms with the commandant, as was his representative at the boma, Lwamgira.

Neither von Stuemer's regime nor anything else could ever put a complete stop to the Bahayapenchant for fitina (intrigue), but until the First World War created new opportunities, such plots as occurred did not at least occupy the center of political life. In those kingdoms which failed to settle down to stable rule, von Stuemer was able to deal summarily and effectively with the twists and turns of traditional power seeking. Karagwe, which had been in perpetual crisis since 1880, was finally placed under the rule of Kicbya an uncle of Kahigi. In Bugabo, a ruler was dismissed simply because he could not put a stop to the plots of his rivals. The other dismissal of the period, in Ihangiro, seems to have resulted simply from the refusal of the king to supply services demanded by the government. There is speculation that von Stuemer even envisaged some sort of paramountcy for Kahigi in Buhaya, but I have found no evidence for this.

As the British were later to point out in criticisms, von Stuemer was able to supervise only the upper layer of this administrative system. Although he made extensive tours outside of Bukoba, informants report that he spoke only to the chiefs or to the people assembled en masse. In the latter case, he had to rely Swahili-speaking interpreters, because, despite his long service in Bukoba, he never mastered the Haya language. Von Stuemer usually took government troops along on his tours, but is said to have used them very seldom for
coercive purposes. The real responsibility for internal order, as well as the enforcement of such measures as coffee growing, lay with the Bakama, for which purpose their rugaruga (tribal police) were armed with carbines and drilled annually in Bukoba.

It may be quite true that, as the English were to insist, the lower levels of administration resulting from these conditions were extremely sloppy and corrupt, chiefs hearing law case "in their houses over a gourd of beer", and tax-collectors buying their positions from chiefs as concessions for graft. However, it is difficult to imagine these functions carried out in any other way by the then existing cadres of the Bahaya. Von Stuemer's approach to these shortcomings was to support the development of an education system which would produce better functionaries in the future.

Here again, the task was essentially a diplomatic one. The forces for introducing education on both a primary and advanced level had long been present in Buhaya in the form of the White Fathers' mission. However, until the time of von Stuemer, policies of aiding the mission had appeared to fit very badly with those of supporting the chiefs.

This problem of a need for administrative personnel and inability to make use of the missions had been encountered by the German East African government throughout most of its territory. The initial solution was to recruit staff from among the Muslim peoples of the coast, as these had a background of contact with alien institutions, could be further educated at the coastal centers of German government and already knew Swahili, the official language of native administration. The resulting deprivations practised upon interior tribal populations by alien colonial servants - both civil and military - have frequently been cited as the standard criticism of the German East African regime.

Indeed, the system had been attacked in the German legislature as early as 1899 by Catholic partisans representing the interests of the missions. The Dar-es-Salaam secretariat came under attack by pointing out that missions only attracted the "poor and abandoned" members of African society and attempted to retain the best of them for their own work of proselytization. The government would overcome its present dependence on "intermediaries" by setting up schools of its own in the interior, in which children of "the intelligent and influential" sector of the population would be taught to serve their own people.

The situation in Bukoba at this time conformed very closely to the government's description. Most of the White Fathers' adherents continued to be Baganda, who had followed them into exile, and the few Bahaya drawn to the mission were almost inevitably those of very poor political fortune. At no time in the German period did a single reigning chief accept so much as a deathbed baptism and Mutahangarwa, with the full support of his elders, disinherited his oldest and ablest son for refusing to give up Christianity.

The military station had also made several attempts to set up a government school, but with very limited success. European teachers were completely cut off the question and even coastal Africans could only be brought to such a remote area as Bukoba with great difficulty.
Von Stuemer set out to reverse this trend in the first months of his administration and by September 1902, had procured an agreement with the Bakama of Bugabo and Kiziba, as well as the ruler of Rusubi, to assign specific plots of land, including houses and banana plantations, for the use of mission primary schools. Kahigi of Kianja remained excused from this obligation because his general cooperation with the military station was accompanied by what von Stuemer called "a holy apprehension" (ein heiliges Scheu) of the missions. Muntu of Kiamtwara remained equally opposed, but here the commandant was willing to use the pressure of threatened deposition so that in the next year Muntu agreed to give the missions even more land than had his colleagues.

The actual standards of missionary teaching still remained unsatisfactory to von Stuemer, but he was subtle enough to combine his threats of sending Muslim teachers to the villages with promises of further support should the schools improve. The situation still required delicate handling is illustrated by the chaos aroused during the latter part of 1903 by von Stuemer's leave replacement, Oberlieutenant Göring. As part of a general program of immediate and sweeping reforms, Göring repeated in very strong terms the previous charges against the missionary schools. He also allowed himself to be drawn into renewed intrigues by Muntu against the missionaries, who, it was claimed, had received far larger plots than was necessary for their schools thus, rendering a number of peasants landless.

Von Stuemer, upon his return, took this situation into hand by a typical set of compromises. The missionaries were assured of the continued support of their educational enterprises, but enjoined to make a new agreement for the purchase of their land in Kiamtwara so as not to disturb the position of the Mukama. The White Fathers, who advocated instead a radical change in Buhaya land tenure and a general restriction of the powers of the Bakama, saw this attitude as evidence of von Stuemer's "fear of making any enemies". Von Stuemer, at the same time, outlined his own determination:

"to use the harsh monarchical constitution and the power of the sultans and sub-chiefs to educate their subjects, if necessary, by compulsion, for economic undertakings so long as the natives have not attained a cultural development in keeping with the interests of the colonizing power".

This system did, in the remaining years of German administration, provide the results which it had set out to attain. The energetic commands of the Bakama, particularly Mutshangarwa, produced a very vigorous attendance at schools, even allowing for the establishment of two higher schools in the district, one by the mission and the other by the government. The products of this educational system were used by the Germans to promote higher standards of administration both in Bukoba and Ruanda-Urundi where many Baziba found employment.
There is no space here to discuss in detail the economic developments - mainly coffee production - which accompanied these more general reforms. The basic method, however, was again compulsion by the Bakama, who took great interest in both the quantity and the quality of their crops. When, later, the government provided agricultural experts for the promotion of this effort, even the White Fathers began to cultivate coffee seriously.

The outbreak of World War I found Bukoba remote from the center of German power and strategic interests and threatened by superior British forces both in Uganda and on Lake Victoria. The impact of the war seems also to have been very parochial. German and British forces never engaged in any major land battles and even after an amphibious raid from Uganda had destroyed the major German installations in Bukoba, the main interest of the Bahaya appears to have been focused on the subsequent arrest of Muntu for plundering the town.

With little hope of holding back the expected British invasion on his own front, von Stuemer seems to have directed his policies towards keeping the district running smoothly. Very few Bahaya were conscripted as either carriers or soldiers. Orders were given not to disturb Africans employed on European missions or plantations, including that of one British settler. When he finally did withdraw from the district in 1916, von Stuemer, who had always spoken well of the British, gave instructions not to make trouble for the invaders, as the departing forces "wished to find the country in the same condition as they left it when they returned in three months time after the approaching German victory in Europe".

To a great extent, the Bahaya displayed loyalty to their rulers during these first two years of the war. The chiefs freely contributed their rugaruga to the small force of local troops and mobilized civilians. Lwamgira, Mutahangarwa's boma representative and by now von Stuemer's right hand man, was left at one point, entirely in charge of the administrative headquarters. Later he and several other African officials stayed with the Germans through very heavy fighting against the Belgians on their retreat to Tabora.

But the instabilities of war, abetted by the very active British intelligence service, offered the Bahaya an irresistible temptation to reassert their traditional capacity for intrigue. Apart from Muntu (whose actual guilt is debated to this day), the Mukama of Bugabo was also suspected of treason, as was even Mutahangarwa. The Karagwe chief, Ntale, was actually caught communicating with the British and subsequently hung.

When the British finally did make their appearance in Bukoba in June 1916 they found the chiefdoms in an already acute state of flux which was accelerated by the first actions of the new regime.

Perhaps the most dramatic alteration in the political structure did not occur more by coincidence than design, as within ten weeks of the German withdrawal, both Mutahangarwa and Kahigi died. The former had been seriously ill for some time with venereal disease and had made arrangements for his succession with von Stuemer and Lwangira.
However, with both of these absent, a bitter struggle developed between factions supporting a Christian and a pagan claimant to the throne, and the heritage of intrigue was to permanently undermine the position of the Kiziba monarchy.

Kahigi, who had been particularly unhappy with the change of administration, is said, according to one version, to have committed suicide when threatened with deposition by the British District Officer, D.L. Baines. Even, if, as is more likely, the immediate cause of his death was disease and old age, he also left a weakened heritage. His chosen successor, Kalemera, was the son of a commoner mother and soon proved lacking in the courage necessary to deal with the inevitable plots on behalf of a more legitimately descended brother.

The British themselves undertook the dismantling of Kahigi's "paramony" by restoring to their thrones the legitimate heirs of Bukara and Karagwe. Both these rulers, however, were boys still well in their minority, and regencies had to be established while they received an education.

In the confusion which followed Muntu of Kiamtwara's arrest, his brother Lwajumba had succeeded the throne with the general acceptance of his subjects. But this once formidable warrior and intriguer was now both too old and too little educated to operate effectively as a modern administrator.

Of the two Bakama who did continue from pre-war times, Rugachwa of Bugabo had always been weak, and at this stage developed epilepsy. Ruhinda of Ihangiro did display many of the characteristics of an able ruler and ultimately proved to be the leading personality among the Bakama of British times. But he too lacked education and the remoteness of his kingdom gave him an initial handicap in grasping modern affairs.

This weakened state of the Bakama suited very well the personality of D.L. Baines, who was to remain in charge of Bukoba for over seven years. Although by profession a civil servant, Baines had developed, during his sixteen years in the Uganda Provincial Administration, an authoritarian character which contrasted sharply with the diplomacy of von Stuemer. In appearance, Baines was extremely tall and sturdy, and in manner, something of a bully. Nevertheless, he was an intelligent and effective administrator and the Bahaya, who are perhaps less adverse than other peoples to authoritarianism, remember him with affection.

It is somewhat ironic that such weakening of the traditional political system of the Bahaya should occur at the hands of a British administrator from Uganda. German governors and colonial secretaries had long looked upon Uganda as a general model for precisely the policy which von Stuemer had carried out in Bukoba, of working through the traditional rulers. During the great debates about Tanganyika's administrative system in the 1920's, Baines himself was to cite Lord Lugard's Dual Mandate in support of similar ideas about using indigenous institutions as the foundation of colonial administration.
The introduction of these ideas into Tanganyika and their general popularity in British colonial thought, however, coincided with a stage in colonial history when by a process more of evolution than policy, the centrally controlled bureaucracy was to increase its control over local administration. Thus, Lugard himself, in the years around the First World War, was berating his Northern Nigerian Residents for their treatment of the Fulani Emirates as treaty states rather than administratively subordinated native authorities. Several years after the war, the Uganda administration was to begin its inroads upon Buganda autonomy.

In any case, with the spontaneous decline of the Bahaya chiefs just at the advent of British rule the proper analogy for these Baines years is perhaps less the conquest of the centralized indigenous states of East or West African than the extension of administration to the more acochelous outlying regions of the Uganda Protectorate. In Bukoba, as in the former case, the British made extensive use of Baganda auxiliaries and imposed Ganda models upon what appeared generally similar political institutions.

In comparison with previous German policy, these Baganda in Tanganyika were neither as ubiquitous nor as seriously oppressive as the Swahilis. However, as the fully endorsed agents of British political ideas and religious beliefs, they had perhaps a more wearing effect in the undermining of traditional institutions.

This effect is perhaps best illustrated in the area of religion. The Bahaya had always been able to perceive a very clear distinction between the Muslim Baswahili or the Catholic Bafranza and the governing Abadaki (Germans). Abangreza, however, had always meant to them both representatives of British Uganda and Protestants, since the Anglican Church Missionary Society and its Baganda converts had always been the source for Protestant proselytisation. Even the Lutheran mission which had been allowed to enter Bukoba by the Germans in 1910 depended for the little support it received upon Bahaya who had first been introduced to Christianity through Uganda influences.

Baines himself trusted the White Fathers even less than had the Germans, and he lent early support to the installation of a C.M.S. mission in Bukoba. Problems of personal forced the C.M.S. to abandon Bukoba in 1924, but in these few years, the number of Protestants in the district had climbed from less than one hundred to over two thousand. Before the war, none of the Bakama had been baptized. By 1924, all were Christians four Protestant and three Catholic.

Although Baines, in his official dealings, did maintain a strict neutrality between the two missions, he made it quite obvious that he was in favour of some form of Christianity. The connection between this and his political policies is perhaps best illustrated by his first major decree of November 1916 when he announced both the reorganization of the chiefs' courts on the Ganda pattern and the abolition of various traditional institutions of inheritance, recruitment of children for the royal court, and all forms of sorcery and magic. The White Fathers, who had been vainly fighting these same institutions since their arrival in Bukoba could only remark, "Never did an act of the German government sound such a Christian note".
The achievement for which Baines is best remembered among the Bahaya is his very forceful promotion of increased coffee growing. While the Germans had made some progress in this area, the "scientific" policy of their latter years had emphasized research and planning rather than immediate production results. Baines, on the other hand, was faced with meeting enlarged expenses with temporarily reduced means. The strong chiefs who had helped promote coffee under the Germans were now gone. Moreover, the drop in coffee prices in 1917, along with a rise in the cost of textiles had convinced the Bahaya that the British - who had already introduced a number of diseases and large scale military conscription - were plotting to sacrifice their wealth to the Indian merchants. Baines was, at first, compelled to use very harsh corporal punishments along with frequent harranguing to convince the Bahaya to improve their cultivation. Eventually, he was able to temper this policy by employing Francis X. Lwamgira (Mutahangarwa's former representative, now also a Christian), first as a political assistant and then, in 1921, as Native Inspector of Agriculture.

If Baines must be held directly responsible for the destruction of the Bakama's position, during the years of his own administration he was at least able to offer his own vigorous intervention as a substitute for chieftaincy. None of his successors up to 1939 remained in Bukoba for more than two tours (roughly five years, minus six months, leave), and most of them for an even shorter time. As the personal ties on the local level weakened, the supervision from Dar-es-Salaam, particularly after 1928, when the Central Railway reached Lake Victoria, became much closer. Again, this period of centralization coincides with an elaborate profession of government through indigenous institutions under the most famous disciple of Lord Lugard, Sir Donald Cameron. For Bukoba, the policies carried out under this program of "indirect rule" either furthered the decay of the chiefs' positions or cameflagued this process with insignificant gimmicks.

Thus, the first step taken by Cameron's administration was to convert the tributary payments to chiefs into an equivalent salary, to be paid out of a "Native Treasury" which would also allow local budgetary autonomy. In Buhaya, the authority of the chiefs, as well as their fiscal and judicial power, was to be enhanced by bringing their persons and resources together in a Bakama Council.

While the salaries did serve to maintain the older chiefs at a very high standard of affluence, the local European administration showed its evaluation of the contribution made by these rulers by reducing the share each new successor was paid out of the Native Treasury. As a judicial appeal body, the Bakama council probably worked fairly successfully. But the record of its deliberative sessions (in bad Swahili) indicates little participation in the formulation of real policy, the Council here serving mainly as a rostrum for European officers to announce their aims to the chiefs. An indication of the Bakama's own feelings towards their role in administration was their decision, when a new Council chamber was to be built, to have this outside the town of Bukoba where the present Bakama (unlike the favored chiefs of German times) did not feel "at home".
The major economic policy of the inter-war period continued to be the production of coffee, with a gradual return to the emphasis on scientific control of quality. In 1937, after some passive resistance by the Bakama, the administration convinced them to accept a new set of regulations for the inspection and improvement of the coffee crop. The chiefs had doubtlessly realized that these rules would be extremely unpopular among the Bahaya, who feared them as a threat to both their property rights and their much valued leisure. Whether the Bakama continued their resistance by not explaining the rules to their subjects, or had simply lost the influence to bring about such changes, the attempt by agricultural officers to enforce the rules led to serious rioting throughout the district and the reforms had to be abandoned.

In educational policy, the two aims of the indirect rule era were to adapt the substance of school curriculum to "African" conditions and to coordinate the efforts of Government, missions and native authorities. The only intensive effort to promote "adapted" education among the Bahaya was made by W.B. Mumford in the early 1920's, but the African reaction to his policy of promoting the teaching of arts and crafts was simply mistrust, and his successor reverted to more orthodox practices.

The substance of cooperation between different bodies involved in education was to be that the government would give material subsidies to schools run by either the missions or the native authorities. The original decision as for such cooperation between missions and government had been made in 1925 by a committee of various experts meeting in the Colonial Office and continuing to formulate doctrines on the type of education needed in Africa and similar places. A parallel "Advisory Committee on Education" was to meet in each colonial capital, and in Tanganyika, at least, Provincial Educational Committees were also established. Such a committee did meet a number of times in Bukoba between 1928 and 1931, bringing together government officials, missionaries and chiefs, but again, little of substance appears to have transpired. The granting of subsidies certainly brought the missionary effort into even closer identification with government, which now exercised an ever-growing control over the curriculum of their schools. The native authority schools apart from being financed mainly from local funds, never differed in any way from regular government institutions.

On the more general cultural issues of social cohesion and morality, which had become major crises in Bukoba by the 1930's, the Bakama proved very little help. On the contrary, three of the younger and more educated chiefs, Rumanyika of Karagwe, Mutakubwa of Kiziba and Lutalemwa of Bugabo proved so dissolute in their personal behavior that between 1937 and 1940, all of them had to be sacked.

The political picture which emerges from the above analysis of official policy and the role of the chiefs during the first phase of British rule in Bukoba is virtually a blank. To understand what forces actually kept the governmental machinery in touch with the Bahaya during this period and to seek some element of response to European policies, it is necessary to look beyond the chiefs to more poorly documented activities of the still very small educated elite.
Such an element was rare in the up-country areas of Tanganyika during the 1920's and 1930's and its existence in Bukoba can be traced directly to the previously strong position of the chiefs. The few men who dominated native administration, economic enterprise, and popular agitation during these years had all received their education in German times and were inevitably connected to the families and courts of the Bakama. They tended also to come from those kingdoms closest to Bukoba and most cooperative with government programs, particularly Kiziba. All had been influenced by new religious forces, mostly Catholic (but in one important instance, even Islam), although they still professed a strong allegiance to the Bakama.

The most successful of those new elites were those who threw in their lot with the government, particularly in the Native Administration. The outstanding example here is Francis X. Lwamgira, who, from 1925 to 1945 acted as secretary to the Bakama Council and is sometimes referred to as the "King of Buhaya".

As already noted, both von Stuemer and Baines had placed a great deal of reliance upon Lwamgira, and his position grew even stronger with the turnover of administrators which followed them. Given the weakness of the Bakama and their penchant for intrigue, it is obviously Lwamgira who must be credited with the smoothness which prevailed throughout the administrative changes of these years. But when judged in political rather than administrative terms, Lwamgira's role seems far more circumscribed. Because of his innocence of any ambition for self-aggrandizement and his great outward deference toward the Bakama, he was able to maintain the general confidence of the Bahaya. But in moments of crisis, it is obvious that they did consider him to be essentially a servant of the Europeans.

Thus, in 1921 Lwamgira was chosen by the Dar-es-Salaam secretariat to represent Tanganyika native views at a Joint Parliamentary hearing on East African Closer Union. In fact, there was little controversial about this, as the government shared the fear of Africans that any move toward political union would allow Kenya settlers to undermine existing native policies. However, the Bahaya were sufficiently convinced that Lwamgira would present the government's rather than their own views that they supported the Bakama in efforts to present their own views directly to London.

Again, in 1937, Lwamgira attempted to uphold the government's new coffee rules with such conspicuous lack of success that on one occasion he was stoned by a mob. Subsequently, he formed an Agricultural Association to promote more progressive cultivation among an enlightened minority, but despite an impressive membership list, this effort too failed to alter the thinking of the Bahaya.

Early in 1924, a small group of educated Bahaya announced the formation of an organization "for the development of our country and for the seeking of a system for the simple way to civilization, to our mutual advantage". This Bukoba Bahaya Union stressed repeatedly its interest in "progress" and "civilization" and disclaimed all involvement in politics. In these efforts it even received the sanction of the administration, which allowed it a site in Bukoba township and acquiesced in some of its demands for the elimination of minor abuses, such as the enforced saluting of Europeans in public places.
This organization took on a somewhat wider orientation in the 1930's when, during the heightened awareness of the Close r Union controversy, it affiliated with the Dar-es-Salaam Tanganyika African Association. In Bukoba itself, its activities became somewhat more controversial. Herbert Rugasibwa, a leading member of the organization was fired from his clerkship in the Bakama Council for protesting directly to the Governor against the conversion of the Bukoba Government Central School into an agricultural training center. Another leader, Klemens Kiiza, became involved in a rather acrimonious suit against the White Fathers' mission by some of its peasant tenants. Finally, in the 1937 coffee riots, the African Association (as it was by now called) was strongly suspected of having helped organize the resistance to the government and went into a hibernation from which it did not arise until after the Second World War.

The aims of this Bahaya Union African Association were unquestionably highly confused. At one time they advocated consolidating the power of the Bakama into a paramountcy, in other instances they opposed some of the Bakama's traditional prerogatives. They advocated progress and civilization, but refused to support the government in its reforms of coffee production. The government as well as the Bakama tended and unrepresentative. Nevertheless, in their efforts to express some of the responses of the Bahaya to colonial administration, they must be considered the only truly "political" element of this period. Government policies had anticipated any major programs of rational change which could be advocated at this time, but in doing so, they had destroyed all the means for spontaneous communication between rulers and ruled other than that of protest for its own sake.

Sources: Deutsches Kolonialblatt; Mittheilungen aus den Deutschen Schutzgebieten; Akten des Kaiserlichen Governments von Deutsch Ost-Afrika; Tanganyika Secretariat Minute Papers; Bukoba Bakama Council Minutes; Bukoba Bahaya Union and African Association files; Diaries of White Fathers' missions Bunona, Kashozi; D.L. Baines Notebooks; Bukoba District Notebooks; Bukoba District Book; Edini Omuli Buhaya; Hans Cory, Historia ya Wilaya Bukoba; Franz Langheld, Zwanzig Jahren Deutsche Kolonien; Hermann Rehse, Kiziba, Land und Leute; Pere Samson, "Mémoires de Karitsaigwa;" Franz Stuhlmann, Mit Emin Fasha ins Herz von Afrika; Interviews, Bukoba.
1. Ihangiro
   Nygorabambara 1875-1911*
   Ruhinda 1911-1936

2. Karagwe
   (Kigogora) 1883-1893*
   Kamanyika 1916-1940*

3. Kiziba
   Mutatembwe 1870-1903
   (Lushabula) 1898-1900*
   Mutabangarwa 1903-1916
   Mboneko 1916-1927
   Mutekubwa 1927-1937*

**Legend**
* deposition by Europeans
( ) imposed illegitimately by Europeans

Greater Kikwitwa

4. Kianja
   Kahigi 1890-1916
   Kalanera 1916-1943*

5. Bukuru
   Bwogi 1894
   Kishabuka 1894-1901*
   Rugemore 1916-

6. "Lesser" Kikwitwa
   Mubutani 1888-1895*
   Bwembe 1895-1901*
   Muntu 1901-1916*
   Lwejumba 1916-1939

7. Bugabo
   Kayoza 1860-1895
   Ritahigwa 1895-1899
   Lwokyendersa'99-1910*
   Rugachwa 1910-1927
   Luteleena 1927-1937*

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Dar-es-Salaam