THE BANK'S AGENDA FOR ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT:
Dialectics, Doubts and Dialogues

By Reginald Herbold Green and Caroline Allison

...Fragments of our lost kingdom...
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a deadman's hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star.

T. S. Eliot, 'The Hollow Men'

We asked for bread
And they chucked a stone at us.

Senior African economic analyst on AD

Economic growth implies using...scarce resources more efficiently...policy making inevitable has to embody wider political constraints and objectives...the record of poor growth...suggests that inadequate attention has been given to policies to increase the efficiency of resource use and that action to correct this situation is urgently called for.

AD, p. 24

People...must be able to control their own activities within the framework of their communities. At present the best intentioned governments - my own included - too readily move from a conviction of the need for rural development into acting as if the people had no ideas of their own. This is quite wrong...people do know what their basic needs are...if they have sufficient freedom they can be relied upon to determine their own priorities for development.

- President J. K. Nyerere
What Difference Does It Make?

The 1981 appearance of the World Bank's review of and prescription for Sub-Saharan Africa - Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda For Action - has certainly attracted more attention, discussion and diatribes than any other economic study on Africa. It is perceived by analysts and decision takers concerned with Africa - African and external, friend and foe - as a critical importance even if their assessments range from a new source of revealed wisdom through a secular variant on the Book of Revelation to a recipe for accelerated starvation. Is this amount of attention justified and, if so, why?

The answer must be yes. AD rests on a major data collection exercise. Its presentation of the 1960-79 economic history of Africa - even if one doubts its treatment of the 1970's as a homogenous period rather than as four quite divergent ones (1970-73, 1974-75, 1976-78, 1979 -) - is a serious attempt at description and analysis. It is based on a political economic ideology and model of some real analytical bite, political power and past/present capacity to perform for some classes in some countries at some times. It is therefore a significant work from an applied intellectual point of view.

Moreover, it stands - or as of 1981 stood - virtually alone. It was the only major policy oriented analysis of Africa's economic crises and what might be done about them. The OAU's Lagos Plan of Action certainly presented longer term (and radically different) two decade strategic proposals but it neither addressed the immediate crises nor marshalled an articulated set of prescriptions nor followed an empirical approach. African national strategic documents are - by definition - not regional and rarely present overall historical and political economic perspective explicitly. Further, like non-official publications by African authors they
tend to be viewed as second rate or unimportant before (and often in
substitution for) reading.4

Finally, any set of World Bank proposals backed by its influence, technical
capacity, funds and influence on other analysts and sources of finance will
have a significant impact on events as well as the way in which they are
perceived. This is particularly true for Sub-Saharan Africa - the group of
countries which are economically weakest, currently most dependent on
external resource transfers, with the poorest export-import substitution-
access to commercial finance prospects, 5 and historically most disposed to
accept (and/or least able to reject?) external advice backed by economic
influence. Whatever academic and African official analysts think of it -
and however cogently they criticize it - Accelerated Development is and will
remain a substantial force for good for evil - or, more realistically, for a
mixture of both.

In The Beginning: Genesis Of A Report

AD was born out of a 1979 request by the African Governors of the World Bank
to President McNamara for the Bank to review the causes and potential cures
of the dim economic prospects which they believed confronted their
economies. Their perception - while in 1979 was by no means as stark as it
was by 1981 - is fairly well reflected in the opening of AD: 6

Output per person rose more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa than in
any other part of the world, particularly in the 1970s and it
rose more slowly in the 1970s than in the 1960s...The tragedy of
this slow growth in the African setting is that incomes are so
low and access to basic services so limited...Now, against a
backdrop of global economic recession, the outlook for all less-
developed nations - but especially for the sub-Saharan region - is grim.

The Report was prepared over the ensuing two years on the basis of memoranda from a range of invited commentators, a basic consultancy draft by Eliot Berg and a series of in-house papers and review committee meetings. It appeared in the fall of 1981 as the first comprehensive ideological and programmatic manifesto setting out the post-McNamara Bank's response to lagging development (in many cases disintegration) in the context of rising global economic disorder and deepening industrial economy recession.

African Response and Some Of Its Causes

African responses to AD were initially mixed - welcoming the call for a doubling of aid, but politely querying whether outside export advice was always part of the solution rather than the problem; agreeing on the poor record of the 1970's, but wondering whether it was not both less uniformly gloomy and more the result of external shocks than the Report presented it; agreeing to put higher priority on production and - in particular - exports, but expressing some scepticism about the rather simplistic market forces, private sector, primary product led model of the Agenda. The evolution has been toward sharper criticism - including by economists and officials who are both serious and moderate as well as increased opposition to Bank prescriptions and a sharpening of the plaint 'we are where we are because we did what you told us to do', most recently by the Ivory Coast, one of AD's models of prudent policy.

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Several characteristics of AD have contributed to this response. First, its style is *ex cathedra* and minatory. No signs of self-doubt by the authors as
to the correctness of the analysis or the wisdom of prescriptions intrude on
the reader (even when these contain apparent major internal inconsistencies
or are not backed by the 'supporting' data tables). Further, there is a
clear implication that the Bank will support only SSA states which act on
its Agenda - and will seek to influence other donors to do likewise. In
this regard AD does the Bank and its audience less than justice. In face to
face discussion and dialogue (and internal debates) Bank personnel show far
more uncertainty and realisation that actual decisions are complex,
imperfect choices with no unique right answers. Furthermore, at least to
date, the Bank has shown uneven, but real, flexibility in adapting
programmes to actual contexts and 'pure' economic calculations to political
economic realities. It has been, to its credit, more prone to use its
potential for mobilizing other agencies as a carrot rather than as a stick.

Second, the Report's analysis and prescriptions are riddled with sweeping
generalisations, logical non (or non necessary) sequiturs and inconsist-
encies. This is partly the result of the normal operation of an institu-
tional editing committee dealing with an outside consultant's draft.10
Professor Berg has a more robust and rigorous free competitive market
allocated, comparative advantage led, neo-liberal political economic world
view informed vision than that reflected in AD. While some changes were
presumably softening, most seem to have been additions to safeguard certain
existing Bank commitments (e.g. food production, manpower development,
population planning) even where these appear to contradict the main thrust
of the Agenda. In addition, the Bank's typical style of using general
background analyses, broad principles perhaps derived from/supported by the
analysis, and micro level thumbnail sketches as a means to arrive at
concrete policy proposals, lacks any clear articulation from empirical data
to analysis to general principles or down from them to policy proposals.11
Apart from the omnipresent danger of over-generalisation, this approach gives maximum room for backing initial premises by selective use both of evidence and of explanations which will 'back' the authors' preferred lines of action without ever subjecting them to any rigorous tests as to practicability or prudence.

Third, reading the Agenda is unlikely to suggest that the Bank has ever made mistakes other than those based on inadequate technical data inputs or misplaced faith in the rationality and expertise of recipient governments (and that, somehow, none of these errors cast any doubt on its collective institutional technical competence and wisdom). Yet - to cite two examples - in calling for highway project analysis and support to include maintenance costs (pp. 106, 126), and in condemning the creation of parallel, autonomous, expert staffed policy/implementation units outside the domestic decision taking structure (pp. 130, 132), the Bank is reversing its own 1970s advice with a vengeance. This is damaging in two ways: to admit and to analyse - as well as to reverse - past mistakes is often a necessary step in avoiding future ones; to seek to avoid all responsibility for the results of policies and projects in which one is (and is known to be) deeply implicated both undermines the credibility of the new proposals and generates animosity on the part of those who know their case histories and thus impedes rational consideration of the new proposals. Learning and convincing others requires overt recognition of fallibility. Further, ex post criticism of decisions is not the best way to find out how and why they were made. This is especially true of 'good ex ante/bad ex post' choices - i.e. ones which during the pre 1973 or the 1975-78 recovery seemed to be sound and would have been had the 1960's world economic trends been continued or restored. With much greater economic uncertainty a fact of the 1980's and with SSA particularly prone to damage from uncertainties because
of its externally open economies and limited resource margins, this topic required specific attention it did not (and does not) receive; attention which might have led to more prudence and less certainty in respect to a number of projections and recommendations, e.g. that 1981-1985 would see a highly positive evolution of the terms of trade of primary agricultural exports.

Fourth, while certain modifications are made in the direction of human investment and basic services (but with higher user charges and partial privatisation) and of selective, public sector incentive focused state intervention, the basic doctrine of the Report is that of economic (and political) neo-liberalism. Economically it resembles both 1930’s mise en valeur strategies and both economically and politically those of the 1950’s late colonial era approaches to development. Access to basic needs, elimination of absolute poverty and distribution are not on this Agenda. They are treated, at best, as optional by-products of maximizing growth by selective allocation of resources to areas and sectors with high short-term output potential and by over-riding concentration on (also short-term?) profitability. From this perspective, closer integration of SSA’s domestic economies (already among the world’s most open in terms of import to GDP ratios) into the world economy is seen as self evidently desirable, because of the poor growth prospects for the major industrial economies and for international trade. The assertion of AD (p. 1) that it builds on the Lagos Plan of Action which calls for SSA national and regional integration and for relatively less dependence on/vulnerability to the international economic environment, is (with the exception of the Report’s support - pp. 118-119 - for regional economic integration) not simply inaccurate, the reverse would be much nearer the truth.
These four characteristics are not all of a kind. The first three raise questions as to completeness, consistence and direct applicability to specific cases (a doubt the Bank - e.g. pv - occasionally shares), but not necessarily on its overall sweep of data, analysis and conclusions. The fourth is rather different. Economic neo-liberalism as a credo (as opposed to a number of the measures contained in neo-liberal programmes) is contentious analytically, disputable empirically and ultimately accepted or rejected on normative, self interest or theological rather than pragmatic, public interest or programmatic grounds.16

Central Themes Behind The Agenda

Four central themes link AD's empirical evidence, descriptive examples and interpretive analysis:

1. Sub-Saharan African economies performed only moderately well in the 1960s and much less well in the 1970s. Prospects for the 1980s were (correctly to date) seen as even bleaker, and for the 24 low income countries to include falls in per capita GDP if existing trends continued;

2. The external economic environment surrounding SSA in the 1970s was mixed with some negative shock effects (e.g. drought, oil and grain price explosions) and some windfall gains(e.g. 1972-74 commodity and 1976-77 beverage booms). 1980 prospects are worse;

3. Levels of overall economic growth and of export performance in SSA are significantly poorer than in other developing regions and worsened in the 1970s;

4. The economic policy and practice of SSA governments lies at the root of the deteriorating economic performance. In particular there have been biases against exports, agriculture and the public sector and in favour
of the public sector, inward looking import substitution and (albeit AD is self contradictory on this) food.

To deny that each of these capsulized contentions contains significant elements of truth for the region and for most countries in it would be otiose. In respect to some of them AD's 'left' critics are almost more vehement than the Bank. None, however, is either as clearcut, as applicable to all SSA states or as clearcut as the Agenda suggests (nor, as will be suggested later, do they necessarily lead uniquely to the Bank's policy package).

First, growth performance - while generally unimpressive except over 1976-79 when SSA GNP growth rates were of the order of 6% and above the developing country average - have been very diverse by country and by time. Only since 1979 have almost all economies seen stagnation/deterioration.

Second, while the need to adjust to a worsened external setting is unquestionable (especially as neither AD's optimistic terms of trade forecasts nor calls for doubling of aid seem particularly 'bankable'), the Report understates the weight of external factors in worsened performance (especially for mineral exporters) for the period covered. Even the Bank would agree that over 1979-83 external shocks have tended to overwhelm reform efforts.

Third, SSA 1970s growth performance is certainly unsatisfactory in absolute terms and below average (for the decade) regionally. However, so is that of "structurally disadvantaged" ("most severely affected", "landlocked", "least developed") economies in which categories SSA is disproportionately represented. In these classes, in fact, SSA economies have, on average,
done somewhat better than those in other regions - at least until the 1980s.

Fourth, AD demonstrates a number of specific policy and management errors. This does not demonstrate how widespread or critical they were. More important, it does not uniquely demonstrate how or in what direction to change them. For example - the evidence is consistent with asserting that too little state intervention (on - say - Korean lines) to promote exports and too lax or liberal import licensing were the key external balance failures rather than - as AD argues - too much government intervention and too many barriers to imports. Similarly government expenditure levels and GDP growth do not - as admitted on p. 36 of the Report - correlate.

Finally, a substantial number of SSA states did adjust their policies radically over 1974-75 and their economies did recover over 1976-79 both in terms of growth and external balance. The general downturn dates from the 'second oil crisis' and industrial economy depression. This record casts doubt on any general interpretation asserting that policy weaknesses were a primary, as opposed to a contributory, factor in all - or most - of SSA. That is hardly surprising given the very wide diversity of actual policies between states - a diversity AD seems to skate over except when appearing to hold up implicit models - seemingly in particular the Ivory Coast and Malawi which are rather unlucky choices given subsequent reinterpretation of their policies following their entry into export, external balance and growth problems in the 1980s. As the overall GNP growth (as opposed to distribution patterns and access to public services which do vary sharply in relation to policies) levels do not correlate with the policy differences closely, either a managerial or a specific external or internal contextual explanatory hypothesis might seem more powerful.
None of these criticisms alters the need for clearer priorities, more effective coordination, economy in the use of scarce resources and adjusting to a nastier world environment. It certainly does not alter the facts that over 1976-78 many SSA decision takers wrongly believed (along with OECD and the Bank) that the 1960s global economic trends had been restored and that over 1979-81 many (again like OECD, the Bank and the Fund) were slow to realize that they faced a long recession and a need to cut back and to redeploy quite different from 1974-75's gap bridging by temporary austerity cum interim external borrowing requirements. But the criticisms do suggest that the basic nature of policy errors - and a fortiori of correctives - is not clearly nor convincingly demonstrated in AD.

Patterns of Prescriptions

A positive forest of proposals are presented in AD. They vary widely in terms of generality, individual importance and their interaction with other proposals. Many are fairly clearly desirable on almost any criteria; others are either debatable generally or contextually limited in applicability.

However, a clear set of articulated priorities and a coherent presentation of a framework within which to organize (and achieve consistency among) individual proposals is harder to find. The trees do conceal the parameters of the forest (in some cases apparently from the authors). On the basis of how often and how forcefully cases are cited ten clusters appear to dominate.

First, there should be less (or, at the least, less expansion of) state activity in its traditional areas - except for economic infrastructure supporting the private sector. Universal free access to basic services is
rejected as an operational goal in favour of partial privatisation and higher user charges for all services (the latter ironically packaged as an appeal to increase local community participation in decision taking!). Related is the second focus - curtailment of parastatal activity (especially in directly productive activities and the potentially profitable sub-sectors of commerce and transport). This is to be in favour of making room for dynamic, flexible, lightly (if not all) regulated private sector entrepreneurs (domestic or foreign). There is no actual proposal for wholesale denationalisation but the number of specific proposals for privatisation (e.g. seeds, drugs, basic foodstuffs, medicine) and the clear conviction that the private enterprise can always outcompete and outperform the public are close to adding up to the same thing.

Third, is greater emphasis on export expansion linked to agriculture as a means to raising both real peasant earnings and foreign exchange and also keyed to industry as a means of increasing competitive tests on efficiency and diversifying exports (apparently based on cheap labour more than local raw materials). This is not simply a pragmatic response to the appalling imbalances of payments (often with minimum necessary imports plus debt service two to three times exports) confronting a majority of SSA economies even in 1980 (and to confront all but a handful by 1983). Rather it is part of the more general fourth theme of closer integration into the world market on the basis of short-run comparative advantage unhampered by government restrictions or by measures designed as insurance against uncertainties (except forward sales and purchases to overcome price risks in respect to grain imports and - by extension - primary product exports).

Fifth as a necessary (in ADs view although not in pure logic) corollary to export enhancement, reduced emphasis on self sufficiency in manufactures and
food (albeit AD either havers or contradicts itself on this) is urged on the region with the highest ratio of import to GDP growth rates \((1.7)^{20}\), the lowest ratio of food production to basic nutritional requirements, and the greatest vulnerability to external shocks. Protection is clearly seen as demonstrating inefficiency and arguments about building up acquired comparative advantage, ensuring against risk or using otherwise unemployed resources (raw materials, labour) as either petty quibbles or rationalisations of inefficiency. To improve levels and makeup of production, the sixth theme calls for economic incentives - basically price incentives to peasant producers and private entrepreneurs mediated by unregulated markets and bolstered by devaluation. Non-economic incentives (including distribution, basic services and - it would seem - real wage rates) are specifically set aside as falling beyond the proper concern (or knowledge?) of development analysts. Other economic incentives - e.g. actual buyers, inputs, goods to buy, transport in the case of peasants - are mentioned but in a way, and with a lack of stress or articulation, which suggests they are either very much secondary to prices or are not analysable at regional versus at national or sub-national levels.

The need for more middle and high level trained personnel to provide greater 'technical expertise' is at the core of the seventh area of stress. Somewhat oddly given the calls for government spending cuts so is more primary (but not adult) education. Knowledge creation is the eighth area of emphasis. Data and analysis (e.g. applied research, statistics, financial reports) are seen as a sine qua non for better management and improved policy decisions. Further they are presented - albeit with no evident articulation or resource priority even, or especially, in the crucial agricultural sector - as needed to make available simple, cost reducing, output potential enhancing technical breakthroughs.
A ninth heavy stress is on setting priorities, articulating policies and programmes from them in a consistent manner, coordinating implementation, building in review and actually allocating resources in accordance with clear and articulated priorities. Ironically, AD itself does not rate very high on these tests.

Finally, the necessity of enhanced donor support and involvement in designing/controlling policy design and resource use receives an entire chapter plus repeated references elsewhere. Concessional finance quality should be raised by greater flexibility and programme - vs project - orientation. De facto or de jure donor/SSA recipient compacts like Fund stabilisation and Bank structural adjustment programmes should be used to enforce policy change by conditionality. The Bank should, preferably, coordinate flows to individual countries and ensure that sizeable ones go only to those SSA states accepting the AD Agenda.

Agenda acceptance is not seen in terms of acceptance (often merited) or rejection (also often merited) of the specific proposals. Rather it hinges on acceptance of the main themes and clusters. This is a logical view - if AD's analytical themes and policy cluster stresses are correct, most of the specifics follow. If, however, they are seriously flawed, the Agenda requires basic revision before appropriate, articulated, consistent national strategies and priorities can be constructed even if many components, taken separately, are valid.

First, it is clear that most SSA states must live more frugally. However, with basic functions (including maintenance) at dangerously low levels, a strong case exists for higher taxes more effectively collected and better use of revenue rather than straight output cuts. The bland abstraction from
distribution from saying who would provide what services to whom and from the human cost of cuts already made\textsuperscript{22} is breathtaking. The same general criticism applies to the second cluster relating to public enterprises whose performance is far more varied than AD suggests and is by no means uniformly poorer than that of private enterprises even in pre tax profit terms. Nor can one simply ignore (as AD does) that often the only alternative is private foreign enterprise whose availability, effectiveness and acceptability cannot be generalized. The reduced rates posited for some public enterprises - buyers, sellers, transporters of last resort and guarantors of interyear food reserves - would, by definition, guarantee that they made losses while private enterprises choosing the profitable business made losses, presumably allowing AD Mark II once again to criticize their "inefficiency" (defined as enterprise profits).

The third cluster - priority to raising exports - is valid. Many African countries lack coherent, articulated export strategies\textsuperscript{23} and several of those which exist seem to require review as no longer viable.\textsuperscript{24} The problem is how? AD's targets are not attainable on present or identifiable future export mixes.\textsuperscript{25} Country specific export rehabilitation, pre-export processing, natural resource linked manufacturing and new resource based exports may afford answers - a general invocation of high growth of the present low elasticity, poor global demand growth primary products and neo-NICery is doomed. In any event, the fourth theme of greater external integration (at least globally - AD does not really pursue the regional alternative) via free trade/unhampered comparative advantage is not a necessary consequence of agreement that more exports are a top priority. Historically, escape from low level, free trading dependence has usually involved selective partial withdrawal from the world economy and state intervention to promote exports based on different, acquired (developed)
comparative advantage - e.g. Imperial Germany, France, Italy, Japan, South Korea.

Given the poor export prospects for the 1980's; the historic record of new export bases - especially in manufacturing (e.g. Brazil) as cited in WDR 82\textsuperscript{26}) - being built up behind protective barriers; the stultifying effect of the present incremental import to GDP ratio and the present levels of global excess capacity, deprotection seems likely to release resources primarily to unemployment and reduced emphasis on food production to be an agenda for accelerated starvation. If so the fifth cluster on generalized reduction of internal orientation of SSA economies (as opposed to more selective choices of instruments and projects) is plain wrong, indeed wrongheaded. There are many inefficiencies and rationalisations of unsound open or concealed subsidies (including in respect to the private foreign sector, e.g. domestic market textiles in Kenya and export oriented ones in the Ivory Coast) which are not cost efficient in terms of risk avoidance or building future efficient, nationally integrated economies. These should be reduced (preferably rooted out), but their existence does not render Brazilian,\textsuperscript{27} South Korean or Japanese experience irrelevant. Nor does it reverse the fact that import liberalisation and attempts to alter industry and agriculture toward global competitiveness (as advised by the Bank) tripled Mexico's ratio of imports to GDP, sharply increased food deficits and played a central (not the sole) role in causing the present crisis. More incentives - as stressed in the sixth cluster - are needed to raise production (of products with plausible domestic or export market prospects). Whether - especially in the conditions of massive imperfections, severe crisis and generalized (private and public) restrictive practices pertaining in SSA - the free market can provide production efficient incentives without state market management intervention is a very different question - and one
to which few analysts, businessmen or consumers would give an unqualified yes. The exclusion of many apparently relevant incentives - e.g. access to health and education, programmes to reduce time spent gathering fuel and water - suggests tunnel vision (and little examination of peasant and worker stated preferences and priorities).

The seventh and eighth areas of stress are clearly correct. The problems arise at micro proposal level where ill thought out ideas and gaps can be discerned. Middle level personpower - usually scarcer than high level in SSA - is not treated systematically nor is the accounting cadre (surely an enterprise or departmental management efficiency *sine qua non*) cited as a special priority.

The ninth cluster stressing the need for clearer strategic priorities backed by resource allocations and consistently articulated to policies, programmes and projects is a crucial one - whatever agenda any African state adopts. To plan is to choose and so is to manage. The fact that similar criticisms could be made of most capitalist and socialist states (and of the Bank) does not alter this fact albeit it may temper expectations of how much can be achieved how fast.

In respect to the final external cooperation cluster, differentiation is needed. The case for flexible, programme oriented aid (made at least equally cogently by several SSA states and by UNCTAD well before AD) is both compelling and one on which progress is possible. The doubling of real concessional finance flows to Africa over the 1980s, however desirable, is most unlikely to happen and most irresponsible to project in determining available resources and possible growth rates.
The proposal for greater donor policy involvement would be valid if donors would recognize their own past mistakes (and be less dogmatic now) and engage in dialogue with African recipients. Those characteristics are not evident in AD. Views on reorganizing bilateral and other multinational aid around a core of conditional Bank/Fund programmes will hinge largely on readers' assessment of the accuracy, practicability, political viability and human desirability of their overlapping worldviews. However, even supporters of those worldviews may doubt whether the Bank's apparent aspiration to become SSAs (and the Third World's) planning ministry and Platonic Guardian cadre (an aspiration it had at least since 1970 but seems to see as more fully realizeable as its clients became more desperate to secure foreign finance) is in either the Bank's or SSA's best interests.

Some Sectoral Glimpses

To review AD fully sector by sector would not be practicable in a single paper - a volume is the minimum appropriate length. However it is possible to make certain comments.

In the first place most of the sectoral analysis and proposals do relate to one or more of the main clusters outlined above and so are subject to the same queries - or defensible on the same logic. For example the public expenditure proposals rest on an unsubstantiated hypothesis that African state spending is higher than and different in kind from that in other economies and that viable alternatives to public enterprises are generally available. The available evidence strongly suggests the opposite for SSA as a region and most states taken separately.

The export targets appear, on disaggregation to be patently unattainable or
undesirable. In the case of agricultural products they would trigger price collapses reducing earnings. In that of manufactures they are either premature - if one views the Brazilian and Korean pattern of several decades of protected home market oriented pre-export development as relevant - or plain surreal - if the implicit model is Hong Kong or Singapore with plentiful infrastructure, established business communities, capital surpluses and no rural hinterlands.

The agricultural sector analysis, projections and proposals are particularly critical and, arguably, open to particularly heavy criticism. While they manage to list almost every measure anybody could suggest they do not set priorities, establish a selection/coherence framework, take the existing state of knowledge much further forward nor show any historical perspective as to the past failures or side effects of a number of the proposals (including cases which the Bank must know because it advocated, financed and - negatively - evaluated them). In respect to food/industrial-export crop priorities the chapter is incoherent or contradictory presumably because the sections arguing that food has been overpromoted and that food self sufficiency is a priority needing higher resource allocations and more price incentives flow from different hands. Arguably the very heavy concentration on grower prices (at times apparently nominal rather than real) distracts from less costly, more practicable changes in improving access to buyers, speed of payment, availability of inputs and of consumer goods which would be more cost efficient in respect to short run production raising. Its ignoring the incentive impact of health, education, water access and fuel supply runs against the Bank's own experience as well as against what African peasants say and do.
Finally, it grossly understates the significance of the fact that in field tested, economically viable peasant practicable rural technological improvements (in seed, fertilizer, small scale irrigation, etc) Africa has perhaps a tenth as large a stock as South and Southeast Asia and a much less adequate structure to raise the flow at all levels from local through national and sub-regional to international crops research institutes' programmatic priorities. This is a particularly unfortunate lapse because the Bank is in a position to provide and mobilize resources (financial, personnel, knowledge, institutions) in this sub-sector. The sums required are manageable, comparative experience is critical, because returns are uncertain in amount and not immediate SSA states (and most bilateral donors) are likely to underinvest during a crisis - a set of factors creating a context in which Bank leadership would be particularly appropriate.33

Universal Access to Basic Services, Women and Distribution: Off the Agenda?

Women34 appear in AD largely as a byproduct of its inclusion of reducing population growth as a crucial long term goal. While the simplistic neo-Malthusian tone of the presentation will grate on many readers, the argument that a 2.5 to 4 per cent annual increase in population would raise employment generation, infrastructure and basic service resource requirements beyond levels available from any likely growth rate is valid. It is, in fact, accepted by at least most SSA governments.

What is less clear is the analysis of, or proposals for, achieving demographic transition. Apparently AD views this as a suitable area for state intervention until the process of 'modernisation' itself takes over since the 'market' for birth control, unlike others, is perceived by AD as
imperfect and needing state management! The Report fails to address the historic evidence that a decline in the birth rate (and with a lag in population growth) usually follows a fall in death rates (especially infant mortality) which is itself usually related to more assured - economically as well as physically - food supplies, access to pure water and to education for the absolutely poor, less favoured (in ecology or location) regions and women. The whole thrust of raising fees for basic services (and reducing growth of supply), privatisation and concentrating incentives on better prices to more efficient (defined as more modern and larger scale) peasants and enterprises hardly seems well attuned to achieving these normal preconditions for demographic transition.

As is standard in works of economic analysis - even, or perhaps especially, when they seek to articulate development targets and policies - women are semi-invisible and fragmented in AD. For example the facts that a high percent of rural households are headed by women; that these appear to have disproportionately low access to inputs and extension advice; and that over half of agricultural labour time (with different tasks apparently gender specific) are not mentioned in the agricultural section and therefore lead to no policy proposals. That appears to fly in the face of any common sense approach to identifying and removing constraints on production (let alone on absolute poverty reduction which used to be a central Bank goal). True it is a mistake most SSA governments make but that is precisely why the AD Report should have highlighted it and called it to their attention.

Women have not totally disappeared in AD. The education of women (hardly furthered one might suppose by higher fees which have in the past disproportionately reduced female enrolment ratios) is recognised as a means to reduce population growth and (quite how is unclear) to lessening the
burden (on time not on people) of household work such as food processing, fuel gathering and watering collection. The latter is seen as critical to raising agricultural productivity by 'freeing' time for work in the field — a point which oddly does not appear in the chapter on agriculture but in the section on population.

These fragmentary references are unrelated to — arguably conflict with — the main body of argument. Overall the low priority attached to basic services, expansion linked to proposals to raise charges for those which exist, run directly contrary to facilitating (creating effective incentives for) the contributions to development expected of women. There is no serious analysis of the specific roles women play in economic (directly productive and supporting) structures in Africa. This is especially serious in respect to agriculture where the vision of the smallholding household as 'African economic man' is simplistic (if better than its predecessor as 'African traditional, irrational man' against which AD still has to contend). Quite apart from its reductionist economy mysticism it excludes women. Even a coherent presentation of 'African economic woman' in the Report would have been highly welcome, and potentially highly productive, on analytical and operational as well as normative grounds precisely because so little attention has been devoted to the topic in official analysis and policy making.

The Agenda does not overtly discuss distribution — a telling shift from a decade of stress on "absolute poverty eradication" and "redistribution with growth". It is basically concerned only with short term production increases (which no one would deny are a priority), overlooking the fact that — especially in poor countries — who produces how determines who gets how much why. Participation in production is the only safe base for
participation in distribution and decision taking.

While the AD Report does not discuss distribution, its Agenda has an implicit philosophy about it. That outlook is not "trickle down" but "trickle up":

a. resources are to go to ecologically and infrastructurally favoured zones and to progressive (read richer) peasants;

b. basic services are to be de-emphasized - certainly not pushed toward universal access;

c. remaining services are to be on a fee basis - limiting them to the favoured peasant sub-group;

d. real wages and informal sector incomes for those spending largely on food are to be reduced with the greatest impact on low wage/informal sector people;

e. the service cuts and selection principle for peasants to back will intensify excess labour burdens and differential lack of access for women as household heads, producers, mothers, bearers of wood and water. This is "redistribution with growth" revisited - and reversed. 35

Whether this approach is consistent with development depends on one's definition. For the majority of the people of SSA over the short run (and in the not very long run the poor of Africa are dead and Keynes' dictum against ignoring short run costs36 applies forcibly) clearly no. That poses problems as to whether the Agenda is consistent with medium and long term growth enhancement. First, throwing away the bulk of Africa's plentiful resource, rural labour, may not be efficient. Second, lack of access to basic services will worsen mental and physical capacity of many workers. Third, African states do not have the force to operate productionist police states.
Excluding peasants who are in ecologically unfavoured or low infrastructure zones and lowering poor urban real income levels is hardly consistent with maximum growth in food production or sales. Rural hunger in Africa is largely in poor peasant households and can only be met by making it possible for them to produce more. Urban food demand (at prices encouraging production) will be compressed by cutting real incomes of the poor. A much more serious, complex and specific context centred approach is needed to work out production/distribution policies to cut food imports, reduce incidence of severe malnutrition and of hunger and build up markets for foods.

Concentration on larger, better off, best land peasants may not maximise production even in the short run. Kenya and Malawi evidence suggests that peasants are more scarce resource efficient producers on average and for most crops than large farmers or plantations. It does not show that among peasants larger ones are more efficient - if anything au contraire. One exception is marginal/sub-marginal rainfall zones for which substantial resource allocation can be justified only on the principle that human lives matter. Therefore, even on short term production boosting grounds which AD's peasant focus upholds, its "neo-kulak" preference is empirically dubious. The same type of argument applies in respect to women, e.g. if there has been discriminatory lack of access for women farmers to inputs, advice, marketing, etc. then enhanced access should have high incremental production pay-off.

Somewhat analogous questions arise in respect to urban workers, whether in the modern or informal sectors, employed or self employed. AD's whole thrust is toward lower real wages to increase competitiveness. If informal
sector incomes largely depend on wage earner's purchase and tend to be related to (on average substantially lower than) modern sector wages - as appears to be the case - this is certainly a prescription for greater inequality and more absolute poverty. Even brief contact with the rapidly growing exurbs of - e.g. - Nairobi, Kinshasa, Lagos, Accra, Addis Ababa and Dakar makes that a humanly chilling prospect. More to the point of AD's concerns it is not self evidently efficient in production terms. Workers without access to basic education, health services, pure water and income to meet their household's basic needs are not very productive because they are often sick and hungry, have inadequate knowledge to acquire skills easily and are denied economic incentives (such as being able to feed, clothe and house their families decently). Further, one of Africa's more plentiful resources is labour. Investing so as to increase employment and productivity would, therefore, seem likely to be efficient resource allocation from a production viewpoint even if it did require market intervention other than worker income reduction. AD simply overlooks the problem and therefore proposes no answers to an admittedly difficult question but one with which the ILO, to its credit, has been wrestling for at least a decade.

Accelerated Disintegration - The Agenda Revisited

Since 1981 the economic situation in SSA has deteriorated dramatically as have perceptions about its probable future trajectory. The 1983 WDR's middle projection for low income SSA over 1985-95 is approximate matching of population and GDP growth rates, following a 1979-85 per capita fall of the order of 20% if 1979-81 terms of trade losses are taken into account. That projection assumes sustained moderate to high growth of OECD economies, no increase in their new protectionism, enhanced investment in Africa half financed out of increased net aid and commercial borrowing flows.
assumptions look - at best - on the optimistic side of realism, the outturn is grim.

As a recent Bank evaluation of progress in SSA reveals this result and these projections are not for any general lack of attempts to consolidate and to adjust. On the one hand terms of trade shifts, external resource flow contractions, drought and war/economic destabilisation (especially in respect to states unfortunate enough to be South Africa's neighbours) have often overwhelmed positive national initiatives. On the other, the short term costs of adjustment are usually high and early while the gains are gradual and later; thus additional resources are necessary to alleviate early costs if the changes are to be seen as politically feasible or to survive if adopted.

In fact the Bank - never unanimously in support of AD - has resiled from a number of its key positions. How fully, how far and why is obscured by the fact that the Bank rarely (except in its internal memoranda and published evaluations of individual projects) admits to error. However, the list is impressive:

1. major sustained terms of trade improvement of African exports is not in sight and generalized increases in growth rates for tropical agricultural exports would be counterproductive;

2. efficient import substitution is a real category and is of comparable importance - at least in the medium run - to export expansion. Basic food self sufficiency and enhanced domestic energy are generally applicable goals as is a greater range of basic (e.g. broad market consumer goods, construction materials). ECA's statement "Unless sound and efficient import-substitution policies are implemented and exports diversified in terms both of products and markets, the projected
The historic growth of GDP might not materialize\footnote{44} is now cited by the Bank with approval;\footnote{45}

3. 'price distortion' has been introduced as an index of policy efficiency\footnote{46} - an approach somewhat more objective and less ideological than AD's strictures on public sector efficiency. There are problems with this approach of three types: a.) targeted incentives usually involve price distortion as does almost any attempt to alter existing income distributions, b.) the judgements on how much distortion is present are basically subjective (and look very odd in some cases - e.g. Malawi and Kenya appear much too low), c.) the correlation between price distortion and growth while positive is not high - other factors appear to have been more critical in at least some cases. However, the concept is more subject to refinement and to application of constraints than the looser intervention/public sector denigration of AD;

4. better public sector management has become one of the Bank's key operational target - for government and enterprises - and one it is trying to articulate.\footnote{47} While WDR 83 is very uneven and breaks less new ground than it supposes it at least centres squarely on the selectivity and goal efficiency focus of AD dropping its, partly implicit but unmistakeable parallel theme, of "the less public sector activity the better";

5. the priority to applied and tested agricultural research appears to be in the process of significant upgrading;

6. some concern is again expressed on distribution issues both in terms of political sustainability/human desirability and of production incentives and results;

7. at least orally - in some negotiations and public discussions, as well as in private, the Bank's staff are much readier than AD was to admit they do not know all the answers nor suppose that the same specific
answers can apply equally (or in some cases at all) to each of its 40 odd SSA members.

That is a not insignificant set of changes. Unfortunately it leaves the AD strategy and Agenda seriously undermined without providing a coherent alternative or set of alternatives. Further, it has been reflected only partially and unevenly in Bank relations with SSA members. Some (not all) negotiations still seem based on the premise that AD is absolute revealed wisdom. 48

Efforts toward alternative construction lie outside the scope of this paper but have begun to appear from several sources: northern applied academic (often linked to advice to aid agencies)49, African continental bodies50 and African non-governmental organisations and scholars.51 These accept AD's premises that structural transformation - following initial consolidation - is needed and that achieving it requires both austerity and clear priorities in resource use. They are - fairly uniformly - critical of AD's emphases on primary export led growth, unleashing the private sector (as opposed to providing more incentives and less purposeless regulation) and reducing (rather than prioretizing and restructuring) the role of the state and of state owned enterprises. In particular they seek to look more closely at particular national contexts clearly believing that direct application of regional general principles to specific cases without thorough selection and adaptation will chop societies and economies to fit an externally designed and warped procrustean bed.

A Conclusion Advocating More Dialogue

The preceeding assessment of Accelerated Development - and particularly of
its Agenda - may seem highly critical. It is meant to be. The Report's political economic worldview is incomplete, contentious, flawed and - in places - internally contradictory. Therefore, it is not - as the preceding section suggests the Bank might now tacitly agree - a complete or safe guide to action. Further, the Report's overly self confident style and tendency to instruct (or hector), rather than inform or advise Africans and African leaders appears radically inconsistent with its own endorsement of participation, with the reality that only Africans are primarily concerned with the well being of Africa and with the brutal fact that outsiders can walk away from the results of wrong decisions (including those taken on their advice) while Africans have to live with them. They have the right to take basic decisions about their own destiny and only they can implement any agenda no matter how strong its internal logic or the external pressures for its verbal acceptance.

However, AD cannot be written off either as trivial or as totally wrong. It has begun to concentrate attention - both in SSA and more generally - on the need to concentrate attention on strategic reformulation. Steady as you go is hardly an adequate navigational policy on a ship demonstrably in danger of sinking; more of the same seems a counsel of despair given the actual results of 1979-80 (both as to attempted accelerated growth on the same lines and in respect of orthodox retrenchment on those advocated by the IMF). Further, as cited above, a number of elements in its analysis and apparent priority lists and many of its specific proposals are both valid and applicable in at least many SSA countries. To deny this and to seek to return to the strategies and policies of 1976-79 (however appropriate some of them may have been then or however necessary retention of some strands in them may be now) would be even more rigidly ideological, pedantic, captious or blind than the most egregious elements in the Report.
The pressing need is for further data creation and collection, more analysis and fuller dialogue on what the strategic, programme, policy and project implications of that data and analysis are. The marginal utility of more general critiques of AD - except for new, and especially new African, audiences - is probably declining rapidly. What remains critical is to select what is valuable from it and to reconstruct with additional elements to create coherent, viable, economically practicable and humanly acceptable strategies - policies - programmes - projects for specific SSA countries for particular time periods (beginning with the present, not starting after consolidation is assumed to have been achieved). It should be stressed that for both normative and operational reasons that is a task which must be carried out primarily by Africans in Africa. The problem to date is not so much that there is absolutely too much outside contribution (albeit the tone of some of it is open to grave objections) but that there is too little African or genuinely joint African/outsider contribution. Ultimately that is a weakness only Africans can remedy but more serious attention to their work, cooperation with their efforts (including finance for research and conferences) and full acceptance that well meaning academic and international agency paternalism or would be Platonic Guardianship is as normatively indefensible and ultimately damaging to both sides as any other form of colonialism or neo-colonialism are contributions which they can expect.
Notes

1. Reg Green is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) as well as a part time consultant to the government of Tanzania, the World Council of Churches, SWAPO, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference and various international agencies and a Trustee of the International Center for Law in Development. The analysis and views of this paper, however, are his personal responsibility and are not necessarily those of Tanzania, SADCC, etc. Caroline Allison is a Research Officer at IDS. She has co-edited the IDS Bulletin on Accelerated Development and written on issues relating to the interaction of women and development in SSA and on the position and struggles toward liberation of Namibian women.


3. OAU, 1981.

4. African critics - with an uncomfortable degree of accuracy - say they are viewed with reservation both globally and in Africa because they are African. Whether this is a variant of 'if you are so smart why aren't you rich' is based on cultural or racial prejudice or/and is simply because Africans (including African writers and their work) are - like women - so often 'invisible' to many analysts and administrators is less clear but the results are almost equally unsatisfactory whatever the cause.


6. op cit, pp.3,4.

7. Professor Berg has distinct and growing reservations about the final version of his draft.

8. A process which is not in itself at all unusual for international agency reports nor about which (as opposed to what changes were made at whose instigation) the Bank makes any secret.


10. One co-author has experienced this process from both sides - in academia and government and as a consultant to international agencies. It has its virtues in reaching agreed action programmes but substantial costs so far as rigour of analysis, clarity of priorities and internal consistency are concerned.

11. This is to a degree inevitable in attempting to work from concrete analysis to organising principles and back to concrete proposals for a large number of cases within severe space and time constraints. In AD it is exacerbated by the Bank's apparent desire to avoid any serious analysis of the nature of the very distinct political, social and
economic divergences among African states. This is understandable and by leaving the political and the contextual out of political economy in a way Smith, Ricardo and Mill would have found just as unsatisfactory as Marx and Engels.

12. One co-author has been in several country negotiations with the Bank on precisely these issues. Indeed on one occasion he was - wrongly he now believes - a supporter of its proposal to create a de facto parallel administration.

13. This is not to say that the Bank was either alone, careless or ill intentioned. One co-author must acknowledge having supported advice from the Bank he now perceives as erroneous while in Tanzania (e.g. early 1970's cuts in grower prices for maize, selecting tea and tobacco as 'growth pole' crops). Nor is it to argue that the Bank necessarily has a worse track record than other sources of external advice. However, it has been influential and in a number of cases instrumental in securing the adoption of policies, creation of institutions and implementaion of projects now severely and rightly criticized.

14. See ACMS/UNCTAD, 1984, Section B-1 for fuller elaboration.


16. This is true of any broad political economic perspective and of strategies derived from them. The same point could be made about Marxian, pragmatic welfare capitalist (e.g. Keynesian or Brandtian) and neo-social democratic (e.g. basic needs) perspectives, albeit in these the public interest (or externalities surrounding self interest) and distribution have greater weight than in neo-liberalism.


18. For an independent analysis of Malawi see C. Harvey, "The Case of Malawi" in Allison and Green, 1983.

19. To define only inherently loss making functions as appropriate for private enterprise creates logical problems for using profitability as a test of their efficiency.


21. This is hardly a severe criticism - any list of 500 specific proposals (including any by the present authors) will contain some which are not fully thought out, subject to negative side effects, impracticable, eccentric and/or plain dotty.


23. An extreme, but not unique example, is Tanzania which had fairly clear sectoral priorities and strategies in most sectors from 1969 on but none in respect of exports until 1981. Before then there were a clutter of
micro initiatives, projections seeking to estimate (not manage or alter) future export earnings and isolated statements neither welded into a coherent, articulated strategy nor receiving serious political backing. This contrasts oddly with very different approaches to import management and foreign exchange budgeting/allocation - a contrast much more widely perceptable than simply in Tanzania.

24. e.g. Ivory Coast whose export volume has stagnated since 1979 and Malawi whose plantation bias centred strategy is literally starved of resources to the verge of bankruptcy.


27. World Bank, 1983, p.69 praises Brazil for having provided uncoordinated special incentives to enterprises in response to their pressures and influence within a broad import substitution and subsequently export promotion strategy for manufacturing.

28. This is often disguised by the fact that senior personnel have to do their own middle level work (or fail to function because it is not done) which gives the first impression that the gap is at or near the top, rather than in the middle of the continuum from unskilled worker to senior manager.

29. See, e.g. Allison and Green, op cit.


31. See M. Godfrey, op cit.

32. See R. H. Green, 1984.

33. See Lipton, 1983, for a fuller exposition albeit in this article he is urging EEC action because of its focus on EEC/ACP Convention issues.

34. See Allison "What Alternatives for Women in Africa" in Ndegwa, Mureithi and Green forthcoming, for a fuller discussion of AD's implications for women.

35. In fairness, it seems unlikely that ADs, final editorial group ever explicitly worked out their document's implicit distribution strategy.

36. "this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead." (A Tract on Monetary Reform, MacMillan, London, p.65.) This is a general criticism of all "turnpike" and Mahalanobis models pushed to long term growth maximisation conclusions.

37. See I. Livingstone, "Choices for Rural and Urban Development" in Ndegwa, Mureithi and Green forthcoming, for a fuller exposition with special
reference to Malawi.

38. See de Gaspar et al, 1982, for a much fuller exposition.

39. See Livingstone, op cit.


41. op cit, pp.57-63.

42. Bank, 1983a.

43. ibid; K. Y. Amoako and S. Please, 1983; Bank 1982 and 1983 passim as well as conversations with Bank personnel provide the basis for this list.

44. ECA, 1983.


46. WDR 83 (Bank 83), pp.57-63.

47. ibid, Part II, "Management in Development".

48. This comment is based on direct experience and on discussions with African officials by one of the co-authors.

49. e.g. Allison and Green, op cit; Carlsson, op cit.

50. e.g. ECA, 1983 and the 1983 Tunis Seminar of the African Centre for Monetary Studies on External Debt a majority of the papers for which and all but a handful of the participants in which were African.

51. e.g. Ndegwa, Mureithi and Green which flows from a Kenya Chapter of the Society for International Development March 1983 Conference, also with an African majority of papers and participants.
Sources and References


