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SOME PERSPECTIVES ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NATION-BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT.

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(The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies).

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"The African will withdraw into the uterus of tribal custom. He will be more frustrated and unhappy than he is now and be completely overcome by witchcraft and superstition. He will starve himself to death as he deserves. And in twenty years time there will be no more Africans in Rhodesia; as they increase their families their living standards will fall and they will die out". [quoted from a sampling of views of Rhodesian District Commissioners by A.K.H. Weinrich, Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1973 pg. 73)]

"The Council has done absolutely nothing for us here. No boreholes, no help in the transportation of our crop harvests. We don't know why we have a council". [Villager interviewed in Zambezi Valley Guruve District by Sunday Mail Reporter, August 26, 1984]

"For agricultural workers, little gardens and potato plots; for the town workers sanitary improvements and the like - such is their programme. It is an excellent sign that the Bourgeoisie are already obliged to sacrifice their own classical economic theory, partly from political considerations but partly because they themselves owing to the practical consequences of this theory, have begun to doubt it. The same thing is proved by the growth of professorial Socialism [Kathedersozialismus] which in one form or another is more and more supplanting political economy. The actual contradictions engendered by the mode of production have become so glaring that no theory can conceal them any longer, unless it were this professorial socialist mishmash, which, however, is no longer a theory but drivel.

..........Their socialism is municipal socialism; not the nation but the municipality is to become the owner of the means of production". [K. Marx and F. Engels: On Britain (London, Lawrence and Wishart 1954 pg. 519, and pg. 532)]

IN LIEU OF AN INTRODUCTION: REDEFINING THE SENSE OF COMMUNITY BEYOND PETTY PROJECTS OF MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM. ACT ONE, SCENE ONE.

The state of the art in western administrative science on theorising about effectiveness and efficiency in public administration is in the throes of a mighty crisis. Though this theorising is hardly relevant to underdeveloped countries like Zimbabwe, it is necessary to recapitulate and review some of the local reflections of this theorising. And it would tantamount to a vulgar banality to state that these theories have created certain class
practices in colonial Zimbabwe which we have inherited, either through reading about these theories or of actually trying to transform some of them into practice by drafting legislation, plans, procedures and structures for local government in post colonial Zimbabwe. Inattention to this type of detail, can only lead to our local administrators, be they rural or urban unwittingly falling into one of two traps:

(i) if imbued with some historical consciousness a local administrator can land up pursuing the administrative logic behind the unrealised dream of some unnamed colonial native commissioner

(ii) completely forgetting the concrete socio-economic realities in Zimbabwe and going on a search for some of the plans and theories that are meant to salvage the 'administrative crisis' of western monopoly capitalism.

The administrative crisis of western monopoly capitalism has a long pedigree, as it goes back to the classical transition from feudalism to capitalism, so faithfully chronicled by Marx and Engels. Monopoly capitalism, when it first reared its ugly head in the seventeenth century - the so-called age of mercantilism etc, had as its hand-maiden the emerging administrative apparatus of the nation state. The twin processes of monopoly capitalism and European nationalism led to centralisation (unity and integrity), unbalanced growth, and preference to loyalty over merit. During this dark age in the history of western man, European civil society was ripped asunder by civil Wars (England 1642 - 49), on either the religion, the divine right of Kings, etc. A description of the platforms on which these various civil wars were fought, however, falls outside the bounds of this workshop. It is, however, important to note, especially if we are interested in demystifying colonial procedures of this country, to recall some of the effects produced by monopoly capitalism and European nationalism, in their classical forms.

One of the most concrete effects was the creation of an administrative logic that sought to balance land-owning and capital-owning sections of the bourgeoisie. While industrialisation was later able to diffuse the contradictions between land and capital through the transformation and commodification of land. In a sense, land became capital. The most lasting and telling legacy for contemporary Western European societies was that this civilized and civil conflict, led to the autonomisation of the state and rule by the bureaucracy unchecked by a legislature.
Today, the success of any organisation whether public or private, is often said to be measured in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency. Efficiency has been meant to refer in western administrative logic to goal fulfilment, and efficiency to output per unit of input. But Western applied social science has reached an impasse or crisis. For efforts to apply these concepts in western society have, however, met with serious difficulties which can be explained by contradictions inherent in contemporary North American and West European civil society. Painstaking research by researchers armed with the finest technology for human measurement has led to conclusions such as the following:

"Single prescriptions for effectiveness are like mirages: desirable but distant, receding".2

Consideration of factors such as moral acceptance, accountability, professional ethics, and the need for human involvement and creativity, which have generally been ignored in classical theory are ultimately seen to be vital and crucial:

"Selection of the appropriate decision-making structure is influenced by the legitimacy of the alternative structures, the proportion of professionals on the staff, whether or not an emergency exists, the degree of improvisation involved in the work and so forth".3

Western researchers find that:

"In any organisation the personal needs that workers most want fulfilled are the very needs whose fulfilment facilitate (sic) organisational effectiveness".4

The wonder of it all however, is that the last governor of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, sought, in a guest appearance on our television screens on the 14th of January 1986 to lampoon the ruling party's National Political Commissar's speech on management reported in the Sunday Mail of 12 January.

Even in the advanced fortresses of international monopoly capitalism, Lord Soames with all his Churchillian wisdom would scarcely deny the fact that in Britain itself, management values and perspectives often remain "at odds" with the psychological satisfaction of workers. Western theory building efforts whether by spokesmen of the international brotherhood of the captains of industry such as his lordship, or by British academicians can be said to have reached an impasse. And as yet less pragmatic souls in the former British Empire, have yet to hear of what the practical way out of this impasse in western society is. But more urgently,
as Satya Deva has remarked:

"If this is the state of the science and art of administration with regard to developed countries, application of the same paradigm to underdeveloped countries, with far more complicated problems can only be described as ridiculous".  

The burden, history has thrust upon our shoulders, is not however, one of finding the way out for western administrative science to solve the crisis of accumulation or de-industrialisation, or even the achievement of socialism in western Europe and North America. The latter project certainly is academic for western Europe. In Zimbabwe it is not academic, but it is on the agenda of the state, and of the ruling party. And in the debate on what this agenda for socialist transformation is in Zimbabwe, some limit must be imposed on the extent to which we drug ourselves with the models and unfulfilled dreams of other societies.

The whole issue of 'racial attitudes' no matter in what modern form or covering they appear should no longer be on our agendas. For, at the national level, the policy of reconciliation redefined the whole concept of 'community', away from the whole issue of race, tribe, etc. and towards a more materialist perspective - of developing Zimbabwe for the benefit of its citizenry.

The struggle for reconciliation and for the acceptance of this redefinition of community has not taken place at the national level but at the local level or district level - especially on the issue of amalgamating rural and district councils. Thus we learn from two local political scientists on some of the pressing issues:

"Because of the disparity in the socio-economic and demographic conditions of Africans in rural areas and commercial farming community, there is fear that the interests of the one community will be subjugated to the other ...... Any desire to preserve the values associated with the socio-political system of the past in Zimbabwe would be antithetical to government policy".

Our two political scientists, however, while having some suspended cognition that a return to the "values associated with the socio-political system of the past" would negate present state policy, are, however, not explicit about what 'these values are" and how they are obstructing amalgamation. But interestingly enough they mention the thorny issue of "demographic conditions". They do not, however, spell out what these are, and the problem as they state it is very reminiscent of the whole colonial debate about the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia in the 1930's where a major policy issue for Colonial Office social planners - was the fears of the white
settlers in Southern Rhodesia, that amalgamation would upset demographic conditions and swamp the white settlers with the black peril from the North of the Zambezi. Demographic conditions are not only about the biological reproduction of labour power but are also about societal views about the value of that labour power. The fundamental question about the transition of values, is not one of inter-racial dining and wining but more about values about labour power. For there can be little doubt that values about labour power, its development, and deployment are the most crucial factor at all levels of society right from the national level to the level of the humble household.

Failure to acknowledge this latter point has in some circles led to an attempt to conceptually fragment the national project of development into local issues and national issues. The 'local issues' by implication being non-political and technical. But even more dangerously such a dualism can only divert the national effort for development into an unco-ordinated series of petty and regionally chauvinistic projects for municipal socialism. Such an assertion should not, however, be interpreted to suggest that all technical experts should be given an explicit and formal role in the affairs of state. Rather what is being called for is a clear conceptual framework which patterns local/district issues with national issues, in such a manner that no confusion arises as to cause and effect.

It is only by such an effort that a new sense of community will emerge which will not be a return to the values of the past. And in our view the creation of these community values for nation building and development are the most objective criterion for accountability in administrative practice at all levels of administration.

One could also go further to say that, the fact that such a redefinition of community values which are not antithetical to the state's dictum of national reconciliation, has not occurred, can be placed squarely at the feet of those of us engaged in the business of manufacturing concepts and ideas that would be then transformed into value for the intellectual consumption of the concrete social actors in Zimbabwe.

During the period of the transition to socialism, however, before we can agree on what community values have to be changed, we have to agree on which community values belong to the past social system and are not only antithetical to government documented policy, but also which values negate the state's projected goals of national transformation and national development planning. And we do not need to be accomplished relativists - be it in history, religion, sociology, economics, political science etc, to realise that
the past social system we are concerned with is that established in this country from 1890 - 1980. Arguments about the personality or impersonality of that particular social system of settler colonialism, are as irrelevant to us as solving the crisis of western social science theory, and dissolving the sense of 'angst' in western man's philosophical development. What is more pressing is to redefine community values, regardless whether the instrument for bringing about change is a shovel, plowshares hammers and sickles, or mental constructs and models of ideal roles, procedures and structures.

Whatever angle or assemblage point one prefers to take about socialism - African or Scientific - what is undeniable is that in Zimbabwe it is about the reproduction of a new social structure for whose achievements tens of thousands laid down their lives. No amount of econometric modelling of state and bureaucracy and capital flows, and input and output ratios is going to change that crucial fact about social existence in post colonial independent Zimbabwe. For as one European scholar has written about the 'crisis' in his own society:

"The state does not merely serve the function of facilitating accumulation through demand maintenance, the state also serves a vital legitimation function in capitalist society which helps to stabilize and reproduce the class structure as a whole."  

The evaluation of procedures, structures and implementation practices is, therefore, in a sense a hunt for appropriate crisis solving mechanisms. But without being inebriated by verbosity we should be clear about the nature of the 'crisis', of African development. There is no use in continuing to hide our heads in sand and pretend that Zimbabwe is not affected by this African crisis. If consensus does emerge that the crisis is one of accumulation there should still be deeper probing of the question: the crisis of whose accumulation? This would not be an exercise in experimental definition to show one's good command of the English tongue but a more thorough-going African radical and militant materialism that would reaffirm community values destroyed by imperialism. Such an affirmation could even go as far as simple exercises of affirming that in Zimbabwe's development this is more fundamental than that.

Action can, therefore, proceed by all those with a vested interest in the creation of a developed socialist state in Zimbabwe to remove some of the conceptual blockages in the affirmation of the community values of the majority.

The major conceptual blockage in contemporary Zimbabwe is the conventional definition of politics, which in so many ways ranging from technical mystification to administrative procedure asks people not to participate in politics i.e. decisions
about the use and distribution of resources in relation to the affairs that are very often very important to the lives of the people regardless of their level of socialists consciousness or literacy.

In this consideration of 'administrative accountability' minimal attention is paid to the narrow institutional contexts of the systems of administration. Though institutional detail is important there is the real risk of research effort degenerating into either compiling a shopping list of technical equipment or compiling an unordered list of unprioritised problems. More important than a grasp of institutional and administrative detail is a clear grasp of the relations of these local "systems" of production, distribution, power, social organisation, culture and ideology. The question of administrative accountability would not resolve itself around the exercise of determining which class or group could best be squeezed for the purposes of financial accumulation of the local council. The basic questions that have to be answered before the local administrator can define accountability beyond the red and black and red lines of his accounting ledger are:

(a) What resources in the district are being obtained, used, produced, argued about or mobilised.

(b) For what purposes are they being used, by whom and why?

(c) How are they currently distributed and redistributed and according to what principles and methods.

(d) How are decisions taken about such matters, by whom and according to what procedures and rules.

(e) What is the structure of power - both political and economic - how it distributed and why?

(f) What is the social organisation associated with all this, and what values are receiving affirmation.

This would, of course, constitute a monumental project, too broad to be covered within the scope of this paper. Our attention will rather focus on some of the contemporary phenomenal forms that constitute a blockage to the realisation of community values for national development, and some of their intellectual origins.
The basic assumption running through this paper is that the procedures and structures of local government inherited at independence, are social constructs in their own right and yet incorporate influences from the wider British settler society. Colonial social planners, native commissioners, consultants of native opinion, native clerks etc. like people in any other organisation developed a culture and a frame of meaning.

Social interaction in the settler colonial bureaucracy, naturally followed an organisational hierarchy, presumably a combination of the formal procedures (as laid out in memoranda and policy documents) and informal versions improvised during crises and emergencies, and this was reflected in the power relationships in outside society which was divided into races and classes. The organisation or bureaucracy would then be divided up into agents of capital, management and labour. By the time we got to independence in April, 1980, various sets of people had put together in amazing detail the frames of meaning for the running of the colonial state. Without delving into historiographical bibliographies and biographies, of the settler state, it is nevertheless possible to isolate the administrative logic of white settler colonialism in Zimbabwe, which determined civic and community values.

TOWARDS A PROSPECTUS OF WESTERN GLOBAL VILLAGE AGENDAS AND DEBATES ON THE CRISIS OF 'MANAGEMENT' IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT. ACT ONE

Scene Two.

In a very abstract and academic sense, the debate about 'management' has very little to do with Africa, but more with debates about the nature of the state in Western Europe and North America. Neo-classical political economy has for long been based on the basic intuition that the methodology of neo-classical economics can be used to "analyse decisions and adjustments of participants in the public sector, and in other areas where decisions and adjustments are collective, just as it can in the market sector of modern economies". The demand and supply equation is, therefore, supposed to apply in equal and identical proportions through the whole business of running a government and a local district clinic to the petty operations on the black market or underground economy. The sale of human skills is, therefore, co-related to the principles of an existing 'black economy' in order to plot out the demand or supply dimensions of a commodity, and then plotting its distribution amongst formal and informal organs of the acquisitive spirit of Capital. Liberal social democratic and Fabian analyses have, however, balked at such stark quantification of the problem of capital accumulation. The memories of the social
horrors perpetrated in the name of political and economic science - ranging all the way from the Eugenetics movement to that efficient Informatics Plan for creating community acceptance for the extermination of the Jews brilliantly managed for Adolf Hitler by Dr. Goebbels. Due to some form of amnesia induced by excessive fragmentation of concrete social reality, it is often forgotten that traces of that type of thinking that led to the Holocaust are still present not in the grey matter of some rabid racist farmer in the Transvaal but in the whole international information order comprising book titles, systems of social classification, literary classification etc. Until the whole administrative logical structures that tried to bridge the gap between public and private sector economics in Nazi Germany, and that underly all Neo-Keynesian underconsumption theories of the state are effectively dismembered no matter their organic or inorganic form, Hitler's ghost will continue to haunt the hall-ways and book shelves of higher centres of learning of the west. Monetarists are still at great moral pain to explain that western economists and planners who wrote and even achieved world fame in the years 1890 - 1929 did not influence Hitler's project for genocide. It is pointed out often that most of these economists and historians were actually very nice and personable types whose popular writings could not have led a section of humanity being placed on the agenda for extermination.

In the same sort of breadth it is boldly stated amongst more musically minded thinkers that Wagner's stirring symphonies could not possibly have had any influence on the Nazi project, just because Hitler liked them. Goebbels' improvement of western administrative science lay in providing through a medium using all six physical human senses a model to alter consumption patterns in Germany to fit in with the accumulation of monopoly capital by the divided German bourgeoisie. And in this drama Hitler's "socialist origins" in the German socialist movement are really not relevant. The core of Goebbels' brand of information management has been beautifully described by Robert Edwin Herzstein:

Goebbels and his collaborators believed that transferring guilt for German crimes to the victims themselves was an effective answer to grumbling and privation. Anti-Jewish propaganda reached its peak in 1944, when most of the Jews of Europe had already perished. The Nazis continued to impute genocidal war aims to the Bolsheviks and the plutocrats both of whom were fronts for "the Jews" even after the Allies had liberated several German concentration camps and showed the world what had taken place in such institutions".

And even more interesting for progressive intellectuals struggling to find autonomous space in post colonial Zimbabwe the contrast between Hitler the Implementor and Goebbels the Medium:
"Goebbels had contempt for the masses, as did Adolf Hitler. Possessing a good mind and superior education, the young Goebbels must have noted how much easier it was to move people by violence and cheap demagoguery than by clear idea and reason"....."The rank and file are usually much more primitive than we imagine. Propaganda must, therefore, always be essentially simple and repetitious. In the long run only he will achieve basic results in influencing public opinion who is able to reduce problems to the simplest terms and who has the courage to keep forever repeating them in this simplified form despite the objections of the intellectuals".10

The basic administrative logic to unite and integrate the civil relations of the German people with those long preached about by German bourgeois economists in the practice of the Nazi state was even seen in even simpler terms by Goebbels, as Herzstein tells us:

"Mass media must not be élitist in its approach though it must be directed by an élite: 'Far and away from the majority of those who listen to the radio have been roughly treated by life....' They have a right to genuine relaxation and recreation in their scarce hours of quiet leisure. The few who want to take their nourishment only from Kant and Hegel are very much in the minority".11

Of course, whether one draws exact descriptions of the Nazi state machinery of the colonial state in Zimbabwe, the point will still remain that the settler administrative logic has its social origins somewhere in British state both in its contemporary and historical forms, and extensions. And that point from the assemblage point of concrete Zimbabwean socio-economic realities is not premised on some tribal or ethnic preference for the English or German or dispositions of Zimbabweans - i.e. on which type of colonialist was really evil and brutish. The penetration of the European 'tribal spirit' is no longer the issue - and even those who have attempted the academic project are still a long way from finding visible evidence of humane thought in the administrative logic of the European state and its North American mutation - the United States of America.

More at issue is the fact that whenever the various media of the western global academic villages have sought to propound on Zimbabwean politics, they have preoccupied themselves with their own ethno-centric fears about monopoly assumptions in political economy - or to put it more simply - the unity of the political economic and social elements in state structures. The fears about monopoly in these two fields of endeavour - politics and economics are further heightened when the whole issue about the creation of a one party social democracy in Zimbabwe is mentioned. How can this happen in Zimbabwe, when it has never taken place in North Western European liberal social democracies?
The monopoly assumption is embodied in the assumption that bureaucracy may be modelled as a single bureau, and that decision markets within that bureau have a single objective or set of objectives, so that the bureau itself behaves as a monolithic unit. From this assumption there emerges the expectation from international captains-of industry/robber barons [depending on one's taste for euphemism] that African governing politicians should monitor the performance of both senior and junior bureaucrats in the same way as boards of directors monitor and motivate business managers in the private sector.

From such a perspective the bureaucracy at all levels from the Permanent Secretary to the assistant administrative clerk out in the district office appears to be in a competitive labour market, a market in which there is competition among subordinates for jobs and competition among bureaucratic superiors for subordinates. Civil servants who do not perform satisfactorily in an African state will be replaced; those who do perform well are still under pressure to do better from ambitious underlings, from bureaucrats in departments of governments and parastatals.

The competitiveness of the political processes of the West are elevated into a sacred cow somekind of 40th Article of Faith. Anything that overtly diverts from this course is denounced as a communist dictatorship. The basic naivety in all this type of thinking is the failure to realise that no state will ever achieve the perfect market for bureaucrats, wherein perfect competition among superiors for the services of subordinates. And in the bastions of Western democracy themselves, even if politicians did possess monopoly power over public office, there is no reason why this should be freely surrendered to computer-wielding techno-bureaucrats. The basic crisis of the western state is that of legitimacy - the logic for centralisation in bureaucratic systems which gave to unbalanced growth and preference to loyalty over merit. The search for equilibrium models whether in economics or other social sciences in the West therefore, is really about balancing loyalty over merit, in a civil society where there is a scarcity of non-commodified community values to inspire the loyalty of the citizenry. Africa has thus in a sense become a dumping ground for obsolete political technologies. The fact that the generalised preference of loyalty over merit is more a result over the administrative logic of imperialism, rather than a sign of some sort of 8th Wonder - i.e. African Tribal Spirit or pre-capitalist survivals of pre-colonial social networks in a modern civilised world of the bureau is often forgotten.

The World Bank's policy analysts have indeed played a prominent role in outlining the dimensions of the African "crisis" of development. More recently they have turned
their attention to the whole issue of administrative practice, management etc. in Africa.

In the famous or infamous Berg Report of 1981, it was decided that "to cure the antidevelopmental policies of African governments and their low levels of administrative capacity" large doses of market discipline and economic planning were needed. The report advocated institutional changes to support economic policies on exchange rates, terms of trade and prices. It went on to document that African governments were growing faster than their economies and that public sector employment was increasing as a percentage of "formal" employment.12

But the whole set of proposals for administrative reform was based on the wrong assumption that the now ailing world capitalist system was built on free-competition, with minimum state interference in commodity markets. But as Leonard underlines:

"Pleas that government employment is expanding too rapidly for the sake of the fragile African economies are missing the point. The dynamic underlying this growth is not a mistaken understanding of economic rationality, but a correct appreciation of still more fundamental and pressing political and social rationalities".13

It is also clear that arming all planners in African bureaucracies with Apple Computers would never in a thousand years bring a coincidence of structures or integration of the economic rationality of monopoly capitalism and more fundamental and pressing political and social rationalities. And even in Zimbabwe where the settlers tried to create a European state, this is unlikely to take place in the real world.

Leonard's critique of the Berg Report's administrative proposals was in fact very constructive. The unproductive growth of the African bureaucracy would require a more subtle approach than/laissez-faire economics of the Chicago Boys:

"We have a situation in which the performance of public organisations is poor because few of their participants are committed to purposive rationality. In other words most actors expect to use governmental agencies to achieve extra-organisational goals first and formal goals second. To propose market discipline as a cure for this problem is simply to call for the imposition of a new form of purposive rationality. It is true that the market can achieve purposive rationality with a smaller number of consenting actors than can hierarchically imposed rationality".14

In attempting to propose "politically attractive projects", Leonard further criticised the World Bank's approach to planning i.e. moving decisions to where the planners are, first by creating central planning offices then by developing planning units in
the operational ministries. This had led to the isolation of African planners and reduced any impact they might have had; and to correct this state of affairs Leonard suggested:

"If planners cannot be made into decision makers, their training in planning (or policy analysis more generally) should be provided to those who already are decision makers. Far from it being appropriate to recentralize planners into distinct "gatekeeping" institutions it generally will be more effective to disperse them further into operational careers throughout their governments." 

But even more important than actual mistakes in the technical recommendations, Leonard puts his finger on the crucial dilemma of western global village policy analysts:

"World class economists sit in donor institutions and become 'objective', "uninvolved" arbiters of decision-making processes in which they are never integrated. Thus, they destabilize a society's value consensus by intervening in decision-making but do not assist in the emergence of a new one because they remain aloof from the day-to-day process."

The western academic global village has further been split into two camps or schools of thought of administrative behaviour: organisation theorists and environmentalists. The former i.e. organisation theorists hold that the theoretical principles underlying and explaining organisational behaviour are universal, so that at least some modified Western management techniques may be able to improve administrative performance in Africa. Environmentalists for their part hold out that African administration is distinctive in the degree to which it is penetrated by its politicised and patronage-prone environment and it is, therefore, not amenable to management methods based on a Western conception of purposive rationality. The pitfalls in the environmentalists thought are that it does slide into racist arguments that Africans are irrational in any case, so that their organisations being so deeply rooted in larger political and social structures are unreformable. Price for example suggests that only when African administrative elites become isolated from the rest of the society in the way in which European Calvinists, Leninists and aristocrats were, will they have the autonomy necessary to impose purposive rationality.

It follows from this argument that the only economic rationality than can be imposed on Africa is that of the market, since it is the only one that does not demand widespread acceptance of purposive rationality. Many of these assumptions were incorporated into the Berg Report.

Leonard's confession of an impasse in administrative science, however, offers a light at the end of the tunnel for those western social theorists genuinely interested
in promoting African development:

"We certainly have no knowledge of what reforms might be used to improve the performance of Africa's public organisations. We can be reasonably certain that techniques imported from the West will fail unless they are revised quite fundamentally... Our whole search process has been fundamentally biased and flawed to date. We have tended to look at those instances in which technical assistance personnel were introducing imported innovations. We therefore were examining reforms that were intensive in their use of managers and economic rationality. These 'factor proportions' are inappropriate in the African environment. Instead, we must study the more indegenously based organisational experiments that have a greater chance of being 'appropriate technologies' for their environments".

The whole issue of 'indegenously based organisational experiments' would in the case of Zimbabwe focus on the ruling party - ZANU-PF as it is the most visible and legitimate evidence of the success of an 'indegenous organisational experiment'. The problem of integration of structures - i.e. rural councils and district councils would be one of integrating party and state at the lower levels of the state apparatus. Such integration, however, need not necessarily arouse economistic fears of monopoly, as nothing in Zimbabwe so far suggests that the integration of party and state is personnell centred. The real struggle for a one-party democratic state could then be perceived as one of creating integrated procedures for democratic participation, from the level of the Village Development Council to the National level of Parliament.19

Many of the criticisms of the Berg Report with regard to administrative reform seem to have been heeded, at a technical level but many of the assumptions underlying prescriptions for African administrative reform remain as concrete as ever. From a reading of the latest World Bank's diagnosis of the African crisis, the accent has moved away from laissez - faire to active intervention by the state - not in the matter of exchange rates, pricing etc., but in adminstrative reform.20 There has been a notable shift in emphasis from macro-level to micro-level planning as the World Bank Joint Programme of Action states:

"Broad sector priorities for determining expenditure are often misleading. For instance, although infrastructure and industry are not priority sectors for new investment, expenditure for maintenance and operation of existing capacity is usually a priority".21

In the drawing up of the World Bank's demand and supply equations for bureaucratic output, focus in the last report has also been directed at, on the concrete social actors albeit in 'human capital' terms:
Despite the scarcity of trained manpower in Africa, skilled and trained people are often as underutilized as physical capital at least in the public sector. The key to the problem is the management of local and expatriate manpower. Typically local staff are poorly motivated and lack leadership and direction; appointments in senior positions are often political and rewards and punishments are unrelated to performance.

It is quite clear however that the World Bank still sees the solution to Africa's administrative problem in terms of imposing the logic of the market and purposive rationality of western economic theory, for which no model of success exists in the metropolitan countries. The bureaucratic process is viewed in the same way as any other process of commodification, and perhaps there still lingers the dream that a reform of procedures and structures in African planning systems will bridge the gap between the public sector in Africa and global merchant capital. And there is an attempt to apply some crude input-output analysis to the whole business of running the affairs of state:

"Distorted incentives and inefficient institutions are central to Africa's poor return on investment and therefore to its economic performance. These failings have deep roots in African societies, and to improve economic performance requires governments to have political will to overcome these interests. Political reality dictates that the process will take time, and donors have to gear their support accordingly."

Despite all the high sounding phrases about 'political reality' and 'political will', the World Bank is demanding that African governments accept the domination of international monopoly capital by restructuring their procedures and structures for the implementation of state policies so that they coincide with the aims of international private capital. Effectiveness, accountability, and efficiency in this projected World Bank dream will therefore come to be judged in terms of the maintenance of the status quo, i.e. of the international economic order. The only blockage to the achievement of this dream is that the 'chosen' technocratic elite must continue to define development as consisting mainly of Westernisation; effectiveness remains aping the West with all its faults.

The programme for administrative reform preached by the World Bank, if accepted will actually mean that effectiveness of administration in Africa will be judged by the support it provides to monopolistic business, and not to balanced regional growth.
That it will not be accepted, is however certain, given the failure to achieve this rationality in the metropolitan state formations. This record of failure is indeed a sign of hope for social scientists trying to grapple with the problems of administrative accountability and nation building in Africa.

More importantly however, is the urgent and pressing need for African social scientists to set their own priorities, agendas, and indices of administrative accountability which reflect the perceptions of the concrete social actors in the global village drama for accumulation. Such an agenda would not be premised on attempting to solve the crisis of world capitalist accumulation in the 1980s but would revolve around the principle that development is for people. The most important index of accountability will therefore be popular participation. In operational terms, popular participation means procedural and structural mechanisms to enhance the managerial and productive capacities of rural workers and peasants to create opportunities to devise and develop alternative income generating activities, to provide an institutionalised process of giving the rural poor a better chance in reaping the benefits of development programmes, and to provide a process and method for people to bargain with development agencies. The very diffusion of decision making and political power would enhance the efficiency of the process of development by using the people's capabilities and reducing administrative overheads.

In Zimbabwe, the structural transformation, at the highest level of the state to bring about more active participation by the people, has been going on for the last five years. The struggle at hand now is to defend the structural gains of the first five years, and at the same time remove the inheritance of a particular type of administrative logic and ingrained procedural forms for implementing state policies. The next section of the paper will address these issues, outside the parameters of western global village thinking.

THE BURDEN OF HISTORY FOR THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATOR IN POST COLONIAL ZIMBABWE: ACT TWO SCENE ONE:

"Though Zimbabwe is only five years old, technically speaking it is much older than that".

- The Mayor of Harare at Reception welcoming delegates and participants to South-South Conference, Harare, 11th November, 1985.
The burden of history thrust upon the shoulders of the modern Zimbabwean administrator, is more challenging than that other famous 'White Man's Burden' so eloquently eulogised by Rudyard Kipling at the turn of this century. The weight of this burden however does not stem from the assumptions made by Western Scholarship about the nature of Man in Africa. The history of those attempts has a very short pedigree in his historical memory or collective unconscious: at most three generations. And in trying to measure the length of these generations - he does not need to be equipped with all the finest archaeological techniques for generational dating in Pre-Colonial African Oral historiography, to be able to clearly see that the colonial capitalist social order imposed on Zimbabwe did not bring about any kind of order in the people's life and culture. Attribution theory, be it in politics, economics, sociology or psychology is not going to help him identify the Beast that still blocks the potential for human development and the realisation of life-sustaining values in Zimbabwe. He also knows that this Beast still lives, though in a wounded form, north of the Limpopo. The realisation of all this of course does not really require much schooling or de-schooling on the part of the majority of Zimbabwe's populace. The weight of this historical burden on the modern Zimbabwean administrative officer regardless of his grading has however been transmitted through voluminous tomes, dissertations, libraries, philosophical treatises etc., in the West. More recently this weight was transmitted through the agency of the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, which though representative in part of centuries of social, economic, and political planning theories, theorems and models, was summarised into a few typed pages, that are easily portable in an elephant-skin briefcase. The brevity of this grand design, does not however in the least instance lighten the load. Our young modern administrator is all familiar with Polonius' adage: "BREVITY IS THE SOUL OF WIT". But unfortunately he would find nothing witty about the Lancaster House Constitution, or its appointed implementer in the dying days of 'illegal' settler colonialism - coming back six years later to publicly announce that statements about the need to change the style and structure of management in the private sector by the National Political Commissar were arrant nonsense, and distorted Zimbabwe's image amongst British robber barons/captains of industry, desperately in search of a way to revive the industrial revolution inorder to whet their now very expensive taste for profit and financial accumulation.

The modern Zimbabwean administrator's burden is also not lightened by a prevalent empiricist argument that he thinks in Shona and writes in English,
in other words what he writes whether in the form of rules, procedures, plans etc. is too summarised, unclear, abstract or theoretical, and needs to be elaborated, expanded etc. or even that he uses wrong and emotional imagery or illustration.

In short we need to be very clear that English is the lightest of the burdens thrust upon the shoulders of our young and modern Zimbabwean administrator. That point is however, often missed by those critiques of Zimbabwean society specialising in literary criticism. Thus in a review of Samuel Chimsoro's *Nothing is Impossible* by a certain Miss M.E. Tsuro we read:

"The author has a tendency to think in Shona and wrote in English. The reader is very much aware that English is a second language to the writer. Instead of this tendency being a structural strength to the novel (as is the case with Chinua Achebe and Soyinka's novels and plays) it is a weakness because the author is quite unconscious of this fact. For example:

Simbai sacrificed pleasure for the welfare of his twenty-eight member family. One might ask what fantastic things he did for his family which left him in a position that he could afford only to himself and clothe himself to the extent of being presentable. If one looked at his performance through the glasses of those who had, the means, he did not do much, but the little he did put his family on a strong foundation on the road to success"

Had this been in dialogue (Sic) form, the author would have got away with it, but this is in the third person narrative which exposes this weakness. It is all very well when it is in dialogue form, for example, when Muhondo says "Please go and peep at others at home": This type of thing introduces the reader into the African consciousness which is an advantage to the structural strength of the novel".

Not so fast Miss Tsuro, we cannot see how this type of thing can lead us to understanding our own consciousness, and we very much doubt whether it would achieve the same purpose for the expatriate academic tourists. For, 'home' 'musha' in our own unschooled understanding does not refer to a bungalow in the low density suburbs, peopled by a model of the Western nuclear family - but has a wider geographical and social meaning - which for the case of a patriotic district administrator would extend beyond the confines of his own household to the so-called 'bush' around him. We find it difficult in the cited text above, how 'Muhondo' could have told his questioner about the state of his twenty-eight member family, by just taking a 'peep', at their condition.

Of course, the struggle about language has brokecn the bounds of the classes on Teaching English as a Foreign Language to other fields of Scriptual endeavour - economics, politics, etc. - where what has been termed ideological debate has really been about the appropriate English terminology to describe emergent social and
economic forms and practices in post colonial Zimbabwe. This ideological debate has yet to enter biological discourse - i.e. the evolutionary patterns of these forms and practices and their purposive logic, so that the whole issue of 'novelty' is still one of much controversy.

The end of it all, however, is that Zimbabwean intellectuals, (a large percentage of which includes administrative officers) have danced around the conceptual Tower of Babel designed and created by western scholarship over the past 400 years or so, in a bewildering cacophony of unco-ordinated sound. The debate has also taken place amongst less vocal souls - but this has been more about the appropriate rituals and procedures with which to pay homage to that great western conceptual Tower of Babel. . In all this of course, the technical debate at its most basic level of formulating procedures and strategies, is more about the correct ritual forms on which to base implementable decisions. What is forgotten in all this, is that it is not rituals that create practice, but rather practice creates rituals. These rituals are then reproduced into institutional forms, It is, therefore, essential for the administrative officer to have a clear perception of the administrative logic of institutional forms created by the white settler administrative order in Zimbabwe. This logic was not about writing well articulated memoranda in the foreign language to the Head of the Ministry. No administrative order, however, is that rigid and totally blanketing to block out all initiative by the concrete social actors, to create informal styles of operation which coincide more with the needs and aspirations of those whose lives are most acutely affected by the decision making process. One would, therefore, expect that part of the historical burden that relates to illogical administrative procedures inherited through the protection of the settler Public Service in the Lancaster House Constitution has now been lightened. The Presidential Directive of 1980 solved, the problem of removing the personnel that created the dominant social practices and paradigms of British settler society. Most of the procedures still remain, but their removal will not be premised on action based on the notion that some administrators lack the purposive rationality of North American and West European social, economic and political science.

Western social science in Zimbabwe is now not just content to "take a peep" at our home but is trying to uncover and bare the whole core of our existence. But being thinking men like Hamlet we should now declare to the world at large, about the machinations of neo-colonialism - no matter its apparent and manifested form:
economic forms and practices in post colonial Zimbabwe. This ideological debate has yet to enter biological discourse - i.e. the evolutionary patterns of these forms and practices and their purposive logic, so that the whole issue of 'novelty' is still one of much controversy.

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Western social science in Zimbabwe is now not just content to "take a peep" at our home but is trying to uncover and bare the whole core of our existence. But being thinking men like Hamlet we should now declare to the world at large, about the machinations of neo-colonialism - no matter its apparent and manifested form:
"Call me what instrument you will, though you can fret me you cannot play upon me".

Perhaps then they would be no problem about administrative officers thinking about policy problems in Shona and writing official documents and memoranda in English. Shona thought is, however, based on experience of the real world outside the bureau, and the concrete situation of either the victims or beneficiaries of administrative decisions.

An enterprising English social anthropologist cum playwright, David Lan, has even gone further than the famous Professor Ranger's attempts to delve into the Zimbabwean soul. Some of his observations and utterances deserve some mention. Thus writing in the New Statesman of 18 October, 1985 in a feature entitled 'I was First First', he premises his feature article from some suspended cognition that:

"The Shona have practised spirit possession for centuries. The most important of their mediums are those possessed by the Mhondoro, the spirits of the long dead chiefs of the past. These spirits can predict the outcome of any event whether to do with politics, agriculture, sickness or war. It has long been the practice of chiefs to consult the spirits before making any major decision".25

Of course, the recognition of such historical facts, would not warrant the summoning of a national workshop to authenticate the credentials of our contemporary claimants to national mediumship.

Our young social anthropologists, however, is not content just to take a peep at this ancient institution of the Mhondoro, but probes further into the period of Zimbabwe's transition to full political economic and social independence. This is his thunderous verdict, based on his book called Guns and Rain - Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe:

"In trying to understand change it is always necessary to understand what has stayed the same. To a large extent the structures of belief and action that underly belief in the ancestors (the authority of male elders, the polluting power of female sexuality) have survived the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, from Police State to democracy. And yet without the support of the mediums, would it have been fascism that survived? Moreover, the political committees that briefly administered the villages immediately after the war included both women and young men and yet had the 'blessing' of the ancestors. It seems to me that belief in ancestors and in Utopias are mirror images".26

Yes indeed, Mr. Lan, there are indeed too many mirrors with varying distorting effects but we very much doubt that English social rationality no matter how understanding of the dynamics of our revolution will provide the mirror. All a peasantologist from the English global village will find in Zimbabwe will be reflections of his own history going back to the Utopia of Sir Thomas Moore or even of John Wycliffe. But perhaps western academic rationality should now end
end the whole project of trying to define for Zimbabweans either what is material well being or what is Utopia.

We will not dwell on the modalities for the 'bestowal of the blessing of the ancestors, which Mr. Lan says is responsible for saving us from fascism during our transition. Neither shall we proccupy ourselves with terminological labels scattered throughout the article, save to note that too many terminological inexactitudes have been made in the best of faith and in the furtherance of knowledge. Sadly enough, however, despite the good faith and scientific objectivity, such inexactitudes, have not advanced an understanding of concrete social realities as they have mainly taken the form of offerings at the altar of conceptual expediency.

More interesting, however, for our story of the modern administrative officer, trying to find appropriate informal procedures and structures to implement government policy in 1986, is the dialogue recorded by Mr. Lan. It matters little here whether this dialogue was in the first, second or third person, or even the French impersonal "on". Through some of the dialogue quoted in the article it is possible to trace a change in administrative logic - from that of Mr. Grosvenor, born in Maidstone Kent, whom he found still in place, but soon to be replaced in Mr. Lan's words by a "stocky young Shona in a good suit beaming confidence and pleasure as he sat at the desk from where for almost 90 years his enemies had ruled". Thus thundered Grosvenor Esquire D.C. of Bakasa, Zambezi Valley:

"Damn it, man, that post gets struck by lightning at least once a year. It had to be there during the war to bounce our signals down into the valley. I've advised very, very firmly not to budge. If they do, god help them. Anytime we have to push through something unpopular - and we'll have to, believe you me - some wild-eyed prophet will crawl out of a bush to say the ancestors won't wear it. They'd be fools to move that post. But then, god preserves fools, doesn't he?" (Emphasis Added).

Presumably in the logic of Mr. Grosvenor, the liberation war had killed off all the wise men in Zimbabwe. Mr. Lan's search for these living wisemen, was probably more fruitful - and presented itself in the form of a recorded dialogue in the files of the District office in a report written by a police sergeant, who had visited this wild-eyed prophet who had again crawled out of the bush.

"Then the sergeant gave some gifts of mealie meal, meat, beans, salt. He said: "when this post was built no one know this was your home. This took, some months to build so it can not take a few days to pull down. We also have our superiors who are responsible. Things will be
solved bit by bit, not with intimidation. As you are a spirit medium, you should realise this. We all learn by mistakes."  

There is thus a clear change in the administrative logic of the state, which Mr. Lan misses, though it was right under his nose. The action of the police sergeant to a less sensation-orientated person than our anthropologist/playwright, was no indication of the "structure of belief and action", but more of the new informal administrative logic of consultation and participation with the local community. These informal procedures have yet to be operationalised into rule books and formal by laws, but the structures for mass consultation have been laid both at the level of the party and state in the form of the ten-cell households, the village development, councils, ward development councils, district development councils etc. It is from the womb of these structures that an administrative logic for Zimbabwe's one party democracy will emerge.

A curious bureaucratic practice with regards to the dissemination of information, whose pedigree is difficult to trace in the Zimbabwean social environment, however, acts as an extra-burden for the modern Zimbabwean administrative officer. That burden relates to whole issue of access to consultancy reports, commissioned by aid donors, or which come in the technical aid package. As one observer noted in December, 1983:

".... Civil servants have considerable power in determining what impact consultancy has. Ultimately they can determine who undertakes the study, what the terms of reference are, how the final report is released, which recommendations are accepted and which rejected. It is common for senior civil servants to write a summary of the report for their ministers. This allows them to influence considerably how it is interpreted. It can be argued that this is not an acceptable political process in a country with Zimbabwe's history and aspirations."

More importantly, what is wrong is that this whole range of inquiries and investigations has to be conceived of as ultimately being "for the people". The confidential expert report approach conceives of people simply as objects of study, not as citizens. They enter the process in two stages - at the start when they are studied by the experts and at the end when the policies are imposed on them.

Now of course, as such observations are increasingly being made by government research workers and research administrators, there can be no telling of the wonderful and mysterious ways of the administrative logic of consultants from the West's scattered global villages. These soldiers of intellectual fortune are probably waiting for a pass word from their pay-clerks in the banking bureaus and vaults of the village either somewhere on Wall Street, Geneva (for the sake of anonymity of
the owner of the banking account) or in that other great village in the City of London. And by all intents and processes the watchword or password has been whispered by the World Bank policy analysts: "MISMANAGEMNT CRISIS REIGNS IN AFRICA FROM TOP TO BOTTOM". And in our further ignorance of the wonderful mysteries of Western man's administrative logic, we could also safely declare that it will not be long before it happens, or that it has already happened: Imperial socialists rather than social imperialists are busily devising Trotskyite strategies on initiating the neo-colonisation of Zimbabwe. And many consultancies on consultancies are being commissioned in order to measure the costs and benefits of consulting outsiders first on how to solve our own domestic disputes no matter what form of resolution they have taken: Violent or non Violent. We say this because in today's global village - the planet Earth - the line between political and technical advice is indeed thinner than the silicon wire of a computer with 1 billion kilobytes.

In a world in the words of Altaf Guahar [at the recent South-South Conference in Harare] threatened by nuclear - apartheid, political decisions are more than just economic decisions, but are also technical decisions. Clearly then the age of innocence is long over in Zimbabwe. This is not primarily because our burden of history is the 'Old Chip on the Shoulder' of Cockney drunken fame. This characterisation of the dynamics of the historical burden of the administrative officer in modern Zimbabwe has, therefore, been made in the best of faith, and not with the purpose of starting a project for a Zimbabwe National Lampoon of some existing intellectual practices in Zimbabwe.

The simple point this rather eclectic and lengthy historical prologue has attempted to make it that if Zimbabwean intellectuals are serious and sober about the tasks ahead in our development it is crucial that we first define our own problem as a family or national problem (depending on how one describes the nature of the state) before jumping onto theoretical high horses and tangential departures from the concrete social base. If defined as such, the procedures for consultation that are adopted are of paramount importance in trying to draw up any sort of input-output tabular ratios in political economy. As Dr. Joshua Nkomo forcefully put it in an interview with Z.T.V. crew following his 'friendly chat' with the now famous Lord Soames - the modalities for resolving Zimbabwe's problems have to be thrashed out by Zimbabweans themselves.

In a similar breath or vein conceptual problems about our transition to socialism can only be resolved by internal consultation amongst all Zimbabwean thinking men and women, regardless of their standard of formal or informal literacy or illiteracy. For, were western global villagers to decide that the quality of consultancy is a
factor in blockages in Zimbabwe's public administration system, it is very unlikely and even ridiculous for one to even imagine, that a foreign consultant can write himself out of job in the international civil service.

Even more basic to the thrust of this whole paper is that Zimbabwean administrators should stop prioritizing documents as though they were some mysterious paraphernalia of the Nganga's Chitundu museresere. Such practices hinder the democratization of information so vital for the intellectual development of those at lower rungs who have to implement the decisions described in those documents. That perhaps is the major administrative logic of our British settler heritage that has to be broken: that the poor are poor because they are illiterate or ignorant about life-sustaining values.

Another sort of danger that can emerge from the prioritization of documents has been very much in evidence during these first few weeks of January - the hunt for the Five Year National Development Plan, whose main impetus was stated in the Prime Minister's New Year Message. The publication of this speech in the dailies, and advertising on the Television Screens, has however, left our antiquarian powder monkeys cold. Seeing the Five Year National Development Plan and actually smelling the quality and texture of the paper is really a secondary consideration in the whole national planning exercise. But from reports in the press and from a purposeful examination of the Prime Minister's Speech, it is clear that the plan in no way negates the community values and aspirations of the majority of this country.

CREATING SPACE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LIFE SUSTAINING COMMUNAL VALUES: A ZIMBABWEAN VILLAGE DRAMA?

ACT TWO SCENE TWO

It is clear that by its very mandated nature, this workshop is not the appropriate forum for delving into the issue of what structural space, there exists in Zimbabwe's present institutional order for creating maximum accountability. All that is possible is to point out some of these spaces - between structures and procedures - that can lead to more efficient planning for development that transcend the petty bourgeois projects of Western municipal socialism touted by consultant project-mongers, and their fellow travelling professorial merchants.
Instead of reproducing some easily available documents relating to the country's local government structure and party structure. It will attempt to put the whole argument in a diagrammatic form. Previous models in Zimbabwe were based on Triangles, and the spurious writings and drawings that have graced our bookshelves have either attempted to justify some sort of triangular relationship - whether this was called the two pyramid policy or the horse and rider principle. The triangular project in the heads of imperialist social planners has, however, not been totally abandoned - there is still some faint hope that those who now occupy the apex of the triangle in the civil service by virtue of their educated talents can constitute a nodal point of reference for international capitalist accumulation. Broadening this apex would not make any sense, as the majority still lack any notions of western economic rationality, and do not talk the same language as the international captains of capitalist industry, but think in Shona.

Our diagrammatic representation of the structures that have to be integrated is constituted of two hexagrams - one representing Government Structures or agencies and the other Party structures - which constitute the platform from which the political technology for planning exists at all levels of society.

![Diagram of Government and Party Structures](image)

From the above simple diagrammatic representation the obstacle to effective integration of the two hexagrams should be self-evident. Less sophisticated souls prefer to describe this dividing wall as The Lancaster House Constitution. Within that walled space there is to be found the whole grey area of procedure. It is an area wherein state legislative activity cannot penetrate no matter how brilliantly the
The most important step in the creation of structural autonomous space for consolidating peoples power for national transformation in Zimbabwe, was announced on February 27, 1984, by the Prime Minister, Comrade Robert G. Mugabe. On that day he announced in Harare, government plans to establish new provincial structures aimed at "greatly increasing the involvement of ordinary people in the development of their own areas". These new structures, which included Village Development Committees, Ward Development Committees, Rural District Councils and Provincial Councils headed by Governors, were intended to bring about the following:

- "a more systematic implementation of each ministerial plan in so far as it applies to each of our administrative provinces.

- greater co-ordination between the various ministerial plans and functions in order to achieve a more efficient use of ministerial and local inputs in the accomplishment of set objectives;

- a comprehensive and more effective system of involving the local communities both horizontally and vertically in the process of planning and effecting their development, thus enabling Government to assess the development needs and priorities not only of the provinces but also of the district, ward and village areas within the province;

- a more efficient supervisory machinery over existing future programmes and projects undertaken in the accomplishment of set ministerial or local government plans;

- a more effective and co-ordinated system of self-reliance projects across the various ministerial areas;

- a greater emphasis on stimulation and acceleration of rural development in quantitative and qualitiative terms; and

- much needed decentralization of the planning and supervisory functions of Government!31

In our view, these structures indeed provide a basis on which to begin to formulate and affirm concrete community and communal life sustaining values for
measuring administrative accountability and for the reproduction of social relations that will guarantee mass participatory democracy.

More interestingly, however, these structures did not emerge from the Lancaster House Constitution, but from a purposeful search for space within the limits of the Lancaster Peace. It was a major achievement of social interpretation because clearly the Zimbabwean Government since independence has not seen the Lancaster House treaty, as ending the War of the Roses in Zimbabwe. It might have been so in England in 1485 but we cannot answer for the British state whether the system of political reconciliation worked out from medieval barbarism and now operating under the iron-hand of Margaret Thatcher, is the best political technology for the reproduction of the state formally created in Zimbabwe on 18 April, 1980, through our own blood and iron. Clearly from what we read in the papers, all is not well in that realm, and the natives have for long been restless. But an attempt to project the long hauled problems of transition from village to Empire are no good enough reason for us to see similar reflections or crises in our own political system. The English have long since been plagued by their own problems of developing a socially accountable state though they have developed through the management of public relations an effective system of legitimacy through the Westminster Parliamentary system. The problems of transition for the British state have remained as mysterious and as slippery as the famous Loch Ness Monster. This is clear from a simple counterposition of descriptions of England's transition from the medieval to the modern ethos in the twelfth century and the more troubled transition today, from Empire to nation state:

"The transition from the medieval to the modern ethos was far from complete in 1399. The spirits of Englishmen remained troubled by recurring plague, social unrest and cultural grouping".32

"The British no longer command the world stage. Their smaller dramas are nonetheless enthralling. Doubtless you are aware that we are in the midst of one of unsurpassed ferocity.

"We may be a great democracy, but we are not an open one. Our leaders are obsessed with secrecy and confidentiality. We are governed from behind closed doors".33

So much then for those who still hold out some hope for a decentralization and devolution of the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy in Zimbabwe down to the level of the village. These hopes for the legislative potential in Zimbabwe, have largely been nursed by press revelation of the Public Accounts Committee of the Zimbabwean Parliament. But in the absence of a clear
definition of the 'public' at all levels of our public administration, even if one were to be clever enough to try and have some kind of model of our ordinary village development committee having a mini Public Accounts Committee, this would not add a jot to the village administration's social accountability nor would it contribute to the building up life sustaining community values amongst the households represented in the VIDCO.

All that would be achieved in the long run by such an attempt at integrating the irreconcilables, would be the institutionalization of suspicion, rumour mongering, secrecy and closed door administration.

Looked at from another angle, it could also be said that, even if we internalise the ritual aspects of the Mother of Parliaments, there would be problems if we tried to internalise the administrative logic that has legitimised the House of Commons at Westminster.

There is no similar crisis of legitimacy about the state in Zimbabwe as there is in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The British state's contemporary crisis of legitimacy goes beyond Ian Douglas Smith's neo-classical crisis of capital accumulation from 11th November 1965 to the 17th of April, 1980. It is more encompassing, and those of us who learned to read and write English during that Dark and Barbaric stage of Zimbabwean history, still recall an even more intense global village drama and debate that rocked the British nation in the aftermath of Ian Douglas Smith's American-style Boston Tea Party a là Rhodesian style. The announcement of that great and momentous declaration of illegitimate British settler independence was accompanied with the solemnest of English dignity and ritual. Those of us, then entering high-school were asked on that fateful day to pack up our books and go home, and listen to the radio for a major speech by Prime Minister Smith.

In the course of struggle to define what was secret and confidential the public was to be treated to gauche attempts to censor opinion with the appearance of deleted headlines in the breakfast daily and great white yawning gaps of newsprint below those earth shattering headlines, guaranteed to ensure the security of the settler state.

Without attempting to put too fine a point to our whole argument and without sacrificing our perspective, we are correct in now assuming that the 'security'
Smith's bureaucracy tried to ensure was not our security, nor were the intellectual security forces that were the guardians of that very noxious and illegitimate spell of illegitimate British rule, guarding our security.

We can continue our own debate about what is illegitimate in present phenomenal forms in our ancient traditional civil society and social constitution, but the inherited practice of administrative officers of the state making it their mission in life to hide information meant to benefit the intellectual and physical development of the nation, is unforgiveable, if not treacherous.

Even if the same argument were to be presented in the very elegant academic terms of "the autonomy of the state" the inescapable point is that the 'autonomy' being protected is none other than that of western monopoly capitalism throughout the villagedom of Northern international professorial bureaucracy.

Recovering space for autonomous action to participate in the affairs of state at all levels, as called for by our Prime Minister on February 27, 1984, will not be achieved by constantly seeking the autonomy of other troubled states. That autonomy has not been about the famous two-party British democracy or the republican American democracy - but has been about by the entrenchment of a bureaucratic dictatorship over people's opinions and lives, whether this process occurs at the level of the most basic office rituals of signing memoranda etc. That very same bureaucratic dictatorship sometimes elevated to prohibitive procedural formulations, underlines the reliance by senior civil servants on international professional advice about how best to motivate the people of Zimbabwe for development.

That same faith in the administrative logic of western monopoly capitalism underpins the whole consultant business of attempting to establish a monopoly of the invisible accumulation of capital from the sale of technical services in Zimbabwe. And preventing access or even a peep at some of this policy advice is a strange mutation of this grand administrative logic of the bureaucratic mind of settler colonialism in Zimbabwe. It is also a reproduction of the white settler resource mentality, which took 80 years in Zimbabwe to fully acknowledge that people were the most important natural resource, and should therefore, fully participate in the making of decisions that affect their welfare, and about all projects that are likely to affect the whole drama of accumulation.

The whole drama of accumulation affects the households represented by the village development council and one does not need to crack one's head to find out that
unless people are consulted no plan, will work even if all the figures, and input-output ratios are correct. The failure of any such plan, would not be because villagers in Zimbabwe do not know how to count - inasmuch as any Transitional National Development Plan, is to be judged on correct 'macro-statistical projections of the growth rate.

Without attempting to put too fine a point to these arguments, one is, however, continually astounded by some of the arguments of some of our economic wizards namely that there is no economic theory on the face of this earth that can justify a one party social democracy in Zimbabwe. And regardless of the protestations about doing research in order to benefit the concrete social actors in the drama of accumulation such professorial indictments of the project for socialism in Zimbabwe are but the signs of a terrible hangover in some drunken African heads from the heady wines of Western social democracy.

The diagrammatic representation above, therefore, has been drawn, not in the spirit of that favourite conference/seminar/worshop activity of doodling. Rather it has been offered as an attempt to illustrate in some patterned order, the institutional configuration which can best lead to the creation of social accountability in public administration, at all levels.

The great project for integration in 1986, therefore, is not about integrating ethnic, or other types of anti-social attitudes, but rather to integrate the administrative structures created since independence, and the opinions of the majority. And the only social movement that has made that its life-time project is Z.A.N.U. (P.F.). The results of the last two elections amply demonstrated that the majority agreed with the party's own social planners, that Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) was the most appropriate forum or political technology for achieving the total good and welfare of our citizens. The problem about integration, unity at all levels of society and about the related problems of procedure, structures and implementation were succinctly solved in the words of Dr. Herbet Ushewokunze, Secretary for the Commissariat and Culture, Z.A.N.U. (PF):

"Government formulates its policy, puts it to the electorate and the public is enticed by its rightness and, at the polls, it is elected and the other contending parties lose simply because they have nothing comparable to offer. When, however, these minority parties want to join the majority party they must not ask for compromises because the majority has demonstrated that their policies are good and adequate."³⁴
The prospects for the integration of party structures and local government structures at the moment indeed seems healthy and auspicious, as the editorial of the Sunday Mail put it:

"One does not need to be a member of the party in order to be impressed by the increasing tendency towards more rigorous enforcement of discipline within ZANU (PF). It is only a strong and confident organisation that is able to publicly punish and even dispense with the services of those of its officials who commit acts of political indiscipline. The war declared in Manicaland by Cde. Tekere against corrupt and indisciplined elements within the party must be echoed in all the provinces".

That great tour-de force of noble sentimentality by the editorial team, is however, soiled by the poisoned pen of their resident village idiot or cynic or cartoonist J.G. whose cryptic comment on the events in Manicaland was:

"Bullies should listen to the Squatters".

I shall leave to you to ruminate on this point about administrative logic, and whether it is really in accordance with the editorial comment.

Finally and more serious, the plans announced by the Prime Minister on February 27, also threw down the gauntlet to all intellectuals and researchers in state or parastatal institutions, in the following; intention, of bringing about:

"a comprehensive and more effective system of involving the local communities both horizontally and vertically in the process of planning and effecting their development, thus enabling Government to assess the development needs and priorities not only of the provinces but also of the district, ward and village areas within the province".

That burden by extension would extend right up the chain of the bureaucracy to the bureaucratic villages run by Permanent Secretaries and their under Secretaries. The whole style of chiefdom even within the bounds of office routine and rituals ought to change from that of running staff meetings as a tutorial, wherein memoranda and other submissions by junior civil servants become English compositions classes where essays are marked for correct use of imagery or rooting out the emotional practice of thinking in Shona and writing in English.

What is more crucial at this conjunctual moment of our development for any professorial inclined bureaucrats is really to establish the spirit of enquiry and
and research, as a social movement. The model for such an intellectual movement exists in by far the most successful social movement of our times in Zimbabwe - our vanguard Party Z.A.N.U. (P.F.).

Any professorial wisdom, available in Zimbabwe's civil bureaucratic structures, should, therefore, be directed at consolidating such a social research movement within the structures laid out by the party - there is plenty of room at all levels. There is therefore, no need for our intellectuals to channel their efforts to making Zimbabwe a social science laboratory for model builders from western academic villages. The resulting drama would not only be comical, but would be more of a tragedy.

A new democratic socialist order can become a concrete reality in Zimbabwe, if social and public administrative practices are geared to ensure a free and non-commodified exchange of three basic rights and obligations or civic values between policy markers, implementers and the beneficiaries of the Five Year National Development Plan:

1. THE RIGHT TO BE CONSULTED
2. THE RIGHT TO ENCOURAGE
3. THE RIGHT TO WARN
NOTES AND REFERENCES


3. Ibid, pg 185


5. Ibid pg. 94


10. Ibid pg. 36

11. cited in Ibid Ibidem


15. Ibid pg. 107.

16. Ibid pg. 107


18. D. Leonard op. cit pg. 108

19. For a discussion of some of these issues see T.D. Shopo, Rethinking Parliament's Role in Zimbabwe ZIDS Working Paper No. 3.


21. Ibid pg. 38
22. Ibid pg. 39
23. Ibid pg. 44
25. David Lan, 'I was First, First' in New Statesman 18 October, 1985 pg. 23.
26. Ibid pg. 24
27. Ibid pg. 23
28. Ibid Ibidem
29. Ibid.
34. Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, Secretary for the Commissariat and Culture, ZANU PF, 'Yes To Unity, No to Concessions' The Sunday Mail, January 19, 1986.
36. Provincial Governorship of Zimbabwe.

TDS/Pvm.