


**A COMPARISON OF GOVERNANCE OF SOME  
COMMUNITY BASED WOODLAND AND WETLAND  
PROJECTS WITH GRAZING SCHEMES IN  
MASVINGO PROVINCE, ZIMBABWE**

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# **A Comparison of Governance of Some Community Based Woodland and Wetland Projects with Grazing Schemes in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe**

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## **Introduction**

Community based woodland and wetland projects may be defined as specified woodland and wetland resources owned, managed, utilized and controlled by a defined group (community). An example of a group could be households in a kraal under a specific kraalhead. Grazing schemes were defined by Cousins (1988) as interventions aimed at, firstly, improving livestock productivity in communal areas, and secondly, conserving the vegetation cover of grazing land and reducing the risk of environmental degradation. A description and analysis of governance of grazing schemes in Zimbabwe with emphasis on those in Masvingo province was undertaken in the first part of this series of papers (Mugabe et al., 2001). The analysis revealed that problems of governance were still prevalent in most grazing schemes. Some of the problems identified were inadequate collective choice arrangements, poor definition of scheme beneficiaries, lack of congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, no application of graduated sanctions and ineffective conflict resolution mechanisms.

Cousins (1992) also reported that attempts to implement grazing schemes had always resulted in conflicts within local communities, between scheme members and excluded members, and between local communities and the state. In the analysis by Mugabe et al. (2001) it was noted that boundaries between grazing schemes and adjacent communal areas were known but not respected. To this end, Guveya and Gwata (1998) concluded that this was partly because grazing land in the communal lands had become an open access resource. This arose partly because no sanctions were imposed after boundaries had been violated or the grazing land abused.

In this paper, governance in community based woodland and wetland management projects in Masvingo Province will be reviewed. The intention is to identify similarities and difference in governance with those of grazing schemes. However, governance in grazing schemes will not be reviewed as this was done in previous publications (Cousins, 1996; Mugabe et al., 2001). Ultimately an analysis will be done to determine any lessons that could be applied to improve governance in grazing schemes.

## **Analytical Framework**

We recognize that the success of a grazing scheme or any natural common property resource is dependent on ecological and technical characteristics, socio-economic structure, power structures and institutional arrangements (Cousins 1993). In this paper, we will mainly address the power structures and institutional arrangements, which are related to governance.

## **Principles of Good Governance**

Ostrom (1990) discussed eight design principles that characterize common property resource (CPR) institutions. These design principles relate to governance, since a design principle is an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success of these

institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the rules in use. These design principles are:

1. *Clearly defined boundaries*: individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resources from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must be the boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. *Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions*: appropriator rules restricting time, place, technology and quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material and/or money.
3. *Collective choice arrangements*: most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
4. *Monitoring*: monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. *Graduated sanctions*: appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions depending on the seriousness and content of the offence, by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators or by both.
6. *Conflict resolution mechanism*: appropriators and officials have access to low-cost arenas to resolve conflicts.
7. *Minimal recognition of rights to organise*: the rights of appropriators to devise their own institution are not challenged by external government authorities.
8. *Nested enterprises*: appropriation provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

In this paper these design principles will be referred to and used as the "principles of good governance".

## **Case studies of Governance in Community-based Woodland and Wetland Management Projects in Masvingo Province**

Three woodland and wetland projects in Masvingo Province were studied. These were Mapendere Woodland Management Project, MaPLAN Wetland Management Project and Bika Woodland Management Project. We interviewed leaders, and committee and ordinary members of the projects. Ordinary members were randomly selected from the lists of members presented by the projects. In general, we interviewed the kraalhead, at least two committee members and at least two ordinary members in each of the projects. Where the committee had men only, we deliberately selected at least two women (ordinary members) for the interview in each project. The interviews were informal but a check list of issues to be followed up had been drawn up from literature. We observed the state of the infrastructure (e.g., parity of fences), the conditions (e.g., ecological) of the wetland, woodlands, water resources, and activities in the area in an attempt, among other things, to verify claims from interviewees. Additional information was obtained from external agents associated with the projects and literature.

# **1. Mapendere Woodland Management Project**

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## **Initiation**

This project, which was started in the early 1990s, is situated in Charumbira communal lands of Masvingo District. According to Matuvhunye and Munyanyi (1999) the project was initiated after the two villages of Mapendere and Pasi noticed a rapidly increasing degradation of part of a micro-catchment. This was manifested through the loss of trees, grass and other vegetation and the development of a gully around a spring. This spring was an important recharge area for the village gardens downstream. The area was also an important source of reeds for making baskets and mats, which were important sources of income. Market gardening was another important income generating activity. The two village communities decided to protect the micro-catchment to be assured of a continuous water supply that was being threatened by the degradation.

A committee was formed and was tasked to approach the Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe for assistance. Forestry Commission then donated barbed wire and poles to fence off the 16-hectare area. The committee of the project is chaired by kraalhead Mapendere. He appeared to be the dominant force behind the project. A constitution was formulated by the Forestry Commission was generally not applied.

According to the Forestry Commission (Masvingo Forestry Extension Services, 1997) there were 60 members in the project. During the interviews we conducted, we noted that only 18 members were registered and active. The joining fee was Z\$5.00, which some of the members interviewed claimed they could not raise.

The project has succeeded in rehabilitating the degraded land, regenerating the grazing and resuscitating the wetland. Fruit trees such as bananas and citrus have been introduced to the wetland to speed up the healing of the gully. Community members are no longer walking long distances in search of water. There is water for drinking and gardening, benefiting both project members and non-members. Reeds and sedges for craftwork are available. Bee keeping has been introduced as a catalytic move for conservation of the woodland because bees provide short interim benefits to the community. Poles are being sold for building cattle kraals and for firewood. Part of the woodland is being developed for livestock grazing by members of the project.

There is some division of labour. Women are responsible for collecting manure for the tree nursery and preparing food when people are working on the woodland. Men are responsible for fencing and provision of security, especially to prevent poaching of timber and sedges from the woodland.

We identified problem areas related to governance. Cooperation, especially between kraals, appeared to be weak. Some of the members of the community who were interviewed were not happy with the name "Mapendere" for the project, as it was associated with an individual member of the community (kraalhead Mapendere). Kraalhead Mapendere was more active than kraalhead Pasi. He appeared to be the visionary of the project and all activities centred around him. Kraalhead Mapendere had this to say: "I call upon the people of Zimbabwe to conserve their sacred places and forests so that wildlife returns, otherwise future generations will see these animals in books like what is happening in other countries". However, because of domination by kraalhead Mapendere, members of the project from Mapendere kraal were cutting down trees and grazing their livestock without the project community consensus. There were complaints that the constitution was not being adhered to. The youth in the area were not involved in this project.

## Analysis of governance in Mapendere Woodland Project

The role of the Forestry Commission was advisory and facilitatory which gave the community the right to organize. The project has clearly defined boundaries. Membership of the project was clearly defined but some benefits such as irrigation water also accrued to the entire community, and not just to project members. The dwindling number of paid up members was, however, a cause for concern. This may have indicated some internal resistance to the idea of paying for a natural resource. This could be interpreted as a violation of Ostrom's principle of congruence between appropriation rules and local conditions.

There was evidence that collective choice arrangements, monitoring, application of graduated sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms were limited or weak. The constitution included all these aspects but adherence to the constitution was not evident.

The violation of the rules of the project by members from Mapendere kraal and the frustration of the Pasi people brings into question the effectiveness of monitoring and collective choice arrangements, imposition of graduated sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms. We had the impression that the dominance of kraalhead Mapendere was to the detriment of democratic processes in the project. It is inconceivable how the project will be governed in the event of the departure of kraalhead Mapendere. The people of Mapendere seemed to be taking advantage of the dominance of their kraalhead to secure a greater share of the benefits from the scheme, if not abuse the woodland. The Pasi people did not seem to have any recourse since their kraalhead was not as imposing as kraalhead Mapendere.

Despite these problems, the project demonstrated a variety of benefits that can accrue to the community. The obvious material benefits could be used to motivate community members and promote sustainability of the project. Failure to involve the youth was a weakness. Involving the youth could lead the project to posterity and continuity since all age groups in the community would be conscious of the purpose and benefit of the project.

## **2. MaPLAN Wetland Project**

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This project is one of several projects in Chief Charumbira's area in Masvingo District. The various projects in the area form the MaPLAN Conservation Union.

### Initiation

The MaPLAN Wetland Project was claimed to be the brainchild of Mr. Makasi, a community member. Mr. Makasi discussed the issue of land degradation, deforestation and unavailability of water with the councillor, Member of Parliament, and community elders in the area. The community then approached the Forestry Commission, the Department of Natural Resources, AGRITEX (agricultural extension department), the Ministry of National Affairs and Employment Creation, and the MaPLAN council of elders, which is in charge of the MaPLAN Conservation Union. The project was started in 1990.

## Power structures and institutional arrangements

Four kraals are participating in the project. The project is governed by a constitution prescribed by the MaPLAN Conservation Union. The constitution and union concept were the brainchild of the Association of Zimbabwean Traditional Conservation (AZTREC), a non-governmental organization.

The constitution prescribes a hierarchy of committees. It states, among other things, the objects, membership, committees, office bearers, and scheduling of meetings. The constitution is, in our view rather elaborate and has the following objectives, among others:

1. To preserve and protect the traditional way of life in Charumbira and Zimbabwe as a whole
2. To rehabilitate vlei and spring wetlands reclaim gullies and manage woodlands (sacred and ordinary)
3. To establish an eco-tourism industry through conservation of flora and fauna and establishment of a cultural village
4. To raise and source funds from states, donors, regional and international authorities, individuals and others to support community projects.

Membership in any of the projects within the union is open to local citizens interested in traditional environmental conservation. All ages and gender should be considered for membership. Members pay a joining fee of Z\$80-00, and groups (projects) contribute Z\$60-00 per year as a membership fee which would be used as emergency funds. Membership could be terminated by non-payment of subscriptions, majority vote of the Council of Elders or at the Annual General Meeting. The project is served by several committees namely: the council of elders, the implementation committee and group committees. There is also a disciplinary committee and a youth committee.

The council of elders is composed of the chief who is the chairperson, headmen, kraalheads and influential elders. The Chairperson appoints a secretary who represents him in the implementation committee. The council of elders is the supreme authority in the projects and has responsibility for financial management and control in the projects and appointing a coordinator. The chief always signs for any withdrawal of funds but two other signatories are also required.

The implementation committee has a two-year term of office unlike the council of elders, which is somewhat permanent. This committee is responsible for supervision, monitoring and evaluation of project activities, among other responsibilities. The chairperson of this committee should be a group committee chairperson. All the chairpersons of group committees are members of the implementation committee. The implementation committee supervises a secretariat that is led by the coordinator.

Group committee terms of office and structure are similar to those of the implementation committee. The committee is elected by group members at kraal level and has responsibilities similar to those of the implementation committee but at group level (village project level). The group committee is responsible for local environment conservation activities. The MaPLAN Wetland Project is an example of a group, run by a group committee. Mr Makasi, who was instrumental in the initiation of the project, is the chairperson of the group.

The disciplinary committee chancels, and attends to the grievances of members of the Union. It is led by the chief (Chairperson of the Council of Elders) and is comprised of respected elders and the chairperson of the implementation committee.

The youth committee has the same terms of office as the group committees. The chairperson is a member of the implementation committee. The committee compiles all youth projects and its members serve as tour guides for project visitors. It also assists in the implementation of projects at group level.

Some benefits have accrued to the community. The water source has been conserved and does not dry up during the dry season. Reeds and medicinal herbs are being harvested from the area. The grass is used for thatching and grazing is available for use by livestock. Fishponds and vegetable gardens have been established. Siltation has been minimized. Water in pools is valued for church baptisms. The area is visibly rehabilitated with resurgence of tree and reed growth.

Moyo (1997) reported some strengths that were noted by participants at a workshop who visited the MaPLAN conservation project. There was active traditional leadership and a high level of community commitment. Community efforts were fuelled by strong links to tradition and culture. This respect of tradition appeared to unite people in the area. During our interviews we made similar observations and discovered that the wetland was regarded as a sacred place. The involvement of youth was encouraging and a unique feature of the project.

Some concerns about the project and its weaknesses were presented to us. There was some misunderstanding within the community. Some members said that there was too much interference from AZTREC. Political differences (factionalism) had become so serious that project operations had been suspended in 1999. Although Mr Makasi was the chairman, the secretary was said to have taken a leading role for political reasons. Enforcement of by-laws was at times executed by the chief's security guard and not from within the community. This did not go down well with some members of the project.

Moyo (1997) also reported some weaknesses in the conservation project in general. There were weaknesses in record keeping and the evaluation of project activities. There was no equity in project activities, for example, gardens. Individual gardens were disproportionate in size and this was neither desirable for equity nor for conservation of land.

### Analysis of Governance in the MaPLAN Wetland Project

Most of the principles of good governance are satisfied in the MaPLAN wetland project. There are strong nested enterprises and monitoring. However, the hierarchical committee structure appears to be somewhat alien to the community. Complaints of too much interference by AZTREC could be an indication of a violation of Ostrom's design principle on the minimum recognition of the community's right to govern. If AZTREC is excessively involved, there is a danger of the project collapsing when it pulls out, as seen in many grazing schemes. The numerous committees and the existence of a secretariat can easily swell up the overhead costs and threaten the survival of the project.

The conflicts due to political differences seem to have permeated the committees, all the way down from the council of elders to group committees. We believe that the hierarchy of committees would normally facilitate conflict resolution but in this case, a complex scenario was created. National and provincial government politics filtered down through the committees to the members in the projects. These developments led to the suspension of

project activities. This shows that existence of a hierarchy of committees can result in mixed agendas and manipulation of members of a project to the advantage of certain individuals.

The dominance of the traditional leaders and the linkage of the project to the preservation of sacred forests and ancestral spirits brought respect to the project. Unfortunately, this led to a problem of poor congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. There was more preservation than a balance of preservation and utilization. The communities worked very hard but they seemed to get little tangible returns. It was noted that there was inadequate fodder for livestock for the dry season, despite under-utilization of the grazing resources in the wetland conservation project. This is not sustainable and is unwise because if members do not get some benefits there is no reason for them to maintain their membership. According to Murphree (1991), there must be a positive correlation between quality and quantity of management and the magnitude of benefit

### **3. *Bika Woodland Management Project***

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This is situated near Bondolfi Mission in Masvingo District about 25 km south of Masvingo town. The project is in headman Bika's area and is located in Chibaya village.

#### Initiation

This project was started in the mid 1980's but activities were stepped up in 1989, when serious efforts were put in place to arrest the development of a gully. Massive community mobilization about the impending danger of the developing gully through the powerful traditional leadership resulted in the reduction of disorganized farming activities in the gully area. Headman Zvashura Mazvidza Bika was the man behind the successful implementation of the project.

After banning of farming along the gully area, 27 hectares of land surrounding the gully were fenced off in 1992 when the community received fencing material from the Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe. The villages that were affected by the fencing off of the gully were relocated. The fenced off area was originally a sacred place and the custodian of the local community's culture and traditions. Efforts to protect the sacred wetland were said to have started in the 1940s but these efforts had been disturbed by settlement in the area during the colonial era and liberation war.

#### Power structures and institutional arrangements

A project committee was established at the initiation of the project and headman Bika was chosen to lead this committee. Headman Bika stepped down as chairman in 1997 due to poor health. He is said to have commanded a great deal of respect in the area.

Within the project area were crop fields and gardens. The affected community members were asked to stop using them and compensation was agreed on. A consolidated community garden was established and a borehole was to be sunk outside the project area to give an alternate water source to a well that was in the project area. The movement of people and relocation of gardens and fields out of the area created some conflicts with a neighbouring village but were quashed by headman Bika. An individual who was living near the project area had to be displaced and this was done through the community leadership.

The Forestry Commission compensated the displaced person. A borehole was drilled but not to the right depth due to administrative problems. It has not been completed to date; hence, water has to be fetched from a stream in the woodland, some 50 metres from the garden.

Some benefits have accrued to the community. Firewood is now available, and poles and grass for building can be harvested from the woodland. Water for irrigation of gardens is now available. Traditional healers are also getting herbs from the woodland. The project has succeeded in reclaiming the gully, regenerated the vegetation and may have improved biodiversity.

There are some concerns about the Bika woodland management project. The project does not appear to have had an impact on the management of other woodland areas in the Headman Bika's area. The trend towards degradation in these other woodlands is apparent but the communities are not taking action to control or contain the degradation. The utility of the project to the community does not appear to have been emphasized. The village elders keep on emphasizing the spiritual and ancestral importance of the project and for this reason the community has not been successful in its request that the project area be used for the grazing of livestock.

### Analysis of Governance in Bika woodland management project

This project demonstrates the power of traditional leaders and ancestral and spiritual beliefs. Considering the principles of governance, boundaries were clearly defined. Monitoring, imposition of sanctions and conflict resolution were evident. However, all these activities centred on headman Bika. Collective choice arrangements appeared to be limited. The refusal by the village elders to allow livestock to graze in the project area despite pleas from the community is a good example. This creates the impression that the custodians of the wetland project are not the community members but the headman and the village elders.

Reporting on the project, Matuvhunya and Munyanyi (1997) noted that traditional institutions could be very powerful entry points and effective tools for project implementation. In addition, traditional institutions centre around individuals (the traditional leaders) and this could bring complications. Should the leader die or is incapacitated, there will be far reaching impacts on the project as "the centre" will no longer hold. It is also possible for the leader to direct things for his personal glory. People can get frog marched into projects they do not believe in. Other lessons were that sentimental values (spiritual/aesthetic) do not always excite young people who have the energy to work. They also present contradictions of using modern technologies "to get back to the past". Measurements of direct benefits become problematic. Ideally, a project should be designed to address the genuine needs of the people. In addition, the empowerment of target groups is important in handling socio-economic cultural dynamics and project management. The ultimate lesson from the Bika woodland management project is that the protection of a project area can create an ownership and accounting stance, which leads to evident physical outputs.

The Bika woodland management project did not demonstrate nested enterprises, as is considered ideal. This may not have been necessary because of the dominance and general acceptance of the traditional leadership. The headman's judgement appeared to have been accepted as final in all instances.

## **Comparison of Governance in Grazing Schemes and in the Three Woodland and Wetland Projects**

The governance comparisons made here are not exhaustive. They relate to the community based natural resource management projects we reviewed. Ultimately, the essence of the comparison is to identify strengths in the CBNRM regimes that could be useful in improving governance in grazing schemes (our main interest).

In all the three woodland and wetland projects, boundaries were clearly defined. This is not like most grazing schemes where the issue of boundaries, especially between the grazing schemes and adjacent communal areas has been a cause of conflict. The dominance of traditional leaders and the ancestral and spiritual attachment to woodland and wetland projects appears to have promoted respect for boundaries. In the management of these resources, benefits accruing to the community are generally not conditional or dependent on ownership of resources such as cattle. These community resources are often required by all the community members. This reduces potential areas of conflict.

In both grazing schemes and woodland/wetland projects there was limited congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. In the woodland/wetland projects benefits that should have been realised by the community were not being offered fully despite the availability of resources. There appeared to be more emphasis on protection and not balancing protection and utilisation. Most communities were working hard in the management of the natural resources but their livestock were not being allowed to utilise the grazing available.

In the grazing schemes considered there was evidence of structures allowing for collective choice arrangements. In the woodland/wetland projects there appeared to be less of this due to the pivotal and dominant roles of traditional leaders. Ultimately the impression created was that the traditional leaders were the custodians of the common property resources, especially woodlands. This custodianship had some implied ownership of the resource by the traditional leadership. Sanctions could thus be imposed on violations of boundaries or abuse of the common property resource. As long as ancestry spiritualism and traditional leaders were still respected, the common property resource was likely to be respected. Of concern was the limited involvement of youth, except in MaPLAN. If the youth are not involved it is doubtful whether they will continue to respect the traditional leadership, ancestral attachment and spiritualism required to take the common property resources into "eternity".

Monitoring in grazing schemes has mostly been weak. This has not been the case with the woodland/wetland resources which have been monitored closely. The security guards of the traditional leaders have been actively involved in policing. The intervention by the security guards and the existence of the kraalheads and headman's courts allow for imposition of sanctions on abusers of the common property resources. Such "courts" are not apparent in grazing schemes because the powers of traditional leaders were normally within the orbits of the grazing committees.

Woodland and wetland projects appear to have strength in being able to compose graduated sanctions and in conflict resolution mechanisms. These were rather deficient in most grazing schemes. It appears that the pivotal role played by traditional leaders provided for the imposition of sanctions and for conflict resolution.

In both grazing schemes and woodland/wetland projects there was some evidence of minimal recognition of rights to organise. Most external agents that have assisted grazing schemes have insisted on the formation of grazing scheme committees to organise activities

within the schemes. Regulatory frameworks to allow for democratic process have been established in virtually every grazing scheme. The communities may have failed to follow the guidelines but the regulatory framework exists. The reasons for communities not following guidelines that are intended to empower them to organise themselves may be the result of the guidelines deriving from external agents. The suggested guidelines or proposed institutions could have been alien to the community. Institutions proposed by external agents may not relate to traditional institutions. In the woodland/wetland projects we noted that institutions were organised around traditional leaders. External agents such as the Forestry Commission appeared to play advisory and technical roles. Perhaps, the institutions' tasks should be centred around traditional leaders. Such an institution is easily understood and respected by the community.

In some grazing schemes and woodland/wetland projects nested enterprises were evident. Some of these enterprises were complex with a hierarchy of committees as in the MaPLAN Conservation Union and in the World Vision assisted grazing schemes in Mashonaland Central Province (Paradza, 1990; Mugabe et. al., 2001). It appears that multiple layers of enterprises can bring risks to the operation of projects. Conflicts at a high level can filter down to the ground and cause problems at the operational level. The woodland projects, Mapendere and Bika, were run by committees that were led by traditional leaders. The committees seemed to be effective despite the absence of higher authorities.

It appears that inclusion of traditional leaders in committees could be effective provided the traditional leaders can be allowed to exercise their traditional powers in the event of an impasse.

## **Conclusion**

The woodland/wetland projects had clearly defined boundaries. The dominance of traditional leaders and the ancestral and spiritual attachment to these natural resources appear to have promoted respect for boundaries. Distribution of benefits in the projects was rather limited despite the abundance of resources. Thus, there was overemphasis on protection of resources instead of balancing resource protection and utilization. Collective choice arrangements were limited to the dominant role of traditional leaders.

Monitoring, imposition of graduated sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms in CBNRMs were generally effective. The pivotal role played by traditional leaders provided for the imposition of sanctions and for conflict resolution.

There was some evidence of minimal recognition of rights to organize in the woodland/wetland projects. However, institutions were organised around traditional leaders. External agents had a rather peripheral advisory, technical role. In some woodland/wetland projects nested enterprises were evident, such as the hierarchy of committees in the MaPLAN conservation project. It appears that a multiple of enterprises can bring risks to operation and survival of projects. The simple committee headed by a traditional leader was effective in Mapendere and Bika suggesting that inclusion of traditional leaders with full powers to adjudicate is desirable.

Governance of the woodland CBNRMs differed from that of grazing schemes with regard to the role of traditional leaders and sentimental values. In the woodland/wetland projects traditional leaders played a pivotal role, which facilitated the definition of boundaries, imposition of graduated sanctions and conflict resolution. It was evident that traditional institutions could be powerful entry points and effective tools for project implementation and management. Traditional leaders have not always been included in all grazing schemes

and at times their power within grazing scheme committees has been dictated by constitutions (often drafted by external agents). Adjudication of powers of traditional leaders in most grazing schemes do not appear to have been respected and are often dampened by the presence of local governance politicians (e.g., Councillor).

The spiritual and ancestral value of woodland and wetland resources is not often associated with grazing schemes. There is need to evaluate the potential benefits that could be derived from the protected woodlands. Woodland grasses and trees could be harvested for feeding livestock during the dry season if grazing of livestock in the sacred woodlands is considered sacrosanct. This could be a practical option considering that most woodland conservation projects have been successful.

Some of the projects do not involve the youth. This should be considered as it promotes project posterity. It appears that multi-layered enterprises can bring the risk of excessive control, which may not be desirable. Nested enterprises are likely to succeed if they are within the established and well-known traditional governance structures.

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