TOWARD THE FIRST DAYS: Notes on Public Sector Priorities

by Reginald Herbold Green

To plan is to choose. Choose to go forward.
- J.K. Nyerere

Time past is perhaps contained in time present and time present in time future ... all time is irredeemable ...
- T.S. Eliot

Of Periods and Priorities

When discussing public sector strategy and tactics it is necessary to have three questions in mind:

1. What is necessary in terms of immediate targets?
2. How is it possible to carry out what is necessary?
3. Where will the immediate steps take one in respect to strategic goals, ie clearly open up new steps toward them, neutral, create obstacles.

These questions must be asked because time, knowledge and personnel will be the most valuable and scarcest resources available to Namibia's Party, state and public sector. If they are not asked bits of the presently desirable will be done, and pieces of the necessary left undone; the important will be attempted by impossible routes and the short-term will either become a barrier to the long-term, or the possibilities it opens up will pass unseen and unused.

There is nothing abstract about these comments. First, they are based on twenty years of advisory and operational experience in African public sectors (and on what the author, now sadder, if perhaps not wiser, sees as his own mistakes just as much as those of others). Second, they relate to the concrete context of Namibia.
prior to, at and over the years immediately following independence. Third, because they are related to Namibia they exist in a specific context of ecology, political economy and history domestically and of geo-political relations (including, but not limited to, location) and the global political economic system of the last quarter of the twentieth century (and its present clear and continuing crisis).

Further, there are - even within this perspective - four distinct periods:

1. From now until a constitutional assembly is elected;
2. from that election to independence;
3. the first eighteen months of independence;
4. the ensuing three years.

What must and what can be done within each period varies. It is no criticism of *Towards Economic Development Strategy Options for Independent Namibia* to warn that much of what it proposes cannot be implemented until after the end of the fourth period. That does not render it irrelevant. Technically longer-term goals and target frameworks are necessary if short-term decisions and actions are to avoid needless future costs. Politically (or more accurately political economically) a strategic frame must look beyond a set of crises and transitional periods, even though immediate action within that strategy must concentrate on survival, consolidation, selective steps forward and working out the tactics for advances in the future, not an attempted leap from the present to the long-term future ignoring intervening deserts, canyons and mountains. Psychologically crisis management does not afford - by itself - an adequate basis for mobilisation; it must be linked to fuller and longer-term goals and "payoffs" - and, by the same token, must seek to include clear and present evidence of progress toward them.
That said, one element in strategy is identifying what is to be done at given time periods. The following notes seek to do this in respect to each of the time periods and, more particularly, in respect to certain key themes. These do not exhaust what is desirable because not all that is desirable is possible. Nor do they cover routine activities and those (eg police, prisons, courts, security forces) on which the author has no expertise. There may well be commissions but to be blunt, the list already errs on the side of demanding more than can be done. If new priorities are to be added there will have to be cutbacks on some of those suggested. In no sense are the suggested approaches under the priorities definitive - they claim no more than to be apparently consistent with first steps toward stated SWAPO objectives and potentially feasible.

Today to Assembly: Planning and Preparation
The key constraint in this period is very limited ability to act on the ground in Namibia in the normal public sector (governmental and parastatal) sense. That will presumably remain true even during the cease fire/election period (especially given the over-riding organisational and electoral priorities which SWAPO must place first).

The key advantage is that there is - ironically - more time to reflect and to develop parameters for strategy, policy, institutions and programmes. Later (at least until eighteen months after independence) the need to act to deal with today will compete even more strongly with forming and revising medium term strategy, policy and institutions. This is not a very good thing - ability to test proposals against a broad spectrum of Namibian workers and peasants opinion and also against concrete realities (in Namibia and in terms of what can be negotiated/secured externally in specific areas) is limited. But it is a thing which will be forgotten now at the cost
of confusion and muddle later.

The priorities now are:

a. developing a strategic framework and broad lines of action within it;

b. articulating what the public sector must do (or is likely to have to do5) when and how this might be accomplished;

c. maximising buildup of Namibian personpower (the more familiar word manpower is deliberately not used) on a basis and time scale corresponding to (and checked against) the strategy and the initial public sector priorities;

d. systematically building up community (camp, settlement) level experience (in services, production, organisation) not only because it provides a foundation for future public and command/co-operative sector action later as well as a test (which should be used) on what is desirable and practicably as seen by typical Namibians7;

e. lining up particular external skills and resources - whether in terms of individuals or states or organisations or enter­prises - and laying a basis for speedy action, on key external negotiations after independence.

Transitional Period

There does not appear to be a coherent, articulated view on how the public sector of Namibia is to operate from the election of the Constitutional Assembly to independence. This is not a case in which it is practicable, let alone wise, to let sleeping dogs lie as they will assuredly wake up after the election and probably prove to be rabid.

a. to continue South African administration (even with nominal
UNTAG supervision) is implausible since the election result will have repudiated them in a way quite different from the normal last stage colonial transition period; nor can operation under existing laws be envisaged seriously - first, substantial total laws and elements in most are obnoxious and second, much of the legislation is suitable only for a semi-integrated part of South Africa, not for a separate territorial unit.

The most evident way forward would be:

a. to secure for the Constitutional Assembly the power to serve as an interim Legislative Assembly to amend/repeat/enact as necessary without prejudice to the ultimate constitutional provisions;

b. in preparation therefore SWAPO (via UNIN or the Nationhood Programme) to secure proposed draft laws and amendments to fill gaps and to remove obnoxious acts/provisions;

c. to secure power to the Constitutional Assembly to appoint a Supervisory Committee (interim cabinet) - if necessary made up in proportion to party representation in the Assembly - with powers to issue policy directives to and supervise the public sector (civil services and parastatals);

d. to provide that the Supervisory Committee may appoint a limited number of "additional" senior civil servants/managers to each Ministry/Department/Corporation;

e. to identify one or more Namibians (or if necessary expatriates chosen by SWAPO) to serve as "policy auditors" under "d." and to negotiate with UNTAG for a parallel group of more technically specialised personnel;

f. under "a." and "c." to enact exchange control regulations in
particular with respect to all payments/transfer to South Africa except those for current purchases or out of current personal incomes, and to require separate accounting and management for all Namibian branches of South African para-statals;

g. to secure termination of all appeals from Namibian to South African courts as of the election date (preferably as of the cease fire date) and the appointment of a new "Supreme" Court (final appeal court) in Namibia staffed by justices nominated to it by the International Court of Justice;

h. to secure the appointment of a Director of Public Prosecutions and of a Chief Parliamentary draftsman to replace the South African manned incumbents as of the date of the election and to be named by the presiding judge of the ICJ and the Secretary General of the Commonwealth respectively.

These are in sense minimal proposals - major as they are and hard as they will be to negotiate. They are the minimum needed to avoid the systematic sabotage of the territory by the public sector, a massive flight of funds, and a judiciary/prosecutary process inimical to a smooth transition to independence. Each is - and can be shown to be - reasonable in constitutional, legal and administrative terms and the lay legal appointments are proposed to be made by persons (or institutions) of substance or independence. The total impact is somewhat analogous (although less sweeping at least in principle) than the 1974-75 transitional period arrangements in Mozambique.

The Initial Days: Averting Collapse, Consolidating, Laying Foundations

The first eighteen months of independence will be critical. Either transition to a less than perfect but working public service within
a reasonably functioning economy will have been achievable (as in Zimbabwe) or the failure to achieve it (as in some sectors in Mozambique) will lead to very heavy subsequent costs. The Namibian public service cannot singlehandedly prevent chaos and collapse but it can create frameworks conducive to avoiding them, and to being able to move promptly and decisively to fill gaps before they expand into gaping holes in the fabric of production, services, personnel or policy.

Because those gaps are predictable in the sense that there will be some, but less so in the sense that some expected problems may not arise (eg adequate numbers of urban water and power station engineers may stay) and some unanticipated (by definition not subject to examples!) will arise, the public service must keep a reserve of "top level" time and personnel available to act at once then they emerge. In the context of overall scarcity of personnel and of their time, this will be hard to achieve. But it is crucial - if all problems identified in advance are handled but there is nobody to monitor, identify, act on new ones as they emerge (before they are crises) much of the value of what is done will be undone.

This is the first period in which the Namibian public sector can address the full range of priorities adumbrated below. Range - not depth. In each case two questions must be asked on any particular action under the priority:

1. Can this be differed without a high cost?
2. If yes, what will the cost be (in terms of something else left undone) of doing it now.

Strict use of these criteria might preclude any medium term tactical,
institutional, planning and programme data collection, articulation and draft option/proposal writing (for political decision takers) and thus prevent maintaining momentum after consolidation was achieved. Therefore, on key areas forward planning units not responsible for current operations should be created - if possible with at least a core of Namibian staff to ensure that their articulation is consistent with, not in contrast to, medium term strategic goals.

Progress toward Medium Term Planning

With effort - and luck - by about eighteen months after independence the transition/consolidation crisis will have been resolved and a more normal context for public sector operation achieved. This does not mean structural transformation will be complete - only the immediately essential bits will have been done and even their maintenance will require continued effort. Rather, it means that medium-term planning and action in greater depth and based on longer-term analysis and assessment will be possible because immediate threats to keeping the day to day operations of the public sector, the economy, and the society, going, have been overcome.

At this point fuller integration of the forward planning units into the overall decision taking and operational structure is needed and possible. Needed because - e.g. - once Walvis Bay is recovered forward port facility planning interacts with existing operations - and possible because - e.g. - until Walvis Bay is recovered the operational public sector concern is creating and running alternative ports to avert immediate collapse or South African strangulation of the new state and simply does not mesh with five or twenty year development of Walvis Bay or "Kunenemund". 8
Aspects of Public Sector Activity

Public Sector activity is not homogenous. There is of course the division between the civil service and government and the public operational or enterprise sectors but the divisions directly relevant to this paper crosscut that categorisation. A functional division includes:

A. Overall policy and framework formulation (e.g. incomes policy, foreign exchange budgeting and control);
B. Sectoral and particular policy and frameworks (e.g. urban planning, building codes);
C. Control (e.g. auditing of accounts, credit limitation, school and hospital inspection);
D. Operational activities (e.g. mineral export corporation, motor vehicle repaired depot, teaching);
E. Resource mobilisation and allocation (e.g. taxation, personpower recruitment and assignment).

Within each category there are elements which either cannot be performed other than by the public sector (e.g. exchange control) or cannot be performed elsewhere except by abdicating public control over key elements (e.g. incomes policy which can - at a price - be abdicated to "market forces"). There are others which it is highly desirable but not essential to have in the public sector (e.g. commercial banking) but which can under some circumstances be left private if adequate policy and control frameworks exist (e.g. in the central bank and treasury). Further cases are ones in which both private and public have at least interim roles to play (e.g. medical services, large ranches). Others are probably unsuitable for central public sector as opposed to local/communal/co-operative
or private operation (e.g. small farming, much of retail trade).

There is no clear division of function by institution e.g. a treasury is engaged in some functions of each of the five types as is a state metal export corporation. There are differences in weighting e.g. a single regional hospital is largely operational but may have some sectoral policy and control (of other medical units) aspects.

An Aside - What to Avoid

To attempt to do slightly more than is possible is probably usually useful, i.e. setting a target a little beyond the reach of attainment leads to maximum effort. But this is very different from gross overloading of the public sector with tasks which simply cannot, even approximately, be performed with available resources. That leads to bad performance in each area and to a real danger of systemic collapse. For example, there is no way the public sector in Namibia over the period under consideration can operate 5,000 retail shops and 6,500 ranches. To attempt to do so will not only guarantee most run badly (or not at all) but will in practice cause a failure to define and control in terms of coherent commercial and ranching functions, provide supporting services and wholesale facilities and operate key retail or ranch units which would otherwise collapse - an agenda just within the limits of the possible, if attention and resources are not misallocated to attempting the patently impossible.
Co-operative, communal and neighbourhood organisation roles should be encouraged and given room for manoeuvre (neither tied down by red tape nor smothered by ill considered "help"). To put the public sector proper into building all or most new houses, running all or most shops or ranches, to establishing all nurseries and creches, to creating all or most small enterprises is madness. It is not simply technically unfeasible in Namibia and operationally inefficient but politically totally counter to encouraging active participation and actually (as opposed to verbally) mobilizing effort.

By the same token it is dangerous to take over private enterprises which either cannot be run (for whatever reason) at the time or which are of no particular priority, 100% owned, 100% self managed, 100% closed mines are 100% worse than 60-40 joint ventures with technical services contracts responsible to an alert Ministry of Mines with economic, safety, and geological analytical/inspectorate units and selling through either a State Export Corporation or via a system including a state valuer. Taking over upper income service and trade units does not further any basic goal - it diverts resources and probably worsens services. Hairdressers and delicatessens can and should remain private - they are no threat to overall economic organisation and control, they will be run better (and at less scarce resource cost to the economy and the people) in private hands, so long as there is an upper income group (i.e. so long as a substantial expatriate and/or settler community remains) they help avert premature loss of skilled personnel.
Tourism is an example of a totally non-priority area. State bodies can promote tourism. State corporations can provide competent hotel and travel services. But the only priority goal tourism could conceivably promote in Namibia is earned import capacity (i.e. net foreign exchange earnings) which - at least over the next decade - can be done better by public sector action in respect to mining, ranching, fishing and processing. Further the "housekeeping managers" the sector needs would - from a Namibian public sector point of view - be much better deployed to schools, hospitals and other public institutions with a "room and board" component. If a modest private sector can continue to operate well and good - indeed it might well be modestly encouraged - if not, a public sector salvage operation let alone a major sectoral effort would be a gross misallocation of resources.

Maintaining and Rebuilding Population

The key priorities in respect to the productive sectors will be to prevent major falls in production and to restore already lost output plus providing inputs and services to increase small agricultural sector production, and to render transportation less dependent on South Africa. Not all output is key (eg tourist hotels, small businesses serving the high income community) and not all losses can be prevented (eg fishing is largely wrecked now, the world recession has debilitated the smaller mines, lorries - fishing boats - cattle are likely to have flowed to South Africa in large numbers before independence). The combined results of global stagnation and war, panic flight and sabotage mean that the economy will be in poor condition during transition and at independence.
Mining is critical to foreign exchange flows (earned income capacity), productive surplus (investment and state revenue) and, to a lesser degree, employment. Three companies - Consolidated Diamond Mines, Tsumeb and Rossing constitute over 90% of the sector.

In the first two cases joint ventures (state majority plus utilisation programmes) backed by a public sector mineral export company (as in Zambia and Zimbabwe) and a geological/economic analytical and supervisory unit in a ministry of mines appears workable. The same applies to minor pre-1966 mines.

Post 1966 mines - illegal from the start by international law - require separate consideration. The two in copper could be contract run from Tsumeb. Rossing - unless a contract to manage is to be negotiated with RTZ - will require a managing agent/technical partner with four characteristics:

a. not geo-politically threatening (ie not from a great power);
b. capable of operating mining and concentration and of improving worker health and environmental conditions;
c. credible as a commercial venture oriented to seeing Namibia keeps oxide production for sale at normal prices to atomic electricity generation customers at or near capacity;
d. not closely linked to RTZ, South Africa or the British Atomic Energy Authority - Nuclear Fuels complex.

By elimination, the places to look are probably France, Federal Germany and Sweden.

New prospecting and exploration can - probably should - be suspended until Namibia can sort out geological data and the legal regime for prospecting-exploration. A suspension (say for the
period up to a year after independence) on development is even more critical - Langer Heinrich is no exception even when taken over by the public sector, as in present and probable 1980's state of the yellowcake market it may not pay to complete it at an early date.

**Agricultural services** are the key to restoring and (for the small scale sector) raising output. Research, extension, farm planning, marketing and credit have been central to the large ranch sector. It is anything but an example of rugged individual boers - rather it is one of the world's most guided, serviced and cossetted rural sectors. To keep these services going - and to build up serious research - extension - input - marketing provision for the small farming sector and for crop production on ranches, it is vital to keep existing units running. This entails - if at all possible - negotiating at least interim (5 year?) contracts with most serving professional staff as well as training Namibians and recruiting new expatriates.

Large ranching cannot remain totally European or totally private. Given the dreary record of state ranches both in production and in participation (in Namibia they would look uncommonly like the status quo with expatriate managers replicating the old pattern - an approach likely to have very high political costs) and the total impracticability of small scale ranching at anything like present production/employment levels - the goal should be communal/co-operative ranches in the hands of present ranch workers plus their families with state ranches basically an emergency holding device for abandoned ranches whose workers are not yet organised to run them. Because ranch workers are used to
production team (not household) work organisation and are on the ranches the key "normal" problems to creating communal resettlement villages do not arise. If services can be maintained and brief skill upgrading courses held for experienced workers (some of whom are *de facto* deputy managers) substantial output maintenance and fairly speedy recovery should be possible plus a build-up of crop and dairy production backed by altered price incentives and utilizing the increase in labour power resulting from recruiting families.

Early announcement of fairly generous compensation for improvements, workable assets (especially cattle, lorries, machinery), handing over ranches in working order, staying as interim manager (or owner in some cases) would help both in averting Angola-Mozambique type settler panic flight and sabotage and in phasing departures over four to six years so transition is consistent with consolidation. Until carrying capacity pasture maintenance and related issues are better known/controlled stock levels should be forbidden to exceed those of the late 1970's.

*Small farming* in the relevant period requires support on a primarily household production/communal infrastructural investment (e.g. feeder roads, water supplies, woodlots, godowns) basis. These must be backed by supporting services, marketing, small scale irrigation (large scale will take longer only moving to detailed studies and initial works construction can be accomplished before near the end of the relevant periods) and price incentives (if necessary including production subsidies) are needed for three
reasons: to raise small farmer incomes, to set in motion a dynamic
toward food self-sufficiency, to avert a rush of small farming house-
holds to non-existent urban jobs and already overstrained urban
services.

Much fuller discussion appears in UNIN's agricultural monograph
(Mshonga) and options paper, Chambers and Green's chapter in Namibia:
the last Colony and a forthcoming Catholic Institute for International
Relations monograph (Moorson). The need now is to reach decisions
on medium-term strategy (SWAPO), identify priorities (SWAPO/technical
support) and begin to articulate resource requirements and programmes
to implement them.

Fisheries will require a salvage operation. Very few vessels are
likely to remain at independence. The first steps will probably
need to be contract fishing to supply local tinneries (once Walvis
Bay is recovered) paralleled by a study on sustainable yields and
contracts to procure replacement vessels, and train Namibians to
operate them.

Transport faces immediate priorities. Procuring replacement lorries
and buses (and possibly planes if Namib Air chooses to fly away)
during the transition period. Creating non-South African linked
enterprises (plural) to operate them whether purely public sector,
with technical assistance (eg from African haulage companies like
ZTRS and treindly country co-op hauliers) or joint ventures with
external (or small local capitalist) partners. Ensuring that rail-
way rolling stock and personnel do not all race off to Upington and
points South, that replacement needs are identified and procured
(negotiations during transition, delivery as soon after independence
as possible) and that maintenance facilities are created to remove
dependence on Upington and Cape Town. That if - as seems likely - Walvis Bay is still occupied at independence, alternative port facilities are planned now, designed and negotiated during transition, put into place during and just after transition. The key programme is probably dredging, lighter and crane procurement, artificial breakwater building (sinking old ships about to be scrapped), establishing an oil depot (a permanently moored tanker) and upgrading railway sidings and godowns at Swakopmund. Unless these priorities can be met the entire movement of goods (and therefore their production and government revenue, foreign exchange earnings, food supply, public services) will become erratic (or worse).

Communications priorities centre on keeping posts-radio-telegraphy working (training courses plus selected expatriates) and augmenting facilities by temporary radio telephone links as well as delinking international communications from South Africa by building a ground satellite station. Power includes similar considerations in respect to Escom including completing Ruacana Falls ancillary facilities and transmission line.

Water priorities in the first months centre on maintaining urban supplies and expanding them to meet the demand imposed by "ending contract". In parallel a small-scale rural water (human, livestock, spot irrigation) programme is needed to improve rural access especially in the North.

Commerce is an area for selective action. Export marketing must either be in the public sector or subject to independent price verification (eg an independent valuer in a renegotiated CSO marketing agreement in diamonds possibly using the Tanzania valuation office on a contract basis). Basic imports probably should be handled at
least in large measure by one or two public sector majority joint ventures with friendly country co-operative or medium-scale private import/export houses. This is critical as present importers have in many cases little capacity to identify low cost sources (or any sources) globally - they order from South Africa only. A public sector presence (to provide a check to exploitation and a capacity to fill gaps) in wholesaling will also be a priority - again needing either technical or partnership contracts with external firms (co-op, state or private and - where appropriate - African or Asian).

Retailing - except perhaps for a few large urban stores and conceivably an urban areas chain - is best left to the co-op/communal and private sectors with training/financial backing for the former, and some controls to prevent gross exploitation (but not interminable red tape on licensing, nor exclusion from areas or products before adequate communal/public alternatives exist, which they rarely will in the periods under consideration) by the latter.

Nationalisation/compensation priorities are as much practical as normative over the next five years:

a. colonial government and colonial state corporation assets (by precedent with no compensation);

b. abandoned property (minimal compensation);

c. land and mineral title (separate from use rights which need to be renegotiated rather than acquired en bloc at these stages) without compensation;

d. at least 50% interest in key mines (minimal cash compensation);

e. selected other enterprises which perform key roles (or threaten for whatever reason to stop performing them!) and for which creating new public sector alternatives is not immediately practical (reasonable compensation);

f. phased acquisition of improvements, fixed assets, moveable assets
(eg herds, vehicles, machinery) on ranches (reasonable compensation);

\[ g. \] post-1966 mines (no or no substantial compensation).

Certain problems arise - external loans (eg to ESCOM, Rossing) from financial institutes (especially non-South African ones) should probably be serviced and repaid. "SWA-Namibia" borrowings from non-territorial sources should be repudiated as under the 1971 ICJ opinion they are clearly illegal. Where limited payments ensure smooth transition on a going concern basis as opposed to a closure before takeover or actual sabotage, these need to be considered pragmatically (if also sceptically). ¹⁰

**Services: Present and Future**

Existing services - especially health and education - need to be kept going as a basis for achieving their transition to access and roles appropriate to a liberated Namibia not first allowed to disintegrate. This applies to private (and especially to public sector subsidised church and non-European voluntary agency services) services as well as public. ¹¹ (It does not apply to the present "security" services nor to "native" and "homeland" administration which are not services at all, but naked tools of oppressive coercion). To do this requires retaining and retraining existing personnel and recruiting new (see, eg, UNIN's monograph on education and on language).

However, immediate action on transformation does have priority along several lines:

\[ a. \] removing all racial barriers to access and - at least in public and church institution cases all economic barriers excluding workers and peasants ¹² - within days of independence at the
latest;

b. establishment of a programme (and first major steps to implement it) of basic education (primary and adult), primary health care (preventive and health education as well as curative) and access to pure water (probably often by communal or neighbourhood taps) for all Namibians with special attention to rural areas;

c. buildup of urban services linked to the requirements of population movement on "ending contract" and of women (see separate section below);

d. mass English language education;

e. emergency, large scale, skill upgrading courses to permit 20,000 or more experienced Namibian workers to fill the gaps in their ability to handle semi-skilled, artisanal, secretarial/clerical/book-keeping, supervisory, para-professional (eg extension officer) and professional (eg nurses, primary school - adult education teachers) posts. This is the first step toward broadly based Namibianisation of production and services provision.

These priorities seem clear, and therefore to need articulation, programme and resource need identification and resource mobilisation. Beyond them more detailed studies of priorities, sequences, ways and means are needed. These probably cannot - except as gaps emerge in the list of what is immediately necessary - be implemented until the close of the consolidation period\textsuperscript{12} but they need to be decided upon and organised for implementation then to maintain a forward dynamic.

**Basic Personal Needs and Income Distribution**

Key goods (eg basic foods including those needed for improved diet) and purchased services (eg transport) as well as basic public services
(eg education) need to be identified and requirements quantified. This is critical to selecting areas for priority attention to maintaining /expanding production, strengthening distribution, filling gaps by imports and - if necessary and feasible - instituting price management to avoid excess profits (while preserving adequate surpluses in production and margins in transport and distribution). It is important that - eg - hoes, roofing sheet, salt, fish, cooking oil, grain-meal-flour-sugar, cotton prints and drills, probably beer and cigarettes, radios, bicycles, needles and thread, matches, soap be available in rural shops (co-op, ranch, private, village) at reasonable prices and - eg - that buses exist at predictable times and places convenient to rural residents. To ensure that it happens requires knowing what, where and how much, so that production, trade and other programmes and policies can pay special attention to these basic needs.

However, no amount of attention to adequate supplies of goods/services at non-exhorbitant prices in shops/places accessible to the consumer will allow basic personal needs to be met until income distribution is altered especially in respect to raising incomes of Namibian workers and peasants.

The employment and agricultural self-employment aspects of such changes or income distribution are noted below. But several incomes policy or relative remuneration issues arise:

a. minimum and middle wages (for non-white Namibians) need to be raised to cover minimum socially acceptable household cost of living;

b. a non-racial salary scale for the public sector (including joint ventures) needs to be formulated promptly;
c. both wages and salaries must be well below present European rates - Namibia cannot afford to consolidate labour payments at the white rates;
d. the phasing of increases must relate to capacity to pay - wiping out productive sector surpluses would cripple taxation and investment as well as production and employment;
e. the radical reduction of present wages/salaries for settlers is not possible, at least in the short run, without most of those whose services are most needed leaving - possibly paying the unified scale or a frozen present rate, whichever was greater, and placing all employees taking the second option on term contracts might serve;
f. new expatriates can be served only at the going rate for their services at income plus some (say 15-20%) incentive to face the extra problems of serving away from home - a problem at least theoretically soluble by inducement of expatriate allowances on term contracts.

while ad hoc and interim decisions can buy time they cannot produce even interim answers to incomes policy questions. The most appropriate approach may be a special body like Zimbabwe's Riddell Commission with members and a secretariat possessing varied expertise to hold hearings, collect data, analyse, propose alternatives in respect to wages, salaries, prices to the political decision takers after six to eight months.

**Personnel and Employment**

Broad personnel requirements have been identified in UNIN's *Manpower Estimates and Development Implications* study. Substantial training - broadly consistent with, albeit much smaller than the projected needs - is underway through SWAPO and Nationhood Programme projects.
The immediate requirements appear to include:

a. using analogue (parallel institutions in other African countries), direct (where Namibian data are to hand), or indirect (where other methods fail) estimates of key institutional and sectoral requirements in more detail. One case of each (central bank, posts and telecommunications, foreign service respectively) was done by UNIN in 1977-78 and basic data for forty-odd analogue studies collected. Either UNIN or SWAPO should reactivate work on these lines;

b. on the basis of the refined requirements assess how far present programmes go toward meeting them, and what can be done to expand them;

c. plan (and where possible, test - eg camps) upgrading programmes for, eg, experienced ranch or mine workers or medical assistants who will need at independence to be trained to fill middle-level /semi-skilled/supervisory posts;

d. develop and test (eg, in camps) programmes to teach English quickly to many people and to teach teachers to make the decision to make English Namibia's lingua franca and official language effective.

During transition more action (using real Namibian data in calculation) in all four points becomes possible with the last two moving toward full-scale operation. Employees - especially large ones - must be required to provide released time, and on the job, teaching in respect to skill upgrading, literacy and English.

Expatriate procurement will pose serious operational problems:

a. lay, policy-oriented position posts should be filled either by individuals identified by SWAPO or by ones interviewed by SWAPO;
b. other posts should be filled only after at least a brief examination of the qualifications of proposed candidates (interviews for all are not practicable given numbers needed);
c. standby arrangements for identified key personnel from specific sources should be negotiated before independence to allow timely arrival;
d. a unit to evaluate all requests for, recruitment and contractual arrangement in respect to and allocation of expatriates must be set up with a Namibian head and experienced professional staff. It should, where feasible, delegate handling of details after approval of numbers, types, source to the Namibian institution to use them if this will save time.

There are two problems to be faced. First, getting enough expatriate experts for the actual jobs requiring them on time will be hard. Adequate personnel are scarce, recruitment is usually slow. Second, hordes of individuals and agencies will offer themselves and their personnel for a wide array of reasons and many of the personnel proposed will be irrelevant, unsuitable, or worse. "Have a headache, take two expatriates" is not a good working model, especially as it leads to often having the wrong expatriates in the wrong posts.

The severe shortage of middle-level, skilled and professional personnel will be paralleled by an employment problem. The self-employment half turns primarily in speedy action to make small agricultural household access to incomes and public services adequate to avert massive population movements other than those resulting from "ending contract" and secondarily on facilitating co-op/communal self-employment (eg in construction). The wage part requires adequate ranch wages/access to services to avert a loss of their (needed) experienced labour force and a systematic identification of
ways to build up productive wage employment. Some preliminary indications of possible priorities and programme opportunities appear in the UNIN person-power study cited, but require further articulation at least during the transitional period.
"Ending Contract" - Liberating Women

"Ending Contract" implies more than changes in terms and conditions of employment. It implies reuniting of households probably at the workplace of the wage employed member. That is likely to mean that up to 100,000 Namibians move to ranches and up to 250,000 to urban/mining areas within the periods covered by this paper - a movement of over a fifth of the total population within five years of the elections.

These population shifts must form the basis for urban planning and for housing policy as well as a locational framework for service provision. Basic urban and general services (sites, roads, water, open spaces, schools, clinics, buses, places for shops and service establishments and churches) must be a key urban development priority. Early mapping out of the approximate location and timing of moves will be critical in the transitional and immediate post-independence months.

Housing is a priority in a different way. Maximum encouragement (including access to finance, construction materials and training as well as abolition of building codes tied to European standards and/or bureaucratic inertia) to self-help and co-op/communal/small private building is needed. Neither the public nor even the private modern building sector can possibly construct the houses in time or at acceptable (to residents or the Treasury's need to maintain domestic balance) cost levels. The alternative to decentralized communal/private building of units acceptable to residents is not better quality, public sector housing estates. It is a bankrupt housing corporation, inadequate numbers of public sector houses allocated in criteria doing little for public morale or morality and miles of unplanned, unsanitary, unserviced shacks.
like those of Mathare Valley outside Nairobi or Dakar's satellite town of Pekine. Some of these issues are discussed in Manpower Estimates and Development Implications and in UNIN's housing study, but more articulation and testing of proposals is needed.

"Ending contract" will either massively advance the liberation of women or massively increase their subordination. The women who move will have been productively employed (self-employed) in a social context (however unsound) they know. In the new environment (whether ranch or urban) they can have better access to services but unless priority is given to seeing that they are given access to new forms of productive employment (not limited to household work nor traditional unskilled employment) and to new ways of social organisation and interaction, they will be even more subordinated economically and much more alienated and isolated socially than before.

A number of issues, priorities and programmes in this area have been outlined in Manpower (sic) Estimates and in a Catholic Institute of International Relations monograph by C. Allison. But these lack concrete interaction with Namibian women in a Namibian context while SWAPO's Women's Council has to date not had the time and personnel (nor the requisite access to women in Namibia) to outline an overall approach, articulate priorities, identify required public sector action and organise women to liberate themselves in concrete ways related to production, learning and social relations in ranching and urban areas. Doing that is a priority for the Women's Council - especially during the transitional period - and one for which they have a need to be allocated professional assistance (from SWAPO sectoral units or technical assistance) as and when they require it.
Some Institutional Issues

General models for institutions are rarely applicable with much precision to any actual institutions. Indeed institutional design is normally best seen as a part of sectoral strategy - policy - programme design not as a separate sector. What follows here are therefore a few notes on elements which should form part of the context and framework of most institutions, not a diagram for any institution.

Participation in decision taking - including coherent explanations on the limits of the possible - is critical. This applies to workers'councils (at workplace and at institutional level in government as well as public enterprises) but also more broadly to consumers (again of public services as well as products of public enterprises). Some consultations clearly must go via the Party and government, but many can and should be between, eg. agricultural extension staff and peasants or post office employees and letter writers and recipients (or non-recipients) to discuss quantity, quality, makeup and satisfaction from services with a view to seeing what can be done about it.

Decentralisation is a necessary - though never a sufficient - condition for broad participation. Unless people can see public sector employees with some power to alter the programmes directly affecting them, they cannot participate. If all decision taking civil servants and managers are in central Windhoek offices only a narrow elite with time and money (and skill at getting past doormen, receptionists and secretaries) can participate. One aspect of decentralisation is coordination at "regional" (eg. Kaiokoueld, Kunene, Kavango-West Caprivi, East Caprivi, Tsumeb-Otavi-Grostfontein, Okahandja-Gobabis (North Central), Rehoboth-
Mariental (South Central) South, Walvis Bay-Swakopomund-Rossing, Luderitz, Oranjemund, Windhoek Metropolitan) level. This requires somewhat similar decentralisation within ministries, departments, enterprises, whose activities affect people's day to day lives, some regional policy and planning capacity and regional development advisory committees reflecting community and interest groups (women, workers, co-op members, villagers, churches, small businesses, major public and private employers, etc). However, ten full-scale regional civil service centres cannot possibly be staffed during the consolidation period so coordination, not full-scale regional planning and administration, must be the central operative principle.

Decentralisation is possible only if major policies and programmes are set out clearly through the political and public sector technical/managerial process. Only then can sub-units know what goals and guidelines must be pursued, why and what alterations and modifications are either within the sub-units' power to make or likely to be approved if proposed to central units.

Law should constitute a reflection of national socio-political and political economic values (ie a set of norms) as well as a set of standards against which to test actual or projected actions and a central frame to sanction improper conduct. It is of course not the only central frame - internal regulations of the public sector merge almost imperceptibly into administrative law.

Law should not be primarily a matter for courts. As a set of norms or standards for conduct and as an ex ante (before the event) control frame laws and the law fail every time a criminal, civil or administrative case has to go to court. Legal education
(for professionals, para-professionals and "consumers") is one route to strengthening the non-court (success story) side of the law and laws. One element is to convince the public sector that a) administrative law is the servant of public policy and programmes - if it truly impedes them it can and should be amended, but b) until it is amended it should be obeyed not ignored. The public sector should set an example of being law abiding.

Namibia faces severe problems in respect to the law and laws. The inherited image of the legal system and many laws is one of oppression and exploitation. Rewriting the laws, explaining them intelligibly (in terms of why they are needed not just what they require or forbid) and rapidly changing public sector legal personnel (judges, prosecutors, draftsmen, contract negotiators) are priorities if laws and the law are to become understood, respected and obeyed.

Fiscal and Monetary Affairs
Namibia requires the ability to mobilize and allocate domestic monetary savings and credit. That requires a central bank and either public sector (51% or more ownership plus operating control) or closely regulated (by central bank) private commercial banks and insurance companies, plus specialized public sector provident/pension funds and investment banks.

To operate such domestic credit budgeting requires exchange control which is operable only with an independent national currency, ie. the "Namib" must succeed the Rand as soon as practicable. Further the probable scarcity of foreign exchange and certain need to control capital outflows and transfer pricing indicates that foreign
exchange budgeting, import licensing and remittance licensing will be necessary.

South Africa is not in general a low cost source of imports. Its indirect tax structure is not (cannot be) related to Namibian goals. Therefore, Namibia needs to leave the South African Customs Union. Indirect taxes should be set on the primary criteria of raising revenue and of being progressive (i.e., low on goods which bulk large in low income budgets and high in luxuries) and the secondary one of selectively encouraging domestic production (which can often be partly or fully done by import licensing, purchase contracts, bloc payments in support of investment as well as or rather than taxation). The basic indirect tax should be a simple, once for all sales tax (on the East African model).

Direct taxes (including royalties and export duties) need to be set to maximise revenue consistent with providing adequate incentives to production (private or public enterprise or peasant) and to avoiding giving incentives, ecological abuse and resource non-use (e.g., abandoning low grade mineral reserves, not cutting lower quality timber). They must therefore be designed on a case by case basis (e.g., personal income, company, diamonds, uranium, other minerals, other natural resources).

Power to pass on parastatal annual budget (plan) making and to monitor performance, (physical and financial) is also critical to effective fiscal operations as well as to general public enterprise sector efficiency. Unlike the planning/preparation of the tax structure, but like credit and foreign exchange budgeting, it requires a substantial (perhaps 20 in Namibia) professional cadre
with analytical competence and experience in accounting, applied
economic analysis and management.

Expenditure control requires that the Treasury budget section
understand the substance (not just the accounting) of ministerial
departmental, regional proposals and the relation between outputs
sought, inputs required and financial provisions. It also
requires ongoing contact with spending bodies including - but not
limited to - expenditure reports monthly, not over two weeks in
arrear. To achieve this again requires a substantial (10
initially?) cadre of professionals who know financial management
and learn about the spending bodies with whom they deal.

External finance (analysis of need, identification of sources,
negotiation, expedition of release, monitoring of use) and
auditing (for government and public enterprise accounts) are
other critical Treasury priority areas. (The auditing ones
should probably be in an independent department and a parastatal
corporation respectively). They too require specialized,
professional staff at least a core of them with prior experience.15

External Economic Relations
Beyond negotiations and arrangements at enterprise level, Namibia
will need to decide on its relationships with several international
economic or technic/economic organisations soon after independence.
The most critical appear to include:

a. UN and UN agency family (yes - except the intellectual
   property organisation);

b. OAU-ECA (yes);

c. Commonwealth (yes);

d. Non-Aligned (yes);
e. SADCC (yes);

f. ACP (given the fact that ACP membership does not seem to alter state policy, ie. it is serviceable to self reliance oriented African states, does provide access to some resources and is needed to secure a beef quota, probably yes);

g. CMEA (problematic as basically an industrial economy plan coordination body centered on East Central Europe with, to date, inadequate modifications to render it really suitable for pre-industrial southern economies);

h. IMF/World Bank (problematic - useful for resource mobilisation, dangerous to states allowing themselves to arrive at a position in which massive transfers from these bodies are vital because of their ability at that stage to impose broad political economic conditions - probably yes, once how to avoid overdependence after joining is articulated);

i. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs - requires further study;

j. South Atlantic fishing convention - now are probably needed to limit and allocate catch and to ease enforcement of 100 mile economic zone;

k. Waters conventions with Botswana, Angola and - if possible - with Lesotho (where Orange River rises), South Africa;

l. East and Central African Preferential Trade Area - dependent on its ratification by Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe (none of which has signed to date) and on evaluation of whether its provisions are consistent with Namibian national goals and SADCC commitments.

Each of these organisations will take up time and personnel - first
to collect data to determine whether membership is advisable, negotiate accession and then to use membership. To be a member of a body without participating - at least on issues key to Namibia - is not likely to be very useful.

Namibia - as a territory or more commonly as an annex to South Africa - is a member of a range of international organisations and a party to a number of international agreements. In some cases continued membership/participation is desirable. Reviewing to take decisions will take time. As a holding operation a variant of the procedure used by Tanzania in 1961 ("Nyerere Doctrine") might be useful:

a. declare right of Namibia to abrogate, withdraw, not continue in membership at any time up to five years after independence;

b. maintain membership/participation in force ad interim (including whatever rights arise) until a formal announcement of withdrawal/abrogation is given;

c. systematically sort out the individual cases at technical level\textsuperscript{16} with reports on potential commitments, duties, obligations, rights and rewards to political decision takers to allow arriving at definitive settling of this "inheritance" within - say - three years of independence.
Forward Planning - Marketing Out Ways Ahead

It was suggested above that a series of special forward planning units - free of day to day responsibility - would be needed to ensure that when consolidation was achieved there would be a data - analysis - options on which decisions as to the next round of priorities to sustain advance could be taken and acted upon. Some of the areas in which this is most vital are:

a. Small scale agriculture including irrigation, seed improvement, use of improved implements and animal power, crop combinations and rotations, supporting services, communal organisations, building up community based skills (eg. first aid, agricultural practices, construction, implement and vehicle maintenance, accounting and record keeping), soil fertility and use of fertiliser;

b. Large scale agriculture including permanent ecosystem defence (anti-desertification), desert retrieval (eg. grass/tree planting), carrying capacity determination, range management, small (eg. borehole, spring, check dam) and large scale irrigation, arable crop development, construction and non-agricultural economic activities;

c. Mining including building up Namibianisation of ownership and all phases of operation through external sales, possible further processing potential, optimal use of existing mine
reserves, systematic prospecting - exploration (including private sector) desirable timing of new mine development, contract negotiation models and procedures, mining sector legislation;

d. **Fishing** including determination of long term inshore and economic zone sustainable yield and means to develop a Namibian capacity to protect and harvest (possibly with some quota allocation to other states, especially Botswana), optimal processing and export strategies, ways and means of expanding local availability (including fresh water fishing development);

e. **Water** including a complete survey of local resources and means/costs to capture and distribute water, proposals for allocation of major resources (especially border river supplies) by sector and area, negotiation of water rights agreements on border rivers;

f. **Energy** including hydroelectric, coal, natural gas (although its probable main uses would be chemical production), oil (including a strategy for concluding prospecting - exploration - development agreements on the most favourable terms such as those of the last two Tanzanian agreements - but also including a preliminary assessment of prospects), wood (the basic rival fuel) and charcoal (a suitable urban fuel unless and until kerosine and/or "bottled gas" is locally produced).
g. Education and personpower development with special emphasis on middle level personpower continuing adult education, in service (including enterprise) training and providing skills to members of communal/co-op groups (to reduce dependence on "outside" public sector "experts");

h. Health including first aid, health education, nutrition including building up production and distribution of appropriate foods), child and mothercare, family spacing, personnel development (including part-time and volunteer "first aiders");

i. Management including accounting, control budgeting, financial planning, production planning, maintenance, storage with emphasis on workable institutional structures, accountability (including to workers councils) and personnel development;

j. Technology with special attention to operation, maintenance, reproduction, adaptation, selection, bargaining in the context of institutional and personnel requirements and of identifying a limited number of areas in which in depth research and development is appropriate because no basically useable technologies to impart, master and adopt appear to be available;

k. Commerce with particular reference to effective, low cost domestic and effective, high return external marketing systems, and their information, personnel, institutional requirements;
1. **Transport** including the best road-rail mix (possible northern extension of rail? abandonment of rail south of Mariental?) links to neighbours (eg Trans-Kalahari to Botswana, highway or conceivably rail link to Angola), Walvis Bay medium term development, northern port (?), secondary and feeder (possibly locally built and maintained) location and engineering issues, domestic and regional airservice (including freight) and long distance airfreight service, coastal and (perhaps in partnership with Botswana-Angola?) deep sea shipping;

m. **Industry** concentrating on small scale, basic goods production support in production and marketing (co-op/communal sector) pre-export processing and partial manufacture, import production for construction-mining-fishing agriculture, selected large scale ventures in SADCC context (ex possible cement "joint venture" with Botswana and/or fertiliser or chemical production based on natural gas and/or coal).

n. **Overall economic and political economic analysis** on eg. external and internal balance, medium term budgeting targets, sectoral growth and interaction (integration);

o. **Legal systems** including not simply laws but access to the legal system and to understanding of the law and laws;

p. **Negotiating capacity** including data collection, analysis and actual negotiating tactics to enhance performance at the international economic relations level (eg. technology transfers, transfer pricing, joint ventures, service contracts, construction contracts, mining and mineral prospecting/exploration agreements.)
In Beginning

This paper has sought to bring out a sense of urgency - decisions on priorities for public sector action need to be taken now so capacity can be built up and resources allocated to meeting them. It has also sought to make clear the need for ruthless selectivity - only the necessary (not also the desireable) can be accomplished and what is deferrable for later action should in general be deferred.

Namibia is ecologically, technically and economically an unforgiving land. Neither Namibia's enemies nor Namibians will be forgiving of serious public sector mistakes and the international economic environment (as well as the Southern African geopolitical area) are hostile and unforgiving. Whatever the intent, trying to do too much, too unselectively leads to serious mistakes which remain mistakes and have to be paid for, however meritorious the attempted goals.

Over time the limits of the possible will broaden if - and only if - initial attention is concentrated on avoiding breakdowns, consolidating, seeking to achieve the most critical breakthroughs. Certain priorities can be identified now and - if possible - agreed upon so that they can be articulated in more detail, decided on (by SWAPO) and resources mobilised/allocated toward fulfilling them.
This paper is not definitive for several reasons. It is an adviser's paper - written in the context of SWAPO's stated goals but not by a political decision taking group. It is incomplete - the author is not expert in any and all fields and space/time are limited. Parts of it are wrong (unfortunately the author cannot say which) because data is incomplete/erroneous and because the contexts of the future can never be projected perfectly in advance.

What it is - or is advanced in the hopes that it may become - is an input into a process of priority selection and articulation leading to resource mobilisation/allocation to meet the agreed priorities.

It is in that sense that it concludes "In Beginning" since if the paper is a self-contained end in itself its value is nonexistent.

La lutta continua - Venceremos.
The echo of Comrade President Machel's statement that the first day of independence is the first day of the longer and harder struggle for economic independence and development is deliberate.

Professor Green has been a student and practitioner of the political economy of African countries since 1960 and a supporter of Southern African liberation efforts since 1955. He has written extensively on Namibia since 1977. While he has been a consultant to SWAPO and UNIN as well as involved in IDS (Sussex), C11R and WCC programmes relating to Namibia and is a SADCC Liaison Committee member the analysis and views expressed in this paper are his personal responsibility and not necessarily those of any of the groups/institutions with or for whom he has worked.

The assumed pattern includes an election for a constitutional assembly and a transitional period along the lines now being negotiated. Some type of transitional period is likely under any probable transition to independence scenario.

This is not to underplay the need to deliver clear gains as soon as possible.

Part of the requirements will flow not from any logical public sector extension scenario but from gaps created by colonial state, colonist and external enterprise departures.

Decentralised public sector is referred to here and throughout the paper as cooperative/communal to distinguish it from the larger more formally organised national public sector.

Learning - and seeking to act on - what peasants and workers know and want is - unfortunately - not a common characteristic of intellectuals, technocrats and public servants (even, indeed often especially, radical ones). It is time consuming and hard but failure to do it usually involves high technical, production, real resource and political costs.

"Kunenemund" stands for a northern port - the exact site cannot be evaluated let alone determined until after independence.

To discuss this openly is not to aid South Africa. The sooner RSA sees that Namibia can and will bypass Walvis Bay the sooner it will agree to abandon what will then be an unprofitable colonial enclave with a decreasing nuisance value. Postponing discussion and technical planning (the latter cannot be kept secret) has costs for Namibia and Namibians.

For six months and hand over to a new management in an orderly manner may be in the Namibian people's interest. This has nothing to do with the clearly unlawful basis of the project best described as a Vorster-Benn-Duncan "compact" to lengthen and intensify the exploitation of the people of Namibia to bolster South Africa's security, the UK power consumer's access to cheap electricity and RTZ's profits.

The route to "taking over" such services should not be by ending funding or help with recruitment for the true voluntary sector (largely church) but by creating broader management committees (with user majorities), ensuring equal rights of access, eventually transforming into public sector bodies (not necessarily fully even within a decade judging by Tanzanian experience).
12. Private medical practice is a special case. It can provide a "safety valve" for the high income minority, who will in many cases refuse to stay if the only medical care available is uniform, universal access public sector services, which cannot be of industrial economy standards for financial and personnel reasons. Zimbabwe experience in radically transforming the public health services while allowing the upper income minority to "buy more" if they wished is relevant. Tanzania's abolition of profit-making (not non-profit voluntary agency nor employment unit based) health care is relevant in the medium term, but it was not practicable until fifteen years after independence, and was in the context of a much smaller expatriate community.

13. Indeed, universal access to primary and adult education, basic health services and access to pure water themselves cannot be fully attained until five years (at the most optimistic - more realistically probably ten) after independence. Tanzania has given top priority to these goals and may meet the education one in 1985, the health one by 1990 and the water one in 1995 (independence was in 1961). Namibia can learn from experience, and may suffer lesser financial constraints, but personnel and institutional development cannot be speeded up to instantaneous by throwing money and expatriates at problems (often quite the reverse).

14. These are posts needing Namibian interviewing and selection. Ideally the experienced professionals would be from similar posts in African states (and themselves African) but expertise is as essential as goodwill and commitment.

15. These are not here viewed as political units - let alone ethnic. The suggested regions are geographic/ecological and the case for decentralisation is functional and participational.

16. Here some expatriates with experience within aid agencies (interviewed and selected by Namibia) can be useful. They understand how these agencies operate better than outsiders, and - almost by definition - those who have worked only on the recipient side are outsiders.

17. This requires not only lawyers (to identify formal obligations and rights) but also substantive specialists to indicate what the objective meaning of the agreements is for the sectors of the economy - polity - society affected.