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FORGOTTEN BUT NOT GONE: SLUM CLEARANCE IN OLD BONDENI, NAKURU

By

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ABSTRACT

Some twenty years after the original quit notices were served on plot-holders and their tenants in the then African Location of Nakuru, much of "Old Bondeni" is still awaiting demolition. This redevelopment seems imminent and during this latest stage of planning, it is timely to look at the conduct of this "slum"-clearance program to see what guidelines it suggests for the current program and more generally what insight it provides in terms of urban development in Kenya. This paper will deal with several aspects of the Bondeni demolition schemes — the policies adopted by the municipality, the interpretation of these to the population involved, the nature of the response of the affected groups in trying to maintain their interests, and in a very general way, the social cost considerations in slum clearance programs in small cities like Nakuru.
Some twenty years after the original quit notices were served on plot-holders and their tenants in the then African Location of Nakuru, much of "Old Bondeni" is still awaiting demolition. This redevelopment seems imminent and during this latest stage of planning, it is timely to look at the conduct of this "slum" - clearance program to see what guidelines it suggests for the current program and more generally what insight it provides in terms of urban development in Kenya. This paper will deal with several aspects of the Bondeni demolition schemes - the policies adopted by the municipality, the interpretation of these to the population involved, the nature of the response of the affected groups in trying to maintain their interests, and in a very general way, the social cost considerations in slum clearance programs in small cities like Nakuru.

Bondenzi was the name given to all that area which was the African Location in Nakuru, about 200 acres of Municipal land at the start of the redevelopment program. It was defined legally in schedule 13 of the African Locations Bylaws (Cap.136, Gen.N. 1610 of 1938) which along with the Control of Africans Bylaws (Cap.136 Gen. N.538 of 1931 and 1168 of 1932) were revoked in 1963. It contained two dense areas of temporary housing which were to be demolished. The larger of the two was "Old Bondeni" and the smaller was the Somali Location (not strictly an African location as the Somalis were administratively separate).  

Both these neighbourhoods started just after the First World War. Individuals who had served in the military or had otherwise rendered service to the Crown were given in appreciation Temporary Occupation Licenses permitting them to erect houses on designated plots. This special relationship to the Crown was to be invoked often especially in the case of the Somali Location redevelopment. Two illustrative letters are reproduced below in Appendix I.

1. For the significance of this on redevelopment see page 9 below.
2. This special relationship to the Crown was to be invoked often especially in the case of the Somali Location redevelopment. Two illustrative letters are reproduced below in Appendix I.
be withdrawn on short notice (3 months) at any time the land might be needed for another use but on the other hand there was no set time when that might be. In the event the licenses remained in force for more than 30 years.²

The licensees, the large majority of which seem to have been Somalis or Muslim Africans, built on their plots typical Swahili-style urban housing generally known as 'majengo' housing. These are the roughly rectangular mud and stick-walled buildings consisting of a doublebank of rooms (sometimes as many as twenty or more but typically in Nakuru of 12 to 18) opening onto a central passageway that runs the length of the building. Within this arrangement there is considerable flexibility for the owner; front rooms which might be larger and also open onto the street were suitable as shops and workshops, smaller rooms were available as stores or for other purposes, and rooms could be let singly or in combination by the house-owner to families or numbers of individuals. An attractive feature for the tenant was that this housing provided both a certain amount of privacy (his own door) and quite good security (his room opened onto an internal passage and strangers would be noticed by other tenants or the houseowner or caretaker).

But majengo housing, being temporary, was not subject to the strict control of the locality in terms of building standards. Nor in practice were environmental health standards applied to these acknowledged 'substandard' dwellings - with the result that buildings might be overcrowded, poorly maintained, with inadequate drainage and sewage. It was mainly these public health problems that provoked discussion of demolition.

The Decision to Demolish -- Early Plans.

The period after World War II saw new urban planning initiatives being taken after the years of relative inactivity during the war. The population pressures on the town were great and were building up steadily. In 1944 a census of the African Locations had disclosed a population of over 8,500 (1944 Annual Report). Lack of adequate housing represented a threefold problem for the town's development: first of all, a health problem

3. In that period buildings were sold and inherited, often without the new generation of plotholders realizing that they didn't own the plot at all. Long use led to the widespread impression that these people, some not even licensees in any legal sense, were landlords. This misunderstanding was the cause of much acrimony later.
caused by overcrowding, poor sanitation, and so on; a social problem represented by high rents for inadequate accommodation, a floating population with no permanent abode at all, etc.; and an economic problem in that business could hardly be attracted or encouraged to expand if there was no place for its labour force to find reasonable lodging in the town.

In 1946 the Town Planning Advisor was considering revisions in the lay-out of the locations and certain plans were firming up; sites for new government and railroad housing for example. However it was to be a slow start. The Nakuru Board reported that though "housing accommodation in Nakuru (was) acute for all races, until building materials (were) in free supply little improvement would be effected. Consideration (would) have to be given to alternate building materials and probable relaxation of the By-Laws." (1946 Annual Report) The Somali Location represented an especially acute problem as the Somalis "require stock houses, grazing and bomas, a potential source of danger and infection to the adjacent labour lines and housing." (1946 Annual Report)

A provisional development plan was exhibited for public comment in 1947. Because there was such a pressing need for housing, a 'temporary' substandard scheme (Pangani) was underway and nine 10 room landies were completed and occupied that year. There was a long waiting list. It was completed in the next year and added 324 rooms to the housing stock. (1947 Annual Report)

In 1948, the Development Plan was approved by the Board. It set out the policy to be adopted with respect to Old Bondeni.

A large proportion of the houses in this location have reached a stage when they are barely fit for human habitation. Schemes have been put forward by the African Location Planning Sub-Committee and duly approved whereby a fresh area is to be laid out with plots available to Africans and employers of labour, for building in permanent materials on a 99 year lease, in accordance with plans approved

4. Municipal authorities, investigating conditions in Old Bondeni, were surprised at the extent of overcrowding. One notable case was that of a room 8' x 12' which was occupied by 8 adults, some using it by night and others who worked night shift slept there during the day. (Interview 12/3/74 with Mr. W.H. Sayer)

5. Sanitation problems included, aside from inadequate pit latrines and the like, a large number of goats and sheep which created a continuing nuisance. (Minutes of the Finance & General Purposes Committee Meeting 18/6/52)
by the Municipal Board. Facilities will be offered to lessees of existing plots in the old Location to move to the new area and, at a future date when the ground occupied by the present Location has recovered, re-building will commence. In the meantime, no further building is to be permitted in the old Location. The project has been discussed by the Nakuru African Advisory Council, when the general reaction was extremely favourable. It is, however, felt by the Advisory Council that the present suggestion that existing temporary occupation licenses for plots in the old Location should terminate after five years, is too short a period and an extension is under consideration.

A second aspect of municipal policy was also made official that year: the budget debate produced a resolution that "a housing fund be started to provide, progressively, housing for labour; first in temporary material and afterwards the accumulation of a fund for building in permanent materials for this purpose." (1948 Annual Report)

The Start: Quit Notices.

By 1953 the now Municipal Council found itself confronted with its own deadline for starting demolition of Bondeni. The housing situation had barely eased. The estimated population of Nakuru was 15,000, distributed roughly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Bondeni &amp; Somali Loc.</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Pangani</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>New Housing Scheme</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Housing was a first priority. The council then had provided housing for 2000 in the Pangani scheme and in the first large-scale municipal housing scheme done in permanent materials (Kivumbini I). This latter scheme was attracting the interest of other local authorities in that it was designed to bridge the gap between urgent short-term needs for bedspaces to house single workers and long-term needs for family accommodation. These were

6. Municipal authorities did give first priority to the provision of African housing (although demands for other housing were also great). (Minutes of the Housing Committee Meeting 9/6/52) When the five year capital expenditure was proposed, £120,000 out of a total of £270,000 was allotted to African housing. (Minutes of the Housing Committee Meeting 9/6/52) This was upped to £380,000 designed to build 3960 bedspaces by the end of 1957. (Minutes of the African Affairs Committee Meeting 17/11/52 and Housing Committee Meeting 24/11/52)
double units of four rooms back-to-back built to be used initially as single-room accommodation. They could be converted (in the Kivumbini II plan for example) into two-roomed units with W.C. and kitchen added on. But because demand for single rooms remained very high, this was hardly done.

Then some large employers and especially the railroad had been building up their own estates. The Council too was constructing a second housing scheme (Kivumbini II) of the same size and along generally the same plan as Kivumbini I. Municipal authorities went to view housing schemes in Nairobi, Kericho and Thika. The Council was looking into possible sub-standard pre-fabricated housing manufactured in Njoro which could be used on a temporary basis (for a period of not longer than ten years). Yet despite all this groundwork, the demolition of Bondeni was a daunting prospect. Clearly it could not be done in a single or even a few stages considering that the entire five year housing program, even at its most ambitious, didn't provide enough bedspaces for this project, (see note 6). But some beginning needed to be made. On 31 August 1953 the Council formally served "notices of determination of license" on all plotholders in Old Bondeni and Somali Locations. This required them to quit their plots and deliver them up in one year's time. It was now the job of the Council, after five years of intermittent planning and discussion, not merely to arrange the conduct and phasing of the demolition and the related building schemes but also to formulate and communicate a clear and comprehensive policy to the people concerned. In the event, it was to prove more difficult to do the latter.

The Redevelopment Schemes; Demolition and Debate.

The redevelopment plan was formulated by the Council in terms of the overall development and progress of the town. It therefore was not phrased in terms of special interest groups except in so far as it made concessions to commerce and industry (in the economic interests of the town) and in that it was evolutionary rather than radical (i.e. it was an explicitly African redevelopment plan, designed within the limits of the racial separation maintained in the colony). In a sense then the plan was apolitical; it aimed at the greatest good for the greatest number, as the Council understood this. However because it did threaten the interests of

7. Interview with Mr. W.H. Sayer 12/3/74.
8. Minutes Housing Committee Meeting 1/9/52.
some groups, most directly those of the plotholders, it became a matter of political debate. In this section I'd like to consider two aspects of the political process: how the political claims were put forward and were reacted to and how these special interest groups refocused policy concerning demolition and redevelopment. With respect to the first there are problems of the nature of interaction between groups and government which are perhaps still of significance today. And the second, the shift in policy which took place also has implications for current redevelopment plans. These two aspects, described in this section, will be discussed in the final sections of the paper.

Within a few weeks of the quit notices being served, a letter was received by the Council from six plotholders representing the householders in Old Bondeni. They asked for a meeting with the Council and Government to further consider the matter. The Council responded by putting off the meeting while a "detailed memorandum... outlining the Council's proposals for future development of the whole area" was being prepared, and at a subsequent meeting chose a committee to attend the meeting with reps from the locations (one of whom must be a Somali).

The meeting took place before the memorandum was officially out. I will set out the main points covered in the meeting in some detail because much the same ground was to be covered in every subsequent meeting. The meeting, being only an initial statement and first tentative questioning of redevelopment policy, was relatively calm and coherent. Other meetings will be contrasted with this one, mainly in terms of the polarization of views and the style of interaction.

The meeting was opened by the Mayor who expressed the "earnest wish of the Council to assist... in every way possible." He then outlined the Council's policy:

1) In no circumstances could the Council agree to any extension.
2) No compensation would be considered.

It is my feeling that the fact that this debate took place during the Emergency only served to emphasize certain general styles of interaction, especially that of paternalism.

10. Minutes, Housing & Estates Committee Meeting 21/3/53.
11. Minutes, MCN Meeting 5/10/53.
12. Minutes, Town Planning Committee Meeting 7/10/53.
13. This meeting was held on 24/11/53. The Mayor was in the chair, the D.C., the Deputy Mayor, and four Councillors represented the administration, while four Bondeni plotholders and one Somali elder represented the licensees.
3) Displaced persons would either be offered alternative accommodation in municipal housing or on plots of land which they could develop themselves at appropriate standards.

4) In genuine cases of hardship the Council would consider offering financial assistance under the terms of the Vasey scheme.\(^{15}\)

5) Plotholders with sufficient funds should consider themselves suitable applicants for the Council's tenant purchase type houses.

6) The Council would give special consideration to those cases where hardship was likely to be suffered where elderly men and women were concerned to ensure that they would be re-accommodated within the means at their disposal. However, the responsibility for elderly people fell primarily on their families and each case would be very carefully considered on its merits.

7) To enable the Council to appreciate the circumstances of all residents in Bondeni and Somali locations, it had been decided to carry out a detailed survey.

8) It should be clear to everyone that no householder in either location possessed any legal title to their plots.

9) To enable people to develop their own plots in permanent materials it was possible that additional land might be included in the location.

10) The demolition would be carried out in phases, depending upon the land requirements of the Council.

These points answered some of the questions that the householders had listed on their agenda. These included requests for an extension of the quit deadline from one year to ten years in the case of Bondeni and to five years for the Somali Location, compensation for the houses, that landlords be given advance warning of demolition, etc. They also made additional requests which were referred to appropriate Council committees for consideration. These included the request that leases on new plots be for longer term than the suggested 40 years; that existing shopkeepers be given priority in the allotment of tenancies in the new trading centre; that Council permit the establishment of shops in the residential areas as well; that individuals be allowed to build their houses in stages as their financial situation permitted; and that, in view of the fact that many plotholders earned their living by the establishment of lodging houses, the Council consider the erection of suitable houses for renting or tenant-purchase.

The memorandum when it came out a week after this meeting turned out to be a rather comprehensive plan wherein the demolition of Bondeni was only a small piece of a program which envisaged the complete transformation

\(^{15}\) THE VASEY REPORT, report on housing of Africans in townships and trading centres, Nairobi, 1950.
of the African locations — physically, administratively (with village and
ward level councils), and socially (with increased responsibility for
education at all levels, health services, recreation, etc.). This plan
(which is reproduced in outline in the appendix) represented in the
main a progressive (if culturally assimilationist) 'liberal' position,
seeing Kenya society as evolving in the direction of a sort of multi-
racialism (although with some separation of the races) by a process of
improving the position of Africans so they would by 'convergence'
become increasingly 'integrated' into the wider society. While this
can be taken as the best expression of council policy, it is true that
Council was never in a position to carry out any such wholesale redevelop-
ment. Particular projects might go in these directions but the
program as a whole never was to make any impact on the townsfolk; and
subsequent debate about demolition never was dealt with in the broad
context of such a redevelopment plan.

The beginning of demolition came as a great shock to people —
crowds watched the bulldozers do their work. Even after the
planning and the notices, the meetings and the clarifications, demolition
had little sense of actuality until it happened. (Perhaps that was
partly because of the necessarily long discussions; it seemed it could
be discussed forever.) The first phases of demolition however did not
create any very organized opposition. Small areas of Old Bondeni were
cleared (to make room for expansion of social services of various sorts)
and tenants were moved into municipal housing — Kivumbini II and later

16. At the same time these intermediate levels of government, set
down in this gradualist approach, could be seen as politically unacceptable
in terms of maturing and more radical African demands. The village council
was not only an attempt to inculcate notions of modern political process
but also and quite transparently an attempt to organize and more closely
supervise and control the African population given the Emergency situation.
It was also, in effect, a way of defusing African agitation for a stronger
representation on the Council itself where wider policy decisions were made.

17. Interview with Mr. S.L. Ojuka 18/3/74.

18. From 1953 on, rent receipts from plotholders were endorsed
with the legend "property subject to demolition, no compensation payable."
(Letter from Senior D.C. to Secretary for Local Government, Nairobi
29/6/56.)
Shauri Yako when it was opened in 1955. A pilot tenant-purchase scheme of 12 houses had been built in 1954 which might have catered for (but was not expressly built for) some plotholders who had capital, but the terms were not very attractive and plotholders didn't take it up. Concessions to bona-fide plotholders, i.e., original licensees or their dependents, might properly take the form of leasehold plots they would develop themselves, (as was argued by the resident magistrate in his judgement of 22/5/56). But all the plotholders had not pressed their case to the fullest yet.

Opposition to the program of demolition increased when the council finally came to consider demolition of the Somali Location.

There was several reasons why the Somalis, who in many respects didn't differ much from the bulk of Bondeni plotholders (who were equally long-term fully-committed urban-dwellers, also Muslim, also earning much of their income from house rents, etc.), were able to force their special interests on the attention of the civic authorities. The first is that, as they formed a relatively small group and were to face demolition all at one time, it was easier for them to put up a common fight. Bondeni plotholders who might have years more enjoyment of their housing would not be so likely to form a strong common front when only small sections of Bondeni were being demolished in the early phases.

19. These estate names do tell a story of political conflict of a sort which took place in that era. Kivumbini (in the dust) was not a popular name with Council; it symbolized the poor conditions that Africans saw themselves as suffering compared to other groups in the city. Lake Nakuru was nearly dry at the time and acrid soda dust blew into the estates (and only to a lesser extent further up into the town); hence this name. Shauri Yako (your problem) was supposedly adopted as a name in that this housing was to be accepted by people who were redeveloped out of a room; finding any alternative was their problem.

20. Letter from Senior D.C. to Secretary for Local Government, Nairobi, 29/6/56.
A second major reason is more complex and more interesting in terms of the nature of the debate that ensued; namely, the administrative status of the Somalis. The Somalis were not regarded as Africans by the colonial government, and in part at least, because the Somalis grew up with these legal definitions of the British, they also saw themselves as apart from the African community. The very fact of a specific Somali Location confirmed their separateness and reinforced their sense of community. They owed their separate status (as they did their plots) to a historical relationship with the Crown; a "child of colonialism", one of several sorts that the Kenya colony produced. This gave them some additional leverage. Africans, very tightly controlled during the Emergency, could not so easily organize themselves in opposition to the authorities. Demolition was relatively easy for the municipality under those circumstances when Africans had to be careful how they responded; Somalis could take a slightly different tack.

The Council knew that the Somalis had political resources to fight for their interests. They were anxious not to be embarrassed or to have the colonial administration embarrassed. The Somalis had shown their fight in the Bondeni demolitions of 1956 when they prevailed upon the Kenya Muslim League to petition against this demolition to government and took the matter outside the local arena. The Council therefore took a long time over preliminaries, trying to tie the Somalis to various agreements. In a meeting between Council representatives, the Divisional Engineer, E.A.R. & H., and Somali representatives held on 9/8/57, the plot for the new Somali Location was looked at and a general baraza was planned to get Somali approval. The Town Clerk approached the Somalis' lawyers, the firm of Shaply, Barret and Allen, advocates in Nairobi, to try to arrange for an irrevocable agreement to be signed so as to avoid "any possible misunderstanding when the time comes for development, as, from past experience, while the Somali Elders have always proved themselves most cooperative, misunderstandings have often occurred." 23

22. Letter revealing this situation from the D.C. Nakuru to the P.C. Rift Valley Province 14/7/58.  
23. Letter from the Town Clerk to the Commissioner of Lands, Nairobi 15/8/57.
The Council updated the public health evidence for demolition in a report by the Medical Officer of Health.

On the 16th of June 1958, the Deputy Town Clerk ... and I made a tour of inspection of the Bondeni and Somali Locations...

... cesspits, pits and rubbish dumps are spread over the area... The number of choos is far below that necessary for the population.

The structure of these old dilapidated houses is such as to harbour vermin and insects of almost all varieties found in human dwellings, and it is obvious that were Plague to break out... the entire population would have to be moved at once ... only demolition with the aid of fire ... could ... make the area reasonably safe for building later.

Overcrowding is at once apparent ... Entire families of 4 or 5 persons are living in single rooms, and the party walls are in many cases incomplete so that privacy between neighbours is quite impossible.

The water supply is from outdoor standpipes, which drift and make the surrounding ground soggy and a place eminently suited for the spread of hookworm.

Ventilation is by chance and not by management; cracks in walls ... Many of these cracks are of such size as to provide a threat of physical injury to children by the falling of building materials on them.

Floors are in almost all cases of mud, and a large population of them are at such a level as are apt to become water-logged and boggy in wet weather.

The Council also reviewed the administrative and political pros and cons of the two paths open to them to force demolition; the Recovery of Possession of Property Ordinance whereby the whole plot is demolished (used in the Old Bondeni demolitions) or the Public Health Ordinance whereby each room or family unit would be considered a dwelling. The latter method was obviously more cumbersome but it was not as politically sensitive. It was based on relatively impartial public health criteria whereas the first method initially...
demolished some houses entirely, leaving other plotholders in full, enjoyment of their rental units for years until the Council could afford to demolish them. Using the Public Health Ordinance, a larger number of houses could be demolished in part, a group of rooms at a time. So it was decided that this increasingly sensitive program of redevelopment would proceed on this latter basis.

Given the fact that the Council had proven its willingness to demolish and had the appropriate legal tools to do so, opposition was focused not against the demolition itself but against the redevelopment plan in an attempt to push it in the direction of the interest group -- in this case the Somali householders. This debate was indeed to force the administration, albeit very grudgingly, to build their plans around the rehousing of the plotholders. In this regard the minutes of a meeting held between Somali elders and the Town Clerk and the D.C. are interesting, especially when compared to the meeting of 24 November 1953 outlined above.

This meeting was between five Somali representatives on one side and the Town Clerk, his Deputy, and the D.C. on the other. The following is an outline of their discussion:

The Somali elders stated they had requested the meeting to see the Municipal Council with regard to promises made to build houses on a hire purchase scheme for members of the Somali community. The Town Clerk stated at the outset that the Council had not promised to build houses but would try to obtain loan funds from the government. The Somalis reiterated their version of the story and said that the Somali community had agreed to the suggested monthly rental of 280/-.

The Town Clerk repeated that at no time had a firm promise been made and further that he had no recollection whatsoever of the figure 280/- per month. He referred to the information given the Somali elders by the Council's Housing and Estates Officer wherein it had been proved to the Somalis that the income from a house with nine rooms would be 350/- whereas the monthly outgoings would be 35/- and for a 12 room house the monthly income would be 495/- and the outgoings 516/75. In view of these figures, the Council were satisfied that the proposal to erect rental houses on a hire purchase system was not economically possible.
The Somalis referred to the alternate accommodation available in the number 6 housing scheme and stated they could not afford to pay the monthly rent for such houses. They stated they would be much happier if they could build their own houses in the new Somali Location and would agree to pay the Council whatever the Council assessed as rent.

The Town Clerk noted that there was an inconsistency here. The houseowners replied that if they were to build their own houses, they would endeavor to obtain any shortfall from someone else who might help them. In the meantime they asked whether it would not be possible to defer demolition until some decision on the application for a government loan could be received. This was denied.

The Somalis stated that in these circumstances the Council and the government were throwing them out on the street as they could not afford a house in the new scheme. They had no money and as far as they were concerned it was now up to the government to do what they liked.

The D.C. responded that they were in effect asking to undertake a financial liability over a period of 20 years. They would have no income whatsoever and only face a monthly deficit. The houseowners stated that they hoped to make up this deficit from somewhere and that this way the houses would be theirs at the end of 20 years. The government had originally authorized them to live in their present Location and as the government now wanted them to move it should make available funds for them to build new houses. The elders would like to be told how they should live, as they had no businesses and they were living on the income from rents.

The D.C. rejected this statement as a complete self-contradiction. The elders responded that they would just lie in the streets and die ....

The D.C., noting the fact that the Somali community had received not less than five years warning of the forthcoming demolition said that they as leaders of the Somali community should have made plans to meet the situation when it arrived. His best advice for them was to build small houses on the plots available and as and when they acquired additional funds they might consider extending them.

This meeting and other similar ones which took place afterwards were thoroughly unsatisfactory as far as the Somalis were concerned. Aside from being characterized by a high level of sophistry on all sides, it was the unstated propositions that made true dialogue impossible. With careful ingenuity the administration argued that the householders could not afford to own rental houses any longer, the
the Somalis could only fall back on restatements of their special relationship to the government.\(^{24b}\) There was no way of explicitly stating in this atmosphere of piously assumed legality, that rent controls or no, the Somalis knew they could derive income from large rental houses. That the administration knew this too was obvious as was their desire to limit the possibilities for Somalis to become large-scale renters again, given the many administrative headaches caused by many charges of rent abuse levelled against the landlords by their tenants and the counter-charges of rent evasion they brought against their tenants.

Their attempts to again widen the arena of debate, as in their meeting with the Minister of Housing (on 19/8/58), wherein the Minister gravely lectured them on the limits of his ministerial authority which did not extend to demolition but only to the construction of houses, were thus largely frustrated. Still, the effect of this extensive politicking,\(^{25}\) although not all the Somalis might have hoped, was a better deal than previous plotters had gotten. In the compromise first worked out by the P.C., Somalis were given double plots, (many soon divided among an enlarged group of owners) small 3-room tenant-purchase houses built for them on long-term government loans, the houses designed so as to be easily enlargeable for rental purposes. Businessmen applied to have business premises built into their dwellings and (at a fee) this was done. Their success in getting concessions from the administration should be measured not only against that which came before but against the weak legal position from which they were forced to argue. Two of the recalcitrant house owners (both non-resident in those buildings) were taken to court to try to bring the rest of the community in line, and while the senior resident magistrate's judgement (attached as an appendix),

\(^{24b}\) See Appendix I.

\(^{25}\) This included conferences with the F.C., the Minister of Housing (above), their firm of Nairobi advocates, the Secretary of the Muslim League, the General Secretary of the Nakuru African District Congress, Mr. Tom Mboya, etc. (Report submitted to Finance & General Purposes Committee 28/8/58.)
a tongue-lashing of considerable severity which undercut all their arguments, might have inclined the community to accept a compromise, it is interesting that it didn't do more to push the Council back to a central focus on the tenants.

The official opening of the New Somali Location took place on 30 May 1959 with considerable fanfare. Invited guests included the Ministers of Local Government, and of Housing, the Commissioner of Lands, the Director of Surveys and the Town Planning Advisor, an impressive list from the national administration, reflecting the scale of the political battle ending.

The last phase of demolition in the Old Bondeni redevelopment scheme thus far took place during and after the Somali Location program and was much affected by it. The same legal approach was taken by Council, using the Public Health Ordinance provisions, the tenants could go into the 5th Municipal Housing Scheme then going up (Kaloleni Estate), and a tenant-purchase scheme was developed for the plotholders (plot 12-77). Businessmen, who wanted to relocate within the residential area (as was allowed to a certain extent in the New Somali Location), did not get that concession in this case as the Council was busy filling a commercial centre to serve the surrounding municipal housing estates as a group. This deal seemed to be about the best that the plotholders could expect to get and everyone seemed willing to work through this phase of Bondeni redevelopment without going to court. 26 Such an agreement was in fact reached in the special subcommittee meeting of the General Ward Council held on 3/6/59.

There were delays though. Landlords argued special problems in finding alternative housing for all their dependents, new tenants popped up as soon as old ones were rehoused and claimed to have been there all the time (some of these were destitutes and represented a special problem in rehousing), and the business parts of two of the houses remained long after the rest was down as the business owners dickered.

26. Letter from the Town Clerk to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, Nairobi 31/7/59.
for more time to wind up their affairs, (e.g., one diehard vacated his business premises in February 1961 but continued to live in the back). Worse than delays, other sorts of problems came up. Two of the six plotholders, owners of plots 76 and 77, didn't join in the agreement with Council. Perhaps initially this was because they were absentee landlords living in other towns and contact between Council and them through their caretakers was poor. In any case it was necessary to take all heads of households in these two houses to court and secure eviction notices. But a more worrisome reason for this stubbornness was that the tenants of these houses now had cause to join with the plotholders in refusing to budge. Because of their policy of keeping rents 'economic' in the municipal housing estates, the Council found itself forced to raise rents in the new housing estate in which these tenants were to be relocated. The tenants, angered by what they regarded as an underhanded move, and backed by the Nakuru African District Congress, refused to cooperate further and thus Council had to sort it out through the courts. Thus even in this latest phase of demolition, despite all that had gone before that should have led to a regularization and routinization of the development process, issues continued to arise which obstructed swift and orderly development.

The Post-Demolition Phase: 1960/1 to Date.

I have gone over the various phases of demolition in some detail; it is not my intention to do the same for this period, 1960 to date. Instead, after noting some of the lines of continuity between the pre-independence and post-independence policies regarding Bondeni's redevelopment, I would like to reconsider the above historical

27. Report on the progress of the demolition submitted by the Town Clerk 19/7/60 and letter on remaining demolition from Housing & Estates Officer to Town Clerk 22/9/60.
28. Letter regarding the tearoom on plot 73 from the Town Clerk to the Municipal Medical Officer of Health 22/2/61.
29. Criminal cases, MCN vs. occupiers of plots 76 and 77, Bondeni 9/11/59.
30. Letter from Town Clerk to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, Health & Town Planning 4/11/59.
detail, and try to tie it to certain general problems of formulating and putting into effect redevelopment plans.

This period, broadly the independence period, has seen no further demolition, leaving the large bulk of Bondeni standing. Life and business go on much as usual with the threat of demolition always somewhere in the background. During the early 1960's it is my impression that the threat was usually far in the background; only kept there by occasional debates or recommendations in the section of the annual reports on public health. But when it was taken up seriously from time to time, the problems were still the same, and that being the case, it is not surprising that the proposed policies showed a strong continuity with that part of the pre-independence redevelopment program that dealt with the physical aspects of demolition and rehousing. Committees were sent out to view other redevelopment programs (most notably one which assessed the suitability of the Pumwani redevelopment scheme), social surveys were conducted to guide planning (one in late 1968 by the Housing and Estates Department, updated in 1971 and submitted to the Minister for Housing 28/9/71; a second done late in 1973 by the Town Engineer's Department), alternate sites were discussed with plot holders, plans were drawn up for tenant-purchase housing for householders, and other plans for self-built or mutual-aid housing, site and service and other low income housing are being considered. Meanwhile Old Bondeni has been forced to give itself a facelift so that it doesn't represent an embarrassment to the town which often plays host to important visitors, most notably President Kenyatta who uses State House, Nakuru as his base on his official visits to Rift Valley Province. There is again a growing determination to redevelop Old Bondeni in the near future. In view of this, the initial phases of demolition and redevelopment deserve evaluation to see what current relevance they have. The discussion that follows attempts this in only very general terms, rather than going point by point through the present City Council's program. I prefer to be general because the city's program is still fluid, but more importantly because I believe that it is not the concrete details, but the overall considerations that are the most intractable. These latter are the ones which are conveniently ignored; they go unmentioned, the former are necessarily worked out in debate.

31. These social surveys form the basis for a forthcoming paper on changes in the social composition of Old Bondeni.
Discussion.

The first part of this discussion deals in a general way with some of the social costs arising out of the demolition and redevelopment itself. The second part concerns the problems that arise out of the planning, discussion and debate phases. This is a sort of commentary on the politics of redevelopment which comprise much of the 'historical' sections of the paper.

A) Some Social Costs of Slum Clearance.

Slum clearance, like other kinds of social engineering projects, often turns out to have a number of unplanned and unintended consequences. And this is true not merely because the plans so often have been devised in narrowly physical or economic terms, without any adequate appreciation of the total social context. The fact is that the situation is generally so complex, the various subsystems inadequately connected within any larger social model, and therefore the social scientist too is unable to simulate the cumulative effects of particular sets of policies. Slum clearance programs in their wider aspects ('urban renewal' as it is styled in North America) have represented very costly and generally not altogether successful social experiments from which a good deal has been learned but mainly in terms of what not to do rather than what is effective and humane. Quite similar kinds of dysfunctions were seen to be at work in slum clearance projects in the developed countries and in developing African situations. 32. I would like to consider a number of these social costs of redevelopment in terms of the Bondeni case.

1) The costs of enforced stagnation. Once demolition and redevelopment are considered for an area, typically a moratorium on further building and development in that area is declared. This is done so as to simplify matters administratively in terms of dealing with requests for compensation or stopping windfall and other

32. The work of Peter Marris is a good example of somewhat parallel findings for rather different social and socio-economic settings in England and Nigeria.
speculative short-term development, and also to protect members of the public on the theory that it is no use encouraging the grafting of a new twig onto a rotten tree which will have to come down anyway. In the case of Bondeni, the Council was prepared to reject claims for direct compensation (although some were made on the grounds that recent costly improvements had been made) but there were possibilities for gains in short-term developments. For one thing, since the Council was committed to rehouse tenants and was disposed to give preference to displaced businessmen in the allocation of plots in the new commercial areas, there was scope for people to try to capitalise on this situation. And in fact the surveys that were undertaken to try to tie down the population to whom benefits were due showed that some of this sort of thing was occurring.

But it is the aspect of public protection which is most suspect in terms of this policy decision. It is well documented that few things will push a neighbourhood into decay faster than the decision to demolish it. Naturally, not only is new development stopped but any incentive there might have been to maintain property is also gone and even the legal sanctions designed to enforce minimal compliance with regulations become unenforceable. This policy then tends to make any reconsideration of the decision to demolish unlikely as, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, the area becomes unsalvageable.

Has this been true of Old Bondeni? Despite the fact that development has largely stopped for the last 20 years, it isn't easy to say. For one thing, what demolition has taken place has largely been at the margins of the neighbourhood, leaving the rest relatively untouched rather than creating large gaps in the area. A second factor is that it is not clear how much ever went into the maintenance of the majengo housing; certainly it wasn't well maintained before. By its nature, it is not difficult to maintain at some minimal level if patched and plastered; and in that some of the worst housing was demolished the remainder might not present today a worse aspect than the

33. Letter from Mr. M. Ali to Town Clerk 16/4/59. This is the only remaining building from the old Somali Location (what is now one of the railroad estates). It was apparently retained as a concession to the houseowner, a long-term railroad employee, who argued successfully that he had put a lot of money into it and it was sound and shouldn't be demolished. (Interview with Housing & Estates Officer 12/3/74.)

34. Letter from Housing & Estates Officer to Town Clerk 22/9/60.
neighbourhood of those days. This is not to argue that the area had no scope for decline, rather the operative fact was that many of the houses were owner-occupied or supervised by relatives or dependents and so long as the outlay wasn't great compared to the income, housing remained at some minimal level (by Council standards sub-minimal); the usual sanctions and pressures to maintain the property were as effective or as ineffective as they had been.

A second point to consider, given that the area hasn't really decayed in any absolute terms, is whether it would have been improved were it not under the threat of demolition. The house owners don't seem to have much capital (as far as the social surveys show) although there is considerable cash inflow in the form of rent. Even so, it is likely that alternative forms of investment -- in trade, land, or sub-standard housing elsewhere in the town, might have been more attractive than the possible gains from upgrading these houses. On the other hand, it is also likely there would be scope and incentive for political leadership to organize or encourage a certain amount of 'harambee' effort in Bondeni, especially if self-help groups, in the form of companies, might be able to buy up housing or further develop a plot as a form of investment as well as community improvement. In this regard the social surveys taken show that a good number of heads of households were interested in contributing to a mutual-aid housing scheme, including working a certain number of hours a week if that enabled them to get accommodation of the type they wanted or better still, an interest in income-generating rental accommodation.

2) The costs of community break-up. Slum clearance programs destroy neighbourhoods and tend to disperse the inhabitants or at least reestablish people in different groupings. To the extent that the slum was a community and provided people with psycho-social support or presented certain kinds of opportunities, then slum clearance imposes considerable social costs on certain categories of individuals.

This is a difficult question to consider in the Bondeni case in view of the information lacking. The Somali Location was recreated and thus the Somali component of that area was not broken up. The level of integration between the Somalis and their African tenants, given the historical conditions, was probably low. Even in Old Bondeni,
there was something of a social and religious gap between landlords and
their tenants, although it might not have been as clear cut. But on
the other hand, just superficial analysis of the social survey data shows
that even the tenant population in Old Bondeni contains a substantial
core of people who have been very long-time residents of Nakuru and who
have lived in Bondeni for most or all of that stay in the town. While
this might simply reflect a lack of alternatives, it does suggest
the existence of a commonality of experiences and interests that marks
off the Bondeni population.

Community is an ill-defined concept and indices of strength
of community sentiment don't come easily out of social surveys; it is
not surprising therefore that no assessment of this sort of social
cost appears in redevelopment plans. The feeling among urban officials
apparently is that these costs are minimal. I have no firm evidence to
suggest otherwise in this case, but I think that planners should at least
sensitize themselves to this problem.  

3) The costs of relocation. There are two related points to be
considered in this regard. The first has to do with location, the
second with zoning and licensing.

Some 'slums', especially those in the centre of the city
or one at a good access route at the former boundaries of an expanding town,
have locational advantages. Because such land is scarce and at a
premium there may be considerable pressure to redevelop the area and
little likelihood that the site on which people will be rehoused
will have equal locational advantages. In such cases, people will
find themselves worse off than before in terms of the cost (in money, time,
or convenience) of access to jobs or urban amenities and services.

The fact that access might be worse has other possible
implications. In developing countries certainly, it is likely
that a considerable percentage of employment opportunities for slum
dwellers are to be found in the informal sector. Poor accessibility of
the housing development to which slum-dwellers are moved can have
the effect of cutting down on the size of the client population, perhaps
with serious socio-economic consequences.

35. See in particular J. Bujra's revealing monograph on Pumwani,
a somewhat comparable area of Nairobi. Bujra, J.M. Pumwani: The Politics
This factor of location and accessibility does not seem to be a problem in the redevelopment of Bondeni. The municipal estates built to rehouse people are roughly in the same area and can't be more than marginally less accessible from the central business district, the market, schools, and dispensaries, etc. They are served by the same bus lines and are about equally inconvenient in relation to the industrial area, which is on the opposite side of town. The old town area of Nakuru (which is the area within which municipal housing estates have been built) is fairly compact and thus these social costs of redevelopment are minimized.

The second point in this argument also deals with a restriction in the range of opportunity to be found in the new housing estate. Aside from the possibility that the new area will not be as convenient or attractive for various kinds of enterprises, it is also likely that numbers of enterprises will be legally excluded by restrictive zoning or other means. This is certainly true to some extent in the case of Bondeni redevelopment. Municipal housing estates (while in a few cases they might have some provision for rented shops in the location and while there are generally shopping centres developed adjacent to them to service a number) do offer relatively less accommodation for businesses, control the type of business more closely, and often the rents for the businessmen are much higher than they were in Old Bondeni.

4) The costs of 'urban removal'. Perhaps the most serious charge that is levelled against slum clearance programs is that often they do not rehouse the people they have displaced. This may occur for pure political motives -- an urban authority may be interested in upgrading an area and encouraging the present inhabitants to move out entirely, or for reasons of cost pressures, the municipality is not able to supply housing, even subsidized housing, at low rent as the former slum-dwellers can afford. In either case the effect is similar and cumulatively disastrous. The stock of very low cost housing is reduced while the numbers of people looking for such accommodation is

36. It should be noted that businesses had been controlled in Old Bondeni. Before permission to use a room for business purposes was granted, the African Affairs Committee considered whether the service was needed, whether the room could be spared, and so on. And certainly the separation of noxious, noisy or otherwise objectionable types of businesses from residential areas is a thoroughly defensible procedure.
increased, resulting in still greater overcrowding, more rapid decay of remaining very low-cost housing: the seeding of new and enlarged slums.

The Council's policy has always been very clear; they have never undertaken to demolish unless they had alternative accommodation to offer people; better accommodation. But it has seldom been cheaper accommodation. Given the building standards which have to be met, an economic rent (which is what the Council charges) can only be so low. On the housing market as a whole, municipal housing is a bargain; it is cheaper than any comparable privately-owned housing in the central area. That is one reason there is an ever-growing list of applicants for public housing. But many residents of Old Bondeni have been paying 20/- or 25/- a month. The only Council housing which is in that price range is substandard housing, primarily the Pangani Estates, which the Council is currently planning to replace. Again, a quick look at the social surveys shows that many people in Old Bondeni would be willing to pay more than their current rent for better accommodation but even this higher amount is less than the economic rent of many of the housing estates (the current rents are 35/- in Lumumba and Kaloleni B, 40/- in Flamingo I, 50/- in Kaloleni A, Kivumbini I & II, Baharini, and so on up). One would expect a considerable amount of sub-letting (with attendant crowding) in these Council estates, given low average incomes and the housing shortage, and in fact this would seem to be true. These factors all serve as a disincentive to demolish Old Bondeni, because the technologies for replacing it with ultra-low-cost housing even on a 'self-help' basis are not available (unless and until current standards are revised).

A Brief Consideration of the Politics of Slum Clearance.

Urban development and, much more narrowly, slum clearance are political issues par excellence as they affect the position and prospects of various interest groups. The Bondeni demolitions raised a number of points which we can now see to be significant in understanding the policies being pursued by Council.

One very broad question is what is the appropriate political arena for debate on urban redevelopment issues. This question is bound up with the nature of political representation and the division
of administrative powers, a problem too complex to consider fully here. But it would be fair to say that the municipality would prefer to thrash out urban policy within the confines of municipal government. In pre-Independence days this included the African Advisory Council and later the General Ward Council as well as the Municipal Council and its various committees. Representation on the Council was specifically in terms of interest groups at the beginning of the period considered here, but changed to very broad geographical representation later and is now about to be tied to smaller defined areas. None of these three forms of representation serves a neighbourhood (although the last one goes in that direction) and so it is not surprising that representations on behalf of neighbourhood groups, like the Bondeni plot holders for example, come in large measure from outside this political body. But it is mostly the fact that powers are divided among several authorities that encouraged interest groups to force the debate through a number of channels, dealing with whatever political leadership they felt they could influence. Thus, in the case of the Somali Location redevelopment, the Somalis not only lobbied with the municipal administration but with the provincial administration, figures in the central government (like the Minister of Housing) and political proto-parties and pressure groups like the African District Congress and the Kenya Muslim League. In that very crucial decisions, like the final authorization of the new plot and the loans for the tenant-purchase housing, were made at the central level and not at the municipal one, there was scope for politicking among levels. The Somalis didn’t do as well as they might have liked because there was a general desire on the part of various levels of government to minimize the fuss (given the overall political position of the colony vis-a-vis Britain during the Emergency), and there was quite good communication between the municipality, the provincial administration and Nairobi. It seems to me though that in an independent Kenya there is much greater opportunity for their African constituents to appeal to politicians at one level to help them in opposition to another group of politicians at another level and thus try to play off different levels of government so as to push policy in personally desirable directions.

This homespun political analysis leads me back to the municipal level, which is the one from which most of the initiatives in terms of redevelopment should stem. In the case of the Bondeni demolition schemes discussed here, it would seem that was so. However, I have argued above that political opposition was more difficult to organize then
under those circumstances than it would be now. The kinds of political constraints are much more complex today. Moreover the municipality cannot depend on very close coordination with the relevant decision-makers at higher levels of government; local authorities fight for attention in what they often feel is an unresponsive Nairobi. In short I believe it has become harder for municipal authorities to take strong initiatives in such sensitive areas; rather they are in the position of having to react to initiatives taken by others.

In this sense Bondeni represents just part of a problem that is overtaking the Council. There is in Nakuru, as in all growing towns in Kenya, a serious housing shortage. It becomes difficult to argue publically, even if there are good and sufficient reasons, that housing for which there is a demand should be pulled down, given the limited resources that the city has to work with. Council has resources in law with which to go ahead and a responsibility to do so, but this is so politically unappealing that unless Bondeni were to be seen as some sort of true danger, a source of evil and crime, or a proven centre of pestilence, there is little incentive to undertake demolition which has high political visibility. Organised interest groups, like the one the Somali houseowners represented, can portray the situation to their own advantage: poor wananchi who just want protection from a government that isn't offering them just compensation for their hardships. And in fact, the Council has, in their deliberations about final Bondeni demolition, paid a great deal of attention to satisfying the needs of the houseowner group even though this orientation is not the one which Nairobi would prefer and money for compensatory schemes for the plotholders will be difficult to get.

The problem confronting the Municipal authorities is much wider now than when this program was started. Bondeni was the major block of unacceptable accommodation. Now there is also a good deal of unauthorized substandard housing which the Council finds difficult to control for similar sorts of political reasons. That is, Bondeni redevelopment is now just a small part of a much larger development problem: viz., catching up with urban growth. Always being in a catch-up situation, the municipal government is in the unpleasant position of not fully controlling (even to the extent of its legal powers in relation to other authorities) the direction of planning or the pace of development. Unauthorized housing can be seen as a sort of unwelcome 'harambee'.
effort which it becomes politically advisable to coopt rather than to oppose. Harambee projects, sanctioned or not, are all based on the hope that "the government will help those who help themselves." And certainly where the self-help (or "self-help" in the case of people with capital investing in substandard rental housing) takes the form of housing, the municipality cannot for very long ignore it and hope it will fade away.

In conclusion, I see the history of Bondeni redevelopment as illustrating, in a progressive fashion, an increasingly reactive posture forced on the Municipal Council, somewhat against their intention. A careful reading of the events of the first stage of this redevelopment program (and I have attempted only a broad outline here) would give one a good perspective for considering the more complex problems that were germinating then. The reader is invited to use the historical material presented here to work through this exercise in the hopes that will contribute to a greater critical understanding of and at the same time sympathy for the problems of municipal authorities in directing urban growth.
APPENDIX I


I came to this country in 1902 to visit my late father who was in this colony at that time. My father entered this country with the late Lord Delamere, he was serving him as headman and served him until the time of his death. I am an old man of about 89 years and have eleven children, seven are here and four are working for Her Majesty's Navy abroad, all of them were born here, one is a daughter, the rest are schooling.

Secondly, one point which is not clear to us, we have eight shops and two hotels in Somali Location and their future position we respectfully would like to know. I myself am owning a shop... and would like the Council to build one extra room... and a shop to replace the one I got and I am prepared to pay the cost of the room and the shop...

Thirdly, my son is about to marry and would like a house on his own. Will it be possible to get a plot and to get the council to build a house if he is prepared to pay the value of the house?

Letter From "Alhaj Mohammed" to the P.C. 20/11/58.

... I am now 99 years old...

I was a British Police Officer during the time of Queen Victoria's coronation and King Edward. On the coronation of King Edward, Ras Mukenin, the father of Haille Selassie, the present Emperor of Ethiopia was going to Britain to attend the coronation. He was accompanied by Sir Heriden who was then the British Consul at Ethiopia. I met them at Aden and I was driving them on the boat when they were to transfer to ship. I was still employed on the coronation of King George and also when Transvaal was captured.

In 1902 I was an officer in the ship Mihok during Madmullah's fight. We fought at a place called Durbo and another place called Illok. Our captain was injured and one officer killed. I was awarded medal for these fights.

I first came to Kenya in 1911 and several times I returned to Aden and again came back. I had excellent documents awarded to me but when the Italians captured Somaliland they seized from me all my documents and former passport.

I am now blind and had several operations performed on my stomach which is still very bad. For nearly 6 years now "Rashid" of Nakuru Somali Location helped me with room to sleep and food. But now as "Rashid's" house is faced with demolition I am begging the government...
Suggestions for the Development of the African Population of Nakuru During the Forthcoming Five Years 1954-59. Memorandum prepared 2/12/53 and reviewed at the meeting of the African Affairs Committee on 15/1/54.

1) Housing.

I suggest that all existing African housing, throughout the municipality, that fails to conform to the minimum standards to be decided by the health authorities, be demolished.

When designing housing estates every effort should be made to provide accommodation suitable or adaptable for use by families, and rents be adjusted throughout housing schemes so that family houses are subsidized from rents received from bachelor type housing.

Every encouragement should be given to employers and individuals to build houses for their staff and their own use, but the erection of private "lodging houses" should be severely restricted.

When planning new estates it will be appreciated that the period under review will undoubtedly see a sharp increase in African wages, the obvious results of which will be as follows:

a) a general reduction in staff, particularly in the lower grades;

b) the necessity for the provision of less housing than would appear necessary at present;

c) an increase in the ability of employers and individuals to pay economic rents for better quality housing;

d) a greater desire for a more individual type of house design.

Suggested phasing of housing:

Phase I 1954. Complete number 2 housing scheme and demolish the section of Bondeni bounded by Location road, Kiberenge Road, Kinyanjui Road, and Sumner Road. Move these displaced residents into housing scheme.

Phase II. 1955. In the cleared area, erect flats for families in the high and middle income groups presently residing in the housing schemes. These will make room for people displaced by the demolition of a section of Bondeni bounded by Kiberenge Road, Kinyanjui Road, Sumner Road, and Shuleni Road.

Phase III 1956. In the newly cleared area, erect family style houses for high wage group families and transfer these from the flats. Move any remaining middle wage families from the estates to the flats which should leave the housing estates with mostly single low wage earners. This method will admittedly involve a considerable amount of movement but this will occur in any case as the population sorts itself out into various strata and people move into the accommodation they consider most suitable.

Phase IV 1957. Erect more flats and family houses in East Bondeni.
Phase V 1958. Erect more housing of the type built in number 1 scheme if necessary.

Parallel to the schemes I would propose an area of 50 plots planned to permit the erection of houses of the Beeston type to be replaced by permanent dwellings in 10 years.

I would propose also a survey of servants accommodation in European and Asian areas with a view to a reduction of the number of servants living on the plot.

In conclusion I would suggest that the use of the word 'location' to describe African residential areas be dropped and that such areas be named and regarded as village suburbs within the municipality.

2) Village Units

   (This section deals with the structure of village units, village committees and the general ward council that was to act as a liaison between the villages and the council.)

3) Education

   This is, without question, the most valuable weapon available to a local authority in their planned development of the African population towards a full sense of their civic responsibility, but unfortunately at present local authorities have only a small share in the administration of schools within their area.

   Every effort should be made to take over full responsibility for African education within the municipality at nursery school, primary school and intermediate school levels and also to undertake parallel technical training and evening classes.

   No other single factor is likely to help more to promote a hardworking and civically minded African than the knowledge that by his labour his children are receiving a sound education, and he is prepared to submit to much increased taxation in order to achieve this...

4) Medical Services.

   It is government policy that local authorities should be requested to take over the responsibility for certain medical services. Our program involves the provision of the following facilities:

   a) a general dispensary
   b) a maternity hospital starting with 2½ beds
   c) the conversion of the existing maternity into a staff clinic and laboratory
   d) an inoculation centre.
5) Social Welfare.

With the African population well-housed, healthy, efficiently and closely administered and first class educational facilities available for his children, the foundations for a more stable African community will have been laid. But these amenities are of little value unless adequate attention is paid to the filling in of their leisure hours with clean and healthy activity... to achieve the status of a town to which the African is anxious to come, settle in and work hard for...

6) Race Relations.

...Better race relations cannot be achieved by legislation but a tremendous amount can be achieved by local effort. An improvement in living standards will enable the African to meet the other communities on a more equal footing ...

...In Kenya the emphasis should be on convergence and not parallel development of the races.

Wherever it is possible to bring the races together in a friendly atmosphere, special efforts should be made, and in this connection the sportsground is one place where early success can be achieved.

I would suggest that every effort be made by the municipal council in conjunction with local trades associations to permit Africans, by competitive examination or other means, to enter higher or more responsible posts in the town. Once the African is convinced that he can rise by sheer merit to the highest post, a better atmosphere will prevail. But the early stages of such progress must be marked by great patience and sympathy on the part of the employer.

7) Finance.

...That a greater measure of financial responsibility be given to the General Ward Council which should be given status equivalent to an African District Council whereby they could raise by cess licenses, fees etc. funds ...

This principle of financial "segregation" should, I suggest, last only during the period of convergence and disappear when a measure of integration has been achieved, and the position of the African as an essential and important citizen of the town has been accepted.
APPENDIX III

Judgement Misc. Case 5 of 1958, Resident Magistrate's Court at Nakuru 27/9/58. On the licenses of plot 1 section I and plot 1 section II.

The court made a detailed inspection of the whole Somali Location... and the only two rooms which approached the standards required to make them fit for human habitation were 2 rooms in another building which a Somali Elder informed me were occupied by himself and his family. The conditions enjoyed by his adjoining African tenants were pathetically in contrast.

...It remains to consider the questions of hardship, alternative accommodations and reasonableness.

...For many years he and his fellow Somali plot holders have, I am informed, been paying only a peppercorn rent of 40/- per annum which covered only conservancy charges whilst they themselves have waxed fat from exorbitant rents amounting to hundreds of shillings per month from their African tenants. It is not part of the duty of the court to protect the illegitimate interests of persons who cannot in the Court's view be said to be earning a livelihood but are merely collecting rents and have shown not the slightest interest ever in alleviating by improvement, repair or otherwise the unfortunate lot of their African tenants.

...As regards the Somali plot holders (of these two plots) the question of alternative accommodation does not arise since they are housed elsewhere. As regards the African tenants I have inspected... Housing Scheme 4.... It is an understatement to describe such accommodation as suitable only and the council may well be proud of the type, size and design of this estate. ...

As regards "reasonableness" it is quite apparent that throughout despite obstructive tactics by the plot holders who are almost as devoid of any legal rights as they are of moral, the council have acted towards the Somali plot holders far beyond their deserts with commendable generosity ....