Cross-border Violence as an External Stress: Policy Responses to Cross-border Dynamics on the Border between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia

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June 2014
The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing processes. This material has been developed under the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme.

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The authors would also like to acknowledge comment and feedback on this publication from Richard Crook, Teresa Dumasy, Freida M'Cormack and Jeremy Lind. Harold Malcolm Aidoo of the Institute for Research and Democratic Development, Ibrahima Tiohozon Coulibaly of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding in Côte d'Ivoire, and Daniel Tucker, a student of University College London and a volunteer of the West Africa Programme at Conciliation Resources, provided research assistance for the preparation of this report.

The material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies.

AG Level 2 Output ID: 63
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADDR</td>
<td>l’Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Demobilisation et la Réintégration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Populaire Ivoirien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRCI</td>
<td>Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBSC</td>
<td>Joint Border Security Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBSCBU</td>
<td>Joint Border Security and Confidence Building Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberian National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJP</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPIGO</td>
<td>Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRU</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Patriotic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORH</td>
<td>Operation Restore Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDCI</td>
<td>Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPCI</td>
<td>Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>Mouvement Uni pour la Démocratie au Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Executive Summary

One of the key issues identified in the new policy literature on external stress is the incidence of cross-border violence and the current lack of efficient and permanent mechanisms supported by international organisations, governments and civil society to deal with the violence. The focus of this research is the border region between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. The protracted violence which has affected the region for many years stems from the internal conflicts which afflicted both countries at different times, and which had regional dynamics and implications. Western Côte d’Ivoire acted as a proxy battleground in the first Liberian civil war (1989–96), and the region is the birthplace of the military and political crisis that affected Côte d’Ivoire from 2002 onwards. An inaccessible and neglected region, it has acted as a training ground and base for rebel groups and security forces, and it is local people who have borne the brunt of the insecurity. In 2012–13 the region experienced a resurgence of cross-border violence linked to the 2011 electoral and political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. Some accuse the political elite loyal to former Côte d’Ivoire president, Laurent Gbagbo, who are based in Ghana, of funding military incursions by militants and Liberian partners in the west of Côte d’Ivoire to destabilise the region. Anomosity between different communities and the limited capacity of security forces to provide safety to the people perpetuates the precarious situation.

Both the Liberian and Ivorian governments have sought to address the situation through short-term security responses, many of which have been supported by the UN missions in the respective countries, but ultimately the two sides fail to agree on the basis of the insecurity or the correct response strategy. For Côte d’Ivoire, the problem comes from Liberia and attempts have been made to ‘buy-off’ armed groups with financial incentives. For Liberia, the problem emanates from Côte d’Ivoire and the response has been to secure its territory through border controls and closures, and attempts to win over the local population in the Liberian border area. Neither strategy resolves underlying grievances nor are they sustainable.

Food security and livelihoods are central issues within a broader set of human security considerations. The risk of recruitment into violent activity is exacerbated due to the lack of sustainable livelihood opportunities available to the youth. Access to security and justice for border communities is another problem affecting populations in the region, and while efforts are now being made by both governments to decentralise these services, the results are mixed. Full implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes and the management of refugee flows are also critical to the management of border security. Work on civil–military relations is needed to improve the low levels of trust between security forces and local communities which is affecting the sustainability of security efforts.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and other external stakeholders have long emphasised the need for a concerted bilateral effort by the Liberian and Ivorian governments to increase their cooperation on cross-border issues, and have supported increased levels of cooperation over recent years. Meetings of a joint committee of chiefs, joint border patrols, and joint border security strategy meetings have been undertaken, although their impact has been negligible due to their ad hoc nature and the lack of a strategic and long-term goal underpinning them.

A regional response is the most promising solution to the cross-border violence, with coordination and communication at the centre of the strategy. The Mano River Union (MRU), an intergovernmental association of four countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone), is well placed to support efforts to address the range of security issues affecting the Ivorian–Liberian border, but it would require the commitment of governments and support
from the United Nations (UN) and other external actors to address the complex political, social and security issues in the region.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) and networks have a vital role to play in monitoring progress in bilateral and regional efforts to address security, and in holding governments to account for commitments in this area. With sufficient political will, they can also act as a bridge between security forces and communities, building on established relationships of trust in the affected regions.

Section 6 of this report puts forward detailed recommendations for action in the following areas:

**Cross-border collaboration**

- Military and civilian response strategies to address the mistrust between communities and security forces;
- bilateral cooperation and coordination of joint response and security strategies between the governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire;
- strategic engagement with ex-combatants/ex-militias by the Liberian and Ivorian governments, with the support of the UN and civil society expertise;
- engagement with and involvement of local communities in decisions affecting them, and in the design of security responses;
- coordination of national responses between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire to explore and see through practical joint measures to improve security.

**Support from the MRU**

- Commitment by governments and international actors to the regional security strategy developed by the MRU and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with the support of the Africa Development Fund, UN and European Union (EU).

**Government of Liberia**

- To cope with the drawdown in UN military presence, the government of Liberia should conduct a review of the capacity of its national security forces to respond to tensions and violence;
- provision of long-term staffing and resources for the regional hubs to allow national security and justice systems to take over from UNMIL;
- effective and inclusive devolution of security and justice mechanisms.

**Government of Côte d’Ivoire**

- Extension of reconciliation processes to western regions of the country to help communities address contentious issues;
- exploration of ways to develop a new inclusive political settlement including through a national dialogue;
- engagement with the Ivorian diaspora in support for a country-level reconciliation process.
United Nations

- Review of UNMIL drawdown and mechanisms to address security issues that emerge at stages of its transition;
- strengthen effective coordination and cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL through the inclusion of bilateral components in their mandates;
- a longer-term strategy with measures to address gaps in the capacities of national security forces, to manage post-conflict situations including political tensions and movements of armed groups across the border.

Civil society

- Monitoring drivers of and trends in insecurity, and acting as an advocacy platform;
- extension of the activities of civil society organisations based in capitals to the border regions;
- donor support to allow civil society organisations to extend their activities to the region.
1 Introduction

The question of external stress is receiving increasing attention following the publication of the 2011 World Development Report, which drew the link between ‘exposure to internal and external stresses and the strength of the “immune system” and the risk of violence in any society – national or regional (World Bank 2011: 7).

One of the key issues identified in external stress is the incidence of cross-border violence and the current lack of efficient, permanent mechanisms from international organisations (in particular the UN) to deal with cross-border regional issues. The focus of this report is the Mano River Union (MRU) region (i.e. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire); especially the border between Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia, as it presents many complex challenges in terms of regional dynamics and politics. More fundamentally, the region offers a new and interesting example of cross-agency collaboration that may be of interest for emerging work on external stresses, cross-border violence and regional governance arrangements.

For the past 20 years the region has been an area of violent upheaval and political instability. Recent research has shown that the probability of conflict contagion is heightened by four to six percentage points if the neighbouring country is ethnically similar to the warring country. It is further suggested that these effects may be even greater if the neighbouring country’s dominant ethnic group is shared with the country experiencing conflict (Bosker and de Ree 2010).

The civil wars in Liberia (1989–96, 1999–2003) and Sierra Leone (1991–2002) not only devastated the two countries but to a certain extent also destabilised an entire region (involving more specifically Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea). At the end of the Cold War, the region lost part of its strategic importance and was ignored for some time by the international development community. New actors became crucial for Liberia and Sierra Leone; states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Libya played a crucial role behind the politics and conflicts in both countries. New, complex regional political and security dynamics have been developing between these different countries. More than ever before, the interconnectedness of the MRU countries in terms of combatant mobility, arms trade, political and ethnic ties, is particularly relevant for our analysis. The underlying drivers of conflict persist – unresolved legacies of previous conflicts, unclear and porous borders, a lack of accountability and transparency in governance, as well as marginalisation caused by poverty and unemployment (particularly affecting women, youth, and rural and border communities).

Although large-scale conflict has ended in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, cross-border movements and instability have been increasing, especially since 2012. An estimated eight million light arms are circulating in West Africa, according to Jeanine Jackson, 2006–9 US Ambassador to Burkina Faso (IRIN Africa 2007). A feature of the MRU region has long been the virtual power vacuum, or absence of state power, in border areas – at times entire districts – in which informal trade and security networks implicitly govern the area. Yet, at the same time, these areas are also becoming battlefields paradoxically representing the interests of the different capital cities in the region. Of particular importance in the context of previous and potential conflict scenarios are the highly mobile fighters, who are reported to take part in conflicts across the region, and do not only change their battlefields but also change sides during the same conflict (Aning and Atta-Asamoah 2011).

This report will be divided into four sections. Firstly, we will look at the history of cross-border dynamics between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia and seek to untangle the political, economic and
cultural affinities and exchanges across the border. Also in this section we will look at border flows, especially during the aftermath of the 2010 election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. Secondly, we will describe the various cross-border incidents that have occurred since the end of the political crisis and reflect on the underlying drivers and causes. The third section looks at policy responses to the Ivorian–Liberian border tensions, reviewing existing institutional mechanisms to address cross-border violence. The fourth section considers some of the key challenges and underlying drivers and causes of the violence in the border region, such as incomplete DDR processes, management of refugee flows, food insecurity and livelihoods of the populations. Finally, we will look at the various policy responses to cross-border incidents and provide detailed policy recommendations for the future.
2 A history of cross-border dynamics between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia

2.1 Cross-border history, conflict and cooperation
The border area between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia has a long-standing, interwoven political, social, cultural and economic history: trade relationships, political alliances, ethnic group affiliations and intermarriages between cross-border communities. The border population is characterised by a high level of mobility, both for social and economic reasons.

There are four main ethnic groups on both sides of the border: 1) the Yacouba/Gio in the Man region and the northern Nimba County; 2) the Guere/Krahn in the Guiglo region and the southern Nimba and Grand Gedeh Counties; 3) the Kru/Grebo in the Tabou region and the River Gee and Maryland Counties; and 4) the Malinke/Madingo spread across the west of Côte d’Ivoire and in the Nimba region. These cross-border kinship and family ties mean that visits to the surrounding villages across the border are extremely common and continue to strengthen the sociocultural ties of the people. The border has also not stopped people from pursuing livelihood opportunities, particularly in the form of working on plantations and conducting trade. People cross the border to access their land more quickly or to reach key markets in the region. There are regional trade routes, which also play a key role in the movement of people across these border routes. The selling price of rubber, for example, is more attractive in Liberia, and so Ivorian rubber is often sold directly to traders at the borders who then trade with the big factories in Liberia. For a similar reason Liberian cocoa and coffee is often sold in Côte d’Ivoire (Barriere and Gray 2012).

The movement of people across this border region intensified during the first and second Liberian civil wars (1989–96, 1999–2003) with large refugee flows (some of whom still remain in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana and other neighbouring countries). For example, after the toppling of the Doe regime in 1990, Krahn in Grand Gedeh fled to Guere areas of Moyen-Cavally for safety (Barriere and Gray 2012). The cross-border ethnic affinities outlined above have been reinforced by political allegiances and cross-border political strategies between parties on both sides of the border.

The dynamics of the civil war in Liberia are very much connected to Côte d’Ivoire. In December 1989 Charles Taylor launched an armed uprising from Côte d’Ivoire into Liberia to overthrow the Doe regime. The President of Côte d’Ivoire at the time, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, was allegedly a political supporter of Taylor. General Guéï, who had been appointed chief of the army under Houphouët-Boigny, was in frequent contact with Charles Taylor. General Guéï later became leader of the Ivorian military junta in 1999/2000. The military and strategic connections between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia were reinforced. Guéï, who initially refused to recognise the result of the 2000 presidential elections, which he lost, fled to Gouessesso, near the Liberian border. The links between Taylor and Guéï were reinforced following the onset of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. Taylor and Guéï were then directly implicated in the creation of two rebel groups in the west of the country in 2002, the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP).

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1 The Gio, an ethnic group of the border region (see Figure 2.1), formed the main element of Taylor’s armed forces.
Figure 2.1  A political map of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia with a specific zoom on the border region

Source: Authors’ own.
Laurent Gbagbo, the then President of Côte d’Ivoire (2000–11), retaliated by arming and supporting fighters linked to Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) forces in late 2002 which culminated in the creation of the Côte d’Ivoire based LURD splinter group, Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in early 2003. MODEL was comprised predominantly of ethnic Krahn, which had strong links with Ivorian Guere across the border. Krahn from Liberia were involved in the political violence in the Moyen-Cavally area, especially between 2002 and 2006. In fact, former MODEL combatants were reported to work in gold, rubber and wood trafficking around Guiglo during these years (Berman and Florquin 2005).

Although one could argue that Guere/Krahn represent the political partnership between the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) of Laurent Gbagbo and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, and that the Yacouba/Gio linked the National Patriotic Party (NPP) of Charles Taylor in Liberia and the Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI) of General Guéï in Côte d’Ivoire, one should not base political loyalties on ethnic affiliations alone. As witnessed by many observers, warlords on both sides have changed their loyalties many times, and powerful economic interests are an important factor in understanding the regional political and military dynamics. There are also land tensions and disputes among the people in the communities, and between the communities and migrant populations from the Sahelien countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (Allouche and Zadi Zadi 2013).

The fear of violence coming from across the borders has been increasing over the last 20 years. Liberian and Ivorian combatants and commanders have a long history of using existing command structures on both sides of the border to facilitate fighting. Cross-border political dynamics and violence are therefore not a new phenomenon, and there are examples of earlier initiatives which sought to bring about joint responses to violence in the region. One such initiative, albeit short-lived, was the Mano River Union Civil Society/Peace Forum (see Box 2.1). A decline in violence between 2005 and 2011 resulted in the lapse of the initiative, although it presents interesting lessons and innovation from which to draw.

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2 Liberian security sources said police and UN peacekeepers arrested Adama Keita in April 2005 on suspicion that he was recruiting child soldiers to fight across the border. According to IRIN news reports, he was picked up in eastern Zwedru, close to the Ivorian border, but security sources would not disclose whether he had been charged. A top Liberian intelligence officer explained that, ‘Both the government and UN security networks have been suspicious of this gentleman’s activities around the borders with Ivory Coast and we are questioning him about his involvement in the recruitment of ex-combatants in that region to fight in Ivory Coast.’ Adama is said to be a member of MODEL, a former rebel faction during the civil war backed by the Ivorian government. For further information see Weiss (2005).
Box 2.1 The Mano River Union Civil Society/Peace Forum, 2004–2006

The Mano River Union Civil Society/Peace Forum was made up of 24 civil society actors from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea representing youth, religious leaders, traditional rulers, women, human rights/democracy campaigners and the media, and two international non-governmental organisations – International Alert and Conciliation Resources.

The Peace Forum was set up to monitor events in the region, identify issues for advocacy and make formal representations in policy meetings to governments and inter-governmental bodies to influence policy actions for peace. The project design envisaged analysed information to be fed through to the Forum’s Secretariat, located in the MRU Secretariat office in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The Secretariat’s role was to organise a series of civil society meetings and regional policy meetings with government and development partners from the three countries.

According to International Alert, one of the Forum’s successes was a workshop for MRU parliamentarians and government officials from incumbent governments and opposition political parties, who agreed to form a network of MRU parliamentarians to foster peace. A significant investment was made in promoting women’s participation and activities, such as their participation in the Akosombo Peace Process (the process that ended the second Liberian civil war (1999–2003). This amplified their voices and brought to light the capacity of women to play a role in peace and security in the region.

In the longer term the Forum intended to create a regional constituency of conflict prevention and resolution expertise that cut across physical, social and ethnic boundaries. However, due to funding shortages, efforts to encourage and motivate local and marginalised voices to influence policy came to an abrupt end in 2006, having been launched just two years earlier in 2004.

Some of the flaws in the Forum were an over focus on meetings at ministerial level, rather than monitoring and collecting data, and on building the capacities of civil society to do this effectively. Agendas for meetings did not allow sufficient space for inputs from civil society and the perspectives of marginalised and conflict-affected communities, and relied too heavily on expertise of individual analysts. The Forum would have benefited from clearer objectives and having been more results-driven. The Anglophone-Francophone linguistic divide added to the challenges and an over focus on form and structures also undermined its sustainability in the long term.

The experience of the Peace Forum underlines the fact that efforts of regional civil society networks or coalitions should be focused on how states, regional institutions and international actors connect with the citizens of the member countries. As issues in the conflict areas are local, so efforts need to strengthen capacities for gathering local information, sharing common problems and developing voices for policy influencing which can have wider regional impact.

2.2 Border flows during the 2010 Ivorian election crisis

As a result of the porous border and inter-connections between border populations, ex-fighters have been able to cross the border with ease for potential recruitment for fighting on the sides of both current president of Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, and Laurent Gbagbo, making it difficult for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN agencies to determine who is a refugee, a former combatant, and who is a migrant. Between November and December 2010, approximately 3,500 refugees composed mostly of the Yacouba population fled from Côte d’Ivoire into neighbouring Liberia, Nimba County (UNHCR 2010). As fighting moved south and the Force Nouvelle (‘rebel forces’ from the north) won battles, the refugee flows took on another dynamic. The Guere population began seeking refuge in southern Nimba and Grand Gedeh County in Liberia, and another influx of Kru and Guere refugees entered Liberia into River Gee and Maryland Counties.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established and operated six refugee camps: Bahn Camp (opened in February 2011), Ziah Camp (opened in March 2011), Solo Camp (opened in April 2011), Dugoe Camp (opened in April 2011), PTP Camp (opened in September 2011), and Little Wiebo (opened in April 2011). UNHCR quoted the refugee population at the height of the crisis as over 200,000. By mid-2011 there were over 175,000 Ivorian refugees in Liberia. With the voluntary repatriation process facilitated by the UNHCR, many Ivorians are now returning to their villages. In Zouan-Hounien 90 per cent of the people have returned, 60–70 per cent in Toulépleu, and 50 per cent in Bloléquin (Barriere and Gray 2012). It is estimated that there are currently close to 59,000 Ivorian refugees still in Liberia.

Before the repatriation process started in 2013, there were a significant number of cross-border flows which involved refugees, normally women from Nimba and Maryland County, visiting Côte d’Ivoire to assess the security situation. They were sent instead of their husbands due to fears that the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) would arbitrarily arrest the men. These visits put the women at a myriad of risks, whether it be drowning as they crossed the river, extortion of money and, if they did not have money, sexual violations and harassment by the armed groups in the forest.

There are still many radical Gbagbo supporters in Liberia. Supporters in exile in Ghana and Liberia have established a solid network and have reactivated contacts with Liberian warlords. Three of the military officers implicated in Operation Red Falcon – Colonel Alphonse Gouanou, former commander of the western military region; police Superintendent Loba Patrice and Sergeant Serge Brou – have visited the Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire border several times. According to the Ivorian security services, they contacted several Liberian warlords, including former members of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Mouvement Uni pour la Démocratie au Liberia, ULIMO) and LURD (International Crisis Group 2012: 8). Questioned by Human Rights Watch investigators, Liberian militiamen said one of their generals, Augustine ‘Bush Dog’ Vleyee, was a key figure in recruiting and training Liberian mercenaries on the Ivorian border (International Crisis Group 2012: 9). These very active networks are responsible for the increasing number of violent incidents across the Ivorian–Liberian border under discussion in this report.

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3 Operation Red Falcon was an attempted military coup against the current president of Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara.
3 Security incidents

Cross-border violence really started after the 2011 post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. As a result, many specialists have argued that it is Gbagbo supporters, namely the political elite based in Ghana, who are funding military incursions in the west of Côte d’Ivoire using militants and Liberian partners to destabilise the region (BBC 2013). The region was the epicentre of conflict and violence between both parties during the Ivorian political crisis. The continuing animosity between different communities and the security forces’ inability to provide safety to the people means the situation remains volatile.

There have been a number of recent border security incidents, and in particular in the Moyen-Cavally and Grand Gedeh border area. The first attack after the political crisis occurred on 11 May 2011 in the town of Zagné, Côte d’Ivoire, and resulted in eight people being killed and three injured. Zagné is a strategic target given the resources derived from the production of gold. A subsequent incident occurred on 15 September 2011, when an armed commando unit from Liberia killed 23 people in Ziriglo, Côte d’Ivoire, 37km from Taï (Soir Info 2012). The border area then became relatively stable for six months, but this was followed by a significant increase in the number of incidents between February and August 2012, averaging at least one incident per month as shown in Table 3.1. It is interesting to note that the intensity of cross-border incidents increased following major arrests in Liberia on 27 January 2012 in the gold mining camp of Zwedru. Seventy-six people, Ivorians and Liberians, were arrested by the Liberian police in connection with an alleged plot against the Ivorian government in Abidjan.

Table 3.1 Cross-border security incidents since the post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire between February 2012 and November 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 February</td>
<td>Six people were killed in the Konankro camp, 8km from Ziriglo. The camp was mostly composed of Burkinabé and Baoulés.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 April</td>
<td>Eight people were killed in similar circumstances in Sakré, a village located 27km from Taï. The houses and other properties of the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) mayor of Taï, Désiré Gnonkonté, the village chief and the president of youth were targeted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>An attack in the Para area, resulted in the killing of seven UNOCI peacekeepers and 10–15 civilians. The attackers reportedly comprised 100 militiamen and mercenaries. Eleven Liberians and eight Ivorians have been indicted in Liberia for the attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>Attacks during the night on the Ivorian border villages of Siebloe-Oula and Tiele-Oula in which at least five civilians were killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 August</td>
<td>In the Toulépleu, armed mercenaries attacked an army position resulting in at least four dead, two of whom were FRCI soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Individuals believed to have come from Liberia attacked two villages near Diboké, approximately 85km west of Guiglo. Four people were killed and several wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 March</td>
<td>Zilébly village, situated 37km from Bloléquin, was attacked, resulting in at least six confirmed deaths, including two FRCI soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 March</td>
<td>The village of Tuobly was attacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 March</td>
<td>Petit Guiglo village was attacked, resulting in the killing of at least eight people, two of whom were civilians, and the displacement of some 2,700 persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November</td>
<td>An incident occurred in the Taï National Park where water and forest management officials were attacked, one killed and one civil servant injured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the methodological problems in classifying cross-border violence is to distinguish cross-border incidents from other violent events in the region. It is clear, for example, that the destruction of the Nahibly refugee camp just outside the town of Duékoué, Côte d'Ivoire, on 20 July 2012 clearly affected cross-border dynamics. This attack, which was reportedly led by FRCI soldiers, armed units linked to local traditional hunters (*Dozos*) and angry civilians, left an official death toll of six. The camp, which was supervised by the UNOCI and housed 5,000 people, was completely demolished. According to the International Crisis Group, the attack was presented as a violent reaction to armed men in the camp, responsible for armed robberies in the nearby town of Duékoué (International Crisis Group 2011). In the absence of a judicial investigation, the exact circumstances and number of victims of the attack are still unknown.

Undoubtedly, the most significant development in the border region over the past few years was the series of attacks in June 2012. On 8 June 2012, seven Nigerian UN peacekeepers and 10-15 civilians were killed during an attack in Taï in south-west Côte d'Ivoire. This initial attack was followed by a subsequent attack on the Ivorian border villages of Siebloé-Oula and Tiele-Oula on the night of 11/12 June 2012, when at least five more civilians were killed. It was alleged that these attacks were carried out by pro-Gbagbo militias, however there are separate rumours that the attacks were from Liberian mercenaries, a group of disaffected fighters who supported Ibrahim Coulibaly, an Ivorian warlord. The attacks drew the attention of the international community; UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that he was 'saddened and outraged' by the deaths (BBC 2012). The increased international focus following the attacks spurred a response by the Liberian and Ivorian governments. The following section looks at some of the policy responses to the increased violence.
Figure 3.1  Locations of the key attacks identified in Table 3.1

Source: Adapted from World Food Programme (2011).
4 Reviewing the policy responses to the Ivorian–Liberian border tensions

Existing institutional mechanisms to address cross-border violence between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire are ad hoc and unsustainable. This section will highlight some of the recent policy strategies, their shortcomings and recommendations for improving levels of security in the Ivorian–Liberian border regions.

Over the past two years, the border policies of the governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire have been developed in response to international pressure following attacks on the border in June 2012 in which seven UN peacekeepers were killed. The primary strategy of both governments has been to militarise the area. Both approaches are based on different perspectives of the problem and its origins – Liberia judge it to be an Ivorian problem, and therefore not a policy priority, while Côte d’Ivoire judge it to be Liberian – and different perspectives on how to deal with it. In particular, the Ivorian government’s strategy for the border region is not one of engaging the affected communities but a seemingly ill-fated and unsustainable financial incentive scheme to ex-combatants.

4.1 Militarisation

On 9 June 2012, just one day after the killing of seven UN peacekeepers, the Liberian government launched Operation Restore Hope (ORH) in an attempt to secure the porous border and prevent pro-Gbagbo Ivorian rebels from using Liberian soil as a staging ground for attacks into Côte d’Ivoire. A Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the Emergency Response Unit of the Liberian National Police (LNP), and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation, was dispatched to the region and tasked with patrolling the 716km Liberian border with Côte d’Ivoire. In addition to the increased security force presence, under ORH the border was closed (though it was partially reopened in Maryland County in September 2012 and fully reopened in April 2013), and artisanal gold mines near the border were shut due to their possible role in funding armed groups. Liberia’s militarisation of the border region was replicated on the Ivorian side with the army deploying a special force led by Losseni Fofana. This was criticised by many international human rights organisations as Fofana has been cited by some as one of the military commanders behind the Bouaké (Côte d’Ivoire) massacres in 2010.

Publicly, the UN Mission in Liberia declares ORH as having successfully disrupted the activity of militia groups in the region. They note that in the five months after ORH’s launch, caches of arms were discovered in Garleo Forest in the border district of Konobo, Liberia. The largest haul, in mid-July 2012, included five RPG rockets, 437 rounds of ammunition for automatic weapons, 41 empty AK47 magazines, two empty pistol magazines, 331 AK47 rounds and four RPG busters (which is strikingly low) (Viban 2012). ORH has also been praised by the UN for establishing relative security and ensuring a period of relative peace in the border region. Indeed, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Karin Landgren stated in August 2012 that: ‘There’s been a lot of attention and concerns about the border situation, and my impression is that the Liberian security forces themselves are stepping up to the task of security in this region’ (Viban 2012: 8). This was reiterated in April 2013 when Landgren stated: ‘Despite a number of challenges, the operation has proved a credible and responsive presence along the border’ (UN Multimedia 2013).

Whilst ORH may have received widespread acclaim from the UN for bringing relative peace to the border region, this report suggests that any such praise should be qualified. The UN
refer to the period between late August 2012 and early January 2013, when there were no attacks and relative calm in the region for ten months, as evidence of the success of ORH. However, the successes should not be exaggerated. Firstly, in the year before the June 2012 attacks there were four significant attacks along the Liberian–Ivorian border (Human Rights Watch 2012a). In comparison, in the year after the launch of ORH there were three such attacks in August 2012, January 2013 and March 2013. The attacks in August 2012 were particularly significant because they were part of a series of attacks across Côte d’Ivoire, which indicated that the security threat was more complicated than ever before and that the militia groups were adopting more sophisticated strategies (Human Rights Watch 2012b). On 13 August 2012, military posts near Toulépleu on the Liberian border were attacked leaving at least four people dead.

It is apparent that despite the increased security presence large portions of the border regions lack effective state control. Both governments lack the capability and resources to effectively oversee the ‘hinterlands’ away from the capital. For example, in western Côte d’Ivoire, it is apparent that in the absence of government officials the majority of civil order functions in the border region are conducted by Dozos (traditional hunters), who have neither the legitimacy nor skills to perform these functions. Their role is particularly problematic because UNOCI holds them accountable for 20 per cent of the human rights violations attributable to the FRCI and their auxiliary forces during the 2010–11 crisis (International Crisis Group 2012). On the Liberian side of the border, this lack of state control is exacerbated by the fact that the local communities are often aligned ethnically to the Ivorian combatants.

The border region is also characterised by dense forest, which makes vast swathes inaccessible by road, particularly during the rainy season. These access issues do not just impede state control but also severely inhibit cross-border UN operations. As highlighted by a report to the Secretary-General: ‘neither the situation nor the terrain allow for additional cross-border operations beyond the aerial patrols conducted by the three armed helicopters shared between UNMIL and UNOCI’ (UN Security Council 2013a: 14). This means that these areas remain largely outside of the influence of the security forces and provide militia groups and mercenaries with locations from which to recruit, conduct training and launch attacks from hideouts. These concerns are demonstrated by the fact that following the March 2013 attacks in Zilébly and Petit Guiglo, Grand Gedeh, the security forces delayed their search operations in the area because they feared that it would provide too many points of ambush (UN Security Council 2013a).

To exacerbate the lack of capabilities and resources that the respective governments have at their disposal, there has also been a decline in political will to engage in the border regions in light of the period of relative calm. Indeed, there has been a widespread withdrawal of UN Joint Task Force operations since April 2013. Within a year of the most intense violence, security forces were drawn back to the centre of the country despite the ongoing post-conflict needs in the border areas. The remaining forces are insufficient in view of the scale and depth of the problem. In Grand Gedeh the sole remaining element of the Joint Task Force is the Emergency Response Unit where there are now just 24 officers (UN Security Council 2013a). This shortage in personnel is further hampered by weak logistical support, including a critical shortage in the number of functional vehicles for patrols. As a result, there are growing fears of a security vacuum in the border regions, where understaffed security forces are now ill-equipped to deal with future incidents. This vacuum is likely to develop further if UNMIL continues with its intended process of military drawdown. Thus, although the security situation along the border has improved, the lack of security personnel present in the region is of significant concern should violence flare up again.

The International Crisis Group suggests that the relative security in the region recently is less a product of securitisation and more likely a result of the fact that the FPI and other pro-
Gbogbo networks no longer have the financial capacity to support Liberian mercenaries (International Crisis Group 2014: 25). They further add that a number of prominent Ivorian militia leaders are no longer active. Perhaps most significantly, Oulai ‘Tako’ Anderson, one of the most active militia leaders in Liberia, was killed in March 2013 following the attacks in Petit Guiglo.

This report argues that the militarisation strategy used by both the Ivorian and Liberian governments has not brought a sustainable solution to the external stresses on the shared border areas between the two countries. Firstly, and most importantly, it is clear that the security situation in the border region remains fragile and violence could reignite at any time. Secondly, although there has been a relative decline in the number of cross-border incidences since militarisation, this is just as likely to be a product of the reduced financial capacity of the actors that funded Liberian mercenary activity.

4.2 Improving civil–military/police relations in cross-border regions
The security forces in both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia played a central role in their respective crises and have a long history of civilian brutalisation and misuse of positions. It will therefore take a long time and a lot of work to overcome the mistrust between national security structures and local communities in the border region. This is of particular significance in Liberia because the AFL’s deployment to the border region in June 2012 was their first major deployment since their reformation in 2005. Whilst the international community have praised the AFL and ORH for supposedly improving security along the border, and while others claim that the most important aspect of the deployment has been the fact that there have been relatively few reports of intimidation, harassment or extortion, relations between security forces and communities remain poor. In Côte d'Ivoire they are worsened by the imbalance of power between the FRCI and Gendarmerie, coupled with the presence of the Dozo performing some local security functions without due regard to human rights. In recognition of the need to improve their attitude towards the local community there has seemingly, at least publicly, been an attempt to rebuild trust with the local community.

Indeed, whilst ‘Phase 1’ of ORH was almost exclusively military in nature, the focus of ‘Phase 2’ in January 2013 increasingly shifted towards improving the AFL’s standing amongst the local border communities. A key aspect of this phase of ORH is closer interaction with the local community. Senior Inspector of Police Colonel G.O.W. Coleman stated: ‘Whatever development projects the community or County authority engaged in, we worked with them so they saw us from a different perspective from before. Some of us in the Forces today are choristers, evangelists and have different disciplines but [it is] the uniform, which sometimes makes people go far away from us. But we want to do all this to reverse the stigma caused by the uniform’ (Morris 2012: 8). Coleman noted that during ‘Phase 1’ of ORH local residents appeared to be afraid of their presence; however interactive activities led to improving relations. This intention to interact closely with the local community was also mirrored in the regional hub model (see Section 4.3) and its public outreach initiatives (Sherif and Maina 2013).

The security forces have a long way to go before they markedly improve their reputation with people, especially in the border communities. Indeed, a recent survey by Transparency International found that in Liberia, more than in any other country in the world, people believe the public sector to be corrupt, and a staggering 94 per cent of the population believe the police to be corrupt (Haroon and Finn 2013). Whilst local communities believe that security has improved over the last few years, most accredit this to UNMIL’s military presence rather than improved effectiveness of the local security services. Local communities in Liberia have developed a dependency on UNMIL for their security, which makes UNMIL’s ongoing process of drawdown all the more concerning. The acute disconnect between national
security forces and local populations is evident in the western region of Côte d'Ivoire where the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in the wake of the 2010–11 crisis to address abuses and foster dialogue, has been unable to involve people in dialogue processes to address or implement programmes addressing the grievances, interests and needs of people from affected communities.

Furthermore, recent research in local communities on both sides of the border showed a degree of resentment towards the state’s understanding of security as entirely physical in nature and not including the underlying socioeconomic and cultural factors in the border areas. There is a strong popular feeling that efforts to stabilise the border region need to extend beyond this narrow conceptualisation of security and instead deal with the myriad of other issues in the region, such as land rights, youth empowerment, identity, ownership, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. This is a view that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has regularly reiterated by stating that ‘security measures alone will not create lasting stability’ and that there needs to be a concerted effort to tackle the root cause of the conflict and address grievances in the border region (UN News Centre 2012).

### 4.3 Enhancing the capacity of justice and security services

Building the capacity of justice services is an important aspect in the conflict. Security measures will not work if the major belligerent parties are not properly judged for their criminal offences.

Liberian authorities were slow and ineffective in responding to the flow of mercenaries and pro-Gbagbo militias who crossed into Liberia in the aftermath of the 2010 Côte d'Ivoire election crisis. Human Rights Watch note that several high-profile Liberian mercenaries were quietly released after an initial arrest, which provided the militants with the opportunity to steadily recruit and mobilise along the border without effective response from Liberian authorities (Human Rights Watch 2012a). However, after the June 2012 attacks the Liberian government took swift legal action and by 15 June had ordered the arrest of 17 Liberians and Ivorians in connection with the attacks. In total, 25 individuals were detained in Liberia, almost all of them in Grand Gedeh County, in the wake of these attacks (UN Security Council 2012b). Subsequently, in July 2012, the government ordered the extradition of 41 Ivorians suspected of mercenary activity.

Human Rights Watch commended the government’s swift action, stating that ‘the Liberian Government has taken important steps making it clear that those responsible for devastating attacks on Ivorian border residents and the deaths of seven UN peacekeepers will be held accountable… the attackers should know that there is no safe refuge from justice’ (Human Rights Watch 2012b). However, others have questioned whether these actions have followed due process and query what IRIN calls the ‘briefest of court hearings’ (IRIN Africa 2012).

In an attempt to build up the Liberian security and justice service, the government of Liberia, supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund, has pledged regional hubs in each of the country’s five subdivisions. The aim of these hubs is to decentralise and enhance the population’s access to security and justice services, and in the process to counteract the cynicism, lack of confidence and sense of marginalisation felt by citizens outside Monrovia in seeking redress. These hubs intend to take a holistic approach to improving justice and security institutions and seek to not only improve the capacity and infrastructure of the police, the courts, state prosecution, public defenders and corrections services, but to also institutionalise coordination between them (Keane 2012). The hubs also prioritise improving their relations in the communities and, as such, public outreach initiatives form a core element of the project.

The first hub has been located in Gbarnga, and was inaugurated in February 2013. The hub serves Bong, Lofa and Nimba Counties. Reports from officials in the region suggest that whilst the necessary infrastructure is in place, there are still severe logistical challenges that
need to be addressed. One such example is that just a couple of months after the hub in Gbarnga opened an estimated 60 per cent of staff members left the site due to problems with the water system (Sherif and Maina 2013). Therefore, whilst the regional hub model may have significant potential, in its current form it appears to be largely ineffectual.

Liberian president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, stated on 27 January 2014 that ‘the construction of Hubs 2 and 3, in Zwedru and Harper respectively, will commence soon’ and both would be operational by the end of the year (Front Page Africa 2014). This is encouraging news because both of these hubs will be better placed than the Gbarnga Hub to deal with the isolation, inaccessibility and insecurity along the Liberian–Ivorian border. However, in order to gain any tangible results the hubs’ implementation and management must be more effective and inclusive than that of Hub 1. Furthermore, for the populations in rural and inaccessible border areas with limited means, the cost of reaching the hubs in district centres may prove an obstacle. Community dialogue and peace initiatives are still needed to offer accessible ways to seek redress and an alternative to violence.

4.4 Regional response to security and peace

It has long been noted that neither Liberia nor Côte d’Ivoire’s security can be resolved in isolation from the rest of the region, thus a regional approach is critical to addressing insecurity within and between the two countries. The MRU is uniquely placed to implement joint security initiatives throughout the sub-region. In early 2012, the MRU set up the Joint Border Security and Confidence Building Units (JBSCBU) with Joint Border Security Committees (JBSC) in 12 locations in the sub-region. The units were established to ensure that provisions on peace and security in the MRU 15th Protocol were fully implemented with the participation and input from citizens in the borders of the sub-regions. Of the 12 JBSCBUs four have been set up to serve the Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire border in the following locations:

- Toulépleu (Côte d’Ivoire) and Toe Town (Liberia);
- Danane (Côte d’Ivoire) and Yekepa (Liberia) – this unit also serves the border with Guinea, which is located at Lola;
- Tabou (Côte d’Ivoire) and Harper (Liberia);
- Taï (Côte d’Ivoire) and Galeo (Liberia).

The functions of the JBSCBU include joint border patrols; promotion of good relations between people in border regions through cultural, social and sporting activities; the exchange of information and monitoring and reporting of border security activities to a rotating chairman of a technical committee; and the resolution of minor cases of border security violations in their areas. According to the 15th Protocol, the JBSCBU comprises representatives from communities, including youth and women, as well as border officials from police, customs and district officers. The units are intended to meet as frequently as possible and no less than once a month.

Speaking to UNMIL personnel, it is clear however that these JBSCBUs are not functioning to their full potential. Although commissioned in 2000 by the MRU, they opened only in 2012; their potential therefore remains largely unexplored. However, certain difficulties are already observable. In practice the JBSCBUs include representatives from local agencies – border

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4 The MRU 15th Protocol provides for participation by the following in the JBSCBUs: 1) district officers of border districts in the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, and ‘sous-préfets’ (sub-prefects) in the case of Guinea; 2) the paramount chiefs or their counterparts in the border areas; 3) the senior police and/or immigration officers at the border areas; 4) the senior customs officer at the border post or his equivalent; 5) the senior border guard at the border; 6) the commanding army officer at the border; 7) the youth representative at the border; 8) the representative of women at the border area; and 9) chairman of the Rural Development Committee in Guinea, or his equivalent in the other member states.
and immigration, police, army, drug enforcement, county authorities – who are supposed to be reporting to their parent ministries such as the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice, and Defence. However, the officials in central ministries have unclear and uncertain reporting responsibilities in relation to the MRU, so this link needs to be strengthened to improve the effectiveness of the units. Secondly, the units lack the capacities and means to function effectively, and the MRU itself is severely under-resourced and may require support to be able to support the functioning of the JBSCBUs.

4.5 Côte d’Ivoire: incentives for non-violence

Early in 2013 the government of Côte d’Ivoire initiated a strategy providing financial incentives to Ivorian combatant commanders with the hope that this would motivate them to stop cross-border attacks (UN Security Council 2013c). The strategy also included resettling ‘Ivorian militia elements residing in Liberia back to Moyen-Cavally, in Côte d’Ivoire’ (UN Security Council 2013c: 14). The UN Panel of Experts on Liberia stated that this has ‘probably served’ as a significant factor discouraging cross-border attacks (ibid.: 14). They suggest that it has enhanced information gathering and created confusion among mercenaries and Ivorian militia concerning the identities of possible government agents.

However, this incentive-based strategy seems to be an unsustainable method of increasing stability in the border region. The payments, said to range between US$2000 and US$8000, are not sufficient to have a lasting impact, meaning that most fighters remain impoverished and without alternative livelihood opportunities (UN Security Council 2013c). Therefore, the commanders remain susceptible to future recruitment by the highest bidder, and as such, are particularly vulnerable to being enticed by the funding provided by others. Furthermore, it is unclear as to whether the commanders have reinvested the money by purchasing additional arms and ammunitions, thus posing a potentially even greater risk in the future. A further concern is that some commanders, who had not received Ivorian incentives, expressed a desire to the UN Panel of Experts to carry out more attacks in the border region with the specific aim of showing the Ivorian government that they too can threaten border security, and therefore merit financial incentives from the government (UN Security Council 2013c).

4.6 Policy meetings and cooperation

Over the last few years there have been repeated calls and commitments to improve cross-border cooperation between the Liberian and Ivorian security forces to respond to security incidents in the region. However, beyond a series of joint manoeuvres along the Cavally River in December 2012, there seems to be little evidence that these commitments have ever been followed through, and it is only when the next meeting comes around that the topic of cooperation comes to the fore once again.

Since April 2013 there have been two quadripartite meetings between the Liberian and Ivorian governments and their respective UN missions: the first in April and the second in June 2013. Prior to that, an emergency meeting was called in March 2012 in response to the attacks in Tai. In October 2013, UNMIL and UNOCI supported both governments to hold a peace and reconciliation conference with traditional chiefs from both sides of the border in Zwedru in the south-east of Liberia. Each of these meetings seem to have had a different agenda, and their outcomes invariably ended with a commitment to enforce their borders through enhanced cooperation, to implement a shared strategy to support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements on both sides, and support voluntary refugee returns (UN Security Council 2012b; UN News Centre 2013; The Analyst 2013).

Similarly, since April 2006, border officials from both sides have held monthly meetings, initially facilitated by UNMIL and UNOCI. The purpose of these meetings, code-named Operation MAYO, has been to present security issues that have been identified and to
develop a cooperative strategy to manage or avoid tensions. In June 2012, this concept was revitalised to hold meetings twice a month and to undertake common mapping of the border. However, as with the more high-profile meetings, Operation MAYO has failed to produce any real action points and is losing credibility (Mohammed 2013).

As indicated above, the conference between 16–19 October 2013, involving 108 chiefs and elders from both sides of the Liberian–Ivorian border in Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, sought to enhance cooperation, collaboration and coordination between the two sides, improve information exchanges between civilian and security authorities along the border regions of the two countries, and enhance peace-building and overall stability in the region. However, whilst a meeting of this kind has great potential, there is a sense that the meeting was hampered by the presence of the Liberian and Ivorian presidents, which distracted officials from its primary purpose which was to draw up strategies for the joint committees. As it was, the most significant outcome of this meeting was a pledge to set up a technical working group. However, significantly, this was charged under implementing recommendations and resolutions from subsequent meetings. Therefore, this technical group will not actually perform any functions until the next round of meetings and seems to be a way of proclaiming greater levels of coordination without actually doing something tangible.

The persistent lack of coordination between the governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire was exemplified in May 2013 when Côte d'Ivoire government officials were detained in Grand Gedeh County during an awareness-raising programme (UN Security Council 2013b). On 20 May a delegation of Ivorian officials, two Ivorian ex-combatants and a number of Ivorian gendarmes in plain clothes entered Liberia in an attempt to raise awareness among Ivorian refugees, militia commanders and former Gbagbo political leaders of the ‘Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Demobilisation et la Réintégration’ (ADDR) programme. However, the Liberian government were not informed of this awareness-raising programme and were concerned as to the identity and intentions of this group, especially considering the widespread rumours that militia and mercenary recruitment for cross-border attacks was prevalent in the area. As a consequence, the delegation was arrested on 23 May and deported the following day. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this anecdote is that the lack of communication between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire extends well beyond the governments. Despite the respective UN missions of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia constantly reiterating the need for greater transparency and coordination between the two states, it is apparent that the UNOCI who were part of this delegation did not inform the UNMIL about the mission either.

As a further indication of the lack of coordination between the Ivorian and Liberian governments, it is apparent that the Liberian government was not made aware of the Ivorian government’s strategy to provide financial incentives to refugees and militia groups. The lack of trust between both sides is shown by the fact that the Ivorian government told the UN Panel of Experts that they implemented the new strategy secretly because they felt that the Liberian government had handled the mercenary issue highly ineffectually, and that they feared the Liberian security forces would misappropriate the funds and jeopardise the operation (UN Security Council 2013c). In June 2013, the Liberian government grew concerned over the possibility of imminent cross-border attacks due to irregular funding received by Liberian mercenaries; it turned out however that the Ivorian government had actually provided these payments (UN Security Council 2013c). This lack of coordination led to the Liberian government’s unnecessarily reviewing the payments. More significantly, it could have led to increased tensions in the border region between the security forces and the local communities if it had resulted in a more rigorous security programme.
5 Some challenges to cross-border security

5.1 Incomplete disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process

A critical issue remains the incomplete and ineffectual demobilisation and reintegration process, particularly on the Liberian side. It is strongly believed that many of the former combatants in Liberia, particularly in Grand Gedeh and River Gee, were not demobilised and reintegrated, and in areas where they were, the exercise was not properly implemented. Unlike other post-conflict countries, Liberia did not absorb ex-combatants into the security forces post-war. Instead, the government chose to entirely reform the armed forces in an attempt to move away from its association with the civil war. This created a relatively large number of jobless former combatants who remain alienated, neglected, disempowered and in a state of readiness to commit violence. Empowerment and employment of former combatants, while a necessity, remains a challenge for Liberia. The country needs to prioritise the reintegration of former combatants as the state’s failure to economically reintegrate this constituency has the potential to further contribute to the fragility of the country’s security. With respect to the border region, the mining areas in Grand Gedeh are places of potential exploitation, trafficking, and mobilisation centres for young adults to participate in future conflicts if the opportunity arises. Furthermore, ‘weapons hidden in the border region, namely in Tai-Tempo area and River Gee-Gpabet area continue to be a threat to stability’ (Barriere and Gray 2012: 6).

On the Côte d’Ivoire side of the border, the DDR programme is also problematic. There is widespread popular concern that only former combatants affiliated with the current government during the crisis, including former Force Nouvelle members, will benefit from the programme, despite the fact that the government has emphasised that all former combatants, including pro-Gbagbo elements, can benefit from the programme. The other major issue is that the DDR process has only focused on the capital city. According to UN News Centre press releases, weapons collection has been ongoing since June 2012 and approximately 1,300 weapons have been retrieved from 2,000 ex-combatants (UN News Centre 2012 cited in Barriere and Gray 2012). It is only in recent times that the ADDR office has opened its regional offices in the western region of Côte d’Ivoire.

5.2 Refugees

Since April 2013 the Ivorian and Liberian governments, UNHCR and NGOs have encouraged Ivorian refugees in Liberia to return. According to UNHCR the occasional violence in the western border region of Côte d’Ivoire resulted in about 2,500 refugees moving into Liberia in 2013. By the end of 2013, through the voluntary repatriation process, a total of approximately 30,000 Ivorians had returned. UNHCR plans to assist 11,000 Ivorians back home in 2014. Whilst security in border regions appears to have improved, there still remains a significant number of Ivorian refugees in Liberia. Several are returning while a few still express the fear of return due to security and safety concerns; therefore, the refugees’ personal insecurity remains.

Some returnees expressed that upon return the lands were taken and protected by armed Dozos who were not allowing access to the land. According to a Norwegian Refugee Council project in 2012, 50 per cent of surveyed individuals with land disputes experienced associated violence. Adding to this the refugees have raised concerns regarding their own land rights, with there being a sincere belief that their land has been sold to commercial farmers.
5.3 Food security and livelihoods
There are large numbers of youth in the border regions that lack sustainable livelihood opportunities, who can easily be drawn into possible violent conflicts. Land conflict and social cohesion problems also persist on both sides of the border. The porous border between the two countries facilitates cross-border movements of people and goods, but because of corrupt practices and lack of governance, it provides an enabling environment for illicit activities, including the movement of armed groups. Barriere and Gray (2012) have argued that security concerns and existing tensions are exacerbated by food insecurity and land tensions. The border region straddles the Cavalla River and is rich in natural resources including gold, diamonds and timber. With numerous water points across the region and direct access to the ocean, the soil is fertile and fish thrive in its rivers and lakes. Despite its natural wealth and fertile lands, food security remains a major concern within the region. Evidence collected by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2012 shows how food and social insecurity are tied to issues of land conflict and weak social cohesion which persist throughout the region.

In early May 2012, representatives from NGOs including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, and the UN agencies within Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia – namely the FAO and World Food Programme (WFP) – met in Monrovia to discuss new approaches to food security interventions along the Ivorian–Liberian border. In this meeting, eight cross-border actions outlining a new approach to food security along the Ivorian–Liberian border were agreed upon. In March 2013 an action plan was drawn for cross-border food security and nutrition for Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire for 2013–16.5 It is hoped that this plan will focus not just on international investors but also supporting local initiatives and national investors as well.

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6 Conclusions and recommendations

6.1 Conclusions
The external stress from violent attacks in the Ivorian–Liberian border region has its roots in a history of violence, ethnic and land tensions, and political crisis in the region. Security measures alone cannot address the complex underlying drivers and causes of the tensions, which require thorough analysis and coherent strategies for effective policy response. The over-centralisation of resources and ideas for post-conflict reconstruction in national capitals limits states’ abilities to address underlying grievances and drivers of violent conflict. Government and international responses are needed which address refugee flows, incomplete DDR processes and the inaccessibility of the region, as well as the grievances of the local population, including land tenure rights, access to natural resources and unemployment.

However, responses have thus far suffered from a lack of consistent coordination and cooperation by the governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, and their priorities and strategies for dealing with the tensions differ. Two joint meetings facilitated by UNOCI and UNMIL to enable the development of joint response strategies have resulted in no specific cooperative or collaborative effort for change. Greater commitment from both governments is needed to coordinate responses to shared insecurities in the border region.

The support and encouragement of the MRU and ECOWAS is also key to the success of the UN efforts to bring the governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire together around common and longer-term policies and strategy. A shift to a human security approach, catering to the broader economic and social security needs of affected communities, would allow space for civil society and community actors to inform and engage with the design and monitoring of national and international responses in a consistent manner.

6.2 Recommendations
The following recommendations to the governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, the UN and other international and local actors flow from the analysis in this report:

6.2.1 Cross-border collaboration

Military and civilian response strategies
Perceptions of safety and security depend not only on infrastructure, but are also heavily determined by a citizen’s level of trust in security providers. The absence of this trust between the community and security forces is a significant issue not only in the border regions but also throughout Liberia and the western region in Côte d’Ivoire.

- Security forces in both countries should receive UN training in civil–military relations – if possible, jointly. CSOs, who in many cases are working with, and who enjoy the trust of and good relationships with, the local communities, should be involved in training programmes in order to build sustainable relationships beyond them.
- Joint outreach projects by Liberian forces which are financed by the UN with community involvement should be less ad hoc, and sustained in a more consistent manner.
- The valuable role that civil society can play in monitoring the performance of security forces in the region following the proposed training, and in acting as a bridge between communities and the security forces, needs recognition and support.
Bilateral cooperation and coordination
Stronger cooperation and coordination of response strategies are needed from the governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.

- Joint border security meetings should be enhanced through consistent joint border security patrols and information sharing. More effective functioning of the MRU Joint Border Security Committees would support this.
- Greater support from the governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire is needed for more regular and sustained joint council meetings of traditional rulers.
- The Operation MAYO meetings should be revisited as a way to enhance the implementation of joint strategies. Joint mapping of the security threats and current strategies could enhance the functioning of joint border initiatives.

Strategic engagement with ex-combatants/ex-militias
Grievances and interests of ex-combatants and ex-militias should not be ignored as part of a more holistic strategy to address cross-border tensions.

- The Liberian and Ivorian governments need to engage with ex-combatants and ex-militias in a strategic and long-term manner in order to address their needs and interests, and give them the capacity and opportunity to transform and become active citizens in their respective countries.
- The UN civil affairs units in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, in collaboration with CSOs with experience in engaging armed groups, could facilitate dialogue with the ex-combatants/ex-militias in order to map out training and transformative programmes for governmental support.

Engaging and involving local communities
Involving people from affected communities in the decisions that affect them offers them an opportunity to raise their concerns and channel grievances in non-violent ways as citizens. Both UNMIL and UNOCI have experiences in working directly with affected communities and with NGOs in these communities.

- Both the superintendent in Liberia and the préfet in Côte d’Ivoire have potential and joint roles to play in addressing community tensions and violence, where the chiefs are unable to do so, by leading community-level mediation of grievances. Their capacity to convene and manage informal ‘reconciliation committees’ would be enhanced through the provision of mediation training.
- UN, EU and donor missions should connect more directly with local populations in the design and review of responses and programming for the region, and in ongoing monitoring of the security situation.

Coordination of national responses
Coordination of responses between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire is largely restricted to national government level and to meetings on protocol and form, rather than implementation. Working-level relationships and decision-making between counterparts in Liberian and Ivorian ministries are needed.

- Inter-ministerial meetings at regional and district levels between, for example, officials from respective Ministries of Internal Affairs or Foreign Affairs, could be mandated to plan joint programmes at the regional level with local communities on both sides of the border.
To enhance the effectiveness of such an initiative, joint mapping of existing committees and initiatives, particularly on the Ivorian side, would be a useful first step. Rather than set up parallel institutions for implementation of initiatives and ideas, governments should explore partnerships with existing CSOs with links to and relationships in the region.

6.2.2 Support from the MRU
The development of a regional security strategy by the MRU and ECOWAS with the support of the Africa Development Fund, UN and EU aimed at providing a comprehensive framework for addressing common and cross-border issues, is a much needed and welcome initiative, yet requires the full commitment of regional governments and multilateral actors for its effective implementation.

6.2.3 Government of Liberia
The implications of the ongoing reduction in the UN military presence are already felt in the border regions. The government of Liberia needs to take practical steps to ensure that the scaling down of UNMIL does not create a security vacuum in the south-eastern part of the country. The devolution of security and justice mechanisms to county level is a potentially positive move towards improving accessibility to justice and protection for Liberian citizens, thus contributing to citizen safety and confidence in the government.

- Support should be provided to the government of Liberia to review the capacity of its national security forces to respond to tensions and violence.
- The government should bolster and support national security and justice systems for effective takeover from UNMIL. This includes a commitment to long-term staffing and resources for the regional hubs.
- Effective devolution of security and justice mechanisms is vital to meet citizens’ expectations and security and justice needs; ways to ensure inclusivity in the process are vital.
- Financial incentives to armed groups may offer a short-term strategy to improve border security; however, they do little to improve long-term security threats and, as such, should be stopped. Financial support should instead be channelled through strategic livelihood programmes that can address the economic and social needs of the ex-combatants, ex-militias and wider border community.

6.2.4 Government of Côte d’Ivoire
The reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire has not extended beyond national-level politics, and political dialogue has stalled; cross-border violence and existing government responses cannot be separated from the overall political reconciliation process. Security sector reform has also been slow and networks affiliated to the former government remain in existence beyond the country’s borders whose aim it is to destabilise the current government.

- Reconciliation processes should be extended to western regions of the country to help communities address some of the contentious issues, such as land litigation and land rights, as well as ethnic identity issues and deep-seated political divides.
- A new inclusive political settlement in Côte d’Ivoire is needed; the idea of a process of national dialogue should be explored drawing on the growing body of international experience and expertise in this area.
- Any political dialogue should engage the Ivorian diaspora in the wider region and European capitals in support for a country-level reconciliation process.
6.2.5 United Nations

- The UN should review the UNMIL drawdown and put mechanisms in place to address security issues that emerge at stages of its transition.
- The UN should consider inclusion of bilateral elements in the mandates of UNOCI and UNMIL to enhance their coordination and cooperation.
- A review should include a longer-term strategy with measures to address gaps in the capacities of national security forces to manage post-conflict situations, including political tensions and movements of armed groups across the border.

6.2.6 Civil society

CSOs and regional networks can play a vital role in enhancing border security and addressing underlying tensions as highlighted in previous recommendations. Further ideas for their role include:

- Monitoring the drivers of and trends in insecurity, and acting as an advocacy platform for messages to policy actors at national, regional and international levels.
- CSOs based in capitals should expand their activities to the border regions to support community-based and individual civic activists operating in the region. Areas for work include human rights, peace and security, agriculture and livelihoods.
- Donors should provide support to allow this extension to happen, given the costs of operating in the region, poor communications and security issues.
References


