Brazil’s Engagement in International Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate

Iara Costa Leite, Bianca Suyama, Laura Trajber Waisbich and Melissa Pomeroy, with Jennifer Constantine, Lizbeth Navas-Alemán, Alex Shankland and Musab Younis

May 2014
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## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (Brazilian Cooperation Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABDI</td>
<td>Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial (Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABONG</td>
<td>Associação Brasileira de ONGs (Brazilian NGOs Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIIF</td>
<td>African Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEX</td>
<td>Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos (Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNDES</td>
<td>Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMEX</td>
<td>Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Brazilian Chamber of Foreign Commerce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPES</td>
<td>Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Brazilian Higher Education Coordination Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGFOME</td>
<td>A Coordenação-Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome (General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger, attached to the Ministry of External Relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGU</td>
<td>Controladoria Geral da União (Office of the Comptroller General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNM</td>
<td>National Confederation of Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPq</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (Brazilian National Research Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBRADI</td>
<td>Relatório sobre Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional (Report on the Brazilian Cooperation for International Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFIG</td>
<td>Export Financing and Guarantee Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONARE</td>
<td>Comitê Nacional para os Refugiados (Brazilian National Committee for Refugees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSEA</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (Brazilian National Food Security Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian Central Workers’ Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embrapa</td>
<td>Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENAP</td>
<td>Escola Nacional de Administração Pública (Brazilian National School of Public Administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGV</td>
<td>Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Getúlio Vargas Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIESP</td>
<td>Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiocruz</td>
<td>Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, attached to the Brazilian Ministry of Health)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNP</td>
<td>National Front of Mayors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCEM</td>
<td>Fundo para a Convergência Estrutural e Fortalecimento do Mercosul (Mercosul Structural Convergence Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNAG</td>
<td>Fundação Alexandre Gusmão (Alexandre Gusmão Foundation, attached to the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNEC</td>
<td>Fundo Especial de Cooperação Técnica (Special Technical Cooperation Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>GR-RI</td>
<td>Grupo de Reflexão sobre Relações Internacionais (Reflection Group on International Relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTI-AHI</td>
<td>Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial para Ajuda Humanitária Internacional (Inter-ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBASE</td>
<td>Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (Institute for Social and Economic Analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>International development cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INESC</td>
<td>Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (Institute of Socioeconomic Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td>Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute for Applied Economic Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>International technical cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAF</td>
<td>Programa Mais Alimentos África (More Food Africa Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCTI</td>
<td>Ministério de Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação (Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Ministério da Defesa (Ministry of Defence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (Ministry of Agrarian Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDIC</td>
<td>Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior (Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDS</td>
<td>Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social (Social Development Ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Ministério da Educação (Education Ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercosul</td>
<td>South American Countries’ Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPOG</td>
<td>Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão (Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Ministry of External Relations), also known as Itamaraty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Movimento dos Sem Terra (Landless Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAA</td>
<td>Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (Food Purchase Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAHO</td>
<td>Pan-American Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP</td>
<td>Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (Portuguese-speaking African countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Partido Progressista (Progressive Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROEX</td>
<td>Programa de Financiamento à Exportações (Export Financing Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REBRIP</td>
<td>Rede Brasileira Pela Integração dos Povos (Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAE</td>
<td>Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos (Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, linked to the presidency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENAI</td>
<td>Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial (Brazilian National Service for Industrial Apprenticeship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG-PR</td>
<td>Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República (General Secretariat of the Presidency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDC</td>
<td>South–South Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCDC</td>
<td>Technical cooperation among developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCTP</td>
<td>Third Country Training Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASUL</td>
<td>União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Union of South American Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Executive summary

The international development cooperation architecture has changed dramatically over the last decade. The global context, characterised by a lingering financial crisis and the emergence of new powers, has brought South–South Development Cooperation (SSDC) to the core of international development debate. The growing influence of emerging countries, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as development cooperation providers requires a deeper understanding of how and to what extent these countries are promoting sustainable and inclusive development by cooperating with partners in the global South. To be able to answer these questions, the national dynamics need to be unpacked by mapping institutions, ideas, and interests informing decision-making processes, and shaping, not only policy priorities, but also the effectiveness of development cooperation.

Brazil is in the spotlight and Brazilian cooperation, in all its different modalities (from technical, scientific and technological, educational, and humanitarian cooperation to contributions to international organisations, refugee support and protection, and peace operations), has risen to unprecedented levels in recent years. According to official data, Brazilian development cooperation increased from US$160 million in 2005 to more than US$900 million in 2010. In that period, the country’s technical cooperation disbursements grew almost fourfold and its humanitarian cooperation expanded from less than half a million dollars in 2005 to US$161 million in 2010. However, interviews and the current budget freeze on the Brazilian Cooperation Agency’s (ABC) activities indicate that the upward trend may have changed in the last three years.

However, Brazil’s prominent role has been accompanied by persistent national development challenges and by challenges in its development cooperation’s institutional framework that hinder overall planning, coordination and a sustainable flow of resources. Nevertheless, there is a growing number of national institutions, civil society organisations and think tanks directly involved in and/or debating SSDC in Brazil. There have also been announcements of a new agency, a White Paper on foreign policy and the creation of a foreign policy council, all pointing to the fact that the SSDC agenda is at a critical juncture in the country. It is now essential to draw on the recent history and current challenges and opportunities facing Brazil’s SSDC to inform debates and political choices.

The State of the Debate report captures this particular moment of Brazil’s engagement in international development cooperation by gathering and analysing the main ideas and narratives, institutions and interests informing the country’s current development cooperation practices. This effort aims primarily at contributing to an evidence-based debate within Brazil on its international development engagements, as is explained in the introductory section. The second part describes the scope and methodology of the report, explaining the focus on technical cooperation. This is not only due to Brazil’s growing international recognition but also because this modality involves a broad range of national partners and has a great potential to strengthen a national constituency for development cooperation.

Section 3 provides an overview of the origins of Brazilian development cooperation’s principles and narratives, showing how the country’s historical engagement as a receiver of development cooperation informs its current involvement in SSDC. The study points to current narratives (such as horizontality, non-conditionality and being demand-driven) that result from how the government has experienced and perceived being an aid recipient. Recognition of the support given to the advancement of some particular sectors is at the same time accompanied by resentment towards asymmetric relations and interference, which are seen as the main drivers for low and inadequate developmental outcomes. Though these narratives find some resonance among civil society groups, many tend to have a more positive view of international cooperation in Brazil’s democratisation efforts.
More broadly, it is argued that Brazilian traditional foreign policy principles (such as pragmatism, pacifism and non-intervention) and the collective national perception of the country’s international identity as a ‘middle-power’, an ‘intermediate’ and ‘system-affecting state’ belonging to the global South and serving as a bridge or a mediator in international affairs, also influence the current discourse on development cooperation. Brazil’s development trajectory plays an important role in shaping the country’s identity as a new cooperation provider, projecting its image as a developmental state promoting poverty reduction and social inclusion. Engagement in technical cooperation is seen as fitting all of these narratives through different angles: helping Brazil to build on its soft power, reaffirming its ‘diplomacy for development’, and its identity as the champion of developing nations.

In the fourth section, the study draws a tentative picture of Brazil’s profile and priorities in different SSDC modalities. It contrasts the official discourse on policy priorities with the publicly available figures coming from official reports (which now cover the period from 2005 to 2010), and from technical cooperation data from ABC. In the absence of a comprehensive national development cooperation policy and up-to-date statistics, the figures reflect part of a larger and overlapping landscape of development cooperation modalities. Patterns and tendencies are thus treated with caution, emphasising the need for more in-depth analysis.

Between 2005 and 2010, technical cooperation delivered by several federal agencies has increased almost fourfold. Data related to initiatives that are coordinated by the ABC reveal that Latin America is the major geographical recipient in terms of the number of projects, while African countries receive the majority of ABC funds. Sectors vary across regions, with agriculture, health and education (including vocational training) being the three main areas. These traditional sectors have been accompanied by emerging sectors, mainly public security. Beyond geographical and sectoral allocation, the nature and implementation of technical cooperation defines the key features of Brazilian development cooperation. This is demonstrated in the priority given to ‘structuring projects’, the increasing intermingling of differing modalities and the expansion of trilateral cooperation agreements, notably in Africa.

Brazil’s profile as a cooperation provider is a result of the interplay between numerous ideas, institutions and interests. As discussed in Section 5 of the report, informality and dispersion are central features of Brazilian cooperation’s institutional framework. ABC, currently part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), is just one among a myriad of institutions making decisions and implementing cooperation initiatives. Currently, there are divergent proposals to reform this system: one is to create a new agency in charge of development cooperation, trade and investment, and the other to strengthen ABC by boosting its human and financial resources.

A second argument is that the fragmentation of decision-making calls into question the idea that Brazilian technical cooperation is purely an instrument of foreign policy – if the latter is interpreted through traditional literature lenses according to which foreign policy is a state policy developed and led by MRE, in isolation from other actors. Alternatively, there are numerous cooperation ideas and practices, and they often respond to a series of parallel (and sometimes conflicting) strategies held by different actors beyond the MRE: the presidency, ministries and other implementing agencies, the private sector, civil society, and traditional donors. It is therefore not an instrument of a single policy but of a multiplicity of interests.

Thus, findings show no clear indication that ABC responds to one single, or coherent, national public policy or strategy. However, that does not mean that technical cooperation is not influenced by foreign policy priorities. The research shows that technical cooperation may be a mechanism to maintain and/or foster Brazilian political and economic interests abroad. Conversely, the presidency is a key actor in fostering partnerships and defining priorities for development cooperation. Policy shifts from one head of state to another are clear: from
Cardoso’s health diplomacy, to Lula’s focus on fighting poverty and hunger, and President Rousseff’s promotion of Brazilian commercial interests.

Regarding policy implementation actors, ministries and implementing agencies take part in international policy diffusion networks, promoting their national work abroad, and thus generating international demands for those successful policies and programmes. Implementation can happen with or without ABC’s supervision and oversight. Findings show that the alignment of implementing agencies with broad governmental priorities is a key factor in the expansion and sustainability of their engagement abroad.

The analysis of interest groups found little information available on the links between geographical and sectoral allocations of technical cooperation and private sector investments. There is, however, a correlation between commercial and investment flows and cooperation initiatives, but causality needs to be further explored. Civil society and social movements have gone from implementing actors in the past to participants, in formal and informal spaces, of the policy debate on Brazilian technical cooperation and on SSDC. Existing participatory mechanisms related to food and nutritional security and humanitarian cooperation, for example, are seen today as models for citizen participation, and could also inform ongoing discussions on participation in foreign policymaking, beyond SSDC issues.

Unpacking the legislative branch, the National Congress is still mainly reactive to the agenda set by the Executive. Despite the lack of a specific caucus or organised group on international development cooperation, important initiatives have happened in the past decade, such as the creation of the Parliamentary Group on Brazil–Africa, and the debates on food aid and solidarity diplomacy. Findings show that Congress is slowly, but steadily, acting as a check-and-balance force on cooperation issues, and has the potential to build constituency around development cooperation in Brazil.

Finally, traditional donors and international organisations have not only played a key role in promoting Brazilian ‘development solutions’ abroad, but have also financially supported and operationalised Brazilian engagement in other countries. Traditional donors’ mediation often influences the demands that reach the Brazilian government, and they are currently partnering with Brazil on trilateral cooperation arrangements. The description of the various actors involved in technical cooperation indicates the complexity of the interests at play, beyond the narrative of being demand-driven.

In the sixth section, the study also explores current policy debates around Brazilian SSDC. Such debates are embryonic and often fragmented, made up mostly of ad hoc and informal spaces. Despite the apparent small public constituency on the topic, existing debates allow for discussion on both specific policy aspects of Brazilian current developmental practices (geographical and sectoral priorities, budget allocation, implementation challenges, developmental impact), but also on the framework of Brazilian cooperation policymaking – including transparency, accountability, and participation. Less critical and incipient traditional policy debates in the media and academia contrast with civil society actors that are contesting official discourses and problematising political choices.

Five key issues being debated are: (1) the so-called uniqueness of Brazilian cooperation; (2) demands to recognise the role of civil society in the policies currently being ‘exported’ elsewhere and their legitimacy as actors in SSDC; (3) the need for more systematic publicly available information on Brazilian development cooperation, especially financial cooperation provided by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES); (4) the reiteration of the need to treat international cooperation as a public policy, promoting an inclusive process to foster debate on: what is understood as SSDC, why Brazil should cooperate, and the relationship between the different modalities coexisting; and (5) the need to democratise foreign policy by creating a council and/or a national conference.
The concluding section emphasises that efforts, such as the two official reports that systematise data on Brazilian development cooperation, are helping to assess the complex puzzle that represents the diversity of Brazilian cooperation and at the same time set the basis for the construction of a national policy. The fact that the main features of Brazilian development cooperation provision are still under construction can be seen as an opportunity to reflect on lessons learned by the various agencies involved in development cooperation. It is also an opportunity to engage various stakeholders in the debate and to build a system that is both coherent with its guiding principles and realistic with the challenges imposed by Brazil's national agenda and the tension amongst multiple domestic interests.
1 Introduction

The international development cooperation architecture has changed dramatically over the last decade. On the one hand, the diversification of providers, approaches and themes has opened up new debates on how to improve effectiveness. On the other hand, traditional development models have been increasingly challenged due to the current financial, food and climate crises, thus questioning the capacity of such models to generate sustainable social inclusion in the South.

The influence of emerging countries such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is also rapidly increasing, including their role as providers of official and non-official South–South Development Cooperation (SSDC). Brazil’s role in development cooperation is marked by a wide recognition of its development experiences as potentially useful for other governments, as well as for international organisations and other actors engaged in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Beyond the growing interest in Brazil’s international engagements, the current critical juncture in international development cooperation provides an extra impetus to understanding the state of the debate within Brazil on this issue, as well as the role played by ideas, institutions and interests. Brazil’s growing activism in development cooperation is accompanied by the persistence of challenges to national development, as well as by challenges in its development cooperation’s institutional framework that hinder a sustainable flow of resources and national planning and coordination to respond to a perceived increasing number of demands. Despite these constraints, a growing number of Brazilian actors involved in SSDC have been learning by doing and continuously reassessing modes of engagement. Within this constantly changing picture, there is a need to better understand and debate narratives, policies and practices shaping Brazilian provision of SSDC, so that particular reflection and learning processes can achieve a systemic level and contribute to an effective engagement.

This report aims to provide a snapshot of interests, institutions and ideas, including narratives and policy debates, relating to Brazil’s official engagement in SSDC, mainly focusing on the provision of technical cooperation. It is divided into seven sections. Section 2 presents the methodology and scope of the research. Section 3 provides a background account of how Brazil’s engagement in development cooperation has evolved in practice and in discourse in recent decades and how it relates to perceptions of the country’s role in international affairs, as well as to shifting national and international politics and conceptions of development. Section 4 presents Brazil’s profile as a provider of SSDC and describes its different modalities, going on to focus on the sectoral and geographic distribution of its technical cooperation. Section 5 maps and analyses the institutional framework related to Brazilian technical cooperation, decision-making processes and interest groups influencing the allocation of public resources. Section 6 focuses on policy debates and the narratives and ideas of the private sector and civil society regarding development cooperation. The final section summarises the main findings of the research and concludes with suggestions of areas for future work.
2  Research scope and methodology

International development cooperation has been traditionally framed through the conceptual framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), particularly its definition of ‘Official Development Assistance’ (ODA). However, emerging donors claim that South–South cooperation differs from, and is broader than, traditional development cooperation. One of the main stated differences is that the former is based on mutual benefits. According to Donald Bobiash (1992: 6), South–South cooperation refers to ‘economic and political co-operation among developing countries’, and its modalities include: ‘co-operation among developing states in multilateral negotiations with the developed countries; promotion of South–South trade; the development of regional political and economic associations, and the provision of development assistance’.

This research focuses on the latter, which will be referred to as South–South Development Cooperation (SSDC), though recognising that SSDC does not exhaust South–South cooperation and that it should not be viewed in isolation from other types of engagement (such as South–South political cooperation and South–South economic relations). Since there is no consensual definition of SSDC among Southern countries (ECOSOC 2008), this research considers it as an intersection between international development cooperation and South–South cooperation, thus encompassing the flows of technical cooperation, financial or in-kind donations and concessional loans among developing countries aimed at tackling development problems. SSDC has been claimed to be more effective than traditional aid as developing countries face similar development challenges. Greater potential effectiveness would also result from more horizontal relationships, mutual trust, inspiration provided by other Southern country successes and lower costs of implementation. SSDC also includes, besides official relationships, actions undertaken by the private sector and civil society organisations (CSOs).

This research focuses on Brazilian official SSDC and, specifically, on the modality known as ‘technical cooperation among developing countries’ (TCDC). Even though this does not represent the bulk of Brazilian SSDC (see Section 4), increasing international recognition of Brazilian development experiences has conferred a centrality to the principles and characteristics of Brazilian technical cooperation. Besides, Brazilian official technical cooperation includes a broad range of national partners, including ministries, subnational governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This means that Brazilian technical cooperation has great potential to strengthen national constituencies, supporting the allocation of public funds to promote international development. Many of the current and potential implementing agencies and groups have also been developing innovative solutions to inclusive and sustainable development. Such solutions could potentially be scaled up in a global context and used to help bring about a revision of models and paradigms within international development cooperation. For this potential to be realised, it is important to bridge the knowledge gap concerning the Brazilian architecture of technical cooperation.

The main dynamics regarding Brazilian technical cooperation cannot be fully captured if they are analysed in an isolated manner. This research will therefore explore some of the interfaces of technical cooperation with other modalities of SSDC, such as humanitarian assistance and contributions to international organisations, as well as with trade and investment.

The main intersection that will be explored in this research is related to the linkages between technical cooperation and Brazilian foreign policy, as the redefinition of Brazil as a rising power and as a global player has a crucial impact on the country’s development cooperation agenda. However, emerging countries engaging in international cooperation, like traditional
donors, cannot be treated as anthropomorphic units. They encompass a collection of interests, ideas and institutions that influence the sectoral and geographic allocation of public resources.\(^1\) Mapping these and understanding which ones shape decision-making instances (and why and how they are doing so) is crucial in order to ensure that Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation in particular, and in SSDC in general, is transparent and participatory.

The following methodology was used in each section:

- **Brazil’s engagement in development cooperation (Section 3):** This section was based on a comprehensive literature review on Brazil and international development cooperation, South–South cooperation and Brazilian foreign policy. Aiming at exploring the current state of the debate in the country, priority was given to conventional sources – official and authored by scholars and diplomats – published in Brazil and/or by Brazilian authors in foreign institutions. When possible, it was cross-checked with other relevant sources. In some cases, grey literature was also included.\(^2\)

- **Brazil as a provider (Section 4):** The main source of information for this section was the Brazilian official reports on international development cooperation (COBRADI) that were released in 2010 and in 2013, and that gathered data, respectively, from 2005 to 2009 and in 2010. Considering this three-year gap and lack of detailed information regarding sectoral and geographic allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation, the team collected information available from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and their officials. In addition, official documents on budget allocation and execution for those missing years, ABC grey literature and figures on other modalities of South–South cooperation that were not included in COBRADI were also used. A more accurate account of the recent flows was not possible due to lack of up-to-date public systematic information, which implies that recent trends and shifts that have been identified during the research were not necessarily backed by data. Data analysis was supported by literature review and interviews with specialists and practitioners.

- **Institutions, interests, and decision-making (Section 5):** This section was based on a literature review and interviews with staff from ABC, from main implementing agencies and, to a lesser extent, from institutions that are engaged in modalities of development cooperation (in order to initially explore how technical cooperation has or has not been communicating with other modalities). The complete list of interviewees may be found in Annex 1.\(^3\) Findings from this section are preliminary and have to be further explored.

- **Policy debate (Section 6):** This section explores the views held by NGOs, the media, academia and the private sector. This section is mainly based on interviews with civil society’s representatives and the private sector, as well as views and opinions shared during three focus groups that had been organised in São Paulo, Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro engaging academics that work specifically on international development cooperation and SSDC (generally from the field of international relations), researchers and policy advisors from

\(^1\) See Lancaster (2007).

\(^2\) For the literature review, priority was given to Brazilian international relations journals (Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Contexto Internacional and Política Externa). The search was complemented by word-searching in nationwide databases, such as Scieio, using the words: ‘cooperação internacional’, ‘Agência Brasileira de Cooperação’, and ‘sul-sul’. A review of national Master and PhD theses was done using the same keywords on the thesis database of Portal de Periódicos Capes. The review of official documents, statements and opinions was done using official government websites.

\(^3\) The research team guaranteed interviewees and focus group participants that they would remain anonymous, to ensure people shared their views freely.
existing foreign policy thinktanks, and representatives from NGOs, networks and social movements that have been involved in development cooperation and foreign policy discussions. The complete list of attendees can be found in Annex 2. These views are complemented by grey literature published in the last two years, authored by CSOs’ representatives. Text boxes containing a short analysis of the academic debate and media coverage related to the theme of Brazilian engagement in development cooperation have also been included.

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4 Although invitations were sent to a wide range of individuals and organisations, the meetings were mainly attended by people who had or have a close relationship with PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores – Workers’ Party), and are concerned about issues of social justice, democracy and accountability.
3 Brazil’s development cooperation: principles and narratives

This section explores the genesis of the principles and narratives guiding Brazil’s current engagement in international development cooperation. Starting with the fact that the country has a dual engagement in the international development cooperation system (Hirst 2012; Lopes 2008), the central argument here is that Brazil’s current narratives in technical cooperation are closely related to how the Brazilian government and, to a lesser extent, Brazilian CSOs have experienced and perceived being an aid recipient. Such narratives are also informed by Brazil’s identity as ‘belonging to the global South’ (which has deeply influenced the country’s foreign policy principles), by how the country sees its role in international relations and by shifting domestic ideas and politics (development models, political regimes and social mobilisation).

3.1 Brazil as an aid recipient: recognition and resentment

In most Brazilian official narratives, being an aid recipient is seen as having had a positive impact on the advancement of some domestic sectors, but also as having prevented the country from overcoming underdevelopment. A historical overview of the country’s experience of foreign assistance sheds light on this ambiguity.

Specialists agree that Brazil was only marginally included in the global system of aid provision (Ayllón, Nogueira and Puerto 2007; Hirst 2011). From the 1950s, Brazil benefited from modest but sustainable aid flows coming from the OECD-DAC countries and multilateral donors. The height of Brazil’s receipt of aid was during the 1960s and the 1970s when the Brazilian government, following the foreign policy principle of pragmatism, tried to link its support for Western anti-communism to receiving foreign aid to assist the country’s state-led development (Leonardi 2010; Valler Filho 2007). Pragmatism, which has been a crucial element of Brazil’s foreign policy (Cervo and Bueno 2002; Fonseca Jr. 1998; Lima 1982) refers to the idea that Brazilian foreign policy should adopt political realism, remain closely linked to national development strategies and avoid being constrained by ideological alignment.

During the Cold War, however, Latin America was not a priority and the actual amount of aid provided to Brazil fell short of national expectations. This generated some resentment towards traditional donors. Moreover, middle-income countries’ access to aid was further limited by the 1970s global economic crisis, the general ‘aid fatigue’ of donors, and the establishment of graduating practices in development cooperation. By the 1980s, the Brazilian government had taken on most of the national implementation costs of foreign assistance.

According to Amado Cervo (1994), in the period up to 1989 the main bilateral donors (by number of projects) were Germany, France, Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Food and Agriculture

5 Although in the period up to 1983 only 0.7 per cent of the 453 projects that UNDP financed worldwide benefited Brazil (Ayllon et al. 2007), some authors tend to argue that financial assistance was numerically more important (Ayllon et al. 2007; Leonardi 2010).

6 Pragmatism in receiving foreign aid was first applied during the Getúlio Vargas administration in the 1930s, with negotiations with the US culminating in Brazil receiving US$20 million in loans from the US Export-Import Bank (EXIMBANK) to construct the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) steel plant in the early 1940s. For more information, see: http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/FatosImagens/CSN
Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) figured as the main multilateral donors.

Brazilian sectors covered by international aid flows have changed over time according to national development models and the evolution of the architecture of development cooperation. Initially, during the period 1940–1960, Brazil and foreign donors converged on an economic growth-based development model, though there remained differences over the means of achieving it.\(^7\) During that period, the Brazilian government prioritised receiving cooperation in order to support the development of basic infrastructure and scientific and technological advances. In the 1970s, the emergence of the ‘Basic Human Needs’ approach, with its proposed focus on actions tackling poverty in rural areas, was at odds with Brazil’s official focus on economic growth. In parallel, donors’ direct support to social movements and CSOs\(^8\) had a significant impact on the country’s return to democracy and on the democratic reforms that followed in the 1980s.\(^9\) Not surprisingly, the military government perceived such international support as interference in Brazil’s domestic affairs. This preoccupation with international cooperation received by Brazilian NGOs is still present in government discourse. In an OECD-led event in 2008, the Brazilian delegation emphasised the need for government ‘supervision over the activities of NGOs in development projects’ (MRE 2008).

During the 1990s, Brazil abandoned its traditional ‘developmentalist’ strategy in favour of macroeconomic stability. Structural adjustment programmes began to be dominant\(^10\) and ODA was reoriented mainly to poverty alleviation projects (ABONG 2010; Cervo 1994). The 2000s brought another shift, with the renewal of Brazilian state-led developmentalism (Bresser-Pereira 2011), this time with a greater emphasis on social inclusion (Arbix and Martin 2010; Trubek, Coutinho and Schaprio forthcoming). Social development started playing a major role in Brazilian demands for development cooperation.

Despite widespread resentment of the asymmetrical character of received assistance, there is a perception that it has nevertheless effectively contributed to fostering national human and institutional capacities in key strategic sectors, namely technology, industry and agriculture (Abreu 2013; Barbosa 2011; Cervo 1994). As a result, it helped consolidate success stories and national ‘islands of excellence’ (Barbosa 2011; Cabral and Weinstock 2010; Santos and Carrion 2011; Santos 2011), such as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI), all of which later became active in Brazil’s engagement in technical cooperation (see Box 4.3).\(^{11}\) From the point of view of foreign

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\(^7\) Despite major affinities on the growth-based model, resentment of traditional donors was already significant during the period. President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961) started the ‘demonisation’ of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that would continue, to varying degrees, over the following decades (Almeida 2004). In the 1970s, the Brazilian government was extremely critical of shifting positions on US cooperation because they ended up affecting Brazilian nuclear ambitions during Ernesto Geisel’s administration (1974–1979). Later on, US President Carter’s policy of linking aid to pro-human rights policies was not well received in Brasilia either.

\(^8\) The relation between the total ODA of traditional donors, their ODA to Brazil and their willingness to invest in civil society is well explored by Leonardi (2010). In his thesis, the author shows how major donors – such as Germany, Italy, Spain and France – have invested little in Brazilian CSOs when compared to smaller donors, such as the Netherlands and Sweden.

\(^9\) Authors tend to agree that, by funding social movements such as the Central Workers’ Union (CUT – Central Única dos Trabalhadores) and the Landless Movement (MST – Movimento dos Sem Terra) and non-governmental organisations – such as Ação Educativa, IBASE and Pôlis, among others – foreign assistance has actually supported Brazil’s democratisation efforts (Campolina 2011; Landim 1993; Masagão 2011).

\(^10\) During the 1990s Brazil went through a series of unsuccessful economic stabilisation attempts, mediated by the IMF. Dissatisfaction with the IMF’s structural adjustment policies and its conditionalities was already strong at the time and is a major factor shaping Brazilian understanding of global economic governance.

\(^11\) For an analysis on the Embrapa and SENAI cases see Barbosa (2011) and Gonçalves (2011), respectively. Other frequently cited examples of successful stories are the Centre for Aeronautic Technology, the Brazilian National Research Council (CNPq) and the Higher Education Coordination Agency (CAPES).
ministry officials the existence on the Brazilian side of an institutional structure designed to connect received aid to state-led national development plans (see Section 5) is seen as the main mechanism explaining this effectiveness.

By 2010, Brazil’s ratio of ODA to GDP had been reduced to 0.031 (OECD 2012a; World Bank 2013). There is very little information on the subnational dynamics of this trend to unpack where reductions/increases have taken place and why. Despite this relative independence from foreign aid and the predominance of the narrative of having evolved from a recipient to a provider of technical cooperation, cooperation with other countries is still seen as an important tool to support Brazil’s development.

Between 2003 and 2010, Brazil benefited from 1,800 technical cooperation projects (Brasil 2010a) and, in 2010, it received US$661 million in ODA-like flows from DAC countries (OECD 2012a), notably from Germany, Norway, Japan, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. Environment, education, agriculture, public management and health were the main targeted sectors. In 2011, Brazil received a record amount of ODA, totalling almost US$870 million (see Annex 3). The Brazilian government also requests international cooperation in strategic sectors such as satellite technology and agro-genetic development (Hirst 2012), although in many cases the country has evolved from a recipient to a co-producer of innovation, going beyond the strict domain of international development cooperation. Embrapa’s virtual laboratories – LABEX – in China, Korea, Europe and the United States are mentioned as examples of a more mature relation among the company and counterparts in other countries. Sectoral allocation of bilateral disbursements in 2010 and 2011 was mainly concentrated in social sectors and production (see Annex 4).

The recent reorientation of traditional donors – targeting new regions, closing official representations or shifting them to multi-stakeholder and trilateral ones, and channelling aid through different channels (such as international NGOs and the private sector, for instance) – was deeply felt by some sectors in Brazil, particularly by national CSOs. They claim that, despite Brazil’s status as a middle-income country, it still hosts many of the world’s poor (Balbis and Fernández 2011) and that development assistance and cooperation remain crucial for the sustainability of Brazilian NGOs (Masagão 2011).

3.2 Principles and narratives related to Brazilian technical cooperation

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a global shift towards an emerging consensus around a more ‘egalitarian philosophy’ in technical cooperation (Cervo 1994). Emerging ideals of horizontality and non-conditionality have influenced the guiding principles of Brazilian technical cooperation, also resonating with the country’s perceptions on its previous experiences as an aid recipient. These ideals were also closely aligned with Brazil’s foreign policy principles, mainly non-intervention, autonomy, pacifism, and universalism, all of which were firmly grounded in the country’s Southern identity. Such foreign policy principles are considered to guide and promote consistency in Brazilian external action. Historically, continuity in Brazilian foreign policy has prevailed over rupture even across different regimes (Cervo and Bueno 2002; Leite 2011; Lima 2005b; Vizentini 2005). Continuity is also guaranteed by having foreign policy principles enshrined in Article 4 of the 1988 federal constitution.

12 According to data from the Brazilian NGOs Association (ABONG), financial dependency on international donors among ABONG’s members was 75.9 per cent in 1993, 50.6 per cent in 2000, 39.4 per cent in 2003 and 78.3 per cent in 2007 (ABONG 2010).
Brazil’s self-image in international affairs also plays a role in shaping the country’s engagement with development cooperation. A prominent conception shared by politicians across the political spectrum is that of Brazil being destined to play a greater role in international affairs (Lima 2005b; Celso Amorim, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Pecequilo 2008; Saraiva 2007). Building coalitions with other Southern countries, diversifying partners, and projecting soft power are seen as instruments that can help to guarantee Brazil’s leadership in international affairs and to reduce its structural dependence (Barbosa 2011; Cepaluni and Vigevani 2007; Dauvergne and Farias 2012; Leite 2011; Lima 2005b; Puente 2010; Pecequilo 2008; Valler Filho 2007). Building on its traditional foreign policy principles and on its Southern identity, the country also repudiates coercion as an instrument for accomplishing international goals; therefore cooperation is seen as a bulwark for Brazil’s international engagement.

Though belonging to the category of ‘developing countries’ is seen as guaranteeing preferential access to trade and differentiating responsibilities in global governance in several areas (Cozendey 2007; Ratton Sanchez Badin 2008), Brazil does not want to be seen merely as a ‘developing country’; it wants recognition of its distinctive position vis-à-vis Southern countries in general. Narratives of Brazil being a ‘middle-power’, an ‘intermediate, emerging’ and ‘system-affecting state’, which are highly prominent in the literature (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Hurrell 2009; Lafer 2000; Lima 2005a; Saraiva 2007; Sennes 2012), have framed a collective national perception of the role of the country as an intermediary between North and South. This position, however, is not merely a self-proclaimed one: Brazil’s inclusion in initiatives such as the 2007 Heiligendamm Process,13 as well as the leading role played by the country in establishing innovative mechanisms to finance development and in triangular arrangements with traditional donors, are clear signs that this self-perception is shared by developed countries.

Engagement in technical cooperation is seen as fitting all those narratives in different ways: as helping Brazil to build on its soft power (Barbosa 2011; Puente 2010); as reaffirming its ‘diplomacy for development’ and its identity as the champion of developing nations (Dauvergne and Farias 2012); as cultivating hegemony in the Southern Atlantic (Morais de Sá e Silva 2005); and as a pivotal or anchor country in international development cooperation (Schlager 2007).

Brazilian diplomats and scholars, in general, subscribe to the view that the country’s engagement in technical cooperation is an instrument of foreign policy. Technical cooperation is seen as a vehicle to foster relations in other domains with developing countries (Ayllón and Leite 2009; Barbosa 2011; Cervo 1994; Puente 2010; Valler Filho 2007). Creating favourable conditions for the achievement of economic goals abroad and gathering international support for raising Brazil’s international profile on fronts such as the quest for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)14 and Brazilian candidacies in international organisations are cited as particular examples.

Brazilian identity as a development cooperation actor is also a product of the interplay between Brazil’s foreign policy agenda and domestic politics. The re-emergence of South–South cooperation (see Box 3.1) in the 2000s has to be understood within the realm of state

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13 The Heiligendamm Process was a dialogue started in 2007 between the member states of the G8 group of countries and some emerging economies: Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. It is considered to have been a starting point for further discussions on global governance reform.

14 Brazil’s quest for a permanent seat at the UNSC has been a longstanding foreign policy priority since the 1990s. In recent years Brazil has tried to raise the issue of the Security Council reform in almost every multilateral forum, in joint efforts with other non-represented countries such as India, Germany and Japan (the G4) or through bilateral lobbying efforts with its strategic partners and permanent UNSC members. For more on the Brazilian perspective of the UNSC reform, see Brasil 2010a.
activism in the post-neoliberal setting (Hirst 2011; Leite 2012b; Morais de Sá e Silva 2009) and also in the context of the promotion of South–South best-practice transfers (Morais de Sá e Silva 2009) aiming at achieving the MDGs. Such shifts, which coincided with the Lula administration in Brazil, contributed to, and were also fuelled by, this administration’s narratives on global distributive social justice and ‘solidarity diplomacy’ (Abreu 2013; Ayllón 2012; Milani 2011).

### Box 3.1 A brief historical overview of Brazilian South–South relations

Although the growing recognition of Brazil as a Southern leader is a recent phenomenon, the country’s engagement in South–South relations is not new. In Brazilian foreign policy thinking, looking South is traditionally seen as a means of universalising and diversifying partnerships, thus guaranteeing an autonomous position in the international system (Oliveira 2005). Therefore, South–South relations are seen as a pragmatic move.

Two specific historical periods marked the expansion of Brazilian South–South relations: the first under the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ of Joao Goulart’s civilian government (1961–1964), and the second under the ‘Ecumenical and Responsible Pragmatism’ of General Ernesto Geisel’s military rule (1974–1979) (Leite 2011). General Castello Branco’s administration (1964–1967) also marked the beginning of an orientation of Brazilian foreign policy towards the search for markets for higher added value products, for instance organising the first trade missions to African countries (Cervo and Bueno 2002).

Despite sharing a colonial past and the fate of underdevelopment with many developing nations, Brazil was not a protagonist in the events that brought about the emergence of the ‘Third World’ in global affairs: the Bandung (1955) and Belgrade (1961) conferences. The first event that Brazil actively took part in was the creation of the G-77 at the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.

Until the 1970s Brazil maintained a strategic ambiguity in relation to Third World aspirations. Support for the movement’s development quest was not felt as strongly as support for anti-colonial struggles. While supporting anti-colonialism in general, Brazil refrained from openly condemning the presence of particular colonial rulers in Southern countries (such as in the case of the UN resolution condemning Portuguese rule in Africa). Such an ambiguous position was not welcomed by other developing countries; in 1973, for instance, Brazil was included by a number of African states in a list of countries to be subject to economic and diplomatic sanctions for supporting apartheid rule in South Africa (Pinheiro 2007). Brazil’s growing economic presence abroad, initially led by the state oil company Petrobras and later boosted by the second oil crisis, was also condemned by left-wing scholars who started seeing Brazil as a semi-peripheral country reproducing traditional exploitative relations with other Southern countries (see, for instance Carlsson 1982).

On the other hand, during the 1970s Brazil actively participated in the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (Buenos Aires 1978). Brazil had officially started providing technical cooperation in the 1960s and early 1970s, but initiatives were boosted after the Buenos Aires Conference. By the 1980s, demands for technical cooperation were already numerically more significant than projects involving received technical cooperation. Therefore, when ABC was created under the MRE in 1987, Brazil was shifting from a recipient to a provider of technical cooperation (Cervo 1994). At the time, technical cooperation was considered an instrument that could increase a country’s political and economic relations with its neighbours and with newly independent countries (Valler Filho 2007).

Just as in other Latin American countries, the place occupied by South–South relations in Brazilian foreign policy suffered a severe setback with the macroeconomic problems and democratic transition of the 1980s and 1990s (Morais de Sá e Silva 2009). A new phase began at the end of the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, with Brazilian South–South cooperation being boosted by domestic and global drivers. Increasing projection of national development experiences in the context of the MDGs is seen as both resulting from and strengthening international recognition of Brazil’s state-led development model. In this new context, the traditional rationale of pragmatism in South–South relations has disappeared from the official mainstream rhetoric.
Though the element of solidarity gained centrality in the diplomatic discourse during the Lula administration, closely related to the conceptualisation of ‘non-indifference’ and to the ideals of Lula’s Workers’ Party, it was already present, to a lesser extent, in the diplomatic discourse of the preceding administration led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Solidarity, like the right to development, would be grounded in Brazil’s adherence to the principles of international law, including those contained within the United Nations Charter and the MDGs (Valler Filho 2007). It is also considered to be a national value (Dauvergne and Farias 2012; De Faria and Paradis 2011; Leite 2012b; Valler Filho 2007).

Brazil’s official discourse is that it offers a different type of development cooperation from that provided by traditional donors. For example, official discourses emphasise that Brazil does not see itself as a ‘donor’, which would imply incorporating the asymmetries in traditional cooperation, preferring to refer to itself as a partner in/for development. According to the diplomat Carlos Puente (2010), even in the face of uneven development levels between Brazil and some of its partners, using the terminology ‘partner’ would help to promote a spirit of equality that is operationalised in an innovative way during the whole process of identifying the partner’s demands and jointly negotiating, designing and planning projects.

Another stated difference lies in Brazil’s opposition to a donor-driven agenda. By respecting the demand-driven principle and by avoiding supply-driven priorities Brazil claims to promote more horizontal forms of cooperation. However, absolute horizontality is difficult to achieve in practice due to differences in the level of development of recipients. This often means that the country with the highest level of relative development tends to have more weight in setting priorities or sharing knowledge. In this sense, the use of the term ‘partnership’ instead of the terms ‘provider’ and ‘recipient’ would be ‘markedly rhetorical’ (Puente 2010: 115). Márcio Corrêa (2010) from ABC, converges with Puente and also states that ‘the fact that there is political will to act in a respectful manner is not sufficient to ensure a balanced relationship of cooperation’ (Corrêa 2010: 96–7). Thus, cooperation must be empirically proven (Souza 2012).

Solidarity, or the will to ‘contribute to the social and economic progress of other peoples’ (Brasil 2010d: 9), is also a guiding principle of Brazilian cooperation. Economic and geopolitical interests are not completely denied, but this is not regarded as a dilemma. Brazilian technical cooperation can be both altruistic and beneficial to Brazil, contributing to fostering multifaceted relations between partners. Mutual gains have also been increasingly recognised as crucial in ensuring domestic support for technical cooperation, since the latter involves public resources. However, economic and commercial benefits, rather than being stated as a condition, are seen as possible medium- and long-term consequences of closer ties.

The official discourse also states that Brazil prioritises knowledge transfer – technical assistance, skills transfer and capacity-building – over other modalities of cooperation. Presenting itself as a ‘knowledge database’, sharing national best practices with countries

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15 In a speech made in the United Nations General Assembly in 2002, Brazil’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Lafer, stated that ‘Brazilian foreign policy condemns the thesis of the right to intervene, which is contrary to the structuring of the world order in an equitable basis, and defends, for a matter of basic human solidarity, that the international community effectively assists men, women and children in critical situations’ (Lafer, cited in Valler Filho 2007: 47). The solidarity discourse in this context was used as an opposition to the inequitable North-South relationship established by developed countries, but did not relate to South-South cooperation specifically.

16 A more detailed discussion on solidarity in Brazilian international cooperation can be found in Seitenfus (2006).


18 For more on domestic support to Brazilian foreign engagements, see Sections 5 and 6.
with similar problems, Brazil claims to have a firsthand understanding of poverty and underdevelopment, which differentiates it from industrialised countries (Abdenur 2007). The importance of the adaptation process, the recognition of local experiences and the existence of synergies between partners is also recognised. The practice of having public servants that have experience in implementing policies and programmes in Brazil – and not consultants – working as implementers of development cooperation activities is also seen as supporting this approach. By lending its own technical experts for missions abroad, Brazil might be seen to affirm its coherence with its principles of untied and sustainable aid. Moreover, cultural and socioeconomic affinities between Brazil and its partners are also seen as distinguishing assets (Barbosa 2011; Puente 2010).

Finally, non-interference in partners’ domestic affairs is also a guiding principle of Brazilian SSDC, leading to practices of non-conditionality and non-discrimination based on good governance or democratic credentials. Figure 3.1 summarises the main principles guiding Brazilian SSDC and the official narratives related to these principles.

**Figure 3.1 Brazilian SSDC official guiding principles and narratives**

![Diagram showing guiding principles and narratives of Brazilian SSDC]

*Source: Based in the sections on international cooperation and bilateral provided cooperation of Brasil (2010a) and Abreu (2012).*

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4 Brazil as a provider: profile and priorities

Brazil is engaged in bilateral, regional, trilateral and multilateral development cooperation through several modalities: technical, educational, scientific and technological, and humanitarian cooperation, as well as contributions to international organisations, peacekeeping operations, and support to refugees in Brazil. Financial cooperation is also an important modality of Brazilian cooperation.

This section will present Brazil’s profile as a provider of development cooperation by analysing publicly available information: (1) the two reports entitled Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (hereafter COBRADI) (Brasil 2010d, 2013), which cover government expenditures from 2005 to 2010, published by the government thinktank the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), which is linked to the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE) of the presidency, in partnership with ABC; (2) information on technical cooperation provided by ABC; (3) qualitative information on programmes, projects and main institutions engaged in cooperation; and (4) published analysis produced by diplomats and researchers.

Scholars specialising in Brazilian development cooperation have remarked on the groundbreaking character of the first report, COBRADI 2005–2009 (Ayllón 2012), and described it as an unprecedented effort to collect and systematise official data in this area (Leite 2012b). It was also welcomed by international and national thinktanks and CSOs, though the latter criticised the government for failing to open COBRADI’s database for consultation. COBRADI is presented as an evolving effort to represent the reality of Brazilian government cooperation practices and its institutional context. Although its data is framed by conceptual and statistical delineations, it should not be interpreted as the government official position on modalities and definitions (de Campos, Lima and Gonzalez 2012). An important role of the reports has been the mobilisation of a multitude of institutions that provide cooperation, in addition to improving Brazil’s development cooperation transparency (Brasil 2013).

The second report (hereafter COBRADI 2010) (Brasil 2013) analysing 2010 data was published in 2013. Though it covered a wider range of institutions and modalities, it still does not give a complete picture of Brazilian official cooperation. For example, it does not account for financial cooperation such as loans, credit exports and debt relief. Milani and Carvalho (2013) argue that through limiting the scope of development cooperation, the Brazilian government has committed to be accountable only for the modalities included in the report.

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20 The term ‘provider’ was chosen to specify initiatives in which Brazil commits human or financial resources, however small they might be. It also emphasises the descriptive rather than the normative; that is, absolute horizontality or bi-directionality in cooperation initiatives is difficult to achieve in practice and must be proven empirically (as discussed in Section 3). ABC also uses the term ‘provider’.

21 The term COBRADI refers to Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional, or Brazilian International Development Cooperation, and it is the working name for a research programme guided by IPEA involving, voluntarily, institutions of the federal public administration, who are responsible for systematising data on their cooperation inside IPEA.

22 The use of those different data sources does not translate into a triangulation strategy. IPEA and ABC quantitative data are incomparable. ABC data refer only to technical cooperation under the agency’s coordination. However, ABC data are more comprehensive in terms of geographical and sectoral allocation of initiatives, something that is indispensable for analysing trends and priorities.

23 The report was published with changes that make a rigorous analysis of trends and progression of Brazilian development cooperation unfeasible. The main differences between the two reports are: (1) COBRADI 2010 divides modalities differently, includes peacekeeping operations and expands the scope of humanitarian cooperation to encompass food aid (see Table 4.1); and (2) out of an estimate of more than 170 federal agencies engaged in international development cooperation (Brasil 2013), COBRADI 2005–2009 accounts for expenditure made by 66 federal entities, while COBRADI 2010 registers information on 91 institutions.
At the same time, initiatives that combine different modalities are becoming more common. For instance, the Food Acquisition Programme includes both humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation, while the More Food Africa programme combines technical and financial cooperation (see Box 4.4). Brazilian peacekeeping operations also show that Brazilian cooperation has been increasingly intertwined with peace efforts, for instance using Brazilian forces to reconstruct infrastructure and to deliver humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the agenda in public debate, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the relationships between different modalities are responding to a coherent strategy, or to analyse their impact in the field.

Taking into account the complexity of treating different kinds of data and the constantly shifting agenda of development cooperation in Brazil, the information given below may not represent an exact picture of Brazilian SSDC. To promote transparency and methodological dialogue, footnotes provide clarification of the methodological decisions taken by the research team in gathering and analysing data.

### 4.1 Brazilian development cooperation: overview

COBRADI’s reports listed the costs and expenditures for the modalities shown in Table 4.1.

Under these modalities, data publicised by both COBRADI studies show that Brazilian development cooperation between 2005 and 2010 reached an approximate total of BRL4.5 billion in current values (or US$2.3 billion), having evolved from approximately US$160 million in 2005 to more than US$900 million in 2010. It is worth noting that in 2010, besides the higher number of institutions mapped, peacekeeping operations expenditures were included in total disbursements, representing more than 30 per cent of cooperation flows. The bars in Figure 4.1 show the proportional annual progression of each modality’s share, while the line shows the total expenditures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005–2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Technical, scientific and technological cooperation</td>
<td>1. Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Scholarships for foreigners</td>
<td>2. Scientific and technological cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Contributions to international organisations</td>
<td>3. Educational cooperation (including scholarships and other bilateral academic exchange programmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>4. Contributions to international organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Humanitarian cooperation (including food aid)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 In COBRADI 2005–2009 disbursements made to peacekeeping operations were presented, but only technical hours dedicated by military staff were included in total disbursements.
26 Though COBRADI 2005–2009 states that it included scientific and technological cooperation, as stated in Annex 2 (Basic Guidelines of the Survey), technical hours and disbursements related to participation in scientific and technological events were not accounted for. On the other hand, the report states that human and financial resources [d]edicated to the production or adaptation of technology that has the main goal of responding to the needs of a particular country or group of countries individually or regionally, were included (Brasil 2010d: 54). By analysing the discourse of the particular section of COBRADI dedicated to scientific and technological cooperation, it is possible to see that it is in fact focused on technical cooperation (‘transferring’, ‘sharing’ and ‘diffusing’ Brazilian development experiences). Moreover, scientific and technological cooperation tend to involve initiatives in which not all funds are non-reimbursable (meaning they were not included in the first COBRADI).
27 Spending with refugees in Brazil, as well as Brazilian contributions to UN specialised agencies such as UNHCR and UNRWA, was initially defined as a separate modality (IPEA 2010). However, in the final 2005–2009 report, the spending was included in two separate modalities of Brazilian international development cooperation: humanitarian assistance and contributions to international organisations.
According to data presented by ABC’s former director, adding other modalities to the ones listed above and measured in constant values (debt relief – US$474.23 million; food financing initiatives – US$349.25 million; exports financing – US$1,742.83 million) would lead to a total disbursement of more than US$4 billion from 2005 to 2009 (Farani 2011b). Adding those three modalities would also lead to a substantive variation in the share of each modality in total disbursements (see Figure 4.2). Box 4.1 gives a brief description of Brazil’s financial cooperation.

**Figure 4.1 Historical progression of modalities presented by COBRADI (2005–2010)**

![Figure 4.1](image)

*Source: Authors’ own, based on Brasil (2010d) and Brasil (2013).*

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28 The category ‘Technical cooperation’ for 2005–2009 also represents expenditures for scientific and technological cooperation whereas 2010 figures apply to technical cooperation only (see footnote 26). The category ‘Scholarships and educational cooperation’ accounts for scholarships in 2005 and 2009 and educational cooperation in 2010 (where scholarships account for more than 80 per cent of total expenditures for educational cooperation). Peacekeeping operations expenditures were added to the total disbursements for 2005–2009. This figure was collected and presented in COBRADI 2005–2009 but not added to its analysis and aggregates.
Figure 4.2  Approximate variation in share of each modality in total disbursements comparing COBRADI 2005–2009 and data including other modalities for the same period

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>COBRADI</th>
<th>Financial Cooperation Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food aid</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt relief</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official export credits</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and S&amp;T</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Source: Based on Cabral (2011) and Farani (2011b).

Box 4.1  A quick glance at Brazilian financial cooperation

**Debt relief.** Discounts granted to Brazil’s developing country debtors amounted to US$1.25 billion, of which more than US$1 billion concerned heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) (Brasil 2010b). Mozambique, Nigeria, Gabon, Cape Verde and Bolivia were among the beneficiaries. For the Brazilian government, debt relief is part of a broader international development strategy in which increased funds being paid to heavily indebted poor countries by international financial institutions are considered to be key in coping with the structural indebtedness of such countries (Brasil 2010b). New debt relief efforts announced by Dilma (see Annex 9), also links such efforts to Brazil’s intention to intensify trade relations with Africa.

**Public loans.** Since 2005 the volume of Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) loans increased by 391 per cent, reaching US$96.32 billion in 2010 – more than three times the loans provided by the World Bank in that year (Garcia 2011). BNDES *Exim Automático*, for instance, is an export credit line for financing Brazilian products through accredited foreign banks hosted in the buyer country. Exim started its operations in 2011 and today more than 140 banks in 42 countries are accredited to operate BNDES Exim (BNDES 2013). BNDES Exim agreements were first made with Latin American partners, which represent the largest market for Brazilian industrial products. They are now reaching Europe, the Middle East and Africa, where credit lines have been opened with Nigeria and South Africa, with others being negotiated in Angola and Mozambique.

**Private sector investments.** BNDES also plays an important role in financing infrastructure development abroad. In a recent study on Brazilian financial cooperation and FDI (foreign direct investment), Masagão, Suyama and Lopes (2012) show how the largest engineering and construction conglomerates are able to use public export credits to expand their activities in Africa. According to the authors, funding has been directed towards the following countries: Mozambique (US$80 million in 2009 for the construction of the Nacala airport), Ghana (where the Brazilian firms Oderbrecht and Andrade Gutierrez will construct the eastern road corridor in a project budgeted at a cost of over US$200 million), and Angola (where four Brazilian construction companies have an approved credit line of US$3.5 billion for national reconstruction projects).

More research needs to be conducted on the relation between such BNDES loans, which support country national exports and investments abroad, and other official cooperation flows. The socioeconomic impact of those loans in developing countries, in the long run, also calls for further inquiry and research. It is also important to note that the relationship between financial cooperation and other modalities of Brazilian SSDC is still underexplored.
4.2 Technical cooperation

Measured in current values, technical cooperation provided by Brazil, and registered by both COBRADI, has more than tripled in six years: from approximately BRL27.6 million in 2005 (US$11.4 million) to BRL101 million (US$57.7 million) in 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, Brazil executed projects to the value of approximately BRL396.3 million (US$180 million). Training and courses were responsible for 69 per cent of the total amount spent in 2005–2009, while related administrative costs and equipment amounted to, respectively, 28 per cent and 3 per cent (Brasil 2010d). As Figure 4.3 shows, except for 2004, there was a continuous rise in the number of actions initiated each year by ABC.

Figure 4.3 Progression of ABC budget allocation, execution and number of actions initiated in each year (2003–2010)


30 According to Puente, the ABC’s percentage of MRE’s total budget also rose. In 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 this percentage was, respectively, 0.05 per cent, 0.48 per cent, 0.43 per cent, 0.62 per cent and 2.4 per cent (Puente 2010).
According to ABC’s website, official priorities for technical cooperation are, respectively: commitments made by the president and the minister of foreign affairs during official visits; South American countries; Haiti; African countries, especially the PALOPs, and East Timor (PALOP stands for Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa and refers to the five African Portuguese-speaking countries, former colonies of Portugal – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe); other Latin American and Caribbean countries; support to the CPLP (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa – Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries); triangular initiatives. These priorities are attributed to the General Coordination of Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries, www.abc.gov.br/SobreAbc/Direcao/CGPD (accessed 7 April 2013).
31 There are discrepancies between the data presented by Abreu (2012) and Abreu (2013) regarding budget execution and between Barbosa (2011) and Abreu (2013) regarding number of projects.
COBRADI 2005–2009 states that the increase in disbursements on technical and humanitarian cooperation represents a ‘clear sign of the growing importance that Brazil attaches to international cooperation in a global framework of economic and social development’ (Brasil 2010d: 19). In the case of technical cooperation, this rise may be particularly related to: the growing presence of the subject in diplomatic and presidential speeches and missions; increased recognition of Brazilian development experiences abroad; growing diffusion of such experiences through publications and enhanced participation of ABC and of particular ministries and agencies in international forums; growing international commitments assumed by the Brazilian government in relation to international declarations and treaties and specific regional and sectoral commitments;32 and growing global diplomatic presence through the opening of 40 new embassies abroad during the Lula administration, 19 of them in Africa.33

In this section we analyse the geographical and sectoral allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation, including information on disbursements and number and type of projects.

4.2.1 Geographic allocation

As Figure 4.4 shows, Latin American and Caribbean countries were the main beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation between 2005 and 2010 (49 per cent), followed by Africa (35 per cent). Projects with North America and Europe represented at least 7 per cent of technical cooperation resources allocation.34

32 A brief analysis of Brazilian commitments in expanding South–South cooperation in health can be found in Almeida, de Campos, Buss et al. 2010.
33 The opening of new embassies has broadened official channels through which partner countries can take demands to the Brazilian government. In the case of Africa, data collected by BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Brazil in October 2011 highlighted that Brazil had embassies in 37 of the 54 African nations, ranking fifth (behind the US, China, France and Russia). The opening of new embassies in the continent has been accompanied by the inauguration of 17 diplomatic missions of African countries in Brazil since 2003, bringing the total to 33 (Fellet 2011). Since many of these new Brazilian embassies in Africa have insufficient diplomatic staff (see more details in Fleck 2013a), technical cooperation activities represent the most viable option for promoting ties with African countries.
34 Represents 2005–2010 average for bilateral expenditures identified geographically. Multilateral expenditure is not identified by countries or regions.
Figure 4.4  COBRADI’s information on budget execution per region in US$\textsuperscript{35}

![Chart showing budget execution per region]

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Brasil (2010d, 2013).

Focusing on ABC’s technical cooperation total disbursement shows us that, historically, Africa has been the main receiver of Brazilian technical cooperation financial resources managed by the institution. The predominance of Africa as the main destination for ABC’s budget is not completely translated into number of projects. From 1995 to 2012, Latin America was the main destination of the majority of ABC projects, with a significant share of projects in Central America and the Caribbean countries.

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\textsuperscript{35} COBRADI disaggregates information into seven regions: Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Oceania, North America, Europe, Asia, and Middle East and Northern Africa. Regions were aggregated in Figure 4.4 to facilitate visual representation and comparison with the other information presented in this section. 2010 data included disbursements for both Technical Cooperation and Scientific and Technological Cooperation, as these modalities were aggregated in COBRADI 2005–2009. 2010 values were calculated based on information regarding the percentage that each region represented in total expenditure. However, it is not clear if the percentages per region consider technical cooperation total expenditures (BRL101 million) or only the 81 per cent of expenditures designated to bilateral technical cooperation. COBRADI 2010 does not contain information regarding technical cooperation with Europe, North America or Oceania, except projects with Spain. Thus, disbursements to Europe and North America represent mainly science and technology projects. For 2005–2009 the chart excludes 20 per cent of total technical cooperation disbursements made through international organisations, as well as the 23 per cent of total resources presented as ‘other/not specified’, since they are not disaggregated geographically.
An in-depth analysis of 2010 Brazilian cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean shows that:

- 55 per cent of total disbursements in the region were destined for the mobilisation of military troops to Haiti;
- 26 per cent represented contributions to regional organisations (e.g. Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund, Pan-American Health Organisation, Organisation of American States);
- 13 per cent was spent on transport and logistics;
- 9 per cent were other expenses directly related to implementation of projects.

Sectoral analysis of these expenses indicates that one third (3 per cent of total cooperation with the region) was destined for educational projects, followed by technology (2 per cent), health (0.9 per cent) and defence (0.7 per cent). Nevertheless, if organised by number of actions instead of disbursements, public security and defence represent 19 per cent of total actions registered, followed by education (15 per cent) and agriculture (13 per cent). Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay are the main partners in education and public security and defence activities.

- 1 per cent were donations, mainly health equipment and treatments. Main destinations are Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia.

Source: Lima, de Campos and Neves (forthcoming).

### 4.2.2 Sectoral allocation

COBRADI 2010 states that 44 institutions executed technical cooperation projects (Brasil 2013: 33–4). The main executor is MRE (which includes ABC) with almost 80 per cent of the total amount disbursed (BRL101 million). The federal Police Department (Ministry of Justice) is the second largest executor, with 2.4 per cent and the health ministry with 2 per cent. However, the analysis by executing institution does not lead to a better understanding of sectoral allocation, since the MRE budget applies to all sectors. COBRADI 2005–2009 does not present systematised data on the allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation by sector, but it does mention the case of health, responsible for 9 per cent of total technical cooperation for 2005–2009 (BRL24 million or US$12 million – 49 per cent of which came from MRE, followed by the Ministry of Health, 25 per cent, and by Fiocruz, 20 per cent).\(^{36}\)

To explore allocation by sector, this section will focus on technical cooperation coordinated by ABC. To identify which sectors may be experiencing a more significant growth in terms of number of projects, Figure 4.5 compares official data covering different periods of time (1995–2005 and 2006–2010), as annual records by sector are not available. However, an article published by ABC Director Fernando Abreu (2013) shows a table with the breakdown per sector, the top four being: agriculture (19 per cent), health (16 per cent), public security (11 per cent) and education (11 per cent).\(^{37}\)

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\(^{36}\) The reason for this growth in health sector spending is attributed to increasing demands resulting from the 'relatively recent development of a policy of universal free public health in Brazil and the visibility achieved by the country in international forums on the subject' (Brasil 2010d: 39). Specific issues addressed by technical cooperation activities include HIV/AIDS, malaria (prevention and control), yellow fever (training in the production of vaccines), Chagas disease (diagnosis and management), maternal and child health care, and human resource management for hospitals and clinics.

\(^{37}\) It is not clear, though, if these percentages are based on number of projects or budget committed/executed.
As Figure 4.5 shows, despite some variation between 1995–2005 and 2006–2010, agriculture, health and education (including vocational training) lead the distribution across both time periods. Embrapa, Fiocruz and SENAI are key institutions (see Box 4.3). Although sectoral engagement in environment and public administration had already started in the first period, ‘public security’ did not appear in the 1995–2005 period, and then ranked fourth in the period 2006–2010. However, data on the sectoral allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation by region (Abreu 2012) shows that the predominance of each sector varies geographically (see Annex 8 for details).
Box 4.3  Key institutions of Brazilian development cooperation

Embrapa – Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation: The state-owned company Embrapa was created in 1973 with the aim of fostering the development of Brazilian tropical agriculture and agribusiness via knowledge and technology generation and transfer. International cooperation has consistently been a part of Embrapa’s success history. Embrapa was a key player in Brazil’s expansion of soya production, in partnership with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and today has virtual laboratories for collaborative work (Labex) in several countries. Despite the existence of some legal constraints for foreign disbursements, Embrapa has been active in providing technical cooperation in agriculture since the early 2000s (Barbosa 2011). It has opened offices in Ghana (since 2008), in Panama (since 2010) and in Venezuela (in partnership with the Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development). Today it is responsible for Brazil’s three main ‘structuring projects’ in African agriculture: cotton with Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali; rice culture in Senegal; and agricultural innovation in Mozambique (Barbosa 2011).

Fiocruz – Oswaldo Cruz Foundation: The Ministry of Health designated Fiocruz as the focal point for Brazilian health-related South–South cooperation. Founded in 1900, Fiocruz now runs national activities including teaching, research, production and technological development. In 2009, Fiocruz set up its Centre for Global Health (Cris/Fiocruz), which coordinates the Fiocruz International Cooperation Technical Group. Fiocruz has been developing a series of structuring projects in health, notably with South American partners (through the Union of South American Nations - UNASUL) and in Africa (notably in CPLP members). These projects aim to foster ‘capacity building for development’ with partners through the strengthening of partner country health systems, combining concrete interventions with local capacity-building and knowledge generation, and promoting dialogue among actors. In 2009, Fiocruz coordinated 18 projects with CPLP countries and had a further ten projects under negotiation. The Foundation also explored new collaboration opportunities with Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Tanzania (Almeida et al. 2010).

SENAI – National Service for Industrial Training: SENAI is a professional education and vocational training company. Created in 1942 by official decree, it is organised and run by industrial entrepreneurs and today runs 809 sites in Brazil offering 3,000 courses. SENAI first started receiving foreign assistance from industrialised countries in the 1950s. Since the 1970s, it has also been active in providing development cooperation in Southern countries, especially in the Americas (Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname) and CPLP countries (Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guiné-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, and East Timor). Today, it implements official agreements coordinated by ABC and cooperates autonomously with partner organisations in developing countries (Gonçalves 2011). In 2011, SENAI was engaged in 13 technical cooperation projects and was the recipient of a further 13 projects. It was also negotiating another five projects, which were being worked out autonomously without the collaboration of any Brazilian governmental bodies.

The importance of vocational training in Brazilian cooperation is likely to diminish although, according to a diplomat, training centres led by SENAI have been positively evaluated in terms of results, effectiveness and social impacts (Puente 2010). This is due to constraints imposed on ABC’s budgetary expansion by the current Dilma administration (see Box 5.3) and the fact that the training centres, however successful, are also the most expensive initiatives in Brazilian technical cooperation (as they also incur expenses for infrastructure and equipment).

Brazilian official actors involved in technical cooperation have been prioritising ‘structuring’ projects in sub-Saharan Africa\(^\text{38}\) (see Box 4.4) that are capable of ‘developing institutional

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\(^{38}\) The Brazilian government uses projects with a structural approach for ‘projetos estruturantes’, while Cabral and Weinstock (2010) talk about ‘groundwork projects’. The majority of these projects are currently located in Africa and have a strong regional component. Greater emphasis is given to agricultural projects, but African countries also currently receive structuring projects in the health, food security and professional training sectors. More information is given on groundwork projects in Box 4.5. For
capacities with sustainable results in the benefited countries’ (Brasil 2010d: 34). This change of focus on structural approaches reflects a learning process amongst Brazilian practitioners, as well as the recognition that isolated initiatives have reaped few results within fragile institutional contexts. Triangular and multi-stakeholder arrangements have also been prioritised in sub-Saharan Africa.

**Box 4.4 Flagship Brazilian agriculture initiatives in Africa**

**Cotton-4 and Rice Project in Senegal:** Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Chad are known as the ‘Cotton-4’ countries. Brazil’s Cotton-4 programme, based in Mali, provides support to the development of the cotton industry in these countries through the testing and adaptation of productive cotton varieties in order to organise a regionally profitable supply chain. In 2013 Togo joined the initiative’s second phase, which will include agriculture – cattle-raising integration, agricultural mechanisation, rural infrastructure, integrated pest control to reduce insecticide use and integration of other agents into the cotton chain. Brazil also runs a rice project in Senegal that provides assistance to technical staff in Mali, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau. Both projects aim to have a regional impact and together they cost US$7 million. Embrapa plays an important role in both.

**More Food Africa:** Created in 2010 by the Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), this project aims to encourage food production and productivity in the family farming sector in Africa, as well as facilitate access to food production-related machinery and equipment. This programme combines technical and financial cooperation with an inter-sectoral (agricultural and industrial) approach in order to increase family farming productivity in a sustainable way and to support national food security strategies. By 2012, eight African countries (Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal, Kenya, Cameroon, Namibia and Tanzania) had formally asked to join this project.

**ProSavana:** ProSavana, in Mozambique’s Nacala corridor, is Brazil’s latest and most ambitious agricultural cooperation initiative. Organised as a trilateral programme with Japan, it has a budget of about US$500 million over the next 20 years. ProSavana is focused on the agricultural development of Mozambique’s tropical savannah, based on the experiences of Brazil’s Cerrado development, which is said to hold lessons for Mozambique due to a number of geographical and conceptual similarities between the two regions. Technical cooperation in the case of ProSavana is accompanied by private sector investment initiatives through the Nacala Fund. This fund, which is currently being established, is an initiative promoted by ABC, Fundação Getulio Vargas, JICA, Embrapa, FAO, Brazil-Mozambique Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Mozambique’s Ministry of Agriculture. The aim is to attract private investment to promote the development of agribusiness and food production in the Nacala region.

**Food Purchase Programme (PAA-Africa)** – Brazil (MDA, Social Development Ministry-MDS, General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger-CGOFME), FAO, World Food Programme (WFP) and ten African countries (Ghana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger and Senegal). This trilateral partnership, launched in 2012, aims to strengthen family farming by establishing local food supply chains, public networks of food and nutrition facilities and social assistance institutions, and food stocks. PAA Brazil was launched in 2004 as one of the pillars of Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy and has inspired PAA Africa.

### 4.2.3 Triangular cooperation

Brazil is also active in triangular cooperation. COBRADI 2005–2009 considers this modality as central to Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation as a key tool to ‘scale-up and improve the impact’, and to recognise the ‘excellence and technical effectiveness’ of Brazilian technical cooperation (Brasil 2010d: 34). For the Brazilian government, such
initiatives must respect the principles guiding SSDC, namely being ‘demand-driven’, non-interfering in beneficiaries’ internal affairs, and remaining untied (Brasil 2010a).

Official estimates suggest that Brazil invested US$20 million in triangular cooperation between 2003 and 2010. In 2010 the total budget for triangular cooperation initiatives coordinated by the ABC (19 in total) amounted to US$49 million, and Brazil financed at least 30 per cent of it (MRE, cited in Ayllón 2013).

Data released in 2011 show that the main partners were Japan, Germany, US, Italy, France, Spain, Israel and Australia. Trilateral cooperation involving developed countries supported 31 cooperation projects in developing countries in the Americas and in Africa, including: Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique, Paraguay, Peru, Kenya, São Tomé and Príncipe and Uruguay. Most projects under triangular cooperation focus on public health, education and agriculture, and are aligned with Brazilian priorities in technical cooperation. This is particularly clear in engagement in food and nutritional security in sub-Saharan Africa, where the main current projects have FAO and WFP as the usual partners. Besides that, ILO and UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) are also important multilateral partners for Brazilian trilateral initiatives in developing countries (PR 2011).

Triangular cooperation with traditional donors is complemented by innovative schemes engaging developing partners, such as the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum) Poverty Alleviation Fund, created in 2004. Its main goal is to support projects contributing to wellbeing and the achievements of MDGs in least developed and/or post-conflict countries. With an annual fund of US$3 million (US$1 million contribution from each partner) and administered by the UNDP’s Special Unit on South–South cooperation, the IBSA Fund has financed initiatives in Haiti, Palestine, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Laos and Cambodia, and has received a number of international recognitions for its South-South cooperation achievements.

For Brazil, scaling up its cooperation, while sharing some of the cost-related burdens and acting as a broker (Ayllón 2013; Barbosa 2011; Hirst 2011) can be a tactic for national self-promotion within a broader strategy of foreign relations (Abdenur 2007). Simultaneously, traditional donors see trilateral agreements as an alternative to providing direct aid to the country. In the long term, it means progressively disengaging from assistance to Brazil and using the country as a lever for reaching out to other Southern countries (Abdenur 2007).

### 4.3 Other modalities

Contribution to international organisations, peacekeeping operations and educational, humanitarian, and scientific and technological cooperation add up to more than 90 per cent
of the total funds between 2005 and 2010. The following subtopics present key features of those modalities.

### 4.3.1 Contribution to international organisations

In terms of total amounts, the most significant modality is Brazilian contributions to international organisations. Between 2005 and 2010 it represented 51 per cent of Brazilian expenditures or BRL2,746 billion (approximately US$1.4 billion).\(^{44}\)

This modality increased significantly in nett terms between 2005 and 2010, from BRL300 million to BRL548 million, but proportionally it decreased, from 53 per cent of the total flow in 2005 to 34 per cent in 2010.\(^{45}\)

The Brazilian government attributes this nett growth to its inclusion in new international organisations, as well as to its increasing commitment to and support for specific entities like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WHO and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) (Brasil 2010d). Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of Brazil's contributions to international organisations between 2005 and 2010.

**Figure 4.6  Ten largest contributions to international organisations (2005–2010)\(^{46}\)**

![Figure 4.6](image-url)

**Source:** Authors’ own based on Brasil (2010d, 2013).

\(^{44}\) Represents the sum of totals presented in current values by COBRADI 2005–2009 and COBRADI 2010. This includes regular contributions to organisations in which Brazil is a depositor and beneficiary (as with the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank). The percentage was calculated taking into account data on peacekeeping operations available in COBRADI 2005–2009.

\(^{45}\) Calculations for 2005–2009 include peacekeeping operations.

\(^{46}\) Numbers for 2005–2009 are available in Brasil (2010d: 40) and for 2010 in Brasil (2013: 90). 'Others' include: ILO; Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; African Development Fund (AfDF); UN Industrial Development Program; World Meteorological Organization; Ibero-American Programme for Science, Technology and Development; International Criminal Court; Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum; Latin American Integration Association; Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries.
Contributions to international bodies were relatively homogenous: 44.1 per cent went to international organisations while 55.9 per cent went to multilateral development funds. Among the latter, Mercosul was the key recipient - its structural convergence fund (FOCEM) alone received BRL565 million from the Brazilian government between 2005 and 2010. This represents 27.5 per cent of the total amount spent under this modality. The significant contributions to FOCEM reflect Brazil’s focus on regional integration. A slight change in this trend can be observed in 2010, as IDA (International Development Association) received BRL30 million more than FOCEM. Table 4.2 below disaggregates the progression of the contributions to international multilateral development funds.

Table 4.2  Progression of the largest contributions to international multilateral development funds 2005–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mercosul/FOCEM</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>76.83</td>
<td>97.97</td>
<td>128.54</td>
<td>126.97</td>
<td>133.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>49.88</td>
<td>95.86</td>
<td>90.66</td>
<td>81.28</td>
<td>70.72</td>
<td>168.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDF</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In BRL million/current values.
Source: Brasil (2010d, 2013)

4.3.2  Peacekeeping operations

Brazil has been engaging in UN peace missions since 1948 and its participation in different missions around the world has been increasing. In 2012 Brazil contributed to UN peacekeeping operations with a total of 2,199 troops in the following missions: Western Sahara, Haiti, Central African Republic and Chad, Cyprus, Liberia, Nepal, Sudan, East Timor and Côte d’Ivoire (UN 2013). In 2010, the amount invested in peace missions increased to BRL585,000, out of which BRL467,000 were destined to Haiti only, mainly as a result of the earthquake that hit the country in that year (Brasil 2013).

Brazil does not have a specific strategy defining when to participate in UN peace missions, but it uses the National Defence Policy as a framework and the presidency and the foreign relations ministry ultimately make the decision. On a long-term basis, Brazil will continue to act in peace missions that are aligned with national interests and comply with the UN mandate (Brasil 2013: 87).

Brazil has also invested in increasing its involvement in, as well as sharing its experience of, preparing military and civilian personnel to participate in peace operations and mine clearance missions. This was possible thanks to institutional improvements such as the creation of the Brazilian Joint Centre for Peacekeeping (CCOPAB), located in Rio de Janeiro, in 2010 (Brasil 2013).

4.3.3  Scientific and technological cooperation

According to COBRADI 2010, science and technology are strategic components of social and economic development in Brazil. Thus, Brazil has been investing in cooperation in these areas in order to contribute to domestic and partner countries’ development. In 2010, its investment totalled US$24 million (Brasil 2013).

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47 As mentioned previously, COBRADI 2005–2009 did not include peacekeeping operations in the total amount of Brazilian cooperation, because United Nations provide reimbursement to the Brazilian National Treasury expenditures and COBRADI 2005-2009 only registered resources invested by the federal government as non-recoverable funds. COBRADI 2010 accounted for expenditures made by public bodies in the conclusion of responsibilities taken in international treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements, deals and commitments.

As demonstrated in Figure 4.7, the regional allocation of scientific and technological cooperation is mainly focused in Europe and North America, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean, while technical cooperation is focused on Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. Argentinia, Spain, US, Switzerland, India, Finland, Pakistan, the European Commission, France and Germany, in this order, are the ten countries to which Brazil allocated most of its resources in 2010.

**Figure 4.7  COBRADI 2010 information on technical and scientific and technological cooperation**

Brazil acts on three different levels of scientific and technological cooperation: (1) large scientific international cooperation programmes or projects; (2) regional and bilateral scientific and technological cooperation programmes or projects; and (3) partnerships or activities established directly between scientists. Brazil’s cooperation covers a wide range of scientific areas and includes major international projects such as: the high energy physics project of the Large Hadron Collider; the international Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project; Planck satellite; Southern Astrophysical Research; the Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope; and the Human Genome Project. South–South cooperation projects include the Centre of Structural Biology of Mercosul and the China–Brazil Earth Resource Satellite, which aims to construct a satellite in partnership with China, through the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) (Brasil 2013).

### 4.3.4 Educational cooperation and scholarships for foreign students

Another modality explored in COBRADI is the award of scholarships to foreign students in Brazil, a practice that has existed since the 1950s. Expenditures on scholarships reached US$173 million between 2005 and 2010. For 2010, COBRADI provides disaggregated data per recipient and academic degree, showing that the majority of bachelors’ scholarships (73.7 per cent) are granted to PALOP students (especially Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau).

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49 COBRADI 2010, unlike COBRADI 2005–2009, did not register technical cooperation with developed regions (Europe, North America and Oceania), except projects with Spain, which were included.

while postgraduate scholarships are mainly granted (70 per cent) to South American students (mostly from Colombia, Peru and Argentina).

Another aspect of Brazil’s educational cooperation, as stated in the CAPES Institutional Guidelines, is the prioritisation of programmes with countries that have deficiencies in their higher education systems and countries prioritised by Brazilian foreign policy as development partners. Since 2004, the Brazilian Higher Education Coordination Agency’s (CAPES) international cooperation policy has emphasised Southern countries, especially Latin America, Africa and Portuguese-speaking African countries (Brasil 2013). CAPES expenditures with specific educational bilateral programmes in 2010 amounted to around US$5.3 million in projects with East Timor, Cuba, Argentina, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

The rationale behind scholarship programmes is the diffusion of Brazilian culture and the Portuguese language, which also has the objective of promoting good perceptions of Brazil and Brazilian people abroad (Brasil 2010a), developing human resources sympathetic to the Brazilian government and companies (Brasil 2012a), strengthening political and economic ties between partners (Rosa 2008), and seeking hegemony in the Southern Atlantic region (Gusmão 2011).

4.3.5 Humanitarian cooperation

Brazilian humanitarian assistance, or humanitarian cooperation as COBRADI 2010 terms it, is the modality that had the most significant increases between 2005 and 2010. While representing only 0.31 per cent of the total amount spent in 2005 (US$487,990), it reached 18 per cent of the total in 2010 (US$161 million). Especially noteworthy are the resources allocated to Haiti’s reconstruction in 2010, which amounted to almost 70 per cent of all humanitarian cooperation (see Box 4.5 for more on Brazil–Haiti cooperation).

The MRE’s General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger (CGFOME) has been playing, since its creation in 2004, an important coordinating role in Brazilian humanitarian cooperation. Created to reflect the government’s national priorities on fighting hunger and poverty and to coordinate Brazilian foreign policy on food and nutritional security, CGFOME had its budget increased from US$1.25 million in 2007 to US$17.5 million in 2010.51

A shift in the means of delivery can also be observed. In 2005, Brazil channelled almost half of its humanitarian assistance through multilateral channels. By 2009, 97 per cent of such aid was given bilaterally. In 2010, the government channelled 56.8 per cent of its humanitarian cooperation through multilateral channels and the remaining 43.2 per cent bilaterally, reaffirming the belief in the UN as the central coordinator of humanitarian assistance (Brasil 2013).

Across the period 2005–2009, donations in kind (i.e. supplies) accounted for 65.7 per cent and financial cooperation for 21.4 per cent of the total invested in humanitarian assistance (Brasil 2010d). Similar data are not publicly available for 2010.

51 CGFOME comprises: food and nutritional security, including the right to food; agrarian development (agrarian reform and family agriculture); small-scale fishing; the Brazil–Argentina Social Institute; International Fund for Agriculture Development and the World Food Programme; World Social Forum; and dialogue with civil society. Achievements led by CGFOME include the realisation of two meetings of the Coordination of Brazilian Civil Society in Haiti (2010 and 2011), and the launch of a budgetary line in 2012 through which the MRE finances national CSO participation in international humanitarian assistance and international dialogue and negotiation forums in the area of Food and Nutritional Security (Budgetary Action number 20RE). See www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/o-ministerio/cgfome-coordenacao-geral-de-acoes-internacionais-de-combate-a-fome/.
Brazilian commitment to development worldwide can also be seen in the country’s expanding engagement in UN peace operations, a modality seen as contributing to the country’s efforts in becoming an important player in global peace and security affairs. Brazil currently takes part in 13 UN peace operations, with leadership roles in Haiti and Lebanon. In 2009 alone, the country invested BRL125.41 million in peace operations.

Brazil’s leadership role in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since 2004 is an example of the Brazilian multisectoral approach to security and development (Verenhitach, Deitos and Seitenfus 2007), notably because troops are involved in reconstruction efforts that go beyond traditional military activities. Besides peace-related activities, Brazil has cooperation projects in Haiti in six different areas (among them agriculture, health, infrastructure, security and environment). Between 2005 and 2010 around 25 per cent of the total humanitarian aid delivered by Brazil went to Haiti. During this period, it spent more than BRL160 million in the country – most of it on humanitarian aid and the remainder in technical cooperation and scholarships for Haitian students in Brazil (Brasil 2010d).

Brazilian cooperation activities in the country involve more than 50 entities (32 national state agencies, 10 Haitian agencies and 12 foreign partners and international organisations) (Hirst 2012). Among them, the Brazilian Ministry of Health, as well as Brazilian CSOs Viva Rio and Alfabetização Solidária, have been particularly active in Haiti.

Nevertheless, there is no consensus any more on MINUSTAH involvement in Haiti (Hirst 2012). There is also a growing internal debate in Brazil on whether the country should leave Haiti and what responsibilities it should bear towards the Caribbean country and its population (notably on the cholera outbreak and on the ongoing wave of Haitian migrants arriving in Brazil). This lack of consensus on what role MINUSTAH should play in future does not make it inevitable that Brazilian technical engagement in Haiti will be reduced. Increases in the flow of new incomers from Haiti to Brazil in the past two years, under government-created ‘humanitarian visas’ and beyond, tend to reinforce the need for continuing and deepening existing cooperation projects in the country.

According to COBRADI 2005–2009, the region that received the largest amount of Brazil’s humanitarian cooperation was Latin America (76.27 per cent or BRL107.82 million), followed by Asia (BRL23.24 million) and Africa (BRL10.27 million). The main beneficiaries during the period were Cuba (BRL33.52 million), Haiti (BRL29.84 million), the Palestinian Territories (BRL19.94 million) and Honduras (BRL15.65 million). Portuguese-speaking countries have together received 8 per cent of the amount given in this modality, with Guinea-Bissau ranked as the top recipient. Low-income countries have also grown as a destination for Brazilian humanitarian assistance. Their share grew from 6.2 per cent in 2005 to 35.2 per cent in 2009 (Brasil 2010d).

Such growth in humanitarian cooperation is attributed to logistical improvements, mainly through the creation of a humanitarian warehouse (Armazém Humanitário do Galeão) at Rio’s international airport in 2009, as well as developments in legislation and national coordination. A key innovation was the 2006 creation of the Inter-ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI), which entitled MRE, through CGFOME, to ‘coordinate efforts with other organs of the Federal Government and with countries and

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52 For more on Haitian migration to Brazil, see the ongoing dialogue between the Brazilian NGO Conectas Direitos Humanos and the Brazilian government, www.conectas.org/institucional/conectas-manifesta-preocupacao-com-politica-migratoria-para-haitianos.
53 Despite being outside Brazil’s traditional regional priorities, Palestine mobilises Brazilian public opinion more than other situations worldwide and thus may have an influence on aid assistance choices, especially with a left-leaning government in power.
United Nations’ specialised organs aiming at guaranteeing speediness in the realisation of Brazilian humanitarian actions. To implement this coordination, GTI-AHI has proposed new legislation authorising the Executive to undertake humanitarian activity, and has supported the creation of a specific budget element for humanitarian activity in the National Budget Guidelines Law (2D28 – Operações de Assistência Especial no Exterior).

One of the main shifts in Brazilian humanitarian assistance since 2012 has been the promotion of ‘sustainable humanitarian cooperation’, which defends a transition from humanitarian to ‘structuring actions and local coordination’, supporting socially sustainable development processes. During this period, CGFOME’s actions have also been increasingly intertwined with technical cooperation and contributions to international organisations. Such a shift is explained in COBRADI 2010 as a strategy coherent with the domestic priority of ending hunger and poverty, and also aligned with a prioritisation within Brazilian technical cooperation towards sub-Saharan Africa and sectoral and inter-sectoral initiatives in agriculture (see Box 4.4). The flagship programme is Africa Food Purchase Programme (PAA Africa), involving Brazilian funding to UN FAO and WFP, which totals US$2.375 million (FAO 2012). Nine out of ten countries participating in PAA are also involved in at least one other food and nutritional security initiative from the implementing agencies: the More Food Africa programme and/or the Home Grown School Feeding and Purchase for Progress (P4P/WFP) programmes (Leite, Pomeroy and Suyama 2013).

5   Technical cooperation: institutions, interests and decision-making

Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation is deeply influenced by the country’s national institutional framework, as well as by decision-making processes in foreign policy, which are permeated by a variety of domestic interests. On the one hand, the increasing role of Brazil in technical cooperation has not been accompanied by institutional reforms, including the design of a national legal framework establishing priorities and aims, and guaranteeing the necessary flows of human and financial resources to guarantee effective engagement. 56

On the other hand, there is currently a strong dynamic of horizontalisation and politicisation in Brazilian foreign policy, with ministries, subnational governments, CSOs, thinktanks, the Congress, and private actors increasingly engaged in Brazilian international relations, and claiming to have their roles in SSDC recognised by the state. It is very difficult, however, to unpack particular interests from state-led initiatives.

Strategies that at first seem ambiguous may actually reflect Brazil’s emerging position in international relations. While the country has been making efforts to accumulate traditional military and economic capabilities, it has also been trying to promote new values in the world order, mainly concerning the fight against poverty and hunger.

Both of these strategies have been influencing shifts in Brazilian sectoral and geographic allocation of all the SSDC modalities and also shifting its domestic system, as this section will show. While there is increasing engagement of a variety of domestic actors in debates regarding the allocation of Brazilian SSDC, it seems that particular strategies that are either induced by or converging with governmental proposals in particular sectors have in fact had more access to Brazilian official SSDC (see page 71 for hypotheses that may explain the actors’ degree of influence in shaping SSDC). In the case of technical cooperation, which is the focus of this report, there is a clear move away from the central role of ABC as a coordinating and financing agency towards other official and non-official actors influencing the allocation of Brazilian SSDC.

5.1   Institutional framework

Brazil’s engagement in technical cooperation is marked by a strong institutional dispersal. ABC, which is subordinated to MRE, is legally entitled to coordinate received and provided technical cooperation (Câmara dos Deputados 2012). It is estimated that the agency coordinates actions implemented by 120 national agencies, including agencies connected to the Executive, the judiciary and the legislature, NGOs, universities and local governments (MRE 2007a; Puente 2010). In the case of bilateral initiatives, besides offering technical advice, ABC covers the costs of their operationalisation, while partner national agencies usually cede the technical hours of their staff (as agencies pay for their salaries).

However, ministries and other official agents also engage in technical cooperation in an autonomous way. The main source of this dispersion is the lack of specific legislation in Brazil clearly defining the objectives, scope, mechanisms, competences and processes of

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56 Evaluating advances and challenges to the ABC’s framework, a Brazilian diplomat has pointed out that ‘[…] there is no legal norm that clearly defines distinctions between financial cooperation and technical cooperation or between the latter and scientific and technological or educational cooperation, for instance. And that unequivocally established its scope, principles, aims, instruments of action, delimitation of competencies and interministerial or interinstitutional coordination mechanisms […]’ (Puente 2010: 135).
development cooperation. The only existing instruments are Basic Bilateral Agreements, which encompass several modalities of cooperation (technical, scientific, cultural, economic) and have to be approved by the Congress as they involve the allocation of national resources.\(^{57}\) Particular initiatives in technical cooperation gain content through Complementary Adjustments and Project Documents. Though the former have not traditionally been submitted to the National Congress,\(^{58}\) this has been changing. In recent years, legislative decrees approving treaties and agreements that were signed in 2011 and 2012 have included a clause stating that any act or complementary adjustment that entails costs to the national treasury must be approved by Congress (Câmara dos Deputados 2012).

Not counting its own particular legislation, technical cooperation initiatives also fall under general restrictions imposed by Brazilian legislation, which is strictly followed by the judiciary and control agencies when overseeing the execution of initiatives. Relying on national labour and procurement laws, these organs have contested, for instance, the hiring of public staff involved in technical cooperation without public tenders. Though such decisions have mainly been targeted at received multilateral cooperation, which had a central role in ABC’s activities in the 1990s,\(^{59}\) they have challenged the whole Brazilian technical cooperation system (Puente 2010).

This system has been built by relying on transitory arrangements in which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which supported the creation of ABC, became the main agent in operationalisation of technical cooperation in Brazil. UNDP was entitled to hire and train ABC’s staff and to manage and implement initiatives. Working with the intermediation of UNDP was thought of as a way to overcome MRE’s limited staff, ABC’s limited internationalised structure and constraints imposed by national legislation.

In 2001, decisions made by national judicial and control organs catalysed an attempt by the ministry to absorb ABC into its own structure (‘itamaratização’ or ‘despenudização’ of ABC). This was undertaken through the creation of the General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation, and by progressively substituting consultants hired by UNDP by the Foreign Service’s public servants, temporary staff and, to a lesser extent, outsourced staff.

That process, which was completed in October 2005, could not be sustained. After two years, according to MRE’s internal rules concerning career progression, chancellery assistants and officials who had been hired to work at ABC started being transferred to posts abroad. The agency was re-staffed by UNDP consultants,\(^{60}\) this time following procurement

\(^{57}\) According to Article 49 of the Brazilian Constitution, ‘[t]r is exclusively the competence of the National Congress… to decide conclusively on international treaties, agreements or acts which result in charges or commitments that go against the national property’ (Brasil 1998: 54).

\(^{58}\) The non-submission of Complementary Adjustments follows a position according to which ‘international agreements would dispense Legislative approval and ratification by the President of the Republic in some hypotheses, among them the ones referring to agreements “that necessarily and logically result from a treaty in force and that complement them” (like the complementary acts resulting from a basic agreement)’ (Accioly, cited in Câmara dos Deputados 2012: 4). According to the ABC, signed Basic Bilateral Agreements would be necessary only for projects. In the case of isolated activities, the criteria are the country having diplomatic relations with Brazil and negotiating a Basic Bilateral Agreement with Brazil (Abreu 2012).

\(^{59}\) Multilateral received cooperation, accompanied by national funding usually in excess of 80 per cent, was used as an instrument to temporarily fill the shortfalls in governmental staff in various areas (following restrictions imposed by Brazilian adherence to the Washington Consensus). In 2001, when ABC had 180 hired consultants, only 40 of them were allocated to the Third Country Training Programme’s (TCTP) activities, which had about 20 per cent of ABC’s budget. Responding to judicial decisions, basic legal instruments containing specific mechanisms on project negotiation and management and hiring of consultants were designed in order to regulate multilateral received cooperation. Examples include Decree 5.151/04, Portaria MRE 732/08 and Law 10.667/03 (which reformed Law 8.745/93 in order to include international technical cooperation projects in regulations concerning the federal government’s temporary contracts of no longer than four years) (Puente 2010).

\(^{60}\) According to data from ABC accessed by Cabral and Weinstock (2010), in 2010 more than 50 per cent of ABC’s staff were UNDP-hired staff.
procedures that had been harmonised with Brazilian national law.\textsuperscript{61} The problem of high staff turnover, however, persists in ABC, since UNDP employees have, in general, one to two year contracts (Abreu 2013).\textsuperscript{62}

Also responding to judicial and control decisions that considered the practice of UNDP consultants working temporarily in the field for 6 to 12 months irregular, Technical Cooperation Centres (Núcleos de Cooperação Técnica – NCTs) started being created in 2004 in Brazilian embassies. These focal points followed schemes designed for the Trade Promotion Centres (Setores de Promoção Comercial, SECOMs), allowing the hiring of local technical assistants through public selection processes (Puente 2010). However, the satisfactory fulfilment of their tasks as supporters of the operationalisation of initiatives in the field was also compromised by short-term contracts (Cabral and Weinstock 2010).

\textbf{Box 5.1 A brief historical overview of the Brazilian system of technical cooperation}

The design of the Brazilian technical cooperation structure started in the 1950s. While at first MRE was the main coordinating institution, at the end of the 1960s the Ministry of Planning assumed a central supervising role. This shift attempted to integrate received technical cooperation with domestic global development plans.

When Brazil started offering technical cooperation in the 1970s, the Ministry of Planning was still in a central position, although MRE supported it in the identification of partners, as well as being entitled to receive demands and negotiate initiatives. Nonetheless, the provision of technical cooperation had no interface in Brazilian embassies and official representations abroad. Without a legal framework authorising the allocation of national resources to technical cooperation, projects that involved capacity building activities in Brazil, carried out by national institutions, predominated.

As Brazil was ‘graduated’ by international development agencies, it increasingly had difficulties in accessing external resources to promote national development. Financial constraints were paralleled by rising demands for Brazilian provision of technical cooperation in the post-Buenos Aires Conference context, leading to the establishment of triangular mechanisms mainly with international multilateral organisations. Graduation led to the demobilisation of the whole institutional framework, headed by the Ministry of Planning, that had been designed to guarantee an adequate absorption of development cooperation by national institutions, culminating with the creation of ABC under MRE in 1987.

It was in that context that MRE reassumed the coordination of technical cooperation, while financial cooperation continued under the mandate of the Ministry of Planning. In 1987 ABC was created, linked to MRE’s structure. While ABC assumed technical and executive functions, the formulation of the cooperation policy was MRE’s responsibility. Firstly linked to the Alexandre Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), an independent unit supervised by MRE, ABC would be financed by a Special Technical Cooperation Fund (FUNEC), and directed by the chief of the MRE’s Technical Cooperation Division. In 1992 a decree established that ABC would have its own director, although its activities would still have to be closely coordinated with the Department for Scientific and Technological Issues (DCT). Four years later, FUNEC was abolished and ABC was formally linked to the MRE’s General Secretariat of External Relations. A more detailed description of decrees establishing and reforming the Brazilian system of technical cooperation is available in Annex 5.

Source: Puente (2010).

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\textsuperscript{61} Manual de Convergência de Normas Licitatórias, negotiated between the ABC and the UNDP and approved by the Federal Audit Agency in 2004 (Puente 2010).

\textsuperscript{62} According to Puente, before and especially after the 2002 crisis in the Brazilian system of technical cooperation, the creation of a specific category of professionals was debated, but MRE would have opposed it because they would not fit into the ministry’s traditions, methods and hierarchic structure (Puente 2010).
In the face of constraints imposed by national laws concerning public procurement, budgetary execution and payments abroad, technical cooperation initiatives have been mainly executed through technical cooperation umbrella projects signed between ABC and UNDP, which usually cover a five-year period. These umbrella projects were established after the extinction of the Brazilian Special Technical Cooperation Fund (FUNEC) (see Box 5.1 above) and financed by the UNDP Fund, which was created in 1997, following a resolution made by MRE that public resources that were not being used for multilateral received cooperation were to be applied through a special (non-budgetary) fund. This allows national resources allocated to ABC to be retained after a year if not spent and not returned to the treasury, as required by law. Projects can thus be implemented on a multi-year basis. However, from 2002 onwards, technical cooperation activities under ABC have additionally started to be financed via ordinary budgetary resources (Puente 2010).

ABC’s budgetary enhancement, particularly during the Lula administration, was accompanied by the agency’s demotion inside MRE’s hierarchy. While in 1996 the ABC was linked to the Ministry’s General Secretariat for External Relations, in 2004 it reported to the General Sub-Secretariat of Cooperation and Brazilian Communities Abroad. Today it is part of the General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation, Culture and Trade Promotion. Such a position contrasts, for instance, with that occupied by CGFOME. Figure 5.1 highlights the place of both ABC and CGFOME in the MRE’s hierarchy, as well as of other departments involved in deliberative and decision-making spaces in other modalities of development cooperation (see Annex 6).

Besides the challenges described above, Brazilian technical cooperation implemented under ABC has experienced some advances in recent years. One such advance is related to the process of internal professionalisation, which has been deepened through a partnership between the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GIZ), ABC and the National School of Public Administration (ENAP) that aims to train staff from ABC and central implementing agencies.

Planning, monitoring and evaluation, however, have remained poor, which can be attributed to general deficits in public management in Brazil, including in foreign policy, as well as to particular processes that hinder strategic planning in Brazilian technical cooperation. One such factor is the substantial extent to which actions continue to respond to visits made by the president and the Ministry of External Relations (Puente 2010). Although a few implementing agencies have been allocating internal resources to enhance the management of technical cooperation initiatives, no overall plan connecting intra- and inter-sectoral actions (fundamental to guaranteeing effectiveness on the ground) has been prepared so far. Nonetheless, the new director of ABC, who took office in 2012, has pointed out in an interview that improving management practices within the agency will be one of his priorities. In 2012 ABC started designing a Manual of Good Practices, which might represent an important step in developing more comprehensive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

In terms of transparency, ABC has evolved though the launch of an open database on the actions it coordinates, although the specific resources invested in each one of them are not specified. CSOs, thinktanks and researchers also claim that they have not been able to access comprehensive information on specific projects, including on evaluation. Converging with this perception, the 2012 Aid Transparency Index classified the ABC as having poor

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63 According to Puente’s estimates, of projects implemented between 1995 and 2005, 82.8 per cent of them were actually implemented over a 12-month period. Reasons for delayed implementation varied from lack of availability of permanent and trained staff in Brazilian implementing agencies to shifts in partner countries (Puente 2010).


65 For a more recent evaluation of advances and challenges to public management in Brazil, see Abrucio (2007).

66 The Ministry of Health, for instance, has established an internal system to manage technical cooperation – the SISCOOP. Projects are being registered in the system, which is supposed to generate data for enhancing monitoring and evaluation.
transparency practice. With an overall below-average score, the agency ranked fourty-nineth out of 72 donors. The 2013 index placed Brazil in fifty-sixth position. According to the Brazilian Institute of Socioeconomic Studies (INESC), this position is not consistent with national legislation and international commitments made by the country to improve transparency and access to information (INESC 2013).

**Figure 5.1 Position occupied inside MRE by organs involved in Brazilian provision of international development cooperation**

Source: Based on MRE’s internal regulations and simplified chart, and on information raised during the research.

### 5.2 Decision-making processes and interests

Since Brazilian engagement in SSDC is fragmented in several modalities and decision-making spaces (formal and informal), it is not possible to have a comprehensive understanding of the drivers of the allocation of public resources. During the 2000s, an increasing number of public and private national actors have organised themselves in order to have more influence over Brazilian SSDC; meaning that which actor has access to

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67 See 2012 *Publish What You Fund* index, [www.publishwhatyoufund.org/index/2012-index/brazil/](http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/index/2012-index/brazil/) (accessed April 2013). In the 2012 index Brazil was ahead of China (seventy-first) – the only other emerging donor that took part in the index. Brazil’s score puts the country in the same group as traditional donors like Spain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland and Luxembourg, among others. Among the 41 indicators on information collection and publication, there are only three on which ABC does not collect information; for 24 indicators it does collect information, while for the remaining 17 the information collected is only published sporadically.
decision-making has, therefore, become a crucial issue. To explore this dimension, this subsection will focus on decision-making processes and interests influencing the geographical and thematic allocation of public resources to technical cooperation.

5.2.1 Foreign policy and the Ministry of External Relations

At first, looking at ABC as part of MRE’s structure would point to an interpretation of technical cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy, as studies made by diplomats as well as by scholars have suggested (Ayllón and Leite 2009; Barbosa 2011; Cervo 1994; Puente 2010; Valler Filho 2007). Indeed, most interviewees believe that MRE is the main decision-maker in the allocation of resources.

However, apart from being informed by traditional principles of Brazil’s foreign policy (Section 3), this research found no clear signs that ABC coordinates Brazilian technical cooperation following a single coherent and publicly stated diplomatic strategy led by MRE. MRE works with a broad international network of embassies and other official bodies, whose main task is to help identify partner institutions abroad, contact local authorities, support in the negotiation of instruments and, less commonly, to follow up actions in the field (Puente 2010). As one interviewee pointed out, some ambassadors may figure as active players in taking demands to ABC, but it is not clear that they do so following Brasilia’s instructions.

The fact that ABC is under MRE’s General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation, Culture and Trade Promotion might mean that technical cooperation is closely linked to strategies aiming at diffusing the Portuguese language and at promoting or preserving Brazilian trade and investments abroad. This research found some coincidences in both cases – that is, some of the top recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation resources allocated under ABC between 2003 and 2010 (see Annex 7) are either Portuguese-speaking and growing receivers of Brazilian goods, services and investments (for instance, in the cases of Angola and Mozambique), or both – but only in the first case was it possible to identify causality. For instance, it is clear that meetings held under CPLP since its creation in 1996 have promoted demands for Brazilian national experiences in several areas.

On the other hand, diplomats tend to treat economic benefits as unintended consequences of technical cooperation (Barbosa 2011; Puente 2010), since doing otherwise would contradict the whole discourse of Brazilian technical cooperation as having no relation with economic interests, despite the fact that diplomats also acknowledge Brazil’s commercial interests in partner countries. Still, the coincidence among countries receiving Brazilian investments, services and products and technical cooperation might point to the latter as an instrument of either preserving or fostering Brazilian economic interests in partner countries.

While economic interests are not usually publicly stated in Brazil’s diplomatic discourse, the same does not apply to political interests (Puente 2010). Gathering support for Brazilian candidacies and proposals related to global governance reform is indeed assumed to be one of the main diplomatic aims driving Brazilian technical cooperation. This might suggest further explanations for why technical cooperation does not follow traditional diplomatic priorities as far as geographical regions are concerned (see Section 4), but instead tends to be dispersed in dozens of different countries.

In general, sectoral and geographical allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation does not follow particular foreign policy strategies that match programming and adapt cooperation to specific bilateral settings. That is, sectoral cooperation initiatives are not planned according to the main issues that characterise Brazil’s relations with each particular developing country. Some scholars and diplomats seem to indirectly recognise this, as they suggest Brazilian technical cooperation should focus, particularly in the regional domain, on cross-border issues, such as arms, drug trafficking and migration (Avellar, cited in Barbosa 2011; Spektor 2012).
Instead of being the central decision-making site related to the allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation, MRE seems to be more of a vetoing agency (for instance, denying cooperation demands from countries that do not host Brazilian diplomatic representations) and a facilitating agency for decisions made outside the ministry. Though MRE has a strong potential to lead coordination among several modalities of SSDC, as the only institution having seats across the main decision-making and deliberative arenas (see Annex 6), several factors hinder the ministry’s influence. Besides the ones already mentioned in the previous subsection (legal, financial and operationalisation constraints under the ABC), the increasing role played by other national agents in Brazilian international affairs, and the demand-driven logic in Brazilian technical cooperation, also hinder the ability of MRE to plan and coordinate technical cooperation initiatives. The following subsections will explore the role of the main actors engaged in Brazilian technical cooperation.

Box 5.2 A new ABC? Announcement and reactions

On 25 May 2013, during the celebration of the African Union’s fiftieth anniversary, Dilma Rousseff announced the creation of a new agency of cooperation, trade and investments for Africa and Latin America in a press conference (see Annex 9 for the transcript). The only information given on the occasion was that Brazilian cooperation would no longer be executed by multilateral organisations, though they may still be partners. Emphasising the importance of Brazil’s cultural and economic relations with Africa and the continent’s renaissance, Dilma also announced that the Brazilian government would forgive African debts as a way to guarantee a ‘more effective relation’. The president stressed that if debts are not forgiven Brazil would not be able to promote investments and trade relations that involve higher value-added products, concluding that they benefit Brazil as well as African countries. She also expressed gratitude for Africa’s support to the Brazilian WTO (World Trade Organization) candidate, Roberto Azevedo, and highlighted that South–South relations are based on mutual advantage and are not grounded on unequal relations (‘feeling of superiority’).

According to an official note published by Casa Civil (the Brazilian Presidential Chief of Staff Ministry), renegotiating the debts of 12 African countries, the establishment of the new agency, as well as negotiating new investment treaties and financing conditions, represents ‘measures aimed at intensifying Brazil’s relations with the African continent relying in reciprocal cooperation and mutual development’. These principles would make Brazil stand out in comparison with other countries acting on the continent (Rossi 2013).

News in the Brazilian media after the announcement added more details on discussions regarding the new agency, but there is no consensus on its institutional linkage. While one article mentioned that the new ABC would not be linked to the MRE due to high turnover rates in diplomatic careers and would be instead linked to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) (Paraguassu 2013), an article signed by a former ambassador stated that the new ABC would become an autarchy, attached to MRE, with its own staff and financial autonomy (Barbosa 2013). For the latter, such reform would aim at enhancing Brazil’s soft power.

Informal interviews revealed that recently there were two models in dispute. The first would see the new agency with a cooperation, investment and trade remit linked directly to the presidency’s General Secretariat (previously the rumour was that it could also be part of Casa Civil). The second model, defended by some diplomats, would involve strengthening the ABC, keeping its institutional anchorage at MRE. Technical work necessary for the creation of a new agency has been taking place in Casa Civil, although it seems that the debate has lost momentum and champions. Some argue that the change of Foreign Affairs minister may support the case for the agency to stay at MRE. However, with 2014 being election year, it is unclear how fast this debate will move forward.

(Cont’d.)
Box 5.2 (cont’d.)

During the conference on Brazil’s foreign policy (see also Box 6.1) in July 2013, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Patriota, did not give details of ABC’s institutional linkage, but said that the new agency would have more financial resources and it would be renamed the Brazilian Agency for Development Cooperation (ABCD) (Fleck 2013b). Articles that were published during Dilma’s trip to Africa said that studies were being undertaken to review international models to contribute to the reform proposal (Barbosa 2013; Paraguassu 2013). More recently, an article stated that the so-called ‘Africa Agenda’ was elaborated by the African Working Group, an interministerial group coordinated by Casa Civil that included MDIC and MDA. The group was convened in the beginning of 2012 and concluded its tasks when the agenda was handed to Dilma a week before her trip to Ethiopia.

According to the Executive Secretary of the Chamber of Foreign Commerce (CAMEX), André Alvim, the working group aimed at aligning ministries and establishing a national strategy towards Africa. The Africa Agenda includes various actions to strengthen Brazil’s ties with Africa and, apart from exploring economic issues, also proposes increasing financial and human resources to humanitarian and technical cooperation, prioritising ‘actions in which Brazil has accumulated specialized knowledge, such as poverty reduction, education, health and agriculture’ (Rossi 2013).

Some diplomats and government officials have argued against an eventual withdrawal of ABC from MRE. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Lafer said that the way ABC works today makes it an agency based on solidarity and interested only in Brazil’s international projection. Putting together investments and technical cooperation would lead to questioning the rhetoric of selfless cooperation. Moreover, it would narrow the MRE sphere of influence, which could have a negative effect on the institution and on Brazil’s foreign policy. Luiz Felipe Lampreia, former chancellor and the first director of ABC (1987–1989), stated that all around the world technical cooperation is part of foreign policy. The current director of ABC, Fernando Abreu, praised the announcement of the new agency as an instrument to make it independent from international organisations, though he claimed that its reform would have to be discussed with MRE through the creation of a fourth career under the ministry. For him, it is technically possible to have investments and cooperation in one agency without conflict of interests or linking financing activities and equipment to investments.

A former ambassador, Rubens Barbosa, stated that attributing trade competences to the new agency would threaten Brazil’s international projection. For him, there are already several other public agencies in charge of trade and investments, such as the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX), Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI), and MRE’s Department of Trade Promotion, and that what is lacking is coordination amongst them. Speaking in the name of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), where Barbosa is the international advisor, he argued that CAMEX should be strengthened as the focal point for trade policy and directly linked to the presidency (Barbosa 2013).

Publicly, some key people linked to PT have supported linkages between technical cooperation and promotion of investment. For José Dirceu, it is not about linking aid to trade, but about building conditions to ensure partnerships have a broader remit and are more effective in a context marked by growing demands from African countries for investments and cooperation (Dirceu 2013). Deputies linked to PT also stressed, referring to Dilma’s announcement of Brazil’s debt relief to Africa, that ‘it is a great gift to Africa … a great gesture’ (Benedita da Silva, PT-BA), that ‘[i]ntegration is better among equals’ and that ‘debts have been a great obstacle to their [African] development’ (Amauri Teixeira, PT-BA) (Thomaz Jr. 2013).

Representatives of civil society and scholars have shared concern over the possibility of putting Brazil’s development cooperation under the same umbrella as trade and investment. However, there is an overall consensus that ABC should be strengthened, or a new agency must be created, in order to overcome the current obstacles to Brazilian development cooperation. There are divergences regarding where the best locus for the new agency would be, but most emphasise the need for one institution responsible for data collection and accountability for all modalities.
5.2.2 The role of the presidency

According to information available on MRE’s website, the ministry acts according to guidelines established by the presidency of the Republic. This means that the presidency is responsible for foreign policy formulation. Literature on Brazilian foreign policy has also increasingly recognised the role of the president in the definition of foreign policy priorities, contradicting previous theses according to which the MRE would be seen as a state agency, thus isolated from governmental changes.

In the case of technical cooperation, presidential influence has paved the way for a greater appropriation of Brazilian provision of technical cooperation by domestic entities. During Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second administration (1999–2002), leveraging the presentation of national experiences was undertaken in favour of his government’s external priorities, such as diplomacy for peace and health diplomacy. These priorities were used, respectively, as tools to gather international support for the Brazilian candidacy for the Security Council and for the Brazilian position at the patents’ litigation concerning antiretroviral drugs. Congressmen holding particular ideas about development issues in Brazil were also active during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration in using the presentation of experiences abroad as an instrument for strengthening them at home.

In terms of geographic allocation, the creation of the CPLP in 1996, during Cardoso’s first administration, resulted in movement within the Brazilian Congress towards technical cooperation, culminating in the creation of the Frente Parlamentar Brasil–África in 1999. One year later, a parliamentary amendment adding BRL2.5 million to the national budget was approved, aimed at financing technical cooperation with CPLP countries (Puente 2010).

During the Lula administrations (2003–2006; 2007–2010), Brazilian SSDC was brought to the centre of the foreign policy agenda. In the case of technical cooperation, presidential diplomacy was one of the main drivers of the exponential rise in demand for learning from Brazilian experiences. For instance, Lula visited 12 African countries during his two terms in office, while the minister of foreign affairs conducted 67 visits to 37 African countries during the same period (IPEA and World Bank 2011). These visits were crucial starting points for various SSDC projects. ABC’s budgetary execution expanded, as well as the number of projects initiated each year.

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68 MRE is entitled to ‘execute the guidelines of foreign policy established by the Presidency of the Republic’ (see www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/conheca-o-ministerio/view).
69 See, for instance, Cason and Power (2009); Cepaluni and Vigeveni (2007); Preto (2006); Ribas and de Faria (2011). For MRE, technical cooperation, just as foreign relations in general, should be a state policy and not subject to political changes. See Danese (1999) and, particularly on MRE’s critical reflections on the influence of the president and other ministries in TCDC, see Annex XIX in Puente (2010), which presents the minutes of interviews made with former directors of ABC. There seems to be an unresolved dispute between MRE and the presidency over the appointment of the director of ABC. While the decree that linked the ABC to MRE’s General Secretariat for External Relations (2.070/1996) stated, in Article 53, that MRE would be responsible for naming ABC’s director, a decree approved in 2001 (3.959) stated that the director had to be appointed by the president, while subsequent decrees from 2003 onward approving MRE’s internal regulations were unclear on the issue.
70 Since Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation only received broader attention in academic studies recently, the few studies that explore its historical dimensions in each of the presidential administrations. The most comprehensive study, undertaken by Puente, focuses on the 1995–2005 period, but the author also analysed other historical periods. For instance, he mentions the First National Development Plan of the New Republic (post re-democratisation), which already stated that technical cooperation should be stimulated, especially as an instrument to promote regional and sub-regional potentialities (Puente 2010).
71 For instance, a group led by senator Cristovam Buarque (Democratic Labour Party - PDT) created Missão Criança, an NGO focused on the promotion of the ‘Bolsa Escola’ model in Brazil and in other developing countries, eventually leading pilot projects abroad as an instrument to strengthen domestic support for the Bolsa Escola programme (Morais de Sá e Silva 2011).
72 Before that, a four-year special fund amounting to US$3.1 million had been approved relying on additional budgetary resources in the years 1997–1998. None of those complementary resources, however, entered into ABC’s budget; they were allocated by the MRE itself through a specific umbrella project with the UNDP (Puente 2010).
The dimension that assumed more visibility under the Lula administration was the launch in 2004 of the Global Action against Hunger and Poverty. Resulting from a conjunction of international drivers (global efforts to fulfil the MDGs and the search for solutions to global disorder in the post-9/11 context) and domestic ones (the creation of the Zero Hunger Programme), that initiative led to shifts in the structure of Brazilian development cooperation, with the creation of CGFOME under MRE, also in 2004.⁷³

Though recognising macroeconomic and social advances in Brazil during her predecessor’s mandate, the Dilma Rousseff administration has prioritised domestic issues, especially fighting extreme poverty (as expressed in her government’s motto, ‘a rich country is a country without poverty’). In foreign policy, on the one hand, the new president has renewed Brazilian relations with developed countries, in search of advanced technologies and training for Brazilians through initiatives such as the Science without Borders Programme.⁷⁴

On the other hand, in the context of national deindustrialisation, economic relations with other developing countries have been brought to the centre of the agenda, thus creating a more pragmatic and win-win view on South–South relations. Shifts in financial cooperation that started emerging during the last years of Lula’s administration in order to widen the number of eligible countries⁷⁵ were deepened with measures aimed at rendering criteria for loans made by the Export Financing Programme (PROEX) and the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) more flexible.⁷⁶

Concerning technical cooperation in particular under ABC, two important shifts have happened during the Dilma administration: a greater focus on Latin America, as shown in the planning of ABC’s budgetary allocation for the 2012–2015 period (see Section 4.2); the freezing of the agency’s budget for technical cooperation in 2011 and its cut in 2012 and in 2013 (see Box 5.3). The new president, contrary to her predecessor, did not sign the foreword of the COBRAI 2010 report, which can be interpreted as a de-prioritisation of cooperation with other developing countries. Additionally, technical cooperation is not mentioned in the president’s general foreign relations speeches.⁷⁷ Other shifts related to Brazilian engagement in development cooperation under Dilma’s administration are explored in subsection 5.2.4.

In 2013 an important shift in Brazilian foreign policy took place with the nomination of a new minister, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo. Human rights were brought to the centre of the agenda, with a plan to prioritise themes such as child labour, gender, LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) and other issues. Strengthening negotiating teams, to include not only diplomats but also other governmental institutions and civil society organisations, is part of his strategy (Oliveira 2013). Moreover, mainly driven by the need to promote trade and investments, president Dilma asked the new minister to lead on the formulation of a White Paper on Brazil’s foreign policy. In order to meet this request, MRE’s Department of Diplomatic Planning will be reformed to be able to produce strategic projects with the objective of guiding foreign policy (Leo 2013).

⁷³ Although CGFOME is known for its work in humanitarian assistance, as listed on the MRE website it is also active in: food and nutritional security, including the right to food; agrarian development (agrarian reform and family agriculture); small-scale fishing; the Brazil–Argentina Social Institute; International Fund for Agriculture Development and the World Food Program; World Social Forum; and dialogue with civil society. See www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/o-ministerio/cgfome-coordenacao-geral-de-acoes-internacionais-de-combate-a-fome/.
⁷⁴ See www.cienciasemfronteiras.gov.br/web/csf-eng/.
⁷⁵ For data on the evolution of disbursements made to sub-Saharan countries during the Lula administration, see IPEA and World Bank (2011) and Cabral (2011).
Box 5.3  Possible determinants and perceptions of the interruption in growth of the ABC budget

In 2011, the first year of Dilma’s administration, ABC’s budget was BRL52 million (Barbosa 2011). In that year, the national government’s compulsory and discretionary expenditure suffered a cut. MRE’s budget, just like other agencies and units, had to cut by 50 per cent with expenses such as per diems and tickets, as well as suspend new contracts to rent, buy and reform properties and to rent cars, machines and equipment (Brasil 2011a).

In 2012, these restrictions were sustained, but MRE’s budget was the only one, within discretionary expenditure, that was not cut. On the contrary, it was guaranteed an extra BRL151 million above what had been predicted in that year’s Law of Budgetary Guidelines (Brasil 2012d). Still, ABC’s budget for technical cooperation decreased to BRL36 million in 2012 and 2013 (Fleck 2013b).

All of the interviewed people from implementing agencies working under the coordination of ABC in technical cooperation activities, except for one person, were deeply dissatisfied with the interruption in the growth of ABC’s budget and considered that it would compromise initiatives that were underway.

Interviewees had various opinions regarding the drivers of ABC’s budgetary reduction from 2011 onwards, including reflections on:

- general cuts in governmental expenditure;
- the traditional realist rationale that dominates MRE, in which the promotion of development models is identified with an idealist position;
- ABC not having spent its technical cooperation budget during the previous years;
- technical cooperation not being a priority for the new president as it was for the previous one;
- the influence of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG), an agency that would prioritise national development and received cooperation and thus would be against the whole discourse and practice of Brazil having evolved from a donor to a provider of cooperation;
- the lack of domestic constituencies supporting technical cooperation.

5.2.3 Ministries and other implementing agencies

Ministries are also important actors in Brazilian foreign policy as they have the legal mandate to sign international cooperation agreements and officially represent the country in international forums. By virtue of holding technical expertise in particular areas, national ministries have traditionally figured as important actors in the implementation of technical cooperation. However, the influence of each ministry on the decision-making process varies.

Though accumulated experiences in the field might strengthen their efforts to take an active part in the definition of the specific content of initiatives, the position occupied by each ministry in each administration’s foreign policy priorities also seems to play a crucial role. For instance, the Ministry of Health has been very active since Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration, but during Lula’s administration new ministries (Agrarian Development and Social Development) also started playing crucial roles. In the transition from the Lula to Dilma administrations, the Ministry of Defence has also gained a central role in decision-making concerning the allocation of technical cooperation actions. During the Dilma administration

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78 Research undertaken by Cassio França and Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin identified that, from a universe of 170 ministerial organs (cabinets, state and executive secretaries, departments and 22 ministries), 61.4 per cent have some competency on international issues, 37 per cent have some initiatives being undertaken abroad and 30 per cent have the legal mandate to represent Brazilian interests internationally. All ministries, except one (National Integration) have international advisory units or secretariats directly linked to the Minister’s Cabinet (França and Ratton Sanchez Badin 2011).
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI), and agencies linked to it, have intensified efforts to engage in South–South cooperation, for instance through negotiations to use FOCEM’s resources to finance activities related to research and development and the organisation of an international panel on Africa by CNPq in 2013.79 The enhanced roles played by the Ministry of Defence and MCTI might explain why the second COBRADI has expanded modalities.

Key traditional actors in technical cooperation, Embrapa, Fiocruz and SENAI have not only accumulated experience in the field but also, faced with growing demands in the 2000s, autonomously developed criteria for selecting the demands on which they focus. Their international experience also results from the fact that they have previously experienced a higher degree of internationalisation due to having been privileged recipients of technical cooperation from traditional donors and having traditionally taken part in regional and international functional discussions that constituted a locus for diffusing their particular experiences and thus creating demands for them (though initially that was a spontaneous process rather than a strategic one). To what extent such demands will actually be approved, however, varies across administrations and also depends on each implementing agency’s internal institutional alignment related to the need to maintain engagement in technical cooperation across different administrations.

In the case of activities coordinated by ABC, this research has identified that the main mechanism through which an implementing agency or interest group can influence resource allocation is signing a protocol of understanding with ABC. Protocols have been signed, for instance, with: the National Front of Mayors (FNP) (see Box 5.4); the unit of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation dedicated to agribusiness (FGV-Agro) for the establishment of the Nacala Fund;80 and with the Ministry of Defense, aiming at raising the number of military staff from developing countries trained in Brazil as an instrument to promote arms sales and doctrinal harmonisation (Antunes 2010b and 2010c; see also Abdenur and Marcondes 2013).81 The existence of a strong basis in the Brazilian Congress, as well as of representatives (attachés or adidos) in the field, might also configure as important drivers of the influence of defence and agriculture interests in the allocation of technical cooperation.

79 During the Lula administrations CNPq had an important role in South–South cooperation through initiatives such as the South American and African Programmes of Support to Science and Technology Cooperation Activities (PROSUL and PROÁFRICA). However, both programmes were interrupted in 2011. According to da Silva and Furtado (2013), the interruption of PROÁFRICA, as well as of other initiatives, resulted from the decision to focus CNPq’s efforts on the Science without Borders programme.

80 According to published information about the Nacala Fund, its aim will be to finance agro-industry and infrastructure projects in the north of Mozambique, including financing productivity of small and medium farmholders and associations among Mozambican and Brazilian food producers (Guarany 2012).

81 Initially focused on South American countries, aiming, according to the official discourse, at promoting a regional defence industry and strengthening the South American Defence Council, such initiatives have been recently expanded to western African countries, as data available on the ABC online database shows. The online database is available at www.abc.gov.br/ABC_por/WebForms/projeto.aspx?secao_id=132. By selecting ‘South–South cooperation’ in ‘Type of Cooperation’ and ‘Defence’ in ‘Sector of Activity’ it is possible to identify the recent expansion of military training, including in African countries.
Box 5.4  The role of Brazilian subnational governments in technical cooperation

Brazilian subnational governments have taken part, for decades, in decentralised international cooperation networks and initiatives in areas such as environment, regional integration and cross-border cooperation. Municipalities in particular have been collectively mobilising themselves in order to influence decision-making in foreign relations through national networks such as the National Front of Mayors (FNP), the Brazilian National Confederation of Municipalities (CNM), and the Brazilian National Forum of Municipal Secretaries and Managers (FONARI), having an interface at the MRE, through its Special Advisory Unit for Federative and Parliamentary Affairs (AFEPA), and especially at the presidency, through its Federal Affairs Under-Chief (SAF).

While such links have been more substantive in the regional domain (particularly in Mercosul and cross-border cooperation), there has been a broadening of their geographic engagement over recent years. One example was the mobilisation of Brazilian cities, articulated through the FNP, in order to support the reconstruction of Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake, which culminated in the signature of a Protocol of Intentions between the FNP and the ABC, aiming at enhancing decentralised cooperation between Brazilian cities and their Haitian counterparts (see Leite 2011).

Subnational governments’ calls for enhanced engagement in Brazilian technical cooperation have culminated in the approval of two calls, in partnership with the ABC, to finance South–South decentralised technical cooperation initiatives. The first one, Call for Proposals for Franco-Brazilian Decentralized Trilateral Cooperation Projects for Haiti and the African Continent, was launched in April 2011, in partnership with the French Agency for Development (AFD). A total of 22 proposals were presented and two projects have been approved: one involving Fortaleza (Brazil), Porto Novo (Benin) and St Denis (France); and another involving Guarulhos (Brazil), Lyon (France) and Maputo and Matola (Mozambique). The second call, Decentralized Technical South–South Cooperation Program, was launched in several Brazilian cities, beginning in February 2012, having received more than 60 proposals and having approved four projects engaging the following municipalities: Bagé (Brazil) and Cerro Largo (Uruguay); Vitória (Brazil) and Xai-Xai (Mozambique); Canoas (Brazil) and Morón (Argentina); Curitiba (Brazil) and Rosario (Argentina).

The mobilisation of subnational governments has also culminated with the publication of a study, sponsored by the FNP, aiming to propose avenues, relying on other countries’ institutionalised and non-institutionalised experiences of decentralised cooperation, for the establishment of a legal framework for decentralised cooperation in Brazil (see Rodrigues 2011). Increasing engagement in technical cooperation reflects subnational governments’ will to export local policies as an instrument to strengthen such policies in Brazil, as well as the claim that national public policies and experiences that are being sought by other developing countries have their origins in local spheres. The insufficient capacities of central government to cope with increasing demands has also favoured the decentralisation of implementation, which is also seen as an instrument to broaden national constituencies supporting the increasing allocation of national resources to promote international development.

5.2.4 Trade and investment promotion agencies and the private sector

Though there is a tendency to treat the connection between foreign policy and SSDC and Brazilian private sector interests as resulting from the latter’s mobilisation, such as in the case of ethanol and soy production abroad, the research found that the internationalisation of both agribusiness and industry to other developing countries has been mainly led by the state as an instrument to enhance Brazilian capabilities, to foster Brazilian development and to ground South–South cooperation in business alliances. Though this process was already

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82 See, for instance, Antunes (2010a); Dolcetti (2012); Schlesinger (2012).
under way during Lula’s second administration, it has become more visible during the Dilma administration (as demonstrated by her announcement of a new agency, see Box 5.2).

The main way the private sector benefits from Brazilian development cooperation is through financial cooperation. Nonetheless, it is unclear if, and how, financial cooperation influences technical cooperation. In practice, what has been noted is that an increase in funding by BNDES for Brazilian companies carrying out infrastructure projects in Africa coincides with growing governmental technical cooperation projects in these countries (Masagão et al. 2012).

Although technical cooperation has experienced budgetary freezes (2011) and cuts (2012 and 2013) in the Dilma administration (see Box 5.3) there has been a growing interest in the theme in MDIC, as mentioned previously, particularly among sectors that have been dedicated to the promotion of Brazilian trade with African countries. In 2013, led by the presidency’s Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE), the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP) organised a seminar on Brazilian soft power, and at that time it was suggested that the ABC should be strengthened (Barbosa 2013).

When compared with the outward-looking government programmes during ex-President Lula’s terms, the current perception amongst government agencies working with the Brazilian private sector is one of slow disengagement with Africa. The Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI), for instance, has redirected its efforts from countries like Mozambique and Angola to Mercosul and other parts of Latin America.

Commercial ties rather than grants or solidarity loans are the new orthodoxy with regards to Brazilian industrial engagement with Africa. A new focus on markets in the global North has also ensued, viewed as a way to upgrade Brazilian firms’ capabilities by supporting them to export to the ‘most sophisticated’ (e.g. North America and Europe) markets and hence become more globally competitive. This shift is also thought to increase the export of manufactures instead of natural resource-based products to Asia, particularly to China. In October 2012 there was growing alarm that for the first time the balance of trade between China and Brazil had tipped to the benefit of the former.

The Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) has been assigned fewer resources in general, but this is particularly true in the case of resources destined to support exports to Africa. This is compounded by reluctance amongst medium enterprises to venture outside of the large and lucrative domestic market which has been growing for over a decade. Medium-sized firms (usually the target for support from APEX) see few reasons to invest and take risks for the African market, leaving this task to the largest firms in Brazil in the sectors of construction, mining and natural resource-based products.

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83 Shifts in financial cooperation that had started emerging during the final years of the Lula’s administration in order to widen the participation of Brazilian companies in exports (including medium and small enterprises), as well as the number of eligible countries, were increased by measures, for instance, aiming at rendering criteria for loans made by the Export Financing Programme (PROEX) and the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) more flexible. See, for instance, the legislation that authorised the use of lines of credit for indirect export made by Brazilian trading companies (www.comexbrasil.gov.br/conteudo/ver/chave/uso-do-acc-indireto-nas/). Such measures have been mainly proposed by specialised working groups created within the MDIC-headed Brasil Maior programme, which is presented on its official website as the current government’s ‘industrial, technological and foreign trade policy’ (www.brasilmaior/mdic.gov.br/conteudo/128). For more information on the development of mechanisms aiming at boosting Brazilian trade with Africa’s sub-Saharan countries, and data on the evolution of disbursements made to sub-Saharan countries during the Lula administration, see Cabral (2011), and IPEA and World Bank (2011).

84 Such interest is illustrated by the fact that the Africa subgroup that integrates the Technical Group of Strategic Studies on Foreign Trade (GTEX), which has been created with the mandate of ‘producing studies and elaborating proposals on foreign trade policy with specific countries or regions’ (CAMEX 2012), has been inviting people from the ABC, as well as main TCDC implementing agencies, such as Embrapa, to take part at its meetings.
MDIC, which oversees ABDI and APEX, contends that the presence of Brazilian private and public industries in Africa has not been reduced nor have economic flows diminished. A shift from grants and low-interest loans to commercial relationships and investment that seeks higher returns for Brazil has ensued. The governmental position is that this will actually improve conditions for Brazilian investment in Africa which in turn will encourage higher numbers of projects and exports for the benefit of African economies whilst also promoting Brazilian economic interests.

Moving towards the private sector side of the complex Brazilian spectrum of organisations that provide support to businesses, there is SENAI. This is one of the flagship agencies of the CNI (Confederação Nacional da Indústria – National Confederation of Industries), which is a private sector-led organisation that was created by government policy and provided public goods to the employed Brazilian population. During President Lula’s two terms, SENAI spearheaded a number of centres for vocational training in several African countries but these projects are no longer being encouraged. The new priority for SENAI is to strengthen technical and vocational training and industrial innovation in Brazil.

### 5.2.5 Civil society and social movements

Currently, there are not many permanent spaces (either ‘invited’ or ‘claimed’) in which the policies and practices related to SSDC are discussed. Government engagement with civil society and the private sector on such issues tends to be limited or *ad hoc*.

An initial attempt to map spaces that have objectives directly related to SSDC or that have had discussions that were considered influential for the continued consolidation of the field shows that such spaces tend to have either a very broad remit (i.e. encompassing all or many aspects of the country’s foreign policy) or are too focused on specific aspects of SSDC. The research identified around 20 initiatives including *ad hoc* spaces, councils and permanent forums on sectoral issues, regional integration participatory initiatives, focused remit spaces and civil society spaces. Such spaces are registered below in Table 5.1.

#### Table 5.1 Government and civil society spaces related to SSDC

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of space</th>
<th>Spaces identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ad hoc spaces</td>
<td>General foreign policy meeting held by MRE and SG-PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral councils or</td>
<td>Working group for the international agenda of the National Food Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent forum</td>
<td>(CONSEA), the Permanent Committee for International Affairs (CPAI) linked to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Council of Rural Sustainable Development (CONDRAF MDA), the Amazonia Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional integration</td>
<td>CPLP Civil Society Forum, Social and Participative Mercosul programme, Mercosul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initiatives</td>
<td>Economic and Social Consultative Forum, BRICS and IBSA Academic Forums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused remit spaces</td>
<td>Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, CONARE (National Committee for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees), Conex (CAMEX’s private sector consultative council), Civil Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forum in Haiti, GTI-AHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society claimed spaces</td>
<td>GR-RI, Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples (REBRIP), ABONG’s working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>group on Brazil–Africa relations, BNDES platform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on official documents and interviews.

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85 ‘Closed’ spaces are where decisions and discussions take place without broader consultation or involvement of other stakeholders; ‘invited’ spaces are government-sponsored participatory spaces, institutionalised or not, that create opportunities for involvement and consultation of different stakeholders; ‘claimed/self-created’ spaces are those that emerge out of sets of common concerns or identifications by civil society or the private sector, or may consist of spaces in which like-minded people join together in common pursuits (Gaventa 2006).
Box 5.5 Private sector perspectives on working in Africa

When talking to private firms in the mining, oil and gas, construction and agriculture sectors, notions of hardship, opportunity and accomplishment emerge. Hardship as firms express how investment and work conditions in Africa seem to them much more difficult than ‘even in the poorest areas of the Northeast [of Brazil]’. For some of the interviewees these meant it has been a challenge to find staff willing to move to Africa to lead and implement projects. This challenge has been compounded by a labour shortage within Brazil, given the expansion of the economy over the last decade and the creation of new local jobs. Institutional challenges such as contract enforcement, facilitation of payments and competition with Chinese and Indian firms in Africa has added to this sense of hardship.

‘Opportunity’ was the other notion that firms expressed when referring to their work in Africa. Construction firms in particular view weak African infrastructure as an opportunity for investment and for obtaining support from BNDES’s loans for internationalisation. Over the last decade ‘many new Brazilian multimillionaires were created’ according to some interviewees, because of large infrastructural projects but also thanks to the increased demand for engineering services and other technical maintenance services for mining and construction provided by small firms. Brazilian construction firms are the ones that have spent most time in Africa and had the most sophisticated view of Africa – they stayed in countries like Angola during war and conflict to the point that these companies are seen as ‘local’ with much local employment. This was also part of the model they wanted to foster, to be seen as ‘African’ construction firms instead of Brazilian. Odebrecht was frequently mentioned as the Brazilian construction firm that had the best reputation in Africa linked to high-quality standards and timeliness in finishing projects as well as involvement in social housing projects. Mining companies such as the giant Vale have also seen in Africa a land of opportunity with large projects in Mozambique leading the way. However, political instability and complex relationships with partners have seen their investments shadowed by scandal in other places such as Guinea (Simandou). Brazilian exporters of manufactures tended to be more conservative about their assessments of opportunities in Africa as local competition from South African and Chinese manufactures thwarted many ambitious plans such as those of Brazilian cosmetics firm O Boticario, which closed operations in Africa after a few years, or the many small and medium enterprises that did not benefit from the ‘Brazilian content’ clause included in BNDES internationalisation loans to large companies. Regardless of these limitations, a number of personal services franchises from hairdressers to language schools are now expanding to Africa according to the Brazilian Franchise Association (website and interviews in October 2012).

‘Accomplishment’ and ‘responsibility’ were also very often mentioned by interviewees from the private sector when referring to their operations in Africa. Several interviewees expressed that in Africa their social responsibility projects are even more important than in Brazil because of the dire social and economic conditions in which their African employees live. A mining company engineer explained how their company became involved in sponsoring orphanages for children whose parents had died of AIDS, which is something they would never attempt in Brazil to avoid being accused of creating projects that foster dependency (assistencialistas in the original Portuguese) instead of empowerment. In many geographically remote areas where these companies operate, they have decided to fill the vacuum left by the absence of a strong state (for health, education and security) to help their employees and their families. Given that Brazilian firms tend to employ African labour, these social initiatives for employees benefit the local community. Much has been said about the fact that Brazilian firms invest in training the local workforce and regardless of motive (Brazilian shortage of labour or genuine desire to build local capabilities) this is a key feature of Brazilian business practices in Africa with clear links to development objectives.

Surprisingly, the largest oil and gas company from Brazil (with a large percentage of government capital) never got involved in social programmes in Africa and is now disinvesting in order to focus on Brazilian domestic priorities. This finding goes against the assumption linking state-owned companies with social programmes and privately owned companies being associated with little investment in the area of social development.
However, it is important to note that in the last two years, concurrent with the increased role of the country in international cooperation and the growth in foreign investment, there have been more opportunities for reflection on the trends, motivations, contradictions and strategies of South–South cooperation.

There are incipient initiatives of civil society participation in cooperation decision-making and implementation. Even though these initiatives are very focused and numerically restricted they represent advances and recognise the role of civil society in development cooperation. Such initiatives have been led by two institutions: the presidency’s General Secretariat (SG-PR), which started promoting technical cooperation initiatives partnered by civil society organisations and governments; and, particularly, by MRE’s CGFOME.

The presidency’s General Secretariat’s International Affairs Advisory Department aims to foster citizen participation in Brazilian international agendas and international organisation participatory spaces. The department promotes meetings and seminars about social integration (Mercosul and CPLP), dialogues over civil society cooperation and other initiatives, like the Mercosul Social e Participativo, or consultations with civil society (i.e. Rio +20 and UNDP’s Beyond 2015).

In the particular case of development cooperation, SG-PR’s reflection about the experience of Brazil as an aid recipient, has led them to the conclusion that development impacts were more sustainable in cases where projects connected international actors to local CSOs and governments. This lesson informs, for instance, the project ‘Implementation of Community Seed Banks and Capacity Building to Rescue, Multiply, Store and Use Native Seeds in Family-Based Agriculture’, coordinated by the ABC and partnered in Brazil by the SG-PR, the Institute for Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE), the Popular Farmers’ Movement (MCP) and the Women Farmers’ Movement (MMC). The main partners of the projects in Africa are: the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Trust for Community Outreach and Education in South Africa; and the Ministries of Agriculture and Planning and the National Farmers’ Union in Mozambique.

Overall, there are no indications of a government strategy to engage with society in SSDC policy formulation as a whole. One hypothesis is that the existing spaces and initiatives respond to civil society mobilisation on specific subjects (i.e. Mercosul Social e Participativo and the role of the labour union), or PT’s priorities on civil society and foreign policy. Those priorities are related to the party’s agenda on enhancing the voice of CSOs in foreign policy as a means to: strengthen rights at home; ground domestic participatory mechanisms and the national consolidation of social rights on international practices and architecture; and ground Brazilian technical cooperation in domestic constituencies. Nevertheless, the research did not explore evidence on the extension of civil society influence and impact on the cooperation agenda debated in those forums. Also, the research did not investigate the relations between civil society and the sectoral ministries’ initiatives on technical cooperation, which might present different dynamics and background.

Finally, the existence of civil society ‘claimed spaces’ (which are created by CSOs themselves) demonstrates that initial mobilisations that were focused mainly on international trade have now broadened their remit, following the country’s increased international engagement in SSDC. The initiatives that were identified coordinate prominent non-governmental organisations and social movements dedicated to debating and monitoring Brazil’s actions abroad. It is also important to mention that those groups and networks

86 As mentioned in Mercosul Social e Participativo official documentation: www.secretariageral.gov.br/.arquivos/imagens-publicacoes/Mercosul_volume2.pdf.
present a clear demand for foreign policy democratisation and the establishment of formal and institutionalised participatory mechanisms and spaces for deliberation.

5.2.6 Congress debates and public opinion

Initially the research tried to explore debates that have been taking place in the Brazilian Congress concerning engagement in international cooperation, but the influence of particular congressmen, lobbies and groups concerning the areas and countries of allocation for Brazilian development cooperation remains to be explored. Two debates that took place in the Chamber of Deputies have been analysed: debates on the new statute of Embrapa, which authorised its international operation; and debates concerning food aid.

The first debate was very brief and had an under-attended public audience, while the discussions on provisional measures 481/2010 and 519/2010, concerning food donations of public stocks to international humanitarian assistance through the World Food Programme, have been more extensive and complex.

Several deputies have pointed out that national needs should be prioritised, though solidarity towards the peoples of other developing countries was not being questioned. On the contrary, the deputies have considered solidarity as a principle that goes beyond the Workers’ Party’s foreign policy, mirroring international, religious and moral principles as well as values held by the Brazilian parliament and society as a whole.

Converging with this position, according to a national poll on Brazilian foreign policy (2010–2011), which interviewed 200 social and political leaders and a random sample of 2,400 people in Brazilian cities, 86 per cent of the Brazilian foreign policy community considered helping to improve quality of life in less developed countries to be extremely or very important; while 92.5 per cent of the interested and informed public, and 81.5 per cent of the uninterested and non-informed public, considered it very important.

More recently, the Brazil Public Opinion Monitor, an internet-based survey that engaged 2,189 opinion leaders, pointed out that only 37 per cent of them believed that Brazil receives aid from other countries, while 63 per cent said that Brazil should receive it. On the issue of provided cooperation, 61 per cent believed that the country provides assistance, 51 per cent said that they support such actions, while 40 per cent positioned themselves against it. When asked which factors should drive Brazilian provision of assistance to other developing countries, most respondents considered promoting national security as very important, followed respectively by reducing poverty, promoting peace and security in the world, and institutionalised participatory mechanisms and spaces for deliberation.

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87 Opposition did not centre on the donation of food itself, but on: (1) it being an instrument to affirm the international image of President Lula and his alignment with countries whose governments were found not to be respecting domestic human rights; (2) it being an instrument to promote compensatory programmes abroad, to the detriment of other policies targeting sustainable social inclusion (such as health and education); (3) it being decided by the Executive; (4) the possibility of directing seized merchandise at home to humanitarian assistance; and (5) the quantity and kind of grains that would be destined for other countries, having in mind their impacts on national prices. In the end, both provisional measures were approved. Their rapporteurs, respectively, deputies Mauricio Rands (PT) and Luiz Carlos Heinze (PP), concluded in favour of the legality of food aid. The provisional measure has been considered an adequate instrument, given the urgency of the issue; the donation of food from public stocks has been found consistent with the Law of Fiscal Responsibility (which states that the utilisation of public stocks does not incur additional expense to the Union’s budget, except expenses related to its operationalisation), as well as with the Brazilian people’s spirit of solidarity towards populations that are affected by malnutrition, insufficient income, and natural catastrophes. Beyond solidarity, one of the factors that has stimulated support for food aid has been its convergence with the national minimum price policy. This rationale has been argued by Heinze’s report, as well as in interventions made by other deputies, for instance, by Deputy Zonta (PP).

88 Souza (2008) defines the Brazilian community of foreign policy (comunidade brasileira de política externa) as the group of people who take part in decision-making or contribute in a relevant manner to opinion formation concerning the country’s international relations. It encompasses therefore not only members of the Executive and the Legislative, but also representatives of interest groups, leaders of non-governmental organizations, scholars, journalists and entrepreneurs who act in the international arena (Souza 2008: 3).
promoting solidarity, responding to natural disasters, promoting human rights, promoting Brazil’s economic interests, promoting the position of women in other countries, promoting Brazil’s political interests and promoting better government (Henson 2013).

5.2.7 International actors

Traditional donors also have an important role in the diffusion of Brazilian policies, either because of the practice of replicating in third countries projects that had been implemented in Brazil previously, or because of their roles in collecting and diffusing information on Brazilian development experiences abroad. Sometimes they actively play a role in helping partner countries engage with Brazilian SSDC. Therefore, they have an indirect influence as they contribute to demands being developed by partner countries.

Additionally, many of the flagship technical cooperation projects form part of trilateral arrangements. How far the international organisations and bilateral donors influenced the agenda-setting and what their actual role is in implementation was not explored by this research.

Traditional donors still play an important role in supporting Brazilian technical cooperation capacity building. As recent examples, in February 2013 JICA and UNDP partnered ABC’s project Capacity Development in Management of South–South and Trilateral Cooperation and DFID supports learning and knowledge exchange and consolidation in the framework of the Africa Food Purchase Programme led by the Ministry of Social Development and CGFOME. (Leite et al. 2013)

It is important to consider the role of international organisations and traditional donors as influential actors in Brazilian technical cooperation. This expands actors’ field of political action, since national governmental and non-governmental actors can also mobilise knowledge and resources in international arenas. While this adds even greater complexity to the decision-making process, it also opens up possibilities for enriching Brazil’s experience, since a wider range of actors can engage in SSDC initiatives.

5.2.8 Map of influences on Brazilian technical cooperation

Figure 5.2 below attempts to summarise this section’s main findings. To simplify the understanding, national and international actors are represented in an aggregate manner. The size attributed to each actor represents the research hypothesis about the extent of the influence exerted over the technical cooperation decision process as a whole.

It should be pointed out that the graphical representation of ministries, implementing agencies, economic groups, non-governmental actors, international organisations, other countries and traditional donors as single actors hides their multiplicity and complexity (i.e. some ministries have much more international presence and/or influence over other actors and some international organisations or traditional donors are more influenced by/influence more than others). Also, all non-governmental and international actors were aggregated (in boxes) to facilitate the reading of the map. Again this aggregation may conceal more complex relations.

MRE also represents ABC, the embassies and the diplomatic body. Along with the promotion agencies (like BNDES), MRE has been classified as a facilitator actor (represented by the grey colour) since they do not implement cooperation alone. Although promotion agencies only have an indirect impact on technical cooperation, as their actions are related to financial cooperation (represented by yellow lines), they have been included in the figure as a first attempt to explore their potential influence on technical cooperation. A deeper comprehension of mutual impacts and relations between financial and technical cooperation remains to be explored.
A blue line surrounds actors responsible for direct implementation of cooperation, while institutions with veto and control power are represented in red. The figure also shows information about the research hypothesis on the flow of influences (represented by connection arrows), pointing out unilateral or mutual influence and formal or informal relations.
Figure 5.2  Tentative map of influences over Brazilian technical cooperation

Source: Own elaboration based on official documents and interviews.
6  Policy debate

Although SSDC is still an incipient field in Brazil, the research attempted to identify some of the ideas, narratives and demands of civil society, academia and media that shape the domestic policy debate. We understand ideas as widely shared values, beliefs and narratives related to issues such as: international cooperation, the role of the country in engaging in SSDC, and how partner countries are perceived and known.

This section is based on views and opinions shared during the three civil society dialogues organised by the research team and interviews with the private sector. It also references some of the key articles and papers published in recent years by representatives of NGOs or civil society networks, when they reinforce points raised during the civil society dialogues. Text boxes containing a short analysis of the academic debate and media coverage related to this theme complement these perspectives. Additionally, the box below unpacks some of the main discussions during a key foreign policy event in 2013.

6.1  Ideas and narratives

As mentioned previously, the policy debate around SSDC is embryonic and often fragmented. Many of the ideas and narratives are still being formed, and the concepts and boundaries of the debate are fluid. As opposed to traditional donor countries, in which the boundaries of what is considered international cooperation have been ingrained during the past 50 years, in Brazil competing perspectives are still being debated. Some of these converging and diverging views are presented below. Each of these issues, as well as the converging or diverging perspectives regarding the topic, could be further unpacked and debated to provide recommendations and possible ways forward. It is important to note that due to the lack of information and research, perceptions presented by participants and interviewees are often not backed by empirical evidence. However, there are an increasing number of debates and analyses taking place (for instance see Boxes 6.2 and 6.3), leading to a more informed and evidence-based discussion.

There was an overall consensus that Brazil is going through a transitional moment regarding its role in international cooperation. The country was seen to have reached a new international status due to its so-called ‘inclusive growth’. This narrative – commonly used by government, international organisations and some civil society organisations – has been important in establishing Brazilian policies and programmes as ‘best practices’ to be shared with other developing countries. The international recognition of certain policies and programmes has also led to further legitimisation of such experiences nationally.

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89 In civil society dialogues, participants were asked for their opinion on three main questions: (1) ‘Which should be the main drivers of Brazilian engagement on SSDC?’ (Why? For what? And for whom?); (2) ‘What are the main forces that influence Brazilian engagement?’ (actors, interest groups, drives, ideas); and (3) ‘What are the main challenges and lessons learnt by the Brazilian SSDC?’

90 This argument is also raised by Beghin (2012), who stresses that the positive impacts of social policies in Brazil led to their international recognition and increasing requests to share its experiences.
Box 6.1  2013 National Conference on Brazilian foreign policy

In July 2013, a groundbreaking National Conference on Brazilian foreign policy was held, entitled ‘2003–2013: A New Foreign Policy’ (the timeframe coincides with the PT’s rule in Brazil). The conference was organised by the Reflection Group on International Relations (GR-RI), a diverse assemblage made up of self-identified leftist or progressive stakeholders from the government, academia and civil society. The conference, which gathered approximately 700 people in person and more than 12,000 people online,91 aimed at reflecting on past priorities and achievements, current challenges and future perspectives for Brazilian foreign policy, as well as emphasising the need to democratise it. The group presented a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs demanding the creation of a foreign policy council.92

The starting point for thematic discussions was the conceptualisation of the so-called ‘new’ Brazilian foreign policy, described by former Ministers of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim (2003–2010) and Antonio Patriota (2011–2013),93 as ‘lofty’ (capacity to defend one’s own points of view) and active (altiva e ativa in Portuguese). Some of the foreign policy shifts that were mentioned under the PT administration were: renewing ties with the South without undermining its relations with the North; and willingness to actively engage in world affairs, including reforming global governance through normative and agenda-setting initiatives (the issues of food security and fighting hunger were highly emphasised).

Policymakers and analysts shared their perceptions on constraints and opportunities for Brazilian foreign action. These included concerns about the financial crisis and current developmental models, regional integration challenges and the national technological gap, among other topics. Particularly on Brazil–Africa relations, senior diplomats underlined enhanced political and commercial ties, arguing that there was still room for improvements (for instance, the need to expand BNDES credit lines to African countries and to promote better understanding in Brazilian society of the potential for closer relations with Africa). Many speakers raised the need to discuss the current development cooperation framework, encompassing policies, practices and flows.

As part of the debate on democratisation of foreign policy, speakers repeatedly stressed the need to treat the latter as a public policy. Speakers emphasised that participation is a principle guiding different policies in both current and past administrations, and should also inform foreign policymaking. Citizen participation was described as a ‘creative tension’ that should be fostered not only domestically, but in spaces such as Mercosul, G-20, BRICS, UNASUL, and CPLP. Finally, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Patriota mentioned the government’s intention establishing, until the end of 2013, a consultative body, most probably a dialogue forum, between government and civil society on foreign policy issues.94

It is worth noting that the conference has sparked debate beyond the ‘usual suspects’. Reactions from other groups have, on the one hand, shown how the notion of a ‘new foreign policy’ since 2003 is still contested in its novelty and essence.95 On the other hand, it has confirmed a current emerging trend of increasing the political (and even partisan) debate around foreign policy issues, which reinforces the need for consolidating more permanent spaces for public debates on Brazilian foreign engagements.

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92 The letter putting forward this proposal can be found at http://blogbrasilnomundo.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/pela-criacao-de-um-orgao-institucional-permanente-de-consulta-participacao-e-dialogo-sobre-a-politica-externa-brasileira/.
93 Patriota left his Chancellor position in August 2013. At the time of the conference, he was still Brazil’s Foreign Minister.
94 The longstanding demand from civil society groups, much inspired by other national participation mechanisms, has been discussed by MRE and the presidency for a long time, including in exchanges between the government and its close circles in civil society. Patriota had, however, mentioned briefly the government’s willingness to create a type of body by the end of 2013 in a previous hearing at the Senate, back in April. See www.conectas.org/en/actions/foreign-policy/news/undefinedminister-iwanttoknowundefineddefined.
95 One example of the public debate generated among foreign policy analysts is the dialogue between Matias Spektor and Sergio Fausto published in Folha de São Paulo. Spektor wrote ‘O futuro em São Bernardo’ [The future in São Bernardo] in his weekly column (24 July 2013), and a few days later there was a public reply, ‘Palpite Infeliz’ [Unhappy guess], written by Sergio Fausto (5 August 2013).
Interviewees and participants mentioned that the country is not prepared to take on this new position. They pointed out that Brazil wants to be seen as an emerging power but does not want to take on the responsibilities that come with the new status, including those related to international cooperation. The obstacles and challenges to improving South–South cooperation and ensuring Brazil fulfils its new position mentioned during the civil society dialogues include the absence or deficiency of:

- a legal framework consistent with the country’s role as a cooperation provider;
- a strong and autonomous coordinating agency, leading to fragmented strategies and no clear policy;
- funding channels for different stakeholders to engage in SSDC;
- absence of adequate information regarding Brazilian cooperation;
- social accountability mechanisms;
- a culture of monitoring and evaluation of SSDC projects, as well as unclear definition of what characterises effective SSDC projects;
- transparency and accountability of BNDES;
- knowledge of the ‘Other’, particularly the political, social and cultural realities of countries in Africa and Asia;
- trained personnel to work in SSDC.

During the revision of this research, scholars raised further challenges:

- lack of systematic dialogue with other Southern countries and regional blocs on issues of South–South cooperation, reducing the opportunities for learning and improving the quality of its SSDC;
- state bureaucracy is organised to deal with domestic issues, even though increasingly dealing with an international remit;
- lack of postgraduate courses in international development cooperation;
- weak understanding of who the actors are demanding the development of an international cooperation policy.

Although it is common to hear in global debates a discussion about ‘the Brazilian development model’, most interviewees and participants contested the ideal of a single model and talked about the different ‘Brazils’ that exist side-by-side. This duality, or multiplicity, is characterised by the persistence of poverty and social exclusion, as well as policies and programmes that are based on distinctive development objectives. A good example of possible contradictions or complementarities is seen in agricultural development, in which official engagement promotes both agribusiness and family agriculture (more about this discussion below).

A key issue raised by civil society is their relevance as actors in development and international development cooperation. Many public policies, which are shared by the Brazilian government with other developing countries, are seen as the result of social

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96 Beghin (2012: 58) remarks that ‘the ambivalences and ambiguities of Brazilian engagement... are related to the fact that Brazil is still an emergent country in the international sphere: it knows that it has responsibilities towards others but it does not know how to exert them’.

97 These obstacles are also raised by ABONG (2011), Bava (2011b), Beghin (2012), Masagão et al. (2012), Mello (2011).

98 Luz and Wolff (2011) argue that internationally there is a simplistic and technocratic image of Brazil, and the official discourse often concurs, which suggests that the social problems in the country are effectively solved. However, the authors point to the continuation and even deepening of the structural problems that lead to poverty and social exclusion.

99 Masagão et al. (2012: 1) mention that ‘support of family agriculture and cooperative enterprises coexist with the promotion of mega projects for commodity production, energy and infrastructure, whose social and environmental benefits are rather controversial’.
dynamics and political struggles that had civil society as a key player. Furthermore, Brazilian civil society has developed experience and knowledge that supports the pursuit of alternative development paradigms, which is not being adequately incorporated into the portfolio of official cooperation. This fact and the accumulated experience of engaging with international cooperation, North–South or South–South, would allow civil society to contribute positively to the construction of other forms of cooperation based on solidarity.

Additionally, one issue raised during the civil society dialogues is that although the country continues to use its traditional discourse of historical dispute with the North, the restructuring of the global system is no longer a policy priority. That is, whereas before Brazil was aligned with other developing countries demanding that global governance institutions become more representative and democratic, such as the UN and G8, now that the country is one of the ‘big players’ it seems to be more concerned with establishing its role as such.

A central narrative that is used across the spectrum – government, civil society and private sector from different political affiliations – is the potential uniqueness of the Brazilian international engagement vis-à-vis other donors or companies from other emerging powers. It is emphasised that democratic values and the capacity to establish horizontal relationships and engage in a more flexible way, differentiate Brazilian cooperation and commercial initiatives, allowing its presence to fit better with the realities of partner countries. Nonetheless, civil society is already questioning if this distinction from traditional aid relations is actually true, as will be further discussed below.

A few interviewees observed that this uniqueness narrative is based on aspects of the Brazilian identity intensely discussed by Brazilian literature and talked about on the streets. These include: the ‘little Brazilian way’ (o jeitinho brasileiro) – the tendency to improvise and be flexible, rather than to follow rules and procedures when trying to resolve an issue; the ‘cordiality’, which emphasises the informal and more horizontal character of Brazilians and stresses that they tend to act based on emotions and not rationality; and the ‘miscegenation imaginary’, a multiplicity of domestic realities that allows Brazilians to connect and relate to different cultures.

An initial point raised during the civil society dialogues is that the normative nature of debate regarding SSDC is not just a technical question but also a political issue. The need to promote an inclusive process to define what is understood as South–South cooperation and explore its relationships with other foreign policy strategies is a recurrent civil society demand. SSDC tends to be seen as broader than the traditional aid sphere, and includes issues that civil society and government representatives feel were sidelined by Northern countries as a way to maintain their status quo in global trade and industrial development. Only when there is conceptual clarity, and some level of consensus regarding the definition of South–South cooperation, can a path towards developing a clear policy be outlined.

Although there is a general agreement of the need for an SSDC policy, what these guidelines should look like and the process by which they should be developed remains contested. There is a historical demand for the creation of a foreign policy participatory council, linked to MRE, similar to councils that exist in other policy areas in Brazil. Another mechanism for participation, consultation and dialogue currently proposed is the organisation of a national participatory council.

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100 Campolina (2011) mentions, for instance, the fact that the Zero Hunger programme was influenced by the Campaign for Eradication of Poverty, led by civil society, and that local civil society organisations in the Brazilian cerrado were responsible for constructing cisterns and piloting solutions to deal with drought.

101 Bava (2011a), Masagão (2011) and Luz and Wolff (2011) concur with this argument.

102 These demands are presented in policy papers from key NGOs and social movement networks, see ABONG (2011) and REBRIIP (2011).
conference to discuss relevant issues, ensure citizens are heard and propose ways forward. In order for the various stakeholders to have an informative debate, it is paramount that efforts to improve the accounting of financial flows and access to information are taken seriously by government.

The normative debate is intrinsically linked to what some interviewees named the ‘substantial debate’. That is, why should the country cooperate with others? What kind of development is Brazil trying to promote nationally and internationally? These are essential questions to be discussed in an attempt to elaborate an SSDC policy and improve the country’s practices. A key objective of civil society that emerged during the civil society dialogues was that cooperation should function as a means of consolidating and expanding rights, and deepening democratic practices. Redistributive justice and the responsibility of Brazil, as the world’s sixth-largest economy, to support low-income countries are also seen as justifications for SSDC. These views diverge from more pragmatic perspectives that emphasise the opening of new markets and expansion of diplomatic relations to fulfil foreign policy objectives.

Regarding the geographical engagement of Brazilian SSDC, the civil society dialogues showed divergences regarding the perceived characteristics of the Brazilian presence in Latin America and Africa. On the one hand, one narrative stresses ‘Brazilian imperialism’ in Latin America, which results from the expansion of Brazilian companies on the continent, often financed by public resources through, for instance, BNDES. On the other hand, the presence in Africa is concentrated in a few countries, and mainly experienced through technical cooperation initiatives. Such differences, as stated by dialogue participants, result from factors such as proximity, historical engagement and regional integration policy. Nonetheless, some argue that the only difference between the two is that Africa is ‘the new frontier’ and that the impact of Brazilian companies there is still negligible (especially if compared to Chinese investments). However, civil society organisations that have been researching Brazilian engagement in Africa mentioned that this picture may change drastically in the near future, with the decrease in technical cooperation and expansion of mining and construction companies on the continent.

6.2 Contesting official discourses

Although civil society representatives point out that the expansion of rights and social justice should be the drivers of SSDC, in all three civil society dialogues it was stated that international cooperation is not above the conflicts and interests that exist in society. Thus, interviewees feel that the official discourse of solidarity creates obstacles for an honest dialogue about the interests of different stakeholders, and how these can, or cannot, be accommodated in an international development cooperation/SSDC policy. For some, such discourse is essentially hypocritical, as the driver of many cooperation initiatives is often commercial interest. South–South cooperation projects that focus on the promotion of soya and ethanol abroad were given as examples of cooperation driven by economic interests. Nevertheless, private sector interviewees do not concur with this perspective.

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103 Mello (2012) puts forward experiences and proposals to contribute to the democratisation of foreign policy in Brazil, including the organisation of conferences.
104 This argument is also emphasised by ABONG (2011), Bava (2011b) and Beghin (2012).
105 The discussion about Brazil’s ‘imperialism’ or ‘neocolonialism’ and the key role played by BNDES is unpacked in REBRIP (2010), Garcia (2011) and Beghin (2012).
106 This argument is also explored in Schlesinger (2012).
107 Schlesinger (2012) maps and briefly analyses various different projects, such as ProSavannah in Mozambique, ProRenova, and the Technical Cooperation Agreement with Senegal to support their national biofuel programme.
Box 6.2  Media coverage on Brazil–Africa cooperation

Media coverage on international affairs and on Brazilian foreign policy has been traditionally modest. This reality, however, is changing rapidly. Op-eds on the country’s foreign policy priorities and diplomatic activities are now much more frequent in the main written media (Folha de S. Paulo, Estado de S. Paulo, Valor Econômico and O Globo) than it used to be a few decades ago. In general, critical stances related to the view that Brazil should prioritise its domestic affairs have been complemented by increased interest and a will to improve the quality of media coverage, as Brazil becomes a more active player in the international arena.

Growing media interest on South–South relations in particular has shifted from views that connected them to a partisan/ideological agenda to the recognition, and even criticisms, of its pragmatic character. When analysing Brazilian behaviour in Africa, analysts seem to conclude that government is being pragmatic, while in Latin America the media are often critical of Brazil’s ‘ideological’ engagement.

In the particular case of SSDC, the media have assessed it both as a moral obligation and an opportunity for the country, recognising that behind the solidarity narrative other national interests are at stake (such as the UN Security Council bid, the candidacy of Brazil for high-level leadership posts in international organisations, strengthening commercial ties, etc.). For instance, Brazilian technical cooperation with Africa was explicitly mentioned as having secured the support given by African countries to the election of Roberto Azevedo to the WTO. The idea that cooperation can also serve as a soft power-building strategy was mentioned a couple of times.

Between 2003 and 2013, cooperation between Brazil and Africa became a common topic in the mainstream media, though the content was often superficial, and mentions of ABC were initially rare. The majority of the stories on Brazil–Africa relations were linked to Lula’s presidential agenda – and sometimes even with his own personal agenda. Lula’s frequent (and sometimes considered ‘excessive’) travels to the continent actually helped keep the subject in the media. Articles also tend to find justifications for Brazilian relations with Africa in terms of potential gains. Alternatively, journalists do not seem to need to justify relations with emerging powers, notably IBSA/BRICS countries.

The Brazilian media often present Africa in a paternalistic way. The continent is seen as a homogenous bloc. Images of a messy and catastrophic place, but rich in minerals and opportunities are frequent. Newspapers also reproduce official discourses, though sometimes from a critical stance, frequently putting forward two main narratives: one focusing on Brazil’s responsibility to help Africa’s development; and the other of the commercial gains Brazil can also obtain from those relationships.

Agriculture (including biofuels and food security) and health were the main topics explored, and geographically the PALOP countries were in the spotlight. In the case of Mozambique, cooperation in agriculture and Embrapa’s role were the main subject, while in the case of Angola the role of the private sector was much more emphasised. The media have described the expansion of the private sector in Africa as part of government policy priorities on the continent. BNDES’s support to the internationalisation of Brazilian companies was mentioned a few times, with at first little analysis to support it. However, cooperation agreements made with African governments despite poor democratic and human rights credentials (such as in Congo, Zimbabwe, or Sudan) were more criticised.

Above all, the agenda of international development cooperation is still quite technical to make the news, and the main international events covered by the media are the ones related to the presidential agenda. Having a president like Dilma, considered as low-profile and willing to rule from the backstage rather than in the spotlight, meant losing part of the media coverage on international affairs in general. In the case of Africa, this pattern has actually changed in 2013, when Dilma visited the continent and made some important announcements concerning Brazilian cooperation with Africa, including on debt relief issues, the creation of an African group inside the government, and a proposal to reform ABC (see Box 5.2). Dilma’s announcement of a plan to merge technical cooperation and trade promotion in one single agency has sparked an unusual, and very welcome, policy debate on Brazilian development cooperation and on reforming ABC, besides having fed media interest in ongoing initiatives in the field.

Beyond development cooperation and South–South relations, the hosting of a National Conference on foreign policy (see Box 6.1) and internal changes within MRE have also made the news in 2013. The arrival of the new Foreign Minister, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, has created a momentum for debating foreign policymaking, transparency, citizen participation, and policy priorities. This unprecedented amount of debate on foreign policy can raise the bar for policy debates in the coming years, including the way the media cover Brazil’s development cooperation.
Moreover, many believe that the solidarity discourse is not enough to create a constituency for international development cooperation (IDC) and SSDC in Brazil. As the country still faces many social and economic problems, the government should be able to communicate the tangible benefits that the country and Brazilian society as a whole receive in engaging in SSDC. The current difficulties in articulating these have repercussions for governmental and societal support for SSDC. It was mentioned that only when IDC becomes linked with national debates and struggles would it become truly relevant nationally.\(^{108}\)

The government rhetoric of ‘demand-driven’ cooperation was also questioned. Participants of the civil society dialogues pointed out that it is not known where the demand originated, who elaborated it, or how it was interpreted and directed by the Brazilian government. The role of international organisations mediating the demands was mentioned, as well as the tendency of the government to direct the demands to certain agencies and focus the possible initiatives on specific policies. Regarding the latter, it was stressed that a demand for cooperation in agriculture is often directed to Embrapa, rather than exploring how other policies, such as those that promote family farming or agroecology, could be a better fit for the demand made.\(^{109}\)

Another common discourse is that an advantage of South–South cooperation, and Brazilian SSDC, is the similarity of the stage of development, and the social and economic dynamics, in partner countries. Nonetheless, especially in regard to Brazil’s cooperation with Africa, participants in the civil society dialogues and private sector interviewees emphasised the difficulties of engaging in cooperation due to social, political and cultural disparities. The low capacity of the state, corruption and weak civil society were mentioned as aspects that complicate the sharing, or replication, of Brazilian experiences in African countries. The lack of knowledge of Brazilians engaging in SSDC regarding the particularities of African countries and the lack of clarity about the outcomes of such engagements to ensure ‘mutual benefits’ were also raised as obstacles to horizontal cooperation.

Finally, a key discussion is what SSDC entails. Policy transfer, technological transfer and export of social policies are concepts/terms frequently used regarding Brazilian SSDC. Nevertheless, some question how far these policies are transferable, as they were products of specific social and political processes. Additionally, it was suggested that such terms reproduce North–South dynamics (i.e. trying to replicate blueprints) that have been condemned by the Brazilian government and civil society. Another critique is that such terms do not encompass the idea of bi-directionality, of mutual benefits and interests that are supposedly principles of SSDC. Cooperation and knowledge-sharing would thus be better terms to use.

### 6.3 South–South cooperation strategies

Although there is a certain level of consensus that SSDC cannot be seen as separate from other foreign policy strategies, such as financial and commercial cooperation, there are divergences regarding how far different modalities and strategies are complementary or contradictory to each other. While financial cooperation and internationalisation of companies are seen as being pushed by ‘big capital’ – and in particular mining, infrastructure companies

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\(^{108}\) REBRIP (2011) in its evaluation of Brazilian foreign policy states: ‘we know that this agenda will only become important in the external arena when it becomes important domestically. Therefore we are convinced of the importance of challenging the debates about Brazilian projects, a new energy matrix based on diversification, decentralization and clean sources, a new land and agriculture policy that prioritizes family and peasant agriculture and agroecology, a new rural-urban relationship, where the policies of supply and consumption invest in shortening [the] circuit between production, distribution and consumption; in the public management of water and the accountability of its uses. Brazilian foreign policy still seems not to have understood that these issues, which were previously seen as minor issues, today have become strategic themes’.

\(^{109}\) This argument is also explored in Campolina (2012).
and agribusiness – technical cooperation is seen as multifaceted.\textsuperscript{110} Although it is unclear how far the expansion of technical cooperation to Africa is also supporting the internationalisation of Brazilian companies and the expansion of commercial cooperation, new government initiatives, such as the Nacala Fund and More Food Africa, are pointed to by some as blurring the line between the two. These initiatives are consequently being scrutinised by civil society organisations.\textsuperscript{111}

An overall concern during the civil society dialogues was that SSDC agricultural projects that support large landowners in developing countries may have a negative effect on the poor and vulnerable. The participants were concerned that these strategies were being shared through SSDC and may, as a result, be exporting Brazil’s internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{112}

One of the main problems pointed out by civil society representatives is the lack of transparency and public debate regarding financial cooperation, especially as BNDES loans given to companies consist of taxes paid by citizens.\textsuperscript{113} In order to explore how far these combined strategies lead to partner countries’ inclusive and sustainable development, civil society organisations claim they need to be able to analyse the desired objectives and impact of different cooperation modalities.\textsuperscript{114}

Another important debate concerns regional integration, though the relationship between integration and technical cooperation is still unclear. Integration has been an important foreign policy strategy in Latin America, especially due to initiatives such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Mercosul, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). However, participants of the civil society dialogues raised the issue that this drive has not been accompanied by a public debate regarding the objectives and action of integration, and how it can contribute to a new regional development project.\textsuperscript{115} The rationale tends to be on productive integration and economic outcomes, and civil society representatives declared that BNDES is a key instrument for raising Brazilian influence in the region.\textsuperscript{116} However, the mobilisation of civil society has ensured that social issues have not been dropped from the agenda. These actors stress that their logic of integration is different from that of the government, and emphasise that integration should promote active citizenship, democracy and ‘people’s sovereignty’.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{110} The power of mining and infrastructure companies is discussed in Schlesinger (2012) and Masagão \textit{et al.} (2012), and agribusiness in REBRIP (2010).
\textsuperscript{111} Masagão \textit{et al.} (2012) is an example of where civil society is reflecting on the public–private boundaries of international cooperation.
\textsuperscript{112} This concern is shared by Campolina (2012), REBRIP (2010) and Mello (2011).
\textsuperscript{113} This point is also raised in Mello (2011) and Beghin (2012).
\textsuperscript{114} For demands raised see, for instance, ABONG (2011) and Masagão \textit{et al.} (2012).
\textsuperscript{115} This issue has been also raised by REBRIP (2010).
\textsuperscript{116} For a more detailed discussion, see Beghin (2012).
\end{flushright}
Box 6.3 The academic debate

In Brazil, unlike many Northern countries, the development studies field has not been consolidated. As the country’s international cooperation expands, research on Brazilian cooperation has started gaining visibility within the field of international relations (IR) and beyond. The number of studies produced each year is expanding considerably. With almost nonexistent autonomous higher education programmes on international development cooperation, most of the teaching and research is done inside the IR discipline. IR itself is a fairly new field in Brazil and its undergraduate and graduate programmes marginally touch upon development cooperation as a subject. South–South relations, in general, are becoming a hot topic, but as described by Bruno Ayllón (2006), the country still lacks research on the technical dimension of South–South cooperation.

Nevertheless, research on Brazil in the international development cooperation system can be found in two main hubs. The first hub is composed of government-related knowledge production centres, such as the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the Rio Branco Institute (attached to the MRE and responsible for selecting and training Brazilian diplomats) and the Alexandre Gusmão Foundation. The second one is composed of a range of public and private universities and research institutes in the country. Subjects and approaches can vary a lot. Although the COBRADI provided a push for universities and thinktanks to start developing research in the area, such research will be compromised by the recent veto on public access to updated data (as explained in Section 2). Other difficulties include the poor state of the official documentation available, especially when it comes to Brazil as a donor (Cervo 1994; Lopes 2008; Valler Filho 2007). When it comes to the content of the available data, documentation tends to be very descriptive (type of project, activities and actors) but with little or no technical details (challenges, impacts, risks, etc.) (Cabral and Weinstock 2010). At the same time, few studies published so far carried out fieldwork exploring the actual impact and efficiency of initiatives in recipient countries. These types of studies are crucial to help the country consolidate critical thinking on its engagement in development cooperation (Hirst 2012).

The arrival of new studies coming from anthropology may help to fill some of these data gaps and bring up new empirical sources for the debate. However, the excessive criticism coming from anthropologists seems to be contributing more to undercover power relations than to improving Brazilian cooperation practices. As Brazilian cooperation expands and diversifies, there is also a need to go beyond much-quoted sources and conventional study cases in order to generate new and critical thinking on the matter.

Results of the thesis mapping

In an attempt to capture the current state of the debate inside the academy, exploratory mapping using the data from the Brazilian Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations was made. The research has been limited to Masters’ and PhD theses completed in Brazilian institutions from 2008 to 2012, coming up with a list of approximately 70 works (two thirds of them were Masters theses). Theses have been mainly written in the field of international relations, political science and law. There were almost none from economics and history.

While clustering the research topics, one can find a significant group of sectoral works (notably on health, agriculture, and education issues). Another emerging cluster is the geographical one – with works mainly on Latin America and Portuguese-speaking Africa. There is also growing interest in IBSA relations, but the nature of these works is more on South–South cooperation than on SSDC. There is also another cluster on the policy process, notably on South–South cooperation as a foreign policy instrument. Analyses of policymaking (actors, policy priorities and institutional change) are still rare. Civil society agency in development cooperation was explored more than that of private actors.

As a tendency, an increasing number of works on humanitarian aid were identified, and a greater role was played by the disciplines of anthropology, geosciences and environmental studies. There are still significant gaps in studies on the efficacy/results of Brazilian South–South cooperation and on decision-making processes.

117 Currently, there is only one graduate programme on International Cooperation (Development, Society and International...
7 Conclusion

Due to its recent development path that combined economic growth, social inclusion and democracy, Brazilian policies and experiences have gained unprecedented international attention. Even though Brazil has been engaging as a provider of development cooperation since the 1970s, disbursements scaled up dramatically in the last few years in a context marked by global efforts to achieve the MDGs and by the emergence of South–South cooperation as one of the main pillars of Brazilian foreign policy. However, Brazil’s prominent role has been accompanied by persistent national development challenges and by the lack of an institutional framework that can ensure overall planning, coordination and a sustainable flow of resources.

This study has shown that the principles of horizontality, non-conditionality, being demand-driven, as well as narratives guiding Brazilian engagement in SSDC, can only be understood in the light of: the country’s Southern identity; its traditional foreign policy principles (non-intervention, autonomy, pragmatism, pacifism and universalism); shifting national development models; and Brazil’s dual engagement in development cooperation. On the one hand, its background as a recipient of foreign assistance and its perception of a somewhat disappointing experience with traditional donors, combined with the country’s relatively low dependency on Northern funds, contributed to create and sustain a critical approach towards traditional aid. On the other hand, there is a perception that received cooperation has contributed to fostering human and institutional capacities in key sectors. Some of the agencies that have benefited from foreign assistance — such as Embrapa and Fiocruz — have been engaging actively in development cooperation, and their positive and negative experiences in receiving aid have shaped their actions, and provided them with a network/platform from which to share knowledge. These actors have also started to form national coalitions that can support their engagement in SSDC, though institutional alignment is still a challenge.

As Section 4 pointed out, the lack of information and the non-comparability of data create challenges for a rigorous analysis of the political domestic dynamics regarding technical cooperation, as well as other modalities of development cooperation. Nonetheless, it was still possible to identify some trends, such as the intertwining of different modalities as a central recent shift in Brazilian cooperation, as is the case in the Food Purchase Programme, ProSavanah, and Brazil’s engagement in Haiti. While these arrangements can represent better coordination between modalities and the promotion of holistic approaches, they can also export contradictory development models (a main civil society concern).

The challenge of building a coherent national public SSDC policy is a result of the institutional dispersion of Brazilian development cooperation and of the lack of a regulatory framework. Elements of a public policy, as per discussions in the civil society dialogues,
could include: (1) a definition of the boundaries of South–South cooperation and SSDC policy and practice; (2) a set of coherent laws and a regulatory framework that set out the objectives of such a policy, as well as how it should be evaluated and adopted by different government actors to provide coherence and coordination; (3) the definition of how objectives should be achieved (the instruments of a policy); and (4) mechanisms for participation and accountability of other stakeholders. These points were all raised during the civil society debates as conditions for a public policy.

As Section 5 has demonstrated, decision-making spaces are highly fragmented and informal; thus, findings could not fully capture who defines and/or influences resource allocation. Nevertheless, identifying which institutions and interest groups have been able to access decision-making and how they do it is crucial. One of the main findings of this report is that, although ABC is part of the structure of MRE, the ministry is not the only decision-making actor defining technical cooperation priorities. The influence of traditional donors and of some implementing agencies has been complemented, over the last 15 years, by the increasing influence of the presidency and some ministries, and by the mobilisation of subnational governments, the private sector and CSOs.

Even though decision-making processes are dispersed and fragmented, some hypotheses that may explain the degree of influence in shaping SSDC priorities of different national actors are:

- the degree of a national institution’s internationalisation in terms of participation in international networks and forums, which are important spaces for the diffusion of particular experiences abroad, and thus for the creation of demands;
- the existence of global instruments and international commitments in each particular area and Brazil’s adherence to them;
- the proximity of the national institution to the presidency;
- the ability of the institution to match its engagement in technical cooperation with each administration’s priorities;
- the degree of cohesion inside the institution regarding the necessity and legitimacy of providing technical cooperation;
- the presence of technical cooperation components involving the institution in broader sectoral and national plans.

These findings and hypotheses imply that the profile of Brazilian development cooperation is not solely a result of a technical endeavour (‘champion’ institutions receiving more requests), but increasingly a product of the interplay between the foreign policy agenda and domestic politics. Nevertheless, a comprehensive understanding of how sectoral and geographic priorities vary according to shifting domestic coalitions remains to be constructed.

The tentative mapping of the various actors involved in technical cooperation indicates the complexity of the interests at play, beyond the narrative of being demand-driven. The findings seem to indicate that technical cooperation is not exactly an instrument of a single foreign policy directive developed and led by MRE in isolation from other actors, but its overall direction is the result of forces that compete in the decision-making spaces. Although the domestic politicisation of Brazilian cooperation has promoted increased ownership by national implementing agencies, due to changes in governments, the shifting domestic drivers can compromise the dissemination of lessons learnt, the medium- and long-term engagement of the country in SSDC, and the effectiveness of cooperation efforts in partner countries.

Efforts, such as the two official reports that systematise data on Brazilian development cooperation, are helping to assess the complex puzzle that represents the diversity of Brazilian cooperation and at the same time set the basis for the construction of a national
public policy. The fact that the main features of Brazilian development cooperation provision are still under construction can be seen as an opportunity to reflect on lessons learned by the various agencies involved in development cooperation. It is also an opportunity to engage various stakeholders in the debate and to build a system that is both coherent in its guiding principles and realistic about the challenges imposed by Brazil's national agenda and the tension amongst multiple domestic interests.

However, building consensus over a national public policy will not be a straightforward task. Literature and official discourse endorse the idea that Brazilian technical cooperation can be both altruistic and beneficial to Brazil, contributing to fostering multifaceted relations between partners. Dilma’s speech in Ethiopia announcing the new development cooperation agency and debt relief efforts is an example of this narrative. Mutual gains have been increasingly recognised as crucial to ensuring domestic support. Nonetheless, civil society has raised concerns regarding the blurred boundaries between cooperation activities and trade and investment interests.

Lula’s administration saw, in the gaps opened by shifts in the global economic and political architecture, an opportunity to influence international practices and norms through the projection of the government’s ideals and policies. The priority given to South–South cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy during his administration, as well as growing recognition of the country’s international experiences abroad, led to an unprecedented mobilisation of national actors involved in technical cooperation and in other modalities of development cooperation. The demobilisation of Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation during Dilma’s administration has been seen as a challenge by practitioners and experts, since it imposes discontinuity in initiatives that might compromise development impacts in recipient/partner countries. Nevertheless, it can also be understood as an opportunity for deepened reflections on the new Brazilian position as a development cooperation provider, exploring lessons learnt and the main challenges and opportunities attached to future engagements.

It became clear throughout the research process that there is a growing number of national institutions, businesses, civil society organisations and think tanks directly involved in and/or debating SSDC in Brazil and, thus, there is an opportunity to involve a larger group of stakeholders in the public debate. Moreover, civil society’s demand for an inclusive process to define what is understood as South–South cooperation, to explore relationships with other foreign policy strategies, and to define the objectives of a national development cooperation policy should be seen as a building block for the consolidation of a development cooperation constituency. Recent announcements of a new agency, a White Paper on foreign policy and the creation of a foreign policy council, all point to the fact that the SSDC agenda is at a critical juncture in the country. It is now essential to draw on the recent history and current challenges and opportunities facing Brazil’s SSDC to inform debates and political choices.

### 7.1 Avenues for future research

This report has mainly focused on the ideas, interests and institutions related to Brazilian official technical cooperation with developing countries. It can be furthered expanded and deepened through:

- opening the black box of decision-making concerning financial cooperation and contributions to international organisations;
- understanding Brazilian ‘uniqueness’ through research on ‘structuring projects’ and projects that cannot be categorised through traditional modalities;
- deepening the understanding of civil society engagement in SSDC, including their role as practitioners, as participants of ‘invited spaces’ of policy debate and formulation, and their contribution to Brazilian social development;
- country studies to understand partners’ perceptions and the broader context in which Brazilian cooperation is inserted;
- case studies in order to trace legislative instruments in each modality (since Brazilian legislation is fragmented, case studies would help to track and map instruments);
- systematising information related to the experiences accumulated by traditional donors, as well as by the emerging ones, in terms of designing national policies in international development cooperation, professionalisation, lessons learnt in the field, and how to conciliate international development cooperation with national interests;
- case studies on the sectors that have experienced enhancement in actions in recent years in order to understand particular influences;
- unpacking how Brazil is engaging in dialogue around South–South cooperation with neighbouring countries;
- analysis of the decision-making processes and practices of specific implementing agencies, and comparative studies of these agencies;
- deepening the understanding of factors promoting and hindering the capacity of Brazilian bureaucracy to engage in South–South cooperation, including regional integration initiatives;
- comparative studies that explore Brazil’s policies and practices in relation to other Latin American and emerging countries.
# Annexes

## Annex 1: List of interviews

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation/Function</th>
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<tr>
<td>Adriana Ramos</td>
<td>Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) and member of COFA/Fundo Amazônia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Kleiman</td>
<td>Health Ministry/International Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Claudia Caputo</td>
<td>BNDES/Economist, Internationalisation Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricio Catermol</td>
<td>BNDES/Manager, International Trade Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Júlia Silva Dolato Tundidor</td>
<td>BNDES/Manager, International Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francisco Ohana Pinto de Sant Ana</td>
<td>BNDES/Economist, International Division, Financial and International Affairs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Flávia Barros</td>
<td>Brasília University (UNB)/International Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ary Quintella</td>
<td>SAE/International Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bruno Sadeck</td>
<td>SAF/PR/International Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlos Milani</td>
<td>IESP/Professor, Coordinator LABMUNDO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Celso de Arruda França</td>
<td>MRE/Chief of Division, Financial and Tributary Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luís António Balduino Carneiro</td>
<td>MRE/Chief of Department, Financial and Services Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conselheira Almerinda Carvalho</td>
<td>MRE/Chief of Division, DAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fernando Rossetti</td>
<td>GIFE/Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frederico Lamego</td>
<td>SENAI/Ses/IEL/Executive Director/Uninter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacques Marcovitch</td>
<td>São Paulo University (USP)/Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Julio Baena</td>
<td>MMA/Coordinator for Bilateral and Regional Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kjeld Jakobsen</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luís Henrique D’Andrea</td>
<td>ENAP/Chief of International Cooperation Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marcelo Costa and team (Maria Cristina Sampaio, Carlos Considera)</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the Presidency/International Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcio Correa</td>
<td>ABC/Coordinator of Multilateral Cooperation</td>
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<td>Marcio Porto</td>
<td>Embrapa/Chief of the International Relations Unity (SRI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maria Augusta Montalvão Ferraz</td>
<td>ABC/Coordinator for Latin America, North America and East Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauro Teixeira de Figueiredo</td>
<td>Health Ministry/Chief of Project Division/International Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michelle Morais de Sá e Silva</td>
<td>Human Rights Secretary/Chief of International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milton Rondó</td>
<td>External Relations Ministry/CGFOME Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nathalie Beghin</td>
<td>INESC/Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paulo Barbosa Lima</td>
<td>ABC/Manager for Bilateral Cooperation with PALOPs and East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pedro Veloso</td>
<td>ABC/Coordinator for French-speaking Africa</td>
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<td>Peter Stossel</td>
<td>MDIC/International Advisor</td>
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<td>Ricardo Luís Paixão</td>
<td>Bacen/Chief of International Technical Cooperation (Coope/Derin)</td>
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<td>Roberto Alvarez</td>
<td>ABDI/International Affairs Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tulio Vigevani</td>
<td>UNESP/Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vinícius Lages</td>
<td>SEBRAE/International Relations Unity Manager (UAIN)</td>
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Annex 2: List of participants in the focus groups: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Brasília

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adriana Abdenur</td>
<td>General Coordinator</td>
<td>BRICS Policy Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adriana de Queiroz</td>
<td>Executive Coordinator</td>
<td>CEBRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa</td>
<td>Professor and Researcher</td>
<td>USP e CEBRAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir Clementino Niv</td>
<td>Intern</td>
<td>BRICS Policy Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Flávia Barros</td>
<td>Professor and International Advisor</td>
<td>IREL e UnB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artur H. S. Santos</td>
<td>President of International Cooperation Institute</td>
<td>CUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cândido Grzybowski</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>IBASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Aguilar</td>
<td>BRICSAM-G20 Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlos Roberto Fernandes</td>
<td>Project Coordinator</td>
<td>Viva Rio</td>
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<tr>
<td>Celso Marcondes</td>
<td>Coordinator for Africa</td>
<td>Instituto Lula</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claudia Antunes</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Revista Piaui</td>
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<td>Claudia Hoirisch</td>
<td></td>
<td>Global Health Centre/Fiocruz</td>
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<td>Cleber Guarany</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fundação Getulio Vargas - Projetos</td>
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<td>Denise Lima</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Aldeia-Mundo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edgar Aparecido Moura</td>
<td>Representative of the International Working Group</td>
<td>CONSEA</td>
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<td>Edneia Gonçalves</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<td>Elizário Toledo</td>
<td>Environment Advisor</td>
<td>CONTAG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fátima Mello</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>REBRIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fernanda Nanci</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<td>Filipe Urias Novaes</td>
<td>Intern</td>
<td>BRICS Policy Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georges D. Landau</td>
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<td>Giovana Zoccal</td>
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<td>Jaime Conrado de Oliveira</td>
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<td>Janina Onuki</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joana Amaral</td>
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<td>João Moura da Fonseca</td>
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<td>BRICS Policy Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juana Kweitel</td>
<td>Programmes Director</td>
<td>Conectas Direitos Humanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Júlia Esther Castro França</td>
<td>Executive Coordinator</td>
<td>Processo de Articulação e Diálogo (PAD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luara Lopes</td>
<td>International Advisor</td>
<td>ABONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luciene Burlandy</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>CONSEA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luiz Eduardo Fonseca</td>
<td>International Advisor to Africa</td>
<td>Global Health Centre/Fiocruz</td>
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</table>

(Cont’d.)
## Annex 2: (cont’d.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marcos Antonio Matos</td>
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<td>Fundação Getúlio Vargas – Projetos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maria Ligia Migliorato Saad</td>
<td>International Advisor</td>
<td>Alfasol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melissa Andrade</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Rede de Humanização do Desenvolvimento</td>
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<td>Mila Dezan</td>
<td>SSC projects officer</td>
<td>Campanha Nacional pelo Direito à Educação</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nathalie Beighin</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>INESC</td>
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<td>Paulo Esteves</td>
<td>Science and Technology And Technical Cooperation Coordinator</td>
<td>BRICS Policy Centre</td>
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<td>Paulo Speller</td>
<td>Dean</td>
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<td>Renata Boulos</td>
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<td>INCIDE</td>
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<td>Renata Reis</td>
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<td>Doctors without Borders (MSF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rosângela Cordeiro</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Movimento de Mulheres Camponesas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvio Caccia Bava</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Le Monde Diplomatique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: Historical series of total DAC countries aid (ODA) disbursements to Brazil

Annex 4: Historical series of Brazilian received ODA by sector (in US$ millions)

**Donor:** DAC Countries, Total  
**Recipient:** Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000: Bilateral ODA Commitments by Purpose (CRS)</td>
<td>266.30</td>
<td>252.22</td>
<td>323.14</td>
<td>345.58</td>
<td>568.86</td>
<td>976.52</td>
<td>1,013.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>100: Social Infrastructure and Services</td>
<td>128.48</td>
<td>162.54</td>
<td>147.35</td>
<td>182.71</td>
<td>219.94</td>
<td>417.52</td>
<td>562.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110: Education</td>
<td>34.15</td>
<td>63.29</td>
<td>71.97</td>
<td>79.21</td>
<td>96.31</td>
<td>98.92</td>
<td>98.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140: Water Supply and Sanitation</td>
<td>20.78</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>243.95</td>
<td>381.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>200: Economic Infrastructure and Services</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>11.47</td>
<td>28.25</td>
<td>171.34</td>
<td>157.74</td>
<td>33.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215: Transport and Communications</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230: Energy</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>22.56</td>
<td>153.48</td>
<td>87.39</td>
<td>10.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300: Production Sectors</td>
<td>22.35</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>92.51</td>
<td>29.27</td>
<td>78.85</td>
<td>272.15</td>
<td>250.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>15.67</td>
<td>86.62</td>
<td>23.89</td>
<td>72.14</td>
<td>231.56</td>
<td>245.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320: Industry, Mining and Construction</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>39.67</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330: Trade and Tourism</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>400: Multisector</td>
<td>91.14</td>
<td>44.15</td>
<td>52.25</td>
<td>81.78</td>
<td>78.02</td>
<td>115.58</td>
<td>154.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>500: Programme Assistance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520: Food Aid</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600: Action Relating To Debt</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700: Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex 5: The Brazilian framework in international technical cooperation in decrees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decree (number/year)</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28.799/1950</td>
<td>Establishment of the National Commission on Technical Assistance (CNAT), presided over by the MRE and composed of 11 members named by the president. The CNAT was responsible for raising, receiving and coordinating demands from Brazilian institutions for technical cooperation from developed countries and the United Nations. It was regulated by Decree no.34.763/1953 and restructured by Decree no.54.251/1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.660/1959</td>
<td>Establishment of the Technical Office of Coordination for Point IV’s Administrative Projects, composed of a Council of Coordinators directed by the Brazilian Representative for the Point IV Programme. Its actions covered five sectors: health, education, agriculture, diverse issues and general administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56.979/1965</td>
<td>Establishment of the Council for Technical Cooperation of the Alliance for Progress (CONTAP), presided over by the Minister of Planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.476/1969</td>
<td>Extinction of previous organs and creation of Sub-Secretariat for International Economic and Technical Cooperation (SUBIN/Minitry of Planning) and the Division of Technical Cooperation (DCP/MRE). While the Ministry of Planning was responsible for the establishment of the domestic policy for technical cooperation and for coordinating its execution, MRE was responsible for the design of the technical cooperation foreign policy, negotiating its instruments and forwarding national demands to international organisations and cooperation agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94.973/1987</td>
<td>Extinction of previous organs and creation of the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (ABC) under the Alexandre Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG/MRE), with financial autonomy. ABC’s responsibilities were to: collect resources for the Special Technical Cooperation Fund (FUNEC) in Brazil and abroad; co-finance initiatives; and support cooperation initiatives with financial resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.070/1996</td>
<td>Extinction of FUNEC, delinking of ABC from FUNAG and submission of ABC to MRE’s General Secretariat for External Relations. ABC is entitled to coordinate, negotiate, follow and evaluate received and provided cooperation, as well as to administer national and international financial resources that are allocated to the activities coordinated by the agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.032/2004</td>
<td>ABC is integrated with the General Sub-Secretariat of Cooperation and Brazilian Communities Abroad, which also included Trade and Cultural Promotion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.979/2006</td>
<td>ABC is integrated into the General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation and Trade Promotion, renamed General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation, Culture and Trade Promotion in 2010.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Puente (2010) and legislation consultation on the Sub-Chief for Juridical Issues’ online database.
**Annex 6: Tentative list of decision-making and deliberative spaces related to Brazil’s provision of international development cooperation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of decision-making space, institutional location and specific legislation</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Presidency and membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Export Financing and Guarantee Committee (COFIG) Chamber of Foreign Commerce (CAMEX/MDIC) Decree 4.993/2004&lt;sup&gt;121&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>- Frame and follow the operations of the Export Financing Programme (PROEX) and of the Export Guarantee Fund (FGE); - Establish the parameters and conditions to the Union’s concession of financial assistance to Brazilian exports and of guarantees to operations related to the exports’ credit insurance; - Guide the Union’s intervention in the Fund of Financing to Exports (FFEX).</td>
<td>- Executive Secretary of the Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, who will preside over COFIG; - Representative of the Ministry of Finance, who will be COFIG’s Executive Secretary; - Ministry of External Relations; - Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply; - Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management; - Staff of the presidency; - Secretary of the National Treasury/Ministry of Finance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee of Evaluation of Overseas Credit (COMACE) Ministry of Finance Decree 2.297/1997&lt;sup&gt;122&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>- Define the parameters and analyse alternative modalities to the renegotiation of Brazilian credits; - Analyse country risk; - Establish criteria for the concession of new credit lines; - Point out limits of exposition by country; - Point out limits to the contingent obligations of the National Treasury in export credit guarantees and insurance.</td>
<td>- Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, who will preside over COMACE; - International Affairs Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, who will be COMACE’s Executive Secretary; - International Affairs Secretary of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management; - General-Subsecretary of Integration, Economic and Foreign Trade Affairs/Ministry of External Relations; - Secretary of the National Treasury/Ministry of Finance; - Secretary of Foreign Trade/Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade; - Prosecutor-General/National Treasury; - Director of International Affairs/Central Bank; - Director of International Area/Banco do Brasil; - Director of National and International Operations/Institute of Reinsurance Institute.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>122</sup> See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/d2297.htm.
### Annex 6: (cont’d.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of decision-making space, institutional location and specific legislation</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Presidency and membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| National Committee for Refugees (CONARE) Ministry of Justice Law 9.474/1997<sup>123</sup> Decree 3.768/2001<sup>124</sup> | - Analyse and grant, at first instance, requests for refugee status received by the Brazilian government;  
- Decide the termination, at first instance, ex officio or by requiring competent authorities, of refugee status;  
- Determine the cancellation, at first instance, of refugee status;  
- Guide and coordinate the actions needed to provide effective protection, assistance and juridical support to refugees;  
- Approve normative instructions clarifying the execution of Law 9.474. | The Ministry of Justice is responsible for designating CONARE’s members, which must include one representative of:  
- the Ministry of Justice, who will preside over CONARE;  
- the Ministry of External Relations;  
- the Ministry of Labour;  
- the Ministry of Health;  
- the Ministry of Education and Sports;  
- the Department of the Federal Police;  
- one non-governmental organisation that is involved in activities of assistance and protection to refugees in Brazil. |
| Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI) Decree of 21 June, 2006<sup>125</sup> | - Coordinate Brazilian efforts in international humanitarian assistance;  
- Formulate draft bill’s proposals to authorise international humanitarian actions undertaken by Brazil. | - Staff of the presidency;  
- the Ministry of External Relations, which will coordinate GTI-AHI;  
- the Ministry of Defence;  
- the Ministry of Justice;  
- the Ministry of Financing;  
- the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply;  
- the Ministry of Health;  
- the Ministry of National Integration;  
- the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger;  
- the Presidency’s General Secretariat;  
- the Presidency’s Staff of Institutional Security;  
- the Ministry of Education;  
- the Ministry of Agrarian Development;  
- the Ministry of Communications;  
- the Presidency’s Special Secretariat of Human Rights. |

Source: Based on legislation consultation on the Sub-Chief for Juridical Issues’ online database.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9474.htm.<br>
<sup>124</sup> See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3768.htm.<br>
<sup>125</sup> See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2006/Dnn/Dnn10864.htm.<br>
Annex 7: Further details on the geographical allocation of Brazil’s development cooperation

Analysis of disbursements made only by the ABC shows that Africa has historically been the main destination for technical cooperation spending, as Figure A7.1 shows. This finding contrasts with COBRADI’s data on official technical cooperation, in which Latin American and Caribbean countries appear as the main destination of disbursements made between 2005 and 2009.

Figure A7.1 ABC total disbursements by region (1995–2005 and 2006–2010)\textsuperscript{127}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure_a7_1.png}
\caption{ABC total disbursements by region (1995–2005 and 2006–2010)\textsuperscript{127}}
\end{figure}

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Puente (2010) and Barbosa (2011).

In October 2012, the director of ABC, Fernando José Marroni de Abreu, presented a three-year budget framework for ABC. This marked a shift in ABC’s geographic priorities, giving greater priority to Latin America and the Caribbean. The plan announced by Abreu for 2012–2015 was for ABC spending to be distributed as follows: US$40 million for Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly for one-off initiatives; US$36 million for Africa, with priority given to ‘structuring’ projects and a focus on Portuguese-speaking countries; and US$4.5 million for Asia, Oceania and the Middle East (Abreu 2012).

During fieldwork for this study, interviewees engaged in official Brazilian technical cooperation were asked about which regions they thought should receive priority. While some stated that greater interdependence among Brazil and its neighbours would require an intra-regional focus, others stated that the growing presence of other powers in Africa, especially China, would push Brazil to prioritise the African continent. There was a consensus, however, that initiatives with other South American countries were proving more

\textsuperscript{127} Puente (2010) analyses the first period (1995–2005), while Barbosa (2011) the second one. Barbosa has included Eastern Europe along with Asia, the Middle East and Oceania, while Puente has not.
effective than initiatives targeting sub-Saharan African countries. One suggested reason was that South American institutions are stronger and therefore more able to absorb technical cooperation.

Disaggregating data by destination country, out of the 11 ‘key countries’ identified by the Brazilian presidency as benefiting from technical cooperation (see Table A7.1 below), six are Portuguese-speaking countries (Mozambique, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola), and four are in ‘fragile situations’ (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and East Timor). In the particular cases of East Timor and Haiti, Brazil’s involvement in peace missions in both countries has been accompanied by strong engagement in technical cooperation. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, besides being part of the CPLP, development cooperation might reflect the fact that Brazil was chosen to head the Configuration of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission for the country in 2007. Finally, in the cases of Paraguay and Uruguay, the relevance of Brazilian technical cooperation may be related to the emphasis given to regional integration under Mercosul. There is, however, a lack of evidence establishing the exact role played by technical cooperation in all of these cases.

Table A7.1 Key recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation (2005–2010/July)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ABC spending (in US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4,007,276.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>3,849,373.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>3,663,076.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>3,328,468.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>2,485,591.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1,891,868.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1,617,114.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>1,773,788.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,208,871.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>828,201.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>735,181.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on PR (2011).

This list of ‘key countries’ benefiting from Brazilian technical cooperation matches regional geographic priorities established by ABC. However, when identifying priority countries and regions, it is important to cross-reference data on budgetary allocation with data on the number of actions (projects and isolated activities). As Puente (2010) states, Brazilian technical cooperation activities with Africa and Asia are more expensive because of higher operational costs and because of the existence of more ambitious projects in both regions. The lack of systematic public data on the costs of each action, however, makes it difficult to

128 The World Bank classifies Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and East Timor as states in ‘fragile situations’, being those ‘countries facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict’.

129 A press release from MRE stated: ‘[I]n coordinating the PBC work on Guinea-Bissau, Brazil will seek to ensure that the Commission offers effective aid to the political reconciliation and economic consolidation processes in Guinea-Bissau, with a focus on actions aiming at development and peacekeeping. Brazil will thus intensify its contribution to the development of Guinea-Bissau, a nation to which it is connected by historical political and cultural bonds. Brazilian support has also been provided through bilateral cooperation (in the areas of health, professional training, agriculture, reform of the security sectors, public administration and electoral assistance), as well as through contributions in partnership with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and the IBSA Fund – a mechanism which brings together India, Brazil and South Africa in South–South Cooperation projects’ (MRE 2007b).
arrive at a more accurate account of the geographic priorities of Brazilian technical cooperation.

The most recent data on the number of bilateral actions per region in 2012 shows that Central American and Caribbean countries and Mexico hosted 231 actions (169 projects and 62 activities); followed by South American countries, with 218 actions (187 projects and 31 activities); African countries, with 145 actions (110 projects and 35 activities); and Asia, Oceania and the Middle East, with 25 actions (12 projects and 13 activities).\(^{130}\)

**Figure A7.2  Number of projects per region, 1995–2012**

Analyising the figures for projects and activities by country shows us that in 2012, Peru ranked first, followed by El Salvador, Haiti and Cuba, as shown in Table A7.2.

With the exception of Mozambique, Portuguese-speaking countries do not figure among the countries with the highest number of projects in 2012. South American, Central American and Caribbean countries dominate the list. While Cuba, Haiti and Paraguay appear in both the list of ‘key countries’ and the list of those with the largest number of actions, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Suriname, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic are not among the largest recipients of technical cooperation spending.

This means that, while Africa receives the largest share of ABC’s budgetary allocation, Latin American and Caribbean countries lead in terms of the number of projects and initiatives. The diplomat Carlos Puente came to a similar conclusion when he analysed data for 1995–2005. While Portuguese-speaking countries, including East Timor, absorbed 70 per cent of ABC’s budget, Latin America and the Caribbean appear as the main destinations for actions (67 per cent).

\(^{130}\) Abreu (2012) does not clarify if the list refers only to ongoing actions or if it also includes those that have been completed. The data are said to refer to 2012, though the presentation was given in October that year. In the case of Central America, data related to regional actions with CARICOM (30 initiatives) were also presented; in data related to the Americas there are an additional 14 regional actions (one project and 13 initiatives) and 167 initiatives in the defence sector. The data presented here only cover bilateral initiatives (thus excluding regional ones) and also exclude the initiatives in defence, because the distribution of the latter actions by country and specific region was not provided.
Table A7.2 Number of projects and activities by country (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Number of activities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Abreu (2012).

What is curious about historical trends and even current patterns in the geographic allocation of Brazilian actions in technical cooperation is that they do not necessarily reflect Brazilian traditional foreign policy priorities in South–South relations. While South America, and particularly Mercosur, are usually presented in diplomatic discourse as the main priority, neither Paraguay nor Uruguay figure as the top recipients in terms of actions or budgetary allocation. Argentina does not figure at all in either list. However, as we saw in Section 4.3, Mercosur is the main destination for Brazilian contributions to international organisations.

Portuguese-speaking countries also occupy an important place in Brazilian diplomatic discourse, particularly after the launch of the CPLP in 1996. In Africa, they are indeed the main recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation in terms of total actions (Cabral 2011), as well as in terms of budgetary allocation (Cabral and Weinstock 2010). However, since 2001 Brazilian technical cooperation with non-Portuguese-speaking African countries has increased (Puente 2010).

Why do Central American and Caribbean countries figure at the top of the list of recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation in terms of actions? The reasons are perhaps clearer in the case of Haiti, which overtook Cuba as the main destination for Brazilian technical cooperation with the region in 2004, driven by Brazil assuming leadership of the UN mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, in 2004, as well as in the case of Cuba, a country with which Brazil has been strengthening relations since the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration.131

The fact that Guatemala occupies sixth place in the list of ‘key countries’ benefiting from ABC’s budgetary allocation (2003–July 2010), while El Salvador and the Dominican Republic occupy, respectively, second and ninth place in number of actions (Abreu 2012), makes it clear that the distribution of ABC’s budget and number of actions does not necessarily converge with Brazilian geographic diplomatic priorities. The most likely driver for this disconnect is ABC’s ‘demand-driven logic’, which includes a tendency for countries that made ‘good use’ of received cooperation from Brazil in the past to continue to receive positive responses from ABC to their demands (Barbosa 2011; Puente 2010). The capacity of the recipient country to cover part of the costs of these actions may also be an important driver in the selection of requests. In both cases, there is a clear convergence with specific

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131 According to Puente, Cuba was the main recipient between 1995 and 2004 due to Brazilian commitments to support the Cuban Special Programme for Economic Recovery.
guidance that the ABC has adopted since 2004: to prioritise projects with greater multiplication effects, greater impact and more effective engagement of partner institutions.
### Annex 8: Sectoral allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation by region, 2005–2012 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>North, South and Central America</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia, Oceania, Europe and the Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training and education</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social development</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public security</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban development</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil defence</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on Abreu (2012).*
Annex 9: Transcript of the announcement of the new ABC by President Dilma

Addis Ababa, 25 May 2013

For us, the relationship with the African continent is very important. As they say here, you know, we also consider that there is an African renaissance in recent years, I would say even, in the last decade. This African renaissance is responsible for significant growth rates in Africa, including, reviews of the IMF show that among the countries that will grow, are African countries. We have had an intense relationship with African countries, both in the bilateral relationship as the bi-regional relationship. This applies to relationships that we have established between Africa and Latin America, between the African Union and Mercosul. But above all, I believe that, here in Africa, we have had a strong commitment to expand our cultural, commercial and investment relations. Many Brazilian companies invest here in Africa, and also increases our business relationship. To make possible and to make this relationship more fluid, including Brazil, which had a number of debts with African countries, who were debtors of Brazil since the 70s and 80s, we came systematically solving this problem for a more effective relationship. That is why we have sent debt forgiveness, not full the full debt, but part of the debt. We have forgiven the debt of nine countries and forward three more. Nine are now, I would say, the complete process, some of them being submitted to the Senate, and three are nearing completion. This is very important so that we can indeed establish new standard of relationship at this time, that is, the twenty-first century, and not be charging so much debt that we and they consider, actually, passed. Also, today I’m here to announce two major instruments so that we can expand relations with Africa. One of them, Brazil will create... We have an agency, called ABC, but this agency is a department of the Foreign Ministry, in fact. All major countries have international trade agencies. We will create an international trading agency for Africa and Latin America. It is a funding agency, but also a commercial agency, it is also an agency to enable investments. In short, it is an agency that has a very large scope. This agency aims to create a mechanism through which the initiatives that Brazil takes do not have to go through other multilateral bodies. You can even do in partnership with the UN, but often our actions in Africa are performed by one of these international agencies, and not by us directly, even though they are our resources. Hence the reason for this agency cooperation, trade and investment with African countries. Further concern is to enable adequate funding. There is no one in the world who expands their trade relations without supplier credits. And those who are selling [right?], ensure the buyer, which is another key element of this relationship. We... I believe we just had a very intense process of expanding both the Brazilian private investment here in Africa, with Embrapa, with bus production companies, and even large contractors, as well as those companies that set forth, for example, to ensure construction material, as explained to me in a meeting earlier today. Anyway... it all has to set a framework for expansion of investment. And we are very grateful to African countries because we believe that for the election of our representative at the WTO we had a great support. I do not know how much, but we have a review of a great support from these countries. I had four bilateral meetings: with Guinea, with Gabon, Kenya and Congo Brazzaville. I could not do more because we had no time, despite having several countries asking us for schedule, which shows that we also have a relationship, I think so, seen by Africans as qualitatively adequate. A relationship that we call South–South, in which you see mutual benefits, and no relation of superiority, or that uses business relationship for other purposes. So, I also believe that this aspect, of being extremely friendly, in the Brazilian relationship, is very important. Now one thing is true. We are the largest country of the African descent of the African Diaspora. We admittedly have half our population of African descent. Also why we have common roots. A very important vein in the formation of our nationality, it has a strong root in diverse culture, too, because Africa is not a single, but diverse culture here in this region of the world. That's basically it.

Source: www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=d7IPg39k2XE
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