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LAND RESETTLEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT

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The purpose of this article is to give preliminary consideration to the program of African resettlement in the Kenya Highlands against the background of political developments and the agrarian revolution of the past fifteen years and in the context of the present emphasis on development in rural areas. The outline of the article is as follows: part 1, the political and economic background to resettlement; part 2, the establishment of the program; part 3, some theoretical problems involved in the relationship of settlement to rural development.

I

Land policy in Kenya throughout the century has been a key factor in both the political development and the agricultural development of the country. Throughout these years there has been a changing and not altogether satisfactory relationship between these three important facts of the over-all progress of the country. Prior to about 1955 and the beginning of land consolidation, land policy was an expression of the political and social relationship existing between Africans in the reserves, European settlers in the highlands, and the colonial administration. As such land policy was an independent variable in the agricultural development of Kenya, and especially in the rural African sector of the economy. The definition of tribal and racial land units represented the desires of the European community to be dealt with by government as a separate political and social community: it was also in keeping with the administration's policy of keeping tribal and racial communities in defined spheres of influence in rural areas for the purposes of maintaining security and protecting tribal communities from one another. At the same time,
the administration when faced with the question of whether to attempt to define land tenure rules in the Kikuyu land unit in 1929 refused to interfere with the existing patterns of land tenure against the objection that the breakdown of the traditional system was a threat to the social order in the land unit, on the grounds that it would be difficult to impose land tenure rules in a situation where traditional land tenure was in fact rapidly changing. These factors meant that agricultural development in the African sectors had to take place within the context of a land policy designed to effect racial and tribal separation rather than to assist agricultural development.

In 1955 Kenya witnessed the first of two revolutions in land policy, the land consolidation primarily in the Kikuyu land unit. This reform was undertaken because it was politically feasible to do so while so many of the Kikuyu political leaders were absent in the forests or in detention, and because it was considered to be a vital pre-requisite to expanded agricultural development. Although land consolidation was, therefore, undertaken with agricultural considerations partly in mind, the revolution in land policy was not designed to be part of a corresponding political advance. Land consolidation was designed, in a political sense, not only to strengthen the loyalty of the Kikuyu against Mau Mau, but to create a stable middle class in the rural areas which would see in their economic gains from consolidation an alternative to recovering the "white highlands" from the Europeans. The program may therefore be seen as intended to further agricultural development while essentially reinforcing the political status quo.

The second revolution in land policy has been the decolonization and resettlement of the former "white highlands." In a sense the demise of the highlands was foreshadowed in the fifties with the excision of certain "sore thumb" areas on the borders of the highlands and their return to the native land unit. Among these were the Kaimosi and Kipkarren salients in Nandi country and the Ithanga area in Kikuyu. These excisions were made because the areas bordered on the tribal reserve, and for one reason or another
were not in use, and/or because the tribe concerned had a valid claim to the areas. The significance of these transfers is twofold. One, they foreshadowed future resettlement policy in parceling out the highlands on the basis of tribal spheres of influence. Two, it was thought that by making these adjustments it would be possible partially to siphon off African discontent with the European presence in the highlands.

The first important step toward resettlement came in 1960, when the legal basis for breaching the racial barriers, African ownership of land in the highlands, was established. Four years earlier the East African Royal Commission had recommended the demise of racial and tribal land barriers in the interests of economic efficiency and development. The then Governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, in his reply stated that while accepting the desirability of the recommendations, it was still too early to consider their implementation. In the meantime, however, land consolidation was proceeding apace and within two years of the Commission Report was completed in Kiambu district. It became the policy to finalize consolidation with the issuance and registration of freehold title, the legal basis for which was established in 1959. Simultaneously some leading official and unofficial members of Parliament had come to think that with the issuance of freehold title to Africans, the time had come to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on racial land barriers. This would be consistent with the policy of multi-racialism which the colonial administration and more liberal minded European leaders supported, while at the same time the agricultural economy of the country would benefit if steps could be taken toward putting land tenure on a common basis throughout the country. Here was an instance, therefore, where land policy reflected a congruence between policy in the agricultural and political arenas.

The bill legally opening the scheduled areas to African land owners, while reflecting the principles of the policy of multi-racialism, also reflected its weaknesses. Leading exponents of the policy were in some cases not only ministers in the government but retained constituencies as elected members also. As a result multi-racialism, while seeking to integrate
Africans in the political sphere, had to be adjusted to take some account of right wing European opinion in order that its major spokesmen could retain their political positions. The inconsistencies which thereby came about were reflected in the land policy which sought to integrate the highlands. Holders in the scheduled areas were given a five year option to convert from longlease to freehold rather than being required to make a prompt choice, thereby frustrating the attempt to put land tenure on a common basis as a price for ministering to early signs of panic in the European community. Further, the land control boards set up to guide the process of land transfer between scheduled and non-scheduled areas was the product of conflicting ideas. Agriculturalists saw in it a method of insuring that racial integration of the highlands was not carried out at the expense of the agricultural economy. More liberal minded European leaders had a similar view, while the right wing Europeans hoped that the land control machinery had been made sufficiently bureaucratic to prevent much use being made of it. Finally, opening the highlands could only be of interest to those few Africans who possessed the experience and the capital to buy and operate large farms in the highlands.

Parliamentary debate on this bill did not take place, however, until several months after the 1960 Lancaster House Conference had set Kenya on the road to independence. It was therefore considered in tandem with the first resettlement programs which later became part of the million acre scheme. The first program of resettlement outlined by Mr. McKenzie consisted of a yeoman scheme and a peasant scheme which combined were to transfer 180,000 acres of European land to African ownership. The latter involved placing 6000 families on holdings which would be sufficient in acreage to earn each family a net income of 100 pounds a year after fulfilling loan obligations and subsistence needs. The Yeomen scheme was to place about 1800 families on holdings designed to net a yearly income of 250 pounds. All this was to be at a cost of 7.5 million pounds, of which the land purchase costs were met partly by grant and partly by loan from the British Government while development costs were met by loan from the Commonwealth Development

1Strictly speaking, the Yeomen and peasant programs stood outside the million acre scheme. In popular parlance “million-acre scheme” often includes these earlier schemes.
Corporation and the World Bank. The Yeoman schemes were for farmers who could produce substantial capital and who had had the benefit of previous farming experience, while the peasant schemes were to provide for people without capital who had been farming at subsistence level. These schemes were later merged into what has been called the "low density schemes." In addition to government-run schemes, McKenzie outlined three other methods of dealing with the need to open the highlands to Africans. These were assistance from the Land Bank, private and commercial schemes similar to the government's Yeoman scheme, and finally the assisted owner scheme on the model of those previously established for European settlers by the former European Agricultural Settlement Board. These schemes were to be privately financed and approved by government.

The new settlement schemes program, like the bill ending highlands racial barriers, was a reflection in land policy of the political principles of multi-racialism. Land was chosen, not on the basis of tribal spheres of influence, but on the basis of there being a willing buyer so that African farmers would be scattered throughout the highlands. Land was to be selected, where possible, that was both high potential and underdeveloped in order to hold the price down but, more important, to maximize the development potential of the settlement plots on the farms. Some settlers were to be selected on the basis of their capital and experience, and the rest were expected to change from subsistence to profitable cash crop farming on economic plots. All this was meant to harmonize political principles of racial integration with agricultural development desiderata within the framework of land policy. But because of this connection between land policy and political principles, the settlement schemes, like the land legislation, bore witness to the weakness of multi-racialism. In the first place, despite the size of the landless and unemployed population in the rural areas, only a limited number of people could be affected by the schemes. A second weakness was that although it was a policy designed to meet in part the land claims of African nationalism, these were schemes run for the Africans rather than by them. Like the political policy of
multi-racialism, the resettlement program was seen by right wing European political opinion as a betrayal of British obligations to the European settlers because of the size of the program; and by African leaders it was seen as a somewhat Machiavellian maneuver to take the steam out of their nationalist aims and ambitions because it was seen as European and administration inspired.

Within a year of the announcement of this program in the Legislative Council, the inadequacy of what was to be called the low density scheme became apparent. The existing schemes assumed that a very large number of European farmers would remain in the country and help maintain the general level of confidence. This turned out to be a false assumption. Their confidence was not assuaged by the African leaders' suspicion of a program run without their collaboration but for which they would nevertheless become responsible. Furthermore, partly as a result of the decline in confidence, the token program for resettling subsistence level farmers proved grossly inadequate to deal with the problems of landlessness and unemployment in the African areas. In mid 1961, a "New Scheme" designed to double the number of landless families to be settled from 6,000 to 12,000 was announced involving the transfer of a further 170,000 acres to African hands. The decline in confidence in the European community is suggested by the fact that on the "New Scheme" the retiring farmer was to receive payment of the whole sum in one lump rather than fifty per cent down and the remainder in a series of installments. At the same time the plot sizes and target incomes were considerably lowered. This program, however, but a preliminary to the million acre scheme announced in July 1962 which was to absorb the "New Scheme". The million acre scheme was a response to further decline in confidence, increased unemployment and landlessness, sharp decline in new development, and the near absence of a market in farm land, all of which had become apparent by the time of the second Lancaster House Conference in 1962. A further important feature was the fact that European farmers could not during this period extract a satisfactory statement (to them) from African leaders guaranteeing property rights after independence, which if legitimate is not surprising since African leaders were being asked in
effect to express confidence in a land program in which they had little part to play while selling out the long and deeply felt claims of their followers.

While the publicly run schemes were being vastly expanded, not only by the million acre scheme but by separate programs for purchasing a number of farms on compassionate grounds and for the purchase of the Ol Kalou salient, the private and semi-privately financed schemes received less emphasis. The Assisted Owner scheme was curtailed and the expense absorbed in the million acre scheme since it was found to be inconsistent with the Loan Agreement between the Kenya government and the CDC and IBRD. The private schemes made a limited impact on the scene in part because the ones sponsored demonstrated an ill-concealed attempt by retiring settlers to make money out of resettlement while prolonging the actual final transfer of land to the new African settlers. Even the low density schemes were slowed down because of prolonged differences between the government and the banks when the latter found the terms of the Agreement too difficult to meet. The government therefore adopted the strategy of going ahead with the schemes as best they could, seeking the banks' approval after the fact. For their part the banks were taken aback by the announcement of the vastly larger million acre scheme and feared for the integrity of their scheme in competition with it.

The million acre scheme marked the exit from center stage of schemes designed to realize multi-racial political principles and agricultural development standards simultaneously. From this point on, a new set of considerations were uppermost. Although much of the land taken over for the schemes was high potential, much of it was also well developed so that the development potential of settlement, even had the farms not been subdivided, would have been small. It was no longer practicable for administrative reasons to wait until a group of farmers decided to sell, so the principle of scattering African farmers throughout the highlands gave way to defined settlement areas which were to be parcelled out.
over a five year period in accordance with tribal spheres of influence. Plot holders on the "high density scheme" (as the million acre scheme came to be known) for the most part were expected to make between 25 and 40 pounds by comparison to the larger budgets of the earlier schemes. 

Agricultural development took second place to the relief of landlessness, and the recognition of tribal spheres of influence replaced the philosophy of racial integration. Finally, the scheme reflected to an increased degree the decreased European confidence in their future in the country.

The million acre scheme to a large extent reflected the self-fulfilling prophecy of economic doom voiced loudly and persistently by settler opinion after Lancaster House. The economic decline in fact helped to strengthen the economic justification of African nationalist claims to the "white highlands." This makes it appear that resettlement was in the common interests of both European settlers and African nationalism. But this does not take account of the fact that resettlement was still being run by a coalition government of Europeans and Africans which had a majority in Parliament only with the assistance of nominated members appointed by the Governor. The largest African party in Legco, and the one which appeared to have the support of majority of the electorate was excluded not only from government but from a major role in the administration of the schemes.

In the eyes of KANU supporters, and others, the schemes therefore appeared to be an insurance policy against the transfer of power. This view is strengthened by the importance in the government coalition of a party representing tribes who feared the encroachment of Kikuyu when the political protection of the colonial government and the geographical protection of the European farms was removed. To some extent the special programs appended to the million acre scheme lent additional support to this allegation, for the compassionate case purchases were designed purely for the relief of Europeans who, because of infirmity or residence on isolated farms outside settlement areas, were in a difficult security position. To some extent the decision to award each tribe some settlement schemes was in response to the hardening of tribal feeling which increased just before independence.
The perception by KANU that the million acre resettlement program was an insurance policy against African nationalism and the transfer of power helps to explain KANU's abandonment as independence neared of a major and longstanding plan of African nationalism in Kenya: the restitution of the highlands to African hands. Even in 1960, when KANU had been no more than formed, some of its leaders were saying in Legco that it was pompous nonsense for European settlers to support their demands by claiming that the highlands was the sine qua non of the Kenya economy. This together with the fact that the majority ethnic group in KANU benefitted first and to the largest extent, prepared the way for the live-and-let-live policy toward remaining European farmers after independence and for the emphasis of KANU on the former African areas. The last policy was already clear in the KANU Manifesto of 1963. The pre-independence distrust of policy in the highlands was compatible with what appears to be a lesser strain in KANU's policy: opposing settlement on the grounds that land would be free later. Since independence, these differences concerning settlement appear to be a source of disagreement between national and local party leaders who were more influenced by free land thinking.

This brief resume of the political History of settlement suggests that resettlement was an insurance policy against the transfer of power; that KANU in response de-emphasized both settlement schemes in particular and the scheduled areas where they were placed, concentrating instead on the former African areas. The de-emphasis of settlement, however, has posed difficult problems for the post-independence strategy of development adopted by the KANU government.

III

Since independence, land resettlement has become an Achilles heel of rural development. The government has sought to de-emphasize land transfer in favour of land development on the economic grounds that it is the latter which results in economic expansion. For similar reasons, it has switched the emphasis from the former scheduled areas to the former African areas in the knowledge that the largest areas of high potential developable land is in
these areas. Thus the government party has found economic development grounds for supporting the political strategy adopted during the pre-independence period. Implicit in the development planning behind the geographical shift of emphasis is the apparent assumption that the government means by "development" primarily economic development, although development is to take place within the context of African Socialism as described in Sessional Paper 10. A reading of the two documents gives one the impression that the social and political structure required to give meaning and integrity to the doctrine of the sessional paper and to provide the foundation and framework for economic development outlined in the Plan has been given insufficient attention. On the other hand the government is bound, by the size of the present commitment of development funds, to make at least a qualified success of a program which challenges the shift of geographical emphasis and draws attention to this weakness in post-independence planning. The program was initiated on the assumption that the scheduled areas were of first importance to the agricultural, if not the whole, economy of the country. Resettlement rested on the premise that a large program of government sponsored land transfer was of compelling importance to the relief of social and political problems posed by landlessness and unemployment in rural areas.

When looked at in the context of rural development as a whole, it will be seen that settlement poses a series of sharp dilemmas for the success of such development. In the first place, if the emphasis of development is away from the principles upon which settlement was established, the size of the development funds commitment to settlement prevents this emphasis from being effected and prevents the government from dismissing settlement as a temporary expedient appropriate to a by-gone set of circumstances. If the economic arguments for making the shift of emphasis to the former African areas and to land development are sound, then the need to devote considerable resources to the settlement schemes makes the development of the settlement schemes something of a depressant to development.
The second dilemma concerns the purposes of settlement now that the actual transfer of the million-plus acres has been accomplished. For this reason the settlement schemes are in fact a test of policy. Since the major part of the scheme program was designed to accommodate landless and unemployed who had stood outside or had been victimized by land consolidation, the settlement schemes are a test of whether the government will refute or substantiate the criticism sometimes made of it that development is primarily for those who already have achieved a certain level of economic progress. If in fact government is content to accomplish and transfer and recover the loan commitment, then settlement will stand as substantiation of the allegation. If on the other hand, the government wishes to emphasize development as well as successful land transfer, then it can be said that government has given evidence of its intention to bring development to those who have not as well as those who have reached a certain level of economic achievement. In the latter circumstance, the critical question becomes whether the development strategy pursued by the government is adequate to deal with persons at several different economic starting points. There is opportunity to test this proposition within the settlement program as well as by comparing settlement with non-settlement since there are settlers in different economic starting circumstances within the schemes. In addition, by holding income level constant it should be possible to test whether the machinery of development as presently designed is as well suited to a land policy of resettlement as it is to one of consolidation, i.e., whether the present development machinery is as effective in creating new geographical centers of development as it is for the intensification of existing centers.

The third major problem comes in the social and political sphere. It is, I think, a shortcoming in the Sessional Paper and the Plan that at least in the area of smallholder agriculture the institutional framework for implementing African socialism and economic development receives inadequate consideration. Although the Sessional Paper speaks of a wide range of forms of control to be employed in managing the economy, both
the Plan and the Sessional Paper assume that cooperatives, subject to more public control, are the most appropriate form of agricultural organization. "The need for discipline in implementing agricultural development is apparent and appropriate legislation and strict enforcement of existing legislation is necessary to ensure that ... (v) those few who refuse to cooperate in a major cooperative farming scheme are made to do so". In the Plan it is stated: "There is one course of action open to the nation and that is to strengthen the cooperatives to play their role adequately. Quite apart from the social and political factors there is no doubt that a strong cooperative movement would maximize the incomes of Kenya's peasant farmers by, on the one hand, performing essential functions of processing and distribution on a much larger and more efficient scale than would be possible for the individual grower, and on the other hand, giving him a share in the profits associated with these operations rather than letting them accrue entirely to private middlemen." Assuming for argument that on economic grounds the reliance on cooperatives is well grounded there is an undefended assumption that cooperatives have a role to play in the social and political spheres as well as in the economic sphere. There also appears to be the makings of an assumption that a single institution can operate effectively in all three spheres simultaneously.

One weakness of planning is, then, that insufficient attention has been given to the institutional and program requirements of settlers in the social and political sphere and to the bearing of these requirements on the success of economic planning itself. Settlement is particularly vulnerable to this weakness. In the first place, cooperatives have been assigned a major and increasing role in settlement. Second, settlement schemes are willy-nilly a social and political experiment as well as an economic risk. Settlers have been removed from their traditional environment and have been placed in schemes together with people who are strangers to them, even if from the same tribe. Furthermore, even if one were to argue that the social structure of schemes is not disrupted by changes in

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environment, it is a well established fact that existing social structure do not always function in a way to aid development. There is the additional factor that settlement, being largely for people who were landless and unemployed, perhaps has greater and more urgent social needs than cooperatives for already prosperous farmers dwelling in their home areas. Settlement Cooperatives therefore pose the following difficulty: If cooperatives are to be imposed on the schemes, is the government also committed to using this institution for the social and political requirements of settlers? If not, what provisions are to be made? Again, if cooperatives are to be imposed, what account is to be taken to elicit voluntary participation by settlers in meeting common social requirements and of registering and responding to settlers evaluations not only of the programs but of the institutions by which the programs are administered. And in all this, there is a choice to be made on whether these requirements are to be satisfied via channels particular to the schemes, or alternatively whether they are to share channels with people outside settlement.

Implicit in the foregoing is an important political problem: the relationship between compulsion and the need to respond and react to settler evaluations of the program, to elicit economic incentive and voluntary participation in meeting social requirements. The elements of compulsion are pervasive in settlement and are particularly important because settlement development starts at a lower economic level than some other agricultural areas. There is an element of compulsion in loan repayments, in land development, and increasingly it would appear in cooperative membership. The reasons for these elements of compulsion, combined with a tendency in the plan to deal with farmers solely as production units, are not hard to find and perhaps in some cases can't be avoided. But on the other hand the very emphasis on economic incentive implies a reliance in the last analysis on a favourable voluntary response from the farmers. In the social sphere the economic need to integrate self help with economic development priorities fails to take account of the fact that priorities in social sphere must be at least in part determined by those who are
expected to participate in their realization and I have seen very little consideration of the institutional arrangements by which adjustment of differences between planning and popular priorities in the social sphere are to be resolved. The need to create institutions for adjusting differences arising as a result of discontinuity between social and economic planning and the voluntary social and economic response upon which the former depends is perhaps the fundamental political problem of rural development. In the settlement schemes the combination of the low social and economic entry point of most the settlers plus the heavy element of what approximates compulsion emphasizes this political problem which may be characteristic of rural development in general. The compulsion is emphasized by the size and nature of the loan burden; the size of the social and economic needs of the settlers emphasizes the urgency that a favourable response in economic incentive and social participation emanate from the settlers. To summarize this part of the paper: The present emphasis on the former African areas in preference to further settlement and the scheduled areas of which they are apart, in part appears to be based on the political strategy of KANU during the pre-independence period. Government is prevented by the commitment of massive development funds from passing off settlement as a politically inspired economic mistake. Government's attitude toward settlement is a test of the accusation that development in for those who already have an economic start. If Government is committed to development as well as land transfer in the settlement areas, the economic and social position and needs of the settlers point to some unexamined social assumptions of planning which may affect its success. The need for institutional arrangements for adjusting differences of view resulting from economic and social initiative of the settlers and planning by the Government is perhaps the fundamental problem of settlement.

IV

It remains to consider the structure and operations of settlement in what must necessarily be both a brief and preliminary fashion. I shall try to keep in mind changes in structure and policy and considerations from the previous section in the analysis.
A. Administration

1. General organisation of settlement. Settlement has gone through a series of major organisational changes to reach its present form. These were in response to political demands of a conflicting and confused nature, to administrative requirements, to the need for haste in carrying out the program, and to the need to assure participation by good agricultural personnel. The Land Development and Settlement Board was set up in 1961 with the establishment of the "New Scheme" and was modelled after the old European Agricultural Settlement Board for European post-war settlement schemes. The board proved inadequate to cope with the requisite speed and size of settlement. It was also not constituted politically to take account of constitutional changes which were about to take place. The Board was heavily manned by nominated representatives of the ministry of agriculture. In 1962 at the second Lancaster House Conference it was agreed that a Central Land Board would be established with the emphasis on representatives from each of the various regions as well as the European farmers who would be selling their land to the Board. The representation on the board was, thus, set up to parallel the "majimbo" constitution hammered out at Lancaster House. A controversy soon arose over the functions of the central land board and over whether there should be an interim central land board to replace the old LDSB until the new Constitution brought the CLB into existence. Although the CLB could not be implemented until the new Constitution took effect, the administrative inadequacy of the LDSB made some adjustment necessary. Simultaneously there was conflict over whether the new CLB was to be responsible for the formulation and implementation of settlement schemes as well as land purchase, or just land purchase. European settlers had more confidence in an independent board with a chairman from UK because it would resemble the tried and trusted LDSB and would, it was fancifully hoped, be above the vicissitudes they foresaw with an African government. KADU members saw some protection from incursion by majority tribes if there were an independent board. Against this were ranged the views of KANU which viewed the whole idea
The creation of the Central Land Board (CLB) was intended to facilitate the purchase of land for settlement schemes. However, the establishment of the Board was marred by controversy and delay. The settlers' fears of an independent board as another attempt by the settlers to protect themselves from an independent African government, not to mention that it was based on a constitution not altogether to its liking. These controversies, overlain by colonial office inability to find a chairman for the board and the resignation of the chairman-designate because of the decision on CLB functions, created a long delay in the establishment of the Board. Parallel to the CLB problem, was the impending investigation and report by the Regional Boundaries Commission; and many African leaders wanted to delay land purchase until the regions were defined and the "majimbo" constitution established in the belief that settlement might otherwise muck up their respective tribal land positions. The effect of all these delays was to complicate the arrangements with the CDC and IDRO who were not necessarily taking sides in these arguments but were concerned about where the changes were leading and what would be the effect on their Loan Agreement with the Kenya Government.

In 1963, the final result was a department of settlement to administer the schemes: the establishment of a committee of Ministers (Finance, Agriculture and Settlement) to oversee the formulation of schemes and the arrangements with UK and the banks; and the Central Land Board which would be responsible only for land valuation and purchase. The Central Land Board as finally constituted represented a compromise between the European and some tribal groups and the Administration which could pass political grievances on land purchase to the CLB and did so. The abolition of the CLB resulting from the Republican constitution of 1964, and the absorption of its remaining functions by the committee of Ministers (Settlement Fund Trustees) reflected not only the completion of land purchase for the Million Acre Scheme but the disappearance of the fears which led to its establishment in the first place. The Central Land Board chapter is witness to the administrative conflict between conflicting political considerations, and agricultural requirements. It is an excellent illustration of the attempt to use settlement as a defense against the transfer of power to an African government.
The insurance theory of resettlement in the pre-independence days appears to have left as its legacy the administrative insolation of settlement in the post-independence period. The field organization is headed by four Area Settlement Controllers each assisted by two to four senior settlement officers and under these are a large number of settlement officers and assistants amounting in 1955 to a field staff of 158. The isolation of settlement from the development process is suggested by the fact that the district development and provincial development committees and their respective advisory committees do not include appropriate representatives from the settlement field organization. And the Area Settlement Controllers whose position is roughly comparable to those on the Provincial Development Committees are in only one case based in the same town as the rest of the Provincial staff. It appears rather that the settlement administration was not set up to be integrated with the rest of rural development administration. This one surmises from the heavy seconding of personnel to Settlement from the agriculture, cooperatives and veterinary departments and from the fact that the number of settlers per staff member is lower than for any other department, in some cases by a factor of ten. The problem with all this comes from the fact that settlement has not been an unqualified administrative and economic success thus far. To the extent that this is the case the residual interests of the other departments whose personnel are seconded to settlement come into play. To the extent that settlement has problems in the agricultural and veterinary sphere the administrative independence of settlement comes in conflict with the requirements of development.

2. Land Selection: Land selection has been done on the basis of tribal spheres of influence, in response to the need to deal with overcrowding in the African reserve areas. The original principles of settlement have been qualified by the policy of setting aside schemes for tribal communities not pressed by extensive land shortage in order to avoid the impression of tribal favoritism. In purchasing the land, a rough guide to the suitability of land for smallholder development was considered also. The basic principle
was to find areas of European settlement on the fringes of tribal areas which were suitable for agricultural use and, at least in the case of low density settlement, land that was under-developed in relation to its potential. Reaching lands and plantation areas were excluded as settlement areas in the brief because they were not suitable for settlement and also because their continued operation as large-scale efficient units was essential to maintain economic productivity and economic confidence during the period of settlement. A final consideration was the purchase of farms on compassionate grounds where, by reason of infirmity or isolation, the farm posed a security problem.

It would appear, therefore, that the relief of landlessness as the guiding principle of high density settlement was qualified by the awarding of schemes as a form of patronage in the interests of political harmony between various ethnic communities after independence. If it is true that settlement has made an important contribution to political stability in this country by reason of its effect on race relations, it remains to be considered whether the effort to bring all ethnic groups into settlement has produced a similar stability in terms of relations between ethnic groups. Given the fact that tribal land barriers continue to stand in the way of agricultural development, it may be time to test the political stability to which settlement contributed, by experimenting on future schemes with tribal integration. If this were tried and found politically and economically successful it could serve as ammunition in the attempt to remove remaining resistance to removal of land barriers.

3. **Settler selection.** The critical point here appears to be the qualification of the original principles of settlement in favor of other considerations. Settlers on low density schemes were to be people with previous farming experience and a certain amount of capital, but there is evidence that many did not have the requisite capital entirely free and clear of obligations to friends and relatives outside the schemes.
"Landless and unemployed" have been found in several instances to possess either employment and/or plots outside the schemes. These divergences are in part the result of the fact that schemes were awarded to all major tribal groups regardless of whether they suffered any very serious land shortage. But the divergences have occurred in other ways as well. Former resident laborers on European farms were to have received priority on schemes if they had worked for a given length of time on the farms even if for ethnic reasons they could not claim plots on the farm where they were previously employed. On the other hand, there are several instances where settlers have come into possession of more than one plot and, in addition, there has been a policy of taking over otherwise allegedly unusable European homes together with 100 acre plots for prominent community leaders.

B. Settlement Structure

1. Land Tenure. The settlers are given a "letter of allotment" which is supposed to give them qualified freehold title. The qualifications refer to the right of the Settlement Fund Trustees to enter upon the land for purposes of installing improvements. There is provision for forfeiture if the land is used for other than agricultural purposes, is subdivided, changed, let, or leased without prior consent of the Central Land Board (now presumably the CFT) or if the allottee does not within six months cultivate one acre, build a house, and erect a fence around his plot. Compensation is to be required even if the settler rectifies the situation. He is in addition under an obligation to use the most acceptable farm methods. The settler is in addition subject to possible eviction for failing to comply with loan obligations.

As with consolidation, it is difficult to deal with inheritance against the need to maintain economic size plots. There is apparently nothing in the legal papers to clarify whether subdivision is permissible in connection with inheritance. There is some evidence that settlement officers have been under such a heavy obligation to secure legal compliance with the property and loan provisions that there has been insufficient time for them to deal with other aspects of settlement. To the extent
that settlement field officers are important in stimulating incentive on
the part of the settlers, there is a need to guard against over-emphasis
on legal enforcement by contrast to instruction and advice.

2. Cooperatives. The general shortcomings and problems of cooperatives
have been well rehearsed in the papers and in periodicals recently, and
will be given thorough attention in other papers at this conference. I
have no particular evidence to indicate that the structural problems of
cooperatives in settlement differ from those outside. One point which does
emerge, however, is that the Department of Settlement appears to want to
train cooperative officials independently of training for other cooperative
officers. This separation has not been completely effected but it is a
reflection of Settlement's continuing administrative independence from
other departments involved in rural development.

C. Settler Response

1. The economic and financial position. The situation on production seems
on the whole to be that low density schemes have met and in some cases
surpassed the pre-settlement position in terms of return per acre, while
high density schemes have in many cases fallen behind. This needs to be
read in the light of the possibility that high density schemes in some
cases may have been in areas of a very high level of pre-settlement
development, while in many cases the low density schemes were in areas
relatively underdeveloped in relation to their potential. There appears
to be a fair amount of full time as well as seasonal employment on the
schemes, though the total impact of this on the employment capabilities of
the highlands relative to the pre-settlement position is something I cannot
document at present. Loan repayments over-all are running at a level of
only 40% of the total amount due, with low density settlement appearing to
do considerably better than high density on the whole. Some of the debt
is of relatively recent origin and may be attributable in large part to
bad growing seasons of late. The relevant questions in the light of this
economic record are whether the economic shortcomings are a function of
(a) institutional shortcomings in marketing of crops and supply of
necessary equipment for farming, (b) miscalculation in the farm budgets, or (c) failure to bring about a sufficient level of economic incentive on the part of settlers for any one of several reasons, some of which have been mentioned here.

It appears to be the case that there are very wide differences within any given scheme in the performance of the settlers. If one assumes that the development facilities are fairly uniform for any given scheme this might suggest either that it is all a matter of individual talent and proclivity, or that it reflects shortcomings in the educational sphere which might be expected to level out some of the differences in performance.

2. Community development. From the testimony of a few community development officers there is some reason to think that the fact of a change in environment plus the rough equality of the settlers have a favorable effect on response to community development projects on the schemes, once the new settlers have had a chance to get acquainted. If this is the case it illustrates two things: (1) that community development should get started before established economic and other groupings form on the schemes and (2) if community is started promptly, settlement schemes are in a position to create favorable demonstration effects on this sphere outside the schemes.

D. Conclusions

On the basis of limited evidence the following considerations about settlement seem to emerge:

a) Settlement, began as a defense against the transfer of power, has maintained an administrative independence from other departments concerned with rural development with possible bad effects on an integrated program of rural development.

b) Land selection indicates that the original criteria and purposes of settlement have been qualified in the direction of concern for national integration. If settlement has made an important contribution to race relations by removing racial land barriers,
could it now serve as a model for the removal of tribal land barriers still remaining?

c). Settler selection further illustrates the significant qualification of the original criteria both for high and low density schemes.

d). Cooperatives. In addition to the points raised in the third section, settlement cooperatives seem on the basis of very limited evidence to have performed about the same as those outside. Cooperative officer training programs reflect the administrative independence of settlement.

c). Land tenure. In the legal papers received by the settlers there is no clear solution to the problem of inheritance, with the possible subdivision involved, versus the need to prevent un-economic subdivision.

f). Response. Low density schemes appear to have surpassed high density schemes in return per acre on the basis of pre-settlement production in the particular area as a standard. The same difference applies to loan repayments which are over-all rather worrisome. Community development opportunities appear to be created by shift of environment and economic and social equality between settlers, making possible favorable demonstration effects outside settlement.