AGRICULTURAL TAXATION AND INTERSECTORAL RESOURCE TRANSFERS

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ABSTRACT

The paper is a survey of recent developments on this topic. It uses a two-sector (modern and traditional) model as the basic framework for analysis. Agriculture's role in development is reviewed briefly, as are the methods of transferring resources from agriculture: transfers on private account, government tax and expenditure policies, and policies aimed at changing the terms of trade of the agricultural sector.

The bulk of the paper reviews the recent experience of developing countries and the literature related to this topic. It is organized around three basic themes. First is a review of the policies including tariff protection that have influenced the domestic terms of trade between agriculture and industry and the effects of those policies on the agricultural sector (which has usually been left to pay the bill for protected industrialization). Second is a discussion of the implications of productivity growth (or the lack of it) in both the agricultural sector and in protected import substituting industries for the questions of resource transfers and of general economic growth in both sectors. Third, the growing concern with unemployment and income distribution is reviewed in connection with the choice of policies to tax agriculture and transfer resources to industry.

The paper suggests a number of elements of an improved system of taxing the agricultural sector to transfer resources both to government and to the non-agricultural sectors while simultaneously reducing the burden on agriculture from misallocation effects of the policies. Attention is also given to policies that would improve the growth rate of employment and the distribution of income. Particular attention in the paper is given to the effects of foreign trade policies on income transfers.
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INTRODUCTION

The techniques of taxing the agricultural sector in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) have not changed much in the five years since this topic was last reviewed. There have been a number of changes, however, in the underlying conditions facing many LDCs, particularly those associated with rapid productivity gains of the "Green Revolution" and with urban and rural unemployment and related social-political problems. In addition, a large number of empirical studies of the experiences of the developing countries have appeared in the past five years. Both the changes in conditions in the LDCs and the growth of knowledge about the effects of various policies on economic behavior have substantial implications for the discussion of appropriate devices for taxing the agricultural sector.

In this paper I first explain how I view agriculture in the process of growth. Then I review the purposes of making resource transfers from agriculture and various instruments that can, in principle, be used to tax the agricultural sector, directly or indirectly. Then, in section IV, I review some of the changes in concerns and conditions that have emerged recently and some of the recent literature on the development process and development policies relevant to our topic. Section V contains some proposals for the elements of a better system for taxing agriculture and transferring resources from it, in the light of recent experience and lessons I think we have learned. There are some final observations in the last section.

AGRICULTURE IN ECONOMIC GROWTH

In analyzing the growth of agriculture in most LDCs, and particularly in discussing basic policy options, I continue to find the two-sector model developed by W. Arthur Lewis most helpful. It has now

* Peter N. Hopcraft and John H. Power provided both useful comments on a draft of the paper and helpful discussions of the issues, for which they should be thanked but not implicated.
been followed by a large number of models offering refinements and amendments, and most of these capture a good number of the essentials of Arthur Lewis' contribution, though generally without the richness of his paper. In the context of the Arthur Lewis model, agricultural growth is crucial for two reasons. First, it is virtually impossible to have sustained growth of real income per capita, with some concern for the distribution of income, without having increases in agricultural production and in agricultural productivity. Agriculture is simply too large in the total economy for the situation to be otherwise; and the studies of development by Kuznets and others have demonstrated amply that rising agricultural productivity is intimately associated with rising incomes per head and with other characteristics of structural transformation during development.

The second reason for the central role of agricultural growth in economic development is instrumental: it will be very difficult (though not in principal impossible) for the rest of the economy, particularly the non-agricultural modern sectors, to grow rapidly in the absence of sustained growth in agriculture. Agriculture's "contributions" to development in other sectors which have been widely discussed, include feeding a growing non-agricultural labor force, earning more foreign exchange, providing capital for development of the rest of the economy, serving as a growing market for domestic manufacturing, etc. As emphasized in earlier discussions of agriculture's role, these latter contributions by agriculture depend not on total agricultural production but on the marketed surplus of agricultural products. And, in the short run it may be possible to increase agriculture's contributions to non-agricultural growth even with relatively constant production if the marketed surplus can be increased.
In the "normal" working of the Arthur Lewis model, the expansion of the capital stock in the modern sector provides employment for labor which otherwise would have to be absorbed by the traditional sector; the resources for increasing the capital stock come from the surplus of total value added over wage payments (which are assumed to be totally consumed); income per head rises as labor is moved from lower to higher marginal productivity occupations and as a consequence the share of the modern sector rises in total output; and the share of saving in income also rises as the modern sector share rises in total income. The classical phase of the model comes to an end happily in the "well behaved" case where wages in the modern sector begin to rise, because so much labor has been transferred from traditional to modern sectors that traditional sector labor becomes genuinely scarce. A recent Fei-Canis addition to the model also describes the behavior of export composition in this well-behaved development of a two-sector economy.

Some important aspects of the model are seen, however, when all does not go well, particularly when food supplies to the modern sector do not expand as rapidly as the modern sector's demand for labor. In that case, the modern sector has to give up a larger share of its output in order to feed its labor force, leaving fewer resources for capital formation. And, it is here that some of the major policy choices have had to be made by various governments in the past decades. More food can be forced out of agriculture in the short run, but the long-run problem becomes one of ensuring a sustained growth of food supplies to support the growing modern sector. Again, the Fei-Canis contribution is helpful in exploring some of the options open to a government facing food shortages in the short run.
A second problem with the "normal" working of the model has also become apparent in recent years in some countries. In his original contribution Arthur Lewis pointed out that the model would come to an early end if real wages (in terms of modern sector output) rose before "unlimited labor" had become exhausted, since the increase in wages would result in a diminution of surplus and a failure of the capital stock to increase rapidly enough to absorb labor from agriculture. More recently Lewis has pointed out in several contributions that this has been a substantial problem in a number of real situations. Again it is worth emphasizing that accelerated development requires more resources, and that those resources have generally come from a surplus of value added over wage payments in socialist, capitalist, and mixed economies. I must confess to a personal worry that the recent and long overdue concern for more equitable income distribution may tend to obscure the important fact that resources for development must be found somewhere, and it is unlikely that they will be found in the voluntary saving of wage laborers or of the salaried-middle classes. In addition, while the short-run effect of rising wages and salaries will be to cut into modern sector surplus, numerous authors have pointed out that the intermediate run incentive may be to recapture some of the surplus through capital—labor substitution, which will have adverse effects in terms of the amount of labor absorbed in higher productivity sectors per unit of surplus generated. The relevance of this process for agriculture is being discussed in other papers for this conference, and will be referred to below as well.

TRANSFER OF RESOURCES FROM AGRICULTURE

The aspects of agriculture's contribution to saving and to government revenue may be distinguished. One is the question of how agriculture may contribute to total tax revenue and to total domestic
saving. This is the question that preoccupied me in an earlier review.\textsuperscript{1}

The second question is whether agriculture should be making a net contribution to a flow of capital or government services to other sectors; i.e. what is the optimal level and composition of net transfers from agriculture?

There are three basic methods of transferring income from agriculture into a "fund" of saving and of taxes. First, there may be voluntary saving by individuals and firms in the agricultural sector. If private investment in agriculture falls short of the saving generated, agriculture will have made a net contribution to financing investment in non-agricultural sectors. Second, the government may tax agriculture directly (with income or land taxes) or through indirect taxes on items agriculture buys or sells (particularly export taxes in the latter case). The government may then provide capital projects for agriculture or undertake a variety of current expenditures or subsidies that benefit agriculture. The net of taxation from agriculture (which requires some incidence assumptions) over the expenditures benefiting agriculture (which also requires some incidence assumptions) would be agriculture's contribution to the non-agricultural sectors on government account.\textsuperscript{2}

Third, the government may turn the terms of trade against agriculture (relative to some meaningful standard) by a variety of policies reviewed elsewhere.\textsuperscript{3} The beneficiaries of the adverse terms of trade for agriculture will be the non-agricultural sectors domestically (after netting out any indirect taxes that fall partly on agriculture and partly on non-agriculture). To the extent that the increased non-agricultural incomes are saved at a higher marginal rate than the decreased agricultural incomes, aggregate saving rates will increase, and agriculture will have made a net contribution to total saving in an indirect manner. In addition, the
government can tax the increased non-agricultural incomes to capture part for government revenue, in which case a recalculation of agricultural and non-agricultural contributions to government revenue needs to be undertaken.

The size of the net transfer of resources from agriculture is both difficult to measure and difficult to evaluate in terms of its optimality. The data requirements to make an estimate are substantial; one must make estimates of incidence of taxes and of the benefits of government current and capital expenditures; and one must have in mind some notion of the "appropriate" terms of trade between the sectors in order to have a standard of comparison with which to measure the actual terms of trade. Finally, assuming that each sector would adjust the level and composition of its output, inputs, and sales with changes in relative prices facing it, one should have estimates of supply and demand elasticities to enable one to measure the value of resource flows that actually took place as compared with those that might have under different sets of relative prices. T.H. Lee's monumental study of Taiwan's experience meets most, but not all, of these exacting requirements in attempting to assess the size, composition, and direction of the resource flows from agriculture. The question of the optimal level of resource transfer is even more difficult to assess.

Optimal levels of resource transfer from agriculture will undoubtedly vary from country to country and within countries over time; and there are also likely to be situations in which the gross level of agricultural contribution to government revenue may be inadequate to meet the service needs of agriculture itself. Thus, the level of resource transfer (taxes plus other transfers) from agriculture could be (i) "too small" in the sense that higher-productivity uses of capital and of current government services in the non-agricultural sectors are
left unexploited; or (ii) "too small" in the sense that the government sector is unable to provide (without reducing higher-productivity uses of resources in non-agriculture) high-yielding public current or capital services to agriculture; or (iii) "too large" in the sense that the agricultural sector is unable to finance higher-productivity activities and instead lower-productivity investments are taken up in non-agricultural sectors. In addition to these largely self-evident definitions of optimality in terms of maximum growth of output, there could be additional considerations introduced on the income distribution side, with transfers from agriculture "too large" or "too small" in terms of distributional goals.

The optimality of various resource transfers from agriculture obviously depends on the goals of the society and on existing conditions regarding the distribution of income and the productivity of investment and of current government expenditures in the agricultural relative to other sectors of the economy. However, in view of the large weight of agriculture in the LDCs, and the imperatives of structural transformation during development, I believe there is a presumption that the net flow of resources will in general be in the direction of optimality when agriculture is making a contribution to the financing of other sectors. And, it is quite possible that within a net overall outflow of resources, government may make net inputs from the public sector. There may be times, though, when a confluence of circumstances (e.g., high-yielding agricultural varieties that substantially raise the productivity of capital in large-scale irrigation, drainage, storage, and transport facilities for some period of time) might make a temporary resource transfer into agriculture sensible from the point of overall growth. Thus, within an overall net outflow, there are still questions of timing and of composition which are more complex.
There are three themes in recent economic history and in recent studies around which I will organize some developments and concerns relating to the taxation and resource transfer questions. **First,** it has become abundantly clear that government policies can markedly affect the terms of trade of agriculture and other relative prices; that such changes in relative prices can result in substantial transfers of income among sectors; and that entrepreneurs in all sectors of the economies of LDCs respond quite rapidly to changes in relative prices, both of inputs and factors and of output. **Second,** concerns about productivity growth that preoccupied economists somewhat earlier in developed country studies have begun to concern economists in LDCs. Rapid productivity growth in agriculture has in some cases substantially increased price elasticities of supply; and, such growth has also exacerbated some problems of income distribution and of direct taxation of the agricultural sector. In addition, the failure of total factor productivity to grow rapidly in import-substituting manufacturing sectors has resulted in high and growing burdens on the sectors that must subsidize protected industry. **Third,** and related to the first two, there has been growing unemployment and related unrest in a large number of LDCs, and there has been a substantial increase in concern for the distribution, as opposed to the growth, of income in the LDCs. These three themes are extremely important in thinking about appropriate policies for taxation and resource transfers for the next decade, and some of the evidence on each of them must be reviewed first.

**Effects of Policy on Relative Prices**

The impact of government policies in changing relative prices immediately raises the question: changing them from what? **Existing studies have used two different definitions of the situation with which**
to compare the price structure at some point in time. One set of studies emphasizing the protection aspects of the problem, has used international relative prices facing the country, or international trade opportunity costs. The other set of studies has used the structure of domestic prices in some base period. These latter have generally been concerned primarily or exclusively with the domestic terms of trade of agriculture and their movements relative to base period prices. The former have been concerned with the extent to which domestic relative prices differ from international prices, but have been primarily concerned with one year only. The data requirements to do any one of these studies are formidable indeed, and data availability undoubtedly explains why most studies comparing domestic and foreign price structures have been single year studies, while those that have been concerned with movements of prices over time have been largely confined to movements of relative prices domestically.

The appropriate price comparisons when we are interested in the possible distorting effects of policies are between domestic price ratios and the set of prices (or, where appropriate, marginal revenues) the country faces in international markets. If one is interested in agriculture’s terms of trade under a given policy regime, the relevant set of prices with which to compare actual prices received and paid by agriculture is the set of prices agriculture would have faced had there not been particular policies with respect to foreign trade taxes, domestic taxes, and exchange rates that distorted the domestic price structure from that which would face the country in international trade. The comparison of the domestic terms of trade today with the domestic terms of trade in some past period may be of interest for sc. purposes. But, it does not present an alternative set of prices which could have been paid or received by agriculture today in the way allowed by comparison of today’s domestic with today’s international prices.
Thus, if we are interested in the effects of policies on relative prices and on income transfers accomplished by means of changing agriculture's terms of trade, we should compare the terms of trade agriculture actually faces with those it would have faced had not distorting trade policies intervened.

An example may be helpful here. Suppose one limited his/her attention to movements in domestic prices only, and suppose the government followed a policy of using no indirect taxes or subsidies (except to correct for world demand elasticities of significantly less than infinity) and had a floating exchange rate. And, suppose under these circumstances we observed a deterioration in agriculture's terms of trade of twenty percent over a decade. Given the policy assumptions, the deterioration in the domestic terms of trade could have come about only because of a deterioration of world prices of similar agricultural goods produced domestically relative to world prices of manufactured goods purchased by the domestic agricultural sector. Domestic government policy per se has made no impact in terms of transferring resources from agriculture to manufacturing, even though the latter has clearly benefited from the movements of the terms of trade. The only way in which to maintain the earlier terms of trade for the domestic agricultural sector is to intervene with taxes and subsidies to protect (i.e., subsidize) agriculture and discriminate against (i.e., tax) manufacturing relative to existing international prices in the later period.

Recent studies indicate that government policies have indeed had major effects on the structure of domestic (relative to world) prices, and that substantial amounts of income have been transferred both between sectors and between producers of different goods within sectors in many countries. Detailed comparative studies of a number of LDCs done by a
group of consultants to the World Bank focussed on the impact of indirect taxes, exchange rate policies, tariffs, and quantitative restrictions on imports in protecting or subsidizing various activities at the expense of others. Manufacturing industry was generally the beneficiary and agriculture the sector discriminated against, but within each sector there were a variety of sub-sectors subsidized and others "taxed" by the protective system. In some extreme cases, activities were found that yielded negative returns to domestic factors when the tradable output and the tradable inputs of the sector were evaluated at international rather than domestic prices, so that real national income would be higher if the activities simply ceased to exist. This has generally been the result of tariff "cascading," with a lower price of foreign exchange implicit in prices of inputs than in prices of output.

The studies done by a group associated with the Development Center of the OECD, summarized, interpreted, and extended in the volume by Little, Scitovsky and Scott, focussed broadly on manufacturing and trade policies, and made it clear that policies that favored manufacturing in many countries did so at the expense of agriculture. By re-calculating GDP at international instead of domestic relative prices, Little et al. found that agriculture was subsidizing manufacturing from ten to twenty percent or more of agricultural value added as a result of trade policies. My own studies in Pakistan indicated that in the 1950s perhaps as much as ten to fifteen percent of agricultural income was being transferred out due to adverse terms of trade relative to world prices. Sadie's examination of Austria-Hungary in the late 19th and early 20th century (which is the only study I am aware of which explicitly takes into account the supply response along agriculture's offer curve in response to changes in terms of trade) suggested that from...
seventeen to forty-five percent of agricultural exports except major grains was transferred from Hungarian agriculture in intra-Empire trade as a result of protectionist policies favoring Austrian manufacturing.

T.N. Lee's study of Taiwan, while using domestic base period prices instead of international prices as the point of comparison indicates that the deterioration of agriculture's terms of trade for the 1950s and 1960s as compared with the base period in the 1930s involved an implicit (or, as he says, invisible) transfer from agriculture equivalent to half to two-thirds of the real capital outflow from agriculture in the latter two decades. Echevarria's study of Chile, differs from others by looking at changes in relative prices (including changes in international prices of goods actually traded) over several sub-periods and by calculating the transfer of resources involved in changes during the period from prices existing in the immediately preceding period. He found agriculture as a whole gained as much as fifteen percent of its value added from changes in relative prices from 1959/61 to 1962/64, which suggests a similar loss of income in the earlier period relative to the later one.

The amounts of resources transferred from agriculture through the use of trade and indirect tax policies, then, have been very substantial in relation to agricultural output in a large number of countries. The amounts are even larger in importance relative to the size of direct agricultural taxes, industrial output, or government revenue and expenditures.

What should have been the consequences of these large gross transfers? In the context of the two-sector model, depressing agriculture's terms of trade and improving them for the modern sector should have improved the saving rate and rate of investment for the economy, the rate of growth in output and employment in the modern sector, and the rate
of growth of output of the economy as a whole. The principal adverse effects, recognized much earlier, might have been disincentives and lack of investment resources in agriculture which would result in inadequate growth of agricultural output and marketed surplus and eventual deceleration of the growth of the modern sector.¹

Instead, however, the principal difficulty encountered by countries following the policy of turning the terms of trade against agriculture is the inefficiency with which the non-agricultural sectors used the transferred resources. Because of the nature of trade policies in a large number of countries, the set of relative prices facing the manufacturing sector encouraged the establishment of industries aimed primarily at the domestic market, using imported (or exportable) raw materials and capital goods purchased at favorable exchange rates compared to the exchange rate implicit in the prices at which they sold output. The nominal extent to which domestic prices of import substitutes exceeded their international prices (c.i.f.) substantially understated the extent of subsidy to value added in the import substituting industries. If the import substituting sectors had raised profits by the full amount of their subsidy from protection, and if profits were heavily reinvested, then the mechanism for accelerating development through the use of trade restricting devices as suggested in the preceding paragraph probably would have worked (except for possible adverse effects on agriculture as mentioned).³ However, in most countries which have had detailed studies of protection, a substantial portion of the increase in gross returns to the firms made possible by the structure of protection subsidized the inefficient use (from the point of view of the economy as a whole) of capital, labor, and intermediate inputs.⁴ Thus, a continuing subsidy to the industries became necessary simply to support the level of output and value added in such industries. And, therefore, the agricultural
sector was being "taxed" not to increase overall saving in the economy, but rather to give an on-going subsidy to industries that would have been unable to compete in international markets, even with a correction for the overvaluation of currencies that existed in countries following this pattern of "growth".

The first problem with a price distorting strategy, then, is that it may encourage the establishment of industry that is inefficient in a static context. But, the dynamic problems that have arisen often have been of greater consequence. The infant industry justification for protection (which was invoked along with the "raising saving rates" argument already explored) assumes that costs will fall in the newly established industry over some period of time. If the costs do not fall, however, the industry will need a continuing subsidy in order to keep producing at its initial levels of profitability. Thus, once such an industry is established, it becomes a permanent drag on the rest of the economy. And, in order to provide protection or subsidy to a new sector, or to allow a transfer of income from agriculture that would increase profits (and by assumption, saving) the squeeze on agriculture would have to be increased. Alternatively put, if costs do not fall in an import substituting sector that is growing, the sector requires a growing subsidy from the sectors of the economy (primarily agriculture) that produce tradables efficiently just to maintain its growing levels of production. If agriculture is unable to provide such a growing subsidy, there will be a diminution in the growth rate of the import-substituting sector, since it will not be able to expand without the subsidy; unless, of course, it is able to increase the productivity with which it uses all resources.
Little, Scitovsky and Scott have put the problem in another way. They point out that the contribution of the sectors that are being subsidized is overstated by the use of domestic-price values added relative to the contribution of the sectors measured at international prices. In like manner, the contribution of the sectors that are discriminated against is understated by the use of domestic prices. Restating the value added in the major sectors in international instead of domestic prices raises the weight of the "taxed" (and usually more slowly growing) sectors and lowers that of the "subsidized" (and more rapidly growing) sectors, thus lowering the rate of growth of the economy as a whole. Economists studying import substituting industrialization have been concerned with explanations for the acceleration, followed by a deceleration, in industrial growth rates (the latter phase often accompanied by greater inflationary pressure and more severe balance of payments problems). With the re-measurement of overall growth rates, the acceleration phase is seen to be largely illusory growth, or a statistical artifact; while the deceleration indicates that the size of the subsidy required to keep the import-substituting sector going has become too large for the more efficient sectors to maintain.

A second difficulty with the use of the transfer from agriculture has occurred where real urban wage rates have risen, particularly in the import-substituting sectors, well before the end of "unlimited labor". In these cases (and there is a growing list of countries where this is of concern) the transfer from agriculture has resulted not in increased saving or increased government revenue, but in increased consumption by the urban labor force. When this use of the transfer is added to that absorbed by inefficient use of intermediate products and of factors, the amount left for the increase of private or government saving is further diminished. Thus, in countries where these
forces have been at work in the non-agricultural sectors, the squeeze on agriculture, which has been real and sizable, has not been growth-fostering in the ways that a simpler view of the two sector model would suggest.

A further set of problems engendered by price-distorting policies is related to the fact that all agricultural prices are not depressed relative to all manufactured goods prices when the terms of trade overall have moved against agriculture. We have already mentioned the effect of tariff 'cascading' (lower rates of duty on capital and intermediate products than on final consumption goods) on the inefficient use of resources in the manufacturing sector. In addition within agriculture there have been wide differences in the impact of trade, tariff and price policies. Numerous studies have shown how quickly farmers in the LDCs adjust to changes in relative prices among agricultural products that compete for similar resources. It is not surprising therefore, to find trade-distorting policies resulting in inefficient use of resources within agriculture, particularly discrimination against export crops and in favor of crops that are import substitutes. Also, the distortions in product and factor prices that have led to a growing concern for efficient use of capital in the manufacturing sector of many LDCs raise similar problems with respect to agriculture. The protective systems, and the overvalued currencies they defend, usually have lent capital goods both for manufacturing and for agriculture with very favorable exchange rates from the point of view of users of these goods. This type of policy has probably had an adverse impact both on the substitution of capital for labor in using activities, on the composition of industries by labor intensity, and on the development of capital goods industries, about which we shall say more below. Even in the absence of substitution, the subsidized price of capital goods has provided an income transfer to users of capital goods from the rest of society.
Certainly the most dramatic events of the past five years in the LDCs are related to the Green Revolution, and the impact of such rapid productivity growth in some parts of agriculture on problems of taxation and resource transfer that concern us here. One of the most obvious impacts has been the effect on domestic relative prices of agricultural commodities, a subject treated by other papers at this conference. These changes in domestic production costs and relative prices are directly related to the problems of the last subsection, though with an interesting set of twists.

If governments try to maintain some historical level of relative domestic prices (especially for import-substitute products, such as food grains on the South Asian Subcontinent) in the face of falling domestic costs, there will be substantial subsidies from some parts of agriculture and those parts of non-agriculture that are efficient producers of tradable goods.\(^1\)

To the extent that resources are substitutable, resources will be drawn out of sub-sectors of agriculture that are efficient producers of tradable goods into those sectors in which real costs are falling but prices are being prevented from doing so. Studies in Pakistan\(^2\) have suggested that the introduction of the new varieties may make cropping patterns even more sensitive to changes in relative prices than they had been under traditional conditions; just as political pressures build up to prevent endogenous changes in relative prices, the need to make sure that prices reflect opportunity costs becomes even more important.

Another aspect of the rapid increase in productivity in some parts of LDC agriculture has been that the long-standing problem of a lack of income-elastic taxes on agriculture has been made even worse. Those countries with land-based taxes and relatively long periods between
re-assessment of the base for taxation have experienced substantial increases in agricultural incomes and no way in the present structure of taxation to tap them. In addition, the political pressure to maintain the prices of the products in which the productivity increases have taken place means a further drain on government resources to maintain subsidies or guaranteed price purchasing arrangements. Thus, assuming prices do not fall substantially, a tax policy question becomes: how do we capture some of the productivity gains in parts of agriculture for use by society as a whole.

The possibility of rapid productivity growth in agriculture has another interesting dimension. As pointed out earlier, if there is little productivity growth in the protected non-agricultural sector, the expansion of that sector will require an increasing subsidy from agriculture (and from the efficient parts of non-agriculture) simply to keep going. The rapid growth of productivity in agriculture, then, can have an effect of postponing the time when non-agriculture has to become efficient. If the non-agricultural sector were really in the process of cutting its real cost of production, this extra breathing room before balance-of-payments and other problems closed in would be welcome indeed. But, if the non-agricultural sector were expanding, increasing its need for subsidy, and remaining an inefficient producer of tradables, the sudden increase in the growth rate of agriculture would simply enable the sector to put off the day of reckoning and would be a waste of the productivity gains in agriculture.

Growth of productivity in agriculture has another dimension relevant to considerations both of efficiency and of equity. If rapid productivity growth puts downward pressure on the price of the commodity in question, it will have a depressing effect on the net barter terms of trade of agriculture. But, the income terms of trade need not deteriorate,
a point often forgotten in discussions of the effect of the Green Revolution on farm welfare. In addition, since a very large fraction of farms in many LDCs are net purchasers of food crops, the effects of productivity growth even with falling prices are likely to be favorable to farm welfare. Also, changes in the net barter terms of trade as a result of the fall in farm prices arising from productivity growth do not have decisive consequences for the incentive to use improved inputs or new techniques. The expected payoff for improved inputs involves both the physical productivity of the inputs (rising with improved techniques) and the price of output (falling with new techniques) relative to the costs of the input. So, while the net barter terms of trade are relatively easy to measure, that fact alone should not lead to its overemphasis in discussing policy options or their effects on output growth in agriculture.

Finally, the new agricultural technologies have another effect on the question of taxation, income transfers, and the net contribution that can be expected from agriculture. Some aspects of the new varieties, at least, involve the need for more sophisticated (and expensive) water control systems; in general, it appears that benefits from the new technologies will be optimized only with increased use of fertilizers and pesticides, which increase the need for working capital in agriculture; even in "labor surplus" economies, the needs for preparation of fields more carefully and the increases in the size of harvests have led to a genuine (i.e., not caused by price distortions) need for investment in equipment of various kinds; and the increased input needs and physical output flows have created transport and storage problems which can be solved only by additional capacity in either or both systems. These considerations suggest that the absolute allocation of private and public capital to agriculture may well have to go up to optimize growth for the economy as a whole; but at the same time, the growth of productivity
stemming from the Green Revolution makes agriculture better able both to meet its own needs and transfer capital to other sectors as well. ¹ It would be dangerous to try to conclude anything "in principle" about net transfers from or to agriculture in this set of conflicting pressures.

**Employment and Income Distribution Questions**

Employment and income distribution questions relevant to the problem addressed in this paper.

The shortage of domestic saving was "the development problem" of the 1950s. It was replaced briefly by the need for education and training in the early 1960s, but that gave way to the scarcity of foreign exchange in the mid- to late 1960s. Since the problems of employment and of equitable distribution of income appear to be the main focus of attention at the beginning of a new decade, one can only hope that as a profession we will sort out the relevant from the irrelevant, and the helpful from the harmful, sooner than we have on these other problems. This subsection reviews a few of the aspects of employment and income distribution questions relevant to the problem addressed in this paper.

A number of writers dealing with the Green Revolution have pointed out that to a large extent the initial beneficiaries of the new varieties and other new agricultural technologies have been the larger farmers.² Part of this has to do with progressiveness, part with ability to take risks, part with the need for working and perhaps fixed capital to exploit the new technologies. In any case, the new technologies seem to have increased the incomes of larger farmers faster than farm incomes as a whole. In addition, the new technologies have had a regional bias in some countries, most dramatically perhaps in Pakistan and India, which has added political strains of a different kind.³ Thus, the technological revolution in agriculture has created a need for the system of taxing agriculture to tap the additional incomes which are exacerbating already
serious problems of unequal income distribution.

An additional aspect of the income distribution question is the rise of modern sector wages ahead of labor scarcity. When agriculture is squeezed in order to transfer income to the urban sectors, the rationales of raising rates of saving and of employment growth are lost when the resources are absorbed by rising urban wage rates. While the higher wage rates improve the income position of modern sector workers relative to large rural landlords and managerial classes in the cities, it does so at the expense of parts of the agricultural sector that cannot boast such large incomes as the groups to which they are transferring income; and, whether from the effects of reduced levels of saving and investment or from effects of capital-labor substitution resulting from higher wage rates, the employment opportunities in the modern sector at higher wages than available in traditional agriculture are diminished from what they might have been. In addition, since higher costs would limit competitiveness with some imports and in exports, there is a reduction in demand for output which will also reduce employment opportunities. So, some aspects of an incomes policy for the modern sector are relevant to consideration of methods and levels of taxation of agriculture.

Price distortions in the agricultural and in the manufacturing sector are involved with questions both of income distribution and of employment growth. The overvaluation of currencies, bolstered by protective systems that leave prices of capital goods artificially low, in conjunction with interest rates facing the modern sector in both agriculture and manufacturing that substantially undervalue the opportunity cost of capital present a package of conditions prevalent in a large number of countries. It would not be surprising, then, to find countries where such conditions are present experiencing problems of unemployment.
and unequal income distribution. This is particularly so in light of
the experience of Japan and China, and more recently Korea, where, while,
government policies encouraging industry and agriculture as well could
hardly be called neutral, the peculiar problems of recurring balance of
payments problems, unemployment, discrimination against exports, lack
of local capital goods, etc. do not seem to be present in such abundance
as in other countries which have pursued the somewhat stylized set of
policies outlined herein.

The kinds of policies that have sharply biased down the price
of capital and the price of capital goods, thus lowering the "user cost"
of capital relative to labor have had three kinds of effects. First,
and most obvious, there is an incentive for capital labor substitution,
especially in cases where the urban wage rate has moved well above the
typical sector wage, but also in agriculture, where the wage rate
may not be much above the opportunity cost of labor, but the price of
capital is heavily subsidized. This effect, then, reduces the amount
of employment for any given industry structure, and for any given level
of technology. Second, the distorted prices of labor and capital would
lead to a choice of industry structure inconsistent with the resource
endowment of the country, further reducing employment below what it could
be with the available capital, and, in addition, putting pressure on the
balance of payments from the inappropriate choice of techniques and,
where agriculture supplies most exports, placing an additional burden on
agriculture as a whole. Third, and perhaps more subtle, the failure to
price imported capital goods at their opportunity costs will discriminate
against the production of capital goods domestically, which may have two
effects: since capital goods industries are relatively labor intensive
(in hand-skilled labor generally) a set of industries is further discrimi-
nated against that would have provided more employment opportunities.
(and more real output) per unit of capital than other industries; and since the locally made capital goods would be more likely to reflect local factor availabilities (and maintenance tolerances) the discrimination against local production of capital goods will result in a capital stock embodying higher capital/labor ratios than would be the case with a larger proportion of locally produced capital goods in the total.

A particularly vivid example of the kinds of effects cited here are explored carefully and empirically in an excellent recent study by Kaneda and Child of the industries supplying capital goods to the agricultural sector in the Pakistan Punjab. They are able to include an additional, and in my view very important, aspect of the problem since their study covered some firms that were relatively privileged in their access to capital and foreign exchange as well as a preponderance of firms that operate without such access (and, indeed, for the most part without knowledge of the authorities that they exist). It is impossible to do justice to the rich array of data treated in their paper, but their findings certainly suggest that (i) the privileged access (at low prices) to capital and to imported capital goods and materials has the effect of increasing the use of these items even within the same industry (relative to firms that do not have access at subsidized prices); (ii) local firms produce capital equipment that is more consistent with local resource availabilities (including maintenance) than is the case with imported capital equipment; (iii) access to capital and to capital goods at low prices (from foreign credits provided by aid agencies in this case) has induced larger farmers to adopt capital-using and labor-displacing methods, while the capital goods produced by the local concerns tended to be labor-complementing, and were sometimes used to break labor bottlenecks at harvest time; (iv) the allocation system for imports at the official exchange rate (which greatly undervalued
foreign exchange) had substantial adverse effects on the small and unprivileged firms, who were unable to get raw materials even at premium prices.¹

One final aspect of the income distribution and employment aspects of many economies relevant to the agricultural taxation question relates to the distribution of land and the incentives to use land in production. Land, more than most physical assets, is a store of value and a speculative holding. Thus, part of the reason for holding land (apart from prestige and tradition) is unrelated to the return from current productive uses of land, and it may be quite rational in the process of selecting and managing a portfolio of physical and financial assets not to maximize the current return to land. This would be more true the lower the marginal utility of current income to the owner, which, one would expect to be the case with the larger than the smaller landowners. The question arises, what are the factors that might lead to less productive user of land, and how could the tax system be used to discourage this and encourage more intensive use of land?

A number of studies in different countries have indicated that larger farms are generally used less intensively (in terms of both output per acre and labor input per acre) than are smaller farms, even where farm is defined in terms of management units rather than ownership units.² Where differences in output per acre are small, there may still be differences in labor input per acre, the difference reflecting capital-labor substitution in larger management units. The pressure for current income is less great on the larger farmers and landowners. Land taxes have substantial income effects which tend to increase the application of other inputs so as to increase current output (as well as current marketings to pay the taxes in cash), and the evidence suggests that this may have been an important factor in obtaining the
substantial contribution of agriculture to development in Japan. The lack of a land tax, then, or a land tax with very low rates relative to current productive capacity of the land will tend to induce less intensive use of land for current production at all levels of land holdings, but presumably it will make the greatest difference with the larger landholders.

There is a further problem which may contribute to the lack of intensive use of land especially by larger landholders in some countries. It is quite common for capital gains to be treated with preferential rates (relative to ordinary income) or to go untaxed completely. One can expect to make reasonably good after-tax income by holding assets such as land even in an economy that is not undergoing rapid price level inflation. If there are costs to getting current income from the land (management time that could better be spent on other parts of the asset portfolio, bother with tenants if that is the principal other option, or just a feeling that one does not want to get tenants used to living on one's land for social-political reasons), it may be quite rational to leave land uncultivated, the more so the lower the eventual tax on capital gains.

If this general diagnosis is correct, the tax system might be used to increase the employment opportunities for smaller tenants and landless laborers at the same time that one makes the tax structure more progressive. The more progressive the tax on capital gains, and the greater the progressivity of the land tax (by size of total holdings, presumably) the more costly it would become to rely on appreciation for income in the future and the more costly it would be to hold land with low current levels of production and income; and the greater the pressure would be on individual landowners, especially larger ones, either to farm more intensively themselves, or to let more land to tenants, or to
sell off those parts of their land that, under the revised rules of
the tax game, were no longer rational parts of their portfolio of assets.

I have tried to review a variety of ways of transferring income
out of agriculture, their costs and benefits, their side effects, and the
conditions under which they have or have not been tried, before talking
about the elements of tax and transfer policies that seem relevant for
the decades ahead. If the tone and emphasis of the section have been
somewhat negative, it is because it seemed more important to look at the
common failures, and perhaps, too, because failures have been more numerous
than successes. In addition, T.K. Lee’s major contribution to this
literature has emphasized the particular successful methods used in
Taiwan, and as he will comment formally on this paper it seems both un-
necessary and presumptuous to dwell on the Taiwanese experience.

ELEMENTS OF A BETTER SYSTEM OF TAXING AGRICULTURE

In speaking of a “better” system, one must have in mind some
set of criteria by which to judge methods (and levels) of income
transfers from agriculture. This section first discusses the means of
getting a gross transfer from agriculture to government and to non-
agriculture, and then goes on to deal briefly with the subsidy and
expenditure side of the government budget. In the discussion, “better”
has reference to the critique of past policies in many countries with
reference both to the adverse effects on long-run sustainable growth
in agriculture and in the economy as a whole and to the adverse effects
on the size distribution of income and the opportunities for employment
(or for “income opportunities”). The outline in this section is sketchy
in part because of the longer discussion in the preceding section of the
nature and effects of various policy instruments.
Approved Means of Achieving a More Transfer

Exchange rate policy is intimately related to questions of appropriate fiscal policy and of income distribution and transfers. A crucial element in designing a better system of taxing agriculture is the movement towards an exchange rate that more nearly approximates the real cost of foreign exchange to the economy, which in most LDCs will involve raising the price of foreign exchange. Such a move has a number of implications. Where exports are predominately agricultural, this will reduce the implicit tax on agriculture from currency overvaluation. It will also improve the efficiency of resource allocation in agriculture where export crops must compete with import-substituting crops selling currently at a higher implicit exchange rate. In addition, in countries which have made a practice of selling foodgrains at prices above world levels, increased production from the "Green Revolution" has made the problem of maintaining these prices more difficult. If the possibility existed of export at prices reflecting the opportunity cost of foreign exchange to the economy, there would be a floor to domestic prices which would have an economic meaning, and which would be self-financing in a way in which government guaranteed prices often are not. So, moving toward a less overvalued currency is also desirable in terms of easing transitional problems of sharp productivity increases in parts of agriculture. The move to more realistic exchange rates might be accompanied by use of selective export taxes so that producers and exporters would face world marginal revenue rather than world price.

A closely related set of measures constitutes a second element in a better system of agricultural taxation: the reduction of the overall level of protection afforded to the non-agricultural sectors and a reduction in the spread of effective rates of protection in these
sectors. To a large extent, it is the high level of protection that has
enabled countries to maintain exchange rates that understate the
opportunity cost of foreign exchange to the economy; and a movement
toward a more realistic exchange rate would necessitate a change in
the levels of protection. The high and differentiated levels of
protection afforded non-agriculture in many countries has required a
heavy burden of subsidy from agriculture. What is more important, the
subsidy often has been used not to increase the rate of capital
formation but has gone to a large extent to subsidize the inefficient
use of resources by the non-agricultural sectors. The nominal increase
in the prices agriculture pays for non-agricultural tradables
(compared with the prices received for agricultural tradables)
measures the gross income transfer from agriculture. What happens to the
gross transfer depends on (i) the extent to which the government takes
a share of the total price paid by agriculture in the form of indirect
taxes on output, (ii) the extent to which the net nominal protection
(after adjusting for domestic indirect taxes) is cascaded into higher
levels of effective protection by differential tariffs on inputs and on
output, and (iii) how the producer "uses" the effective level of
protection or subsidy on value added (as between earning maximum profits
or relaxing productive efficiency thereby using larger amounts of labor
and capital and earning "satisfactory" profits only). Government tax
and exchange rate policies can have a major effect on the uses of any given
level of gross transfer. In particular, a differentiated tariff structure,
with lower rates of tariff on intermediate and capital goods than on
finished products produced in the country, will increase the share of
subsidy to value added for any given amount of nominal protection. Thus,
not only should an aim of our "better system" be one of reducing the
nominal protection to the non-agricultural sectors, but it should also
be one of reducing the differentiation of the tariff structure, to make sure that less of agriculture's gross transfer subsidizes inefficiency of resource use in other sectors.

The third element of an improved system would be an increased use of indirect taxes on the domestic production of manufactured goods. This is closely related to the reduction of net protection, as domestic indirect taxes such as a purchase tax or a sales tax regardless of origin be used to raise the price to the purchaser without providing protection to domestic producers. This type of policy has three separate objectives. First, it can be used as an across-the-board tax to capture part of the income transfer for the government sector. Second, it can be differentiated by categories of goods consumed by different income levels, without simultaneously increasing the incentive to produce luxuries domestically. This would be desirable in order to introduce some progression into the tax system. Third, the purchase or sales tax might be raised to reasonably high levels on machinery and equipment used in both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors for "pure" labor displacement. This latter would be difficult to define in any cases, but there the effort to do so would seem well-worth-while in view of the capital-labor substitution which, buttressed by tied-aid arrangements with well-meaning bilateral and multilateral foreign aid agencies, appears to be taking place in a number of countries.

The fourth part of an improved system for taxing agriculture is an old favorite: a tax on the value of land. The virtues of the land tax are well-known from other literature, and include a strong income effect which induces owners to increase the output per unit of land and to market increased amounts of output in order to pay the land tax. With increased concern about questions of income distribution and employment, the land tax takes on some added significance. A tax on the value of
agricultural land would raise the cost of not using land most productively relative to labor and capital, and would encourage more intensive land use. This would especially affect larger land-owners who may be under-utilizing land and who would have added reason (with an effective land tax) either to cultivate more intensively themselves or to increase the tenant population on their lands.  

There are considerable problems in introducing progressivity into systems of land taxation, as is well known from the literature. However, some form of land tax progressivity would be most desirable from the point of view of its employment effects, its complementarity to land reform policy and its effects on equity. Recent papers on Pakistan and Colombia, as well as numerous earlier studies, point to the desirability of increasing the rate of tax as size of holdings increases, but there are always problems in combining a tax on land with a tax on persons. Some variant on the type of "agricultural income tax" which is used in parts of the South Asian Subcontinent may be appropriate. This tax is in effect a progressive surtax on land tax paid. The rate of "agricultural income tax" (which is of course misnamed), increases as the total amount of land tax paid by any single reporting unit increased. To ensure effective enforcement, it would be necessary to combine a progressive land tax surcharge system with that of the income tax, thus making some crosschecks available with another system of collection and helping to ensure that ownership was translated into spending or income units that could be taxed.

Despite a fairly widespread agreement on the desirable features of some kind of tax on agricultural land related not to actual but to potential value of output there has certainly been no comparable widespread move to introduce or to improve land tax systems. The fundamental problems are political ones, though there are also some major
administrative problems in countries that do not have established land records and surveys. However, the administrative problems are worth trying to overcome if one thinks of a reasonable time horizon for tax reforms and for an enduring system of taxation to be established. With the alarming and increasing population pressure on land, the virtues of a land tax, especially one in which progressivity can be included, are worth the initial administrative outlays. As is so often the case with basic tax reform questions, one comes back to politics as a constraint.

The fifth element in an improved system is a reasonably progressive income tax that includes income from agriculture in taxable income. ¹ In thinking about planning over one or two decades, an objective to move an increasing segment of the population into a tax system which is reasonably flexible and progressive should get some priority in fiscal reform. Such a tax system can not reach down terribly far in the income levels of most developing countries because of the administrative costs relative to the tax collections. But, it would be a way of ensuring that governments will share in productivity increases at least of larger farmers. In addition, there are several aspects of an overall tax system that are significantly improved if a basic and established income tax is in operation. The tie-in with the land tax has been discussed; there would be connections with capital gains taxation as well.

Introduction or improvement of capital gains taxation is a sixth aspect of improving the mechanisms for taxing agriculture. As discussed in the last section, the absence of taxation of capital gains makes the less-productive use of agricultural land more attractive for those whose demand for current income is not high. The use of both land taxation and capital gains taxation would be complementary to other efforts to promote more intensive use of land; and the use of a higher price of foreign
exchange and of excise or purchase taxes on machinery and equipment that may be labor displacing would tend to make the increased intensity of cultivation of land result in more application of labor to the land as well.

Questions of Expenditure Policy

In addition to the above suggestions for revising the manner in which countries have tried to move resources from agriculture through use of taxes and related policies, there are some changes which may be warranted on the expenditure side of government policy as well.

First, there have been increasing questions raised in recent years about the desirability of using subsidies to agricultural inputs and to agricultural credit. One can hardly get into the debate properly in a short space. However, the use of below-market interest rates (especially when borrowers are the more wealthy farmers), the sale of irrigation water at below its opportunity cost (as occurs in India and Pakistan), and similar use of subsidized prices that must be accompanied by non-price rationing systems clearly present situations in which government revenues can be increased by higher charges, which will simultaneously improve resource allocation by penalizing low-productivity uses of scarce resources. The question of using subsidized prices to encourage adoption of yield-increasing innovations by farmers falls more properly in Raj Krishna's paper for the conference. However, to the extent that use of subsidies and taxes will induce farmers to undertake socially productive innovations that they might otherwise have avoided, it is relevant to the subject of this paper that resources be available to the government sector to finance such policies. Thus part of the gross transfer from agriculture may come back through use of subsidies; and to the extent that government resource constraints might limit the productive use of subsidies, the failure to extract a gross transfer from agriculture might limit agricultural growth.
A second aspect of expenditure policy has already been referred to in section IV. An expanding agricultural sector will need a variety of government services and capital projects that will require government expenditures if agricultural growth is not to be inhibited. The mix of capital projects, government research efforts, extension services, etc., will vary from country to country and over time. However, the lack of government finance to provide such services will lower the rate of agricultural growth, and again the taxation of the agricultural sector may provide the public resources to allow capital formation to accelerate agricultural growth.¹

The third opportunity for expenditure policy may appear in countries undergoing rapid productivity growth in foodgrain production. As a part of the transition from food imports to self-sufficiency or even to exports, there may be a need to adjust domestic prices of foodgrains to world prices at a satisfactory price of foreign exchange. The possibility of abrupt declines in foodgrain prices has induced some countries to opt for price support systems which at best are a temporary drain on public resources, and at worst involve serious financing balance of payments, and resource allocation implications as well. In the face of sharp increases in domestic production caused by productivity gains from new varieties or new technologies in agriculture, governments have an opportunity to undertake needed labor-intensive public-works investments and finance them from domestic borrowing without additional tax revenue. The increased demand for foodgrains from the labor employed on the projects will provide some support for foodgrain prices, and instead of government expenditures on increasing inventories of foodgrains held (with no employment created) there is an increase in the productive capital stock and an employment of labor as well.² The parallel with similar uses of PL480 imports of foodgrains comes to mind, and it may be useful to
remember that some countries anticipated PL480 imports and used them to offset (in real terms) the wage costs of public works projects, while in other countries there was simply a heavily subsidized distribution essentially as famine relief with little resulting capital formation.

It would be a pity if countries now facing an expansion of resources at very low opportunity cost were unable or unwilling to take advantage of this means of increasing both the capital stock and employment.

Private Resource Transfers

The transfer of resources from agriculture to the non-agricultural sectors on private account has been neglected, as have questions of the resources and incentives for private saving and investment in agriculture. In part this is due to my ignorance in this area, but in part it is based on the observation that in the Indian and Pakistan Punjab, when investments were profitable (even under the adverse set of terms of trade for agriculture based on net barter terms of trade analysis) the agricultural sector found the resources to undertake investments. Thus, I think the emphasis should be on (i) public sector resource transfers and (ii) a reasonable set of price incentives, and that the private capital needs of agriculture are likely to be less critical a bottleneck, especially if the government is providing research outputs of new and profitable crop varieties and technologies.

Restructuring of relative prices, particularly of capital goods and agricultural implements, may also have some implications for the transfer of resources from agriculture on private capital account. The study by Kaneda and Child points out the importance of family finance in the development of small-scale agriculturally based industry in the Pakistan Punjab. The study of the development of the Indian Punjab emphasizes that industrialization there was closely related to agriculture and that it was located in smaller towns, as was the case with much of the
industry in the Pakistan Punjab. If government policies discriminate
loss against local production of equipment for agriculture, there may be
a flow of private agricultural capital to profitable investment in the non-
agricultural sectors closer to home, where rates of return are higher and
perceived risks are lower than would be the case with the institutional
types of investment in non-agricultural sectors normally open to farmers.
Results in both India and Pakistan suggest that the semi-rural type of
non-agricultural growth is fairly labor-intensive, as well.

Finally, there are non-capital transfers between sectors,
particularly remittances from the non-agricultural sector back to the
farm. These transfers are important for the welfare implications of
policies aimed at transferring income out of agriculture, particularly
where such policies encourage the increase in urban wages. While
transfers from urban workers back to rural areas will not mitigate the
effects of high wages on capital-labor substitution, they will help ensure
that the agricultural sector shares in the increase in urban wage rates,
which mitigates the adverse effects on the size distribution of income
of increasing the wages of the already high-wage sector. Thus, in evaluating
the net effects of policies for transferring income through the price system,
or the "invisible transfer" that Lee discusses, it is necessary to take
account of these transfers as well. That they can be important is
indicated by a recent study in Kenya suggesting that about 20 percent of
the wage bill earned by Africans in Nairobi was remitted to rural areas.2

EXHIBIT 1: OBSERVATIONS

In the past few years considerable attention has been given to
the adverse effects on output and employment growth in non-agricultural
sectors from the distorted set of prices they faced—distorted, that is,
from international trade opportunity costs. A considerable literature has
also developed emphasizing that both farmers and industrialists react to
price signals rather rapidly, so that the prices facing the private sector must be carefully considered as a part of government development policy. As a result of the difficulties encountered by some countries using seriously price-distorting policies, there has been considerable movement among a number of countries toward removing some of the distortions, particularly in adjusting the price of foreign exchange facing exporters so as to reduce the bias in favor of import substitution and against exports.

Perhaps it is now time to raise a warning that distortions of the prices of major agricultural commodities away from international trade opportunity costs may be even more dangerous in its short-run balance of payments implications than distortions within the manufacturing sector, due largely to the relative importance of the two sectors in the production of tradables. The danger is particularly serious with regard to the reactions in countries undergoing rapid productivity change in agriculture, the more so the farther are existing exchange rates from reflecting the value of foreign exchange to the economy; the total size of subsidies needed to keep agricultural prices above world prices at the official exchange rate, and the implications of this for the rest of the world are substantial.

Finally, inappropriate choices of factor combinations, particularly the substitution of capital for labor also present more serious problems for the future of employment growth when it is the largest employment sector that is making the inappropriate choice, rather than the small modern manufacturing sector.

For all these reasons, the dangers of major price distortions within the agricultural sector may be more serious than similar distortions in the non-agricultural sector. The only countering factor is that agricultural land and much of the reproducible capital stock in agriculture except that in tree crops would be less product-specific than the capital stock in manufacturing, so that changes in the composition of agricultural
output could be made relatively fast as price distortions are corrected.

There continues to be substantial scope in a great many countries for government intervention through the tax system both to increase tax revenue and to improve the allocation of resources by correcting the prices that face the private sector. Some of these changes in tax rates would strike directly at prices paid by some or all farmers for goods they buy. Others would reduce the rates of protection being received by the non-agricultural sectors, which would tend to lighten the burden of subsidy to those sectors being borne by agriculture. The rapid productivity increases now being experienced in agriculture in some countries will make it much more feasible for agriculture to contribute a rising amount of resource transfer to the government and to the non-agricultural sectors, but a movement away from some of the policies of price distortion among internationally tradable goods is necessary if the transfers of agriculture are to be effective in raising growth rates of output and employment in non-agriculture and in sustaining agricultural growth itself in the coming decade.
FOOTNOTES

Page 1

1. See S.E. Lewis, Jr., "Agricultural Taxation in a Developing Economy".

2. W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour".

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2. Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, and other references cited therein.

3. B.F. Johnson and J.W. McIlor, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development" is the standard source.


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2. The recent paper by McIlor and Lele, op. cit., incorporates an explicit landlord sector into the agricultural sector. Their device allows more explicit and careful analysis of the effects of various tax policies on resource allocation, choice of techniques, and levels of marketing in the agricultural sector.
One should make allowance for some contribution of agriculture to the production of "pure" public goods such as defense as well as for the benefits from projects or services that benefit only agriculture. Some of the incidence problems on the tax side of the calculation are discussed by V.P. Gandhi, Tax Burden on Indian Agriculture.

S.R. Lewis, op. cit.


An interesting discussion of the optimality problem is given in Tang, op. cit. See also M.I. Khan, "A Model of Optimal Resource Transfer from Agriculture for the Benefit of Nonagricultural Activities", and Johnston and Kilby.

Some of these issues are discussed in H.J. Bruton, "Import Substitution and Productivity Growth". It is important to point out, however, that growth of value added per worker is not enough, since this can take place through capital-labor substitution or other means. What is necessary is that the total resource cost (inputs and factors) of producing a given quantity of output must fall for the burden of subsidy to decrease.

One is interested in trade opportunity costs, so where import supply elasticities and export demand elasticities are less than infinite, the trade opportunity costs are given by marginal revenues or costs rather than prices.

E. Balassa and Associates, The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries.

T.W.D. Little, T. Scitovsky and M.F.G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries.

S.R. Lewis, Jr. "Interrelations Between Agricultural and Industrial Development: Discussion"; and Persistent Industrialization and Trade Policies.
4. S.M.乙20, "The Terms of Trade as a Tax on Agriculture: Hungary's Trade with Austria, 1880-1913". His study distinguishes between the effects on major grains, where producers had some political power, and other exports, where they did not.

Lee, op.cit.

2. R.P. Schevarrn, "The Effect of Agricultural Price Policies on Intersectoral Income Transfers". This study has the virtue that it differentiates among large and small producers, tenants, agricultural and non-agricultural workers, non-agricultural producers and the rest of the world.

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1. To the extent that capital is mobile, disincentives to agricultural investment might result in a shift to non-agricultural investment. It might also be that lower rates of return on agricultural investment would result in higher consumption and lower saving by farmers.

2. The "effective rate of protection" or the protection to value added is designed to measure the combined effects of nominal protection to output and the presence of tariffs on or protection to industries producing inputs into the protected industry. The concepts are discussed and elaborated in Balassa and Associates, op.cit., and Little, Scitovsky and Scott, op.cit.

3. Even in this case, to the extent that the protection raised the private rate of return artificially above that of projects with equivalent social rates of return in agriculture, overall growth would be lower if capital moved in response to private rates of return.


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1. The impact of the growing need for subsidy may show up in the form of foreign exchange shortages, inadequate saving, inflation arising from excessive creation of factor payments domestically relative to productivity of factors, or a combination of all. Some of the problems are discussed by J.L. Power, "Industrialisation in Pakistan: A case of Frustrated Take-off?" or J.B. Sheahan, "Imports, Investment and Growth: The Colombian Experience since 1950".
1. Little et al. op. cit., pp. 75-76.

2. In addition to the references to Power and Sheahan, see A.O. Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import Substituting Industrialization in Latin America."

3. The deceleration may also be brought on by the limitations of markets at the distorted prices prevailing: import substitutes run out of a growing market after imports have been replaced, and the currency overvaluation, the high cost-structure of protected industries, and the higher labor costs that often accompany the import substitution phase eliminate the possibility of entering the export market.

4. Again see W.A. Lewis' more recent contributions.

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2. Ibid. To some extent the added sensitivity comes from the lack of specificity of the new technologies (i.e. tubewell water that can be applied to supplement many crops, so cropping patterns are not tied to timing of canal irrigation or rainfall; or new varieties have different growing seasons from traditional varieties and may affect profitability of growing crops in seasons other than those in which they themselves are grown).

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1. Some of these issues are discussed for West Pakistan in S.R. Lewis, Jr. W.P. Falcon and C.H. Gotsch, "A Commercial and Fiscal Policy for West Pakistan Agriculture in the 1970s."

2. It seems reasonably clear to me that the sudden increase in agricultural growth, combined with large inflows of foreign aid, provided the manufacturing sector in Pakistan with just such an increase in the sources of subsidy in the early 1960s and put off the need to rationalize the sector, thus maintaining the need to have a growing subsidy from the rest of the economy in order to expand.

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1. See Falcon, op. cit. and John W. McElroy, "Technological Change in Agriculture and Intersectoral Resource Flows"; on the points raised in this paragraph.
1. See Mellor, "Technological Change," op. cit. Note too, however, that the growing capital needs of agriculture come from increased high-productivity investment opportunities, thus raising the opportunity cost of wasting resources in lower-productivity protected sectors.

2. See Falcon, op. cit., and Mellor and Lele, op. cit.

3. Falcon, op. cit.

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1. This point is also emphasized in S.R. Lewis, Jr. and S.E. Guisinger, "The Structure of Protection in Pakistan".

2. See, for example, R.A. Berry, "On the Usefulness of a Presumptive Tax on Agricultural Land in Colombia".

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1. See Lewis, Falcon and Gotsch, op. cit., or Johnston and Kilby, op. cit. Note also that the protection system that defends the overvaluation must correspondingly be changed.

2. That these should be used selectively and only to correct for differences between price and marginal revenue should be stressed in light of the number of countries that have overused export taxes in the past fifteen or twenty years.
A large devaluation with a failure to change tariff levels would lead to an increase in foreign exchange reserves, which may be suitable for luxury consumption for non-mercantilist nations of the developed world, but is a waste of resources for the LDCs.

This assertion of the results assumes that the country does not produce much of the intermediate and capital goods that are discriminated against by the tariff system so that the higher costs of protection are paid by the agricultural sector, rather than by some substantial portion of manufacturing.

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1. See Berry, op.cit., for a good recent discussion with reference to Colombia.

2. Berry, op.cit., or S.E. Lewis, W.P. Falcon and C.H. Gotsch, "The Tax Structure of West Pakistan Agriculture: Some Proposals".

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1. One of the difficulties with direct taxation of agriculture in India and Pakistan is that agricultural incomes are not taxable under federal law; taxation of agriculture is a provincial subject. For a suggested way around this problem, see Lewis, Falcon and Gotsch, op.cit.

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1. It is again worth stating that a presumption of a gross flow of resources out of agriculture during development does not mean that there may be a net inflow on government account; or that the net outflow need be large on government account.

2. This is discussed by Falcon, op.cit., and by S.R. Lewis, Jr., W.P. Falcon, and C.H. Gotsch, "The Green Revolution and FL60: Some Parallel Problems?".
1. On investment in agriculture, see, for example, Ghulam Mohammad, "Private Tubewell Development and Cropping Patterns in West Pakistan;" on investment in non-agriculture, see Kaneda and Child, op. cit.; both subjects are referred to in J. Macrae, "The Relationship between Agricultural and Industrial Growth, with special reference to the Development of the Punjab Economy from 1950 to 1965."


1. Macrae, op. cit.


