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Gramsci's Concept of Commonsense:
Towards
a Theory of Subaltern Consciousness in Hegemony Processes

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"The popular element 'feels' but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element 'knows' but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel. The two extremes are therefore pedantry and philistinism on the one hand and blind passion and sectarianism on the other.

— Gramsci on 'Passage from Knowing to Understanding and to Feeling and Vice Versa'.

The paper is about the popular element, its 'feelings', its 'percepts', its 'commonsense', especially as these are formed within hegemony processes. It is concerned with the evolution of a framework as proposed by Gramsci in his discussions of the structure of commonsense in the popular elements. It also offers certain 'cases' to examine some ideas of the Gramscian scheme on the subject under consideration. Gramsci's scheme, as seen below, seems to have a certain distinctiveness in the Marxist tradition which is why it needs special attention in any discussion of the cognitive maps of the popular element. The paper is however silent on the insights into the concept of 'commonsense' offered by sociologists and anthropologists of the modernisation theory genre, and also how Gramsci's Marxist scheme could radically differ from this genre of modernisation theorists. It is in a sense largely a reconstruction of Gramsci's attempts towards an understanding of subaltern consciousness in hegemony processes.

There seem to be two other crucial tendencies in Marxist scholarship on working class consciousness which form the context of the paper. On the one hand, there is a tendency of unilateral pursuit of what is known as "praxis called rebellion". Such studies do probably provide a source of strength for contemporary Marxism in its struggle with various trends of "dominant ideologies". However, in this zealous pursuit of what in a broad sense may be called the counter-hegemony process, the point that seems to be subtly neglected is a vast terrain and possibly the dominant current of subaltern praxis which is non-rebellion.'
On the other hand, studies on 'non-rebellion' or more adequately speaking, the hegemony process, have a tendency to treat subaltern praxis as one co-opted or coerced fully by the "ruling ideas". Hence such studies are satisfied with a critique of 'dominant ideologies' or structures of political economy. Subaltern praxis in the hegemony process is treated as a mere "sedimentation" of the dominant ideologies (Connah, 1986: 7; Bates, 1975:352).

What happens to Marxism as a philosophy when these two broad tendencies continue to predominate the current discourses? More specifically, a central question of the paper is: what is the character of the praxis of subaltern groups when they are subject to the domination/direction of the ruling bloc? This paper is about some such questions and their answers.

The paper runs as follows. In Section I, the views on commonsense (or, 'ordinary' folk's sense-perceptions) as viewed in bourgeois traditions are briefly presented. Section II is about Gramsci's treatment of certain cases of the infiltration of these bourgeois accounts into the Marxist camp by way of his critique of Croce's and Bukharin's schemes. In Section III, Gramsci's own scheme on 'commonsense' & its elements are proposed. Finally, in Sections IV and V, relationships between the hegemony process and the 'commonsense' of subalterns, on the one hand, and relations between certain counter-hegemony systems and subaltern consciousness, on the other, are delineated.

I

What worries Gramsci all through his writings is that certain philosophical traditions, originally elaborated by their advocates to defend the bourgeois social order, have during his time sufficiently penetrated into Marxism, & created tremendous problems for its further progress. Let us examine two such bourgeois traditions before we proceed to see how
Greece formulated certain cases of their infiltration into Marxism. For the present purpose, we may limit ourselves to a brief discussion of Enlightenment and pre-Enlightenment philosophies.

Enlightenment rationality, as is well known, condemned the views of ordinary people as superstitious, naive, meaningless, irrational, and so on. The task of philosophy was to supersede their belief systems, for 'ordinary' beliefs did not even contain a fragment of Truth. On the other hand, much of pre-Enlightenment philosophy in Europe believed that the primary task of philosophy was to explore the world of 'intuitions', 'feelings', 'sense-perceptions', and scoffed at the possibility of 'reasoning' or 'understanding' the human world. For human beings were nothing more than a 'bundle of feelings' (Hume's pet phrase). Not that ordinary folk were incapable of 'reasoning' or 'understanding', but such processes of 'reasoning' etc. were unnecessary for a 'human philosophy, or in a more radical sense, 'oppressive' for the common people.

The Enlightenment tradition did not accord any recognition to the feelings of common people; thereby, it was capable of establishing for philosophy a physical distance from the 'crowd' & their 'percepts'. A 'peasant' is still treated in terms of this construct as an 'uneducated person of low social status' living in the countryside (Longman Dictionary, 1984). The physical distance from 'low social status' people that this philosophy is capable of establishing is very clear in case of historians following this tradition who write volumes on a 'national movement' in India or elsewhere without even mentioning the contributions of a factory worker or a poor peasant.

The continuation of the pre-Enlightenment tradition is more subtle. Philosophy is here some kind of systematic rendering of the chaotic world of sense-perceptions. This philosophy locates sense-perceptions in everyday existence, and has been content to take, just as they are, the feelings, intuitions or ideas of everyday existence. Thus, a common man's structures of feeling are not only meaningful, but these
are the only structures that philosophy must rely on for 'ultimate truth'. All talk of 'reasoning' or 'understanding' in order to establish the meaning of the human world is meaningless, for such talk is only based on arbitrary choice of explanatory schemes. In the preface to the English edition of Capital I, Engels identifies such a tendency in classical political economy (Engels, 1886:14),

"Political Economy has been generally content to take, just as they were, the terms of commercial and industrial life, and to operate with them, entirely failing to see that by so doing, it confined itself within the narrow circle of ideas expressed by those terms .... classical political economy never went beyond the received notions of profits and rents (emphasis mine), never examined this unpaid part of the product in its integrity as a whole ........."

Engels is here referring to certain theoretical obsessions with notions 'received' from the immediate character of observed economic processes. This is an empiricist/positivist tendency in economic theory. In political theory too, one frequently comes across similar tendencies in studies which may be termed as 'populist' literature. The quality of politics of certain 'popular' leaders is evaluated on the basis of the expectations of the 'majority' which the leader commands within a national boundary. In a seminar in New Delhi in 1984, a speaker while dismissing the critics of Mrs. Gandhi's regime argued that Mrs. Gandhi was the only national leader in whom the majority of Indians had 'full faith'. What seems to be the crucial aspect in this populist literature is that certain political regimes are defended for being fully consistent with the perceptions of the masses. A critique of the ideologies propagated by the popular leaders is usually dismissed as being inconsistent with "the will of all". The critics of 'populism', on the other, have usually treated such popular beliefs as popular 'misconceptions'. For, as critics argue, the masses may follow a leader either because of a lack of awareness or because they are 'misled'. 
Thus, there are two crucial philosophical traditions. Philosophers in one tradition wonder how the structure of commonsense can at all be meaningful as a contributing factor to the growth of knowledge, or what it calls 'reasoning'/ 'understanding'. The other tradition feels that the identification of the structure of commonsense or what it calls 'sense-perceptions'/ 'intuition'/ 'feeling', is adequate for philosophy. This is a situation which Nietzsche describes as follows: "There are ages, when the rational and the intuitive man stand side by side, the one full of fear of the intuition, the other full of scorn for the abstraction; the latter just as irrational as the former is inartistic. Both desire to rule over life; the one by knowing how to meet the most important needs with foresight, prudence, regularity; the other as an 'ever-joyous' hero by ignoring those needs and taking that life only as real which simulates appearance and beauty".

II

Both the philosophical traditions, as Gramsci would argue, have infiltrated into Marxism and blocked its progress as an autonomous philosophy.

There is, on the one hand, a tendency in Marxism which, in its attempts at critique, takes cognizance of the so-called 'copyright' philosophies and ignores nonchalantly 'the philosophy of the non-philosophers'. This is a typical rationalist undermining of the perceptions of "the non-philosophers". There are, for example, innumerable Communist Party Journals and non-party leftist periodicals which have so much to talk about the dominant ideologies or the 'avant-grade' radicals, and almost nothing in them about a worker's perceptions.
On the other hand, there is also a tendency in certain radical groups to act as 'intuitive' militants. This intuitive man of the revolutionary genre does not seem to bother about "the heavy thundercloud that might burst upon him to wrap him up in its cloak", for, we are told, he is committed to a 'cause'. And, for him only the cause matters, not its consequences. There is, thus, a tendency in him to live with what may be called the 'intuition' of subaltern groups. Gramsci's critique of Bukharin's Marxism as well as Croce's treatment of 'commonsense' of the popular element identifies these two broad tendencies, respectively.

As Gramsci argues, Bukharin's 'Manual', intended to popularise Marxism among the 'rank-and-file' of the Party, provides a study of social contradictions and a critique of the bourgeois ideologies but does not have anything to say about the ideas or activities of workers themselves. In its concrete political forms, it undertakes only those political tasks which help to 'educate' the working class in the philosophies of the "philosophers". It offers only a critique of the more holistic dimensions in political economy, philosophy or the different kinds of socialism. To transposes this kind of 'Manual' to the Indian case, we might think of a textbook meant to educate the working class in a political-economic critique of the Indira regime or the 'Najdra' or the planning models. It would be essentially concerned with a holistic political economy of India.

The central assumption here seems to be that the perceptions of subaltern groups subject to domination by the ruling classes are the products of a process moulded completely by the "ruling ideas". That the "philosophy of non-philosophers", as we see below, is relatively original to the "non-philosophers" themselves is ignored by a Marxist critique. It is thus completely oblivious of the world which the workers already know and live with. Consequently, Marxism projected in this form turns out for the workers, like any other philosophy, external to their everyday existence, not an integral part of their knowledge processes. In such a situation, the relationship between Marxism and its agencies is,
in an organisational sense, a one-sided monologue, structurally similar to the relationship between the Church and the believer, the temple priest and the peasant, the teacher and the disciple and so on.

In this monologue, the working class, instead of developing further its own thought in and through the organisation's 'mediation', becomes increasingly dependent on the 'direction' of the organisation's professional intellectuals. The organisation, following the logic of 'educating' the subaltern groups, is not able to break with the traditional teacher-pupil relationship and consequently is not able to facilitate an intellectual formation within the agency itself. Notwithstanding the physical hardships, ideological pressures, moral honesty and individual discipline which the 'professional intellectuals' of the organisation do undergo, in their logic of making Marxism popular they only reproduce the traditional teacher-pupil relationship between the 'organisation' and "the masses". The 'de-classed' intellectuals in the organisation become the permanent explicators of Marxism for the workers. Thus, the 'original' cognitive maps of the subaltern groups are in reality made subordinate to the organisation's discourse. The organisation's Marxism seems more and more difficult impregnable and pedantic for the workers to grasp and internalise. Marxism paradoxically reinforces a wide-spread prejudice that philosophical exercises are incomprehensible for laymen. A Marxism that is meant to educate the subaltern groups but which does not evolve out of the workers perceptions, original or appropriated, cannot but remain an external force imposed on the working class as whole.

The other philosophical tendency Gramsci subjects to a rigorous scrutiny is represented by Benedetto Croce's view of the "popular element". Croce (1866-1952), by his association with the French Syndicalist, Georges Sorel, sustained a radical image for himself and had during the pre-fascist period considerable influence on the young intellectuals of the Italian Left. This is one of the main reasons why Gramsci devotes himself at length to a rigorous critique of what could be
called Crocean leftism. Croce, influenced by the hermeneutic tradition in Italy, considered 'common sense' as a set of views expressed by the 'ordinary' folk and treated it as the source as well as the content of each and every philosophical system. Everything under Croce's right, every philosophical system. One would find, Croce felt, each and every philosophical idea in the world of commonsense. It would mean, for example, that Hegel's search for the Absolute Idea was in a sense akin to certain philosophical urges within ordinary people. What Weber explains as the 'charismatic' leadership could be traced back to its roots in the commonsense of common people. So on and so forth. In Gramsci's (1971:422) own words:

"In Croce, the proposition that all men are philosophers has an excessive influence on his judgement about common sense. It seems that Croce often likes to feel that certain philosophical propositions are shared by commonsense. But what can this mean concretely?"

Gramsci finds the Crocean formulations in its concrete forms highly unsatisfactory. As he (1971:422) argues "...one can find there (in commonsense) anything that one likes". And precisely because it can be made to contain 'anything', commonsense is a chaotic aggregate of perceptions in a worker's everyday life. Its fascinating character is the contradictory quality in itself which, as we will see below, unlike the philosophical systems, is not very coherent and systematic. This is the essential difference between the cognitive maps of the 'ordinary' workers and the philosophical systems elaborated by 'extraordinary' individuals or a 'school' of thought — a distinction Croce fails to establish. The history of philosophy, as Gramsci argues, is in certain senses a 'resolution' of contradictions in the world of commonsense, not just a mirror 'reflection' of it. Croce, on the other hand, tends to treat it as a simple reflection of the commonsensical world and thereby, he undermines the questions of historical growth of philosophical systems which are, in fact, nothing but the 'highpoints' of progress made by the history of commonsense (Gramsci, 1971: 330-331).
Thus, there is, as Gramsci admits a form of affinity between a philosophical system and a structure of common sense --- the kinds of affinities Croce exaggerates without being able to establish their distinctions. In the Gramscian scheme, the form of affinity between bourgeois philosophies and the subaltern percepts is always external. They impose themselves on the 'original thought' of the subaltern groups and create/recreate the limits to the progress of a subaltern's knowledge-process (Gramsci, 1971: 419-20). This they do either by patronising common sense as meaningful on its own or by condemning it as superstitious non-sense. In both cases, further development of working-class consciousness is impossible. And, this is central to a hegemony process.

The tendency to ignore the subaltern percepts as in Bukharin, or to patronise them as in Croce, are not merely historical misconstructions of subaltern percepts in hegemony processes, but also misconstruing the externality in the relationship between the "feelings" of the popular element and reasoning/understanding of the philosophical systems elaborated by the traditional intellectuals of the bourgeois society. A mere critique of the dominant ideologies and structures is not likely to break with the external relations which these ideologies have in relation to working class 'percepts'. It is also necessary to recognise the 'originality' in the subaltern groups even when they are subject to the direction/domination of the ruling bloc. What is 'original' about the thought process of subaltern groups situated within hegemony processes? What is its nature? Is it possible, as some people ask, to think of a domain of thought 'original' to certain groups who are by definition subaltern? Are these questions relevant for a political theory? An attempt has been made below to answer these questions by presenting the Gramscian schema and also certain illustrations from Indian cases in order to elaborate the scheme.
Only on the basis of a Marxian notion of totality is Gramsci trying to examine the nature of working-class 'commonsense' in the hegemony process. As he defines the 'common sense' of the subaltern groups in space and time, the structure of common sense appears to be contradictory in character: protests yesterday and subordination today, social satires of upper-class norms even when subject to their control, millenarian hopes entwined with fatalistic submission, undertaking a coup in a factory while expecting the state agents to 'assist', faith in the national/provincial elite in delivering 'benefits' accompanied by a simultaneous process of resentment against the behaviour of local state officials, and so on. These are a few cases of 'contradictions' in working-class consciousness — a 'contradiction' that is central to their own 'being' as subaltern, i.e. subject to a broader hegemony process. Gramsci (1971:333) describes the nature of 'contradiction' of a worker's consciousness as follows: "His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed".

In the English usage, as seen in the above passage, the term is 'contradictory consciousness'. However, for our analytical purposes, we would prefer, as Gramsci himself rigorously argues, 'commonsense'/ 'contradictory commonsense' as a cultural category analytically distinct from the forms of 'consciousness' associated with the philosophical systems. The term 'contradictory consciousness' is not likely to serve the purpose. We prefer 'contradictory-commonsense' as an analytical concept to help us identify certain forms of consciousness of subaltern groups.
The concept of contradictory commonsense does not merely refer to the nature of the perceptions of subaltern 'groups'. It also covers a set of 'feelings' often associated with the life-processes of 'individual' members of the working classes and peasants. James Freeman's (1979) construct of the lower-caste Muli's perceptions does indicate contradictory dimensions in Muli's thought structure. Muli, a Bauri (caste) by birth in a village near Bhubaneswar, earns his livelihood as a poor peasant, as a construction worker and also as a pimp by supplying wealthy upper-caste men with his own caste women. Muli's account of the norms of upper-caste men and women varies from rationalisation to ridicule. In Freeman's (1979:384) words:

"Muli displayed a wide range of behaviours in different situations, with different and with the same high-caste people: he frequently played up to generous landowning masters, construction employers or upper-caste customers for his prostitutes, pretending loyalty but privately ridiculing their behaviours and ideals. Muli's acquiescence to his superiors did not mean that he accepted his lot".

Gramsci's concept of contradictory commonsense is thus about a specific structure of working-class consciousness located in space and time. Since its structure, as Gramsci (1971:419) argues, is "not .... identical in time and space", it means two things: first, when the episodes/moments of subaltern activity, unaided by a systematic theory, are treated over time and across space, the forms of consciousness remain at variance with one another; and secondly, the everyday forms of consciousness of an individual or a subaltern group may be dichotomous in character.

While a worker may have the urge to struggle for a better future, he may not be sure of others joining him in the struggle, and consequently, he may accept the status quo as fate. Sometimes, the workers may like himself or his children to be superior to him, a petty-bourgeois perhaps. On other occasions, as Cohen (1979:25) argues, he might well
agree with what Eugene Debbs said, "I don't want to rise above the working class. I want to rise with them." There may, thus, be a contradiction between the trans-class aspirations on the one hand and the egalitarian aspirations on the other, both simultaneously embedded in working-class 'commonsense'.

Such cases may be episodic. The point, however, is that each episode contributes to a totality and also, a relative totality—its—itsself. The urge to struggle for a better future, the uncertainties in its coordination and, the consequent tendency to accept Fate may well constitute distinct dimensions united in an episode—a micro-totality. The urge to struggle for a better future can indeed be seen historically in opposition to the tendency to accept, however reluctantly, one's own objective position. Even in cases where the worker has accepted the 'destiny' assigned to him by the bourgeois ideologies, fatalism being an active will of the workers, one may in all probability trace here the sediments of a past rebellion or the elementary aspects of a probable insurgency. This is in essence what is meant by contradictions in the commonsense of subaltern groups, especially when they are subject to the domination/direction of the ruling bloc.

**Commonsense as a Concept of 'Immediacy'**

We have so far tried to examine the internal character of the structure of commonsense. Now it is necessary to relate it to a totality of space and time.

As Gramsci (1971:348) argues, the commonsensical views are directly received from the structure. It is meaningful in its immediate surroundings of space and time, even though it may have certain false conceptions of a totality. It has in a sense certain direct affiliations with the object of 'immediacy'. The distant objects in a totality, from a commonsensical view, seem to be the external ones. The internal character of the external objects are not intuitively grasped; at least,
not in the same way as the immediate objects are grasped. Given below
are two illustrations: (a) a case of tribals and peasants in the
Gandhamardan movement; (b) a case of peasants meant as target groups in a
poverty-amelioration programme.

(a) The case of the Gandhamardan people:

In a study of the Gandhamardan movement, it is found that
tribals and peasants, aggrieved by the destruction of their ecology caused
by mining activities, have been struggling for about two-and-half years
against a Central Government mining project conducted by BALCO in
Raikmala (Sambalpur District). While they hold the local Congress MP and
MLAs responsible for the "fate" inflicted upon them by the BALCO "asur"
(demon), they wait for Rajiv Gandhi to perform the "saviour's" role. For
a Central Government project engaged in the destruction of the Gandhamardan
Hills, the Rajiv Sarkar is not held responsible for their Fate. The
Prime Minister is rather treated as an external agent rather than someone
internally connected with the whole process of mining activities in a
Central Government Project. On the contrary he is believed by Raikmal's
poor peasants and tribals as their "Bhagwan" (God) who only could save them
from an impending ecological disaster inflicted upon them by a nexus of
local Balco officials, the BDO and the local Sarpanch, MLAs and the Congress
MP.

(b) The case of rural development target groups:

This is a case of ten Fana families (a scheduled caste group) in
Digapahandi Block (Ganjam District) who were selected as beneficiaries of
a poverty amelioration programme, viz., Economic Rehabilitation of Rural
Poor (ERRP). The programme was launched during the sixth plan period and
was sponsored by the Orissa Government. In this village, out of twenty
potential targets from among marginal and agricultural labourers, ten
families were selected. Each of them was given ten goats. The total project
cost of a goatery scheme stood at Rs.2,200/- which comprised of the subsidy
amount of Rs.1,650/- and the loan amount of Rs.550/- (i.e., 25% of the project cost). The cost of ten goats allotted to each family stood at Rs.1,500/- and the rest of the project money was meant for the follow-up processes in buying fodder, medicines etc. for the goats.

The purpose of the ENRP programme is to help the 'landless poor', the 'agricultural labour' and the 'marginal farmer', i.e., those peasant groups officially called the "poorest of the poor", having a maximum of 2½ acres of land and Rs.1,200/- as annual income. These groups are allotted some productive resources like grater, pigsty, dairy, poultry, cashew plantation etc., with an expectation of generating some incomes (worth Rs.3000/- to Rs.4000/- annually) leading to their rehabilitation above the poverty line.

When the beneficiaries were first selected in 1981, there was no drum-beating in the village to make people aware of the scheme. Rather, the scheme was allotted to certain groups already known to the Block officials who allegedly consulted a village elder in deciding the target groups. Anyway, among the ten beneficiaries who were selected, there was a retired peon who was educated in primary school and was previously working in the Tehsil office. Except him, all the others were illiterate. Since he was also an elderly person, he took it as an obligation to his family members to approach the Village Level (VLW) and other Block officials and to plead for some benefits for his relatives. Except his family which owned 1½ acres land, the other target families had virtually no land. Most of them depended on seasonal employment in agriculture or in the nearby forests.

For them the government scheme came as a major gift in 'due' recognition of their poverty. In their anxiety to be selected first, they paid some 'commissions' to the Village Level Worker (VLW); they knew pretty well that if they did not pay, others would be selected in their place.
True, one of them argued, they would have preferred a Jersey Cow or a buffalo scheme. But that did not mean that they should give up an offer of ten goats. As he said, quoting an oriya Proverb: "A blind uncle is better than no uncle" (in English equivalent: 'something is better than nothing'). Thus, when they were allotted the goatery scheme, they accepted it though not as enthusiastically as they would have if they had been offered a dairy scheme.

After the selection was over, the ten beneficiaries were informed by the technical officers to proceed to a butcher's shop at the nearby town, Aska, 20 Kms. away from their village, to buy 100 'quality' goats. The 'illiterate' peasants found there a number of goats, but were thoroughly dissatisfied with most because of their 'bad' quality; these goats, they felt, were physically weak and vulnerable to local diseases. When they complained about this, the Veterinary doctor allegedly retorted angrily: "Do you know more than I do?" The peasants withdrew from any further argument when the doctor assured them that he would help in taking care of the goats. The beneficiaries, along with a hundred goats, were sent back in a truck to their village, and the officials of the purchasing committee returned after paying the 'necessary' amounts to the merchant.

Two months later, when the goats began to be affected by diseases, the target groups with their diseased animals turned up for help from the Veterinary surgeon (VAS) and were given prescriptions. When some goats were killed by the disease, they 'managed' to get death certificates from the VAS who, along with other members of the purchasing committee were believed by the beneficiaries to have connived in the selection of 'poor quality' goats. A year and a half after their allotment they were left with about six goats each, and none of the families had been 'rehabilitated' above the poverty line. At that time, the most nagging question which faced them was how to pay the bank loans of about Rs. 550/- each. All of them had twice gone to the Block to 'clarify' the bank position. One of them asked: "Should we now sell the rest of the goats to repay the bank loan and
lead life as we did before, or should we keep the goats and struggle
to earn whatever we can by selling its milk in order to maintain a semblance
of escape from our earlier situation?"

Let us recount this process once again and add a few more facts.
The local elites knew pretty well that according to the state government
guidelines, not more than 10 beneficiaries could be selected from each
village. In this particular village, there were more than 10 families of
poor peasants who could claim to be potential beneficiaries. This means
that the government scheme could not cover potential targets. On the
one hand, this introduced among the claimants an intense competition to
snatch the Sarkari gift first and thus made them vulnerable to the
'demands'/'expectations' of the Block officials. On the other hand, it
was also responsible for the officials' manipulation of the target groups.
The official could well expect the peasants to offer him 'commissions'
to have their names included in the selection proforma. Peasants also knew
quite well that they might lose a programme of ten goats worth ₹1,500 to
others who might pay the necessary commissions. The manipulation of the
selection process by Block officials was not at all beyond their grasp,
and they were prepared to make their own strategic decisions accordingly.

The peasants felt cheated when their 'knowledge' in judging
the quality of the goats was ignored by the officials. Their ability in
deciding which were the 'good' quality goats was challenged by the
literate technical officials of the purchasing committee. The peasants
were left with no option but to take whatever goats were available at that
moment with the local trader. When the livestock turned out to be of poor
quality, and the scheme did not turn out to be as successful as was
expected at the beginning, the peasants started indulging in some sort of
counterfeit thinking. One of them argued: "had we been allotted those
'good-looking' goats........had our 'knowledge' been accepted by the
'babus' (in the purchasing committee)........had we been allowed to buy the
livestock from a different merchant........our Fate probably would have been
different ......who knows...." This was a form of fatalistic thinking which,
in this case, represented an active will of the peasants. For this was an indication of their resentment of the officials' behaviour. 'Fatalism' is not necessarily only passive; the active element is clearly discernible in this case.

Yet the scheme is also seen as a 'gift' of a 'good' Sarkar, a package offered and received as patronage, a gift for the amelioration of their poverty. Even after an experience of two and half years with the goatery scheme, one of the beneficiaries retrospectively argued: "The Sarkar understood our problems; offered us this scheme. But the 'babus' came in the middle and caused problems for us. At least, something was better than nothing". Thus, a beneficiary tends to think of 'good' programmes as 'gifts' from a 'good' government, spoiled only by a nexus of 'intermediary' groups which always come between himself and the 'good' government. He tends to appreciate the good intentions of a Government situated at a distance. He tends to identify the local officials of the Block, the Bank and the Veterinary centre located in his immediate proximity as primarily responsible for frustrating the Sarkar's policy. The Government package of goats, Jersey cows, fish, coconut plants etc. are seen as gifts to help them in relieving their poverty. But the local merchants and bureaucrats, they feel, are 'jealous' of the Government's attention towards them and do not let the gifts pass to them easily. It needs to be noted that such beliefs are reinforced by the Sarkari people themselves (Ministers, for instance) when addressing loan 'melas'/village 'melas' and also, though for a different audience, by Planning Commission economists speaking at seminars. In fact, it is not as though political leaders and economists do not know what they are saying when they single out this nexus of 'intermediary' groups as primarily responsible in frustrating the 'good' attempts made by planners in formulating the poverty-amelioration schemes. It is necessary for planners to project a neutral and benevolent image and to lay the blame for the failure of their policies on the 'implementing' agencies.
For the peasants, the 'fraud, cheating and grabbing' by local officials are not difficult to grasp. That the government scheme itself has only a limited focus which provides the potential ground for the local officials to manipulate it is, however, an understanding not easily obtainable by the target groups themselves. The Sarkar's overall failures in resource mobilisation to implement the schemes in time, in mass mobilisation to check the so-called "corruption" of local officials, are not within the reach of their 'commonsense'. A continuous yearly backlog of 50% to 60% in fund allotment by the State Government is too heavy a constraint even for 'good' local officials to implement the Block Action Plan effectively. On the other hand, why is it the case that despite so much talk in village rallies against 'bad' officials and merchants, the programme is still implemented, if not implemented the same way? Why is it that the programme continues to rely on the 'bad' officials (BDO, Bank Branch Manager, Veterinary doctor etc.) as the 'principal agents' in implementing the rural development? Why is it that poor peasants, whose 'amelioration' the programme seeks, are treated as nothing more than passive 'receivers' of the programme? What do all these questions mean politically? Neither these questions nor their answers are easily accessible to the 'commonsense' of the target groups. Nor are these questions asked or answered by planning commission economists or by the Ministers/MLAs addressing public rallies in the villages.

For the moment, let us consider how the above case of rural development target groups brings out the two crucial dimensions of the structure of commonsense: commonsense as a contradictory thought-process and yet a meaningful thought-process of the immediate reality.

As we noted above, the government scheme seems to be a 'good' gift to the poor peasants, and only the local officials are the 'bad' lot. This may be because of a direct relationship between the target groups and the local state officials on the one hand and a mediated relationship between the Government scheme and the target groups on the other.
paternalistic programme of a Sarkar located at a distance seems to carry with it a 'good' intent. The local officials are seen as the main oppressors and the higher-ups in the State hierarchy as "ameliorators" presumably because the immediate society has nothing to offer the peasant except their "bondage". This is precisely the contradictory quality in commonsense perceptions of the State apparatus. Unable to establish the internal connections within the State, it contraposes one unit vis-a-vis another. It expects 'liberation' from the distant unit, while, it treats the immediate unit as its main oppressor.

The commonsensical views are thus incapable of establishing on its own 'the laws of interconnections' among the objects in their totality. And this is why commonsense in the final analysis is fragmentary. As the above cases show, however, it is a meaningful perception of the immediate situation in a totality of space and time. It is capable of perceiving the immediate actors who are responsible for its 'fate'. While the questions of 'immediacy' are central in the structure of commonsense, the distant objects, unlike the immediate ones, do not usually form the internal and directly received elements in its structure. The interconnections between the immediate and distant objects are not self-revealing to the sense-perceptions of the subaltern groups — a point which needs to be studied separately.

Commonsense as a Category of "Original Thought"

One of the most crucial dimensions of subaltern commonsense is its originality. It is a creative thought-process of the subaltern groups. Some rationalisations of their subordination might have been constructed by themselves. Some dissent, discontents and counter-points might have been offered by the subaltern themselves. Such a thought-process could well be directly received by the subaltern groups from the structure/traditions proper, and not necessarily from the traditional intellectuals.
The point to be recognised, for example, is that the religious beliefs often attributed by the subalterns themselves to their subordination/struggle may not be fully consistent with the religious values prescribed to them by the dominant bloc. Each subaltern group may have its own specific religious discourse, different from the religious values prescribed to them by the intellectuals of the ruling classes. In Gramsci's (1971:420) words:

"Every religion, even Catholicism (indeed Catholicism more than any, precisely because of its efforts to retain 'a surface' unity and avoid splintering into national churches and social stratifications), is in reality a multiplicity of distinct and often contradictory religions: there is one Catholicism for the peasants, one for the petty-bourgeoisie and town workers, one for women, and one for intellectuals which is itself variegated and disconnected."

One notices certain trends of 'originality' in case of the tribal activists of the 'Gandhamardan Andolan'. While the Gandhamardan Surakhya Samiti, consisting of the Lohia Socialist youths and Janata Party members, is thoroughly against the Congress (I) leadership, some of the local tribals actively associated with the movement expect Rajiv Gandhi to play a "Saviour's" role. In fact, one of the organisers was surprised when he was told about this image of Rajiv Gandhi popular in certain pockets of the movement. Tribals have offered their own meanings to the struggle. This is the 'originality' directly received from their own traditions, not prescribed to them by the organisers.

One also notices the same process at work with the peasants' experiences with the local state officials engaged in the implementation of the poverty alleviation programmes. That the local officials are a 'bad' lot is within their grasp because the peasants directly experience their 'fraud, cheating and grabbing'. When the provincial leaders talk in the village rallies about this 'fraud' they probably reinforce/systematise the peasants' "feelings" which are already present in their thought process.
What is however crucial in the Gramscian scheme is that this process of "original thought" of the subalterns is essentially contradictory in character. In the normal life of a hegemonic system, there are not merely rationalisations of the hegemony process, there are also different forms of dissent constructed by subaltern groups themselves. Finding a convergence with another anthropological study, Freeman (1979:397) makes a similar point:

"On the basis of evidence from many stratified societies, Berreman concludes that 'no group of people is content to be low in a caste hierarchy — to live a life of inherited deprivation and subjection — regardless of the apparent stability of the system and regardless of the rationalisations offered by their superiors or constructed by themselves'.

Thus, even when "rationalisations" of the caste/class system are offered by the lower castes/classes, there are evidences to show the proliferation of discontent and resentment about their subordination in a hierarchical society. This seems to be precisely the character of the "original thought" of subaltern groups and the nature of contradictions embedded in this thought.

IV

We have so far discussed Gramsci's critique of certain treatments of subaltern consciousness. We have also offered an interpretation of the Gramscian scheme on the subject. There are two mere issues which need to be raised in this paper. Firstly, how are the cognitive maps of the subaltern groups brought into the fold of hegemony processes, and why so? And what is its history in a concrete social formation? Secondly, what sorts of attempts have been made in a specific society to resolve the 'contradictory commonsense' of the subaltern groups? And how can Marxism as an autonomous philosophy provide for...
society a theory to 'overcome' the contradictions in the percepts of the subaltern groups? The first question pertains to the relationship between the subaltern groups and the hegemony process; the second question is about the relationship of the subaltern groups to the counter-hegemony process. Given below is a brief review of Marxist theories on these two processes.

Marxist studies on the hegemony process have a tendency to treat subaltern consciousness either as an outcome of an 'appropriation' of bourgeois values, or its 'inversion'. The logic of appropriation in this case presupposes a very definite process of duplication of decadent bourgeois values by workers who, by doing so, ensure stability within the system. The analytical stress here is obviously on the mode of communication, i.e., on how the whole gamut of ruling ideas are manufactured and subsequently propagated among the subaltern groups, and how these ideas are reproduced by subalterns themselves. This may be called a hegemony theory in the Marxist tradition.

The logic of inversion, on the other hand, lays stress on more structural dimensions like the treatment of consequences as the cause, object as subject, and so on. A producer no longer knows what becomes of the product. The link between production and consumption is 'lost sight of' in the market. The purpose for which he produces is constantly contradicted by the consequences. The workers are forced to sell their 'labour-power' without knowing what they are doing. The workers are dissociated from any control over the labour-process without any knowledge of it. The workers produce more than what they receive without knowing that they do so. These are a few crucial meanings of 'inversion' in the structural sense. The whole idea of 'losing sight of' one's subjectivity, one's own potentialities, the causality of one's own action, means only this: the working class is tied to the totality of "structural antagonisms" in bourgeois society without any knowledge of being so tied; it is consequently 'duped' by the possibilities in the bourgeois system. This logic of inversion is typical of what may be termed as a structural theory in Marxism.
Both approaches the former emphasizing the working class appropriation of bourgeois values (consciousness) and the latter stressing the subaltern inversion of bourgeois positions (structure) as the respective keys to the stability of the system, may be treated as two sides of the False Consciousness School in Marxism. Both approaches tend to treat working-class consciousness in hegemony processes as some kind of concealment of the "structural antagonisms" in bourgeois society. Corresponding to their approaches, both seem to be respectively satisfied with the critique of the 'dominant ideologies' (Ruling Ideas) and 'structural antagonisms' (Dominate Structure). They, consequently, ignore or more often dismiss a proposal to recognize the cognitive processes original to the 'being' of the subaltern groups.

As we have argued in the last section, at least, some cognitive processes of the subaltern groups in the hegemony process are in a crucial sense created by the subalterns themselves. Both approaches within the False Consciousness School have completely ignored this process. Gramsci's concept of contradictory commonsense, as seen above, recognizes "the original thought" of the subaltern groups, even when they are subordinated to a ruling bloc. Hence, this conceptual innovation in the Gramscian scheme for a study of subaltern consciousness in the hegemony process may be considered as a significant departure from the hegemony theory as well as the structural theory in Marxism. The recognition of the crucial distinctions in the belief systems upheld by different classes in the complex of class struggles has a critical significance for a Marxist political theory.

Now the question which remains to be answered is: how is 'the original thought' of the subalterns brought into the fold of the hegemony process; i.e. how is a "pedagogical relationship" established between the contradictory commonsense of the subaltern groups and the ruling ideas largely initiated by the ruling bloc?
We offer a very sketchy answer to these questions by placing an interpretation of a passage in Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire which may form a starting-point of an inquiry into the above questions. Marx is trying to answer what seems to us one of the crucial questions of his time: how was Louis Bonaparte able within three years of his rule to establish an effective "pedagogic relationship" with the most numerous sections of French society, the peasant groups? The answer is offered by Marx himself:

"This point should be clearly understood: the Bonaparte dynasty represents the conservative, not the revolutionary peasant: the peasant who wants to consolidate the condition of his social existence, not the peasant who strikes out beyond it. It does not represent the country people who want to overthrow an old order by their own energies, in alliance with the towns, but the precise opposite, those who are gloomily enclosed within this old order and want to see themselves and their small holdings saved and given preferential treatment by the ghost of the Empire. It represents the peasant's superstition, not his enlightenment; his prejudice, not his judgement; his past, not his future; his modern Vendee, not his modern Cevennes". (Marx, 1973:240)

On the one hand, the series of perceptions of the French peasantry under Bonapartist hegemony may be characterised as a series within the peasant's contradictory consciousness: his prejudice vis-a-vis his judgement; his superstition vis-a-vis his enlightenment; his nostalgia for the past vis-a-vis his hopes for a better future; his ability in creating a modern royalist revolt as an Vendee vis-a-vis his ability to create a movement for "freedom of conscience" as in Cevennes (1702-5). On the other hand, the Bonapartist ideology initiated by "the ghost of the Empire" represented only one 'level' of the series. It established during three years of "hard rule" a pedagogic relationship with one segment of consciousness, not the other in the series. At the same time, its inability to represent to the "precise opposite" of what it represented indicated certain crucial limits to its own way of establishing its ideological hegemony over the French peasantry. True, it
did not represent the French peasants' enlightenment, its judgement about a better future and its ability to fight for freedom from royalism. Yet, by representing the other segments from within the series, Bonaparte in a process of hard struggle was able to emerge as "the patriarchal benefactor" of the French peasantry.

This seems to be a process by which, we suggest, the commonsense of the subaltern groups are brought into an affinity with the principles of the ruling bloc. It is necessary to explore in detail how this affinity, as Marx suggests, is established in concrete historical cases. When the Ministers in loan melas single out only the local state officials as mainly responsible for 'fraud, cheating and grabbing', they do seem to be reinforcing the beliefs already existing in the peasants' world. In this sense, the official mobilisation of the masses in loan melas/village rallies where schemes are allotted may be seen as attempts of the provincial/national leaders in representing certain levels of the peasant's view of "bad life" inflicted upon them by local bureaucrats. More elaborate studies of this sort of problem are needed.

Now we return to the second set of questions raised in the last section. As Gramsci argues, one can ask a series of questions on the relationship between certain schools of thought of elite groups and the commonsense percepts of the subaltern blocs. One may ask, for example, what constitutes the relationship between the hegemonic systems of thought on the one hand and the percepts/structures for feeling of the subaltern groups on the other? Or, say, what constitutes the relationship between the counter-hegemonic strategies of "professional intellectuals" on the one hand and the structures of commonsense of the popular element on the other? Here we can discuss these problems only in a limited sense. We go back to the points raised in Section II and use
these as reference points to examine certain parallel tendencies in Marxist noticeable in recent times. Here, as in Section II, Gramsci's critique of Croce and Bukharin ought to be borne in mind.

In the Crocean scheme, as Gramsci argues, philosophy converges with common sense. Common sense is philosophy and philosophy is common-sensical. Common sense seems to be not merely the source of philosophy but also its 'content'. The forms, however, may be at variance with one another. When the philosophy of an elite group of intellectuals patronises 'common sense' as the sense of a society, it does not merely ignore the historical growth of an epistemology but also in a way serves a more contemporary political project of containing "little people" in their "little traditions" and thereby chokes and possibility of progress of their knowledge and traditions. Croce's philosophy patronizes the common man's common sense and inserts in the 'common' people a Fitch, Eco, "I = I". But a life proud of itself, "I = I" in the immediate sense is a stationary life. It would soon lose sight of its limits and would not be able to create the possibilities of its further growth. More precisely, it would miss the significance of being a 'Critique', i.e., would not be able to understand its own strengths and limitations and look for ways of overcoming the limits.

When a prose of insurgency is inspired by the Crocean perspective, it results in disasters for the socialist revolution. In the 'spontaneity' vs. 'organisation' debate, spontaneity seems to stand on Croce's side. Commonsense is basically a spontaneous philosophy of the multitude, meaningful in its 'immediate' surroundings. Thus a glorification of spontaneous movements, ignoring the limits of their 'logic', not to speak of their spatial and temporal limits, is necessary a glorification of commonsense and, consequently a glorification of 'immediacy' as opposed to a 'totality'. Ideas like spontaneous, uninterrupted militancy or the methods of annihilating the 'immediate' enemy without creating ideological awareness of a 'totality', do considerably undermine the perspective of a totality which is an ideology.
prerequisite for the creation of a revolutionary situation. Such
movements, however numerous and scattered they may be, are consistent
with Croce's project and seem to be rooted in a commonsensical
radicalism of the working classes who possibly in their everyday
existence have the urge for 'annihilation' of the 'immediate enemy',
uninterrupted militancy and so on and thus, now and then, tend to
accept the revolutionary protagonists of the Crocean frame.

The advocates of 'organisation', on the other hand, do seem to
tilt somewhat ironically in Bukharin's way. The votaries of
'organisation' stress the fact that for a socialist revolution to succeed,
it must be guided by an 'organisation' of the working class, a vanguard
of professional intellectuals armed with the 'instruments' of Historical
Materialism. The 'vanguard' undertakes the task of 'educating' the
working class which, presumably under the pernicious influences of the
ruling classes, has appropriated the decadent bourgeois values. The
primary task of 'organisation' in such cases is to enable the
revolutionary spirit to 'trickle down' among the workers by way of a
critique of bourgeois values (Ideas) or the exploitative social
relations (Structures) or both.

The immediate working-class consciousness in the hegemony
process is thus believed to be a bourgeois consciousness — an idea
perhaps deduced from one of Marx's formulations: "The ideas of the
ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas". Or else, how does
one interpret the logic of appropriation adopted by the hegemony theory?
The point to be noted, however, is that the working class under
bourgeois hegemony does not seem to have any 'subjectivity' except its
own 'being'. Even in cases where workers autonomously appropriate the
bourgeois values, they are treated no better than "self-acting mules".
The logic of appropriation, autonomous or not, means only one thing: that
bourgeois ideologies predominate the working classes in normal times.
The vanguard organisation and its intellectuals must consequently provide
a critique of bourgeois ideologies or the structural contradictions.
Bukharin's interpretation, if the protagonists of 'organisation' suggest anything at all, seems to be the dominant tendency still persisting within most sorts of Marxism. This is why it is significant today to recall Gramsci's treatment of the subject. As it comes from one of the leading spokesmen of the 'vanguard' tradition in Europe of the time, it is all the more significant to take into account his critique of the tendencies growing in the tradition. The protagonists of 'organisation' on the questions of hegemony, 'subjectivity', 'revolution spirit' and so on seem to be employing a notion of 'totality' which is some kind of an undifferentiated whole and is completely oblivious of the concepts of 'levels', 'distinctions', 'interconnections' established within a totality. The hegemonic subjectivity is believed to be a single whole. In spite of multiple classes in bourgeois society, all the ideas of society are believed to be ruling-class ideas. The subjectivity of the whole society is one and the same: bourgeois subjectivity. The subjective distinctions within the bourgeois whole are secondary or insignificant in character. What is crucial is its undifferentiated oneness. It is this sort of oneness which is presumed to have ensured the stability of the system. The question of 'revolutionary spirit' is also treated the same way. The counter-hegemony process is not seen as a series of feelings or percepts represented or transformed into "stable concepts by the workers themselves. In this perspective, the revolutionary urge does not seem to be central to the workers' "being". What is rather believed to be crucial is to treat the working class as a potential revolutionary force. Only via a revolutionary organisation, a worker becomes an actual revolutionary and realises his/her own 'being'. His 'being', due to its subjection to a hegemony process, does not on its own seem to determine his 'consciousness' until he is encountered by the 'vanguard'. His own consciousness in the hegemony process is only a 'reified' one, appropriated from the dominant classes. The revolutionary spirit must thus trickle down to the workers from the vanguard and its professional intellectuals.
Both the 'trickle down' hegemony theory and the corresponding 'trickle down' counter-hegemony strategies are analytically misplaced perspectives in the Marxist political tradition. For both considerably undermine the "original thought" of the subaltern groups, their own active will involved in hegemony as well as counter-hegemony processes. For the subjectivity that dominates is not the subjectivity of a whole society consisting of several classes. There are different types of subjectivity in consonance with the existence of different class groups. In a complex of class struggles, one subjectivity predominates the others but does not pre-empt the others' existence. The workers' original subjectivity in consonance with their existence in hegemony processes is not pre-empted by the fact of the subordination of workers to the ruling classes. In the process of continuous class struggles, what is probably central to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in how to produce and reproduce the limits on the original thought of the subaltern groups who constitute its basic opposites. 9

VI

CONCLUSIONS:

It is thus essential, a point which Gramsci reiterates, to examine on its own the original thought of the subaltern group — an elaboration independent of, but complementary to a critique of the social structure and its dominant ideologies. So long as Marxism ignores this question, its relationship with its own 'agency', supposed to be a base of its philosophy, would remain an external one. From this angle, in the journey from Crocean radicalism to a Bukharin-type Marxism, one probably leaps only from the fetish of working-class common sense to the extreme opposite of its objectification. In the latter case, Marxism is trapped within Enlightenment empiricism & its rationality. In the former version, it is paralysed by a critical theory tradition. Marxism is yet to attain the status of an autonomous philosophy with a capacity, as in the
present case, to unravel the cognitive maps of its 'own' agencies. Gramsci's concept of contradictory common sense, as stated above, offers a useful break with these traditions in Marxism and also supplies the elements for an adequate formulation of subaltern praxis tied within the hegemony process. It may, as Gramsci believes, offer a useful starting point to uncover a repository of percepts based on which an effective construction of Marxist theory and practice could be carried out. The journey in the elaboration or in a critique of a hegemony process, as Gramsci (1971:425) suggests, ought to "start in the first place in common sense, then secondly from religion, and only at a third stage move on to the philosophical systems elaborated by traditional intellectual groups."

A systematic examination of this journey is a long task. The present paper is only about its starting point.

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NOTES

1. For the broad generalisations offered by Gramsci himself, see especially the section, "Philosophy of Praxis" in Prison Notebooks (1971).

2. See, for example, works of Bailey (1971), Geertz (1973; 1975) & others.


4. The data presented here are from my field experiences and M.Phil dissertation; see, Patnaik (1984; 1987).

5. For a rigorous distinction between fatalism of professional intellectuals as a passive element and fatalism of the subalterns seen as an active process, see Gramsci (1971), p.337.


7. ibid.

8. For an excellent treatment of hegemony as a pedagogy among the different forces, see Mouffe (1979).

9. For now lower caste/class groups perceive certain attempts by the landlord/upper caste people as strategies in containing them in their original positions, cf. Alam (1985). "There has been very little 'upliftment' of our community except that some blatant forms of discrimination have gone. But the 'swarana' (upper caste people) think that we are getting too many benefits and forgetting our 'place'. So there is an opposite pressure by the powerful people to hold us back and keep us in place". This is one of the expressions of a harijan agricultural labourer (Alam, 1985:45).
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