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The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism

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I

Introduction

Marx's theoretical work was mainly concerned with the study of the capitalist mode of production, of its contradictions, development and revolutionary transformation. The demonstration of capitalism's historical specificity is central to his analysis. In The German Ideology, The Communist Manifesto, Capital (Volumes 1 and 3), and Grundrisse we have an amount of historical analysis to show how capitalism emerged out of the internal contradictions and structural transformation of feudalism. Some parts of Engels' Anti-Dühring also bear upon important issues of the same transition. As regards all this Marx made it clear that his discussions of historical development applied only to the course of history in western Europe. And so events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings led to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by the universal passport of a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical.1

The marxian theory of historical development is based on the necessary correspondence and conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production. Human society works and develops within the framework of an opposition, that between the exploiter and the exploited, which defines the specific contradiction of a mode of production as articulated in the distinct content of class struggle for a historical stage. Firstly in The German Ideology and then in The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels provided a broad resume of the course and turning points in history, indicating as well its
principal stages and revolutionary disjunctures of historical transformation. Marx emphasized the need to relate consciousness to the contradictions of socio-economic being and to comprehend a transformation in terms of its dialectics of material and ideological movements.  

Marx's synthesis of the results of historical development is tied to many significant considerations of structures and processes as we try to explore their complexities. This will be evident when we take up the points and counterpoints raised in the long and still continuing debate on the evidence and inferences regarding the transition from feudalism to capitalism. We have noted already that Marx himself cautioned against any straightforward application of his conclusions in Capital to historical experiences outside western Europe. More recent research reveals that variations in the patterns of feudal-capitalist transition were also significant among countries (e.g. England and France) of western Europe. Thus, a more general statement of Marx should be our guideline in appraising the main issues of the 'transition debate':

> Viewed apart from real history, these abstractions have in themselves no value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata. But they by no means afford a recipe or scheme, as does philosophy for neatly trimming the epochs of history.  

Admittedly, what is now known as 'the transition debate' offers a good amount of real history materials for testing a number of hypotheses regarding the emergence of capitalism. Two stages of the debate can be identified. The Dobb-Sweezy controversy during the 'fifties turned mainly on what would be the correct marxist explanation of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the light of European experience. The contributions of many noted economists and historians moved round the same theme. A pertinent question was raised by Georges Lefebvre when he wrote 'I believe
that the debate provoked by Dobb's book has now reached this point. It would seem futile and even dangerous to pursue it further in abstract terms. For how can we conform to the principles of experimental reason without recourse to historical scholarship and its rules? Giolffano Procacci's reactions were similar. He remarked that British marxists needed to back up their ideas with research which would match that of the established schools of non-marxist historiography which they were, in effect, challenging.

The second stage of the debate is less bound by such limitations. Robert Brenner's critiques of 'the demographic model', 'the commercialization model', 'the falling rent rate model' and 'world system model' are not only rich in fresh insights and developments of marxist analysis, but also utilize a mass of new and meaningful evidence on agrarian history, industrial and commercial evolution and demographic changes. Most of these materials were available by the 'sevenies' as a result of the growing volume and new directions of historical research in the period after the Second World War. While Brenner's critiques have been mainly addressed against non-marxist positions, his examination of Dobb's analysis, Sweezy's misconceptions and Bois' determinism are extremely significant. I shall try to give a summary of the main points of the debate (both in its first and second stages) in the next section. Some references will also be made to the debate on the seventeenth century crisis.

Along with our understanding of the historical experience of capitalist transition in Europe, we should take note of another problematic of global significance. Marx characterized capitalism to be universalistic in its urges. Indeed, that system's scope for internal national articulation was conditioned, among other things, by its capacity to encompass the whole world. From its very inception capitalism lived on the world. And, "the net effect of the rise of European capitalism was therefore to intensify uneven development, and to divide the world ever more sharply
into two sector; the 'developed' and the 'under-developed' countries, in other words the exploiting and the exploited. The triumph of capitalism at the end of the 18th century put the seal on this development. Capitalism, while no doubt providing the historic conditions for economic transformation everywhere, in fact made it more difficult than before for the countries which did not belong to the original nucleus of capitalist development or its immediate neighbours. 7 I shall conclude this paper touching upon the problems of transition relevant for such 'underdeveloped' countries. Some points about 'the transition debate' in Europe may then acquire some practical contemporary significance.

II

The Debate

(a) The Dobb-Sweezy Controversy 8 : Sweezy argued that the collapse of feudalism could only be explained as arising from causes external to the system. He placed emphasis on the growth of trade as the crucial factor accounting for the transition from feudalism to capitalism. According to Sweezy, feudalism is a system of production for use and long-distance trade had no determining role in the objects and methods of its production which catered to the producers' own consumption or to markets which were for the most part local. While Dobb held that overexploitation of labour, unproductive use of economic surplus and exhaustion of power and opportunities to increase the lords' revenue made the feudal mode increasingly untenable, Sweezy tried to show how long-distance trade could be a creative force and act as the key to the feudal ruling class's need for increased revenue in the later middle ages. Sweezy considered the following effects of an exchange economy to be sufficiently pervasive and powerful to ensure the breaking up of the pre-existing system of production: (i) the inefficiency of the manorial organisation of production was clearly revealed by the contrast with a more rational system of specialization and division
of labour, (ii) the very existence of exchange value as a massive economic fact tends to transform the attitude of producers, (iii) development of new tastes for consumption on the part of the feudal ruling class, and (iv) the attraction of towns, which were the centres and breeders of the exchange economy, for the servile population of the countryside. Admittedly the exchange economy would not necessarily imply the end of either serfdom or demesne farming. But the growth of towns as alternative centres of employment impelled the lords to grant concessions marking the elimination of serfdom. Further, manors were fundamentally inefficient and unsuited to production for the market. The association of commercial impact with 'second serfdom' of the sixteenth century and after in eastern Europe was explained by Sweezy in terms of its geography — the distance of these countries from the centre of the new exchange economy. It may be noted that most of Sweezy's arguments were based on the historical studies of Furenni.

There was a long time-gap between the decline of feudalism in western Europe during the fourteenth century and the beginning of the capitalist period in the second half of the sixteenth century at the earliest. Sweezy does not agree with Dobb's characterization of the intervening period as feudal. He considers 'pre-capitalist commodity production' as a transitional form in which the predominant elements were neither feudal nor capitalist. Marx's 'really revolutionary way' of industrial capital is interpreted by Sweezy as the launching of full-fledged capitalist enterprises in contrast to the slow development of the putting-out system. He doubts whether Marx was indicating in this context the growth of capitalists from the ranks of handicraft producers. Sweezy also disagreed with Dobb's views on the two distinct phases of original accumulation. In a subsequent rejoinder to Dobb's reply and Takahashi's comments (details given in the following paragraphs) Sweezy reiterated his emphasis on the role of trade and commodity production.
He held that 'the prime mover behind the development of western European feudalism' was not internal to the system.

I have set forth Sweezy's points in the beginning. This should enable us to place the core of Dobb's argument in contrast to that of Sweezy whose position was marked by several points of departure from the Marxian framework. Sweezy's emphasis on the role of exchange followed from his idea of feudalism as 'a system of production for use'. Brenner points to the basic anomaly of Sweezy's position: "it is to locate the system's potential for development in the capacities of its component individual units (thus, the emphasis on motivations), rather than in the system as a whole — specifically, in the overall system of class relations of production which determine/condition the nature of the interrelationships between the individual units and, in this manner, their operation and development. For Sweezy, then, it is the market relation which gives rise to new needs, engenders a 'profit motive' leading to specialization and the development of production, and which forces competition for survival. * * * In sum, Sweezy's entire account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is based on the implicit assumption that capitalism already exists." 9

In his Studies Dobb rejected the idea of any necessary connection between production for the market and production on the basis of wage labour. He focused on the nature of surplus extraction under feudalism characterized by extra-economic compulsion by feudal lords. Thus the nature of surplus generation, appropriation and use in the feudal mode of production would govern its 'law of motion' and bear upon the potentialities and limits of its production forces. Feudalism had its own dynamic phase (10th - 12th centuries) of expanding production based on the extension of cultivation, some technical improvements and extraction of surplus from a servile peasantry. The typical forms of using up surplus were however unproductive in nature. The peasant producers, though possessing some lands allotted to them, were deprived by the very
mechanism of surplus appropriation (labour, kind or money rents) of any significant means to raise levels of productivity. Such a scheme of things articulated the basic contradiction and class conflicts of feudalism and led to the long run feudal reality of over-exploitation and the crisis of feudal lords facing the need for increased revenues. The mode of production itself became untenable. Dobb indicated how the economic effects of trade and of merchant capital were themselves shaped by feudal class relations. Further, merchant capital is not directly involved in production and hence its source of profits lies in the ability to turn the terms and conditions of trade against petty producers in agriculture and industry. Thus monopolistic power and privilege had an important role in its mechanism of profit maximization. Such exploits of merchant capital could be well assimilated into the feudal mode of production and power.

Since the feudal crisis would not lead to its own solution, the factors accounting for the emergence of capitalism require further clarification. Dobb made the following points: (i) There were regions where serfdom was superseded by contractual relations or even the rise of peasant property. Such a course of events was observed in most countries of western Europe. In eastern Europe seignioral reaction succeeded in reinforcing the system of feudal exploitation. Dobb refers to the relative powers of the nobility and the peasantry and their struggle in explaining such differences. The role of the absolutist states came to be pertinent. This line of argument is blurred by Dobb’s overemphasis on economic factors which, in his opinion, must have exercised the outstanding influence. Brenner remarks that the point at issue is decisive class struggles determining the maintenance of feudal class relations or their transformation. He does not agree with Dobb’s view that political factors, while being contributory, “can hardly be regarded as sufficient to account for the differences in the course of events in various parts of Europe,” and that “All the indications suggest that in deciding the outcome economic factors must have exercised the outstanding influence.”12 For Brenner,
it is not the economic factor as such but the specific and decisive nature of the class struggles which determine whether feudal class relations are maintained or transformed. $^{13}$

(ii) Dobb attached considerable importance to the growth of capitalist elements from the ranks of direct producers released from feudal constraints and engaged in the petty mode of production. In the English example, the crucial role of the petty mode of production in agriculture can be traced from the commutation movement (14/15-central) through peasant enclosures to the overall part played by the yeomanry in centuries of agrarian transformation. In the non-agricultural sphere, it was the class of small and medium capitalists who struggled to become independent of big commercial capital and acted in favour of tendencies towards capitalist industrialization. Here again the long story of the transformation of craft guilds and the place of guild masters therein needs to be recalled for an understanding of the historical roots of England's pioneering industrial revolution.

(iii) Dobb characterized the English Revolution of 1640 as the decisive moment of bourgeois transition and seizure of political power. We have already noted the difficulties of clarifying the nature of the previous period from the feudal decline of the 14th century to the end of the 16th century. The 1640 revolution was, for Dobb, one in which artisans and yeomen (now-become-capitalists) made a bourgeois revolution against landlords and merchants. Brenner raises some critical questions on the point. $^{14}$ We shall discuss this issue in the sub-section on absolutism.

In his contribution to the debate Takahashi emphasized that the fundamental processes of the passage to capitalism were connected with change in the social existence-form of labour power as distinguished by the separation of the means of production from the direct producers. This is how the self-movements (the contradictions of inner structure) of
a petty mode of production within feudal society came to have primary importance. Such changes at the basis of feudal society contributed to productivity advance, relaxation of feudal constraints and eventually to polarities and feudal disintegration, thus creating the new capitalist relationships. As regards the effects of trade, Takahashi pointed out that even in western Europe commercial impact produced no uniform results in different countries (e.g. Britain and France), a feature much more clarified now in the recent writings of Brenner.

Takahashi focused on the essentially feudal character of the period of nearly two centuries (14th-16th centuries) between the disappearance of serfdom and the inception of the capitalist era. For him, it would be wrong to regard money rents, relaxation of feudal bondage and increase in commodity production as sufficient proof for the abolition of feudalism.

Takahashi considered the basic economic process of the bourgeois revolution to be the abolition of feudal production relations, in accordance with the development of industrial capital. In this connection, he made a clear distinction between the different modes of surplus generation and appropriation (i.e. feudal, commercial, industrial) and indicated how Marx's 'two ways' of capitalist development were connected with the encounter between the commercial and industrial modes and the pattern of its resolution in the transition to capitalism. Takahashi did not approve of Dobb's position which mixed up the 'producer-merchant way' with the 'putting out' system. In particular, he pointed to Dobb's identification of 'putting out' with the domestic system which remained the most typical form of production in 17th century England.

(b) Demography, Commercialization, Falling rate of rent: The demographic model (also known as the neo-Malthusian and the neo-Ricardian model) interprets long-term developments under feudalism and also its conditions of transition to capitalism by postulating a homeostatic system or an
ecosystem, with a built-in mechanism of self-correction. Le Roy Ladurie, a leading proponent of this model, remarked "Malthus came too late", implying that the long-term trends of the feudal economy conformed to the malthusian sequence of population growth outstripping food supply and then with the operation of checks like famine/starvation, followed by demographic decline or collapse resulting in trends in income distribution opposite to that of the first phase. Obviously, the assumptions are (i) an economy’s inability to raise agricultural productivity and (ii) a natural tendency of population increase on a limited supply of land. A population upswing would then be associated with the terms of trade running against industry and in favour of agriculture, falling wages, rising food prices, and rising rents. Postan and Le Roy Ladurie tend to apply this two-phase model to the entire period between roughly 1050 and 1800.

Postan covers the period from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries of which the 12/13th were marked by population upswing and the 14/15th by demographic decline. His central point is that the questions of peasant freedom or unfreedom, the extra-economic relationships between lords and peasants, and the burden of customary and additional obligations of the peasantry can be more or less directly assimilated to the supply/demand demographic model. The trends were reversed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries leading eventually to the fall of serfdom.

Le Roy Ladurie indicates an upward push in population during the sixteenth century followed by demographic catastrophes in the seventeenth century. The corresponding trends in the distribution of income and land are similar to those traced by Postan for the previous long cycle. While the demographic decline of the seventeenth century had different structural consequences for the peasantry in Britain and France, Le Roy-Ladurie stressed the decisive role of the demographic factor in shaping the nature and sequence of transition.
Both Postan and Le Roy Ladurie make severe criticisms of the commercialization model which assigns to the growth of trade and the market the crucial role in determining the decline of serfdom and eventually the rise of capitalist agriculture. While agreeing with their critique, Brenner argues that neither Postan nor Le Roy Ladurie goes to the root of the problem. The main thrust of Brenner's argument places the development of class structure and its effects at the centre of analysis.

Brenner considers the demographic model to be subject to the same limitations as that of the trade-centred approach; a neglect of class structure and its effects. As a result we get no adequate answers to what Brenner holds to be the two fundamental problems for a proper understanding of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Such problems, according to Brenner, relate to (i) the decline versus the persistence of serfdom and its effects and (2) the emergence and pre-eminence of secure small peasant property versus the rise of landlord-large tenant farmer relations on the land.

By comparing the different historical experiences of eastern and western Europe, Brenner indicates that the factors taken to be of causal significance in the demographic and commercialization models led to the decline of serfdom (west) and contrarily to its intensification in the east. The demographic model argues that population decline enabled the peasantry to win their freedom since conditions of labour scarcity impelled the lords to offer better terms to the peasants. Brenner points to the other 'logic' from the lords' viewpoint which, given the basic surplus-extraction relationship of the feudal mode, would move the lords to tighten their control over the peasantry. And, "both 'logics' are unassailable from different class viewpoints. It was the logic of the peasant to try to use his apparently improved bargaining position to get his freedom. It was the logic of the landlord to protect his position by
reducing the peasants' freedom." The result was decided by the outcome, different for different regions, of the intense Europe-wide lord-peasant conflict throughout the later fourteenth, fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, over the same central issue.

As regards the problem of emergence and development of agrarian capitalism, Brenner makes his point by contrasting the French and English experiences. In England, the decline of serfdom was not followed by freehold control over land by the peasantry. As early as 1381, the English peasantry was differentiated enough for the articulation of a distinct rich peasant programme at the time of the revolt. The process developed through the subsequent centuries in which a section of the yeomanry and better-off husbandmen were producing food or wool for the market, themselves employing wage-labour and among whom landlords found their tenant-farmers. On the other hand, the outlook of landlords on land use and mode of exploitation was undergoing changes. This was further helped by the sale of lands from the elder nobility to those emerging from the sphere of commerce. There also occurred forcible seizure and redistribution of church lands (e.g., Dissolution of Monasteries in the reign of Henry VIII). The peasant revolts of the 16th century failed to block the growth of rural capitalism. Thus emerged the conditions for the classical landlord-capitalist-wage labour structure which made possible the transformation of agricultural production in England. Its association with England's pioneering and uniquely successful industrial revolution is well known. For Brenner, the key to this process lies in the peasants' failure to establish freehold control over the land. Such consequences of the lord-peasant struggle enabled landlords to retain control over the land, to engross, consolidate and enclose holdings and to lease them to capitalist farmers.

The French experience was marked by the peasants' ability not only to establish certain freedom and property rights vis-à-vis the landlords, but to retain them over a long historical epoch. Brenner cites evidence
showing the persistence of peasant proprietorship even at the end of the 17th century. This led to the continuance of petty peasant production. Such a free peasantry was exploited by the central state machinery for large tax revenues. The tendencies towards enclosure and consolidation were insignificant in large parts of France. It is in terms of such a configuration of class structure and state power that Brenner explains the comparative backwardness of the French economy characterized by a long-term failure of agricultural productivity and a corresponding inability to develop the home market.

In reply to Brenner's critique, Le Roy Ladurie alleges "a simplistic assimilation between power (political) and surplus value (economic)."21 Also, he points to the experiences of Holland and Belgium where the performance of peasant family economics would not validate the English model as the general way to capitalist transformation. Postan argues that the demographic model does not minimize the importance of social factors, nor of the feudal class system.22 Gay Bois agrees with Brenner in his critique of demographic determinism in the malthusian model, and also in the importance Brenner places on social relationships in the evolution of medieval and modern Europe. But Bois comments that in Brenner's analysis "class struggle is divorced from all other objective contingencies and, in the first instance, from such laws of development as may be peculiar to a specific mode of production".23 In his own work on feudal crisis, Bois formulates such a law in what he terms "the tendency to a falling rate of feudal levy." Such a tendency is inherent in the feudal mode because of the contradiction of small-scale production and large-scale property. Brenner finds no reason to dispute such trends, presented by Bois, as they applied to medieval Normandy. But on general theoretic grounds, a universal tendency to a declining rate of feudal rent cannot be accepted without explaining why the lords allowed it and/or could not prevent it.24 Such a vital question has no answer without reference to the question of class struggle and its effects.
(c) Absolutism, state power and society: We have noted already some questions regarding the nature of state and society between the decline of feudalism and definitive capitalist emergence. Such questions are connected with our interpretation of the character of absolutist states both in western and eastern Europe, and of their variants. Admitting the complex of absolutist state power as essentially feudal, in the west "it was the redeployed political apparatus of a feudal class which had accepted the corvée of dues. It was a compensation for the disappearance of serfdom in the context of an increasingly urban economy which it did not completely control and to which it had to adapt."

On the contrary, the absolutist state in the east "was the repressive machine of a feudal class that had just erased the traditional communal freedoms of the poor. It was a device for the consolidation of serfdom in a landscape scoured of autonomous urban life or resistance."

Broadly, such a characterization fits in with the distinction made earlier in this paper between feudal decline in the west and seignorial reaction in the east through the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. Engels characterized the absolute monarchies of the 17th and 18th centuries as holding "the balance between the nobility and the class of burghers." Again, caught between such contrary tendencies, the central direction of an absolutist monarchy depended on its ability to act as the "laboratory in which the various elements of society were so mixed and worked as to allow the towns to change the local independence and sovereignty of the Middle Ages for the general rule of the middle classes and the common sway of civil society."

Engels referred to mighty revolutions in the economic conditions of society in the period of the absolute monarchies. Such changes were not associated with any immediate corresponding transfer of political power. The period witnessed societies becoming more and more bourgeois within the feudal state order. In this context, the process of
transition is linked up with the activity of the rising bourgeoisie in civil society, an area that defines the scope for the economic and ideological struggle for class hegemony.

Indeed, such an understanding of the period of transition can reasonably take us to the Gramscian framework which clarifies how the base/superstructure couple can be encapsulated in the dialectic of state and civil society. Here we come to the proposition that, to be hegemonic, a nascent class must be capable of articulating a complete social alternative under circumstances which would ensure the value of its results. For bourgeois transformation, there is the primary need for a fruitful combination of capitalist profits and requirements of advance in social production. The conflict between three nodes (feudal, commercial, industrial capitalist) of generation, appropriation and utilization of economic surplus comes to be relevant in this context. Its resolution in favour of industrial capital (Marx's 'first way') means the removal of the obstacles at many levels of politics and social living, including that of religion, value judgments, monarchical absolutism and institutions of bureaucracy and theocracy. Trevor-Roper's point on the 'increasing margin of waste' under absolute monarchies is subsumed in those dimensions. Such waste "lay between the taxes imposed on the subject and the revenue collected by the Crown." And "this expansion of the waste had to be at the expense of society." The court/country divergences showed up clearly under James I of England and "The court culture, like court religion, came to be isolated from the mass of the population, and — a new feature — from many of the propertied class." All such instances crystallize in a specific power structure and in the conditions of its revolutionary supersession.
Some questions about the English path of transition may then be viewed in terms of the state-civil society dialectics. The bourgeois seizure of political power in seventeenth century England followed upon its emerging leadership in the sphere of social production. This was by the long history of a rising middle class and a suitable aristocracy whose goals of enrichment had not been divorced from the logic of developing social production. The English gentry became a bourgeoisie of its own particular kind by adapting the institutions of the old society, from parliament and common law downward, to its own needs. 34 No wonder some wealthy landowners and the middle and smaller gentry joined the struggle against the king, though the position of the 'Grandees' (including, among them, Oliver Cromwell himself) was quite different from that of the Presbyterians. Brenner's criticism of Dobb on the ground that the English Revolution had landlord support can therefore be answered in terms of the response and flexibility of landowners facing the earlier feudal crisis, a process explored by Brenner himself in significant detail. Undoubtedly, the real strength of the parliamentary ranks was provided by the mass of artisans, small traders, shopkeepers and yeoman farmers. Further, the peasant question never became critically important in the English Revolution. 35 Its grievances were mostly local, differentiation significant, and the bulk of the peasantry accepted the manorial system. As noted by Christopher Hill, 36 the English Revolution was less marked by excesses like that of the French Revolution, even though England had a more complete and faster capitalist transformation. This may find a proper explanation in the hegemonic development of the bourgeoisie even before the seizure of state power, a process resulting in the creation of a historical bloc of allies who were united against the absolute monarchy's design to maintain and strengthen its domination. The bourgeois ethos had little to do with altruism for the poor. On that count, the last serious attempt to restrict seignorial expropriations came during the years from 1629 to 1640, when Charles I governed England without Parliament. 37 But the bourgeoisie could construct an organic
passage from the other classes into their own, that historical bloc ranging from a large part of improving landlords, affluent gentry to middle yeomanry both in agriculture and industry.

There were many cases of contrast in the European experience. Not to speak of the extreme failures of Spain or Portugal, or of the belated German success and Russian failure; even in France, the failure to build up social hegemony of the rising bourgeoisie had led to monarchical supremacy with its extravagant court apparatus and an elaborate state bureaucracy. As a result, "when the hour of doom of the French monarchy was striking, the solution of the problem which French mercantilism had set itself was scarcely yet adumbrated."38 The agrarian roots of this crisis have been analysed by Brommer. The incapacity of the French bourgeoisie continued even after the revolution of 1789. For her industrial revolution, France required the Credit Mobilier to convert "old wealth to the creed of the new wealth."39

Indeed, the late entrants to capitalist industrialization in Europe (e.g. Germany, Russia, Italy) open up a whole set of questions regarding the roles of government and financial institutions. Gerschenkron generalizes such experiences as follows: "the more backward a country the less autonomous its development and the greater the discontinuity with the past if progress was to be made."40 Such a formulation implies several comparisons with the elaborations one can reasonably make of Marx's 'second way'. Taking the point of relating the agrarian question to the conditions of industrial capital formation on the evidence of comparative history, we may again refer to a proposition made by Gramsci: "It is thus understandable that self government has only been possible in England, where the class of landowners, in addition to its condition of economic dependence, had never been in savage conflict with the population (as happened in France) and had not had great corporate military traditions (as in Germany) with the separateness and authoritarian attitudes which derive from these."41
(d) Development and Underdevelopment: This is not the place for an elaborate discussion on the universals and specifics of Marx's theory of history as applied to the non-European world. Prior to the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), the 'Asiatic mode' had hardly been mentioned in Marx's writings as a separate lineage and mode of production in history. There were occasional references in the Marx-Engels correspondence and in Marx's articles for the New York Daily Tribune. We now know that the idea was more fully developed in the Grundrisse. Before and after, the non-European civilizations were mainly considered in terms of the impact of exogenous capitalist expansion on them. Such need for expansion was inherent in bourgeois society, in its need for constantly enlarging a world market over the whole surface of the globe.

The questions of world market and colonial expansion are closely linked to the dialectics of capitalist development in Europe. As observed by Hobsbawm, Britain's "industrial economy grew out of her commerce, and especially our commerce with the underdeveloped world. And throughout the nineteenth century it was to retain this peculiar historical pattern, commerce and shipping maintained our balance of payments, and the exchange of overseas primary products for British manufactures was to be the foundation of our international economy."

This is not to deny the size and steadiness of a growing home market which had grown out of the decline of feudalism. But to explain why explain why the industrial breakthrough came when it actually did, one has to focus on "the general European or 'world' economy of which Britain was a part, that is to the 'advanced' areas of (mainly) western Europe and their relations with the colonial and semi-colonial dependent economies." To cite figures, there was a three- or fourfold gain in British exports (including re-exports) in the century from 1660 to 1760. The relations of colonial exploitation became more complex and diversified in course of the different phases of subsequent capitalist development.
Given his views on the essentially static and stagnant nature of non-European societies through the ages, Marx interpreted their colonial penetration and conquest by western capitalist countries to have a 'regenerating' role. Marx made clear the horrors of colonialism as "the profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lay unveiled, turning from its home where it assumed respectable forms, to the colonies, where it went naked."\textsuperscript{45} The 'regenerating' role, as Marx had seen it, followed from his emphasis on the great historic mission of capitalism. The ' Asiatic mode of production' had no potential for autonomous development. And so the British conquest of India and the opening up of China had to be "necessary, progressive and productive of revolutionary effects of the greatest importance for world history."\textsuperscript{46} Such invasions would be the tool of history for laying the foundations of capitalist development in Asia. Marx's position should not be taken to imply that any one line of evolution is inevitable or desirable. We have noted already Marx's warning against taking to 'the universal passport of a general historico-philosophical theory'. One can identify some significantly new directions of Marx's ideas on this problem during his later years.

Marx expected capitalism to provide the conditions for economic transformation in the countries of its conquest. But imperialism also shaped as the principal obstacle to economic development in those countries. The effect of imperialist penetration has not been exactly the same in all countries. It has varied according to local circumstances, type of foreign capitalist domination, and the extent and depth of capitalist penetration. Notwithstanding these variations, there has always been a tendency towards the creation of hybrid structures containing an amalgam of capitalist and pre-capitalist elements.\textsuperscript{47} Correlatively, capitalist expansion remains in a position to utilize the older types of exploitation; pre-capitalist bondage is not fully eliminated.
Such structural features are prominent among the underdeveloped countries of the contemporary world. This admixture of feudalism and capitalism may have some points of resemblance with the countries of Europe in the stage when capitalism was not hegemonic, even though the previous mode had reached a point of disintegration. But the two stages are fundamentally different both in their historical context and perspective.

And so underdevelopment, as it prevails today over a large part of the world, is then a discrete historical process which had not been a part of the European experience of transition from feudalism to capitalism. The developmental aspects of capitalism seldom come to the fore in countries that for centuries have been objects of European colonial expansion. In this context, commercialization and urbanization push the agrarian structure to stagnate in the 'backwash' of enclave changes. Consequently, capitalism grows as an admixture of monopolistic rigidities and technological backwardness. Moreover, in conditions of land scarcity and surplus labour, capitalism in agriculture offers no solution for the requirements of unhindered economic growth. The typical structure of underdevelopment contains numerous feudal constraints on its economy and society. But, for reasons already noted, the course of capitalist transition cannot help to spread unhindered production relations and forces of dynamic significance. This is where the historical-questions of transformation come to be different from those posed and answered in Europe's transition from feudalism to capitalism. Andre Gunder Frank's analysis of contemporary underdevelopment, utilizing as it did the earlier Latin American economic analysis of 'dependency' and its bearing on the specifics of capitalism in Third World countries, departed therefore from the so-called marxist orthodoxy of an evolutionary-stage theory. He pointed out that colonial expansion had not been associated with the kind of capitalist development that Marx of the Manifesto had predicted. The process can be characterized as 'capitalist development of underdevelopment' in the regions colonized by Europeans from the sixteenth
century — especially the Caribbean, South America and Africa, as well as the southern part of North America. This is due to colonial subordination to the system of capital accumulation on a world scale whereby as the 'core' end of the chain developed, the 'peripheral' end simultaneously underdeveloped. Such underdevelopment was caused, in the main, by the terms of the transfer of surplus from periphery to core; it was inherent in the export-dependent role assigned to the periphery in the world division of labour.

Later, Frank tried to explain how the process was rooted in the class and productive structures of the periphery. Frank argues that, because of external links and dependence, there emerges a local bourgeoisie whose interests are subservient to those of the foreign 'metropolis'. Such a bourgeoisie cannot initiate and execute processes to end poverty and underdevelopment. Frank characterizes this class as the 'lumpenbourgeoisie' and the state of development as 'lumpendevelopment'.

Wallerstein's *The Modern World System* attempts a global interpretation of the origins, characteristics and development of capitalism. He defines capitalism as a trade-based division of labour where production is for profit in a market, and which encompasses territories larger than any juridically defined political unit. The basic linkages between the parts of the system are economic, and not political as under 'world empires' which Wallerstein distinguishes from his 'world economy'. Indeed, it is in the economic factor, defined as trade/exchange resting on an international division of labour, that Wallerstein locates the dynamics of capitalist economic development.

As regards the social existence-form of labour, Wallerstein takes the technical position that free wage labour is not an essential characteristic of the 'world-system' and that different systems of labour control are best suited to particular types of production, given the eco-demographic characteristics of the region. The mode of surplus
transfer goes against the peripheral countries because of their position in the international pattern of specialization. Firstly, 'unequal exchange' (Emanuel) obtains between accumulated capital and "raw" labour power and "The forces of the marketplace reinforce them rather than undermine them". Secondly, there is the political instrument of a strong state machinery which grows out of the system of labour control/rewards to labour prevailing in the 'core' countries.

While Wallerstein's formulation about free labour in the core countries and forced labour in the periphery points to an important feature of world capitalism and its colonial exploits, Brenner criticises this whole approach for its trade-centred techno-determinism. He mentions the failure to clarify class structure and its role, the exclusion of the logical drive of capitalism for technological advance, confusion of the roles of state power and surplus extraction, as serious limitations of Wallerstein's analytical system. We are placed in a world of "individual profit maximizers competing on the market, outside of any system of social relations of production. It is a universe in which any apparent structure of social relations which emerges in production is merely a technically determined outcome of individual choices by free individual 'producers' who have access to different, relatively scarce factors of production, and who have a given range of alternative production techniques at their disposal. Above all, it is a universe where payments or rewards go to 'factors' according to their relative scarcity, not to classes by virtue of their exploitative capacities." Brenner criticises Frank for neglecting the role of class formation and class struggle. As a result, some of Frank's analysis can be used to support political conclusions he would probably himself oppose.

Frank's analysis takes an extreme and absolutist view of the comprador role, i.e. what he calls the lumpen character of the indigenous bourgeoisie in colonial countries. However, it is not necessary to
totally dismiss the efforts which flowed from the early stage of
development of colonial nationalism in certain parts of the imperialist-
periphery. Yet one cannot deny that under imperialism class structures are
shaped in directions which destroy the very conditions of self-sustaining
capitalist development and growth. Such are the historical circumstances
that may not necessarily move the national bourgeoisie to consistent
anti-feudal and anti-imperialist positions in the spheres of society,
economy and polity. The passage to independence, its form and content,
may then lack the motive force for an adequate social transformation.
And once in political authority and in the possession of a powerful state
apparatus, capitalism rules, whether by autocratic domination or through
bourgeois-democratic integration of the masses, to achieve goals which
are divorced from the needs and perspective of overall national advance.
Thus, the entire lineage of progress from feudalism to capitalism, or
even from colonial constraints to free capitalist development, becomes
a caricature of itself. True, capitalism can never exist without intern-
national entanglements which inevitably involve nexuses of supremacy-cum-
subordination. And in real history, the long journey and its aftermath
have often made a nemesis of the 'regenerating' role of western capitalism
in the non-European world.

This is why Marxist theory and practice faces the central question
about what kind of 'revolution' and 'transition' is to occur in the under-
developed countries. Further, to find suitable answers to this question,
it is necessary to deal with problems of leadership, class alliances,
historical blocs, and paths of transformation that may not readily follow
from the corpus of classical Marxism-Leninism. In fact, Lenin's own
position changed repeatedly on some of those crucial points, as he adapted
his strategy and tactics to the revolutionary situation in Russia and also
in the world as a whole. For him in the 1890's, the progressive impact
of capitalism was of primary significance; the destruction of the peasant
community was a fact of history to be acclaimed by Marxists. The
experience of peasant revolts in 1902 and 1905 imparted some new dimensions to Lenin's understanding of the peasantry and of its alliance with the working class. Again, in his concern for the distinction between the 'two ways' of capitalism in agriculture, Lenin recognised the inability of the Russian bourgeoisie to achieve capitalist development without a compromise with the vested feudal interests, and also its failure to evolve a democratic political order. He contraposed the 'American' against the 'Prussian' way to capitalism in order to mobilise an alliance of the proletariat and the working peasantry against the Stolypin reaction. There emerged the need to clarify the "sound and valuable kernel" of the narodnik utopias as it had been contained in "the sincere, resolute, militant democracy of the peasant masses". Lenin also observed that "In the old Marxian Literature of the 'eighties one can find systematic efforts to separate their valuable democratic kernel. Some day historians will study these efforts systematically and trace their connection with what in the first decade of the twentieth century was given the name of 'Bolshevism'". 57

Among such 'old Marxian Literature', we have glimpses of Marx striving to grapple with some important issues "new to his generation, but nowadays easily recognisable as those of 'developing societies' - be it 'modernisation', 'dependency' or the related yet uneven spread of global capitalism and its specifically peripheral expression. There were several such components of Marx's new understanding, none of them worked out in full. At the centre lies the newly perceived notion of 'uneven-development' - interpreted not quantitatively (i.e. that 'some societies move faster that others') but within the context of global interdependence and the mutual impact of social transformations." 58

The main issue of Marx's correspondence with the narodniki was related to Russia's road to socialism in a historical context where the long-drawn processes of primitive accumulation were not giving way to the growth of capitalist industry and its productive power on a substantial
scale. In agriculture, the rural commune or the obshchina existed alongside of feudalism. The system persisted even after the so-called emancipation of the serfs in 1861. The narodniki envisaged that in Russia socialist transformation could be based on the rural communes embracing the largest segment of the country’s labouring people. Thus, the peasantry in communes was considered to have the revolutionary potential for transition to socialism without passing through the experience of an antecedent capitalist transformation.

In 1877, Marx was concerned over a certain type of capitalism tending to annihilate the peasant community in Russia, while apprehending that such developments would cause the loss of "the finest chance ever offered by history to a nation." Again in 1881, Vera Zasulich, a narodnik who was then in the Black Partition group and later became a co-editor of the marxist Iskra, wrote to Marx an anxious letter seeking his views on the future of the Russian peasantry and also about the historical course of that country's transformation. In his reply, Marx stressed that the analysis in Capital was true only of the west European experience and it provided no reasons either for or against the vitality of the Russian commune. He also stated his conviction "that the commune is the fulcrum for social generation in Russia. But in order that it function as such, the harmful influences assailing it on all sides must first be eliminated, and it must then be assured the normal conditions for spontaneous development."

This final letter was however "only the tip of an iceberg." There were three (the fourth being the actual reply to Zasulich) more elaborate drafts which Marx wrote with a view to replying to Zasulich. They reveal new directions of his thought and also his resolute efforts to depart from the position of Capital, for finding answers to some current questions of concrete history. Indeed, these drafts along with Marx's other studies of Russia in his later years can reasonably act as "a key to the structure of underdeveloped capitalism." It was probably
in his search for such a key that Lenin referred to 'old Marxian Literature of the eighties'. We should also not fail to note the affinity of opposition which both Marx and Lenin faced in this regard from among the socialists themselves.

In those draft letters, Marx analysed at length the duality (private property and community) of the Russian peasant communes and indicated that this very dualism could eventually turn into the seeds of its disintegration. But such a collapse was not inevitable. He pointed to the positive element of Russian communes having expanded beyond narrow kinship ties. And that "Communal landownership offers it the natural basis for collective appropriation, and its historical context - the contemporaneity of capitalist production - provides it with ready-made material conditions for large-scale co-operative labour organized on a large scale. It may therefore incorporate the positive achievements developed by the capitalist system, without having to pass under its harsh tribute. It may gradually replace small-plot agriculture with a combined, machine-assisted agriculture which the physical configuration of the Russian land invites. After normal conditions have been created for the commune in its present form, it may become the direct starting-point of the economic system towards which modern society is tending; it may open a new chapter that does not begin with its own suicide".

Marx held that "a powerful conspiracy is waiting in the wings" to destroy the commune and "To save the Russian commune, there must be a Russian Revolution... If the revolution takes place in time, if it concentrates all its forces to ensure the unfettered rise of the rural communes, the latter will soon develop as a regenerating element of Russian society and an element of superiority over the countries enslaved by the capitalist regime." Among 'historical environments' which Marx considered to be prerequisites for the regenerating role of the rural commune were (i) the transition from agriculture by individual plot to cooperative
labour, (ii) the responsibility of the Russian public - meaning the educated privileged sector of society which for such a long time has existed at the cost of the village communes - for providing resources necessary for introducing mechanical cultivation and (iii) the ability to avoid the 'fateful crises' that were shaking capitalist production in Europe and America.

For Marx of The Communist Manifesto and Capital, the industrial proletariat was the historical agency of socialist revolution, while capitalist industrialization, subject to its own inevitable contradictions, would pave the way for socialism. In this pattern of change, peasants belonged to the past, the vast majority of them being expropriated from their lands by the very process of capitalist transformation. They were the inevitable victims of progress from feudalism to capitalism, of the emergence of the capital-labour relation which would be creative of advancing production forces. Marx's analysis of this process in Capital clarified how the destruction of the peasantry was associated with the advance of capitalist production - the main feature of the phenomenon that "capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt". While his socialist perspective envisaged that the expropriators would be expropriated, Marx did not, in the instance of transition from feudalism to capitalism, wish away the need for the expropriation of the peasant multitude.

Marx's position was different in the drafts which he prepared for replying to Zasulich. In the light of a historical experience not similar to that of western Europe, he shared to a significant extent the narodnik perspective for Russia's transition to socialism through a revolution based on the collective strength of the peasant communes. No less significant is the statement made in the preface to the second Russian edition (1882) of The Communist Manifesto: "If the Russian-revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that each complements the other, then the present Russian common
ownership of land can serve as a point of departure for a communist development. I have noted already how Marx indicated the consistency of his new position with the requirements of advancing production forces. No wonder that the question turned on the priorities of socialist investment, on the choices, or probably compulsions, of the educated, privileged sector of society.

Subsequently, the Russian Marxists were led by Plekhanov to rule out the chances for a socialist revolution in their country before its capitalist maturity. Lenin also attached vital importance to assail some serious fallacies of the narodnik position which ignored the realities of capitalist development in Russia. However, faced with the menace of Stolypin reaction, Lenin stressed the need for Bolshevism to assimilate the valuable democratic kernel of narodnik utopia. It became necessary for the democratic revolution to pit the struggle also against the 'Prussian' way of capitalism. The historical path of the Bolshevik revolution proved that both narodniks and Marxists were right and wrong at the same time. While Russia had not escaped the capitalist experiences altogether, the 'American' path of capitalist agriculture was also a non sequitur in her circumstances. In Lenin's own words, 'It has been Russia's lot very plainly to witness, and most keenly and painfully to experience, one of the abruptest of abrupt twists of history as it turns from imperialism towards the Communist revolution... In the space of a few months we passed through a number of stages, stages of compromise with the bourgeoisie and stages of shaking off petty-bourgeois illusions, for which other countries have required decades.'

And throughout his 'last struggle' during 1921-23, Lenin frequently posed the problem of the duties and responsibilities incumbent on the leaders of a dictatorship that claims to be socialist. Among his primary concerns of those days was the problem of building resistance to prevent the 'Nepen', i.e., the new bourgeoisie, from driving a wedge between the peasant masses and the working class, from splitting the
former off from the industrial workers. Lenin's socio-economic programme and perspective for co-operatives was committed to the task of a 'cultural revolution' which "would be sufficient to transform the country into a completely Socialist country". He did not minimize the immensity of the educational and material effort necessary to achieve that task. Lenin pointed to the long-term nature of the project and emphasized the need for dispensing with pre-bourgeois serf or bureaucratic culture. But the calling "to induce absolutely everyone to take not a passive, but an active part in co-operative operations" cannot but remind us of the narodnik premise of a community which Lenin was now setting forth as the aim of a 'cultural revolution' to be achieved under conditions not yet fully 'socialized' by the impact of the capitalist mode of production.

The cases of China, Viet Nam, and Cuba also exemplified that capitalist maturity was not a pre-condition for socialist transition of indigenous strength. The programme of a new democratic revolution, as formulated by Mao Tse-tung allowed for the general preservation of private capitalist enterprises without the elimination of the rich peasant economy. For Mao, the peasants were not auxiliaries, but the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution. The word 'peasantry' referred mainly to the poor and middle peasants, while the point was also not to identify rich peasants as landlords, nor to prematurely adopt a policy of liquidating them. The political strategy of the 'four-class block' (workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie) was basic to Mao's perspective of the new democratic state and the 'people's democratic dictatorship'. As noted by Deutscher, "Of the peasants' 'two souls' - the expression is Lenin's - one is craving property, while the other dreams of equality and has visions of a rural community, the members of which own and till their land in common. It might be said that Maoism expressed both 'souls' of the peasantry, had it not been for the fact that it never was just the peasantry's mouthpiece. It always looked
upon itself as the legatee of the defeated revolution of 1925-27, of which the industrial workers had been the driving force. Identifying itself ideally with those workers, Maoism continued to echo their socialist aspirations.\textsuperscript{76}

In its anti-feudal, anti-imperialist thrust, the new democratic revolution strived to achieve the pre-condition for socialism by clearing the way for capitalist development.\textsuperscript{77} The Kuomintang experience made it cumulatively clear that capitalism would not grow in China independently of imperialism and feudal interests. Thus, the very logic of democratic nationalism carried the Chinese revolution beyond its bourgeois phase and, in this process, Maoism could find its collective strength among peasant masses and armies.\textsuperscript{78} Such strength of a 'community potential' decisively influenced the Maoist strategy of transition when the Chinese revolution established its full and effective control of that vast country. The socialist alternative was then defined not merely in terms of ownership and direction of the means of production, but also of a collective force acting against tendencies of avarice, privilege and bureaucracy even in a classless society. Indeed, the nature of the Chinese revolution may be considered to be akin to what Marx had admitted as a possibility in his correspondence with Zasulich and the narodniki regarding the historical course of transformation motivated by the pre-capitalist peasant commune.\textsuperscript{79}

The 'non-capitalist' potential for Russia was traced to her village communes and Marx added that a prior or complementary socialist revolution in advanced Europe would help Russia to realize such a path of transformation. There occurred no socialist revolution in the advanced west. Among the bitter ironies of history we have to count again that, during a critical period, no relations of cooperation prevailed between the first socialist state of the world and China, the latter entrant with her pre-dominantly agrarian economy, whose leader spoke of a perspective reminiscent of Marx's 'finest chance': "China's 600 million people have two remarkable peculiarities; they are, first of all,
poor, and secondly, blank. That may seem a bad thing, but it is really a good thing. Poor people want change, want to do things, want revolution. A clean sheet of paper has no blotches, and so the newest and the most beautiful words can be written on it, the newest and the most beautiful pictures can be painted on it." 80

No, we cannot wish away the enormous problems of organisation and incentives in a society and economy aiming to achieve rapid industrialisation. After the partial failure of the Great Leap, Mao was even reconciled to the view that China's industrialization might take the lifetime of two, three, or four generations to accomplish it. Nor can one be certain that a roughly egalitarian distribution of extremely scarce economic resources would necessarily resolve power conflicts in a society where the energies of the party, army and the people had to be simultaneously deployed for executing the socialist strategy of transformation. Such questions notwithstanding, the central idea of socialism has relevance for the problem of transition, once it is admitted that capitalist development provides no path of progressive transformation for the underdeveloped countries of the non-European world.

The question is how to instil socialist ethos into the human dimension of advancing productive forces. Its importance is strengthened by the fact that neither in theory, nor in actual historical experience, can we ignore the possibility of a transition to socialism even from conditions of underdeveloped capitalism with their various blends of capitalism and proto-capitalism. Further, the success of proletarian revolution in the advanced countries of world capitalism has become a more remote reality. Building socialism in one country is difficult, and it becomes a stupendous task for an underdeveloped country. Let us not be blind to the achievements of socialism through this century. But, as noted by Sartre, it is necessary to admit the danger of scarcity being schematized as the universal crystallization of bureaucracy after every
socialist revolution in the backward countries. This is where the central question of modern acquires great significance insofar as it points to the problem of 'bourgeoisement' in the process of socialist construction. As such, the task and the directions of transition cannot but be linked with further developments in the Marxist ideas of mediation and with adequate clarification of what Marx and Lenin set forth as the task of 'educating the educators'.

Such 'education' is not simply a matter of placing some premium on collective relations against individual self-determination or vice versa. We never have the one without the other, replete though they are with numerous types of social formations and experience. In real history, whether through capitalism or pre-capitalism, we find a multiplicity of forms which embody the human situation and its processes and thus articulate the various living patterns, or say an immanent unity, of the collective and the individual self. No unity of this kind is unchanging or free from internal or exogenous contradictions. Marx's paradigm of evolution from primitive communism to class society broadly indicated the scission of one form of unity and its reworking on a different pattern. Further in the light of Marx's analysis of pre-capitalist formations,

"It is also clear now that any conceptualization of exploitative class relations, e.g., slavery or serfdom, requires as a theoretical presupposition the logical existence of a concept of 'communal property'. Also, "In all political formations in which there exists an institutionalized sphere of class domination based ultimately on the direct superiority of physical force, it is in constant battle against subordinate forces seeking to assert (perhaps reassert) an alternative mode of power and authority based on the notion of the community."

Thus, the ability of an exploited class and of its struggle to achieve transition to a new mode of production is inseparably connected with the strength of community that it can articulate as a possible alternative. The point is implied in what has already been discussed in
the section relating to 'Absolutism, state power and society'. The emergence of capitalism and civil society produce the standpoint of the individual who appears to consider social relations as merely an external necessity, as so many devices to serve purely private interests. For its self-identification then, capital asserts an idea of private property free from any collective restrictions. But such individualism can have meaning only with reference to society, and the intervention of an 'invisible hand' was necessary for explaining the commonalty of self-interest and its social goal.

Indeed, the origin of civil society was traced by Marx to the struggle of the burgher's communal movement in late medieval Europe. He pointed to the term capitalia having appeared for the first time in connection with the movement of urban communities against the feudal order which also absorbed a notion of community that enjoined political and religious restrictions on economic activity. Even for the conceptualization of a bourgeois political ethic, civil society required a contract among one and all to work for the common good, no matter whether the constituents were by nature solitary brutes, or noble savages, or just reasonable beings. No wonder that structural anthropology draws on Rousseau's Confessions to attest that "in his collective being also man must recognize himself as a 'he' before daring to lay claim to also being a 'we'."

Again, the urge for community must have been a living force in the course of England's transition which not only had its 'Pride's Purge', but also 'The World Turned Upside Down', the latter signifying "the attempts of various groups of common people to impose their own solutions to the problems of their time, in opposition to the wishes of their betters who had called them into political action." Among the major influences shaping the 'Good Old Cause' and its continuum of commoners struggle over centuries was "a collectivist theory which looks forward to nineteenth and twentieth century socialism and communism as well as glancing backwards to a vanishing village community." Perhaps by the
end of the last century, it was possible for the bourgeois 'cunning of reason' and also its political power to twist and turn that long travail into a stage of ambiguity which is still unending. But the message of such reversal is immensely significant: "...these years appear at times to display, not a revolutionary challenge, but a resistance movement, in which both Romantics and the Radical craftsmen opposed the annunciation of Acquisitive Man. In the failure of the two traditions to come to a point of junction, something was lost. How much we cannot be sure, for we are among the losers." 

We can have similar or even more violent instances from the dialectic of enlightenment and Jacobinism in France. But the path of capitalist transition also provides examples where the very notion of community is subject to an involution, its ideological spell over the multitude can then be utilized for binding the common masses to a collective bond and burden of work which satisfy rabid exploiting interests. This is how capitalism can abandon even its liberal pretence to function in conditions of gross and coercive market imperfections, often with direct state support and patronage. Such experiences pervade the histories of capitalism in Germany, Italy and Japan. They conform to Antonio Gramsci's category of a 'passive revolution' whereby capitalism could proceed in "such a way that it was possible to preserve the political and economic position of the old feudal classes, to avoid agrarian reform, and, especially, to avoid popular masses going through a period of political experience such as occurred in France in the years of Jacobinism." 

We can then have a clearer understanding of Lenin's restless efforts and of some changes in his agrarian programme to evolve a historical bloc of the proletariat and the peasantry against Stolypinist capitalism. Indeed, for us in contemporary Asia, the problem of preventing an involution of community is not merely of historical interest;
it is connected with actual practical themes arising from the nature and tendencies of economic experience that "...capitalism has been able to exploit such pre-existing collective modes of organization and action much better. Most of these collectivities also embody a hierarchical structure, and that provides a very useful framework for capitalist methods of organization and control. When such collectivities are embedded in a state which can provide a collective assurance to the groups at the top of hierarchies and present all the people with a collective threat (of an external enemy, and an internally repressive apparatus), they become powerful engines of capitalist accumulation."  

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It should then be clear that the capitalist mode of production can work in history along with different complexes of power and culture which enable the ruling classes to exercise their domination. Marx himself was always aware of such variances in his reflections on contemporary history, for him again, the question was not one of merely interpreting how capitalism works; he believed in changing the system. His analysis focused on the contradiction between the capital-labour relation and the cumulative socialization of production forces as it inheres in the very dynamics of capitalism. Thus grew the necessity for the transition to socialism which the working class can achieve through its struggle and "in the appropriation by the proletarians, a mass of instruments of production must be made subject to each individual, and property to all modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all." 93 Marx characterized this transition also as one from 'illusory community' to the 'real community', where 'individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.' 94

Marx's analysis of the dialectic of capital-labour relationship made it clear that capitalist property was bound to be in conflict with the advance of social production. Correlatively, we can comprehend the passage to socialism through essentially working class initiative and action as a signpost of historical theory and practice. All this works
as a vital step in our understanding the relevant totality and the interaction between its parts and the whole. The options available to the human agents within the system are associated not only with the corresponding techno-economic framework, but also with its forms and instruments of political domination. The levels of abstraction would—however be confused if the theory of capital and its dynamics was taken to imply that the course of transition must inexorably proceed from feudalism to capitalism and then and then only from a developed capitalist economy to socialism.

Marx and Engels did not lack in their clarification of historical conjunctures characterized by a compounding of the old and the new in the emergent complexes of exploitation and power. We have considerable evidence of Marx’s concern for any bourgeois design to come to terms with the vested interests of the old order. He emphasized therefore the need to upset the whole order of things in Germany and counted upon the possibility of a proletarian revolution to immediately follow the bourgeois revolution. For Russia again, Marx conceived of the ‘finest chance’ for a transition from the pre-capitalist peasant communes to socialism. We have already noted the implications of all this for the subsequent revolutionary strategies of Lenin and Mao in their own countries.

In real history then, the conquest of capital, its universalizing role, leads to “a differential impact on pre-capitalist structures — sometimes destroying them, sometimes modifying them to fit in with the new demands of surplus extraction and the new procedures of governance, and at other times keeping intact, perhaps bolstering, pre-existing productive systems and local organizations of power while merely establishing a suitable extraction mechanism.”95 It is in such circumstances of uneven growth that, as a counterpoint, certain historical possibilities of transition to socialism should be visible even for underdeveloped capitalism, or say semi-feudalism, with its relatively backward
techno-economic formations. Marx, Engels and Lenin saw the link of such potential with the international framework of developed capitalism, its advanced proletariat and superior technology. For the world today, the presence of advanced socialism should also be counted among the favourable factors.

Such possibilities are never spontaneously fulfilled in history. They do not follow from any linear movement of material forces through the processes of evolution. The problem pertains to our point about mediation and 'educating the educators'. Coming back to the question of community, the Marxist task is to pre-empt further appropriation of the collective tradition by a capitalist order. This tradition contains elements of democratic community at the grassroots level as well as that of hierarchical domination from above. Many minute particulars of the past—ethnic, religious, linguistic and other primordial bonds of smaller collectivities—remain as parts of that entire traditional complex and its present living. With or without a system of parliamentary representation, capitalism moves to appropriate the legacy of collective authority, quite often with a chaotic confusion of pluralities in its substructure, in order to integrate the multitude to its mode of production and power. And socialist mediation may fail to produce a real alternative if, instead of being with the masses who are to make up their own minds, it hastens through a cult of enlightenment to make up their minds for them. This was certainly the danger which concerned Mao Tse-tung when he said: "You know I've proclaimed for a long time: we must teach the masses clearly what we have received from them confusedly".

In this context, the relatively undifferentiated masses of the working peasantry present a struggling potential for 'real community' to supersede the capitalist order. The agrarian question cannot be resolved without eliminating capitalist relations. It is not enough to move from feudalism to capitalism. Indeed, no such movement can have much meaning in terms of progress when capitalism and pre-capitalism are historically
interlocked in their modes of exploitation and power. Socialism has to set forth a perspective in which the peasants can move forward to cooperative forms and relations of production without necessarily being prior victims of complete proletarianisation. For the vast rural majority, whether they are small or marginal farmers, or sharecroppers, or landless agricultural labourers, the only path of advance lies in the development of agriculture within a cooperative framework. There obtains the essential thrust of the 'community potential' among the toiling peasantry.

It is then possible to envisage the fronts "linking up into a single struggle in which 'the countrysides' are no longer poor misfits standing in need of a factor of growth" and "transition to the bourgeoisie-democratic phase", but now politically active as an immense potential for socialism. This is what spurred Lenin to be so intensely concerned over the growth of cooperation in agriculture during the last phase of his life. Collectivization in Russia under Stalin belied this perspective since no strong bases had materialized for a non-state cooperative movement and for the building of efficient collective structures. Coming in the wake of a revolution where the peasantry constituted the biggest motive force, the Maoist strategy of 'the great leap' and 'the cultural revolution' now appears to have led to results not quite consistent with its goals. Much of this experience is yet to be known in sufficient detail. Perhaps, considering the huge scales of 'the cultural revolution' in China, it became difficult to restrain 'leftist' impulses that suffered from their own lack of clarity and were reduced to a dogmatic faith in an inflexible ideal of the simplicity of poor and understanding man.

But neither the will to overthrow capitalism in the world today nor the path of socialist construction can ignore some vital contradictions which Mao must have glimpsed in order to avoid them: "Contradictions which are no longer exclusively or essentially contradictions between public ownership and private ownership of the means of production - are these not developing? Are we not seeing the complexity and all-embracing
character of the capitalist mode of production, in its concreteness and in the effect it has in the sphere of consciousness and culture, when the contradictions are lifted from the quantitative to the qualitative plane and when thoroughgoing reapprropriation of human labour is proposed, through complete destruction of the existing system?" 98 Further, "The point is that Lenin worked in the setting of a backward capitalism, whereas Mao, in contrast to what is supposed, is not so much concerned with underdevelopment as with the model of the transitional society as this has been formed in the Soviet Union and as it looked as though it might be reproduced in China." 99 We need not lose sight of the differences in Lenin's idea of a 'cultural revolution' from that of Mao. 100 But it is more important to stress their common ground that capitalism may use its veil of ideology to cover up the selfish desires of the new exploiters to share in the privileges of the old exploiters; the struggle of the toiling millions, who for ages have lived in unheard of ignorance, distress and poverty, dirt, abandonment and downtroddenness, should magnify the fruits of a prospective victory. 101

No transition in history can be an exact replica of what has happened before. The emphasis today is on the necessity for lifting the class struggle to the level of a people's war against exploitative power. This is the central issue which points to the 'community potential' of the toiling peasantry as the fulcrum of a transition based upon the masses. And for late capitalism in the west as well, history has now laid bare problems which are "incompatible both with extremist verbalism and with attempts to return to the glorious schemata of an historical epoch that is over and done with." 102 A people's war cannot but admit all forms of struggle—political and economic, moral and cultural, armed and non-armed—depending on what is possible and fruitful in a particular geographical, politico-economic and cultural configuration of classes, people and power.
Marx had the vision of such struggles and their collective strength when he increasingly stressed the viability of the primitive commune, its power of resistance to historical disintegration and even — though perhaps only in the context of the Narodnik discussion — its capacity to develop into a higher form of economy without prior destruction. Further, when anthropologists discovered the persistence of some savage or barbarian elements in civilized European man, Marx read in them "an index that modern man was not without an archaic communal component, which includes a democratic and egalitarian formation, in his social being." The past provided the basis for a critique of the present civilized condition. There was no atavism in all this. Marx remarked, "A man cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish," and then added that the true character of the human epoch comes alive in the nature of its children. Significantly, both Marx and Engels conceived of the task of socialism as that of the return, again through the negation of the negation, to the nobility of the savage, without the sacrifice of the material powers which science had presented to mankind. Thus, "For Marx the civilized is the limited and oppositional human condition, whose critique is bound to be the revolutionary praxis, which is the first step in overcoming the condition of limitation and opposition, internal as well as external."

III.
Concluding Remarks

This paper offers only a broad resume of some central issues relating to the transition debate, of their relevance for historiography and several practical themes of socio-economic transformation in the contemporary world. To my mind, the essential points may be summed up as follows for further discussion.

(i) Several points of the Dobb-Sweezy controversy, the arguments and counter-arguments can be resolved in terms of what would not only be necessary, but also sufficient to account for the transition from
feudalism to capitalism. Sweezy's emphasis on trade was reasonable as the specification of a necessary condition. But his definition of feudalism as 'production for use' and taking that mode to have no historical dynamics of its own, was logically untenable and empirically baseless. Recent historical research has furnished a large volume of evidence to bear out the pace and content of feudal dynamics. On the other hand, the necessary contribution of trade was a factor indispensable for the entire process of transition. This is apparent even from a rigid Marxist theoretic classification of the alternative directions of a feudal mode with more or less opportunities for commodity production. Further, Takahashi's use of the 'two ways' to bear upon the entire complex of interaction between trade and production clarified how the impact of commerce could lead to various paths of transformation.

(ii) Dobb's Studies used a paradigm, mainly based on the British experience. His general outline was completely faithful, in terms of the then available data, to the basic Marxian framework in Capital, Volume 1, and some further hints for elaboration in Capital, Volume 3. The pioneering works of Tawney for the 16th century and of Mantoux for the 18th century enclosures have been subject to criticisms in the light of newly discovered data. Kerridge argues that Tawney's view on copyhold rights being insecure is misleading both in terms of the strict legal position and actual practice. Hence the picture of capitalism thriving on unjust appropriation of capital is baseless. We have evidence therefore on the importance of a consensual process which might have worked at one level of the English agrarian transformation. This was the purport of the conversion of at least the richer sections of the yeomanry into capitalist tenant farmers. Among the poorer peasantry, however, Kerridge does not rule out the prevalence of tenancy-at-will, lease parol (annual tenancy) and short farm leases. Moreover, "It is ... impossible to trace more than a fraction of the subtenancies and sublettings of demesne, socage and customary lands. That these were at one time occupied by subtenants was none the less generally recognized, and it was known
that many undertenants paid rack-rents".111 Thus, while some of Tawney's stark generalizations may have to be modified in the light of the documents presented and analysed by Herridge, we cannot deny the relationship between the capitalist transition and the decline of the peasantry, particularly of the growth of the proletariat from among its poorer sections.

The non-Marxist viewpoints, which have been set forth by historians like Clapham, Ashton, Landes, Chambers and Mingay, invariably deny the importance of enclosure as the chief source of the industrial proletariat. It is argued that, at the time of the last great wave of enclosures, the rural population was unmistakably on the increase and so "the contribution which the dispossessed made to the industrial labour force came, in the majority of the cases, from the unabsorbed surplus, not from the main body".112 Again some data are furnished to indicate that between 1760 and 1830 the extent of the decline of small farmers was not particularly significant.113 In his reply to all this, Saville comments, "What is still, however, omitted in the most recent discussions, is the large wage-labouring element in the countryside right through the eighteenth century",114 and makes an all important point in his remark: "The creation of the rural proletariat was, then, the result of a complicated situation working itself out in the three centuries before 1800. To describe these causal factors as institutional, meaning those relating only or mainly to the enclosure movement, is clearly too narrow, but to widen the concept of institutional to include all those changes in the social structure which provided a framework for the emergence of a capitalistic agriculture is surely legitimate".115

(iii) The search for a 'prime mover' does not seem to fit well with the logic of dialectics where the reality of interaction should prevail over concern for causal primacy. This is where even the empirical materials found in the works of Postan and Le Roy Ladurie could lead to unsound formulations of demographic determinism. The same bias is
expressed in different terms by Bois' concern for discovering an invariant law of the 'falling rate of rent'. Such predilections would entail the type of misunderstanding we have experienced in associating the elements of capitalist crisis with an invariant 'law of the falling rate of profit', which Marx intended to indicate only a symptom of capitalist contradiction. Brenner's criticism of all this is valid for turning our attention on the importance of class struggle as the key-to-a change in the mode of production. Hilton made the same point when he interpreted the very concept of the prime mover as emanating from the struggle between classes and their relative strengths in the course of history.116

For a marxist, there should be no difficulty in concurring with the view that comparative analysis of class structure is absolutely necessary for a full understanding of economic development. But no moment of complex objective contradictions admits to being reduced into a simple subjective contest of class wills. Thus, "The resolution of structural crises in a mode of production always depends on the direct intervention of the class struggle; but the germination of such crises may well take all social classes by surprise in a given historical totality, by deriving from other structural levels of it than their own immediate confrontation. It is their task within the unfolding emergency which ...in the case of the feudal crisis, then determined its outcome."117 Indeed Hilton was signifying such 'other structural levels' when he stressed the importance of "familial constitution, inheritance customs, problems of the absorption or rejection of younger sons and daughters by familial and village communities and the associated question of non-agricultural by-occupations in the countryside" for any serious research by marxists into the detailed functioning of the feudal mode of production.118
Brenner points to Dobb's neglect of the role of class struggle. But his own view of the landlord framework does not fully clarify either the factor of England's routable aristocracy, or that of changes in the latter's composition. Each and every step in the interpretation of factors accounting for 'the transition', a long term historical phenomenon, has to be more explicit about the interaction between economic and non-economic factors working through the process. This can only help to clarify Brenner's appropriate emphasis on the role of class conflicts and struggle. It is necessary to emphasize that in any process and its decisive moments, a change in class relations and the order of forces cannot but be related to the entire complex ranging from the economic to demographic, socio-political and cultural factors. Such a complex defines the world in which classes take shape and carry out their struggle.

Let us take for example the context of class struggle and capitalist development in Russia from 1861 to the Stolypin reaction. It appears that Lenin would agree with the following formulation of Gerschenkron even though the latter does not make the class dimensions explicit in the contrasts shown between Russia and Britain: "The growth of industrial centres would have been impossible if agricultural production had not been so organized as to provide for the needs of a large industrial population, and agricultural population, on the other hand, could not have developed had not the industrial districts supplied adequate markets with growing number of consumers'. No interaction of this sort was apparent in Russia before Stolypin". But Lenin never missed the crucial distinction between the Stolypinist stage and the classical British experience. This is how the 'prime mover' of class struggle, its economic and extra-economic dimensions, acquire vital significance. Gerschenkron's study of economic growth per se has little concern for that significant totality and its parts.
(iv) To appreciate the full implications of Marx's 'two ways', it is necessary to comprehend the variants of absolutism -mercantilism and their different roles in maturiing the conditions for capitalist transition. In the light of all the on-going debates and controversies, two critical moments can be identified in the process of transition. One relates to the decline of serfdom or seignorial reaction in the 14/15th centuries, the other to the 16-18th centuries leading either to the bourgeois seizure of state power or to a confusion of feudal order and bourgeois exploitation in the course of history. The first instance corresponds to the emergence of absolute monarchies, the second rather to the latter's downfall or to its reinforcement. Thus, the interim period has vital significance for the beginning and development of a bourgeoisie within 'the womb' of the old order. Among the cases of capitalist retardation, we can observe countries whose belated industrialization can be considered as examples of the 'second way'. The conditions for such variance can be properly understood only when we take adequate account of how the three couples (viz. production forces/production relations, base/superstructure and civil society/state) of the marxian system interact and influence the forces of transition. This is where Antonio Gramsci's concepts of 'social hegemony' and 'historical bloc' may help our understanding of the bourgeois revolutions in Europe and also of the cases where they have a 'passive' character. Probably, the key to a meaningful interpretation of the 'two ways' also lies in the same dimensions of history.

(v) In the reference to the problem of underdevelopment in the world today, the question of transition from feudalism to capitalism takes us to a new direction. For marxists, the central issue is one of moving to a stage beyond capitalism, from conditions of backward capitalism, or semi-feudalism, or semi-capitalism, as the case may be, which again would always present a mix of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of exploitation. And the mix has so much variability from one country to another that the point of identifying it as capitalist or not may lose crucial significance. Gunder Frank is certainly wrong in his proposition that all countries in
the nexus of capitalist world market are capitalists themselves. This should not however make us miss the point that lack of homogenization of capitalist production was an important feature of the European experience as well. And so the strategy of an 'anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution' is destined to miss its marxist goals unless it can also mingle with the urge of the toiling masses for a path other than that of capitalist transformation. With the increasing roles of multinational companies, the international agencies of credit and aid in the world strategies of imperialism, there is further narrowing of the scope for indigenous capitalist development as a remedy for 'third world' underdevelopment.

In this context, the marxist theory and practice of transition has to initiate a manner of class struggle which can keep up with the identity of production, meaningful work and living and emerge as the revolutionary force seeking to do away with the capitalist relations of power and exploitation. The racist empathy for 'revolution from below' and also for the critical role of the peasantry has a particular significance in this connection. I mean the empathy and the 'vanguard will' to articulate it, not so much the real history experience in recent decades when the same ideal had frequently been seized by an amalgam of unorganised moral indignation and utopian ideas.

The central questions may then be posed as follows : (a) How do we identify the moment of demarcating the people's democratic strategy from support to capitalist development? When should the path of 'anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution' embrace opposition to capitalism? (b) Particularly in regard to the agrarian question, can capitalism be taken as a necessary phase of advance? (c) Depending on the answer to (b), should the historical view of the peasantry indicate a potential other than that of the capitalist farmer or wage-labourer? Is it necessary then to base on the 'community potential' of the toiling peasantry not only for an alternative after the seizure of political
power, but also for mediating a class-strategy for cooperatives in the course of the struggle to achieve people's democracy? (d) How to associate all this with a solution for the central problem of industrialization, overcoming the age-long contradiction between town and country?

Probably, and more so when we consider what is present as history, this question will call for some serious appraisal of "an intelligentsia that never made an appearance in its own theory, and whose existence and nature are therefore never systematically known even to itself". 120 Again, though in different historical environments, did Gramsci and Mao endeavour to see through to this still concealed level of marxism?

Notes and References


5. Ibid, p.133.


7. Eric Hobsbawm, 'From Feudalism to Capitalism' IN The Transition, p.164.

8. The Transition.


15. E. Le Roy Ladurie, The Peasants of Languedoc (Tr. John Day), London, 1976, p.311. (Languedoc). Le Roy Ladurie comments: "Malthus was a clear-headed theoretician on traditional societies, but he was a prophet of the past; he was born too late in a world too new".


17. E. Le Roy Ladurie, Languedoc.


26. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


34. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Moscow, 1961, p.64-65.


41. Gramsci, SPN, p.106.


43. Ibid., p.51.


45. Marx, 'Future Results of British Rule in India' in *Articles on India*, Bombay, 1945, p.66.


49. Furtado, loc cit.


54. Ibid., p.350.


56. Ibid., p.91.


59. Marx-Engels Correspondence, Loc Cit, p. 312.


63. 'Even Ryazanov, the most erudite of Russian Marxists and first official publisher of Zasulich drafts, as Director of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow, considered that they indicated the decline of Marx's capacities. On top of that, gentle hint he added, quoting Edward Bernstein, an additional explanation for Marx's populist deviations. Marx and Engels have restricted the expressions of their scepticism not to discourage too much the Russian revolutionaries!' Poor old Marx was going senile at sixty-three or else engaging in little lies of civility and expediency, once he departed from 'the straight and narrow' of the Marxism of his epigones. (In amusing affinity - during and after 1905-7 revolution Lenin was accused of leaning toward populism by some of his Marxist associates and adversaries). It says that these two have at least a deviation in common. For example, we can refer to the 1905 appeal of the Saratov Bolsheviks and the call of Nikolaev (A. Shpotovskov), the chief of the agrarian section of the Bolshevik Moscow Committee, against the new agrarian programme - treated as capitulation to the populist petty bourgeoisie" - vide Shanin, Peasant Commune, p. 117. Also 'David Ryazanov: The Discovery of the drafts (1924)' IN (Shanin ed.), Late Marx, p. 127-25.

64. 'Zasulich Correspondence', The Third Draft. IN (Shanin ed.), Late Marx, p. 121.
65. 'Zasulich Correspondence', The First Draft (according to the original publication of 1924, but probably the Second as suggested by recent research vide Wada, Loc Cit, p.143 and IN Shardin(ed.), Late Marx, p.64-65) IN Shardin (ed.), Ibid, p.121.

66. Wada, Loc Cit, p.144 and also IN (Shardin ed.), Late Marx, p.65-66.

67. Marx, Capital (Vol. I) Ch. XXI.


73. Ibid., p.332.


75. Ibid., p.93.


77. "The spearhead of the revolution will still be directed at imperialism and feudalism rather than at capitalism and capitalist private property in general. That being so, the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is not proletarian-socialist but bourgeois-democratic", vide Mao S.W., Vol.3, p.96. This was written in 1939. The same discourse (i.e. 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party') concluded by stressing 'the twofold task' of 'a complete revolutionary movement embracing the two revolutionary stages, democratic and socialist, which are two
revolutionary processes differing in character, and that the socialist stage can be reached only after the democratic stage is completed". IN Ibid, p.101.

78. While recognising the working class as the leader of the Chinese revolution, Mao observed in 'On New Democracy' that "New-democratic politics is virtually the granting of power to the peasants. The now or genuine Three People's Principles are virtually the principles of the peasants' revolution. The problem of mass culture is virtually the raising of the peasants' culture. The Anti-Japanese War is virtually a peasants' war." He added "By 'virtually' we mean essentially, not ignoring other factors, as Stalin himself has already explained". Vide Mao S.U., Vol.7, p.138.


84. Ibid, p.334.


87. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, Penguin Books, 1975, p.13. 'Pride's Purge' (Oxford U.P., 1971) implies the content of the book of the same name by David Underdown who, as Hill comments, "deals with almost exactly the same period as I do, but from an entirely different angle. His is the view from the top, from Whitehall, mine the worm's eye view. His index and mine contain totally different list of names". In the Long Parliament of 1642 the Presbyterians, who represented the
the wealthy merchants, financiers and landowners, had a majority. Though opposed to the arbitrary use of royal power, they preferred a middle path. The Grandees led by Oliver Cromwell had sharp differences with the radical leavellers programme. Since Cromwell had to fight the alliance between the Royalists and the Presbyterians, the difficulties with the left were shelved in 1648. The New Model Army preferred at this point to settle its score with the Royalist forces. Colonel Thomas Pride on behalf of the army purged the Parliament of 150 Presbyterian members. This event, a critical step towards the abolition of the Lords, confiscation of Crown and Church lands, and regicide, is conventionally known as 'Pride's Purge.'


90. In pre-capitalist formations, the natural and communal bonds made an individual the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate. The bonds signified the collective trust of the people, the affirmation of a world in which they could partake of some vital sources of life and culture, and also their weakness in enduring forces which really dominated them from above. In the historical experience of 'involution', capitalism makes a travesty of the trust and affirmation of older communities, but manoeuvres the traditional folk acceptance of patriarchal and domineering authority to enforce its mode of power. Thus, communities and their institutions are turned into mere instruments of power, often characterized by an amalgam of capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of exploitation.


94. *Ibid*, p.82.


98. Ibid., p. 78-79.

99. Ibid., p. 79.

100. The experience of 'the cultural revolution' in China gives an impression that Mao decided to hasten things at a pace and through agencies which led to many negative results. Lenin cautioned against haste and sweeping measures in matters of culture. While pointing up the aim of proletarian culture as the overthrow of all forms of exploitation of man by man, Lenin stressed the need to assimilate and refashion 'everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture'. (Vide Collected Works, Vol. 31, Moscow, 1966, p. 316-17). He also remarked, 'For a start we should be satisfied with real bourgeois culture'; (Better Fewer But Better' in Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 487). This was written in 1923. Mao was equally circumspect in 1940 when he wrote for giving history a definite place among the sciences respecting its dialectical development, but not eulogising the ancient while disparaging the modern, or praising any noxious feudal element'. (On New Democracy, vide Mao S.W., Vol. 3, p. 155). The 'cultural revolution' in China against 'bourgeoisement' marked a new historical conjunction to require some significant renewal of practice and perspective when 'the rural idiots' and the barbarians and the semi-barbarians' have been, for the last forty years, the main revolutionary force in the world'. (Raymond Williams, The Country and the City, Paladin, Frognore, St Albans, 1975, p. 365). Raymond Williams explicates in more detail: 'The terrible irony has been that the real processes of absolute urban and industrial priority, and of the related priority of the advanced and civilized nations, worked through not only to damage the 'rural idiots' and the 'colonial barbarians' and semi-barbarians', but to damage, at the heart, the urban proletarians themselves, and the advanced and civilized societies over which, in their turn, the priorities exercised their domination, in a strange dialectical twist. To see exposure creating revolution was one thing, to see more of the same producing more of something quite different was at best an apocalyptic hope'. (Ibid).


104. Lawrence Krader, *Introduction to The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx* (Lawrence Krader ed.), Amsterdam, 1974, p.3.


114. John Saville, *Loc Cit*, p.261,
115. Ibid, p.263.

116. Rodney Hilton, Introduction to The Transition, p.27.

117. Anderson, Passages, p.198, f.n.3.

118. Hilton, Loc Cit, p.28.


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