Occasional Paper No. 39

RALLYING ROUND THE COW: SECTARIAN STRIFE IN THE BHOJPUR REGION,
C. 1888-1917

GYAN PANDEY

CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES, CALCUTTA
PUBLICATIONS OF
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OCTOBER, 1981

CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES, CALCUTTA
10, LAKE TERRACE,
CALCUTTA-700029.
Rallying Round the Cow: Sectarian Strife in the Bhojpuri Region,
c.1888-1917*

The Bhojpuri-speaking districts of east UP and west Bihar became the storm-centre of a powerful Cow-Protection movement that gripped much of north and central India in the late nineteenth century. The Punjab where the movement was launched under the aegis of the Arya Samaj sometime in 1882, and the Central Provinces where its official headquarters appear to have been located from about the end of that decade, were long described as the chief centres of the Cow-Protection Societies or Gaurakshini Sabhas. Yet it was in the Bhojpuri region that Cow-Protection, as a movement, had its deepest impact. Here, particularly in the districts of Azamgarh, Ballia and Ghazipur in UP, Saran and Shahabad in Bihar (and the neighbouring Gaya and Patna which lay just beyond the Bhojpuri tract), the agitation appears to have acquired its greatest social depth and a quite unexpected militancy. Developments in the area culminated in serious rioting between Hindus and Muslims at the Baqr-ld of 1893, when the weaving

*I owe thanks to Gautam Bhadra, Partha Chatterjee and Barun De for their comments on an earlier draft, and to Ms. Anjusri Chakravarti for the preparation of the map.

The Bhojpuri-speaking region, as identified by G.A. Grierson, Linguistic Survey of India, Vol.V, Pt.II (1903, Delhi reprint 1968), 42-3, covers the districts of Faizabad, Azamgarh, Jaunpur, Banaras, Ghazipur, Ballia, northern Mirzapur, Shahabad and Saran. Bhojpuri was also spoken by the majority of inhabitants in the trans-Ghaghra districts of Gorakhpur and Basti in UP, and a variant of it called Nagpuri in the Chota Nagpur plateau of South Bihar; however these tracts, both fairly different in physical and social characteristics from the central Bhojpuri belt, are taken into account only marginally in the following study. See also, map on p.7a below.
town of Maunath Bhanjan (generally referred to simply as Mau) in Azamgarh district became the chief battlefield in a widespread attack upon Muslims mounted by large bodies of Hindus from the surrounding country.

The network of Gaurakshini Sabhas established in the 1880s and '90s seems to have been disbanded after this, and the movement effectively suppressed. But the cow-protection idea was far from being banished. It surfaced again as a major force in the region in the years after 1910. In 1912 and 1913 violence rocked Ayodhya in Faizabad district (the renowned capital of the legendary kingdom of Rama, and a place of exceptional sanctity for Hindus). Then, following a further build-up of tension in many places in 1915 and 1916, the district of Shahabad was witness to a disastrous conflagration in 1917, a huge Hindu rising that very quickly assumed the proportions of a civil war.

Several historians have written about the Gaurakshini Sabhas and the later riots linked with the question of cow-protection, and sought to account for this massive outburst of sectarian strife in the Bhajpuri region, not to be repeated on this scale in the rural areas at least until the 1940s. Some have viewed the agitation around this issue as a product, pure and simple, of elite (and ipso facto urban) initiative, which petered out because of insufficient mass support. Francis Robinson observes, in his thoroughly researched account of the emergence of Muslim separatist politics in north India, that the Cow-Protection movement spread from the Punjab to UP in 1886 when the High Court ruled that the cow was not unobject amenable down in the law regarding incitement to religious violence, and hence Muslims who slaughtered cows could not be held guilty under this law. It was in the towns, according to Robinson, that
the subsequent "drive to protect Hindu interests" had its greatest impact; for nearly two-thirds of UP's urban population was Muslim and it was in the towns, too, that the supporters of militantly anti-Muslim revivalist groups were concentrated. The outcome of this analysis is, however, ironical: Robinson has to relegate to a footnote what he calls "the most severe communal outbreaks of the century", namely the riots of 1893 in eastern UP, on the curious ground that these, like the 1912-13 clashes in Faizabad, "were rural not urban affairs".

In the most detailed account of the Cow-Protection movement to have been published so far, John McLane goes one step further. The timing of the riots and newspaper comments upon them, he argues, indicates the connection of the Cow-Protection movement with Congress - 'Muslim' [sic] disagreements over the 1892 legislative council reforms. Further, the rapid collapse of the organizational apparatus of the movement after 1893 "suggests that popular sentiment was not broad or adamant and that Hindu leaders regarded the alienation of Muslims and the government as too heavy a price to pay for any possible benefits". Yet, if McLane had paid closer attention not only to the timing but also to the scale of the riots, the identity of the participants and the slogans and symbols behind which they united, he would have found, I think, that the 1892 Councils Act and the aspirations of a few Hindu politicians are altogether too narrow a reason for the outbreak of agitation on this scale -- or for its collapse.

Other scholars, delving deeper, have come up with the suggestion that the Cow-Protection agitation and riots represent the last-ditch efforts of a declining zamindari class, threatened by its own over-population, a sharp rise in prices and the growing assertiveness of a tenantry that was now better protected
than over before. "Displacement of leaders (zamindars and officials) associated with fluctuating prices: this is the picture which emerges in the background of the Shahabad riots", writes Peter Robb after a detailed analysis of the 1917 outbreak. And while "the officials ... with their foreign traditions and their hierarchy and rules were not able to politicise their role as local leaders ... this was surely what was happening in part if landlords in Shahabad made common cause with tenants over cow-killing." By unfurling the banner of the cow, and indeed through deliberate assaults upon the villages and homes of Muslim neighbours, the Hindu zamindars of the district apparently hoped to bring back to the fold their increasingly recalcitrant tenants and other dependants.

The evidence regarding a struggling small zamindari class is not inconsiderable. Yet such an analysis is perhaps a little too facile. For one thing, the wealth of local detail makes no dent in the elitism of outlook. We learn comparatively little about the very substantial (and I shall argue, autonomous) part played by particular non-zamindari castes, notably the Ahirs, in the Shahabad events of 1917. We learn nothing at all about why certain targets, and certain symbols of unity, were chosen; and why various groups with conflicting interests so readily rallied round these symbols. Was the decision to make a scapegoat of the Bhojpuri Muslims quite fortuitous? Or are we to believe that they were never considered a part of the local society? And do we return, by this roundabout route, to the nineteenth century colonial belief in the essential fanaticism of the masses in all matters of religion?"
These questions relate in fact to more than a few isolated studies of the Cow-Protection movement. They are concerned with assumptions underlying a whole range of analyses of the phenomenon called 'communalism' by writers and observers of Indian history. One of the easiest of these is that depth of religious feeling almost automatically leads to 'communalism', if indeed the two are not synonymous. Scholars tend to forget the run of semantic leaps that is necessary to give this view a degree of plausibility. The term 'communalism' is never applied, in the same sense, to feudal Europe or other pre-capitalist societies where religiosity was no shallower and sectarian strife not rare: it is reserved for the analysis of Indian society in the colonial period, and then read back by some as a quality that must have existed in the sub-continent long before this.

Even after this, there is the need for another sleight of hand. 'Communalism' as most laymen understand the term, and as some scholars suppose it to have existed for centuries, refers to the atmosphere of suspicion, fear and ill-will that has come to characterize relations on the ground between different religious communities, and especially between Hindus and Muslims. Most academic investigations of the phenomenon have, on the other hand, been concerned with organized political movements based on the so-called common demands of a religious community, usually in opposition to a real or imagined threat from another community (or communities): sectional demands on state policy for a given share in jobs, education, legislative bodies, leading on in some cases to separatist demands for the creation of new provinces and states. Often investigations of politics at this level have been conducted in quite remarkable isolation from happenings at the grass-roots level. The result, when it comes to an explanation of popular support for much movement, is all too often a retreat into well-worn and essentially
tautological formulae -- the religious character of the mass of the people, or the monolithic unity of faith: assertions that are not demonstrable by reference to any historical data, if not an uncritical reproduction of old stereotypes.  

I propose in this paper to take a close look at the sectarian strife that grew out of the Cow-Protection agitation in the Bhojpuri region, in order to re-examine some of the received wisdom regarding 'communalism' on the ground. A detailed analysis of all the major outbreaks that occurred in the region is not possible here. The following pages focus particularly on the clashes of 1893 in Azamgarh and the adjacent districts of Ghazipur and Ballia, and in Shahabad a quarter of a century later. The riots in these overwhelmingly agricultural districts were more evidently 'rural' in character than even the 1912-13 clashes in Faizabad Ayodhya (which, like Banaras city, had been the scene of major sectarian outbreaks earlier in the nineteenth century). Their scale was also greater than anything that occurred in the region in 1912-13 (and, incidentally, far greater than that of the more frequently discussed 1913 riot in Kanpur, further west in UP). It is one aim of the present exercise to locate the identity and interests of the different social groups in the Bhojpuri region involved in this sectarian strife from the late 1880s to the 1910s. But there is another object which is less often pursued very far in studies of this kind: that is, to consider how struggles between (and within) castes and classes that are divided over many different issues took on a sectarian form. What we need to know far more about, it seems to me, are the circumstances in which large sections of one religious community united around a particular demand or symbol to take up arms against their neighbours, and the social and geographical area over which this 'unity' was established at different times. I hope that this paper will provide at least some pointers towards an answer to this question.
II. The Bhojpuri economy and society:
   a necessary background.

Three features of Bhojpuri society call for special notice in the context of the present enquiry. First, it stood out, even in an overwhelmingly agricultural country, for its extreme dependence on pasture and agriculture. Secondly, it was marked by the clear dominance of a few landowning communities. Finally, it experienced in the colonial period, in common with most of the sub-continent, a severe dislocation of existing social and economic relations.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, over 80 per cent of the Bhojpuri work force was engaged in agriculture and a mere 5 per cent or so in manufacturing. In Banaras Division, which Banaras city and its attendant industries made the most 'industrialised' in the region, agriculture still accounted for 70 per cent of the work-force, manufacturing for about 10 per cent. Again, Patna Division--comprising the districts of Shahabad, Gaya and Patna--had 20 towns and 5½ million inhabitants in 1911, but a bare 26 industrial works employing less than 3000 people.7

Excluding Banaras and the Faizabad-Ayodhya complex, the region was quite bereft of cities. Only one other town had a population exceeding 40,000 in 1911 (Chapra, headquarters of Saran district); three others had between 30,000 and 40,000 (Mirzapur, Jaunpur and Arrah, headquarters of Shahabad district); and there were two more with over 20,000 (Ghazipur, and Sarsar or Sahasram in Shahabad district); towns that had grown up around trade, handicrafts and pilgrimage, and whose importance was maintained by their adoption as centres of colonial administration. There was a handful of other sizable urban and semi-urban
concentrations such as the weaving towns of Tanda (in Faizabad district) and Mau and Mubarakpur (in Azamgarh) with populations of 19378, 16751 and 12562 respectively in 1911: places once noted for industry, commerce and imperial favour, that now found themselves in far more uncertain circumstances. Most 'urban' complexes in the region, however, were very much smaller centres of artisanal industry and trade, rural market towns (qasbas), or large villages classified as towns for reasons of administrative convenience. Even district headquarters like Arrah, Ballia and Azamgarh retained the appearance of clusters of villages, distinguishable from surrounding 'rural' habitations chiefly by the presence of civil courts and officials and the range of services that came up in their wake.

A number of the older towns still bore the mark of their special circumstances in time past, with their large communities of weavers and other artisans, long established houses of traders and moneylenders and service groups of various kinds: clerks, agents, priests and preachers. Many of them also had significant concentrations of Muslims, traditionally prominent in the literate service sector as well as in crafts such as weaving. Thus in Shahabad, the Muslim proportion of the total population (taking Sheikhs, Pathans, Julahas and so on, all together) was a mere 7 per cent, the lowest in all Bihar, but Muslims were present in somewhat greater strength in the southern part of the district around Sassaram, where the Afghan Emperor of Delhi, Sher Shah Suri had been born; in Sassaram sub-division they constituted a little under 9 per cent of the population, in Sassaram thana (or police circle) nearly 12 per cent and in Sassaram town as much as 40 per cent. In Azamgarh, where the Muslim concentration was greater than anywhere else in the Bhojpuri region, they still accounted for no more than 14 per cent of the total population of the district; however, Muslims formed the majority in the towns of Mau, Mubarakpur and Muhammadabad and a substantial minority in Kopaganj, Chiriacot, Azamgarh and several other places.
Into some of these old towns, as into newer trading and administrative centres, a growing body of men crowded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as long distance trade grew, the general monetization of the economy was carried further, pressure upon the land increased, and western education and colonial administration penetrated deeper. Among them were merchants and moneylenders, men in search of casual labour or other employment, and, most noticeable of all, a whole new breed of petty bureaucrats, teachers, lawyers and other 'representatives' ready to take up a variety of causes and act as intermediaries between the people and the colonial power. It bears stressing, however, that these men retained strong links with the land. For land (and the disputes over its possession, payment of rent and revenue, and the like) provided the merchants, moneylenders, lawyers and others their commodities and their clients; sometimes by way of agricultural produce on the family's holdings an additional income; and always by its possession, a mark of status.

Land remained in any event the primary economic resource, and the struggle for various rights in the produce of the soil forms the backdrop to much of the history of the region. Here, over a period of centuries, communities of Rajputs, Bhumihars ("cultivating" Brahmans, also called Bhumihar Brahmans or Babbans) and Brahmans had established a clear dominance. In more recent times they had to vie for control over particular villages and estates with various Muslim groups, local converts as well as newcomers from outside, who on occasion sought intervention in their favour by different Muslim rulers; and into the nineteenth century such conflicts between these and other groups continued. In the later nineteenth century Muslim zamindars had a hold on isolated tracts, especially in the vicinity of the old centres of Muslim administration such as Sassaram in southern Shahabad and various places in Azamgarh, Faizabad and Jaunpur. In the
eastern half of the Bhojpuri region -- eastern Ghazipur, Ballia, Saran, Shahabad, as also in Gaya, marked by a striking numerical preponderance of the cow-herd caste of Ahirs or Gwalas, the Ahirs controlled a fair number of villages, especially those of smaller than average size. Even so, as late as 1951, by which time landowners from several lower-status groups like the Ahirs, Kurmis and even Koeris had emerged in some strength in Bihar, the three 'traditional' upper-caste zamindari communities still accounted for 80 per cent of all landowners in the state. 8

The economic dominance of Rajputs, Brahmans and Bhumihars was reinforced by their numerical strength. While the Chamars and Ahirs greatly outnumbered them in western Bhojpur, centering on Azamgarh, and the Ahirs again in the districts further east, the Rajputs and Brahmans and to a lesser extent the Bhumihars were present in significant numbers throughout the Bhojpuri region. We may take the figures for Azamgarh and Shahabad again as illustration. In the former, Chamars constituted over 20 per cent of the total population in 1911, and Ahirs another 19 per cent. But the next most numerous castes were the Brahmans and Rajputs each forming nearly 9 per cent of the total, and accounting together with the Bhumihars (2 per cent) for a substantial segment of the district population. The other numerically significant Hindu castes were the Koeris and Lunias (or Noniyas, the traditional salt and saltpetre manufacturers), who each provided about 4 per cent of the total population. In Shahabad in 1921, Ahirs made up over 13 per cent of the district population. Brahmans and Rajputs came next, with 10 per cent each, and Bhumihars provided another 4 per cent. Koeris here constituted nearly 8 per cent of the total population and Chamars nearly 7 per cent.
All this is fairly well known. What is perhaps less appreciated is the extent to which the Rajput, Bhumihar and Brahman communities of the Bhojpuri region were communities of smallholders. The Permanent Settlement which covered much of the tract, and the existence of great landlords like the Rajas of Banaras and Dumraon, Hathwa and Bettiah, have tended to obscure the pattern of land control at the local level. "In Bihar", Baden-Powell wrote in 1892, "there never were any large Zamindaris"; and whatever the validity of this assessment for Bihar as a whole, it was true in large part for the Bhojpuri region out the turn of the century. In the permanently settled portion of east UP, which included Ghazipur, Ballia, Banaras, Jaunpur and part of Azamgarh, as the same authority noted, the Raja of Banaras who might have designated "landlord of the whole" was, by agreement, set aside, and the settlement was made with village zamindars, "i.e. the landlord or joint villages (some of them bhaiachara communities ...)").

There were indeed variations between and within districts. Sometimes the headman or representative was treated as the principal with his co-sharers as inferiors. In places the overlordship established over village communities by subordinate chiefs, courtiers or relations of a more or less distant ruler was acknowledged. More generally, however, the collective spirit of these proprietary and cultivating bodies was recognized in the settlements. Crawford commented on Azamgarh in 1908, that

"the district is essentially one of large communities or peasant proprietors. Apart from those definitely recorded as so held, many of the mahals owned by single large proprietors or their descendants were acquired at sales for arrears of revenue in the early days of British rule, and in these the old peasant proprietors will be found in possession of the bulk of the land as occupancy tenants".


His observation neglects the appeal of zamindari (or rather, rentier) status for the upper castes, the importance of never soilng their hands with the messy business of cultivation. But it does point to a factor of significance for the region as a whole: that differentiation within these communities was not especially marked, and Rajput, Brahman, Bhumihar zamindars or occupancy tenants (including actual peasant proprietors) were not easily distinguished in terms of income, status or style of life, while the very insistence on 'gentry' status inhibited the emergence of what has been called 'true bhaiachara', the low level of differentiation (and possibly a sense of allegiance to the great landlords of their stock, Dumraon, Banaras and others) seems to have lent a degree of cohesiveness to these communities, which were otherwise without strict caste panchayats or regulations — a cohesiveness that was evident in this region in 1857 as it was to be again during the cow-protection activities of the 1890s and the 1910s.

If the Rajputs, Brahmans and Bhumihars are readily identified as the zamindari castes of the Bhojpuri region, the Ahirs, Kurmis and Koeris may be categorized as the tenant and cultivating castes par excellence, and still further depressed and untouchable castes (especially the Chamars and the Dusadhas) as the main providers of monial and agriculture labour. But while we make these distinctions between upper, middle and low-status groups — and, more or less congruent with them, classes of small landlords and rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor peasants and landless labourers — we must bear in mind the distinctions made by the members of the local society themselves. Apart from the rigorously observed distinctions between a whole variety of castes and sub-castes (Muslim as well as Hindu), the basic social division in the region as perceived at least by the locally dominant elements, was that between the sharif (or ashraf, i.e. the respectable classes) and the razil
(or labouring people). The former was comprised of the Brahmans, Rajputs, Bhumihars, together with the 'true' Syeds and Sheikhs, Pathan converts from the Rajput community, and some smaller Hindu castes like the Kayasthas. All the rest -- from the Ahirs and Kurmis, and equivalent Muslim castes like the Zamindaras (or Rautaras) of Azamgarh, to the 'unclean' labouring and artisanal castes, Koeris, Chamars, Julahas and the like -- were classified as razil.

One indicator of a community's razil status was the fact that a far larger proportion of its women folk went out to work compared to the sharif. Thus in Bihar in 1911, whereas there were but 8 female workers to every 100 male workers among the Bubhrans, 10 to every 100 among Rajputs and 12 among the Brahmins, the numbers were 52 among Kurmis, 54 among both Ahirs and Koeris, and as much as 69 and 71 among the Julahas and Dusadhs respectively. Other indicators might be practices like widow re-marriage, the consumption of liquor, possibly meat-eating and, not the least significant, the performance of menial and other tasks for the upper castes and landowners. Sharif status carried with it at least a marginal concession in the rates of rented land, for example. But it is worth noting that it was the implication of social inferiority in the term razil rather than the disadvantage in rent that appears especially to have aroused the resentment of certain of the lower orders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. With the advance of impersonal market forces, bureaucratic procedures and law courts, many of these resentments were to burst forth in the form of social mobility movements for caste uplift and assertion of self-respect in the face of zamindari (and, more generally, sharif) oppression.
On the one hand, the extension of cash-cropping and trade, and the registration of the rights of various classes on the land, provided favourable conditions of advancement for many individuals and groups. On the other hand, a century of forced commercialization of agriculture, violent fluctuations in the conditions of trade, and the general trend of de-industrialization in the region, combined with the closing of other important sources of subsidiary income such as service in the native armies and courts, and the growth of population, greatly increased the pressure on large sections of the agricultural community. The zamindari communities of the Bhojpuri region were among the first to feel the effects; and many of their number, unable to relinquish old ways and customs, became victims of an age that required personal supervision (if not cultivation) of smaller and smaller shares in the land.

Eyre, Sub-Divisional Officer of Sassaram tahsil in Shahabad district, noted as early as 1871-72 that the local "gentry" "has of late years so increased in number, that though the pride of those who constitute it is unlimited, the poorer among them are compelled by sheer necessity to resort to manual labour...." From Azamgarh in 1908, Crawford reported some of the same pressures at work -- "the most obvious characteristic of the proprietors of this district is their number" -- and their apparently inevitable consequences: separation and sub-division of estates and holdings, and a "lamentable amount" of litigation. In the thirty years that had elapsed since the last settlement of Azamgarh district, he found, nearly all the 'traditional' landowning communities had lost land: Rajputs 16000 acres, Bhumihars 21000, Kayasths 13000 and Pathans 10000. Meanwhile "trading castes" picked up 32,000 acres and the Zamindaras, a middle-rank Muslim agricultural caste, 19000 acres. Even after this, Rajputs owned $\frac{1}{3}$ of the
district, the "trading castes" less than $\frac{1}{16}$. Yet for thousands of sharif families, the hardship will have been severe. There is no doubt that increasing pressure on the soil, rising prices, and the danger of losing rights long enjoyed through administrative fiat or economic collapse, sharpened the contests between zamindar occupancy tenants and others that came to mark Survey and Settlement proceedings throughout these districts in this period. Without doubt, too, these straitened circumstances contributed to the growing trend of young men from zamindari families migrating to the cities and towns in search of employment.

The economic dislocation that came with colonialism did not of course affect the rentier classes alone. Increased dependance on the market in a generally inflationary era, the strong position of the moneylender mahajan (often himself the zamindar), and the buying or swallowing up of all kinds of rights in land (cultivated as well as waste), all this enforced by a rigorous and powerful bureaucratic authority, subjected the lower classes to enormous stress. The vast majority of the laboring and cultivating communities, lacking ready access to the new economic and cultural resources, and increasingly denied the benefits of earlier forms of personal contact and mutual obligation, found themselves extremely hard-pressed -- but unable even to migrate in protest to take up cultivation in other areas. The migration that now occurred, to the industrial belt of eastern India, the tea-gardens of Assam and plantations abroad, was the forced migration of individuals, predominantly single men: in most cases it retained something of a 'temporary' quality about it, bringing additional income but also new strain to the local communities without fundamentally transforming their work situation or dependance on other classes.
I have tried to document this elsewhere in the case of the weavers of east UP, and to show something of their resistance to what they saw as the increasing oppressiveness of the age. But it was among the middling status agricultural castes (or caste clusters), who could as easily aspire to a higher status and greater economic and political freedom as be pushed down into the ranks of the increasingly immiserized and dependant, that the new tensions that were developing in Bhojpuri society were most clearly reflected. With the Zamindaras of Azamgarh whose gains in landholding in the thirty years preceding the Settlement of 1908 have been noticed above, for instance, were the Mals "a Kurmi caste of some importance" in pargana Nathupur of the same district. In their improved circumstances, the Zamindaras and the Mals became extremely resentful of the low esteem in which they were held by the higher orders, and resisted attempts to classify them as razi. In much the same way, the Sainthwar sub-caste of the Kurmis claimed (and won for itself at the Census of 1911) the status of a separate caste, not associated with the rest of the Kurmis, "chiefly because of the rise of its leading family (of Padrauna in Gorakhpur)".

By the first decades of the twentieth century, indeed, several of these middle-status agricultural castes -- Ahirs, Kurmis, Koers and others -- had begun to register their protest far more openly against all manner of social and economic oppression. Their agitations appear to have gained a clearer focus and organizational form with the attempt of the 1901 Census to list castes according to precedence. Bhumihars and Kayasths were indignant at their classification in the Vaisya varna, along with such lowly castes as Kurmis, Ahirs, Mallahs (boatmen), Hajjams (barbers) and Kahars (water-carriers). Ahirs and Kurmis, too, especially the more prosperous among them, protested against being placed on par with Hajjams and Kahars.
Here was powerful stimulus to the formation of modern, province-
and even country-wide caste associations and the development of
wider solidarities.

To indicate the nature and force of these caste movements
we may take the single example of the Gwala Movement among the
Ahirs of Shahabad and other districts in Bihar, which is of
interest also because it was closely associated with cow-protect
activities in that region. The Bihar Census Commissioner in 1921
described this as the most important of the lower-caste associati
and movements for social uplift that had arisen in Bihar.

"Sessions are held once a year and are
attended by several thousands of persons
... A considerable body of literature
has accumulated in support of the claim
of the Ahirs to Kshatriya origin and it
is stated that 'nothing less than Kshatriya
position will satisfy it [the community]'
... a number of Ahirs have [sic.] assumed
the sacred thread ... The men of this
caste refuse to do Begari [forced labour]
for their landlords or to permit their
women folk to attend the markets to sell milk
and ghee".

Another report, from the Patna Division, noticed various
instructions that the Gwanas had laid down for their community
at a succession of meetings, among them the wearing of the
sacred thread, the herding of cows, an end to the practice of
eyarriage, a collection of one anna per bigha from all
Gwala cultivators to be utilised for the education of the
children, the refusal to do begari for zamindars, and the
maintenance of unity among themselves. About the special
concern for cows expressed by this traditional cow-herd caste,
we may add one more word. With increasing numbers of cattle
passing into the hands of butchers (through cattle-stealing and
poisoning, and by other means) and mortality among cattle at a great height since the later nineteenth century (this, again, associated in part with a declining acreage reserved for pasture), and with the great cattle fairs of western Bihar no doubt clearly reflecting these trends, 19 the protection and care of cows early became an important object of the Gwalas. The implications of this for sectarian relations in the area will become clearer in a later section.

Here it must be noted that among Muslims, too, attempts to reject demeaning symbols and assert a higher Islamic status proceeded apace at this time. The Zamindars claimed a berth among the ashraf. Muslim Rajputs in large numbers "suddenly", between 1901 and 1911, took to calling themselves pathans — the title Singh yielding place to Khan. "Practically all ..... (Muslims) of low degree", weavers, oil-pressers, barbers and so on, aspired to the status of Sheikhs "though the better class Musalmans would not recognise them, nor would they recognise each other, as such". Muslim weavers over much of north India, with their closely-knit community organization and recent history of common hardships and extended struggle, succeeded in having the name Julaha, with its connotations of lowly origins and foolishness, removed from the official record, and were registered instead as Momin (the faithful, men of honour), Ansari (after a claimed Arabic ancestor who practised the art of weaving), Momin-Ansar or Sheikh Momin. 20

Social mobility movements do not seem in this period to have been so closely linked with changes in occupation as was perhaps the case before. 21 Improved communications and long-distance mobility, and the very efforts of the new colonial patron to record the 'traditional' status of his subjects, encouraged their growth. In part, as well, such efforts at
self-purification and upward mobility reflected the response of Hindus and Muslims at many different levels to the powerful movements of religious reform and revivalism in the nineteenth century. In part too, the evidence suggests, they were the product of the threat to an earlier sense of community that was very strong, for instance, among Muslim weavers in different parts of the Bhojpuri region, only a little less so among local groups of Ahirs and Kurmis, more diffuse it would seem among Bhumihars and Brahmans; a more or less desperate search for alternatives (economic and social; food and security) in a situation where earlier, well understood functions, relations and systems of relief were breaking down.

It was in the midst of these emerging tensions and struggles that a number of newly organised 'communal' demands were injected into the Bhojpuri region. Schemes to found Hindu and Muslim educational institutions and to have Devanagri recognized as a script for official purposes found a following among petty bourgeois and zamindari elements of both religious denominations in the cities and towns, though they were apparently more vigorously advocated in Panjab and western UP than in the east. The call for Cow-Protection of course spread further, encompassed a wider social spectrum and gave rise to very serious disturbances in east UP and west Bihar. Yet we must not assume, even before we begin an examination of the strife that erupted, that there was throughout Bhojpuri society a ready-made 'communalism' or simple 'unity of faith' into which the new 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' demands all too easily fitted. Even for the relatively isolated and embattled Muslim community of the region at the turn of the century, the outlook was rather more complex, as the following extract from the diary of a local weaver testifies. Abdul Majid of Mubarakpur (Azamgarh district) thus records his observations on a riot in the town in 1904:

- : 19 : -
"The riot in Mubarakpur was a strange affair. It occurred at the instance of the notables /faide log/, literally, big men/. The lower classes /shote log/, literally, small or unprivileged people/thought that nothing would happen /sic./ because of official precautions. If the latter had known that they would in their haste commit excesses and be punished for them, they would certainly never have taken such action. The head of a pig was found at ... masjid near the pond in the Sikhthi zamindari /one of the three zamindari units that went to make up Mubarakpur/. The Musalmans became extremely agitated. They did not stop to consider who was responsible for this act. The planting of this pig's head in the masjid was the work of Khuda Bakhsh ... of Mustafabad /a hamlet near Mubarakpur/. He performed this shameful deed because of his enmity with Babu Ram Bali Singh of Gujarpur /zamindar of this Hindu village just north of Mubarakpur/. He decided to defile the mosque and then get the Musalmans of Mubarakpur to believe that Ram Bali had done it; thereafter he would withdraw, and yet obtain his revenge on Ram Bali. However, things turned out very differently, and the Musalmans of Mubarakpur began to be arrested from 5 p.m. on that very day .... The police were posted all around. The houses of those accused who had absconded were searched. Inspector Mohan Singh, deroga Dost Muhammad Khan, and ten or twelve policemen and chaukiders entered and searched the house of Maulvi Rafiuddin Sahib in Pura Dewan. They threw a copy of the Quran Majid out into the courtyard, and Mohan Singh trampled it underfoot. We were present there, and were deeply wounded by this slight ..."
Here is testimony to depth of religious feelings, undiminished yet by the advance of an industrial age or scientific education. Here is appreciation of the different interests of the well-to-do (zemindars and bade log) and the poorer classes (ghotia log), as well as the power of the colonial state. Here is a feeling of contrition, too, at the action taken by the Muslims of the town against the local Hindus in an unstudied response to a self-interested person's attempt to exploit their religious sentiments. All this in spite of the bitter experience of the Cow-Protection movement, and the tension and conflict between Hindus and Muslims in the district that flowed from it, of which the 1904 riot too seems to have been a part. The manipulative politics of 'communalism' appears as only one of several objective possibilities in this situation.

III. Baqr EId, 1893.

The Baqr EId of 25 June 1893 was marked in the Bhojpur region by riots of an unusual kind, very different in character from earlier instances of localized strife. Azamgarh district, the chief arena of battle was, in the official phrase, "invaded" by men from other districts.

"Of 35 cases of unlawful assembly and rioting /in Azamgarh/ nearly all were the work of large bodies of excited Hindus, who had collected from distant villages and from the Ballia and Ghazipur districts to join in an attempt to prevent the Muhammadans exercising their lawful custom of sacrifice .... On the day of the EId excited bodies of Hindus wandered round the district demanding, under threats of injury to person and property, the prompt surrender of the cattle destined for sacrifice, and requiring from them an agreement that they would abstain from the sacrifice of kine in the future. On the days following the EId the crops of several Musalmans who were believed to have performed sacrifice were destroyed."
The worst trouble spot in Azamgarh district was Mau, an old cloth-manufacturing centre known since the days of Akbar for the production of particular kinds of cloth. In Shah Jahan’s reign the parganah of Maunath Bhanjan was assigned to two daughters of the Emperor, and the town was renamed Jahanabad after one of them; very soon it came to have as many as 34 mahallas (residential localities) and 360 mosques. A large proportion of the population, then and down to the nineteenth century, consisted of Muslim weavers, and Hindu spinners, traders and businessmen of various castes, many of whom had been induced by the imperial authorities to come and settle in the town. The cotton cloth industry then gained greatly in importance, and the subsequent establishment of an imperial customs post at Mau indicates the volume of traffic that passed through it.

The town of Mau and the surrounding tract appears to have been held for long, again from Akbar’s time if not earlier, by Sheikh Muslim zamindars. The latter were, however, displaced at some stage by Dhoonwar Rajput landowners. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Dhoonwars were still extending their hold in the countryside around Mau, chiefly now at the expense of other Rajput proprietors. The situation in the town when the British took over the direct administration of eastern UP in 1801 might appear, then, to have been tailor-made for conflict between Hindus and Muslims, with Hindu zamindars, traders and moneylenders in the ascendant, but a majority of Muslim inhabitants and the memory of imperial favour and local Muslim dominance. And it is notable that clashes over the issue of cow-slaughter, not unknown in Mau before, broke out again in the nineteenth century long before the advent of the Gaurakshini Sabhas. Yet, as we shall see, many memories, and institutions and arrangements had to be shaken up before the
town was given over to more extended and, as it would then be
described, endemic sectarian strife.

In any case, not the town of Mau alone but the entire
southern and eastern portion of Azamgarh district, bordering
on the districts of Ghazipur and Ballia, was infected by the
new call for cow-protection. In these parganas the impact of
Gaurakshini propaganda, vigorously promoted in Ghazipur and
Ballia for some years before this, was already becoming evident
at the beginning of 1893. Thus on 9 January 1893, a few miles
from Kopaganj (Azamgarh's third-largest weaving centre, situated
six miles north of Mau), villagers "rescued" a herd of cattle
being driven by Muslim butchers via Kopa to Ghazipur. The next
morning the police recovered the cattle at the nearby village
of Kasara, to be confronted by a crowd of perhaps 200 Hindus —
people from Kasara and other neighbouring villages — who took
back the cattle by force and then dispatched them to associates
in various parts of Ballia.  

Such demonstrations against intended (or even, possible)
cow-slaughter increased in the months that followed, and
especially after formal steps were initiated to organize Gauraksha
Sabhas in the district in May 1893. Two large meetings in that
month at Azmatgarh and Jahanaganj, attended by several thousand
Hindus and addressed by Gaurakshini leaders from Ballia, marked
the beginning of this effort. The second of these meetings put
forward the demand that Muslims should give up qurbani (or
cow-sacrifice) and apparently also decided on direct action to
put an end to the practice.
Three days after the Jahanaganj meeting, on 22 May, at Sikandarpur village near Maharajganj, a crowd of several hundred Hindus deprived a Muslim of a buffalo that he was taking along for a wedding feast. A week later butchers driving buffaloes along the road were stopped and threatened by Hindu villagers somewhere between Mubarakpur and the town of Azamgarh. During the same period, tenants of the Muslim zamindars of Walidpur (near Mubarakpur) and certain Muslims of Muhammadabad instituted a number of cases, some of them fabricated, regarding Gaurakshini activities in Walidpur and the forcible confiscation of cattle by Hindus near Muhammadabad. As a Hindu Inspector of Police reported at this time, after the Jahanaganj meeting Hindus in many different parts of the district had prevented Muslims not only from purchasing cattle, but buffaloes & goats as well; and friction between Hindus and Muslims had increased enormously.

At the same time branches of the Cow-Protection League sprang up in various places, quickly carving out for themselves a powerful position in parganahs Sagri (especially its northeastern portions, Ghosi and Nathupur, which bordered on Ballia district) and Muhammadabad (in which Mau and Mubarakpur lay), and spreading out to much of parganah Nizamabad (west of Azamgarh town) and the parts of parganah Deogaon that bordered on Muhammadabad and Nizamabad.

Among the methods adopted by the Gaurakshini Sabhas for the raising of funds was the system of chutki, whereby a pinch (or chutki) of food was set aside for each member of a household at each meal; this was then collected for the village as a whole and passed on along a chain of selected officers of the Sabha, with the proceeds from its sale being deposited with a Treasurer. "Wherever 'chutki! is collected" the Azamgarh Magistrate at the time of the 1893 riots observed, "I regard the
League as being in force. In the Sagri pargana chutki collections were said to have been "in full swing ever since the meeting at Azmatgarh" on 15 May 1893. In the Nathupur division they began even earlier, apparently in January or February: by the middle of the year it was reported that "chutki is collected in every Hindu village in Nathupur".

In Muhammadabad, too, the Gaurakshinists proved very successful. Drawing up a list of the chief organizers of the Sabhas in the district, the Magistrate refrained from including anyone from Mau and its neighbourhood since "every leading Hindu in those parts sympathizes and aids in the movement". 27

The Cow-Protection Movement had advanced rapidly from its initial aim of building gaushalas (homes) for sick and aged cattle. By the time of its penetration into Azamgarh, its leaders were pressing for the impounding of cattle found on the roads in 'suspicious' circumstances, and the collection of fees for cattle so impounded at rates fixed by zamindars, to be used for the promotion of Gaurakshini purposes. In places, zamindars were deciding cases in which cattle were involved and realizing fines for the benefit of the Sabhas. Moreover, an official reported,

"The whole of the Hindu population is driven into its arms by the tyranny of caste, and when once the league is established in any place, its grasp is so powerful that every man, woman and child [sic.] must openly or secretly contribute to its funds, or cease to be a Hindu". 28

How this system of intimidation worked was demonstrated by an incident in the village of Panda Kunda, which lay in the western portion of the Sagri pargana of Azamgarh district, just before the Bahri of 1893. Here a "respectable Hindu farmer". Lachman Paure, was "remorselessly boycotted" for selling a bullo
to a Muslim. Gurbin, Nirajan, Maharaj, Debidayal, Bechu, all Sahu (traders or moneylenders), and a number of other men gathered at his house, pulled down tiles from the roof, and smashed his earthen vessels. They also stopped the irrigation of his sugarcane field, forbade the village Kahars from carrying the sweets that were necessary for his daughter's entry into the house of her father-in-law, and slapped Lachman, threatening to loot his house and put him to death if he did not get the bullock back.²⁹

About this time, too, the Sabhas in Azamgarh had begun to demand ikrarnamas (bonds) from Muslim villagers that in future they would not slaughter cattle under any condition, backing up their demands with various kinds of threat. Muslim weavers were threatened with boycott: none would buy their cloth, nor any bania supply them with grain. Landowning Muslims were warned that their property would be plundered: two of them reported receiving such threats with the qualification that if they contributed to Gaurakshini funds, or gave a certain quantity of rasad for the purposes of the Sabhas, they would be spared.

Some of this information regarding the growth of Gaurakshini activities, culled from the contemporary official reports, may have been painted in particularly lurid colours after the experience of the riots at the Baqr-Id of 1893. But even before the Baqr-Id there was enough evidence of the aggressiveness of Hindu demands and the general growth of tension, for special precautions to be taken. Among these was the posting of Garstin, the Superintendent of the Azamgarh district police force, and Janki Prasad, a Deputy Magistrate, to the town of Mau on 24 June, the day before the Baqr-Id.³⁰
That afternoon, the Deputy Magistrate in fact arranged a compromise agreement between the local Hindu and Muslim leaders. But all through the night of 24 June and the following morning, crowds of Hindus from Ballia and Ghazipur districts as well as places nearer Mau streamed into the town to demonstrate against gurbani. Before the day was far advanced a crowd estimated between 700 and 1200 had moved forward to attack a party of Muslims in front of the Julaha quarter of Chandpura. The appeals of the officials present were ignored. Both sides were armed, with swords, bows and guns but above all with lathis, some of which had choppers attached to them. Open battle was stopped only by police firing (in which two Hindus were killed) and a chance rainfall.

Yet officials and mounted police had to stand between the parties for the next two hours to prevent a renewal of fighting. Indeed, as soon as the Superintendent of Police rode back to his camp to send a report to the Magistrate, at about 11-30 a.m., the Hindus began a new assault. Strengthened by the arrival of fresh contingents in the meantime, the crowd now closed in upon Chandpura, entered the courtyards of Muslim houses and used their lathis on "everyone" and "everything" in sight. Before police firing forced their withdrawal again, they had accounted for three Muslims who lay dead or dying on the usur plain.

The object of the attackers was clear from the start: it was, first, to confiscate all the cows in the possession of the local Muslims that might be intended for sacrifice, and secondly, to secure from the Muslims an agreement never to sacrifice kine in future. They rejected all the officials' efforts to arrange a compromise agreement. Eventually local Muslim leaders gave in. The Hindus took possession of six or more cows and obtained a stamped agreement, signed by several
Muslims and initialled "under compulsion" by the Deputy Magistrate and the Tahsildar.

As it happened some of the crowd, chiefly it appears men from villages around Mau and other places within Azamgaurh district, refused to rest content even with this complete acceptance of their demands. As the assembled groups began to disperse, this section headed for another Muslim hamlet of the town and smashed the tiles of houses there. Then a second fight broke out. Most of the Muslims who had taken part in the first battle had by now withdrawn into Chandpura, but some 150 men had remained outside. This small body was attacked by "united Hindu forces" from the south and west, and six Muslims were cut off and beaten to death; one other, seriously wounded in the attack, died subsequently.

Mau was the scene of the most brutal outrages, but it was only one of the places where large Hindu demonstrations occurred at the Baqr-Id of 1893, demonstrations that led in many cases to clashes and violence. The evidence indicates a concerted attack by Hindus from Ballia and Ghazipur upon the Muslims of Mau, Kopa, Ghosi, Chirakot, all towns and villages within easy reach of the district boundary. Indeed parties from the neighbouring districts found their way even further, to places such as Jahanaganj. On the other hand, local men seem to have been predominant in most demonstrations in the interior of the district, such as those at Jianpur, Azmatgarh and Gaurdh. This appears to have been the case too at Mubarakpur, a potential point of explosion which had been the scene of serious Hindu-Muslim riots earlier in the century. Crowds of armed Hindus apparently gathered in the villages round about on the occasion of the Baqr 'Id in 1893. However, they did not enter Mubarakpur, possibly on account of the advance preparations made by the local Muslims.
Azamgarh district, and especially the region around Mau, appears to have been chosen by the Gaurakshini leaders of the region as the arena for a trial of strength in 1893. But on a smaller scale, examples of demonstrations and clashes, much like those that took place in Azamgarh, occurred in other districts too. In Ghazipur the Gaurakshinists had long been active in propagating their cause. As long ago as the Baqr-Id of 1888 a great crowd of Hindus, incited by "the fanatical speeches of one Gopalanand, a member of the Benares Arya Samaj", had collected in Ghazipur town and sought to prevent qurbani. The arrest of the "ring leaders" by the police saved the situation from taking a violent turn. In April 1892, a gang of Hindus attacked the house of a Muslim butcher in village Nonahira and took away a number of cows kept for slaughter. The Baqr-Id of 1893 brought action of this kind over a wider area.

Such indeed was the impact of Gaurakshini propaganda in Ghazipur that Hindu villagers came out in strength to prevent the killing of cows in individual cases quite unconnected with the general practice of qurbani at the Baqr-Id. Thus on 5 July 1893 at the village of Maupara, two miles from the Police Station of Nandganj, large numbers of lathi wielding Hindus gathered to intimidate a Muslim resident, Wazir Ali, who had planned to kill a cow for a wedding feast that evening. The arrival of armed police held the crowd back, and with nightfall the crowd withdrew to return the next morning to renew their demonstration. Thus they succeeded in preventing the slaughter of the cow for the feast. Yet a few days later, on 11 July, three stragglers proceeding to celebrate the wedding at Wazir Ali’s were intercepted at Paharpur a mile from Maupara, by fifteen Hindu villagers armed with lathis. On declaring the object of their visit, the Muslims were attacked one of whom had his arm broken. The assailants were recognized as being among those who had taken part in the demonstration at Maupara.
Potentially the most dangerous of the demonstrations that took place in Ghazipur district at the 'Id of 1893 was the attack on Patiya. There was evidence of elaborate planning here. For some time before the 'Id two local Bania had collected and stored supplies for the provision of the anticipated crowds. Luckily the district authorities, having learnt of the "determined" preparations being made, arranged for the stationing in the village of an armed police force under Inspector Pollock and for the quicky supply of reinforcements which in fact turned out to be necessary. But for these precautions, as the Divisional Commissioner put it, "there is no doubt that the riot at Patiya would have been on the same scale as that at Mau".

But perhaps as significant as the happenings at Patiya were the events of 26 June in the small village of Khatirpur, no more than a stone's throw away from the Police Station of Shadiabad. Here, on the day after the Baqr-Id, a crowd of some 7000 Hindus armed with lathis confronted the handful of Muslim inhabitants and threatened them with dire consequences until they vowed never again to sacrifice a cow.

The call for revenge against Muslims who had performed qurbani at the Baqr-Id was indeed widespread in the Bhojpuri districts at this time. We may take one more example, from Kazipur village in Ballia, a district which was otherwise relatively peaceful in 1893, probably because the Ballia Gaurakshini Sabhas were devoting their energies to Azamgarh. Two cows were sacrificed in Kazipur at the house of a Muslim butcher, Mangar. On 26 June, the day after the 'Id, news of the qurbani spread in the surrounding areas and the rumour went around that the Kazipur Muslims were likely to perform further sacrifices. By late afternoon that day, a large crowd of Hindus had assembled at the nearby village of Sheikhpur:
ost of the assembly came from the vicinity, but none it seems was from Kazipur. The Muslims of Kazipur sent Ramhit, an old and respected Brahman of their village, to intercede on their behalf and to "tell the mob [That] our sacrifice is over". But neither Ramhit's pleas nor the small police force that had by this time arrived could deter the Hindu crowd. Having hurled a warning brick-bat in the direction of the police, the crowd split up and advanced on Kazipur from different directions. Here they thoroughly ransacked Mangar's house and then dispersed plundering the houses of several other Muslims (zamindars and others) as they went. Their object was plainly to punish the Muslims for the performance of cow-sacrifice. They appear to have made no enquiries regarding the presence of other cows in the hands of the local Muslims, let alone attempting to rescue

In Kazipur the attackers was fairly disciplined. No Hindu houses were attacked, though some of their tiled roofs were struck with lathis; no Muslim appears to have been manhandled; and in no case did the crowd break into the zenana (women's) section of a house. But such discrimination was not the most usual product of extended agitation along these lines. We have noticed the venom with which a section of the crowd at Mau attacked an isolated Muslim body even after all their major demands had been conceded. Six miles away at Kopaganj, on the same day, 25 June 1893, a crowd of several thousand Hindus attacked the bazaar, the police chauki, policemen who were present, Muslim houses in one locality and Muslims who turned out to defend themselves. One (Ballia) Hindu was killed in the fighting, and a very large number of Muslim men and women injured -- most of the women inside their houses, where the attackers did not flinch from taking off their bodies their jewellery and earrings, "tearing the ears in so doing".
IV. Shahabad, 1917.

The excesses of 1893, and increased police precautions and efforts to arrange agreements between local Hindu and Muslim leaders successfully choked off the Cow-Protection movement in the Bhojpuri region. But there was after 1910 a significant revival of the demand for cow-protection in the eastern Bhojpuri districts and neighbouring areas in Bihar: this was to culminate in a massive outbreak of violence in Shahabad at the Bahr-Id of 1917.

Shahabad had felt the power of the Gaurakshini movement in its early stages. As long ago as August 1888 butchers in Arrah complained to the authorities that they could obtain no cattle on account of Gaurakshini propaganda. That year, and again in 1890 and 1891, the important cattle fair at Berhampur was the scene of major demonstrations by crowds of Hindus and confiscation of numbers of cattle from the hands of Muslim butchers and contractors for the military commissariat. On the second and third of these occasions, the crowd attacked the Muslims with lathis; and on the third the assault was not called off until the police had opened fire on the assailants. Then in 1893 there occurred a "great riot" at the village of Koath: in Shahabad district, when Hindus and then Muslims appeared in considerable force to attack the other party, guns were used, numerous casualties resulted, and a large body of additional police had to be quartered on Koath and 46 other villages.

The neighbouring districts of Saran, Gaya and Patna, where too ill-feeling had been reported since 1888, had their share of turbulence. From Gaya it was reported in May 1893 that hardly a day passed without some cases of actual or threatened rioting on account of the anti-kine killing agitation.
The Government imposed punitive police in some parts of these
districts as well; but this did not prevent rioting at a number
of places during the Baqr ld of June 1893.35

The recrudescence of cow-protection activities after
1910 coincided, in the Patna Division, with the rise of the
Gwala Movement. We have mentioned earlier that the prevention
of cow-slaughter became a major object of the Ahirs as they
made their bid for a higher social status. This particular
aspect of their movement, however, soon gained far wider
support, especially it was said among Marwaris, Rajputs,
Brahmans, Bhuihars and Kayasths (the last two, of course
engaged at this time in establishing their own 'pure' and 'high'
status). In 1911, crowds of Ahirs and Babhans (BhumiHar-
Brahmans) collected to prevent the sacrifice of cows at various
places in Patna district. In 1915 what was described as a
large and armed 'Rajput mob' was active towards the same end
in Kanchanpur and Barawan villages in the Fatuha thana of Patna
district. The exercise was repeated and extended in 1916; some
5000 armed Hindus 'arranged in a kind of military formation',
attacked the Military Police in Kanchanpur after the qurbani
had been performed, and were repulsed only after police firing
had killed and wounded a large number of them.36

The outbreak of violence in Shahabad the following
year was on an altogether different scale, described by
observers as "unprecedented since 1857-58". What began as
a show of strength in the villages of Piru and Ibrahimpur on
the occasion of the Bakr ld, 28 September 1917, developed in
the days immediately following into a huge conflagration that
engulfed a vast area. Officials spoke of a veritable war and
acknowledged that over a hundred and fifty square miles of
territory had passed out of their control.37 Administrative
fiat of a kind was restored by the strong military reinforcements
that were called in, but only after a week of frustrating warfare waged by armed police and troops, seeking to protect Muslim villages and enforce 'law and order' on the one side, and thousands of Hindu peasants and zamindars, on the other, wielding lathis and occasionally spears, congregating in a matter of moments and as quickly melting away. The sequence of events leading up to this massive confrontation deserves examination in some detail.

A few weeks before the Baqr-Id of 1917, a meeting of barristers, pleaders, mukhtars and "many others of the influential gentry of the town and district" was held in Arrah. There was another meeting at the district level a few days before the riots broke out at the end of September. This took place in the house of Jai Bahadur, a rich banker of Arrah town and President of the Arrah Gaurakshini Sabha, and was again attended by a mixed group of lawyers, merchants and zamindars.

At one of these meetings, probably the former, the decision appears to have been taken to hold a demonstration on the occasion of the Baqr-Id and if possible prevent the cow-sacrifice at Ibrahimpur. Among those present at the earlier meeting were the co-owners of Ibrahimpur village—the Arrah pleader Shyam Sundar Lal and Jamuna Sahu. Shyam Sundar's family had purchased the village from a Muslim zamindar several generations ago, but the tenants had apparently remained loyal to the original malik and his descendants, down to Nazir Beg who was killed in the 1917 riots. Shyam Sundar's ancestors were put under a good deal of pressure through continuous litigation and eventually sold half the property to Jamuna Sahu's grandfather. It was said that since Jamuna Sahu and Shyam Sundar inherited the property "the raiyats have been coerced to their side and Nazir Beg has been subjected to much
harassment, one act being to interfere with the long established custom of qurban in his house and mosque.\textsuperscript{38} In 1916, tension was acute in the village and tempers ran dangerously high at the Baqer-Id and the Hindu festival of Gaiyâr when pigs were baited by cattle.

Also present at the first Arrah meeting was Rajeshwar Lal, the brother of Mathura Lal (patwari of Bacchri, a village adjoining Ibrahimpur) who was to be convicted for his part in events in the area. It is more than likely that these men suggested the selection of Ibrahimpur for the proposed demonstration. Certainly Shyam Sundar Lal's brothers, Dulchbhanjan and Suresh Prasad, appear to have contributed actively to preparations for the demonstration in their village. Mathura Lal too took a leading part and so, notably, did the Ahirs of Bacchri. The latter were said to have initiated the protest against qurban at Ibrahimpur in 1916; and Bhutan Ahir, a resident and chaukidar of Ibrahimpur, was described as one of the prime movers of the agitation in 1916 and again in 1917 -- a clear indication of a convergence of interest in this matter between the Ahirs and the zamindars.

It was Mathura Lal and some Ahirs of Bacchri who contacted Lakshmi Misr, the Sub-Inspector of Police at Piru, and gained the support of the local Hindu policemen. Thereafter some meetings in connection with the demonstration were actually held inside the Piru Police Station and some of the early patias (or 'snowball' letters), which were really in the nature of notices about the proposed actions, were drafted and sent out from there -- in the hands of police chaukidars. Meetings were also held during this period in other places in the interior of the district, providing a platform for both cow-protection and Home-Rule propaganda, so much so, wrote the Divisional Commissioner afterwards, that these became "a regular topic of conversation in the villages."\textsuperscript{39}
This round of meetings and the first patias sent out by the leaders in Piru met with an unexpectedly enthusiastic response. Hurried arrangements had to be made through the good offices of men like Thakur Gopi Singh, a local zamindar, to feed the thousands of Hindus who assembled at Piru on 28 September 1917. The claim that the action on that date was intended to be a limited one is supported by the fact of hundreds of Hindus marching in some cases from villages where qurbani was to be performed, and was performed without interference, through other villages where qurbani took place, to Piru and Ibrahimpur for a demonstration against the practice. It seems likely, though, that even before these groups set out and saw numbers of others advancing in the same direction, to assemble at Piru in considerable strength, new expectations and new ideas about the needs of justice had arisen in many minds—fed by reports of meetings, and patias, and a whole variety of rumours regarding the end of British rule, the impending arrival of German troops, and the coming of swaraj.40

In Ibrahimpur, meanwhile, the local Hindus and Muslims had succeeded in effecting a compromise on the question of qurbani. By an agreement signed on 27 September the Ibrahimpur Muslims surrendered their right to sacrifice cows in deference to the religious feelings of the Hindus, and the latter agreed to provide thirty goats, to be sacrificed instead of cows, every year from then on. This was a considerable and meaningful achievement, for at the height of the trouble the Hindus of Ibrahimpur not only took no part in the rioting but sheltered the Muslim men, women and children in their own houses.41
On 28 September local Hindu leaders, or at least some of them, sought to inform the assembled crowds of this compromise agreement and asked them to return home. "But", to quote the inimitable language of the British policeman in India, "the mobs having assembled were not to be denied their fun". The crowd of about 5000 Hindus at Ibrahimpur was "very aggressive" and could not be pacified by the Deputy Superintendent of Police or by Hindu leaders. Ultimately over half this crowd rushed at the police party, assaulted the Deputy Superintendent and escaped with all the goats and cattle of the village plus a certain amount of movable property. On the same day, before any cow-sacrifice had occurred, the crowds also attacked and caused much damage to Bhagalpur and Milki, two villages near Ibrahimpur and Piru. They then threatened the larger Piru bazaar, and were stopped only by challenge of the Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakshmi Narain Misr, to kill him, a Brahman, first. Misr's intervention is significant for before this Misr was, as we have seen, an important force in organising the demonstration; for one of its chief organisers at any rate, it is clear, the movement had gone off the rails.

At this juncture the administration took the strange view, which they declared representative Hindu leaders accepted, that the attack by the Hindu crowds had violated the Ibrahimpur agreement and hence the Muslims were entitled to perform qurbani. After the arrival of armed police, a cow-sacrifice took place at Piru on the evening of 28 September, and a Sub-Divisional officer supervised the qurbani in Milki, Bhagalpur and Ibrahimpur on the following day, despite some evidence of reluctance on the part of the Ibrahimpur Muslims to perform the sacrifice.
This act of provocation appears to have marked the critical point in the development of events. All through the night of 29 September a small but angry crowd stood at Bacchri Bridge, not far from where J.D. Boylan, the Superintendent of Police for the district of Shahabad, was camping in the Piru Police Station, raising threatening shouts and slogans periodically. From dawn on the 30th rapidly swelling crowds congregated on Piru, shouting for vengeance where cows had been slaughtered. Before long there was an enormous crowd on both sides of the Police Station, stretching "in a dense mass from the cross roads in Piru Bazar for at least a mile along the Piru-Jagdishpur road". Boylan reported that the crowd at this stage was so concentrated that the lathis above their heads were like a hairbrush; and from the area they occupied he estimated the assembly at about 50,000. In due course nearly all the Muslim houses in Piru, Ibrahimpur, Bhagalpur and Milki were looted and a major confrontation took place between the police and the Hindu crowds. The Superintendent of Police and his party of forty armed policemen were attacked and forced to withdraw into the Police Station, but in the end, following a number of arrests, the killing and wounding of several rioters in police firing, and threats of further and prolonged firing, the crowds dispersed. The District Magistrate felt that the worst was over: "I do not anticipate any further rioting." The mass of Hindus had other intentions as they scattered in different directions, having failed to prevent the qurbani at Ibrahimpur and Piru, and having faced the police in an extended and, as it transpired, as yet undecided contest. A day later a huge Hindu backlash arose very soon to engulf the major part of the district.
Two months later officials tried to compute the casualties and damages. They calculated that 41 people had been killed and 176 injured, while admitting that these estimates were probably very much on the low side. 124 villages were said to have been looted in Shahabad district alone; another 28 reportedly suffered the same fate in Gaya, and one in Patna. The value of property damaged, destroyed or stolen was reckoned to be ₹7 lakhs in Shahabad, ₹1 lakh in Gaya. The number of people sent up for trial was 1800 in Shahabad, 400 in Gaya and 38 in Patna; but at this stage, eight weeks after the date of the riots, many of the accused were still absconding.45

It is neither possible, nor perhaps necessary, to chronicle in detail the battles and the ravages that occurred in the district in the first few days of October 1917. An account of the assault on two villages in the Nasriganj thana — Mauna and Turukbigha — should serve to indicate the prevalent atmosphere. Something of an island among a sea of large Hindu villages, Mauna was inhabited almost entirely by Muslims, among whom were its owners: the handful of Hindu residents belonged to the lower castes and were servants and tenants of the Muslim maliks. On 2 October Sita Dusadh and Pyari Ahir, two Hindus inhabitants, brought news of a patia threatening an attack on the village. A telegram was immediately sent to the District Magistrate, and the matter was reported at the Police Station of Nasriganj on the 3rd and again on the 4th. On the 4th Baldwin, the Special Magistrate at Nasriganj, rode out to Mauna with a private of the Somersets. After enquiries there, he warned the inhabitants of the adjacent Hindu village of Taraon to keep the peace. It may be noted here that a number of Taraon Hindus held land in Mauna on mortgage. At the same time, the Mauna Muslims held half of Parasia, another nearby Hindu
village: and in the course of the Settlement of 1912-16, a dispute had arisen between a Muslim malik of Mauna, on the one side, and, on the other, Girja Lal (thikadar of Parasia) and Saudagar Sunri, both to be charged with participation in the attack on Mauna. One other factor that was mentioned in this context by many local people may be noted: the Ahirs of Babhandi (the village adjoining Mauna on the east), many of whom again were accused and convicted of joining in the attack, were involved in various disputes with the Muslims of Mauna regarding the supply of milk and other matters; certainly some of the Ahirs held land in Mauna. There is no direct evidence that these pre-existing quarrels had anything to do with the attack on this village. Yet it is worth taking note of them for they may well have contributed to its scale and ferocity.

On his return to Nasirganj from Mauna on 4 October, Baldwin learnt of a serious attack that had been mounted on Turukbigha. The next day brought an assault on Nasirganj itself, which was fought off by the 25 Somersets stationed there. With Muslim villages thus being attacked all around, the administration was stretched beyond capacity and Baldwin "was not in a position" (as official reports later noted) "to give effective help for the protection of Mauna". But the Muslims of the village organized their own defence. Behind the seven barricades that they erected and with what arms they could readily get together, a party of some 50 Muslims and 15 Hindus fought off a huge body of attackers for many hours before they finally surrendered.

About noon on 5 October Hindu crowds attacked Mauna from the south (the direction of Taraon), and then from the east (where Babhandi lay). Both attacks were repulsed. The defenders evidently rushed from one barricade to another, depending on where the main thrust of the attackers was at that particular stage. Both sides were armed with swords, spears,
choppers and lathis; the Mauna Muslims also had one or two guns. With these they evidently accounted for a number of the assailants; even after several bodies had been carried away by the attackers, three were left on the ground. Around five in the evening, the attacking crowds began throwing bricks. The Mauna people could not retaliate. Weak with exhaustion, they now gave way. Three Muslims were killed as they retreated through the village; another, a youth lying ill in a house, died of shock. A number of Muslims were injured, and the Judge suspected that there had been cases of rape though (as frequent happens in such circumstances) no one came forward to report any. Several houses were set on fire, being saved only by the damp left by recent rains, and prayer-carpets and copies of the Qoran were defiled and burnt. However, most Muslims hid successfully in the houses of local Hindus, or outside the village. They reappeared only after the withdrawal of the rioters at night, but then hid again all that night and the next day owing to rumours of new attacks. Only, then, on the 7th, were they able to reach the Police Station at Nasirganj to make a report. Baldwin, who now visited Mauna again, observed that the village had been "absolutely sacked".

Our second example is the attack on Turukbigha, a hamlet of mauza Khiriam which lay in the zamindari of Lalchattarpati Singh, one of the principal accused in the case that was instituted in connection with the Turukbigha events. On 28 September 1917, gurbanj had been performed as usual in Turukbigha, quietly and without interference from any quarter. On 2 October, however, the hamlet was attacked by a crowd of some 2000 Hindus. This attack was beaten back. The days later another crowd, again estimated at about 2000, renewed the attack. They were twice repulsed, but then, swelled by large reinforces
that came in from many sides, they succeeded in forcing their way into Turukbigha. Two Muslims were killed before they could reach the relative safety of the sugarcane fields around the village or places still further away, fields and homes where their women, younger children and old family members had already hidden: Baldwin, just back from his first visit to Mauna, met a "panic-stricken mob" of Muslim men, women and children of Turukbigha two miles away from the village.

There would seem to have been some remarkable points of similarity in the attacks on Mauna and Turukbigha, though to some extent these may have been the outcome of the due process of law as practiced by the colonial courts in India. In each case, there appears to have been a spirited defence by a small body of Muslims: in Turukbigha, the defenders were said to number 110 to 115, including boys. In both, the crowd that launched the final attack was said to be about 15000 strong: "at any rate", the Judge wrote in the Turukbigha case as he had done in that of Mauna, "there must have been many thousands". In Turukbigha as in Mauna, the flight of the Muslims was followed by large-scale plunder and burning of Muslim houses, the fire being put out by rain, which fell in Turukbigha immediately after the riot. "Every Muhammadan house [in Turukbigha] had been looted", Baldwin reported, "and what was not worth taking away was broken". But for the rain, be added, probably the entire basti (habitation) would have been gutted.

The situation between 3 October and 5 October 1917 was such that ten or fifteen Muslim villages were being attacked daily in the Nasriganj jurisdiction alone; and like Mauna, many other villages must have gone without police protection. Where the police did appear in the course of an attack, they were sometimes met by stout resistance. At
Hariharganj, a Muslim hamlet of Nasirganj, for example, on 5 October 1917 an armed force of two Gurkhas and twenty others opened fire on a crowd of about 1000; yet the crowd fought on refusing to fall back until one person had been killed and six others lay seriously wounded (all of the latter died subsequently). Elsewhere, sections of the Hindu population not participating in the actual attacks showed open sympathy for the rioters. Thus on 3 October, near the village of Bagahi, local women directed Lieutenant F.C. Temple and his troop away from village Chakaria (Chakrah) where the loot from Bagahi was at that very time being stored. As it happened, the troops spotted bodies of looters and a large herd of cattle taken from Bagahi. The rioters then fled, dropping their spoil and leaving the cattle, "the whole of the surrounding country was strewn with loot of various kinds", Temple reported, "such as beds, doors, school books, clothes boxes, grain, etc. The most valuable stuff had been removed earlier and we only arrived when the low caste riff-raff were gleaning what was left by the principal looters".47

V. Organizer and participants.

Men from a range of castes and classes were involved in the organization and spread of the Cow-Protection movement, and in the consequent attacks upon Muslims in various parts of north India. The initiative for establishment of Gaurakshini Sabhas came in very many cases from petty-bourgeois elements that drifted from country to town and back again: teachers, lawyers, clerks, officials. Strengthening their effort, indeed often goading them into action was a motley crew of Swamis, sanyasis and faqirs. But "the main supporters of the movement", officials concluded, were "the great Hindu trading and banking classes, who are bigoted Hindus, and several prominent Hindu
Rajas have given it their adhesion and support". There could be no doubt, Anthony Macdonell (then acting Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa) wrote to the Commissioner of Patna Division in November 1893, that "Marwaris" were "the supporters and fomentors" of the agitation.48

Many of the wealthiest and most prominent patrons withdrew from the front, however, as the movement advanced to the use of coercive tactics and even came to threaten the machinery for the maintenance of 'law and order'. Commenting on the Cow-Protection movement in his jurisdiction, the Darbhanga Magistrate observed in October 1893 that many of the Gaurakshini Sabhas in the district had been established through the beneficence of the Maharaja of Darbhanga and other notables. The Maharaja, as President of the Darbhanga Sabha, still exercised a fair amount of power: "in Darbhanga and its subordinate branches a controlling hand is noticeable, and beyond protecting and taking care of cows not much activity is observable". But in the most militant Gaurakshini Sabha in the district, that of Madhubani, and in its branches "a very different state of affairs is visible". The Madhubani Sabha now denied any connection with the alleged 'parent' Sabha at Darbhanga: it claimed to have been established independently by some young men of Madhubani who were deeply influenced by the discourse of certain pandits at Sonepur. The Sabha was run by its two Secretaries, Munshi Lal Behari Lal, a mukhtear, and Mahabir Prasad, a teacher in the Middle Vernacular School, both men with "abilities far above the average, a fine capability for organization". The joint Presidents, the Madhubani Babus (Durga Dutt and Rakhdhar Singh), were mere figureheads. "The Sabha is therefore a most aggressive one". The whole movement for Cow-Protection had been supported "without any secrecy" the Magistrate observed,
"by the leading members of the Hindu faith [sic 1/7], such as the Maharajas of Benares, Dumraon, Darbhanga, Raja Ramphal Singh and other Rajas in Oudh and the North-Western Provinces -- gentlemen all on the different Councils of their various Governments... Not one of the original founders of the Gaurakshini Sabhas [he ruefully added], certainly not any of the Presidents, ever thought that the result of their societies would be to disturb whole districts, to have riots common, and armed forces required to keep the peace". 49

"Half-educated English-speaking agitators", priests and zamindars: these were the people whom officials held responsible for the rise of the Gaurakshini movement with such suddenness and force in Azamgarh in 1893. For the disturbances in the district at the Baqr-Id that year, they singled out four men as the principal instigators: Pandit Ghanshyam Narain Misr of Nimdand, Thakur Jagdeo Narain Singh of Nagra (Ballia district), Thakur Sudishth Narain Singh of Mau, and Khaki Baba (or Das). 50 The faqir Khaki Baba, was an important orator for the Gaurakshini Sabhas; and though officials were as ever ready to stick the label of "another professional agitator" on to him, he clearly belonged to their second category of Gaurakshini leaders -- the priests, who lent a certain legitimacy and fanaticism to the movement.

The Brahman, Ghanshyam Narain, may also be thought of as belonging to this category, but as the owner of property in both Azamgarh and Ballia districts he qualified as a zamindar Gaurakshinist as well. His leading part in the establishment of the movement in Azamgarh district is undoubted. He was President of the Gaurakshini Sabha in the Sagri pargana and all the subscriptions of the notorious Nathupur division were deposited with him. The other two zamindars in the above list
of instigators are of greater interest still, for the evidence regarding them brings out well the role of this class in mobilizing the forces for demonstrations of the kind that occurred in June 1893.

Jagdeo Narain Singh, a Bais Rajput of Nagra, once owner of "a fair estate" which had however fallen into the hands of mahajans, President of the Ballia Gaurakshini Sabha, was described as "the soul of the movement" in eastern Azamgarh, where he was particularly active in the weeks immediately preceding the 1893 riots. A petition from 'poor Muslim residents of several villages in Azamgarh', sent to the Government of India a week before the Bacr Id, named Jagdeo Bahadur, zamindar of Nagra, as chief of the assailants who were making preparations to "take the head" of Muslims who sacrificed cattle at the 'Id. According to a police guard, both Jagdeo and Ghanshyam Narain Miar were present at Adri (the village on the path to Mau where men from Ballia district and elsewhere assembled early on the morning of 25 June). They were seen with other leaders "on elephants, &c., marshalling the people". Other evidence seems to confirm these reports about their involvement. One of the first prisoners arrested in Ghazipur in connection with the Azamgarh events said he had gone to Azamgarh on 25 June under the orders of his zamindar to attend a sabha (meeting) of Jagdeo's. It was noted too that the Khatriyas of Chiriakot and its neighbourhood, many of whom were convicted for their part in the demonstration against qurbani at Chiriakot, were closely connected with Jagdeo Narain.
Sudishth Narain Singh of Mau — "the most influential Hindu in those parts ... not a Hindu in the neighbourhood would dare to lift a finger if he ordered otherwise" —— was said to have joined the other organizers of the 25 June demonstrations in their appeal for support from outside the district, circulating letters in a border thana of Ghazipur district which called on the Thakurs there to send in fifty men from each village to help the Hindus at Mau. As a man of property, and a real or affected well-wisher of the Government, Sudisht Narain staunchly denied this accusation. For this ambivalence, as it appeared, he was abused to his face by some of the Ghazipur men who congregated at Mau on the day of the Baqr-Id. In any case, the use of his name, whether on his own initiative or without his prior knowledge, remains a significant indicator of the kinds of people who took a leading part in this agitation and the manner in which they mobilised support.

There are other pieces of evidence pointing to the support lent to the movement by petty zamindars and co-sharers in many different parts of Azamgarh district. The Muslim petitioners mentioned above listed Sheo Das Singh of Mau, Imrit Singh of village Pradhan, Harjan Singh of Jafarpur Korthi (all three presumably Rajputa) and Beasji Maharaj of Kua Kopanganj as the four 'chiefs' for Azamgarh appointed by Jagdeo Narain Singh, and stated that the subscriptions raised as well as account books and detailed correspondence were maintained at the house of Imrit Singh. In Nizamabad parganah, the entire chutki collections were said to be deposited in the hands of some of the local zamindars. In Sagri, the 'treasurers' were Ghanshyam Narain Misir for Nathupur and an Agrawal trader, Bhairo Prasad, for the western division. In the other critical parganah of Muhammadabad, the proceeds were sent up to a faqir, two Goshains (probably practising 'men of religion') and a number of small Rajput and Bhumihar zamindars and co-sharers —— including Jaggi Singh of Bhujoji and Sitlu Singh of Aldemau, who
with Girja Pande of Chiria Kote were described as the "chief men" of the Sabhas in Muhammadabad.53

Still within this parganah, the Thakur and Bhumihar co-sharers of Kasara and its neighbouring villages near Mau were reported to have "taken up the anti-cow killing movement with vigour" at an early stage.54 The same may be said of the Rajput zamindars of Gujarpar and other villages around Mubarakpur, their religious enthusiasm multiplied perhaps by their long standing rivalry with the zamindars and other Muslims of that weaving centre. In Sagri, again, the Surajpur Babus, owners of the Surajpur taluka and of other estates in Saran and Ghazipur, Bhumihars by caste and related to the Maharaja of Banaras, "sympathized actively" with the Cow-Protection movement. The thousands of demonstrators who assembled at Ghosi on 25 June 1893, it was reported, came chiefly from the Nathupur division and from Ballia district beyond it; many of them (some 5000 according to one report) had come into Ghosi from the direction of Surajpur. "What I wish to emphasize as regards the disturbance at Ghosi", wrote the Azamgarh Magistrate, "is that it would have been next to impossible for such an assembly of Hindus to have gathered there without the connivance of the Babus of Surajpur."55

In the numerous demonstrations and attacks on Muslim habitations that took place at the Baqr-Id of 1893 in Azamgarh district but also elsewhere in the Bhojpuri region, the chief zamindari castes -- Rajputs, Bhumihars and Brahmans -- provided a large part of the fighting force, while bringing along with them tenants, servants and others belonging to a whole range of other castes. In Shahabad in 1917, too, many of the most active elements appear to have come from the same groups. Colonial administrators, ready to smell a conspiracy anywhere, sought to dig up evidence of the unseen hand, of the bigger "zamindars, pleaders and mukhtears attending meetings and encouraging the
movement ... /Though/ none of them appeared to have been in evidence during the disturbances/. What was beyond question, however, was "the general support of zamindars and their agents ... given to the movement throughout the affected area". Reports from different parts of the district spoke of the leading part played by Rajput and other petty zamindars. "Nearly all the men of this class over half the district joined the movement", the Chief Secretary to the Government of the province wrote later. "It was precisely these landholders of moderate position, men of good caste and good family, able to turn out two or three hundred /lathialis/ each, who led the mobs in the important attacks". Evidence from some of the trials that were held after the riots tends to confirm these impressions.

About the attack on Tuirkbiga on 4 October 1917, discussed above, it was noted that it differed from the attack on Mauna a day later in that the men leading the former were "not local cultivators or petty zamindars, but the zamindar /Lalchattarpati Singh/ himself, and another well-to-do zamindar of the neighbourhood, Lobhi Upadhyay /Vn/ of Mangraon". After the repulse of the initial assault on 2 October, Lalchattarpati Singh appears to have sent out messengers to Mangraon, Sabari and other nearby places, asking for reinforcements to enable a successful second attack. On this second occasion, Lobhi Upadhyaya appeared on an elephant. His brother Ramasrey "and two other Brahmins" were said to have been on horseback. His son was also reported to have been seated behind him on the elephant, though he was ultimately acquitted of the charge of participation in the riot. A large number of the other men accused, and convicted, of joining in the attacks on Tuirkbiga were kinsfolk, servants and tenants of Lalchattarpati Singh and Lobhi Upadhyaya.
We have had occasion earlier to refer to Thakur Gopi Singh of Narainpur, "a well-to-do zamindar and perhaps the most important person convicted in connection with the disturbances,"60 who provided food for the vast crowds that gathered to demonstrate at Piru and Ibrahimpur on 28 September. In the case in which he was convicted, relating to an attack on the village of Katar on 2 October, 105 people were sent up for trial. Of these 15 (including Gopi Singh) described themselves as zamindars; two were mahajans; and one, Rambaran Lal, the hereditary patwari of Katar. The attack upon Katar, a village owned by Muslim zamindars, appears to have been organised from Narainpur which lay a few hundred yards to the south. Both Rambaran Lal, who was to the fore in the actual organisation of the assault, and Gopi Singh were resident here; and among the Narainpur men found guilty of taking part in the attack on Katar were seven Rajputs (Gopi Singh, three relatives of his, and three others); five Kayasthas (Rambaran, his brother, son and two other relatives); Madho Kumhar, a servant of Gopi Singh; and a Chamar, a Sunri and a Dhobi.

Gopi Singh, Lai chattarpati Singh and Lobbi Upadhyaya were perhaps the biggest landholders convicted for participation in the riots. More usually the zamindars who took part were not particularly noted for their wealth. In this sense, Mauna stands for the general run of events, and Thukbigha for the exceptional. Most of the accused in the Mauna case were "cultivators". Sixteen described themselves as zamindars, one was a patwari, two banias, one "a banker" and one a Brahman chaukidar. Yet the Commissioners of the Special Tribunal trying these cases, handing down their judgements on those convicted in the Mauna affair, imposed no fines 'as we are not aware that any of the accused are very well-to-do men".61
Such men may well have been under heavier economic pressure than the bigger zamindars. On the other hand, as part of the ashraf, they are likely to have been influential men in their villages even if poor. Yet the point to emphasize perhaps is that men from a smaller or greater circle of villages (and sometimes areas as large as a parganah) who shared a strong sense of community are here found leading their kinsmen, tenants and servants into battle for a cause that they and others of their number had espoused. Perhaps the most striking evidence in support of this proposition is the fact that the area of Shahabad that erupted with such violence in 1917 almost exactly coincided with the area affected in 1857, when the same Rajput, Brahman and Bhumihar landowning (and 'martial') communities had risen in revolt under the banner of Kunwar Singh. 62

For a more rounded picture of the 1917 Shahabad outbreak, however, and indeed of other demonstrations connected with cow-protection, it is necessary to recognize similar action on the part of rather different communities that were becoming increasingly well organized around this time -- such as the Ahirs and the Koeris. Contemporary officials firmly believed in the upper classes' monopoly over initiative (and thought), and hence devoted little attention to the significant role of such groups. Yet we have noticed already, from the evidence gathered by these same officials, the important part played by the Ahirs in the organization of the demonstrations at Piru and Ibrahimpur in Shahabad in 1917. Again the crowd of 5000 or so men armed with lathis who congregated at the latter village on 28 September were described as being "mostly Rajputs, Ahirs and Chatis" (sic.) from the villages of Dalippur, Jetaura, Tawani and Balligad Kastar and Katar. 63
The caste breakdown of those arrested for participation in the widespread rioting that followed confirms our impression of the special role of the Ahirs, a role that cannot be explained away by the suggestion that they were drawn in by the zamindari groups. Of the 140 trials instituted in consequence of the Shahabad riots, I have seen the detailed evidence and judgements in only seven cases. Out of 560 men sent up for trial in these, as many as 85 were Rajputs, 90 Brahmins and 55 Shumihars. Other upper castes, fairly thin on the ground in any case, were represented by a handful of Kayasthas and Bania from one or two villages. Ahirs, however, were "very prominent" in the riots, 127 of them being convicted in these seven cases alone. Doubts about the representative character of any sample are heightened in this instance, of course, by the feeling that privileged men of the upper castes would be far more readily noticed in the course of a riot. Yet, if this is granted, the identification of the lowly Ahirs in such large numbers becomes all the more significant.

I would suggest that we have evidence here of a relatively independent force that added a good deal of power to cow-protection activities in the Bhojpuri region — marginally 'clean' castes who aspired to full 'cleanliness' by propagating their strictness on the issue of cow-slaughter; in the case of the Ahirs this motive would definitely have been reinforced by their traditional and continued association with the business of tending cattle. The strength of their autonomous movement was seen very clearly in Shahabad in 1917, but their militancy and independence were already in evidence in Azamgarh in 1893, in the demonstrations and clashes around Ghosi for instance. Here on three successive days, 25-27 June 1893, large crowds of Hindus assembled to demonstrate against qurbani. On
25 June Ahirs and Kurmis took the lead in confiscating a cow from Abdul Latif of Milkipur, and the crowd of 5000 or more that gathered was not pacified until the next day when Abdul Latif surrendered the other cow that he possessed and the gurbani was definitely abandoned.

The same day a crowd of an estimated 4000 Hindus assembled at Karimuddinpur, and a small section of this crowd armed with lathis attacked the Tahsildar and Sub-Inspector of Police, who were both on horses, and the accompanying party of officials, peons and policemen, inflicting substantial injuries upon them and forcing them to retreat. On the following day, at 9 a.m., trouble was again reported to be brewing in Karimuddinpur. Rather than risk another confrontation, officials sent Sher Ali Khan, an influential local Muslim who was on good terms with the Hindus, and three or four Hindus to try and retrieve the situation. This enterprise took the entire day to accomplish and it was only at 5 p.m. that the crowd was persuaded to leave the field they had decided to plunder. But while other sections agreed, groups of Koeris and Ahirs refused to leave without completing the task of plundering. In the end, as the Tahsildar put it, "the remaining low caste people made an assault at Mauza Karimuddinpur at the house of Haji Roshan, a wealthy merchant in the village." Later the Hindus "of the riot" sought to attack the Hindus who had intervened on behalf of the administration; rain seems to have foiled their attempt. Early on the following morning a huge crowd, now estimated at 7000, again assembled, but a major affray was avoided - partly, no doubt, because with the Baqr-ID over and gurbani staved off, the principal point of the rioters had been made.
Major cases of rioting are always likely to provide opportunities for plunder, or for the settling of old scores by poor and exploited groups. It is possible that such factors were partly responsible for the actions of lower caste folk at Karimuddinpur; and something of the same nature was probably operative in Shahabad in 1917 too, though the outbreak there was on an altogether different scale. We have seen how the initiatives of various zamindars, Ahirs and other elements, and the spate of patias and rumours that followed, produced a massive rising against local Muslims and the military and police force that sought to intervene. A very large slice of the Hindu populace of the district appears to have become involved, spurred on no doubt by the fear of social boycott and ostracism, of religious damnation indeed, as much as by any anger over cow-slaughter or resentment against the foreign rulers. In the later stages of the Shahabad outbreak, when the law-enforcing authorities had plainly lost control, whole gangs of men (many of them from the lowest castes and classes) also appear to have been drawn into the riots by the prospect of loot. Such would seem to have been the case with some Nonias of Katar who were found guilty, along with Gopi and others, of participation in the riot there on 2 October; five of them were established as having been among the men and women who robbed the Katar Muslims who had hidden in the fields behind their habitation. Such, too, were the groups of "rioters" encountered by Lieutenant Temple and his force when they reached the village of Bagahi on 3 October. On 10 October, again, by which time the worst of the Shahabad outrages were finished, portions of the district were still described as being in "a disturbed state", and the men responsible for this were said to be "low class caste Hindus". 

66
However that might be, the point that emerges clearly from the evidence is that for most of the period under study cow-protection activities in the Bhojpuri region were the affair mainly of the upper castes, together with one or two lower castes striving for a higher status. In eastern UP, the largest Hindu caste, the Chamars, far from being actively involved in the Cow-Protection movement, was in fact the target of a good deal of Gaurakshinist vilification and attack. One of the rules of the Gorakhpur Gaurakshini Sabha condemned the Chamars as a cow-killer, declared it "most reprehensible that he should be employed to attend cows, or that cows, bullocks and so on should be left to his mercy", and called for a boycott on the employment of Chamars as cowherds. In Shahabad in 1917, as already noted, the Rajputs, Bhumihars, Brahmans and Ahirs together accounted for 347 of the 560 men convicted of participation in the riots in the seven cases I have examined, apart from any who are among the small number that are unidentifiable. Thus they constituted nearly two-thirds of this small but not insignificant sample, while men from numerous other low and untouchable castes together made up the remaining third.

Muslims were always likely to be the prime victims of extended strife between Hindus and Muslims in a region where they were a small minority. Yet the aggressors in such a situation of sectarian conflict were not always the non-Muslims, as the example of the 1904 riot in Mubarakpur (Azamgarh district) that the weaver Abdul Majid wrote about will serve to demonstrate. This riot appears to have flowed in large part out of the tensions generated by the Cow-Protection movement. There had been earlier instances of clashes between Hindus and Muslims in the substantial weaving centre of Mubarakpur, with its Muslim zamindars and majority Muslim population. In 1813 and 1842, indeed, there had been outbreaks of violence in which the Julahas or Muslim weavers
had attacked and plundered the houses of some of the Hindu moneylenders and killed a number of the occupants in two of them; and these were only the most obvious indications of the friction that affected relations between various groups of Hindus and Muslims in Mubarakpur in the earlier nineteenth century. But the Julahas' actions in these instances appear to have been a response to the attempts of rapidly prospering moneylenders to build new temples without the permission of the Muslim zamindars of the qaṣba, and to downgrade Muslim religious practices such as the procession of tazias at the Muharram while promoting their own practices and rituals. And support for the moneylenders on these occasions came not from the other Hindus of the town but from the landowning communities of the surrounding countryside, described as old enemies of the zamindars of Mubarakpur.\(^{68}\) By contrast the 1904 riot involved no attack on the moneylenders: its targets were straightforwardly 'religious' -- two Hindu temples, one in Mubarakpur and the other in Gujarpar, a village to the north that was among those seen as traditionally hostile to Mubarakpur.

Among the immediate causes of this outbreak was the attempt by some Brahmanas to build a new shrine on wasteland south of the main Mubarakpur temple. At the same time the weavers of Pura Sofi, one of the western mohallas of Mubarakpur, were building a small, unenclosed mosque by a tank in the open fields near the town. On Friday, 27 May 1904, two days before the riot, the alim conducting the prayers at the Juma Masjid read out a communication regarding the new shrine that the Hindus were trying to erect. On Saturday there was a meeting of local Muslim zamindars (known as Milkis) and Muslim weavers, and the Brahmans erecting the shrine were called and told that they were building on land claimed by the Milkis. On the same day, a mukhtar practising in the Azamgarh courts who owned some land
in Mubarakpur visited the town and lodged a protest at the local police outpost regarding the building of the new shrine.

Early on the morning of Sunday, 29 May, the Julahas of Pura Sofi discovered that their unfinished mosque had been desecrated during the night. News of the outrage spread quickly, and was discussed in one or two mosques in Pura Sofi that morning. Parties of Julahas went out to consult the zamindars of the neighbouring village Sikhthi, to urge the local police to take action, and to report the matter at the Police Station in Muhammadabad six miles away. Many weavers and some other Muslims gathered at the site of the defiled mosque and, with excitement mounting, some men fetched a large iron drum from the mosque at Sikhthi. Amidst growing calls for vengeance, the beating of the drum marked, as it were, the Muslim declaration of war.

The targets of attacks appear to have been spontaneously chosen. The spires of the Gujarpar temples were plainly visible from where the crowd of Muslims stood; and the Chhatri zamindars of Gujarpar had taken a prominent part in the anti-cow killing agitation of 1893. The excited gathering moved in that direction, Tony seized a calf owned by a Chamar called Ram Charan from a small Chamar hamlet that lay in their path. Nearer their target, they climbed an outhouse belonging to one of the chief zamindars of Gujarpar and armed themselves with bamboos taken from its roof. The captured calf was then killed and thrown on the steps of a temple on the east of Gujarpar. Then the crowd turned towards Mubarakpur.

On their way south to the gasba the Julahas seized another calf from a Khatik, Daswant, who was beaten up for resisting. This calf was slung up by its legs tied to a pole, and the march on Mubarakpur continued. In the town, more neighbours and friends were called upon to join, as cries went
up for the wrecking of the Mubarakpur temple. At the temple, finally, the calf and a cow belonging to the priest were slaughtered, their blood being spilt all around; the temple chest was looted, the images smashed and the doors cut with knives to complete the desecration.

One needs add only that by the close of the nineteenth century the stereotype of the 'bigoted' and 'fanatical' Julaha was already well established, precisely because of the resistance of the Julahas in places like Mubarakpur to new attempts to extend their subjugation. In Mau and Kopanganj, too, to take the example of the other major cloth-manufacturing centres of Azamgarh, there were numerous instances of disagreement and strife between the weavers and other local groups in the course of the nineteenth century. And here, in 1893, the Julahas were prominent among the Muslims who came out to defend their mohallas against attacking crowds of Hindus on the day of the Baqr-Id.

In a situation like that thrown up by the Gaurakshini movement, however, in which Muslims at large became the targets of widespread and often indiscriminate Hindu attacks, all Muslims in such exposed areas tended to come together. There, then, in the Bhojpuri region is a small religious community on the one side, united periodically by its very isolation, and ranged against it on the other a large Hindu force drawn primarily from the upper ranks of the caste hierarchy and from a few other castes, such as the Ahirs, Kurmis and Koeris who had at this time a special interest in the issue of cow-protection.
VI. Symbols and slogans of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' unity.

It scarcely needs stating that the 'unity' we have sketched in the last section, cutting across several castes and classes on each side, was built up at this time on the basis of certain deeply shared religious concerns. In the course of the development of their agitation in the 1880s and '90s, the Gaurakshini Sabhas circulated numerous pamphlets, leaflets and pictures of the cow to drive home the sanctity of this particular symbol. This literature sought to emphasize that since all men drank the cow's milk, the cow was the universal mother and the killing of a cow matricide; more, all the gods dwelt in the cow (as several pictures suggested) hence cow-slaughter was the gravest insult to "every Hindu". Some pictures depicted a cow about to be killed by a butcher and different Hindu castes standing around and crying out to him to desist. "The effect of this symbolical teaching on the rustic mind may be readily conceived", an official observed with typical superciliousness, "and to the Hindu the symbol has in everything displaced the symbolised entity". 70

The same concern for the symbol was relayed by the patias or 'snowball letters' which each recipient was expected to send on to two or five, seven or twelve, or even twenty-five of his acquaintances, and which were circulated on a very large scale in the course of the agitation for cow-protection in the early 1890s and the 1910s. Only the tone of the message had become rather more urgent and aggressive. In Shahabad in 1917 some of the early patias originated at meetings in the Piru area attended by subordinate Hindu police officials as well as local zamindars and their agents, and were sent out to individual zamindars and other "men of influence" in the vicinity, initially through road chaurkider and other village policemen. But very quickly the 'snowball' took over, and it proved difficult in the
lengthy investigations that followed, not only to trace where various *patias* originated and the lines along which they were transmitted but even to lay hands on any significant number of them. The few *patias* that were found and survive in the judicial records, however, merit a closer look.

One *patia* read as follows:

"This *patia* comes from the world of the cow. It brings an entreaty to brother Hindus. The religion of the cow is being destroyed. What evil deed has she perpetrated that she should be killed by non-believers? Literally, others. We entreat our Hindu brothers to watch over the cow in every village and every house. If they do not, the cow will Sadly breathe its last and leave the village(s). If you see a Musalman with a cow, it is your duty to take it from him. It is also your duty to write and send on five *patias*. If you do not you bear the guilt of cow-slaughter. But if you send it on you will receive a gift of 5 cows.

Another, headed "Ramji", declared:

"Hindus have no choice. You know that there is a quarrel between Hindus and Muslims on the question of *qurbani*. And you know well that a Hindu has the local dialect leaves it unclear been tied up and hung from a tree, and in *qurbani* villages the cow has been paraded about and then *qurbani* has been performed. This has brought great shame upon the Hindus, such shame that being alive is a curse. Therefore, you should loot and kill (the Musalmans), then you do mount on your daughter. It would be better indeed to marry your mother to a Musalman. A few words (from us) should be enough to indicate all that needs to be done. If there are
too many Musalmans for you to handle, send a message to the Maharaja of Dumraon and an armed force will arrive at once.

The German King, the Bengalis and the Chhattris are giving us great help and they say "Fight, we shall be with you in no time".71

The two patias quoted indicate the change that came about in the content of the 'Hindu' appeal as the riots progressed. The first of these is clearly from the earliest phase of the rising when the object was to protect cows and prevent cow-sacrifice. The second belongs to a later date, when cows had in fact been sacrificed in various places, the appeal had gone out for revenge against the Muslims and there had also been cases of Muslim resistance to Hindu crowds.

Other cases show more clearly still the assimilation into the short text of a patia of particular incidents which occurred during the disturbances. The patias sometimes also specified the times and places at which Hindu villagers were to gather with all available arms. Following a benediction from "Mother Cow" to the Hindu brotherhood, one noted, for example, that "in Bikramganj, cow is lying bound for being killed. Hindus come to help to save the life of cow on kwar 3rd, dark fortnight, Wednesday. Those reading the letter should issue five letters". Again another patia reported, "Hindu brothers are hiding Musalmans in their houses in Amjhar, Daudnagar, Alwar".72 But the basic pattern of all the patias was the same. They invoked the sanctity of the cow and impressed on Hindu villagers their duty, as Hindus, to preserve that sanctity. Invariably, too, they threatened dire consequences for those Hindus who refused to abide by their injunctions: they would sleep with their daughters, perhaps marry their sisters to Muslims, in any case incur the guilt that comes from the actual slaughter of one (or several) cows,
Among Muslims there was naturally no less concern for the protection of their religious institutions and practices. Mubarakpur amply demonstrates the depth of Muslim feelings in this regard. In 1813 and 1842, when the primary targets of the Julahas' wrath were a handful of Hindu moneylenders; in 1904; and on other occasions in the nineteenth century when tension grew and violence sometimes erupted between local Hindus and Muslims, the spark was provided time and again by the defilement of a mosque, an imambarah, a tazia platform. Revenge too often took the form of the defilement of symbols sacred to the Hindus. In 1813 and 1842, temples were attacked along with the houses and account books of moneylenders. But perhaps the clearest illustration of this point is provided by the 1904 riot referred to above.

The chief incidents of the latter, it will be recalled, were the killing of a pig in a mosque on the outskirts of the town and, in answer, the killing of cows in two Hindu temples and the wrecking of the more important of these temples. This retaliatory move on the part of the Mubarakpur Muslims very quickly assumed the air of a triumphal procession; and it is perhaps worth noticing the particular actions that they considered symbolic of successful revenge. In the course of their punitive expedition the Julahas and other Muslims marched over four miles across open country, snatching on their journey two calves that they were to kill, damaging a little property in some outlying Hindu hamlets as well as inside the gāsba, killing one calf in Gujarpar (a mile and a half to the north of Mubarakpur), and then marching back through the town to the main temple which lay at its southern extremity where another calf and a cow were killed and the temple property smashed.
After the desecration of the Gujarpur temple, it was reported, the Muslims retired towards Mubarakpur "with shouts of victory". On this southward march the crowd seized the second calf, but then, finding it "too small to travel", slung it up with its legs tied to a pole and carried it in procession on to Mubarakpur. In the town, cries were raised for the wrecking of the Mubarakpur temple, and at the temple the calf and a cow were killed, the chest looted, images broken and the doors hacked to complete the ritual revenge. "The temple cow ..." wrote the Judge in the court case that was subsequently instituted, "had her throat cut and staggered round the 'pandearma' or verandah spouting blood till she finally collapsed"; the walls and floors of the temple were "literally bathed with blood". 74

Yet, notably, little other damage was done to property or person. On their march through the town, some of the rioters overturned a few Hindu traders' stalls and purloined sweets and other small items. Elsewhere, a Khatik was beaten for suspected complicity in the defilement of the mosque, two Dhobi boys were robbed near the Gujarpur temples, and a Chhattri lad who lived some distance away but was visiting the Mubarakpur market was manhandled. The temple priest was also badly beaten up. But with the killing of the cow and the two calves, and the wholesale desecration of the Mubarakpur temple, the task of revenge was seen as being fulfilled.

Something of this Hindu and Muslim agitation over sectarian symbols -- concern for cow-protection, anxiety for the preservation of practices enjoined by the shariat -- was of course evident long before the rise of the Cow-Protection movement. It was reflected for instance in the efforts of the Mahabis and Paraijis, on the one hand, and the various Hindu Samajes and reform movements, on the other, to 'purify' their
religious and combat the powerful propaganda of the Christian missionaries earlier in the nineteenth century; and these movements of revivalism and reform played no small part in deepening the consciousness of different classes of Indians as members of particular religious denominations.  

75 We have already stressed the importance of these factors as contributing to the rise of social mobility movements among groups like the Kurmis and Ahirs (among Hindus), the Zamindaras and Pathans (among Muslims). We have indicated too that the challenge posed by moneylenders, protected tenants and others to the upper-caste zamindari communities may have encouraged the latter's support for movements of religious revival and 'purification'; and a similar argument can be put forward in the case of the substantial weaving community of the region whose economic insecurity, if not immiserization, grew markedly in the nineteenth century. Yet if we are not to make the absurd assumption that economic decline necessarily leads to 'communalist' fervour in countries like India, we must examine more closely why men who felt economically and socially threatened came to be active in the fight for a ban on cow-slaughter or the right to practise qurbani.

VII. Colonialism and zamindari status.

We have observed that the classes most prominently involved in cow-protection activities and the resultant sectarian strife in the Bhojpuri region were urban and semi-urban professionals, traders, merchants and moneylenders, priests, zamindars and certain of the cultivating-tenant communities: one might add, for their leading role on the other side, the Muslim weavers (Julahas or Ansaris). Contemporary officials quickly summed up what they believed to be the motives behind the actions of some of these. The chief organizers of the Gaurakshini Sabhas in the towns, professionals and others whom the officials chose to call "half-educated English-speaking
agitators", were in their view pure mercenaries. Yet we know that young men who were even more readily put into this official category became active members of other public associations, patriotic societies and terrorist organizations that sprouted in various parts of northern India from the later nineteenth century onwards: torn from their village homes, scarcely settled in the courts and other colonial institutions, they would appear to have been looking for new ways of reinforcing their identity and self-respect.

The priests, officials considered a critical element, for without them the 'professional agitators' and the press would have no influence with the zamindars or the rest of the populace. As Macdonnell put it in 1893, "one 'Pahuari Baba' did more in a month to stir up disaffection [in Patna Division] than the whole Native Press has probably done in a year". "The Brahmins [= priests ?]", declared the District Magistrate of Azamgarh,

"have everywhere lent their aid to the movement and are foremost in proclaiming the religious necessity of protecting the sacred cow. The spread of the movement is undoubtedly to their advantage as it gives them an opportunity of re-establishing their spiritual ascendancy on its former basis".

One could add that for these men --- and the point of course applies not to 'priests' alone --- such activity might have been a mission as well as a source of livelihood.

As for the zamindars, "the majority of them believe in the religious necessity of supporting the agitation. They blindly levy subscriptions from their tenants and deposit them with some fakir or fanatical zamindar". For them there existed, besides, the need to fight for the preservation of a dominant
status that was eroding slowly under the onslaughts of an assertive upper tenantry, trading castes like the Banias and Kalwars, and not least colonial bureaucratic authority. However, the other side of this coin might have appeared at the turn of the century to be dominated by lower-status groups like the Ahirs, Koeris and Kurmis, numbers of them occupancy tenants gradually working their way into a competitive position, who were fighting for more equal rights and an end to oppressive zamindari practices. A parallel clash would seem to have been developing between the trader-moneylender and the artisans in the towns, though here the former had by the latter half of the nineteenth century established their economic ascendency rather more decisively.

In the case of this 'urban' confrontation it seems possible to trace some of the reasons why sectarian symbols should have become symbols of authority and focal points of strife; and a consideration of these may provide some clues as to the factors that worked towards a similar end in the 'rural' sector too. We may begin with the Muslim weaving community, concentrated in and around a number of old weaving towns, buffeted about and oppressed by several new forces in the colonial period. The evidence suggests that this experience, perhaps more than the fact that they were the object of a good deal of revivalist and other propaganda in the towns, lay directly behind many of their acts of protest in the nineteenth century. The targets of the weavers' attacks during the 1813 and 1842 riots in Mubarakpur were surely not an accidental choice. Indeed in the enquiries that followed the 1842 riot, for which the surviving records are fairly detailed, various pieces of evidence came to light regarding the specific causes of friction leading to this outbreak.
While the houses of five moneylenders were raided by the Mubarakpur weavers, their principal targets were Bichuk Kalwar and his relative Bhawani Prasad whose houses were not only plundered but burnt, without a care for those trapped inside. We know little about the exact dealings, the pressures and humiliations that lay behind this attack. But it was noted by the District Magistrate, Craigie, after his detailed investigations in the town, that Bichuk Kalwar had "by great care, pecuniouness, and usury raised himself to be a dabbler in Mahajunee". By 1842 he was clearly a man of some wealth and had in his debt those whom Craigie described in another charming example of colonial perception, as "several of the reckless and profligate Mussulman Weavers of Mobaruckpoor". Without doubt, the Magistrate noted, Bichuk was "a hard unrelenting creditor". All of which perhaps helps to explain the march on Bichuk's house and the bonfire made of the tamasooks that Bichuk held against the weavers, before the house itself was set on fire.

But there was evidently more to the attack than the burning of tamasooks and the wreaking of vengeance on a cruel upstart. There was the killing of a cow whose body was then thrown into the Hindu shivalaya. There is need to remember, too, that the discovery of a dead pig on one of their Imambaraaha had provided the immediate spark for this explosion of Muslim anger. Eight years earlier the placing of a pig's carcass on the Panj-i-Sharif had led to a similar display of agitation on the part of the Julahas and the murder of a Hindu barkandaz (armed policeman) who went out to investigate, although the situation was then controlled. That had the exploitation of a Hindu moneylender to do with these attacks?
In this connection, again, the enquiries after the 1842 outbreak threw up interesting evidence. Bichuk Kalvar, we learn, was not only "a hard unrelenting creditor". To this cause of unpopularity he added "a superlative fanaticism in matters concerning his own creed and an ultra-enmity in those opposed to it". At each Mohurrum "he endeavours to throw discredit on their [The Muslims'] faith and obstacles in the way of their Tazeeahs". There was indeed a history of extended friction over the size of the Julahas' tazias for the Mohurrum procession for many years before this.

In 1835, Bichuk and a fellow mahajan, Babu Ramdas, had built a wall on the road and thus created an obstruction in the way of the procession of tazias. In April 1838, Bichuk complained to the Azamgarh Magistrate that the thanadar (police Station Officer) of Muberskpur had for the past three years removed some tiles from the wall in order to allow the tazias to pass. The Magistrate, while giving the thanadar credit for his good intentions, directed that he should in future not remove tiles but get the Julahas to reduce the size of the tazias if they wished to pass that way. This order was somehow enforced in 1839 and 1840. In 1841, a complaint was registered with the police accusing a Julaha of having forced the tazias through: if the Hindu landlords had not removed some tiles, it was said, the consequences would assuredly have been most serious. It was in the wake of the tension thus generated that the 1842 outburst occurred, some days after the Mohurrum of that year.

It is worth noting that the vengeance of 1842 did not mark an end to this dispute, for the basic cause of the quarrel remained. In 1842 violence had been averted on the occasion of the Mohurrum only by the detention of Bichuk Kalwar in Azamgarh town ("to prevent a disturbance" and "to save his life"), and by the presence of the officiating Magistrate, Robert Tucker, in
Mubarakpur where he walked behind the main tazia almost all the way on both the principal days of the festival. In 1843 and 1844 the festival passed off peacefully; on the former occasion the officiating Magistrate was again present in Mubarakpur and saw that the tazias were carried by another route; on the latter, this alternative route was again followed and a Joint Magistrate and a small mounted force were present. However, Muslim inhabitant consulted by the administration still described Bichuk and Ramdas' encroachments as the fundamental cause of ill-feeling in the town. In 1844, then, the administration began efforts to get the mahajans to knock down the wall and restrict their construction work to the original limits. In December 1844, they finally succeeded in having the "obnoxious portion" of the buildings removed with the owners' consent and without any disturbance. It is perhaps significant that there was no other serious affray between the Hindus and Muslims of Mubarakpur for the rest of the century. The next major outbreak, in 1904, came at the end of a period when a whole range of outside forces and movements had entered the local arena though they fed of course on old rivalries and tensions in the area.

The aggressiveness of Bichuk Kallar and Babu Ramdas was part of a widespread effort by traders and moneylenders to assert their still relatively new-found position near the top of society. Rikhei Sahu, the mahajan killed in the earlier riot of 1843, had built a "grand" house in the first years of the century, the like of which it was said "was not to be found anywhere else in Azamgarh"; the building is still referred to in Mubarakpur as 'the house'. Bichuk, again, had built what was described as a "splended" two-storied house for himself and his family, not long before the outbreak of 1842.
The assertion of a superior status could proceed through the construction of grand houses, the buying up of land and the adoption of a zamindari style. It could be signalled by conspicuous participation in the Great Tradition of religion; say, the erection of a new temple. It would be demonstrated, too, by the performance of ceremonies, the observance of festivals only as the 'men of position' wanted it --- under their benevolent eye and within the limits prescribed by them.  

Thus we might comprehend the harassment of Nazir Beg, of the family of the original maliks of Ibrahimpur in Shahabad district by Shyam Sundar Lal and Jamuna Sahu, the 'new' zamindars of the village, which included efforts to "interfere with the long established custom of qurbani in his house and mosque." Thus, too, might we follow the reasoning of the Chauhan Rajput zamindars of Katarpur in Saharanpur district who upbraided their leader, Harnam Singh, when the latter 'publicly admitted' (in a discussion with local officials and Muslim leaders in 1918) that qurbani had been performed in Katarpur at the Bacr-Id for some years past: "You are the owner of three-quarters share of the village and you are causing such a thing to occur i.e. acknowledging that qurbani had been performed in the Chauhans' village .... Go and drown yourself."

In the old cloth-manufacturing town of Mau and in other places, as in Mubarakpur, though the records are not everywhere as explicit, the nineteenth century saw considerable jostling between different classes over the symbols of authority and status. Clashes between various parties of Hindu and Muslims broke out in Mau at the beginning of the century, when a long-established ban on cow-slaughter in the town was brought into question by the coming of the new colonial authority with its own particular prejudices against local customs. The Banaras Court of Circuit, trying the cases that arose out of these circumstances
these 'riots', recommended the extension of the earlier ban on cow-slaughter in Mau; and orders to this effect were issued in mid-1808. From then until 1862 or '63, as a petition of several leading Hindus of the town to the British authorities in 1893 put it, there was "no dispute" between the two communities. It is notable too that the renewal of strife in the 1860s began with the erection of a new temple in October 1862, perhaps seen as a further assertion of power by moneylenders and other rich Hindus, and hotly contested by the Julahas and other local Muslims as having no customary sanction. Indeed it is tempting to suggest that this attempted "extension of authority" and the revival of quarrels over the question of cow-slaughter was associated with the exceptional dearness of grain and the very depressed circumstances of the cloth trade at this time, conditions that harboured the distinct possibility of a still tighter stranglehold by Hindu traders and financiers over the Muslim weavers; it was after all in 1863 that the Mau Julahas told the Commissioner of Banaras Division that they would make "the finest quality cloth" cheaper than the coarser, so great was the cost of the raw material and so little the value of their skills in the existing situation.

The years after 1862 were marked by extended friction in Mau: Muslim opposition to the building of the new temple, Hindu retaliation through the defilement of a mosque, friction over the killing of cows by Muslims inside their homes for purposes of food, and incessant petitions and complaints that "poured in on all sides". By 1865 the Magistrate of Azamgarh had proclaimed his inability to keep order in the town "by the ordinary means at his disposal" and applied to the Government for additional police. Then, or slightly later, punitive police was quartered on the town at the expense of the Hindus for their attacks on local Muslims in connection with cow-slaughter.
The example of Mau reveals another factor that was of considerable significance in the growing conflicts over various sectarian symbols and practices. This might be described, simply, as the destabilization of custom, a process encouraged by the very fact of the colonial attempt to record this quantity. This importance of such destabilization is evident from the outbreak of clashes in Mau in 1806, only five years after the East India Company had taken over the administration of the region and it had become uncertain whether the old ban on cow-slaughter in the town remained effective. In the 1860s again, self-contradictory official orders, amidst all the current jostling for economic and social advantage, added to the tension. In January and February 1863 the Azamgarh Magistrate, Henry Lushington, declared that the Muslims were free to kill cows behind closed doors, while at the same time binding down a number of people on both sides to keep the peace for twelve months. In March 1863, on a petition from Hindu inhabitants, he reversed his order:

"Although it did not at first appear probable that the killing of kine should have been altogether forbidden, ... it appears that in fact ever since the time of the Nawab Vazir, the killing of cows, calves & bullocks was forbidden in this city ... Accordingly this notification of the prohibitory order of the Government is now again issued and no one of the Musalmans faith should attempt to kill, or actually kill, cows, calves and bullocks in this city of Mhow". 89

Muslim appeals against this decision were rejected by an officiating Magistrate and the District Judge. But in October 1864 a Joint Magistrate, Richards, acquitted a number of Julahas charged with the slaughter of a cow on the ground that the cow was killed for food, inside a house, with no intention of wounding the religious feelings of the Hindus. There followed, in quick succession, a number of the cases a against Hindus
charged with assaulting Muslims on the issue of cow-slaughter. In all of these Richards convicted the accused, holding that Muslims were free to slaughter kine for food, while the Judge, Ross, holding the opposite view, persistently acquitted them on appeal. The sole exception to this pattern was a case in which the Judge upheld a heavy prison sentence against some Hindus for forcibly appropriating a cow from its Muslim owner, when no cow-slaughter had occurred, nor was there proof that the cow in question was to be taken for slaughter.

Then in 1865 sanction was given for the establishment of a slaughter-house where kine might be killed "without offence to the Hindus", apparently because the dearth of grain had greatly increased the pressure on the poor Muslims of the town. This in the view of some at least in the administration, "finally" settled the question of whether cows could be killed in Mau for food. Yet leading members of the local Hindu community did not quietly accept this decision. They appealed against it all the way up to the Lieutenant-Governor of the province, the Viceroy of India and the Secretary of State for India in Council. They argued that the erection of a slaughter house in 1865 was an emergency measure, necessitated by hard times and accepted by the community beyond what they claimed was the originally sanctioned period of one year only because the Hindus had no objection to the killing of buffaloes and other animals, but not cows, for food.

In 1885 Mullock, then Magistrate of Azamgarh, while convicting three Muslims of Mau for the public killing of a cow, expressed his own opinion that the original Government order of 1808 prohibited the slaughter of kine for sacrifice alone, and not for food. To this the Hindus replied that it was obviously not the Government's intention in 1808 to ban cow-slaughter "once or twice a year and to allow it all the year round". It
was not relevant either, they added in response to other official arguments, whether Mau had a larger Hindu or Muslim population or, again, whether or not it was a place of special sanctity to the Hindus. "What was at issue was "an old custom sanctioned by the Mahomedan rulers" which had been the basis of peace between Hindus and Muslims through the better part even of the nineteenth century. "The peace of the whole town of Mhow mainly depends upon a just and equitable decision of this question". But the bureaucracy, whether because of a felt need to do everything to mollify the 'Muslim' interest in the face of what they saw as a rising 'Hindu nationalism', or because a decision had been taken at the local level and the steel-frame had to be shown to be without cracks, paid no further attention. It was in this situation that important elements of the Hindu community in and around Mau were swept on a wave of anger, as it were, into the rising tide of militant Hinduism in northern India.

It needs to be noted, again, that an official effort to 'record custom' relating to the practice of qurban in Azamgarh appears to have sparked off the Hindu demonstrations at the Baqr-Id of 1893. On 8 June that year the officiating Magistrate of Azamgarh, Duperonex directed that the Muslims of all villages in which there was danger of disturbance should report at their respective police stations before 15 June whether they intended to perform qurban. The order, which was apparently supposed to be communicated only to villages where the police apprehended trouble, was in fact conveyed to all parts of the district, and 426 Muslims "gave notice" of their intention to sacrifice cattle (347 cows and 79 buffaloes).
On 8 June too, Dupernex issued another order directing the "leading Hindus and Muhammadans" of "villages in which disturbances were anticipated" to appear before a magistrate, "so that it might be settled in what villages sacrifice should take place". Hindus and Muslims from numerous villages then appeared before various magistrates, and "in all but a very few cases" (as the official summary had it) recorded their willingness to adhere to "established custom", neither sacrificing nor objecting to sacrifice "in contravention of usage". 91

This inept official interference without doubt stoked the fires of Hindu, or more precisely Gaurakshini, wrath. Certainly, after the riots, a wide body of Hindu opinion expressed a sense of outrage at the officials' meddling with traditional practices. The Dainik-o-Samachar Chandrika of 7 September 1893 observed that Dupernex's notice

"which contained a list of the villages in which cow-slaughter takes place every year, and indulged in surmises as to the places where such slaughter was likely to produce disturbances this year, was published in every village in Azamgarh, and no wonder that it alarmed the Hindus on the one hand, and encouraged the Musalmans on the other".

Earlier on 21 August, the same paper had noted the view held by "many people" in Azamgarh that the Baqr-Id riots were the consequence of the granting of licences for the slaughter of cows "in Mau and the adjoining places, where cow-slaughter was not allowed since the time of Akbar". A day later it declared: "it was the undue encouragement given by the officials to the slaughter of cows by the Musalmans that brought about the disturbances".
The view that the blame for the June events rested squarely on the officials was widely espoused in the wake of the riots. "Messrs. Brunyate [an Assistant Magistrate] and Dupernex have committed an offence whose enormity nothing can exceed," wrote the Banganivasi on 11 August,

"if, being Government officers, they have really incited the Musalmans to cow-slaughter. ... It is said that he [Dupernex] compelled a Hindu tahsildar, a Hindu Deputy Collector, a Hindu Police Inspector, and even several Hindu raises to witness cow-slaughter. On what principle of justice or policy can this act he justified?"

Indeed, many sections of the Hindu press in northern India now expressed a complete loss of faith in the impartiality and justice of the administration of the North-Western Provinces and Awadh (later UP) headed by the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Charles Crosthwaite; though some retained their trust in "the Maharani" and the Viceroy. One wrote of "a close compact" between the Muslims and the British, evident to them in the way that the judicial enquiries were being pursued in Azamgarh, Ballia, Bareilly and other places; another of the "oppression" let loose on the Hindu population by Muslim police officers backed by the British.

It may be recalled here that in Shahabad in 1917 it was the performance of qurbani in Milki, Bhagalpur and Ibrahimpur under official supervision, and in spite of some reluctance on the part of the local Muslims, that changed the course of the riot, transforming what was supposed to be a localised demonstration into a savage affair marked by widespread loot and murder: the point assumes special significance in the light of the Banganivasi's views, quoted above, about the incitement of Muslims by Government officers to sacrifice cows. It may be recalled, too, that it was in a situation very like
like that of Azamgarh in 1893 that the Chauhan Rajputs of Katarpur (Saharanpur district) declared a quarter of a century later, that qurbani could never have taken place in their village.

As in Katarpur, so (with the Hindu and Muslim positions reversed) in the Muslim gasba of Mubarakpur, there was an insistence down to and including the period under study that the assent of the local zamindars was required for any religious, if not any social, innovation. Behind the Muslim actions in Mubarakpur lay, in addition, the feelings, the resentments and the aspirations of another closely knit community -- the Julahas or Ansaris, who now turned to the Sheikh zamindars for leadership. Among Hindus in the Bhojpur region, who were neither isolated nor small in numbers, there was no clear-cut alliance of this sort. But agitating groups from zamindari and other privileged backgrounds found support in the fight for cow-protection among various peasant communities struggling to establish their own 'higher' status. So down to the First World War, if not later, the Muslims of Mubarakpur, like the Chauhan Rajputs of Katarpur and other communities elsewhere, demonstrated their continued (rather, increased) readiness to rise in the defence of institutions and practices that had come to symbolize for them their ascendancy or their self-respect. Frequently the consequences were bloody.

VIII. Some conclusions regarding 'communalism'.

Extended and bloody sectarian strife of the kind witnessed in the Bhojpur region from the 1880s to the 1910s was certain to leave its mark. In an age of increasingly rapid and far-flung communications, a considerably expanded section of the Hindu and Muslim 'communities' was affected by the reports and rumours of the period -- of the brutalities perpetrated in Mau (Azamgarh) or the terror unleashed in Shahabad. The repercussions of the Azamgarh events of 1893 were
felt almost immediately in Bombay and Junagadh: Julaha migrants were to the fore in the Bombay riots which aimed at least in part to avenge the deaths of their brethren in north India. The ripples of the Kanpur mosque incident of 1913 reached out to distant Lahore. And the outrages committed by the Hindus of Shahabad in 1917 were remembered, and to some extent repaid by Muslim migrants from this region on the streets of Calcutta in 1918. Thus Hindus and Muslims of several classes, scattered over a much greater geographical area, are likely to have been drawn into the religious community's concern for qurbani or sacrifice.

However, anything like a permanent Hindu-Muslim divide was as yet far off. For the emergence of that, there was still the need for a clearer political articulation at the provincial and national levels. That articulation, encouraged directly and indirectly by the colonial regime, notably in the case of the Muslim League, of course fed on the suspicions and fears that grew out of sectarian agitations and clashes such as those we have discussed above. Yet even in the worst affected regions like that of the Bhojpuri speaking people, this kind of strife did not inevitably or automatically lead on to 'communalism'. The contradictions in the locality remained many-sided, and it would be difficult to argue that the confrontation between Hindu and Muslim was primary among them.

That so much of the sectarian strife of the 1890s and 1910s involved a clash chiefly between a number of the higher Hindu castes and a small and isolated Muslim community is a fact that is not easily brushed aside. The example of Katarpur village in the western UP district of Saharanpur provides another sharp illustration of this, if further illustration is needed. We have noticed earlier the indignation of the local Rajput zamindars at the public acknowledgement in 1918 that
qurbani was performed in their village. This indignation quickly led on to the use of force to prevent the qurbani. In the preparations for this the Chauhans were advised and assisted by professional men, merchants and priests from the nearby pilgrimage centres of Hardwar and Kankhal. Then, at the Baqr-Id in September 1918, thirty Muslims of Katarpur were butchered to death by a large crowd of Hindus from the village, the towns of Hardwar and Kankhal, and other villages nearby—a calamity that the small police force present could apparently do nothing to prevent. The caste background of the 165 men subsequently brought to trial, and in all but 20 cases found guilty of participation in the riot, is significant. Of them as many as 50 were Chauhan Rajputs. The rest were made up of 24 Brahmans, 17 Banias, 14 Sainis, 7 Mahants or priests (including three who were sentenced to death), 6 Jats, 6 Khatris, 4 Kayasths, 4 Kalals, 4 Gosains, 4 Banjaras—all of these being men of the zamindari, trading and priestly communities—and smaller numbers from other castes. The largest number of accused came, not surprisingly, from Katarpur itself. 33 men of the village were prosecuted. 27 of them were Chauhans, and the remainder are very likely to have been personal servants or other direct dependants. 96 Limited though the evidence is, it nevertheless suggests a general aloofness on the part of the lower castes even in Katarpur (a village inhabited by 538 Hindus and 238 Muslims in 1911) from this defence of 'Hindu' interests.

There is yet another dimension to this. The occasional convergence of interests between various upper and lower castes and occupational groups cannot be viewed in isolation. The joint actions of the Ahirs, Koeris, Kurmis and the zamindari castes of the Bhojpuri region, the Rajputs, Bhumihars and Brahmans, did not lead on to a long term perception of an identity of interests. On the contrary, the upward mobility movements of various cultivating castes in Bihar aroused the bitter antagonism of the
landowning classes leading them into organised opposition to the lower-caste movements. It is worth stressing, too, that the resulting compact among the upper classes of the region cut across the religious divide, with Muslim and Hindu zamindars joining hands. Thus in February 1921, certain Muslim zamindars of Bihar sub-division in Patna district instituted a number of cases against the Gwalas who were now refusing to supply them with ghee, curds, etc., at rates lower than these in the market. Later an anti-Gwala movement was organised by 'upper caste' zamindars, its first meeting being held in October 1922 in the house of a Muslim zamindar, Maulvi Muhammad Wali. "The organizer of this movement", Hetukar Jha tells us, "was also a Muhammadan (Maulvi Muhammad Masood of Marija), ... a zamindar of some influence and a non-cooperation leader". 97

The results of this upper caste counter-agitation were liable to be violent. For instance, local zamindars gathered a large force to break up an "important" Gwala panchayat, called to discuss matters of caste improvement in the village of Lakho Chak in Mungher district on 27 May 1925. In Muzaffarpur in 1923, "the annoyance caused to the higher castes by the determination of Goalas, Koeris, Kurmis, etc., to wear the sacred thread and to attach 'Singh', 'Rai' to their names" culminated in two riots in the Shochar and Belsand thanas. In Darbhanga the move by local Gwalas to wear the sacred thread, following the example of their fraternity in Muzaffarpur and Patna districts, brought them into collision with the Brahmans and Babhans, resulting in a riot in Chak Salem village in 1922. "The Babhans who disliked the idea of the Goalas claiming to be their equal assaulted a Goala girl and left her naked. She lodged a complaint before the S.D.O. [Sub-Divisional Officer] at Samastipur who dismissed it without enquiry." 98 Resistance and further violence followed. It was a pattern of conflict, and of humiliation of the lower classes,
that has lasted to the present day.

Some kind of compact between Hindu and Muslim re-emerged, too, at levels other than that of the zamindars. The weaving town of Mau, which had experienced the fiercest of sectarian upheavals, indicates this well. The need for co-existence and peace between people of the two religious denominations was obvious; the economic well-being of the weavers and the trader-moneylenders remained to a large extent interlinked, and the idea of a separate Muslim state — to which most Muslims of the region would in any case never migrate — was still to be conceived. The excesses of 1893 produced a sense of shame among some of the local Hindu leaders, and led at the same time to increased government efforts to bring about agreements between the representatives of the local Hindus and Muslims and to extend precautionary measures. They seemed, thereby, to have transformed the situation in Azamgarh district within the space of a year. "The Bakr-Id of 1894 has passed off with perfect tranquillity in this district", H.V. Lovett, the officiating Magistrate at Azamgarh reported. "There has been no disturbance of even the smallest kind". Rose, the officiating Commissioner of the Division who had made it a point to be present in Azamgarh at the time of the festival, seconded Lovett's statement: "The attitude of the two communities appeared to me ... one of toleration and peace. There were no symptoms of any sullen resentment or of any aggressive policy."

Rose was instrumental earlier, as the new Magistrate for Azamgarh appointed after the 1893 riots, in having written pledges signed by "resident leaders" in most of the villages and towns where serious clashes and demonstrations had taken place: Mau, Kopenanj, Adri, Azmatgarh, Khairuddinpur and so on. At Mau, a very special effort had been put in. A conciliation
committee of ten Hindus and ten Muslims was set up, Muslims nominating the Hindu members and vice versa. Rai Durga Prasad of Gorakhpur, proprietor of Kopagānj, came and stayed in Mau for several days to assist in the peace-making. Large meetings were held at Kopa and Mau in February 1894, attended by Hindus and Muslims of both the towns and the surrounding areas. At the second meeting twenty copies of an agreement were signed and distributed among the members of the Mau conciliation committee, who were asked to obtain signatures from the inhabitants of the town after Rose had returned to headquarters. By this agreement, which was in line with those made elsewhere in the district, the local Hindus and Muslims bound themselves neither to interfere in the religious practices of the other community nor to introduce any change in the established customs. The Mau agreement stated in addition that the signatories would endeavour to implement the agreement throughout the district, and that they wished the agreement to be printed and a copy sent to the headman of every village in Azamgarh.

About a month after the above meetings Rose received the last of the copies of this agreement, which had been signed by 877 Hindus and 745 Muslims of Mau. In the meantime, another small but significant event had occurred. Returning from Mau after the February meeting, Rose was met at Khurhunt by one of the principal Muslim members of the Mau conciliation committee, Maulvi Karim Baksh, who came to him at night and handed over a number of swords. These were among the illicit arms known to be possessed by some of the Julahas of Mau; the latter had now surrendered fourteen swords to be given to the Magistrate, in spite of the punitive police tax at the time imposed on the weavers of the town. It was further evidence of a renewed will to secure communal harmony.
None of this is to suggest that the 'religiosity' of the Bhojpuri folk had been diluted, or disagreement and tension over sectarian matters ended. The 1904 outbreak in Mubarapur, the Faizabad events of 1912-13, and Shahabad in 1917 would quickly set right any delusions on that score. But the fact remains that our understanding of the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in the locality is unlikely to be enhanced by maintaining a narrow perspective on friction between Hindus and Muslims.

At the end two points perhaps call for special emphasis. The first is one with which this essay began, that is, the need to avoid the conflation of different definitions of 'communalism'. The second is that, in spite of the history of such bitter clashes between Hindus and Muslims in the 1890s and the 1910s, 'communalism' was far from being the only, or indeed the logical outcome of the complex pattern of developments in the Bhojpuri region. We may refer here, as a statement of relevance to both these points, to Francis Robinson's conclusion, after his extremely detailed investigation into the origins of Muslim separatist politics in north India, that 'eastern UP and Awadh' (which covers most of the Bhojpuri region) was a region of 'communal harmony' down to 1923 while 'communalism' was already rampant in western UP.\(^{101}\) If the evidence of large-scale strife associated with cow-protection activities appears to fly in the face of this conclusion, that is a reflection, we suggest, of the continued disjunction between the organized sphere of politics that is Robinson's exclusive concern and the organisation and resistance of local communities, Julahas, Ahirs and Chauhan Rajputs, that we have been examining here. Precisely because of the overlap between the two and the obvious influences that flowed either way, no satisfactory history of Hindu-Muslim relations, or of 'communalism' in India, can be written without a recognition and close analysis of these autonomous domains of political action.
FOOTNOTES

1. UP refers to present-day Uttar Pradesh, earlier known as the United Provinces of Agra and Awadh.


3. J.R. McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress (Princeton 1977), 273, 326-7, also 296.

4. P.G. Robb, 'Officials and Non-Officials as Leaders in Popular Agitations : Shahabad 1917 and Other Conspiracies', in B.N. Pandey, ed., Leadership in South Asia (New Delhi 1977), 198-9, 203. Sandra Freitag also makes the same point about a declining zamindari class in her current work on the Cow-Protection movement: I have unfortunately not had access to the final version of the papers on this theme by her and by Anand Yang which are to appear shortly.

5. Robb's suggestion that "increased assertiveness among tenants and subsequent discontent could be expressed against Muslims even more easily than against landlords" (p. 189, see also 183) is scarcely helpful in this regard. Nor does the idea of 'false consciousness', as used for instance by Bipan Chandra (et al), Communalism and the Writing of Indian History (Delhi 1969), 38, take us very far: whatever its value in other contexts, it tells us nothing here of the character and potentialities of existing consciousness.

6. Cf. Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1916-28 (Delhi 1979), 19, for the unity of all Muslims; Robinson, Separatism, 27, 213, 245 for the use of some colonial stereotypes.

7. J. Krishnamurty, 'Changes in the Occupational Structure of the Indian Union, 1901-61' (forthcoming). The figures for Patna Division would of course be still more startling if Patna city was excluded. These figures, and the information and statistics contained in the following paragraphs are taken from the 1911 and 1921 census reports for UP and Bihar, the District Gazetteers compiled in the first decades of this century and a number of the district Settlement Reports,


15. 'Economic Dislocation in Nineteenth Century Eastern UP'.


17. Sengupta, 'Caste as an Agrarian Phenomenon', 85-9; Bihar Census 1911, Pt. I, 440, 444, 466, etc.


19. Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Home, Revenue and Agricultural Department, No.CLXXX. Papers Relating to the Crime of Cattle-Poisoning (Calcutta 1881), 17 ff; Report on the Scarcity and Relief Operations in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh during the years 1877-78 and 1879 (Allahabad 1880), 10; (Govt. of India, Revenue and Agriculture Department, December 1888. Famine Progs. Reports on the Condition of the Lower Classes of Population of India, Progs.1-24, Letter No.563, Oflg. Commr. Faizabad-Director Land Records and Agriculture, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, 4 April 1888, which indicates that Ahirs are now being pressed into debt servitude. See also A.K. Bagchi : 'Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth in India during the period of British Rule', Bengal Past and Present XV, Pt. 1, No. 180 (1976), 265; Robb, 'Officials and Non-Officials: Shahabad 1917', 183; McLane, Indian Nationalism, 303.

20. UP Census 1911, Pt. I, 360; Bihar Census 1911, Pt. I, 446; Pandey, 'Economic Dislocation in Nineteenth Century Eastern UP'. 

22. Entry headed Sunday, 29 May 1904. (The late Mr. Abdul Mejid's diary is preserved by his family in Mubarakpur. I am most grateful to Qazi Atahar Mubarakpuri for enabling me to copy a few extracts from this document).

23. India Office Library and Records, East India (Religious Disturbances) Copies or Extracts of Reports relating to the recent Conflicts between Hindus and Muhammedans in India, and particularly to the causes which led to them (London 1894) — hereafter, _East India Religious Disturbances, 1894_ — Chief Secy., Govt. of N.W. P. & O to Secy Home Dept., Govt. of India, 28 August 1893, p. 20.


26. The information in this and the succeeding paragraph comes from _loc cit_ and India Office Records, L/P & J/6/357, Dupernex, Offg. Magistrate Azamgarh to Commissioner Gorakhpur, 7 July 1893 (hereafter, Dupernex's Report).

27. _Loc cit_, 'Appendix on the Ramifications of the Gaurakshini Sabha in the Azamgarh District'. This account of Gaurakshini Organization is based on the above, and India Office Records, L/P & J/3/96, 'Note on the Agitation against Cow-killing', section on 'Organization of the Gauraksha Sabhas'.


30. The following account is based on letters and correspondence in _ibid_, Azamgarh Collectorate, Dept. XIII, File 146 of 1894; and Gorakhpur Commissioner's Record Room, Dept. XVI, File 37 of 1898-1900, particularly Court of Session, Azamgarh District, Trial No. 30 & 37 of 1893, Queen Empress vs. Gobind Rai & 48 others (Judgement 14 Feb. 1894). For other precautionary steps taken by the Azamgarh officials, see Section VII below.
31. For Ghazipur, see East India Religious Disturbances, 1894, Enclosure 2 in No.4, H.B. Finlay, Offg. Commr. Banaras Division to Chief Secretary, Govt. of NWP & O, 16 October 1893.

32. Loc cit.

33. Azamgarh Collectorate, Dept XIII, File 215 of 1895, High Court of Judicature for NWP (Criminal), Appellate Jurisdiction, Allahabad 15 May 1894 (District Ghazipur Criminal Appeal Nos.1, 24, 54, 104, Govt. Appeal No.147 and Revision No.125 of 1894).

34. Azamgarh Collectorate Dept. XIII, File 146 of 1894, Register of 'Return Showing Persons Convicted in Connection with Disturbances during and after Bakr Idd 1893', No.8 regarding 'Riot at Kopenaj'.

35. For the above, see L.S.S., O'Malley, Shahabad District Gazetteer revised by J.F.W. James (Patna 1923?), 44; India Office Records, L/P & J/3/96 'Note on the Agitation Against Cow-Killing'; L/P & J/6/1466 (Bakrid riots in Patna, 1916); and Home Progs., Confidential 1919, Vol.52, Prog. no.155, July 1919 ('Note on Previous Cow-killing Riots and Disturbance in Patna Division, 14 January 1918).

36. Loc cit.


42. Ibid, Letter no.1583-S.B. from DIG Crime & Railways, 10 Apr. 1919.

43. L/P & J/6/1507, report from The Times 16 Jan. 1918; Oldham's Report, Appendix V, Copy of First Information Report, Piru and Milki (sd. J.D. Boylan, S.P., Bacchri Bridge, 30 Sept. 1917, 1-40 p.m.). The account of happenings in this area is taken from Oldham's Report, Appendices III-V, VIII & IX.


45. Progs. of Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council (29 Nov. 1917) reply to question by S.K. Sahay (extract in Home Progs. Confidential, 1919, Vol.52).

46. L/P & J/6/1507, Court of Commissioners of Special Tribunal of Arrah, Trial No.5 of 1917, Emperor vs. Akhaj Ahir and others (village Mauna, P.S. Nasirgunj); Trial No.6 of 1917, Emperor vs. Abilaksh Ahir & others (village Turukbighas P.S. Nasirganj); cutting from The Times 4 March 1918.

47. Oldham's Report, Appendix VI & VII.


49. Ibid, H.C. Williams, Magistrate & Collector, Darbhanga to Commissioner, Patna Division, 18 Oct. 1893, & Appended 'Note on Madhubani Gaurakshini Sabha'.

50. The following account regarding these men is based on Dupernex's Report, 17-20.
51. Gorakhpur Commissioner's Record Room, Dept. XVI, File 37/1898-1900, 'Petition to Secy., Govt. of India, from poor Muslim residents of several villages in Azamgarh, 18 June 1893'.

52. Loc cit.

53. Dupernex's Report, Appendix on 'Ramifications of the Gaurakashini Sabha in Azamgarh District'.


56. Apart from some information from the trials instituted after the riots, we have interesting evidence in the list of assailants presented in the Muslims' petition from Azamgarh, 18 June 1893 (n. 51 above). The caste-breakdown of the men accused of preparing to use armed force against the Muslims is as follows: Bhumihars 94, Rajputs 31, Brahmins 16 (these three accounting for 141 of the total of 198), Baniyas 9, Sonars 5, Koeris 5, Kandus 5, Katuas 4, Gosains 3, Others 20, unidentified 6.


59. The next two paras are based primarily on L/P & J/6/1507, Court of Commissioners of Special Tribunal of Arrah, Trials no. 6 and 4 of 1917.


61. L/P & J/6/1507, Trial no. 5 of 1917.

62. Oldham's Report, 17. The Commissioner calls attention also to the slogans that referred to Kunwar Singh's family (Dalippur ko Babu ki Jai!) and the reports implicating other members of the Ujjainia stock.

63. Ibid, Appendix III 'Report' by S. Ahmad Ali, 28 September 1917, 7 p.m.
64. L/P & J/6/1507, Court of Commissioners of Special Tribunal of Arrah, Trials no. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 of 1917, and also case no. 486-G relating to an attack on Bithwa Rasulpur on 5 October, and Emperor vs. Aligu Kandu, etc. relating to an attack on Bisaini Kalan on 5 October. In the last-named case, there was a large gap between the number of accused (253) and those convicted (83): in this case, therefore, I have taken account only of those convicted. Roff's 'Officials and Non-officials, Shahabad 1917' uses evidence only from the first five of the above-mentioned trials. The figures in his table on p.191 also differ from those presented here; I suspect, because of the general difficulty of identifying men's castes through their names; Bhumihars, for instance, commonly took the title of either Rai or Singh.

65. The details of these events are taken from L/P & J/6/357, Chand Narain, Offg. Tahsildar, Ghosi to Magistrate, Azamgarh, 28 June 1893.

66. L/P & J/6/1507, Telegram Viceroy to Secy. of State for India, 10 October 1917, and Trial no. 4; Oldham's Report, Appx. VII.


68. Drake-Brockman, Azamgarh District Gazetteer, 261-2, UP Regional Archives, Allahabad, COG (Gorakhpur), Judicial Azamgarh, Vol. 58, File 47, 'Outbreak in the Town of Mubarakpur, Azamgarh 1845'; Mohammad Ali Hasan, 'Vakyat-o-hadesat: qasha Mubarakpur' (Urdu ms. of 1882. I owe thanks again to Qazi Atahar Mubarakpuri for allowing me to see this manuscript). For the 1904 riot, Abdul Majid's Diary, entry for 29 May 1904; and Gorakhpur Commissioner's Record Room, Dept. XIII, File 63/1902-5, 'Serious outbreak at Mubarakpur'.


70. L/P & J/3/96, 'Note on Agitation against Cow-killing', 10-11.

72. Ibid, patias no.7 & 3. For other examples, see also patias translated in L/P & J/6/1507, Trials no.1 & 5 of 1917.

73. See references cited in n.68 above.


75. For a detailed account of the process among Bengali Muslims, see Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906. A Quest for Identity (Delhi 1981), passim.

76. Cf. Marx, "Alongside of modern evils, a whole series of inherited evils oppress us, arising from the passive survival of antiquated modes of production, with their inevitable train of social and political anachronisms. We suffer not only from the living, but from the dead," Preface to the 1st edition of Capital (New York 1906), 13.

77. 'Confidential Correspondence' of A.P. Macdonnell, letter to Forbes, 9 November 1893; Supernex's Report, 18, from which the next quotation also comes.

78. Apart from Seen II above, see F.W. Porter, Final Settlement Report of the Allahabad District (Allahabad 1878), 47-8; and for examples of struggle in Shahabad during the Survey and Settlement operation of 1907-16, Hubback, Final Settlement Report, paras. 171-180 & 472; Robb 'Officials & non-Officials', 187.


81. COG (Gorakhpur), Judicial Azamgarh, Vol.68, File 47, Craige's letter of 25 March 1842. The following account is based on the reports and correspondence, from 1834 to 1844, contained in this file.
82. Mohammad Ali Hasan, 'Vakyat-o-hadesat', pp. 9-10, 35. The author refers time and again to the haughtiness of the mahajans derived from their growing wealth. Bluntly identifying among the two or three instances in which changes in caste due to increased prosperity 'the case of the prosperous M. who insists on calling himself Mahajan', UP Census, 1911, Pt. I, 352.

83. There is a considerable anthropological and historical literature on these themes: see, for instance, N. Sanyal, 'Temple Promotion and Social Mobility in Bengal' in his Social Mobility in Bengal; C.A. Bayly, 'Patrons and Politics in Northern India', in J. Gallagher, et al., eds., Locality, Province and Nation, Essays on Indian Politics 1870-1940 (Cambridge 1973). Satyajit Ray's film 'Jalsaghar' is a classic comment on this process of change and the difference between 'old' and 'new' zamindars.

84. See n. 36 above.

85. India Office Records, L/P & J/6/1557 of 1918, Judgement in Katarpore Riot Case.

86. 'Petition of Hindu Inhabitants of Mhow, to Secretary of State for India in Council' (nd, 1893?) (I am grateful to Shri D.N. Pandey of Mau, Azamgarh, for permitting me to consult this document which is preserved in the library of his late father, a prominent Hindu gentleman of the town.) The following account of events in Mau is based chiefly on this petition, and its Appendices, which contain detailed extracts from Govt. reports and Judgments relating to conflicts in Mau.

87. Selections from the Records of Government, North-Western Provinces, Part XI (Allahabad 1864), Article IV, 'Informant Regarding the Slackness of Demand for European Cotton Goods'. We may note in this context, too, that in the criminal prosecutions that followed the Mau riots of 1893, the great majority of those accused who belonged to Mau were described as "shopkeepers of the Bania class". Most of them were implicated in the second fight in Mau and the attack on 6 Muslims who were killed on the spot. The witnesses were relatives of those killed and two or three Julahas in each case, whose testimony the Judge considered highly suspect. Yet the accusations, if not the actions of the traders, are a plain indication of the tension that had grown up between the weavers and the traders-moneylenders. Gorakhpur Commissioner's Record Room Dept. XVI, File 37/1898-1900, Judgement of 14 February 1894 in Mau Riot Case.

89. 'Petition of Hindu Inhabitants of Mhow', Appx. C(a), Notification issued by Magistrate, Azamgarh, 20 March 1863.

90. These arguments are put forward in the main body of the petition, ibid.

91. (East India) Religious Disturbances, 18-19.

92. L/P & J/3/96, 'Note on Agitation against Cow-killing', Appendix (extracts from the vernacular press) 6, 7, 8-9, 13.

93. Dainik-o-Samachar Chandrika 13 September 1893, Sulabh Dainik 12 September 1893, also Sahachar 9 August 1893, all in ibid, 4, 10, 11.

94. I try to analyse more closely the contradictions and tendencies existing in Mubarakpur in the 19th century, in a forthcoming paper in R. Guha, ed., Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society Vol. III.

95. In 3 days of rioting in Bombay, 80 people were killed, 1500 arrested, and 300 temples, mosques and shops damaged or destroyed, according to official figures, McLane: Indian Nationalism, 320-21. For Lahore and Calcutta see, respectively, R. Kumar, 'The Rowlett Satyagraha in Lahore' in R. Kumar, ed., Essays on Gandhian Politics (Oxford 1971), 271 and K. Macpherson, The Muslim Microcosm: Calcutta, 1918-35 (Wiesbaden 1974), 37, 40.

96. L/P & J/6/1557, correspondence and 'Judgement'.


98. Ibid., 551-3.

100. For the above, see ibid., Resolution, General Dept., No. 394/TII-461 B of 1894 (Allahabad 29 March 1894), which reproduces letter no. 197/XIII-215, Rose, Magistrate Azamgarh to Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, 8 March 1894.


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