Pro-Poor, Rights-Based Approaches in the Presence of Pervasive Clientelism

An Evaluation of DFID El Gol Electoral Assistance

Aaron Schneider and Rebeca Zuniga-Hamlin
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Executive summary

In 2002 the UK Department for International Development (DFID) provided electoral assistance for local and regional elections. Partners included 23 NGOs and local and national government actors. Their mission was to create an electoral process that was more inclusive of poor, excluded people in rural Peru. This mission quickly expanded beyond mere electoral monitoring and civic education and undertook a wider transformation of citizen attitudes, government practices, and national institutions. The programmes undertaken by the various partners were gathered under the heading, El Gol, and they targeted five Andean highland departments of Peru.

The current report is the product of an evaluation of several aspects of the project. The research included interviews with El Gol partners, local government officials, international donor representatives, and members of civil society.

The El Gol programme applied a rights-based and pro-poor approach to electoral assistance with particular attention to poor, rural, local districts. The report evaluates the impact of El Gol using a political framework that emphasises the operation of rights-based and pro-poor approaches in the context of clientelist local authorities. The most interesting finding may be that rights-based, participatory practices can encourage transformation of clientelist settings to promote more pro-poor outcomes.

Regional findings

The regional reality in Peru includes weak parties, feeble civil society, and an elite class that has reinserted traditional clientelist practices to regional institutions. Incipient opposition and popular movements were making inroads, but they had largely failed to penetrate political power at the regional level. El Gol worked with a bottom-up strategy that fortified pro-poor mayors and a centre-periphery strategy that attempted to use a Lima-base to influence the rules shaping regional behaviour. Several regional observations deserve note:

- Coalitions of pro-poor mayors and opposition movements pressure regional authorities and force a distribution towards the rural areas.
- The same actors have claimed spaces for voice and participation at the regional level.
- Lima-based lobbying created legislation that strengthened the weight of participatory and consultative entities in regional government.

Despite these important advances, a few warnings about the constraints on a pro-poor and rights-based approach at the regional level are in order.

- The national government is sceptical of the potential for effective regional governance, and the timid Organic Law of the Regions reflects that unease.
• Revenues and authority transferred to the regions are wholly inadequate to undertake major functions, and some of these functions transferred are probably more appropriately located at another level of government.

• It is also clear that authorities in the regions are sceptical of institutions biased towards pro-poor and rights-based approaches, such as the Regional Coordination Councils (CCRs).

• Regional authorities are minimising the importance of the CCRs and using patronage to influence the behaviour of province and district mayors.

• The CCRs themselves are flawed. The 40 per cent threshold for civil society participation and the registration requirement for civil society organisations are likely to constrain the capacity of many opposition groups.

• CCRs are structured largely as consultative and consensus-building institutions, and they therefore lack real teeth to hold regional authorities accountable. As a result, they are unlikely to evolve into anything like a participatory or representative regional level legislative branch.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that one of the biggest problems for civil society in Peru is the weakness of political society. Political parties are not doing their job at the regional level. The pro-poor and rights-based approaches that El Gol advanced made some important, though limited progress in strengthening civil society. For civil society to encourage a change in political practice at the regional level, mayors and progressive movements must insert themselves at the regional level in a coordinated way. They will require resources and allies beyond their borders. El Gol NGO partners provided some of the resources, capacity and alliances that were necessary in the short term. In the longer term, more reliable institutional allies will be necessary.

Local findings

New local authorities face the challenge of building viable institutions in the context of a weak state, fragmented civil society, and intense poverty. In particular, the challenges of constituting local authorities has remained factionalised into pro- and anti-Fujimori sections of the local elite. The institutions that could operate in this context combined pro-poor, rights-based approaches in the context of pervasive clientelism. It has to be acknowledged that local social practices were unlikely to disappear overnight, and they continued to exhibit traditional clientelism. Such social norms militate against the full realisation of rights and participation, particularly for women, and perpetuate inefficient and unequal public policy. These traditional clientelist techniques build support for elites and sustain their power by exchanging material benefits for obedience by poorer citizens.

Despite the political, economic, and social inequalities that reinforce traditional clientelism, the rights-based and pro-poor approach of El Gol made important strides in strengthening citizenship.
Districts in which El Gol partners had worked used rights-based participation to channel benefits to poor supporters and potential allies, and in so doing, shifted the terms of clientelist exchange. Several positive local trends deserve note:

- Participation engaged citizens in policy formulation and decision-making.
- Citizens were given ownership and responsibility to ensure the success of policies.
- Citizens offered their own resources and time to the public good, and they used participatory spaces to hold authorities accountable.
- Authorities in El Gol provinces tended to favour long-term, rural, and participatory priorities. Non-El Gol provinces maintained a short-term, urban, and material focus.

The key innovation in rural Peru was a strategic structure of participation. By biasing the sites of participation and the pattern of decision-making towards the poor and rural districts, voices of poor, campesino citizens were privileged. As a result, these groups could mobilise to obtain material resources and realise their rights. The new institutions further privileged these groups by tying rights to active participation. This reinforced the notion that citizens receive their benefits on the basis of their active links to local authorities.

As was evident at the regional level, one cannot ignore the importance of political society to solidifying and realising citizenship gains. The advances that El Gol contributed to realising citizenship rights tended to be geographically, electorally, and fiscally bounded: in other words, in districts where progressive leaders committed themselves to participation, El Gol programmes advanced citizenship. In neighbouring districts and higher levels of government, traditional elites dominated and presented real threats that clientelism would return.

The sustainability of localised experiments in rights based approaches is likely to depend on the ability to institutionalise and spread progressive movements. New authorities in poor districts where El Gol attempted to expand citizenship faced continued problems related to scarcity and institutional weakness. Some local leaders dealt with scarcity by searching for additional resources beyond their borders and could erect fragile institutions of participation. The main protection from a return to clientelism was additional resources through cross-jurisdiction and inter-governmental cooperation. Governments linked across districts and provinces granted leaders a wider area to draw resources and pool administrative, material and other assets. These alliances could also be used to secure resources from higher level governments.

In sum, what began as an electoral assistance programme was actually an effort to bring a rights-based and pro-poor approach to local governance. El Gol partners contributed to a transformation in traditional patterns of unequal and inefficient clientelism. In its place, a new and improved style of governance was emerging. Participation and pro-poor policies were central to this approach, and it transformed some of the terms of clientelist exchange. The result was improved governance at the local level. Still, a real risk exists that new patterns of governance can slip back into old patterns of clientelism:
• The privileged sites of participation for the poor cannot be allowed to disappear or slip into exclusionary mechanisms captured by the rich.

• To date, cross-district alliances have largely concentrated on securing additional resources for each district. This effort should be formalised and institutionalised, if possible.

• Local leaders should consider coordinating the way in which they build political support. A shared set of institutions, policies, and practices can ensure that cross-district collaboration continues on the basis of participatory institutions and pro-poor policies.

• Weak institutions at the regional level should be strengthened through cross-district alliances based on rights-based and pro-poor approaches.

• Political parties are currently weak, but they might be the most decisive actors in aggregating provincial movements. To sustain improved governance, rights-based, pro-poor policies should be at the centre of partisan efforts to create district, provincial and regional voices.

**Future implications**

The key conclusions of these findings relate to the transformation of clientelism through the construction of citizenship and formal institutions. Clientelist practices thrive on poverty and weak institutions. In patron-client networks, disempowered citizens depend on powerful informal authorities, and the result is inequality, weak democracy, and continued poverty. These examples of poor governance remain pervasive in many parts of rural Peru because there is little local demand for citizenship; alternatives to traditional leaders are weak; and few resources exist to build formal institutions. Quite simply, there are few alternatives to clientelism. The El Gol project was quite ingenious in articulating an alternative form of local governance based on rights.

One aspect of the El Gol project deserves particular note because it was unusual. Local, regional, and national NGOs acted like an imported middle class for rural communities where there was hardly any autonomous capacity for change. El Gol partner NGOs articulated demands for citizenship, provided the leadership and capacity that could contribute to formal institution-building, and worked to secure resources from outside. In short, El Gol provided an alternative to clientelism because it forged an alliance between the rural poor, indigenous progressive leaders, and middle class NGO allies.

El Gol opted to operate through NGOs and civil society actors who might strategically ally with some local politicians but would mostly operate outside formal electoral politics. This was probably a wise choice given the notorious weakness of Peruvian parties and their poor track record on combating clientelism. On the other hand, parties have one significant advantage over NGOs — they do not depend on the whims of external donors. NGOs have few resources of their own, and the impending closure of DFID offices suggests resource pressures are likely to increase. By contrast, parties can generate their own resources, and they can sustain cross-class and cross-geographic alliances through attaining public power. El Gol partners indirectly contributed to progressive partisan practices in several localised circumstances.
If a more formalised and institutionalised progressive party could emerge, one could more confidently speak of a sustainable alternative to traditional clientelism. For the moment, the El Gol network of NGOs, local leaders and citizen organisations offers a temporary, though important, alternative.

Map 1 Peru

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Section 1: Introduction

Is it possible to advance the interests of the poor in a rights-based framework in the presence of persistent clientelist structures? It seems unlikely. Though patrons have long built networks by targeting poor clients, pro-poor policies are not often the outputs. Clientelism is the polar opposite of citizenship, universal access, and participation. To change clientelism, citizens must demand their rights, alternatives to traditional leaders must emerge, and formal institutions must replace informal ones.

In the context of local level elections in Peru, DFID worked to enhance a rights-based approach to governance. The projects, gathered under the heading ‘El Gol’, targeted conflict-torn, poverty-stricken rural areas of the Andean highlands where the state and civil society were weak. The project worked with potential officials, with civil society organisations, and with actors at the regional and national levels. In the zones the projects reached, it is clear that there was an increase in policymaking access for excluded groups and an improvement of pro-poor outcomes. It is also clear that expanding rights have not eliminated clientelism, but rather have introduced a new, pro-poor and rights-based approach in the context of pervasive clientelism. The paradoxical combination that has resulted sheds light on the local context of Andean Peru, the role of clientelism in political and social institution-building, and the complex relationship between rights, institutions, and development.

Background

During the 1980s and 1990s, Peru was torn by political violence, economic instability and social exclusion. Relative tranquillity was slowly restored to the cities, but the rural poor remained excluded from the larger polity. In particular, they remained subjects in traditional clientelist and authoritarian networks. This posed a challenge for the return to democracy that occurred in 2001 and was followed in 2002 by elections at the local and regional level. There was a real danger that traditional clientelist relations would solidify through incipient electoral processes. Facing a legacy of demobilised and disarticulated society and a fragmented political elite, DFID sought to bring a rights-based and pro-poor approach to the 2002 elections through a series of projects under the El Gol label.

Distant, poor areas lacked viable and authoritative institutions. No state or civil society entity existed to reach distant and isolated communities, and many citizens were left on the margins of social, economic, and political life. The only institutions that reached them were traditional clientelist networks that exchanged material benefits for obedience and resulted in inefficient and unequal outcomes. Targeted, particularist, patron-client exchange was an ingrained cultural trait that would not disappear overnight. The durability of clientelism was more than cultural; it also served the purpose of managing resources and power in the context of abject poverty and weak institutions. The major contribution of El Gol was to begin a transition in old clientelist institutions by introducing rights-based participation and a pro-poor targeting of resources. This did not eliminate clientelism, but it did alter the terms of particularist exchange in ways that were more inclusive for poor citizens.
The unique management style adopted by DFID deserves mention. The context of poverty and exclusion that existed in rural Peru required flexibility in the techniques and methodologies applied. Local partners were encouraged to develop their own solutions, and bottom-up practices and participation in designing programmes was encouraged. In part, this flowed from the bottom-up, rights-based approach adopted overall. Further, institutional uncertainty meant that centralised control would have been difficult and ill-advised anyway. Typical of the institutional uncertainty that existed, laws regulating the different local authorities changed frequently, even up to the moment of elections. For example, citizens and El Gol partners were working to expand citizenship for regional entities whose authority was not yet defined. DFID and El Gol partners adopted a flexible management style. The result was that rights-based and pro-poor approaches obtained a distinctively local flavour. Each local project developed unique interventions that matched the citizenship demands and institutional needs of the local context.

This approach to management followed a rights-based, pro-poor perspective on development. Rights-based approaches recognise universal citizenship rights, enshrined in law and international convention, and interpreted to fit local contexts. In Peru, basic rights are denied to many poor, indigenous and women citizens. By equipping excluded groups with the tools to develop solutions, have a voice, and organise their interests, El Gol sought to make them conscious and purposive actors in the development process. Ideally, this would enhance their ability to secure benefits from the state, encourage state responsibility to meet its obligations, and give excluded groups a voice in defining their rights.

Over 20 local and national organisations participated in the El Gol electoral assistance project. The regions targeted were the five Andean highland departments, and specific efforts were made to reach poor rural districts. On the basis of partner and DFID analysis, the project expanded rapidly beyond mere electoral monitoring and civic education. In addition to these activities, DFID partners worked to strengthen citizen organisations, state institutional capacity, cross-district alliances, and national frameworks for participation and governance.

These activities sought to change democratic political processes. Citizens were taught to exercise their political rights. The conduits between citizens and the state, especially the media and partisan organisations, were strengthened. Government agencies were trained and encouraged to meet their obligations to citizens. National institutions were lobbied and pressured to recognise and strengthen local democracy. One of the underlying assumptions of the project was that enhanced political rights for the poor would result in improvements in economic and social rights as they gained access to policymaking, public funds, and altered social relations.

**Scope of the report**

This report includes the research and findings conducted in an evaluation of El Gol partners and impacts. The principal researchers conducted desk reviews of literature on rights-based approaches and spent several weeks in Peru visiting El Gol partners and districts where El Gol had operated. The visits provided invaluable information on the realities of local democracy in Peru. Partners and DFID personnel
were eager informants and collaborators in the study. Based on the visit, additional research was conducted to understand the nature and operation of traditional clientelist structures and the way they evolve.

In Section 2, the literatures that address clientelism and rights-based approaches provide the backdrop to the analysis of Peru. To highlight the relative uniqueness of the El Gol approach, other experiences in electoral assistance also receive a brief discussion. Among the experiences reviewed, only Nigeria appears to exhibit similar interventions that address fragile civil society, a fragmented and weak party system, and local democratisation that is both recent and insecure. After the literature and electoral assistance review, Section 3 turns to the Peruvian context in more detail. The detail from Peru highlights the local, regional, and national efforts made by El Gol partners to bring a rights-based and pro-poor approach to electoral assistance. In addition, a specific effort was made to evaluate the impact of El Gol on local authorities. A comparative case study of four districts draws out the differences between areas where El Gol operated and areas that lay beyond the reach of El Gol partners. The report closes in Section 4 with findings.

Section 2: Literature review and international experience

Clientelism

Clientelism describes the low-level citizenship, weak institutions, and power inequalities that are typical of places like rural Peru. Scott describes it in terms of the material and moral ties that exist between patron and client, 'The patron-client relationship – an exchange relationship between roles – may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron' (Scott 1977: 126–7).

Political anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have long been interested in clientelist practices. As the citation above indicates, these relationships generally involve unequal exchanges of personal and material favours between a patron and a client. Clients depend on patrons for necessities, such as land, work, or access to basic services, and patrons cultivate this dependence by tying benefits, to the extent possible, to obedience.

In Latin America, the precise combination of material and moral mechanisms vary with the context and have generated numerous subtypes of patrons, including caudillos, caciques, and populists. Such patterns are common in poorly developed rural areas, where unequal landholding creates dependency and weak state penetration leaves room for patrons to impose their own authority. For similar reasons, urban slums also provide fertile ground for patronage networks, as urban elites can manipulate access to basic services and work in exchange for client obedience (Gay 1994).
The result of patron-client relations is almost always unfair and rarely efficient. Patrons cede only what is absolutely necessary, and clients usually possess insufficient leverage to extract many concessions. In fact, most patron-client networks reproduce and exacerbate inequality. Further, by directing resources towards sustaining patronage networks, real opportunities to improve welfare through efficient uses of resources are missed.

If patron-client systems are so unfair and inefficient, the obvious question to ask is why do they persist? One answer is that clientelism provides a semblance of order in the presence of many problems generated by intense poverty. Poverty implies scarcity, uncertainty, and vulnerability, and each of these fragile conditions operates on multiple dimensions. Poor citizens are quite often triply burdened. They face economic destitution in which they lack access to resources and the means of production. They are culturally excluded by the denigration of their language, dress and customs. They are politically disenfranchised by a lack of interest groups or political actors that can offer the leadership and organisation to incorporate them into public life.

In the presence of extreme poverty, patron-client structures thrive, and they thrive precisely because they address multidimensional aspects of poverty. Patron-client relations manage resources, establish a cultural idiom of practices, and impose order. The results are inefficient and unfair, but they are surprisingly difficult to change.

The first problem associated with poverty is economic. People in poor areas lack access to resources, livelihoods — and especially in rural areas — land. Patronage networks manage, and reproduce, questions of resource scarcity. Patrons control resources, and distribute particularist, material benefits to individual clients (Erie 1988). Generally, this sustains and exacerbates material poverty. To sustain their networks, patrons secure benefits from other patrons or external actors, such as higher levels of government. A typical pattern is for a pyramid of clientelist relations to manage resources across multiple levels of patrons and client. At local level, villages and families of clients are dependent on a local notable or political broker. These actors, in turn, are the clients to higher level regional bosses or authorities that patch together various local units. The pyramid continues upwards, with patronage resources and protection flowing downwards in exchange for loyalty, power, and surplus. Moving up the pyramid, patrons must manage sufficient resources to sustain their networks below, and at each level, power and resources are siphoned off by patrons before passing a few crumbs downward. Obviously, those at the bottom suffer the most. The burden of the multiple tiers of patron authority rests on their shoulders, and at most, they are kept barely above subsistence.

A second problem associated with poverty is social. Poor clients are held as subjects obedient to traditional norms and values. Patrons sustain and reinforce these values through the exchange of gifts and favours, often in elaborate cultural rituals. The patterns of ritual establish what kinds of client demands are legitimate and how demands are to be expressed. Patrons form multi-stranded moral ties with clients, such as fictitious family ties in which the patron takes on rhetorical, religious, or communal roles as head of a family of clients. Skilful patrons aggregate these personal relationships into appeals that tie entire population groups together in a network of personalistic loyalties that underwrite relationships between
high-status patrons and low-status clients. This establishes and sustains a pecking order in which clients are denied basic citizenship rights and are held as obedient subjects. Obedience operates with moral overtones that further restrict the potential actions of clients and tie them deeper into patronage networks (Movnihan and Glazer 1964).

The moral and material dimensions of clientelism are wrapped into political institutions. Patron-client ties form multistranded, informal institutions that can be used to sustain the status quo. At precise moments, the informal institutions and networks of patrons and clients can be mobilised to stage protests, articulate demands, and win elections. During electoral campaigns, patrons often surface, distribute material benefits and symbolic promises, and call on their clients for support. These moments are unusual in occurring sporadically and through formal mechanisms like elections. The constant practice of patron-client ties operates through informal institutions that sustain an exclusionary political order. The main tools patrons deploy are the varied mechanisms of dependence that keep poorer clients in line.

At times, political order can take a more sinister hue as patrons make use of repression. It is not uncommon for patrons to invest part of their surplus in a coercive apparatus. Coercion alone cannot sustain a patron-client network, but the effective deployment of force can impose a reign of fear over a large population. Fear limits the demands articulated by clients, and coercion allows patrons to control the number of clients they must sustain. When new clients emerge or new demands grow, patrons calculate the potential costs in material resources against the potential benefit in political and moral support. At times, patrons find it advisable to exclude new clients, something old clients may willingly support, rather than spread material benefits among a wider group.

Clients are not wholly without power within patronage networks. In fact, many studies have demonstrated that clients are skilful at playing patrons against each other, bargaining to obtain improved terms of exchange, and dissembling or foot-dragging to lower their obligations (Scott 1985). Though they are at a serious disadvantage, clients find mechanisms of survival and constantly negotiate their position within relations to patrons.

Patron-client networks can thus be seen as a less than elegant mechanism of managing supply and demand. Patrons benefit from the moral support, political authority, and material surplus that they extract from clients. In conditions of scarcity, client demand for patronage resources can be great and patrons have only a limited supply of patronage to distribute. One can expect patrons to seek new resources; and, if these cannot be secured, patrons will exclude or repress clients rather than face the cost of carrying them.

Most observers criticise the obvious inequalities in the positions of patrons and clients and point to consistently inadequate outcomes for development. Poor clients should not have to negotiate with patrons to obtain resources or promise obedience to arcane personalistic hierarchies; they have a basic right to universal access, equal voice, and basic well-being (Riddell 1998). In addition, patron-client ties sustain inefficient productive practices, corrupt use of state resources, and poor development outcomes.
Still, clientelist relations persist. In fact, for generations reformers have made only marginal inroads to eliminate patron-client ties. To transform clientelism in the presence of intense, multidimensional poverty is not simple. It requires an institutional alternative.

Patrons manage resource scarcity partly by limiting the number and kinds of claims that clients can make, and there is a limit to the resources they can generate through attaching themselves to wider pyramids of patron-client networks. When patron-client networks cannot meet rising demands, or when alternative sources of benefits emerge, clientelism is unsustainable. It does not mean that it will disappear, however. Reformers must come armed with material benefits with which to outbid traditional patrons.

Patrons also manage social exclusion by establishing a limited basis of demand-making. In particular they limit demands to divisible, particularistic material benefits. Yet, if clients organise and demand citizenship rights instead of material benefits, clientelism cannot respond. Again, this does not mean that clientelism will disappear automatically. Reformers must offer an alternative set of norms and practices.

Finally, patrons manage weak political institutions with a mixture of material and cultural dependence and physical coercion. Clients remain trapped in informal networks because they lack the leadership and skills to organise a different set of political institutions. Once again, reformers must offer an alternative set of formal institutions that can compete with informal patron-client relations.

Clientelism addresses poverty in an imperfect and exclusionary way, but it does not disappear overnight. For clientelism to disappear, an alternative source of material resources, cultural practices, and political institutions must emerge. Rights-based approaches advance such an alternative.

Rights-based approaches

Various practical and intellectual paths converged in the 1990s in a rights-based approach to development. Rights-based approaches imply a web of responsibilities and rights that tie individuals to states in mutually accountable relationships. Rights-based approaches also articulate relationships within society in which all citizens are equal participants in the development process. As a basis for argumentation, rights-based approaches advance universal participation and the use of power and wealth to provide minimal well-being for all citizens (Robertson 1994). The rights-based approach to development is based on the premise that the denial of human rights is inherent in poverty, and therefore addressing poverty requires working towards the realisation of rights. The practice of rights-based approaches is an ongoing process that involves contestation around both the meaning and importance of rights (Hyben 2003).

In part, the origins of rights-based approaches can be traced to international human rights frameworks that underlie international agreements in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Such frameworks began with agreements around civil and political liberties, and they have

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evolved over time to include deeper and broader rights including socio-economic rights to minimal welfare. Once agreed, international organisations defending rights-based approaches work towards enforcing these standards on ratifying countries (Eyben 2003).

It is useful to note that the deepening and broadening of the international human rights framework has been related to the specific efforts of various local, national, and international struggles to include socio-economic rights. In particular, women, landless, indigenous and other subordinate groups have used mobilisation around rights to obtain resources and participate in the decisions which affect their lives. By pressing for the legalisation of basic socio-economic rights, these movements attempt to redefine the legitimate framework that governs public and private life (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001).

Intellectual support for these and other movements has been provided by academic theories that emphasise the transformation of state institutions from particularistic, and often exclusionary, practices towards rights-based practices that emphasise universal treatment and access for all citizens (Gillies 1993). This emphasises a shift from beneficiaries/clients of services to the realisation of rights for citizens (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000). In other words, a rights-based approach thus sees and treats people as citizens – an individual with rights, rather than someone receiving benefits or buying services. Such a shift can only emerge when multiple lines of accountability between state and citizen and among citizens enable citizens to defend their rights (Eyben 2003). Rights-based approaches thus bring accountability and responsibility into development (Hughes et al. 2004).

For some, rights and citizenship have to be actively realised. This implies that rights only become real when they are mobilised and activated through direct civic engagement. In fact, some see the very act of participating as a basic right. Direct engagement allows people to gain information, express demands, and hold authority accountable. People become agents and subjects, rather than objects of their own development (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Eyben 2003; Cornwall and Gaventa 2001).

The active dimension of rights is especially important to theorists of citizenship and participation who highlight the transformative and consciousness-raising impact of action. According to Pateman (1980), the opportunity and act of participation constructs and builds more self-aware and engaged citizens and alters and enhances citizen consciousness. People become more aware of their own rights, more socially conscious about the rights of others, and more educated about their corresponding responsibilities to participate in decision-making processes (Eyben 2003). In this framework, the process by which decisions are reached is as important, or more important, than the decisions themselves.

Seeing participation as a citizenship right also provides an entry point to recognise and overcome social, economic and political power differentials and dynamics (Cornwall 2002). Differences in awareness, access, and voice mean that citizens do not enjoy equal capacity to participate (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999). A hungry, homeless or illiterate person will not be able to demand rights to participate and is unlikely to be capable of engaging in a participatory process (Eyben 2003, Mungoven 2003). In fact, the capacity of the poor to realise their right to participate presupposes not only an active knowledge of this political right, but more fundamental access to basic economic and social rights that meet basic survival needs (Hughes et al. 2004). Therefore, the right to participate requires first a basic and fundamental access
to resources and knowledge. By placing these rights at the same status and as a prerequisite for participation, rights-based approaches offer a mechanism to attack inequality and provide privileged access to participation for those who had previously been excluded.

The convergence of these strands in rights-based approaches to development in the 1990s changed the basis of thinking and arguing about development. Citizens gained a new mechanism to demand participation and make claims. Critical to the appeal of rights-based approaches, all citizens enjoyed rights equally and could be brought into a coalition in support of rights-based approaches. Rich and poor, included and excluded – all were potential allies in protecting equal rights. Few exclusionary groups could oppose a coalition around universally equal access, and this made a rights-based approach particularly powerful as a way of mobilising energy, power, and resources (Tomasevski 2000).

Rights-based approaches offer an important alternative to clientelism. Firstly, they are a substitute for the exclusionary moral tenets of clientelism. Clientelism is based on hierarchy, authoritarianism, and particularist exchange. Rights based approaches offer equality, democracy and universal provision. These norms challenge traditional clientelist norms, and offer a new mechanism to argue against exclusion.

Rights based approaches also offer a political substitute for the informal networks of clientelism. Clientelism ties traditional authorities to poor clients in a multistranded network of material, social, and political dependence. Repression and coercion are common tools of traditional authorities, and the main output is inequality and sustaining the status quo. Rights based approaches make a different coalition politics possible. Middle sectors enthusiastically support rights approaches. These are the groups that drove good governance movements against political machines in the United States and quality of life movements in Europe. Rights approaches attract middle sectors because they emphasise clean, transparent government that operates according to universal norms.

Middle sectors attracted by the norms of rights based approaches offer an alternative set of authority figures, leadership skills, and organisational capacity. Traditional authorities kept poor clients in a dependent position within clientelist networks. Middle sectors can forge alliances with the poor through formal institutions. Participation and democratic practice offer opportunities for middle sectors and poor citizens to oppose traditional authorities.

It is here that two continuing difficulties deserve to be raised with the rights-based approach. First, the universal appeal of rights-based approaches also makes it difficult to resolve issues of competing rights. In particular, rights approaches are not easily translated into attempts at redistribution that take from privileged groups to provide for the underprivileged. Poor and excluded citizens can legitimately argue that they face extra difficulties in realising rights, and they can demand a level playing field. They can also demand access to basic economic and social benefits as a minimal requirement for participation. On the other hand, rights-based approaches alone are difficult to use to justify preferential treatment or to resolve situations in which the rights of the privileged conflict with the rights of underprivileged. Thus, rights-based approaches could be used to overturn anti-minority, discriminatory laws in the United States.
but rights arguments could not sustain affirmative action policies that gave preferential treatment to minorities. Rights-based approaches are important in equalising access, but alone they are difficult to use to justify preferential treatment and redistributive outcomes.

A second difficulty that deserves to be raised refers to potential difficulties created by resource realities. In conditions of resource abundance, universal access and a minimal standard of well-being simply require raising the living standards of those who are excluded and no sacrifice is required on the part of others. Rights-approaches are sufficient to argue for this for many who are excluded. Yet, in resource scarce conditions, universal access and/or minimal standards are probably unobtainable; and many groups are excluded. Even if an effort is made to include new groups, some individuals will inevitably be excluded and/or denied minimal well-being. In these contexts, it is difficult to decide which groups to target.

In response to both of these caveats, rights approaches emphasise changing the terms of who is included and excluded in defining rights themselves. Ideally, these issues could be overcome on an explicitly political and moral basis that privileges the rights of the poor, weak, and the excluded over the rich, powerful, and included (Sider 2003). At the heart of a rights-based approach are the power relationships, dynamics, and structures that mediate the realisation of rights (Hughes et al. 2004).

In practice, participation is central to achieving consensus for rights based approaches. Participatory methods offer a mechanism whereby individuals and interests can negotiate rights and deal with the thorny issues surrounding competing rights and resource scarcity. Through participation, actors negotiate their own understanding of rights in their local context. International and universalistic practices form the background for this negotiation, and local specificities and understandings are allowed to define the terms of rights.

The ways in which participatory institutions are structured becomes central to power relationships. Participatory institutions can be structured to privilege the participation of excluded groups and alliances between middle sectors and the poor. The way these groups are included will depend on local contexts and patterns of exclusion. Where women are traditionally excluded, as in India, democratic spaces can be reserved for them. Where indigenous citizens are excluded, meetings may be held in local languages, traditional dress allowed, and documents printed in indigenous languages. All of these steps have been taken in Peru, where many rural residents speak Aymara or Quechua as their first language. The impact of these institutional adjustments, sometimes minor, can enhance the ability of excluded groups to participate in the negotiation of rights.

A rights-based approach brings together multiple strands of development thought and practice. It ties together notions of citizenship and well-being that provide a basis for advancing the cause of excluded groups. In addition, rights approaches emphasise participatory decision-making in which all citizens have access and equal voice. Of particular interest here, rights approaches emphasise accountable, participatory authority that includes the poor as active citizens deciding their own development. This makes it possible to create an economic, cultural, and political alternative to clientelism.
Clientelism is resistant, and it remains prevalent in conditions of scarcity. Still, rights based approaches offer an opportunity to bring middle sectors and poor citizens together around universalistic rights, redistribution, and participatory democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1 Transforming clientelism</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Challenges</strong></td>
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</table>
| Clientelist responses | • Material resources, usually secured externally from wider patronage networks  
| | • Particularist distribution of material benefits to clients; and  
| | • Multistranded ties between patron and client that maintain order and limit client demands.  |
| Rights-based and pro-poor approach responses | • Material resources secured through cross-class and cross-district alliances  
| | • Distribution of material benefits to the poor; and  
| | • Participatory mechanisms that resolve conflict and structure decisions in favour of poor rural citizens.  |

**International electoral assistance**

El Gol attempted to transform clientelist practices by introducing pro-poor and rights-based approaches. This was a significant departure from traditional elections assistance, which generally does not attempt a fundamental rearranging of power relations. In general, international electoral assistance focuses on free and fair elections in new democracies. In many of these countries authoritarian rule is a recent memory; political conflict takes occasionally violent forms; extreme poverty affects many; and institutional frameworks are extremely weak. As a result, assistance emphasises basic institutional strengthening, election-day monitoring, and international cooperation (Walker 2003). On these issues, the Peruvian experience strengthens and expands already existing knowledge. In addition, the Peruvian experience expands knowledge of appropriate interventions in contexts of weak parties, incipient democracy, fragile society, and pervasive clientelism.

The international electoral assistance project that perhaps exhibits the most similarities to the Peruvian context occurred in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the transition to democratic rule that occurred in 1999 left the country with a weak constitutional framework for elections. A national electoral commission and various state commissions were left the task of designing an electoral framework, including the timing of elections, the demarcation of boundaries, and the registration of voters and parties. Legislative, executive, and judicial pressures have been brought to bear on the commission, but still state election commissions were widely expected to manipulate upcoming local elections.

Similar to Peru, some parts of Nigeria are resource rich. Yet, poverty is widespread, and parties fail to mobilise serious cleavages or organise programmatic debate. Instead, the “money politics” of powerful

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3 Many of these observations are drawn from comments by Sam Unom, DFID officer in Nigeria, and documents by Tim Sheelty and Victoria Erdoo-Ibi funded by DFID.
agents dominates local and national politics. Patrons with bountiful funds for campaign finance swing elections by distributing material benefits to buy votes or use repression to exclude participation.

Electoral assistance has focused on institutional strengthening and has broadened to include election monitoring, citizen education, and party-building. In these efforts, civil society organisations have been important collaborators. Still, the Nigerian case exemplifies the challenges faced in incipient democracies where institutional protections are weak, and powerful individuals and actors use wealth and institutional control to bias democratic outcomes.

The Nigerian case brings up some of the most obvious parallels to rural Peru. Electoral assistance in such contexts can clearly not be limited to election-day observation and post-election evaluation, though both are important to nudging young democracies forward. Institutional development, party-building, and citizen education pose particular challenges to contexts in which democracy is recent, poverty is endemic, and parties and party systems do a poor job of linking state and society. In these contexts, international electoral assistance includes a pro-poor and party-building component. In the Peruvian context, this has included supporting efforts to build a rights-based and pro-poor orientation at the local level.

What is unusual about Peru is that these ideals have partially transformed clientelist practices. The result has not been the complete elimination of clientelism, but rather the beginnings of an alternative. Persistent problems of resource scarcity and political informality remain and provide fertile ground for clientelism. In the paragraphs below, we examine the ways in which rights-based approaches have transformed structures on the ground in the context of electoral assistance.

Section 3: Fieldwork

Peru’s context and existing challenges
A real innovation is occurring in rural Peru. Old-style clientelist networks sustained unequal distribution of resources and traditional elite dominance but they were weakened by a decade of authoritarianism and political violence. Into the vacuum, movements in the rural Andes seized on rights-based approaches. They applied rights-based participation that transformed clientelist networks in ways that began to overcome opposition and generate pro-poor outcomes.

This accomplishment is all the more remarkable given the conditions of rural Peru. The countryside, particularly the Andean region, remains poor and scarred by several decades of upheaval. In the late 1960s, the Peruvian military seized power and imposed a land reform that displaced rural elites (Stepan 1978). Most of them moved to Lima or provincial capitals and left behind rural municipalities where peasants lacked the capital or skill to sustain development. Many peasants migrated to cities, but a significant population settled into poverty and subsistence agriculture isolated from the rest of the country. Infrastructure remains poor and links to major urban centres are weak. The land in most of the Andean interior is rich in cultural heritage and panoramic vistas, but it has been forgotten by the state and remains destitute in quality of life.
After the military exited power in the 1970s, Leftist and popular movements eventually emerged in the Andean zones, but they were devastated by political violence. In places like Puno and Cusco, Leftist coalitions such as the United Left Front attempted to bring together various pro-poor forces in the 1970s and 1980s. Attacks from local elites in provincial centres weakened them, and defections to the national Centre-Left APRA party depleted their leadership. Eventually, the political forces that had begun to take shape during the 1980s were caught between radical Left guerrilla movements and an increasingly authoritarian state. The guerrillas attacked them for presenting an electoral alternative, and the state turned to traditional repressive mechanisms such as civil defence patrols and military abuses.

Political society all but disappeared from rural Peru during the 1990s. Fujimori defeated the guerrillas and inflation, and he seized carte blanche to govern the country. To consolidate autonomous control, he closed parliament, persecuted political parties, and staged populist theatre and distribution to create a direct link between the presidency and a base of support (Levitsky 1999; Roberts 1995). He governed until 2000, when his increasingly rigid and exclusionary regime eventually collapsed under the weight of corruption, political opposition, and economic stagnation. Fujimori fled to Japan, and he left behind a political elite and civil society that was fragmented and weak.

New democratic impulses were released by the movement to remove Fujimori, and attention has slowly been turned to local level institutions. Under great expectations and uncertainty, the process of decentralisation in Peru is only just beginning. The system of subnational government includes 24 regions, and each is subdivided into numerous provinces. Provinces include various districts, with one district serving as the head of the province. Though the provinces and districts have held elections for the past 20 years, regions are only just now renewing direct elections. Since 1990, regional authorities had been appointed by the central government and operated essentially as deconcentrated administrators for central bureaucracy.

The 2002 elections themselves were held before the assignment of power and resources to local governments had been fully decided, and the law regulating regional presidents and councils was passed only days before the elections were held.

Below the regional level, Peru's government structure includes a number of provinces. The structure of province governance is loosely comparable to a hub and spokes in which district heads are surrounded by several municipalities. The municipalities are generally rural and contain populations that range from a few hundred to several thousand. The district head is usually a slightly more urban centre which enjoys a larger budget, some additional responsibilities, and a mayor elected with votes from all communities in the district. Electoral rules for legislative bodies at both the municipal and district level guarantee the party of the mayor an automatic majority. Opposition parties are guaranteed a minority presence. Despite representing the entire province, district mayors often spend their entire budget in the district head, and dispersed rural communities secure resources only by promising votes and obedience in the future.

In terms of revenues, the only reliable autonomous funding at the local level is through central government revenue sharing and taxes on buildings, services, circulation, beer and tolls. Realistically, municipal administrations have extremely poor capacity to collect taxes and largely depend on negotiated
(and politically-distributed) transfers from districts, regions, and the national government. Local
governments control approximately 4 per cent of the national budget for 2004. Though they are scheduled
to increase that participation to 7 per cent in the next year and 12 per cent by 2006, few are hopeful that
such increases will materialise. To achieve the targeted percentages, the central government transfers a
block grant (labelled FONCOMUN) totalling two per cent of sales taxes. This is distributed according to
number of electors. In addition, earmarked grants are transferred for infrastructure projects implemented
at the local level (FONCODES) and social programs (PRONA).

Earmarked transfers are implemented on behalf of central ministries, and they are the currency of
vertical political relations even today. In the past, these were treated as patronage resources handed only to
obedient municipalities by the Ministry of the Presidency. Fujimori obtained maximum leverage during his
regime by visiting tiny municipalities when projects were being implemented. Now, the social programmes
have been grouped into development programmes managed by the Ministry of Women and Social
Programmes, and political dynamics to securing transfers are not quite so explicit. Bureaucratic rules set
the requirements for municipalities to qualify to receive funds. On the other hand, political networks
creep back into the equation as the requirements of qualification remain unclear; most rural municipalities
lack the administrative capacity to fulfil requirements; and frequent ministerial changes have limited the
decentralisation process to a sporadic advance.

In response, local units are attempting to develop newly discovered, autonomous political muscle. Family and social networks of migrants that have left the countryside and come to Lima and maintain
links to the countryside provide an important constituency that pressures urban elites, bureaucrats, and
representatives to favour their rural home municipalities. In addition, electoral laws shifted the national
legislature from a single, national district to 2/3 regional districts and 1/3 from Lima. As a result,
numerous ex-mayors from rural districts have now risen to national legislative prominence. These political
realities help mayors from the local level to pressure for their share of transfers, but pressure remains
informal and poorly regulated by bureaucratic rules or technical standards.

The lack of formal mechanisms of political articulation from the local to the national level and the
lack of capacity at the local level makes it relatively easy for jealous actors at the centre to delay or obstruct
the transfer of resources and responsibilities. In particular, the political capacity to overcome exclusion is
limited for rural jurisdictions and the people of the Andean highlands. Poverty, exclusion and national
neglect have a long history, and the experience of the 1980s and 1990s created an institutional vacuum in
the countryside that was like few other periods of Peruvian history. State and civil society had developed
only destructive capacity to find and attack opposition, demobilise social movements, and distribute

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Several mayors complained about the size of their transfer. The number of electors, they claimed was often
distorted by fraud, and certainly inaccurate as a result of high levels of migration. In particular, more urban
municipalities faced high levels of in-migration that were not counted in distributing transfers.

They have to qualify to receive the funds on the basis of capacity and training. Of 498 applications to obtain
the guaranteed funds, 241 were processed in 2003. At regional level, 67 were approved out of 198 applications.
Useful comments were provided by Martin Soto, an ex-advisor to the Decentralisation Committee and
currently a technocrat in the Women’s and Development Ministry.

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meaningless patronage. The degree of apathy, fear, and distrust among the population was severe. The only viable institutions were those that reasserted clientelism, and traditional authorities were quick to fill the political vacuum.

In several of the communities where El Gol operated, these political realities were directly felt. In Haquira in Apurímac, Sendero Luminoso guerrillas killed two municipal workers in 1995. In Puno, government-organised civil defence patrols were associated with numerous violations of human rights, and one documented atrocity in which a young woman was raped. Organised civil society was seriously damaged.

In most areas, clientelism is the only governance institution that operates. Resource scarcity, cultural exclusion, and weak formal political institutions characterise most districts. Traditional authorities maintain patron-client networks that resolve these problems while perpetuating inequality and the status quo.

There were, of course, select individuals or organisations that surpassed these conditions. They generally mobilised neighbourhoods, communal associations, women's and peasant organisations, and the residue of Left party organisation. Still, such organisations were poorly linked across jurisdictions, and many rural communities lost their most dynamic members to migration to cities.

The most successful alternative movements have been those that attempt to introduce pro-poor and rights-based approaches to governance offering pro-poor policies to address the needs of the poor majority. Rights-based approaches privilege the participation of the poor, prevent the intrusion of traditional patrons, and secure the support of external allies, especially activist civil society, such as NGOs, organised sectors, and the international community.

**El Gol approaches and entry-points**

El Gol electoral assistance operated in the ten-month period that led up to and followed the 2002 local and regional elections. The basic poverty, weakness of institutions and fragile civil society that characterised rural Peru meant that it was impossible to limit assistance to traditional election monitoring, observation and civic education. Prior experience with electoral assistance in Peru and collaborative discussions with local partners encouraged a more ambitious approach (see Table 1). Most of the incidence occurred at the local level, but additional interventions occurred for the regions. Also, both local and regional interventions included national lobbying to influence the institutional framework that governed the subnational level so as to shift more resources and responsibilities to local governments while institutionalising participatory planning institutions. The interventions promoted pro-poor policies through rights-based approaches, and were made in the five Andean regions, Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Puno.

There are multiple ways in which to categorise El Gol activities. The partners contracted to design and carry out projects included efforts at provincial and district level, interventions in public opinion and the media, and pressure for national legislation. The organisations were: Asociación SER y Vicarías de Ayaviri, Juli y Sicuani; Colectivo Ayacucho (IPAZ, CEPRODEP, CEDAP, CCC-UNCCH, Defensoría del
Pueblo, FEDECMA, SER, Solidaridad); Centro Bartolome de las Casas, ADEAS Quillana y CADEP José María Arguedas; Comité Multisectorial de Quispicanchi: Parroquia Santiago Apostol de Urcos; Asociacion de Comunicadores Sociales Calandria; TV Cultura; APRODEH. The following tables borrow from the original evaluation document from the project to describe the activities and geographic scope of the El Gol partners (Romero 2003).

Table 1 El Gol partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SER</td>
<td>Strengthen links between state and society and participation in general.</td>
<td>Puno, Cusco, Huancavelica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicars of the Southern Andes SEPAR, SISAY y CITAQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bartolome de las Casas Centre ADEAS Quillana CADEP</td>
<td>Strengthen civil society, leaders, candidates, and elected authority.</td>
<td>Apurimac (Grau and Cotabambas province), Cusco (Chumbivilcas province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho Collective (IPAZ, CEDAP, CEPRODEP, CCC-UNCCH, Defensoría del Pueblo, FEDECMA, SER, Solidaridad)</td>
<td>Build civil society and candidate capacity for local governance.</td>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Defender</td>
<td>Monitor and regulate free and fair elections with particular attention to the rights of the subordinate groups.</td>
<td>Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, Puno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multisectoral Committee of Quispicanchi (Urcos Parish)</td>
<td>Strengthen citizenship through training in rights and consultative planning committees.</td>
<td>Cusco, Quispicanchi province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RED Peru</td>
<td>Strengthen citizen oversight, improve governance capacity through participatory planning, lobby central government for national legislation on local government.</td>
<td>Apurimac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Cultura</td>
<td>Strengthen civil society capacity through television campaigns.</td>
<td>Cusco, Puno, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurimac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calandria Association of Social Communicators</td>
<td>Strengthen media capacity to evaluate government and promote accountability. Support national legislation on local government.</td>
<td>Cusco, Puno, Ayacucho, Huancavelica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRODEH</td>
<td>Study perceptions of rights among citizens.</td>
<td>Ayacucho, Cusco Huancavelica, Amazonas, Junín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER Association</td>
<td>Study perceptions and behaviour of local elites.</td>
<td>Ayacucho y Cusco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAZ</td>
<td>Electoral ethnography on candidate perceptions of local and regional government.</td>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONPE</td>
<td>Essay competition on promoting rural political participation.</td>
<td>National</td>
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</table>
The following sections examine the impact of El Gol at the different levels of subnational government. It would be impossible to expect a relatively short-term and recent electoral assistance programme to completely transform clientelism. Still, the report attempts to describe those changes that occurred in the context of a rights based approach to development.

**El Gol impact: regions**

The story of new democratic authority in the regions is a story of struggle for rights and pro-poor policies. This struggle is shaped by the nature of local authority and the reality of social forces on the ground, in which El Gol played a small, but important role.

**Developing regional participatory institutions**

Elections occurred simultaneously for district, province, and regional authorities in 2002. The shorter history of democratic practice at the regional level meant that elections to regional authorities did not lead to a flowering of local and popular demands and organisation. Instead, traditional elites entered as democratic competitors and have largely reasserted their authority. Regional elections were won by established national organisations that formed alliances with local elites; APRA won twelve regions, and a coalition of Centrist interests, Somos Peru, won another seven. A few innovative and alternative candidates emerged, such as the president elected in Chiclayo, who had been a Leftist leader persecuted under the Fujimori regime.

In general, the operation of parties at the regional level is particularly weak. National parties identify candidates by looking for local notables, especially those who are easily purchased with resources from central ministries. In turn, regional elites build support by peppering the local level with projects in exchange for support from local leaders. Rarely are regional-local alliances formed before elections, nor are they based on anything like ideology or a developmental plan for the region.

In general, civil society at the regional level is too weak to oppose these practices. Voters emerging from a decade of weak parties, political violence, and little memory of regional authority elections were understandably unconnected to new regional governments. Programmatic messages had little resonance, and traditional elites could mobilise shallow appeals to win most of the regional presidencies in 2002. Local elites in Puno, for example, articulated historical animosities to central dominance and built an electoral victory out of the strategic application of public resources to reward supporters and punish enemies around a Puneno identity movement (Diez Flurtado 2003: 84–6).

The struggle at regional level in Puno is a microcosm of the rest of Peru’s regions. Notable families had long ago migrated to coastal and urban centres, pushed out during the 1970s land reforms and the politically violent 1980s and 1990s. Behind them, they left intermediate elites, owners of medium sized properties and the occupants of upper middle class, bureaucratic and commercial positions. Middle

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6 Interview with Congressman Walter Alejos, member of the Committee on Regionalization and Decentralization.
sectors eventually built their own networks that dominated regional politics, generated leaders, formed alliances, and distributed patronage. By and large, these newly dominant classes bridged urban and familial networks, opening slightly from the white-only dominance that existed earlier but still far from including the indigenous peasants that occupy the rural highlands.

Subordinate sectors in Puno are slowly developing new avenues of social mobility, and they draw representatives from educated peasants and a loose gathering of NGO, university, neighbourhood, work, and Church networks. They have been able to build pro-poor movements that gained footholds at the province and district level, but they have failed to break through to the regions. At regional level, pro-poor movements have few allies.

Still, a legal loophole creates room for opposition movements to attack corrupt administrators. After the first year in office, legal rules allow a recall vote on authorities, and many opposition movements are taking advantage of the opportunity to attempt to unseat traditional elites. The confrontations were just taking shape in early 2004, but it appeared that several provincial presidents, including the president of Puno, faced real challenges. For the time being, it is unlikely that such movements will significantly change provincial authority, especially because the replacements would be drawn from the same middle sector family elites. Still, this represents an attempt to attack patrons operating through traditional clientelist practices.

A more surreptitious attempt to shift the structure of power at regional level in Puno may rest in the Concertation Board. The Board is a representative body of 73 members, including provincial mayors, NGOs and Church authorities. These actors have used the Board to influence development plans for the region, in particular to pressure the regional government in the use of its substantial inter-province development budget (Diez Hurtado 2003: 74). Like other instances of semi-direct participation, the Board supports privileged access for entities representing subordinate groups.

In particular, newly-elected province mayors have been using the Board to expose and transform traditional clientelist practices of the regional president. Large intra-district infrastructure projects, partly financed by the region, are important sources of jobs and patronage, as well as regional development. Also, emergency funds for natural disasters are usually channelled through regional governments before reaching the local level. Regional governments traditionally use them to favour obedient provincial mayors. Through the Board, provincial mayors have pressured to receive compensation for dislocations caused by large projects, such as the Trans-Oceanic Highway, and to oversee the distribution of emergency funds. The mayors have used the funds they secure to target rural and poor districts of their provinces. In essence, they have seized control of traditional patronage funds and redirected them to their own priorities.

Creating a national framework for regional governance

El Gol has contributed to these efforts to widen access at the regional level and strengthen the voice of pro-poor mayors in bodies like the Concertation Board. Partners within the El Gol Project, SER and the Church-based NGOs, worked with pro-poor mayors in Puno and sponsored formal associations of
mayors (RED Perú, REMURPE) that operated at regional and national level. RED Perú held regional meetings of mayors in Puno and Apurimac that attracted 22 representatives of rural municipalities. These meetings were articulated upwards to a national meeting of rural mayors that took place in Lima with representatives of 83 municipalities from several regions. In the absence of national parties that bring local mayors together, such associations are probably the only way in which they can coordinate to influence higher level bodies such as the Puno Concertation Board.

The Concertation Board emerged early in Puno and the Paniagua provisional government that followed Fujimori established a Board to coordinate poverty efforts in each region. Prior to the 2002 elections, El Gol partners worked to shape the national legislation that would regulate these regional boards. As a body that offers preferential access to civil society actors, the Boards potentially created a counterweight to the traditional elites dominant at the regional level. In Lima, El Gol partners worked to introduce legislation that would require all regions to constitute a similar, consultative body with preferential access for representatives of subordinate groups. The Organic Law of Regions that was undergoing discussion in the national legislature offered a convenient opportunity. This law established elections, fiscal power, and planning responsibilities for regional authorities, and stipulated increased revenue sharing and authority for regions as competences for additional policy areas were transferred.

El Gol partners, particularly Calandria, REMURPE and RED Perú, worked to shape the Regional Organic Law. They sought contacts with legislative assistants who were active in the committees that were considering the law. Most were extremely satisfied with the technical competence with which the law was discussed, and El Gol lobbying was considered an important part of sustaining the technical rigor. The law also included a caveat to strengthen political coordination across regions that requires that parties have at least 50 activists in 70 per cent of the provinces or 2/3 of the regions.

The impact of El Gol partners was most evident in the requirements for a consultative body that would include representatives of civil society, the Regional Coordinating Councils (CCR). Like the Concertation Board in Puno, the CCR would include representatives of regional government, local government, and civil society. In particular, civil society was to include registered entities that numbered at least 40 per cent of the membership. The bodies would operate by consensus, and they would be able to approve and monitor fiscal and development plans for the regions.

In sum, El Gol assistance involved bottom-up efforts to strengthen institutions and society at the regional level. Also, partners worked at the centre to build a legal framework for the periphery.

**El Gol impact: local level**

As in the regions, El Gol assistance at the local level included bottom-up and centre-periphery elements. At local level, El Gol partners worked with officials, candidates, civil society actors, and journalists. In
Lima, El Gol partners helped shape the institutional framework that governed municipalities. The backdrop to these national and local efforts was the movements and efforts that were already underway on the ground.

**Forging intra-local alliances and cooperation**

An intriguing movement is underway to strengthen local administrative capacity. Several local mayors found that alone they lacked the resources and expertise to tackle complicated administrative tasks. Instead, they sought mechanisms to join administrative forces and resources. Several factors made such cooperation more likely.

In Huancavelica and Cusco regions, municipalities are joined by topographical coincidence. They have to overcome multiple factors that militate against cooperation, such as differing regional authorities, altitudes at or above 3,000 meters, high rates of poverty, and dispersed populations. Still, several municipalities found themselves linked by geography, specifically a river that began in snow-topped peaks and sliced through each province. This shared river resource gave them an automatic mechanism to coordinate and cooperate. Downstream municipalities tended to enjoy slightly better land and conditions, but they depended on upstream municipalities to not overuse the river for irrigation or pollute the waters. The mayors of the different municipalities sought coordinating mechanisms to govern river water, and this cooperation spilled over into shared administrative capacity to pursue inter-jurisdiction infrastructure such as roads. One example was the San Antonio River Association (AMSAT) and another was growing around the River Cusco. Other organisations that operate around shared topographic or geographic characteristics are ANMIN (Association of Municipalities Affected by Mining) and an association of coastal municipalities that replaces an organisation Fujimori eliminated during his regime.

An additional input to collaboration among local units was the political leadership provided by individual mayors. This leadership was partly charismatic, as it was clear that certain mayors enjoyed the respect of their fellows. In general, such mayors had a political history, and they had attained office in the provincial head. For example, Michel Portier, mayor of Macusani, provincial head of Carabaya in Puno, was a Frenchman, naturalised Peruvian, who had spent years working with the pro-poor Catholic Church and running a radio show in the highlands. His following was related to the notoriety he commanded as a result of radio fame, and his outsider status and years of experience in pro-poor movements gave him legitimacy in the eyes of voters sick of corrupt patrons linked to the Fujimori regime.

Portier, like other savvy district leaders, did not rest only on the appeal of charisma. He used his slightly larger district budget to purchase support among the mayors in the districts that fell within Carabaya province. He promised to share 100,000 soles with each of the mayors that agreed to implement a participatory decision-making process in their districts, and he sent a technical advisor from his staff to

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8 The Mayor of Anta explained the role of water in driving cooperation, “The river is our life. It provides water to irrigate, drink, and build. But it comes from uphill polluted, and we pass it along even more polluted. To clean will cost $500,000, which is beyond what any of us alone could afford.”
help put the process in place. He is also using his administrative staff to assist district-member municipalities to meet the qualification requirements for receiving transfers of social programmes from the central government.

Portier also cooperated with six other districts to lobby for preferential treatment with respect to electric power. The San Gaban dam, which provides power for much of the region, is located in neighbouring Ollachea, and Portier and other neighbouring districts collaborated to pressure national and regional government for compensation based on their contribution to the national power grid. Each district received a small sum, and the collaboration has continued.

One output of the collaboration has been an effort to obtain emergency funds for natural disasters that had struck the region. The funds were transferred from the centre to the region, but appeared to get stalled in regional government channels. Portier and his allies argued, successfully, that an investigation was necessary and both the regional and the national legislatures undertook investigations of the misuse of these emergency funds.

Creating a national framework for local governance

The El Gol project shaped the possibility for these kinds of inter-jurisdiction collaboration in its Lima-based work. As in the case of the regions, an Organic Law of the Municipalities was under discussion in the national legislature. Though the Local Government Committee that reported the law included several ex-mayors, they were not necessarily favourable to pro-poor movements at the local level. They were, however, open to pressure from public opinion.

El Gol partners sought alliances with actors in Congress and other civil society organisations. Key activists, such as ex-politicians with access to colleagues, mobilised their networks, and skilled technocrats facilitated passage. To secure multiparty support, they bargained support for the Regional Organic Law, in which one party held a particular interest, in exchange for special attention to rural areas in the Municipality Law, in which another party had an interest. The political dynamics of regional-local decisions were shaped in part by the fact that the president’s own party, Peru Posible, had won only one regional presidency but had important local support. El Gol partners entered the fray by tying the laws rhetorically to the overall process of democratisation. They framed decentralisation as an aspect of democratisation, making it extremely difficult for legislators, many of whom had suffered under authoritarianism, to oppose. When debate in the committees would stall, the NGO activists with links to the media would publicise the issue of rural municipalities and bring the debate back to public attention.

Though the immediate local efforts did not explicitly encourage inter-municipal cooperation, the actual work of partners made such cooperation likely. Partners often treated districts within a province as units and built cooperation in collaborative training and assistance. Also, they worked explicitly to offer resources and facilities to one inter-district association, AMSAT, whose leader had been the mayor of Haquira and worked closely with El Gol partners.

Much of this discussion comes from interviews with participants in the lobbying efforts, including Julio Díaz Palacios (ex-Mayor, ex-Congressman, current activist in Network of Local Agenda, the Network of Peruvian Local Development, and the Ecological Movement).
These techniques and strategies made it possible to shape some of the provisions in the law. In particular, El Gol partners sought special provisions in the law that would support a development role for government at the local level. Most municipalities were primarily service providers that did little more than wedding certificates and garbage collection. In rural areas particularly, additional attention was needed for issues such as employment and growth. Several decrees modified the law to give special preference to rural areas through more flexible administrative arrangements, a link between mining taxes and rural municipality revenues, and a development plan specifically for rural municipalities.

The flexibility in administration may prove to be key in encouraging the cross-jurisdictional alliances mentioned above. The law allows municipalities to join their administrations for development programmes, and in particular, they will be able to collaborate in seeking the technical capacity required to receive the transfers of funds and responsibilities of social programmes from the Ministry of Women and Social Programmes.

An additional stipulation of the Organic Laws was a permanent call for popular participation through Local Coordination Councils (CCL). Like the regional CCR, the CCL includes mayors of the districts, council-people, and 40 per cent civil society representation. The CCL operate through consensus and produce a development plan and a participatory budget that are communicated to the municipal council.

This participatory mechanism was a hard-fought advance that had to be inserted after the law had left committee. It took explicit bargaining to introduce, and the president exerted his own pressure by refusing to sign the law until amendments had addressed 33 executive observations related to participation and other details. The results of the bargaining lead some observers to consider the municipal law more technically watered-down than the regional law. Still, for politicians and activists convinced of the efficacy of civil society participation, the Organic Law of Municipalities was an important step forward.

The Lima debate over the participatory institutions made one aspect of participation clear – its appeal to urban and middle classes. The appeal for the rural poor was also evident, and will be covered below. For actors within the Lima-based (and regional capital) NGOs and their international donors, participatory decision-making was ideologically consistent with rights-based approaches.

By making participation a central plank in the national legislation and local government, El Gol partners (many of whom were drawn from middle class, urban NGOs) created an explicit link between sectors of the urban middle class and their rural, poor counterparts. National legislators perceived this link. Congressman Ernesto Herrera had been a mayor and he recognised the utility of using participation to build cross-class and cross-regional coalitions, ‘Participation encourages public-mindedness among the citizens. Those with some wealth can see what the poor want, and they can accept dividing the resources because decisions are made openly and in a participatory way’. For urban middle-classes, participation increases confidence that local, rural institutions can be trusted with increased resources and power.

**Empowering local civil society**

In addition to the Lima work, a direct impact of El Gol was felt in the municipalities themselves. An important component of the project focused on civil society at the local level. Partners in Lima, regional
capitals, and rural districts designed projects to work directly with actors in civil society and the media. Calandria, a Lima-based NGO with significant experience in working with the media that supported journalists during the election campaign and distributed materials throughout the regions in local languages. Journalists received training in evaluating electoral promises and development plans; and, after the elections, they were trained to expose corruption. Most journalists were poor, with only basic education, in fact largely moonlighting as journalists. To gain access to radio, most had to pay for time and only those with support from NGOs or the Church could reasonably expect sustained radio time. There was a wide variety in capacity across the regions, partly varying within regions by proximity to regional capitals. Puno, Huancavelica and Cusco had a number of quality journalists; while particularly violent attacks had eliminated or intimidated the most capable media actors in places such as Ayacucho. In a few cases, journalists used the media to gather a following and later pursue public office.

In the regions, local NGOs, associations and activists formed partnerships with Calandria and other El Gol actors to assist media effectiveness. ADEAS Qullana, CBC and CADEP worked in Chumbivilcas district of Cusco and Cotabambas, Grau and Canchis in Apurimac. These distant provinces were eight hours into the mountainous Andean region and were hit particularly hard by the violence of the 1990s. Activities in the provinces included training for local activists who then replicated the training in various communities. Discussions with the activists revealed a sincere dedication to community organising, though it was clear that the wages paid were only barely enough to preserve their interest.

Many of the activists were also radio personalities. Paulina had come from the small community of Colquemarca in Cusco. She explained that her biggest accomplishment had been convincing the parties not to put women at the lowest position on party ballots. She cajoled and exposed manoeuvres by the parties, and there are now women representatives on all the municipal councils. She explained her role as gadfly to the new government. ‘Some of the communities still operate with a blindfold. They sell their vote for one sol ... Some candidates made dumb proposals in the debates. One attacked the other candidates for being indigenous, and then made silly, unspecific proposals. The lack of parties confused voters, but I tried to explain who were the social candidates we could trust and who were the mistis who came from the city and would not keep their promises’.

The El Gol capacity-building efforts with civil society had created a web of journalists and community leaders who were eager to press a rights-based and pro-poor approach. Interestingly, this coincided with the efforts of local authorities who were seeking to embed their authority.

**Transforming local authorities**

In general, El Gol partners worked to encourage local authorities to pursue a rights-based and pro-poor approach to governance. The El Gol partners worked directly with candidates prior to the elections and with officials following the elections. In particular they attempted to alter local authority mentality through training and education campaigns, as well as create institutions and mechanisms of accountability that could operate at the local level.
The tasks were not easy, but El Gol partners could take advantage of local political realities. Mayors in districts and provinces have to balance their appeal to secure election. By including candidates for their ticket with different popular bases, candidates could enhance their vote. Thus, for the rurally based mayor of Anta province, it made sense for him to include council-member candidates from the urban centre where his support was weaker. Similarly, the urban-based mayor from Ollachea district included a council-member from the rural community of Azaroma. These electoral realities created opportunities for El Gol partners to pressure and encourage the inclusion of candidates from traditionally marginalised, poor communities. Another electoral reality that El Gol could exploit was the requirement that party lists include women. El Gol trained women candidates and civil society activists to demand that women appear high on party lists, as opposed to at the bottom.

El Gol programmes were unlikely to change long-standing corrupt practices, but several institutional innovations may lead to improvements. Partners worked with candidates and officials prior to the elections to encourage movement away from traditionally corrupt campaign practices. Workshops with candidates in Huancavelica, Puno, Ayacucho and Cusco trained candidates in making programmatic appeals during election campaigns. In addition, candidates were invited to public debates in the town centre, and candidates were asked to prepare a platform and sign a governance agreement. In Cotabambas and Chumbivilcas provinces in Cusco, over 40 community meetings introduced proposals to candidate planning platforms and were then incorporated into budgets once candidates were elected.

In addition to liaising with candidates during the campaigns, El Gol partners worked with the elected officials once in office. Officials were trained in participatory budgeting, including 11 provinces in Cusco and over 275 participants in Ayacucho, where partners supported officials in the skills required. In Quispicanchi, Cusco, citizens were organised into vigilance committees to oversee project implementation by newly elected authorities.

The political and fiscal impact of these practices can be seen in Carabaya province in Puno. Elected officials sought El Gol partner assistance (particularly SER) to assist in designing a new allocation of resources for their first year in office. Open town meetings were held, and the allocations that the outgoing mayor had left were re-examined and readjusted to better meet citizen demands. Instead of spending on visible, urban projects, like repaving the plaza, the mayor preferred to direct resources to social programmes and rural communities. He held participatory meetings to discuss and reformulate the budget.

Interestingly, participation did not immediately redirect resources the way officials had planned. The allocation that had absorbed most of public spending was a coliseum for 8,000 people (in a town of 6,000). The participatory meeting managed to cut the stadium allocation somewhat, and the funds liberated were largely directed towards health and education. These were priorities of the province, but the reallocation included bulky investments (water tank for the hospital and computers for the schools) that may not have fit within the budget. It was clear to most observers that the redirection of resources was
significantly due to the skilful organisation and dominant oratory of the teachers association and the professional medical staff. They enjoyed prestige in the community, especially in the urban sector, and they could sway the participatory debate.

As a result, for the following year, El Gol partners worked with the mayor to reorganise budgeting to weaken organised interests in the district head. For 2004, 40 per cent of the budget was allocated to the rural districts, half to provincial head priorities, and 10 per cent to inter-district projects. In each rural community, meetings determined the allocation of the territorial funds. Organised sectors like the teachers association protested, but they found that their support in the provincial head had been greatly decreased.

By 2004, the budget was completely different than that inherited in 2002. In the first year, the participatory budget process had shifted priorities away from the traditional clientelist projects left by the outgoing administration; in the next year, the administration took on a different opposition, the urban professionals. By reorganising budget institutions, the administration imposed a new set of pro-poor priorities in the budget as well as building a rural support base that could counter-balance organised interests.

The keys to this switch were institutional rules that secured elite compliance while at the same time guaranteeing entitlements to poor citizens. A similar pattern emerged in Santo Tomas district in Cusco. In the past, local elites had been afraid to invest because the town was constantly torn by violence between urban and rural elites. Now, participatory planning offered a way to settle differences. The priorities that emerged avoided conflict between different elite interests and also included a pro-poor distribution as a result of a formula for project allocation. Projects received more resources if they (1) created work, (2) reached many beneficiaries, and (3) reached places where public works did not already exist. The result was that public investment targeted poor neighbourhoods and rural communities without creating additional conflict among the elite.

In sum, El Gol interventions at the local level included centre-periphery efforts to reform the national legal framework for local government. It also included bottom-up efforts create competent civil society voices in the media and rights-based and pro-poor local government authorities.

**Comparing El Gol and non-El Gol districts**

After several visits to municipalities, interviewing El Gol partners, and discussions with officials, we decided to run an experiment to evaluate the El Gol programme and the nature of political development in the municipalities. Our experiment compared El Gol and non-El Gol districts. Obviously, the experiment did not occur in a controlled environment, and it is difficult to determine what responses truly mean, especially for an outsider that speaks only Spanish, not the indigenous languages (mostly Quechua) spoken by some of the poorest members of the communities visited. In addition, one cannot be sure whether El Gol caused, or encouraged, changing political patterns, or whether the communities and El Gol partners self-selected each other based on prior links. Still, interesting trends were evident. Authorities
were conscious of the utility of participation as a mechanism to organise and incorporate supporters and they were also keenly aware of the necessity of structuring participation to manage demands in ways that directed resources to the poorest citizens.

Four communities were chosen on the basis of discussions with El Gol partners. Two districts near Cusco (Anta, Tambobamba) and two districts in Puno (Macusani, Ollachea) were selected. The districts shared basic economic and demographic characteristics and all were located in the Andean highlands where poverty is acute and political violence directly experienced. In each region, there was one district that had participated in El Gol (Tambobamba and Macusani) and one province that had not (Anta and Ollachea). The design allows us to control as many similarities as possible while attempting to measure the impact of El Gol.

Table 2 District demographics (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population estimate 2002 (number)</th>
<th>Lack basic needs</th>
<th>Illiterate rate over 15</th>
<th>Lack sewerage</th>
<th>Malnourished, 1st year of school</th>
<th>Agriculture work</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anta</td>
<td>20153</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambobamba</td>
<td>12809</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macusani</td>
<td>11434</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ollachea</td>
<td>3936</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Banco de Informacion Distrital (2004).*

Anta was the most urbanised of the provinces visited, and it showed all the signs of a small town that was rapidly growing. It is 30 minutes from Cusco, connected by a paved highway and strong links. Many people work in Cusco and return to Anta where there is a bustling commercial centre. Despite this urban head, the population remains largely rural, and even those living in the centre retain land or conduct seasonal work in rural areas. There are nine districts and the Cusco River provides the main source of irrigation. Most land is held in small plots and production is for subsistence, though some production for Cusco markets occurs.

By contrast, Tambobamba is a relatively urban centre located several hours from Cusco by difficult roads over mountainous terrain. The province is officially in Apurimac province, though it is better connected to Cusco. The districts in the province are located at varying altitudes, with some as high as 4,000 meters and none lower than 2,500. Farmers at the higher altitudes face extremely harsh conditions where only subsistence and simple livestock are possible. In the valleys, more extensive herding and irrigation are possible, though not widely spread.
Reproduced by kind permission of Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Informatica (www.inei.gob.pe).
Macusani lies in the northeastern portion of Puno, just in the shadows of the snow-topped peak of Allun Capac. The land is rocky and the climate harsh, and most of the rural communities are dedicated to subsistence farming and livestock. Some of the more distant districts lie in the fertile jungle that begins as soon as the altitude begins to drop, but these are sparsely populated and poorly connected. Mining companies are increasingly interested in some of these zones where precious metals are thought to lie.

Map 4 Macusani

Reproduced by kind permission of Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Informatica (www.inei.gob.pe).

Ollachea lies just beyond Macusani on the trans-oceanic highway that links Peru and Brazil. Unlike the other districts, Ollachea is not a district head, and its population is significantly smaller. Most of the population live in the rocky hills above the town, and the distinctive characteristic of Ollachea is the San Gaban river that slices through the hills to create the steep slopes that nestle the small urban concentration. The frequent rumbling of trucks rattles the settlement, and a commercial life has sprung around services for the passing truckers. The major source of dynamism (and destruction) is the huge hydroelectric plant that lies a few kilometres below the town. Construction of the plant involved 3,000 workers, who descended on the town from 1998 until 2000. A commercial boom ensued, but so did violence, inflation, prostitution, and a host of social problems associated with abandoned children and mothers. The dam is currently self-contained and interacts little with the community, even supplying food for its kitchen from distant markets. The town is currently engaged in a lawsuit that seeks property tax from the company that runs the plant. If successful, the suit would secure four times the annual budget.
The plant has clearly shattered the community, and it is doubtful that local authorities could resist if the plant owners decided to increase their political activism. Some evidence of future possibilities was evident in the behaviour of the outgoing mayor. Just after losing the election, he repealed the property tax and settled for a truck instead. When the new mayor announced a lawsuit to secure back taxes, the company reneged on the truck.

Map 5 Ollachea

Reproduced by kind permission of Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Informatica (www.inei.gob.pe).

These details should make it clear that all provinces in Peru have qualitative specificities that make them unique. The basic similarities they share are rural and poor with weak formal institutions and civil societies decimated by violence. These basic similarities are borne out in the socio-demographic details included below. Macusani was slightly more urbanised than the other districts, and Ollachea significantly smaller in population, but the basic poverty of rural highlands life are clear from the statistics.

Respondents in each district included mayors and members of the city council; and in one district, members of the executive bureaucracy participated. The total number of respondents was 45, and all districts had at least 10 respondents. In each district, we read a series of paired comparisons, and those
present were asked to vote which of the two priorities they preferred. The paired comparisons included four options (jobs, product prices and infrastructure, basic services, and participatory planning). There were six pairs (jobs-prices, jobs-services, etc). 11

We selected these items to trigger certain kinds of cleavage within the districts. ‘Jobs’ reflected the real need for immediate material benefits. ‘Prices’ reflected the needs of poor, rural producers for longer-term material benefits. ‘Services’ were required by all citizens, but one might expect them to be especially appreciated in the long-term by urban sectors. ‘Participation’ reflected a rights-based approach to development. Obviously, the indicators offer only loose measures of the underlying concepts, but the experiment required surprisingly little explanation. The respondents quickly grasped what they were being asked to compare, and it was evident from their comments afterwards that they were making urban-rural, short-long term, and participation-material comparisons in considering their answers.

The process was explained at the outset, and respondents were presented the paired comparisons with as little definition of the priorities as possible. Explanations of the priorities were offered when asked, and some respondents attempted to provide their own definitions either during or after the vote. Respondents were asked to vote, explain their vote, and then vote again. A discussion followed.

Section 4: Findings

Some real changes are occurring at the local and regional level in Peru. The following paragraphs describe findings from each level of the study, with particular attention to advances and remaining concerns. The section begins with observations drawn from the district experiment.

Comparing El Gol and non-El Gol districts: findings

Several basic trends were evident in the voting and discussion of the experiment. Generally, the second vote intensified the preferences from the first vote; those who held dissenting opinions were cajoled or convinced that they should switch. Also, political dynamics and cleavages were made clear. Most communities are split between several elite factions. The electoral system gave the mayor an automatic majority in the town council, and those in the governing coalition generally looked to the mayor before deciding what they would vote. The opposition generally included at least one member of the local elite linked to the departed Fujimori regime.

The results reported in Table 3 indicate the average of the two votes. The quantitative rankings of priorities offer an indication of the difference between El Gol districts and non-El Gol districts. Respondents in El Gol provinces appeared to favour long-term, rural and participation priorities. Respondents in non-El Gol provinces appeared to favour short-term, urban and material projects.

Before turning to the qualitative comments that enlivened and deepened the experiment, it is useful to note the degrees and kinds of differences between El Gol and non-El Gol districts. The clearest distinction was in participation, which the respondents from El Gol districts showed a clear preference for

11 Details on the methodology can be found in Appendix 1.
(76 per cent) and they almost doubled the preference for participation in the non-El Gol districts (39 per cent). Long-term projects were also preferred in the El Gol districts (64 per cent) though the preference was not so intense and the difference with non-El Gol districts not as significant (44 per cent). Finally, urban preferences were slightly more prevalent in the El Gol districts, though opinions were virtually split (56 per cent) and the difference may not be large enough to determine a difference from the non-El Gol districts (45 per cent).

**Table 3 Percent support for priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>El Gol districts (Carabaya, Tambobamba)</th>
<th>Non-El Gol districts (Anta, Ollachea)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-term more important than short-term</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban more important than rural</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation more important than material</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents (2 rounds of voting)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is difficult to interpret a blunt instrument like this experiment when the task is to measure complex preferences of district authorities. One interpretation that has to be considered is that El Gol districts had learned to say what they think external observers like to hear, ‘Participation is a fundamental right … Through participation we think about long-term, development priorities’ etc. Contradictions and clarifications that emerged in qualitative comments suggest that this is partly what was occurring; elected officials are savvy communicators, especially when they know that people with links to international donors are in the room. Still, the quantitative results at least suggest that El Gol districts differ from districts where El Gol projects did not operate. More ambitiously, it appears that El Gol local authorities were convinced of the potential of participation to open space for citizen rights while at the same time structuring decisions to achieve pro-poor policies. The qualitative comments that followed the votes offered an even more clear indication.

In El Gol districts, there was a clear understanding of the role of participation in articulating rights and biasing outcomes towards pro-poor policies. The mayor in Macusani was explicit in linking participation to rights and pro-poor policy.

Mayors used to budget as they wished. They did not tell anyone about the works, the salaries, or the costs of anything … The result was that all the projects went to the urban centre … Now, the motivation and the point of participation is to send money to the poor rural communities.

The mayor from Tambobamba echoed the pro-poor potential of participatory planning.

Before, you could pick up a rock and money from Fujimori would be underneath. The problem was that people did not choose the projects and help to build them. They may not have even addressed
people's real needs. After the project was done, it just sat there and deteriorated. Now, people believe in the projects and put in their own money and sweat to make sure that the projects are successful.

In Macusani, the mayor also exhibited a sophisticated understanding of participation and rights, though he was not idealistic about it.

Still, everyone is jumping at the chance to participate, and this can create problems, as there are too many pent-up demands to satisfy, especially for a poor municipality... The territorial division of participation here privileges the rural communities and makes it difficult for the traditional families and urban interests to dominate decisions.

The council members reinforced these impressions from the mayors. One woman council-member from Tambobamba explained the way in which participation had altered traditional clientelism to a more rights-based and pro-poor system.

Before, people who campaigned would give food, promise work, and spend money on beer and t-shirts. They even used municipal funds for this, and then they did not keep their promises... I won because I listened to their demands. The participatory planning lets people decide what works are coming and encourages them to make popular contributions. This is what it means to be a citizen—to participate, make demands, and take responsibility for the job.

Another Tambobamba councilperson described the potential political utility of participation.

Participation is popular because it is new. Also, it draws on a long history, in which the community provided work to build things like a temple during a faena. The key thing that participation does is build leaders. Women, in particular, are traditionally excluded. They can be encouraged to participate by involving them in the decisions that are meaningful: the glass of milk programme for kids, the women's committee for deciding on a community centre. Women need to be given the chance and training to develop as leaders. It used to be that being the leader of a community was a punishment or people voted for whoever gave them beer or food. Only the mistis or people with land participated. Now, everybody demands their rights.

In Macusani, the mayor recognised the importance of short-term work in helping citizens alleviate poverty, especially in vulnerable moments of emergency. Previously, such jobs had been a familiar instrument to reassert traditional clientelist relationships. He introduced a more rights-based and pro-poor element by using participation.

It used to be that you had to ask the mayor for a favour when your crops failed and he would give you a job. Me, I divide the jobs into one-month posts. Most of them are unskilled things like cleaning public spaces and such. I tell the Women's Neighbourhood Committee and the Association of
Mothers, “This is how many jobs there are, who needs them? They decide how to share the jobs, and they almost always share them equally and especially with the poorest women… Now, I can count on them whenever I need something in the community done.

Similarly, the mayor of Macusani recognised the utility of reaching out to other subgroups, such as un- or underemployed young men. To tie them into his network of supporters, the mayor provided traditional community police networks, rondas, with uniforms, lassos (the symbol of their authority) and the transportation for training they received in the regional capital. For community events, the rondas were given short-term jobs to maintain crowd security and order. In addition, one of the members of the provincial council elected on the mayor’s ticket had been in the rondas.

The non-El Gol provinces demonstrated several differences from the El Gol provinces. Some of these differences were evident in the quantitative data presented above. The qualitative comments that accompanied the experiment provide further detail. In Anta, there is a pro-poor mayor who pioneered participation in previous administrations of a smaller rural district in the same province, Limatambo. He was now mayor of the provincial head, but it was clear that rights-based and pro-poor practices were still elusive. One of those present explained in graphic detail.

For me personally, participatory planning is the most important thing we can do. Unfortunately, the average person here could not give a fart about participation. They want work, cement, and projects they can see and touch. The people do not care if a mayor is corrupt, dictatorial and atheist; they only care about work.

The notion of participation as a way to build political support did not appear to operate in the non-El Gol provinces. Political support was a purely short-term, material exchange. One councilperson explained the nature of his political links to citizens.

People ask me for two things in exchange for their vote: work and booze… I know that I have a responsibility to provide services, but it is much more important to give out jobs. When a drought or some crisis happens, people are starving. Work can mean the difference between life and death.

The mayor of Anta had implemented a participatory planning mechanism in his home district, and he intended to begin such an endeavour in the future. For the moment, he explained why participatory and long-term planning had not developed:

Our culture used to be rich in planning. Machu Picchu would not exist without serious planning and participation, nor the other wonders of the Incas. But the invaders came, they took the land, they gave it to the Spaniards and the misits. Authoritarian governments continued to the present day. Who can blame us for not trusting planning or investing in land and houses; we have no security! We are afraid to take those risks. They have tried to plan in the past, but it stays as ink on paper. There is no money behind it.
In Ollachea, the mayor was favourable to participation, but he was largely unconvinced that it was realistic in his province.

Participation is important, but we have no idea how to put it in place. We have six thousand people in our town, most are close to extreme poverty and many are single mothers with abandoned kids . . . They know nothing about participation. Really, for them, participation is just extra.

At the insistence of the mayor of Macusani, Ollachea had attempted some open meetings to discuss priorities. The meetings were not understood as part of enhancing rights, however, and there was little pro-poor about the outcome. In addition, little effort was made to reach groups that were traditionally excluded.

The good thing about participation is that people cannot blame the city council after making decisions. People chose the projects, so they cannot attack us if the projects do not work . . . We invite them to meetings in the town, and none of the people from the rural areas show up . . . Sometimes, they are not even told when the meetings occur . . . Only the organised people, like teachers, come. The other people who come look for work, and when there is none, they get angry with us. We lose credibility.

The city council came up with a development plan . . . We went to the participatory meetings, and the projects were approved. Then, all the money was gone, and there was nothing left to fund all the other demands people made . . . Everything was expected to fall on the municipality.

The mayor of Ollachea was sincere in looking for ways to improve participation, and he sensed the political utility of using participation to build a network of supporters. Yet, his idea of a network was much closer to a traditional clientelist exchange than a rights-based and pro-poor network, and he was clearly worried about losing political control over participatory spaces.

We want to pay people to participate and give them a lunch when they do. That would bring them into politics. If we tried to give everyone something, the province would be bankrupt.

The qualitative and quantitative responses from the provincial authorities suggest that much new was occurring in El Gol provinces, even as some things remained the same. To begin it should be clear that in both El Gol and non-El Gol provinces, clientelist practices continued to direct material benefits to particular groups in exchange for political support. Still, the degree of clientelism was different in El Gol provinces. Local authorities appeared to be conscious of participation as a rights-based approach to governance and a way of promoting pro-poor policy. Moreover, they displayed a sophisticated understanding of the way in which formal institutions of participation could be structured for maximum political effect. They structured participation to overcome opposition, target core supporters with benefits,
and distribute benefits to potential allies among the poor. This represents an important advance from traditional clientelist practices that continued in non-El Gol provinces.

**Local findings**

El Gol contributed to the efforts of new local authorities to build viable institutions in the context of weak state, fragmented civil society, and intense poverty. The institutions that could operate in this context introduced pro-poor, rights-based approaches to contexts with persistent clientelism.

The reality of local social practices continue to reinforce traditional clientelism. Traditional clientelism persists because it rests on deep roots that involve social and status distinction. For example, one El Gol partner described a town festival in which a 100 sol prize was given to the grower of the largest potato, an honour many peasants might compete and claim. By contrast, the owner of the cock that won the cock-fight won 100 dollars. Only wealthy patrons with money and time to travel to the coast and buy a large cock could win this prize. The importance was not entirely the money difference. There was status associated with a masculine blood-sport in which only those with resources could hope to win. This reinforced the dominance of the patrons with respect to clients.

Social norms continue to militate against the full realisation of rights and participation for women, as well. One mayor commented in front of the entire council, including the one female member, ‘If there were no law requiring us to get women onto our lists, we wouldn’t bother’.

Still, important female leaders were clearly emerging. In one Cusco community, a council-woman, Mary, described the scandal that she had uncovered. ‘The mayor is a professional who had come to work in the communities. He learned Quechua to make himself look nice, but in fact he was corrupt – a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Once, a distributor from the PRONA glass of milk programme bought the mayor off during the town anniversary. The distributor paid 20,000 soles to get the milk contract. Then, the mayor used the soles to buy beer and sell it at a profit during the anniversary. Who had the license to sell the beer? Why, it was his family! Everybody knows the mayors take kickbacks on the social programmes. Around 2 per cent is what all the distributors add to their costs. It’s even worse with municipal jobs; all of them go to the family members of the mayor’. El Gol projects to educate local authorities and citizens increased awareness about the proper utilisation of public funds. In particular, public debates and efforts to promote programmatic campaigns appeared to have some effect.

El Gol partners have to be realistic about their impact. Most candidates used El Gol events to claim a bit of free publicity. Their platforms hardly differed and were not particularly developed. They continued to use traditional clientelist techniques to build support and sustain unequal relations. In Tambobamba, the mayor complained that his supporters had campaigned tirelessly as they had been trained, but his rival swept in and won a rural community by buying beer and holding a party the day before the election. Traditional clientelist practices were deep-rooted, and elites manipulated traditional mechanisms to claim power. In Colquemarca, one female council-member explained the behaviour of traditional elites who kept one foot in urban centres and one in the rural municipalities. ‘One candidate had a family name, and everybody knew he had money and was a doctor from the city. When he got here, he was just the same as
the people we had before . . . People who come back from the city say they are the ones who bring development projects because they have connections to important people. If we want more projects, we have to give them our vote'.

<table>
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<th>Box 2 Local findings</th>
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<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
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| **Positive signs** | • Progressive movements articulate pro-poor and rights-based approaches that slowly transform clientelism.  
• These approaches targeted previously neglected areas and citizens.  
• Citizens gained ownership over projects and rights to hold government accountable.  
• Leaders structured participation to favour poor and rural citizens. |
| **Negative signs** | • Traditional clientelism continued in most districts.  
• Even progressive leaders faced attacks from traditional client networks.  
• Progressive leaders facing resource and capacity constraints could easily slip into previous patterns of distribution.  
• Local leaders had little capacity to influence the pattern of politics outside their districts. |

**Regional findings**

The regional reality in Peru includes weak parties, weak civil society, and an elite class that has reinserted traditional clientelist practices to regional institutions. Incipient opposition and popular movements were making inroads, but they had largely failed to penetrate political power at the regional level. El Gol worked with a bottom-up strategy that fortified pro-poor mayors and a centre-periphery strategy that attempted to use a Lima-base to influence the rules shaping regional behaviour. It would be fair to say that both efforts demonstrated some success. In Puno, for example, coalitions of pro-poor mayors and opposition movements have clearly placed pressure on regional authorities and forced a distribution of resources away from traditional clientelist networks and towards the rural areas. They have also claimed spaces for their own voice and participation at the regional level. The Lima-based lobbying has created legislation to strengthen the weight of participatory and consultative entities as formal institutions in regional government.

Despite these important advances, a few warnings about the potential for a pro-poor and rights-based approach at the regional level are in order. First, it is clear that the national government is sceptical of the potential for effective regional governance, and the Organic Law of the Regions reflects that unease. The revenues and authority transferred to the regions are wholly inadequate to undertake major functions, and some of these functions transferred are probably more appropriately located at another level of government. For example, hydroelectric and production authority are to be transferred to regions despite the obvious cross-regional importance, and it would be no surprise if such functions are not fully transferred or are transferred and then re-absorbed by the centre. Second, it is also clear that authorities in the regions are sceptical of institutions biased towards pro-poor and rights-based approaches. Regional
authorities are evidently minimising the importance of the CCRs and using patronage to influence the behaviour of province and district mayors.

Finally, the CCRs themselves are flawed. As consultative and consensus-building entities, CCRs lack real teeth to hold regional authorities accountable. The 40 per cent threshold for civil society participation and the registration requirement for civil society organisations are likely to constrain the capacity of many opposition groups. A higher percentage would be able to express real opposition, and looser registration requirements would allow representatives of poorer citizens greater access. In sum, the pro-poor and rights-based approaches that El Gol advanced at the regional level made some important, though limited advances. The ability of mayors and movements to insert themselves at the regional level will likely depend on their ability to coordinate actions in an organised fashion at regional level and find resources and allies externally.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Authority in Peru's regions is generally characterised by weak parties, weak civil society, and traditional elite patrons.</th>
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| Positive signs | • Coalitions of pro-poor mayors and movements exert pressure and redirect resources to rural areas, especially through participatory mechanisms.  
• Allies to these movements lobbied in Lima to strengthen participatory and consultative entities in regional government.  
• New consultative spaces such as the CCRs open room to pressure regional presidents for distribution and transparency. |
| Negative signs | • Traditional clientelism continued among regional elite.  
• Pressure from progressive mayors and civil society easily captured or distorted towards clientelist patterns.  
• National parties doing little to discipline regional presidents nor link them together. |

**Final observations**

Despite the political, economic, and social inequalities that reinforce traditional clientelism, much can be learned from the El Gol experience. It is not that El Gol eliminated the problems of poverty and weak institutions. These are real, and they continue. El Gol electoral assistance brought a rights-based and pro-poor approach. In effect, this improved on clientelism. Traditional clientelist relationships distributed material benefits to enhance the power of patrons and reinforce inequality and inefficiency. In El Gol districts, rights-based participation channelled benefits to poor supporters and potential allies.

At the centre of the new governance institutions lie participatory institutions and the rights-based approach. Participation engaged citizens in policy formulation and decision-making. By incorporating them in decision-making, they were given ownership and responsibility to ensure the success of policies. They offered their own resources and time to the public good, and they used participatory spaces to hold authorities accountable.

The key innovation in rural Peru was a strategic structure of participation. Institutions structure who gets to participate and whose voices are heard. By biasing the sites of participation and the pattern of
decision-making towards the poor and rural districts, these voices were privileged. As a result, the poor could mobilise to obtain material resources.

In addition, these resources were distributed neither arbitrarily nor altruistically. New patterns of governance have to manage scarce resources among multiple claimants, just as traditional clientelism did. Resource-starved local authorities continued to include some citizens and meet their demands while excluding or denying the demands of others. What changed was the basis on which these decisions were made. Under the new governance institutions, benefits were tied to active participation in the participatory institutions. This reinforced the notion that citizens receive their benefits on the basis of their active links to local authorities. Those that do not participate, either by choice or because their voices have been structured out of the political debate, do not receive benefits.

New authorities also dealt with scarcity by searching for additional resources to feed expanding participatory demands. The primary mechanism for securing these resources were cross-jurisdiction and inter-governmental. Governments linked across districts and provinces served the useful benefit of granting each leader a wider area to draw resources. They could pool administrative, material and other resources that could then be targeted through participatory institutions. Equally important, these alliances could be used to great effect to secure resources from higher level governments. Operating as a unified lobbying force, several local districts could pressure and secure additional central and regional government resources. These too could be used to meet local demands articulated through participatory institutions.

In sum, what began as an electoral assistance programme was actually an effort to bring a rights-based and pro-poor approach to local governance. El Gol partners contributed to a transformation in traditional patterns of unequal and inefficient clientelism. In its place, a new and improved style of governance emerged. Participation and pro-poor policies were central to these new institutional practices.

A real risk exists that new governance patterns can slip back into traditional clientelism. (1) The privileged sites of participation for the poor cannot be allowed to disappear or slip into exclusionary mechanisms captured by the rich. (2) To date, cross-district alliances have largely concentrated on securing additional resources for each district. This effort should continue. In addition, they should consider coordinating the way in which they build political support. A shared set of institutions, policies, and practices can ensure that such cross-district collaboration continues on the basis of participatory institutions and pro-poor policies. (3) Finally, intergovernmental coordination should be enhanced. In particular, the weak institutions at the regional level should be strengthened. Ideally, cross-district alliances based on rights-based and pro-poor policies would build institutions that aggregated political support on a regional level.

The political development implied by El Gol partnerships deserves attention. El Gol NGOs from urban areas are performing the tasks of organising poor citizens, articulating a new set of social norms, and offering resources and capacity to local leaders. One cannot help but be struck by the institutional composition of these NGOs. They are staffed by middle class activists and intellectuals.

This is significant for two reasons. First, urban NGOs working in rural areas bring middle class values, resources, and skills to isolated communities where there is at best a weak middle class. The
entrance of these NGOs has a transformative effect in which poor rural citizens gain a new awareness of their rights and an ability to articulate demands. A more active civil society complicates attempts to impose traditional clientelism, and old style patrons cannot so easily manage client demands and exclude or repress popular organisation.

The second significant aspect of extending the reach of urban NGOs to rural areas is that it provides an alternative to clientelist political alliances. Instead of turning to traditional authorities, poor rural citizens can find allies in the urban middle class that staffs NGOs. This generates resources, leadership, and institutional protection for the rural poor. In exchange, middle sectors get the transparent and efficient government that they value.

It is curious that political parties have not learned more from partners like El Gol: it is perhaps a testament to the weakness and patronage orientation of most Peruvian parties. The actors at the centre of El Gol partnerships, the urban – middle class, intelligentsia – are exactly the people one would expect to be leading a progressive political party. The weak and disastrous history of Peruvian parties has driven progressive sectors into NGOs as the only alternative avenue for political articulation.

To make the rights-based and pro-poor agenda a nationally viable, progressive movement, political parties will need to take it on board. The same middle class urban and poor rural alliance that El Gol NGOs are building could act as an electorally powerful alternative. One would like to end on a positive note that such a future is possible. The reality, however, is that political parties are extremely weak and generally do not advance a rights based and pro-poor agenda. Idealistic and progressive politicians exist in individual jurisdictions, but they have been unable to connect movements across jurisdictions and levels. El Gol has laid the blueprint and charted the path, now greater political buy-in is necessary.

<table>
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<th>Box 4 Implications</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Local implications</strong></td>
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| **Regional implications** |
| National government is sceptical of regional government units. |
| Regional governments lack power and resources. |
| Regional authorities distrust pro-poor and rights based approaches. |
| Consultative institutions at the regional level are weak. |

Reformist coalitions building on successful local experiences need help to supplant regional and national clientelist elites. Local civil society is evolving with the help of assistance from the donor and NGO sector. Yet, political society is lagging. Support from national legislators and parties will be important to constructing alternative regional and national movements.
Appendix 1: Methodology for district evaluation

Much of our information about the districts was gleaned from discussions with El Gol partners themselves. We followed the basic chronology of El Gol in organising our questions for these actors, asking them what they did first, second, etc. As observers of multiple jurisdictions, we also asked them to help us identify communities for further investigation. In particular, they helped us to identify similarities and differences across the municipalities that we could pursue further and test during our visits.

In each district, we attempted to conduct individual interviews with members of the district administration, the mayor, and the city council. These interviews were semi-structured, following a basic set of questions that were organised chronologically around the activities of El Gol. Each chronological question was followed by a series of probing questions that varied with the responses offered to the chronological questions. As much as possible, we returned to the chronological string of questions to provide some consistency across interviews and comparability in the information obtained.

1. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with you during the campaign? What were your impressions?
2. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with other authorities during the campaign? What were your impressions?
3. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with community-members during the campaign? What were your impressions?
4. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with you during the elections themselves? What were your impressions?
5. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with other authorities during the elections themselves? What were your impressions?
6. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with community-members during the elections themselves? What were your impressions?
7. What happened after the elections? Did you continue with El Gol collaboration? What were your impressions?
8. What happened after the elections? Did other authorities continue with El Gol collaboration? What were your impressions?
9. What happened after the elections? Did members of the community continue with El Gol collaboration? What were your impressions?

It quickly became apparent that our visits were public events in which many members of the community and local authorities wanted to participate. They were all eager to be interviewed, and most individual interviews quickly evolved into focus group sessions. We modified our approach once this reality became apparent, and designed the comparative study of four El Gol and Non-El Gol districts. We chose the four
districts of Tambobamba, Anta, Macusani, and Ollachea. Tambobamba and Macusani were districts in which El Gol partners had already done significant work. Anta and Ollachea were expected to be incorporated into El Gol partner projects shortly.

Respondents in each district included mayors and members of the city council; and in one district, members of the executive bureaucracy participated. The total number of respondents was 45, and all districts had at least 10 respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tambobamba</th>
<th>Anta</th>
<th>Macusani</th>
<th>Ollachea</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total participants</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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In each district, we read a series of paired comparisons, and those present were asked to vote which of the two priorities they preferred. The paired comparisons included four options (jobs, product prices, basic services, and participatory planning). There were six pairs (jobs-prices, jobs-services, etc).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Product prices and productive infrastructure</th>
<th>Basic services (electricity, water, others)</th>
<th>Participatory planning</th>
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<tr>
<td>Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Product prices and infrastructure</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic services (electricity, water, others)</td>
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The process was explained at the outset, and respondents were presented the paired comparisons with as little definition of the priorities as possible. Explanations of the priorities were offered when asked, and some respondents attempted to provide their own definitions either during or after the vote. Respondents were asked to vote and explain their vote.

After the first round of voting and discussion, we offered the same sequence of paired priorities to the respondents and they were asked to vote again. After the second vote, there was another discussion.

For the discussion after the first round and second round of voting, we asked a series of questions based on the responses. For example, the respondents in Tambobamba favoured work over product prices by a nine to one margin in the first vote. We asked respondents to explain their own vote and why they thought the overall vote turned out the way it did. In particular, we made sure the dissenting or minority voices could defend their position. In the Tambobamba case, it was the mayor who had voted to favour work.
### Appendix 2: Interviews

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Post</th>
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<td>Tambobamba, Cotabambas</td>
</tr>
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<td>Officials</td>
<td>Mayors and Council-members</td>
<td>Tambobamba, Cotabambas</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CADEP NGO</td>
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<td>Civil Society</td>
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<td>Colquemarca, Chumbivilcas</td>
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<td>Pilar Velarda Montesinos, Council-woman, Agropecuniary Commission</td>
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Appendix 3: International electoral assistance experience

EI Gol attempted to transform clientelist practices by introducing pro-poor and rights-based approaches. This was a significant departure from traditional elections assistance, which generally does not attempt a fundamental rearranging of power relations. In general, DFID and international electoral assistance focuses on free and fair elections in new democracies. In many of these countries authoritarian rule is a recent memory; political conflict takes occasionally violent forms; extreme poverty affects many; and institutional frameworks are extremely weak. As a result, assistance emphasises basic institutional strengthening, election-day monitoring, and international cooperation (Walker 2003). On these issues, the Peruvian experience strengthens and expands already existing knowledge. In addition, the Peruvian experience expands knowledge of appropriate interventions in contexts of weak parties, incipient democracy, and fragile society.

Even by the most minimal standards, electoral assistance is not always successful. For example, during most of Nepal’s history, undemocratic regimes opened only partially and intermittently to democratic processes at only the local level. After a quiet revolution in 1992, a UK-style parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch was installed. By the time of the 1999 elections, two, perhaps three, viable personalistic and patronage-based parties and a plethora of splinter parties had emerged, largely led by aged veterans of the pro-democracy movement. The international assistance that occurred focused on the elections themselves and included an effective, military-style, UN mission that monitored elections to protect against fraud or intimidation. Subsequent institutional strengthening had been a priority, but most of the funding targeted official institutions or entities located in the capital city. Some attempt at decentralised governance was initiated, but this was poorly developed and served to fragment an already small country into 75 even smaller and administratively difficult districts. In isolated rural areas, Mao-ist guerrillas blocked electoral participation and electoral assistance. As a result, the monitoring mission barely reached some areas, and civic education and institution-building did not occur. Ultimately, democratic institutions and electoral assistance were served a harsh lesson. The constitutional monarch recently decided to dissolve parliament and reimpose autocratic rule.

Electoral assistance usually does not precede returns to authoritarianism, but neither does it always lead to significant advances in democratic practice. In Zimbabwe, a single, dominant, ruling party was intent on sham elections in 2003. Electoral legislation changed in the week preceding elections; opposition parties were restricted; the media was controlled; police and security forces selectively applied the law; monitoring was by invitation only; and opposition supporters faced violence and intimidation. In this context, free and fair elections were distant hopes for DFID and international donors. Instead, they did what they could to assist local non-governmental organisations as they promoted civic education and

12 The authors would like to thank Ian McKendry, former DFID governance advisor to Nepal, for his insights.
13 The authors would like to thank Luke Mukubvu, DFID advisor, for his insights on the Zimbabwe experience.
election monitoring. Ultimately, examples such as Zimbabwe and Nepal suggest that election assistance may not always deepen democracy. In such situations, perhaps the best that can be hoped is that election assistance at least does not weaken hopes for democracy.

In Rwanda, election assistance faced a slightly different challenge and emerged somewhat more positively. Ethnic violence had only recently subsided and the country lacked even the most basic constitutional and governance framework. As a result, there was a real risk of return to politically motivated and ethnically inflamed violence, and the main objective was to make a marginal advance towards electoral democracy. Elections occurred in two stages in which voters first approved a new constitution and next voted in elections for legislators and the president. The elections were not free of irregularities, including the imprisonment of an important opposition candidate and the legal prohibition of an (admittedly ethnic) opposition party. Instead of focusing on these and other irregularities, most assistance aimed to strengthen basic electoral institutions and election-day monitoring and operated through an international consortium of donors working closely with government. The party that won represented a peaceful solution and held together a multi-ethnic coalition, and the results were largely supported by the international community.

In the context of historical ethnic divisions in a new democracy, donors face the task of cultivating an informed and engaged population. In Eastern Europe, many areas had been ethnically cleansed. In particular, elections in small, rural towns were particularly tenuous. Ethnic minority inhabitants had suffered persecution, many had left, and those few that returned or remained faced very real fears of reprisal if they actively participated. In addition, since the end of the conflict, elections for one authority or another had occurred virtually every year, and there was barely room or time for much more than election-day observation by international donors. On the other hand, the Dayton Agreement that brought peace to Kosovo gave international observers a special mandate to wield their influence, and they directed attention to rural areas and returned refugees. Election songs, radio programmes, and lottery schemes aimed to increase participation. Additional interventions required candidates to reveal their campaign finance to ensure that war profiteers were not included on party lists. Despite many flaws, most observers were satisfied that elections in Bosnia and Kosovo marked a significant departure from the ethnic violence that preceded.

In some instances, the major dilemma facing donors occurs after the elections, rather than before or during. In Zambia, multiparty elections began in 1991 after the end of one-party rule under Kaunda. Despite multiparty elections, the rules for participation were increasingly restrictive and opposition parties boycotted the 1996 elections. In 2001, the outcome was decided by 34 thousand out of 2.5 million votes, and most observers judged the elections flawed, perhaps to the degree that flaws influenced the outcome.

The authors would like to thank Rupert Bladon, DFID Governance advisor formerly in Rwanda and currently in Ethiopia. Tomas Dackwailer, of the New Centre for International Peace Operations, provided generous observations on Bosnia and Kosovo. Anna Wilde, DFID Governance Advisor, provided valuable comments based on her experience in Zambia.
Still, the opposition had significant representation in the legislature, media was more active, and civil society was building capacity. As a result, most observers emphasised a longer term perspective in their post-election evaluations. Instead of outright condemnation, they offered criticisms and encouragement to greater democratisation in the future. They had to be particularly careful because they did not want valid critiques to be twisted into anti-Western rhetoric by the dominant party. The Zambia experience was contrasted to other situations in which strong condemnation by international observers was made after elections. In Russia’s Duma elections, limitations on the media marred proceedings, and international observers chose to criticise. Similarly, in the Zimbabwe example mentioned above, strong condemnation by observers was also judged the only way to maintain pressure on the government.

Other contexts may share more similarities with the Peruvian context of weak parties moving slowly away from authoritarian rule. In Nigeria, the transition to democratic rule that occurred in 1999 left the country with a weak constitutional framework for elections. A national electoral commission and various state commissions were left the task of designing an electoral framework, including the timing of elections, the demarcation of boundaries, and the registration of voters and parties. Legislative, executive, and judicial pressures have been brought to bear on the commission, and state election commissions were widely expected to manipulate upcoming local elections. In a relatively resource rich context where democracy is recent and poverty widespread, the “money politics” of powerful agents dominates. Local and national patrons with bountiful funds for campaign finance swing elections, and parties fail to mobilise serious cleavages or debate. Electoral assistance has continued to emphasise institutional strengthening but has broadened to include election monitoring, citizen education, and party-building. In these efforts, civil society organisations have been important collaborators. Still, the Nigerian case exemplifies the challenges faced in incipient democracies where institutional protections are weak, and powerful individuals and actors use wealth and institutional control to bias democratic outcomes.

Though all of the experiences offer important insights, the Nigerian case brings up some of the most obvious parallels to rural Peru. Electoral assistance can clearly not be limited to election-day observation and post-election evaluation, though both are important to nudging young democracies forward. Institutional development, party-building, and citizen education pose particular challenges to contexts in which democracy is recent, poverty is endemic, and parties and party systems do a poor job of linking state and society. In these contexts, international electoral assistance includes a pro-poor and party-building component. In the Peruvian context, this has included supporting efforts to build a rights-based and pro-poor orientation at the local level. What is unusual about Peru is that these ideals have been integrated with clientelist practices normally considered incompatible with rights-based approaches. The key innovation observed in Peru was the introduction of pro-poor, rights-based approaches to transform clientelist solutions to scarcity and political weakness.

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17 Many of these observations are drawn from comments by Sam Unom, DFID officer in Nigeria, and documents by Tim Sheehy and Victoria Erdoo-Ibi funded by DFID.
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In 2002 the UK Department for International Development provided electoral assistance for local and regional elections in Peru. Partners included 23 NGOs, local governments, and national government policymakers. The mission was to create local electoral processes that were more inclusive of poor, excluded people in rural areas. This mission quickly expanded to undertake a wider transformation of citizen attitudes, government practices, and national institutions. The programmes were gathered under the heading El Gol, and they targeted five Andean highland departments of Peru. The programmes applied a rights-based and pro-poor approach to electoral assistance with particular attention to poor, rural, local districts. This report evaluates the impact of El Gol using a political framework that emphasises the operation of rights-based and pro-poor approaches in the context of clientelist local authorities. The report finds that rights-based, participatory practices can encourage transformation of clientelist settings to promote more pro-poor outcomes.