Addressing and Mitigating Violence

Unemployment, Service Provision and Violence Reduction Policies in Urban Maharashtra

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Executive summary

With almost 40 per cent of its urban population living in slums, the state of Maharashtra faces a severe problem of inadequate housing and urban planning. The acute inequalities that characterise current Maharashtra’s urban development leave many people suffering from inadequate housing, poor service provision, lack of access to health and sanitation, overcrowded spaces, and limited employment opportunities. With urbanisation poised to increase dramatically over the next decades in India, it is urgent to remedy the current situation lest the social ills associated with unbalanced urbanisation grow worse.

Urban impoverished areas in India also tend to be sites persistently afflicted by outbreaks of riots and crime. Maharashtra has become one of the states most affected by civil violence in India. According to official data, while rioting has fallen since the 1990s across India, Maharashtra is an exception, experiencing approximately 6,000 riots per year. In recent years, large-scale rioting has broken out in several towns in Maharashtra, including Pusad, Sangli, Kolhapur and Dhule, leading to several deaths, injuries and displaced people.

The linkages between civil violence and pockets of acute urban vulnerability are complex. Joining in violent activities is sometimes an urban survival strategy for the most vulnerable as the lack of opportunities in the legal sector push young people into criminal networks. In addition, the coexistence of the very rich and the very poor within a small geographical area is liable to generate frustrations and aggression. The inadequacy of service provision and the extreme contest for resources it creates is also likely to fuel crime and violence. When these tensions coincide with ethnicity or religion markers, the potential for communal violence rises considerably.

There is a wide agreement that civil violence happens mostly in impoverished urban areas. However, the linkages between urban violence and vulnerability are seldom tackled in a systematic manner at the policy level. Policy discussions about civil violence tend to revolve around how to maintain communal harmony, and much less so on how urban violence may be shaped by urban vulnerability. It is thus unsurprising that the main policies of law and order agencies fail to encompass violence in its broader social and economic context. Conversely, efforts to tackle urban vulnerability – such as slum policies – do not in general address its links with violence and physical insecurity.

This report argues that the interconnection of crime, violence and vulnerability has to be explicitly recognised for both development and security policies to succeed. Efforts to improve the security of vulnerable urban populations must include physical insecurity at the margin by focusing on social, economic or legal insecurity. Likewise, the rise of violent outbreaks in areas characterised by fast urbanisation, in India and elsewhere, poses serious constraints to development policies as recognised in the recent World Development Report (World Bank 2011).

This report analyses the relationship between violence and economic vulnerability among urban populations in the Indian state of Maharashtra. It draws on: the results of a large-scale household and neighbourhood survey in urban Maharashtra conducted by Gupte et al. in 2010; a policy roundtable held in January 2013 in Mumbai involving key actors of slum and violence-reduction policies; a series of participatory exercises on the issue of safety in slum areas in Mumbai; and an extensive review of existing academic literature and policy documents.
The main findings of the report are as follows:

- Civil violence in Maharashtra is deeply rooted in processes of urban vulnerability. This manifests itself in three ways: (1) violence-prone areas are also very disenfranchised, consisting mostly of slums; (2) among violence-prone areas, those where the lack of services, employment opportunities and social capital are most severe are also those most acutely affected by violence; and (3) within these areas, it is the most economically, socially and spatially vulnerable households that suffer most from bouts of civil violence.

- Violence and poverty reduction policies are disjointed, despite the close relationship observed between violence and economic vulnerability. Initiatives aimed at preventing civil violence consist mostly of government or civil society efforts to foster communal harmony. For the most part, these policies do not directly address broader issues of urban vulnerability. Conversely, attempts to reduce poverty within high-profile policy agendas, such as slum relocation policies, do not consider the issue of violence and safety with the attention it deserves. Slum relocation and resettlement policies focus on granting property rights to slum dwellers. Yet other sources of vulnerability can be more important than tenure security. Current policies run the risk of failing to reduce vulnerabilities and increasing exposure to violence if the needs of local people are not taken into account.

- The state and other actors should stop seeing slums as ‘dens of crime’ but rather recognise that they can be both vibrant economic environments and places where people need protection the most. The problems of under-policing, unemployment or lack of services in slums ultimately stem from the powerlessness of slum dwellers who find it hard to connect with state authorities. Enhancing the participation of slum dwellers is thus required to tackle both vulnerabilities and violence in an integrated and efficient way.

- Initiatives to enhance slum dwellers’ participation in decision-making are welcome. There is a need for slum dwellers and the police to actively engage with each other to strengthen safety in impoverished neighbourhoods. Schemes such as the Slum Police Panchayat (SPP), where police officers and representatives of slum dwellers come together on a long-term basis to solve local disputes, are a step in the right direction. However, these initiatives are seldom rolled out in urban areas other than Mumbai and generally remain fragile as long as they are not institutionalised. Their merits and limitations should also be more rigorously evaluated.
1 Introduction

Many have argued that the confluence of vast urbanisation and dense pockets of localised resources often implies heightened levels of violence (Urdal 2008; Homer-Dixon 1999; Davis 2006). Rapid urban growth is considered problematic as it strains the capacities of service provision and labour market absorption, thereby increasing the contest for space and resources. This contest reaches extreme levels in Mumbai but also in wider urban Maharashtra. In India, a staggering 37 per cent of urban households live in accommodation of only one room or are homeless. In Mumbai, 41 per cent of households live in slum areas (Government of India 2011). A recent estimation published in an official report (Government of India 2010a) suggests that 36 per cent of the urban population in Maharashtra live in slums, representing 19 per cent of the slum population of India. With many poor people in Indian cities unable to access services such as safe water, electricity, waste disposal and drain clearance, as well as living in overcrowded spaces, disease and environmental hazards abound. Moreover, there is little provision of health and education. The living environment and health of the urban poor in Mumbai has been linked to negative consequences in terms of income, literacy, sanitation and hygiene (Karn et al. 2003).

In effect, the vulnerability of the urban poor is the result of several, overlapping dimensions of asset deprivation: (1) a low and volatile income base; (2) environmental vulnerabilities due to the hazards of noise, water, lack of sanitation and insecure living space, which are compounded by inadequate public services provision; and (3) an experience of social distance, cutting off communities and families from support networks (Moser 1998; Gupte 2011).

Recent evidence from India supports the existence of a link between such features of urban vulnerability and violence: urban riots are persistent and widespread, with an average of over 64,000 riots per year over the past decade and 16 out of 28 states experiencing more than 1,000 riots in 2010 (Government of India 2010b). Moreover, this violence takes place in very specific areas, with the vast majority occurring in impoverished urban neighbourhoods where the lack of services described above is most acute.

The challenge of managing peace amidst such urbanisation is daunting and will be even more so in the future. Indeed, for the first time, India reports higher population growth in its urbanised areas than across its vast rural landscape, with its urban population set to reach 600 million by 2031. And yet, India is only 30 per cent urbanised, a rate much lower than China, Brazil or Mexico, leaving much room for expansion. Furthermore, urbanisation has been heavily biased towards cities larger than 100,000, which have grown from accounting for a mere 26 per cent of the total urban population in 1901 to nearly 70 per cent in 2001 (Government of India 2011). Given that India’s urban population is larger than the combined urban population in all countries barring China, the USA and Russia, India is faced with the security concerns of highly concentrated, vast and rapidly expanding urban centres. Large and concentrated urban centres bring with them a greater degree of contest for space and resources than ever experienced before.

This report critically examines existing slum and security provision policies in Maharashtra. It draws on a review of key academic and policy literature, a policy roundtable held in Mumbai in January 2013, and insights based on an original dataset of 1,100 households in 45 violence-prone neighbourhoods gathered by Gupte et al. in 2010. It argues that efforts to reduce urban violence will fail if the overall goals of development and security in slum areas are not better integrated. Recent evidence synthesised in the report shows that there is a large overlap between insecurity and violence on the one hand, and experiences of acute vulnerability on the other. It manifests itself in three ways. First, geographically, urban areas which experienced civil violence in the recent past are almost exclusively very
disenfranchised ones. Second, among these violence-prone areas, there is a strong and positive link between the extent of vulnerability and the presence of acute physical insecurity. And third, people within these areas who suffer the most from riots and civil violence tend to be the most economically, socially and spatially vulnerable. Consequently, approaches to violence reduction need to focus on much broader issues than those expressly involving the police. Insofar as urban violence is concerned, addressing the poverty–violence nexus is necessary to achieve this task.

Existing policy practices are mixed in that regard. On the development side, providing legal tenure has been the main avenue of slum policy for the past two decades. The acceptance of the National Urban Housing and Habitat Policy (NUHHP) by the Indian national government in 2007 and subsequent launching of the national-level housing programme called Rajiv Awaas Yojana (RAY) are significant milestones. RAY seeks to establish a ‘slum-free India with inclusive and equitable cities in which every citizen has access to basic civic and social services and decent shelter’ and rests on bringing all existing slums within the formal system as its main strategic choice. However, the consensus that providing legal tenure protects the urban poor is beginning to be challenged. Tenure might not be a priority for the urban poor, while flexibility of living arrangements or proximity to the workplace might be valued instead. Indeed, there are different levels of security of land tenure and unless there are very clear signals of an impending eviction, any action by the state (such as the provision of services or infrastructure) can be seen as a form of ‘recognition’ and therefore provide a sense of security to the settlement. However, housing policies targeted at slum areas and slum dwellers do not fully recognise the need to provide security nor do they address the linkages between various forms of vulnerabilities and physical insecurity. On the security provision side, the traditional model of policing is oblivious to the intricate relations between vulnerabilities and violence, and leaves little space and incentives for the police forces to be a stakeholder in the urban development process.

In the recent past, there have been several initiatives aimed at closing this gap such as the Mohalla committees and the Slum Police Panchayats (which are discussed in more detail in Section 5). These initiatives are interesting examples of how slum dwellers work with the police and state authorities, which could form the basis of an inclusive policy approach in impoverished urban areas. Potentially, enhancing slum dwellers’ participation could help link issues of services, employment, urban planning and housing with experiences of violence. The report will discuss these within the vulnerability framework outlined above.

The outline of the report is as follows: Section 2 sets the scene by providing evidence on slums and violence in urban Maharashtra; Section 3 makes the conceptual and empirical case for linking socioeconomic vulnerabilities and physical insecurity; Section 4 discusses slum policies (slum relocation and upgrading); and Section 5 presents innovative policing models and discusses the need for enhanced recognition and participation of slum dwellers.
2 From socioeconomic vulnerability to physical vulnerability

This paper considers the interplay between urban violence and vulnerability factors such as unemployment and lack of service provision. Before discussing the evidence of such interrelations in urban Maharashtra and how they matter for policy, we begin by presenting a conceptual framework outlining the different mechanisms that underpin them.

One mechanism goes from poverty/socioeconomic vulnerability towards participation in violence. Poor and unemployed people are thought to have less to lose by joining violent groups as their options in the legal, non-violent sector are scarce (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; World Bank 2011). Furthermore, social psychologists and political scientists argue that frustrations and grievances of young males can easily fuel outbursts of violence, without a need for the latter to be rationally motivated (Gurr 1970; Urdal 2008; Homer-Dixon 1999).

A second channel is through the distribution of services. Because slums are by definition cut off from state resources (although to varying degrees), ‘public services’ function largely on informal and extra-legal platforms. This gives rise to the risk of excluding the poorest and/or empowering violent actors. When those who provide these services are local muscle-men (dada) or organisations with the capacity and the interest to instigate violence, then there are incentives for the vulnerable people to perpetrate violence as a survival strategy. In the context of Mumbai, Gupte (2011) argues that the relationship between extra-legal authority and urban vulnerability, in a context of inadequate provision of security by the state, is such that it encourages the physical perpetration of violence. If service providers are part of an ‘institutionalised riot system’, then the risk of communal violence is high. In Paul Brass’s terminology an institutionalised riot system is a network of various politicians, legal or illegal businessmen, thugs and anti-social elements, and communalists who benefit from communal tensions and conflicts. The work of Berenschot (2012) has shown that amid the Ahmedabad riots in 2002, neighbourhoods with enough collective efficacy and capacity to directly access state resources were able to cordon off the violence. In contrast, violence flared in neighbourhoods where people had to rely on members of the local institutional riot system (local politicians, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishvu Hindu Parishad (VHP), or the Bajrang Dal).

The example of Gujarat also shows, crucially, that community- and ethnicity-based organisations – often part of wider, more violent movements – themselves engage in social work; this problematises the idea that violence can be reduced through efforts to assuage vulnerability. A little-known wing of the RSS, the Sewa Vibha (of which the United States-based equivalent is the India Development and Relief Fund), offers ostensibly benevolent services and development through blood banks and free eye check-ups, schools for the poor, group homes for widows, distribution of clothing and emergency relief. The Hindutva ethic, with its anti-Muslim position, is routinised through ‘an elaborate institutional edifice that is part of the normal associational forms of civil society’ (Kamat and Biju 2003).

Similarly, in the southern state of Kerala, local-level workers of the Marxist left and Hindu right have been involved in political conflict as well as supposed relief initiatives. The RSS has been described as managing to evade responsibility for its role in violence by fostering a close-knit community of friends and supporters forged through extending everyday assistance and care as well as mobilising support in small neighbourhoods, towns and villages of the region (Chaturvedi 2011).

A third channel is the contest for resources, heightened to an extreme level in slums, which is conducive to violence. Slum dwellers interviewed as part of this study confided that long waits at the public water points create anger among residents and easily spill into public
fights. Lack of street lighting and toilet facilities means that women are especially vulnerable to attacks, and greatly contribute to their feelings of insecurity. Rodgers and Satja (2012a; 2012b), in their study of Patna slums, found a similar link between lack of services and violence. The consequences are not confined to low-level routine violence, as these conflicts over resources have been proved to occasionally morph into larger communal conflicts (Rodgers and Satja 2012a; Shani 2007). In return, high levels of routine and/or communal violence of this sort can undermine social capital and neighbourhoods’ capacity to collectively organise to lobby for resources and solve problems.

Finally, the relationship is also mutually reinforcing. Gupte et al. (2012) found that households which suffered most from riots were those who were also most vulnerable economically (lack of assets, savings, self-perceived economic status), socially (inability to rely on neighbours and community’s help in case of need), and spatially (living close to unsafe areas, far from busy crossroads). Socioeconomic vulnerability is thus positively linked with acute vulnerability to violence. The reason is that riots disrupt the normalcy of everyday life in a way that hurts the most vulnerable by, for instance, making it difficult for people to go to work, get medicines or food, or force them to live in a cramped space (without proper sanitation facilities) for the duration of the curfew.

The next section presents evidence of the interrelations between socioeconomic vulnerabilities and violence in urban Maharashtra using the Maharashtra Household Longitudinal Survey on Civil Violence and Welfare (MHLS). The MHLS comprises close to 1,100 households in 45 violence-prone neighbourhoods of urban Maharashtra and offers unique insights on civil violence and vulnerability in Mumbai and beyond (Gupte et al. 2012).
3 Slums and violence in Mumbai and wider Maharashtra

3.1 Socioeconomic vulnerability in impoverished urban areas of Maharashtra

According to the Census of India, a slum is defined as: ‘any compact area of at least 300 population or about 60-70 households of poorly built congested tenements, in unhygienic environment usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water facilities’. The lack of tenure security is thus not an official criterion for declaring a slum area. In contrast, UN Habitat defines a slum as:

as a group of individuals living under the same roof that lack one or more (in some cities, two or more) of the following conditions: (i) security of tenure, (ii) structural quality and, (iii) durability of dwellings, (iv) access to safe water, (v) access to sanitation facilities and (vi) sufficient living area.

In Maharashtra, and contrary to the spirit of the legislation, it seems that the issue of tenure is the dominant criterion for declaring slum areas, where encroachment on public or private land is the proxy. Conversely, dilapidated habitations such as chawls, whose residents can claim legal tenure, are not recognised as slums. However, there are important dynamic characteristics that slums possess and that escape the static definition. Notably, the spatial nature of slums is changing: a slum can come up, grow, be demolished overnight. In slums, this non-permanence can be all-encompassing, ranging from the uncertainty over one’s living space and personal security to uncertainty over one’s livelihood options, and hence, uncertainty over one’s life choices.

In Greater Mumbai, 6 per cent of identified settlements are predominantly temporary structures while 62 per cent are permanent ones, mainly made with bricks and reinforced cement roofs (Risbud 2003). It then appears clearly that most slums have become long-term answers to housing scarcity. It also appears that consolidating investments are the result of a higher level of perceived security: slums facing constant demolitions or credible threats of evictions display the most temporary structures. Slums lack the most basic services: 49 per cent of slum dwellers only have access to water through shared standpipes and 98 per cent of slums do not have any organised system for waste disposal. Sanitation remains the most worrying problem, with 73 per cent of slum dwellers depending on community toilets, while as much as 28 per cent still defecate in the open (Risbud 2003).

Table 3.1 displays key vulnerability indicators for the 45 violence-prone neighbourhoods that are part of the MHLS dataset. The MHLS is representative of the urban areas hit by or prone to civil violence in Maharashtra between 2008 and 2010. It shows that household income in these areas is extremely low (median income per household per month is about £60), households have little access to public amenities (especially water service), and more than 50 per cent lack toilet facilities. These households are also predominantly employed in casual manual labour and face a high risk of unemployment. Accordingly, the average respondent sees his or her perceived welfare status as below the median. However, most respondents own their dwellings, and the overwhelming majority are rather well connected to the electricity grid.
### Table 3.1 Key socioeconomic indicators in the MHLS sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Full sample</th>
<th>Mumbai/Thane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of residents without private toilets</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of residents forced to defecate in the open</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hours of running water per day</td>
<td>3 hours 45 minutes</td>
<td>5 hours 10 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median hours of running water per day</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of residents without running water</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hours of electricity per day</td>
<td>19 hours</td>
<td>22 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median income per person</td>
<td>Rs. 1,000 (£12)</td>
<td>Rs. 1,333 (£16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th percentile of income per person</td>
<td>Rs. 600 (£7)</td>
<td>Rs. 1,000 (£12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of residents who own their dwelling</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median size of dwellings (square feet)</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household size</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-perceived relative status (1=lowest, 9=highest)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% households relying on casual labour</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% households with at least one unemployed member</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ calculations based on the MHLS data

Vulnerability might also be looked at through a micro-level lens by focusing on the physical aspects of urban survival. Borrowing from criminological literature, vulnerability might simply be defined as the inability to protect oneself ‘either because they cannot run fast, or lack the physical prowess to ward off attackers, or because they cannot afford to protect their homes, or because it would take them longer than average to recover from material or physical injuries’ (Hale 1996). Physical vulnerability is entwined with other economic and social vulnerabilities, as explained below.

### 3.2 Civil violence and physical insecurity in urban Maharashtra

Studies of victimisation are particularly rare in India. In Mumbai, two studies using the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS)\(^1\) shed some light on the extent of the problem. Singh (1995) found that only 7 per cent of the Mumbai respondents were preoccupied with crime and/or discussed the problem with others; 21 per cent avoided certain streets; 16 per cent felt unsafe after dark; 25 per cent felt they needed an escort on streets at night; 35 per cent felt it was likely their house would be burgled and an overwhelming 92 per cent asked someone to watch their homes as a crime prevention measure. Victimisation rates among the sample of Mumbai respondents are 6, 7 and 8 per cent respectively for burglary, assault/robbery, and sex offences (Nalla et al. 2011). The authors find that concerns for crime peak within the middle-income group.

\(^1\) The sample consists of 1,100 Mumbai residents drawn from upper, middle, and lower-income groups and the data were gathered through face-to-face interviews with 1,040 respondents.
Quantitative evidence on the extent of violence and lack of safety in informal settlements and/or outside Mumbai is absent. Gupte et al. (2012) found that self-reported crime victimisation rates are virtually nil, as are self-perceived levels of being unsafe. However, these are likely due to respondents’ reluctance to speak openly of their neighbourhoods in a bad light. Indeed, when respondents were asked whether they avoided some unsafe place nearby, 11 per cent did so. On average, such hotspots were 10 minutes away, by walk from the respondents’ homes. The significance of such physical insecurity is manifest when cross-tabulated with the desire to leave the area. Eight per cent of respondents who did not report a crime hotspot declared they want to leave their neighbourhood, compared with 30 per cent for those reporting a hotspot. Similarly, 20 per cent of respondents declared that crime is a major concern in their area—the second most cited concern after unemployment.2

The type and prevalence of civil violence episodes are also captured by the MHLS.3 These include: riots, stone-pelting, public fights, damage to buses or public property, burning of tyres, throwing of bottles, police harassment, agitation related to a strike (bandh), and violence during curfew. While some of these events may be considered as modalities of violence within the context of a riot (such as stone-pelting or damage to property, for example), they may also occur in the absence of it. As described in Table 3.2, the most common forms of civil violence are riots (one in every five households reported at least one riot in their neighbourhood), then public fights and stone-pelting. Curfew follows closely (14 per cent), indicating that a majority of riots in the sample were severe enough to induce the state to resort to this coercive means of restoring law and order.

Most forms of civil violence are heavily concentrated in some neighbourhoods. More than half (55 per cent) of household victimisation by riots can be explained by the neighbourhood people live in. The corresponding figures for curfews, stone-pelting and public fights are 40 per cent, 40 per cent and 28 per cent respectively. These results suggest that household exposure to riots must be understood within the wider neighbourhood context; 12.5 per cent of households were victims of riots, either directly through injuries or physical damage (20 per cent of victims) or indirectly, because of the disruption caused by the riot.

Table 3.2 Prevalence of civil violence in 45 neighbourhoods of Maharashtra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of event</th>
<th>% respondents reporting at least one occurrence of...</th>
<th>Intra-neighbourhood correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riot</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public fight</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone-pelting</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre burning</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tensions due to strike (bandh)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottle-throwing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ calculations based on the MHLS data. See also Gupte et al. (2012)

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2 This measure of crime encompasses petty crime, crime, gang-related crime, bullying, and sexual harassment (‘eve-teasing’).
3 We report here the results of the module in which households self-report the number of events of civil violence that happened in their neighbourhood in the past year.
3.3 Links between physical insecurity and socioeconomic vulnerabilities

In this section we present a quantitative illustration of the multidimensional vulnerability in slum areas discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2.

Based on the MHLS data, we relate the economic, environmental and social dimensions of vulnerability with physical insecurity. From a policy point of view, the interplay between lack of assets base, lack of service provision, unemployment, and crime and violence is of profound significance. This is what we focus on in the data.

Figure 3.1 displays the correlations between the average concerns for crime in each of the 45 neighbourhoods and the average of other concerns, namely unemployment, health issues, lack of service provision, and lack of social capital. Each of these relationships occupies a quadrant in the figure. Neighbourhoods located in the Mumbai/Thane metropolis appear as triangles and they are distinguished from those in the rest of Maharashtra (circles) so as to allow for systematic differences along the urbanisation spectrum. The curves (one for each sub-sample) summarise the scatterplot and represent the relationship between concerns for crime and the other considered variable.¹

We can see clearly that in neighbourhoods where the proportion of people concerned by crime is high, so is the proportion of people concerned by social and economic issues plaguing their neighbourhoods. This is very apparent looking at the upward-sloping curves for both sub-samples. We used concerns as a proxy for the actual manifestations of vulnerabilities, hereby positing that where people tend to worry about unemployment, lack of services or crime in their neighbourhoods, then these problems are acute. Despite the fact that there is little differentiation between these areas in terms of income, there is thus a very strong spatial concentration of physical and other vulnerabilities. We can surmise that the gradient would be even steeper if a representative sample of urban Maharashtra areas was to be used.

Figure 3.1 also shows that unemployment, health issues and lack of service provision are much less of a concern in Mumbai/Thane than in the rest of the state. Conversely, concerns about crime are much higher in Mumbai/Thane. This is unsurprising; migrants are attracted to the Mumbai agglomeration precisely because of its employment opportunities, and while lack of services is made very apparent by the contrast with surrounding affluent areas, the extent of neglect and distance is even greater, in absolute terms, in smaller cities. The fact that concerns about crime are more prevalent in Mumbai is consistent with the challenges of urbanisation that motivate this paper.

In both areas, neighbourhoods with the most concerns for employment, health, and services are also those with the most problems of violence. The only substantial difference between the two areas is in relation to the role of social capital. In Mumbai/Thane, overall social capital is very low, but areas experiencing some modicum of trust are less violent. Outside of Mumbai, social capital is higher on average, but does not relate with crime in a significant manner.²

This section leads to two important lines of questioning: what are the impact of slum policies on the types and levels of vulnerability? And what can be done to jointly tackle vulnerability and violence? The next two sections will be devoted these two questions respectively.

¹ Technically, the curves represent the best fits from local linear regressions.
² We do not claim a causal effect here: social capital is likely to be both a cause and a consequence of violence.
Figure 3.1 Concerns for crime and other sources of vulnerability in 45 low-income urban neighbourhoods of Maharashtra

Source: authors’ calculations based on the MHLS data
4 Slum policies and violence reduction

4.1 Slum relocation and slum upgrading policies in Maharashtra

Different slum policies are based on different views of what is a slum, what actors should intervene, and what the problems are. Annex 1 summarises the slum policies implemented by the state and the Mumbai municipal corporation from 1913 to today. For each, we list the stakeholder, the slum definition used along several dimensions (health, service, housing) and the general policy it belongs to (e.g. slum clearance, slum rehabilitation).

Most interesting for this analysis is the observation that violence mitigation efforts need to have a capacity to deal with the varying vulnerabilities of informal settlements, recognising that some of the variability is caused directly by how informal settlements are treated (or viewed) by state policies. Specifically, how the state has viewed informal settlements over the years has greatly shaped its efforts in violence mitigation and security provision (Gupte 2012).

Policies to improve the situation of slum populations have varied. Until the 1970s, the state and municipal corporation followed a unilateral policy of slum eradication in order to clear land from encroachment. However, people simply rebuilt their tenements after the demolition. Notably, the policy of slum clearance failed to consider that proximity to jobs and services exerts a strong attraction for people, who are willing to trade off housing quality for it. Furthermore, the sheer stress caused by lack of tenure security and threat of eviction looms large in the experience of vulnerability of slum dwellers.

In the 1970s, the state recognised that slums existed as a solution to the severe housing shortage and began to provide water, electricity, sanitation and other amenities. In addition, the need to offer a resettlement solution to slum dwellers whose slum has been cleared was acknowledged. The first projects providing in situ basic infrastructure and amenities were started in 1970 through the Slum Improvement Programme (SIP).

The 1980s witnessed limited improvement, mainly through the World Bank-funded Bombay Urban Development Programme (BUDP), under which two innovative projects were implemented: the Slum Upgrading Project, where dwellers were for the first time given some right to land; and the Low Income Group Shelter Programme, precursor of the ‘cross-subsidy’ approach.

The Slum Redevelopment Scheme (SRD) and Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) were introduced in the 1990s. Their objective was to make free housing available to slum dwellers by providing strong financial incentives to the private sector through what is commonly called ‘cross-subsidy’. In fact, private profitability is ensured thanks to the slackening of social housing standards, the authorisation to directly sell part of the built-up area, and the granting of ‘Transferable Development Rights’ to the developer. SRS projects are monitored by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA), created in 1996 by amendment of the Slum Area Act, 1971.

These legal provisions have extended tenure rights to slum dwellers affected by infrastructure projects and to those participating in these rehabilitation and resettlement schemes.
4.2 Insecurities, slum policies and violence

Policies geared toward extending tenure security to slum dwellers, *in situ* or in a relocated site, are theoretically motivated by the idea that the lack of tenure is responsible for the state of acute vulnerability that slum dwellers find themselves in (Baker 2008; Field 2005). The literature on tenure guarantee has generally observed the effects of tenure formalisation – that is, extension of *de jure* status to the slum settlement, through either giving property titles to the slum occupiers or through certain administrative recognition, such as notification of a slum in Indian cities. It must be noted that there is a lack of general research on the effect of slum upgrading (and relocation) on physical insecurity. A recent systematic review by Turley *et al.* (2013) found almost no rigorous studies linking this type of policy with crime and violence.

There is scarce literature on impacts of *de facto* tenure security, which in essence is recognition of occupancy rights. Durand-Lasserve and Selod (2007) show the possible impacts of *de facto* and *de jure* tenure security. They argue that extension of *de facto* tenure – that is, recognition of occupancy rights and protection against eviction – has potential positive impacts on home improvement, children’s education, labour market participation (in general and of women in particular), women’s empowerment, and small businesses. Those working in South Asian cities find that it leads to increases in home-based work as home is also a place for women on cultural grounds as well now due to development of subcontracting economic systems.

It might, then, be contended that reducing vulnerability in the form of strengthening legal security of tenure in Maharashtra would have the effect of reducing violence. There is the argument that the needs of the urban poor and their priorities are hierarchical; they first need approval to stay in the place, in the form of secure land and housing, and then the provision of basic amenities (Karn *et al.* 2003). Among proposals to end the unstable existence of slum dwellers, it has been suggested that land tenure ought to be passed on in their names; if relieved of the threat of eviction, they might be able to invest in the transformation of their environment. Even in arguments citing the iniquities of slum demolition and the prejudice against slum dwellers, it is contended that alternative means of accommodation, as well as proper show-cause notices, might represent steps towards a more acceptable approach to the problem of providing shelter to the urban poor (Sridhar 2006). And yet, the example of slum relocation policies in Mumbai – with between 5 million and 9 million slum dwellers due to be relocated by 2025 – suggests that transition to secure land and housing has the effect of increasing violence rather than reducing it. The eviction of informal settlements and provision of legal tenure to evictees has been undertaken with the aim of extricating poor citizens from informal and extra-legal economies. However, the demolition drive has been described as ‘vicious’ and even a ‘war’ against the poor, with police often using sticks (*lathis*), guns and tear gas (Azmi *et al.* 1997).

Moreover, with relocated sites and their concretised structures often being in underdeveloped and under-policed parts of the city, slum dwellers have continued to be reliant on the illegal channels of authority associated with violence. Hence those policies based on material and spatial factors alone have failed to address the ‘recursive components’ of insecurity in the form of asset and physical vulnerability (Gupte 2011). A study of the Lallubhai Compound Settlement in Mankhurd highlights concerns over physical safety and security arising out of design and layout, as well as access failures, concerns of unemployment, unavailability of healthcare and education, and the high prevalence of non-cognisable” and petty crime (Gupte 2010). It is also suggested that the government can seek

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6 In the case of a non-cognisable offence the police cannot arrest a person without orders of the court, i.e. without a court warrant, and can investigate into the case only on the express directions of the court to that effect. Therefore, the experience is
to provide infrastructure facilities and civic amenities that are lacking in slums (Azmi et al. 1997). Another notable case of dislocation is that of the millworkers of Girangaon (Adarkar and Meena 2004). Chawls were close to the mills, located near suburban railway stations, and included wide open spaces, playgrounds and community halls (Adarkar 2003). Places that are ostensibly chaotic are, in fact, the safest living and working spaces.

Hence it is suggested that security and long-term violence reduction should be conceived as something rather broader than the mere provision of legal tenure. Indeed, notions of security are closely linked to the forms of urban space, as discussed in Section 3 (see also Gupte 2012). With regard to design considerations in relocated sites, there is recommendation of community-friendly planning, rather than the creation of low-income, high-vulnerability concentration zones. The prevention of overcrowding in part depends on competitive bidding for building contracts, as well as careful site selection and access. In addition, the city police need to be understood as a stakeholder in slum relocations and resettlement, or in other words, as agents of urban development. Typically, police are only involved to help move reluctant households during slum demolitions or clearances, to maintain law and order in transit camps, and then to maintain law and order in the final resettlement site, resulting in violent interjections and a breakdown of trust between ordinary residents and the police, as described previously.

that in a non-cognisable offence, the police station officer records the complaint as a non-cognisable offence, commonly referred to as a N.C., and advises the complainant or victim to approach the court for further directions.
5 Enhancing urban participation: the potential of innovative community policing initiatives

Community policing has been trumpeted as a way to reduce violence in Maharashtra. Moreover, it is arguable that the clearest examples of successful efforts to reduce violence are those associated with police–public cooperation, particularly in Mumbai. Kshire (2000) emphasises the need for community policing, noting that the Khosla Commission Report on police reforms in 1968 acknowledged the change in the role of the police in India from a ‘ruler-appointed police’ to a ‘people’s police’. And yet, the institutional framework of the police continues to be governed by the Police Act (Act V) of 1861; this is described as a ‘colonial hangover’, while the ideal of ‘police–public rapport’ in the form of community participation is compared to the decentralisation institutions (Kshire 2000). In making a similar plea for ‘community policing’, Sen (2000) presents arguments that suggest that increasing police numbers does not increase the quality of policing output, or reduce crime. The stress should instead be on the prevention of crime through consultation, adaptation and mobilisation, with police needing to deepen contacts and hold regular meetings with members of the community. Decentralisation in police functions, with more power given to local commanders, is recommended (Sen 2000).

Saravade (2001) offers several examples of programmes to further police–public cooperation in the city, which have clear implications for policymakers interested in violence reduction. She notes that ‘In order to evolve the best possible practices for effective policing, it was felt that the people should be engaged in a continuous dialogue with the police’, further suggesting that ‘it was also important that the 39,000 strong police force be energized and motivated to continue this dialogue with the community’. In order to advance police–public cooperation in Mumbai, there were two high-visibility, long-term community policing programmes. The first is known today as the Mohalla committees7 and emphasises maintaining communal peace. The second, the Slum Police Panchayat (sometimes referred to as Mohalla Panchayat), is built on the idea ‘to empower the local people to tackle their own quarrels and petty crimes with the helping hand and guidance of police officers of the local police station’.

5.1 Preventing communal violence: the case of the Mohalla committees

The Mohalla Committee Movement Trust (MCMT, formerly Mohalla Ekta Committee) was designed especially to meet when communal tensions were anticipated. However, there was also provision for more regular meetings. The committees, under the guidance of police stations in the city, are formed of ‘secular and socially conscious citizens’ who might help the police through ‘raising a strong voice against communalism’. While police officers attend meetings, volunteers also visit sensitive areas along with police officers in order to settle disputes (Saravade 2001). The popularly held notion of age-old religious divisions endures, as exemplified in comments such as ‘the traditional mistrust between Hindus and Muslims keeps the city’s police on its toes’ (Saravade 2001). Communalism remains an important category of analysis for policymakers. Even more nuanced analyses of communal violence in India stress the importance of ‘bonds of civic engagement and associational activity’ between communities (Sengupta 2005). Indeed, the reduction of tension in India is often associated

7 The initial name was the Mohalla Ekta Movement Trust, which translates as Communal Amity Movement.
with the existence of civic ties between Hindus and Muslims. Elsewhere, there is literature that has tended to focus more on patterns of urban collective violence associated with inter-caste conflict (Upadhya 1997).

Across India, Mohalla committees or neighbourhood groups are well known for their efforts to address Hindu–Muslim tensions. Indeed, they might be characterised as an ‘institutionalised peace system’ (Sengupta 2005). They have been, and continue to be, viewed primarily as a means of preserving peace between two communities.

In Mumbai, the committees were established in the aftermath of the Mumbai riots of 1992–3 and were the brainchild of the then sheriff, F.T. Khorakiwala, who sought to establish citizen police committees in the 72 police stations of the city with the aim of promoting communal harmony. According to Thakkar (2004), the concept of the Mohalla committees emerged from the process of interaction and sharing thoughts, with 24 active committees being formed in communally sensitive parts of Mumbai. Every police station has some beats based on the size of the area within its jurisdiction, and each beat has a Mohalla committee headed by a beat officer.

The first instance of the Mohalla committees can be traced back to the then notoriously riot-prone city of Bhiwandi, Maharashtra, where they were successful in mitigating violence. In 1984, Suresh Kapade, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, established a central peace committee and 75 local committees in each of the town’s municipal wards. In Mumbai, Mahim was taken as a starting point, given its history of tensions. The activities of the committees include celebration of Hindu and Muslim festivals, organisation of inter-faith prayers, cricket matches (there was a Cricket for Peace Tournament organised with the police in 1996) and other sporting contests (sports were promoted in Dongri, Nagpada, J.J. Marg, Malwani, Wadala and Antop Hill) as well as classes for school dropouts. Other activities undertaken by the committees include hearing complaints related to the work of the police of the area, civic issues such as health and access to other amenities, education facilities, and initiatives promoting communal harmony (Thakkar 2004). Following the 1992–3 riots in Mumbai, in DN Nagar there were health camps for police station staff and slum dwellers. In Dharavi, there was a cricket match between the people and the police, as well as the establishment of a family counselling centre to deal with non-cognisable offences. In Versova, there were sewing classes for women, while there was the formation of a street theatre group, ‘Agaz’. In Imamwada and Wadala, there are study rooms and libraries as well as sports facilities, while in Imamwada, young people were helped in securing admission to vocational training institutes as well as being given a tool kit on completion of their courses to begin work as electricians, plumbers and carpenters. In Nirmal Nagar, there was an emphasis on schools and training and employment for young people, while a Mitra Mandal (Friends Association) was started in 1995 in the A.K. Marg police chowky (station) for the Beherampada area to provide skills development. Similarly, Saheli (Friends) was begun for women. In Andheri East (close to the area of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation), there was a workshop on ‘know your rights’. As well as medical camps, there were sports events, including a cycle rally with 150 young members spreading the message of ‘pyar banate chalo’ (keep establishing the bond of love). In Bandra West, the Clean Bandra Campaign was set up in 1995. Across the Mohalla committees, influential and respected individuals are credited with defusing tensions arising from minor incidents, preventing them from escalating into serious violence through their negotiating and conflict-resolution skills (Thakkar 2004).

The Mohalla committees vary from one locality to another. Neither their emergence nor their daily functioning are meant to follow a uniform pattern. The MHLS shows there is in fact a

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8 The emphasis on the absence of civic engagement being a cause of communal violence is, of course, a notable feature of Varshney’s scholarship (Varshney 2001, 2002).
low level of awareness of Mohalla committees: just a quarter of Mumbai respondents and 17 per cent of their counterparts in Thane reported that a committee was operating in their area. Outside of Mumbai/Thane, awareness of Mohalla committees was virtually nil.

One weakness of the Mohalla committees approach may be its excessive focus on communal riots and Hindu–Muslim relationships. The word Mohalla itself is the Urdu name for neighbourhood and gives a ‘minority–majority’ tone to the whole scheme. Accordingly, it was felt by some participants of the policy roundtable that the scheme has become specialised in minority-related frictions and problems (such as those linked to the Muslim personal law, *talaq*) and failed to join up the issue of riots with broader vulnerability issues.

### 5.2 Preventing open violence: Slum Police Panchayats

The Slum Police Panchayats (SPP) appears to have a similar focus on defusing tensions among parties before they take recourse to violence, but without the emphasis on Hindu–Muslim issues. The scheme was first created in Pune and is the result of the partnership between the former Pune Police Commissioner Anami Roy and representatives of slum dwellers. The scheme expanded into Mumbai when Roy was posted there, and there are now 380 Slum Police Panchayats. The SPP consists of a long-term partnership between one community police officer and ten representatives of slum dwellers (seven women and three men). At the organisational level, the scheme is a partnership between the police, the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF), and an NGO, the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers (SPARC). The members of the SPP are chosen by the community, and not elected, to avoid creating differentiated status between members and non-members and acute inter-personal competition. The members get an identity card from the police, but they do not receive financial stipends, nor can they impose fines on people. Their role is to use their knowledge of the community to solve disputes before they turn violent. The choice of seven women and three men proceeds from this logic, as women are seen as better informed about the community than men, and as more capable of listening to all parties and resolving disputes. The impetus behind this scheme was, in Anami Roy’s words, that:

*When we went up to a few slums, we saw that the slum people are one big chunk of our population that are out of our reach. There are no roads or directions or anything in these slums and police service is not at all there unless there is a serious issue. I realised that we were missing about a couple of million people in Pune who lived in slums. (Interview with Anami Roy, Mumbai, 17 January 2013)*

Furthermore, a study of local residents’ grievances of visiting police stations found that a large number of complaints were non-cognisable in nature. As a result, police could not take any legal action in those matters without going through the lengthy process of taking permission from the judicial magistrate. A widespread perception also emerged that if the police did act, it was due to bribes or other sorts of pressure. The diagnosis for prevalence of violence in slum areas is thus one of isolation, social distance and distrust. One could also say that the scheme addresses police fears that major violence can brew unnoticed in slums until it spills out of the slum, where the constituents are much more able to make police accountable.

The non-cognisable (NC) complaints registered at police stations were therefore taken to the localities, with committees of ‘socially active local people’ headed by one police inspector of the police station. NCs were to be discussed at the weekly panchayat meetings, and decisions were taken by jury members, with the guidance of the police inspector, after hearing both parties. The members of the jury are changed annually to incorporate newer members from the same locality, with all residents who do not have a criminal record having a chance to participate in the endeavour by rotation. It is suggested that this programme has ‘encouraged not only the people of the localities to solve their own problems by common
consent but also made the local Police Station officers more responsible and accountable to
the local population’, with goodwill and confidence generated and members of committees
empowered to control disorderly situations and gather intelligence on crime matters
(Saravade 2001).

The number of NCs has, in fact, dropped in many localities of the police stations in Sewree
and Wadala in the Port Zone (Saravade 2001). While this reduction might be due to
permanent, satisfactory settlement of disputes, increased goodwill towards and confidence in
the police might in fact lead to more NCs being registered. Hence a more significant indicator
of the success of the programme is taken to be the number of repeated NCs recorded for the
same dispute. In this respect, there were no repeat NCs on the same dispute in the Sewree
police station during the scheme (Saravade 2001).

Interestingly, there is a tension surrounding the SPP around the issue of formalisation. In his
interview with the authors, Roy mentioned that he was initially unconvinced by the NSDF
leader’s idea of institutionalising the scheme through a government resolution. Yet, without
institutional form, the SPP is dependent on the goodwill of the police commissioners. Roy
admitted that after he left, 50 per cent of the SPPs did not run properly because his
replacement did not see the benefit of the scheme. There is also a reluctance to provide
training to the members of the SPPs in order not to generate status-seeking and competitive
behaviours among slum dwellers. Finally, there are no rigorous learning systems in place to
credibly assess the worth and limits of the scheme. If the scheme is to garner official support
and serve as a template for enhancing slum dwellers’ participation in policing elsewhere, it
will be necessary to introduce some degree of institutionalisation as well as setting up
thorough evaluations.

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) describes on its website numerous other
community policing initiatives across India, which perhaps helps to contextualise the
evidence relating more directly to violence reduction in Maharashtra.9 In Tamil Nadu, the
Friends of Police (FOP) provides opportunities for ordinary citizens to contribute to the
prevention and detection of crime, as well to check the abuse of police power. Any member
of the public, as long as he or she is not involved in a criminal or civil case, can become a
member, potentially helping to reduce violence through engaging in beats and night patrols,
information collection, and maintaining law and order. While the FOP functions in all districts
of Tamil Nadu, there is also mention of the Samarth Yojna Community Policing Experiment in
Coimbatore. The main aim here was indeed the resolution of the ‘communal problem’.
Among its various initiatives, there were regular meetings of area committees and city
vigilance committees, workshops and seminars on the topic of attitudinal change for police
officers, a student–police interface, and a slum adoption scheme. Similar efforts were made
in Trichy. A beat officers’ system saw the city divided into 57 beat zones, each with four
constables called beat officers. A complaint and suggestion box system enabled citizens to
provide anonymous information and feedback to the police. Also, a wide area network linked
all police stations and offices with internet and email service. The initiatives were recognised
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in Washington and conferred
prizes at the International Community Policing Awards in Toronto in 2001. In Assam, Project
Aashwas was started in November 2001 expressly to combat violence. The organisation
identified a cluster of seven villages in each of seven districts where there is a history of
ethnic or terrorist violence, seeking to integrate the community with the police.

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9 See www.humanrightsinitiative.org
6 Conclusion

This paper has looked at the problem of urban violence in Maharashtra and its relationship with the issues of employment and service provision. Based on a unique dataset in urban Maharashtra, we have shown that there is a strong correlation between the degree of vulnerability (socioeconomic and environmental) and exposure to violence. This is true at the community level, as violence-prone neighbourhoods are much more likely to be disenfranchised; and it is also true at the household level, as it is those who are most vulnerable economically and socially who are most affected by violence. There are different mechanisms which can account for these relationships, which co-exist and are mutually reinforcing: lack of employment opportunities might push people into violent careers; lack of service provision may generate conflict and force slum dwellers to rely on violent actors to fill the gap left by the state; and the presence of violence itself further undermines employment and service creation. Indeed, evidence from the MHLS shows that unemployment and poor service provision strongly correlate with issues of violence, even among slums/poor neighbourhoods that are otherwise comparable from an income point of view.

Interventions in informal settlements are not straightforward and are likely guided partly by the form of the settlement itself. While lack of tenure security is undoubtedly a cause of vulnerability among slum dwellers, it is questionable that granting property rights will automatically mitigate other sources of vulnerability, including violence. Slums are the response by poor people to access job opportunities in the context of a shortage of cheap housing. Relocating people far from these opportunities and giving them tenure is unlikely to succeed in reducing their vulnerability. There are even good reasons to suspect that new security problems may arise from these schemes.

Slums upgrading are more promising as they are done in situ and follow an integrated approach. The guidelines of the central government flagship programme on housing (the Rajiv Awaas Yojana (RAY)) explicitly favour rehabilitation over resettlement and also call for implementing participatory approaches. However, the conjunction of economic interests in prime urban land and imbalanced power relations is a threat to the inclusiveness of the policy. The design of slum policies is also oblivious that these policies influence violence – even riots – in profound yet complex ways. There is more to learn on this front, from India and elsewhere, in order to better guide policy in connecting slum policy and crime and violence.

The concept of community policing bridges what might be considered ‘policing’ and more ‘holistic’ strategies. The police require popular support in order to be effective in reducing violence. Moreover, initiatives bringing together ordinary citizens can be more effective in defusing the long-term tensions that lead to violence. Saravade notes that: ‘Increased participation of the community leads to a greater transparency and accountability in the functioning of the police. At the same time, the community also understands the constraints of police work.’ Overall, the key phrases are described as ‘needs identification’ of the people, ‘delineation of constraints’ faced by authorities, and ‘goal fixing’ by both the police and the people (Saravade 2001).

Ultimately, then, it is clear that effective violence reduction in Maharashtra demands a multifaceted approach. While the containment of violence will always depend on a reliable and trustworthy police force, the reduction of violence in the longer term demands engagement with a series of political, economic, social and cultural issues, with the police seen as part of a wider participatory framework and the emphasis being as much on the involvement of civil society organisations and ordinary citizens. The model of the Slum Police Panchayats, which bring together slum dwellers and police within a longstanding partnership,
is an important example of how to achieve violence-reduction policies that are more holistic and tailored to the needs of the people. However, rigorous evaluations of this model, as well as developing a credible way to scale it up to meet the task at hand, are yet to be done.
### Annex  Slum Definition Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slum Housing Policies 1</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Gov't body/Organisation</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>General Conditions</th>
<th>Physical Conditions</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Quantifiables</th>
<th>Impact on Violence Mitigation and Violence Prevention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1913*</td>
<td>Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888</td>
<td>BMC/MCGM</td>
<td>(a) any buildings used, or intended or likely to be used for human habitation, are unfit for human habitation, or (b) the narrowness, closeness and bad arrangement or the bad condition of the streets and buildings, or groups of buildings, within such limits or the want of light, air, ventilation or proper conveniences, or any other sanitary defects, or one or more of such causes, are dangerous or injurious to the health of the inhabitants either of the buildings within the area of such limits, or of the neighbouring buildings within the area of such limits; and that the evils connected with such buildings and the sanitary defects in such an area cannot be effectually remedied other than by an improvement scheme for the rearrangement and reconstruction of the streets and buildings within an such area or of some of such streets or buildings.</td>
<td>unfit for human habitation</td>
<td>narrowness, closeness, bad arrangement, bad condition; want of light, air, ventilation</td>
<td>(want of) proper convenience</td>
<td>sanitary defects, dangerous or injurious to health</td>
<td>Definition directly attributes violence and insecurity to the physical parameters of the built-up environment. Essentialist view that ex-ante or ex-post policing (community or otherwise) can not change insecure outcomes. Need for demolition and relocation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949</td>
<td>BMC/ MCGM</td>
<td>(a) any buildings used, or intended or likely to be used, for human habitation, are unfit for human habitation, (b) narrowness, closeness and bad arrangement or the bad condition of the streets and buildings, or groups of buildings, within such limits or the want of light, air, ventilation or proper convenience, or any other sanitary defects, or one or more of such causes, are dangerous or injurious to the health of the inhabitants either of the buildings within the area of such limits, or of the neighbouring buildings, and that the evils connected with such buildings and the sanitary defects in such area cannot be effectually remedied otherwise than by an improvement scheme for the rearrangement and reconstruction of the streets and buildings within such area or of some of such streets or buildings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>3. (1) Declaration of slum areas. Where the competent authority upon report from any of its officers or other information in its possession is satisfied as respects any area that the buildings in that area- (a) are in any respect unfit for human habitation; or (b) are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, are detrimental to safety, health or morals, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare such area to be a slum area.  (2) In determining whether a building is unfit for human habitation for the purposes of this Act, regard shall be had to its condition in respect of the following matters, that is to say- (a) repair; (b) stability; (c) freedom from damp; (d) natural light and air; (e) water supply; (f) drainage and sanitary conveniences; (g) facilities for storage, preparation and cooking of food and for the disposal of waste water; and the building shall be deemed to be unfit as aforesaid if and only if it is so far defective in one or more of the said matters that it is not reasonably suitable for occupation in that condition.</td>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in any respect unfit for human habitation</td>
<td>dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement and design of such buildings; narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets; lack of ventilation and light; repair, stability, freedom from damp, natural light and air</td>
<td>water supply; drainage and sanitary conveniences; facilities for storage, preparation and cooking of food and for the disposal of waste water</td>
<td>(lack of) sanitation facilities; detrimental to safety or health; drainage and sanitary conditions</td>
<td>Focus shifts to service provision. Documentation refers to slums as detrimental to ‘morals’. Limited scope for state interventions (at State level – Maharashtra) to reduce insecurity; but no role for non-state or civil society.</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>Maha-ashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats Act, 1965</td>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>(1) Where the Council is of opinion that any hut, whether used as a dwelling or for any other purpose, and whether existing on the appointed day or subsequently erected, is by reason – (a) of insufficient ventilation or of the manner in which such hut is crowded together with other huts; or (b) of the want of a plinth or of a sufficient plinth or of sufficient drainage; or (c) of the impracticability of scavenging attended with risk of disease to the inhabitants of the neighborhood, the Council shall cause a notice to be affixed to some conspicuous part of such hut, requiring the owner or occupier thereof, or the owner of the land on which such hut is built, within such reasonable time as may be fixed by the Council in this behalf, to take down and remove such hut or to carry out such alteration of works as the Council may deem necessary for the avoidance of such risk.</td>
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<td>Slum Housing Policies</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>Maha- rashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, and Redevelopment) Act, 1971</td>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>any area is or may be a source of danger to the health, safety or convenience of the public of that area or of its neighbourhood, by reason of the area having inadequate or no basic amenities, or being insanitary, squalid, overcrowded or otherwise; or (b) the buildings in any area, used or intended to be used for human habitation are – (i) in any respect, unfit for human habitation; or (ii) by reasons of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities or any combination of these factors, detrimental to the health, safety or convenience of the public of that area, the Competent Authority may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare such area to be a slum area. Such declaration shall also be published in such other manner (as will give due publicity to the declaration in the area) as may be prescribed.</td>
<td>source of danger to the health, safety or convenience of the public of that area or of its neighbourhood; unfit for human habitation</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<td>Maha-rashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976</td>
<td>Maha-rashtra</td>
<td>108. (1) Where a Board upon report of any of its officers other information in its possession is satisfied that any area is or may be a source of danger to the health, safety or convenience of the public of the area or of its neighbourhood, by reason of such area having inadequate or no basic amenities, or being insanitary, squalid, overcrowded or otherwise, and where the Board decides to carry out any improvement works in such area, it shall cause such area to be defined in a map, and then it shall by an order published in the Official Gazette, declare such area to be a slum improvement area and its intention to carry out such improvement works as in its opinion are necessary and are specified in such order. A copy of such declaration shall be displayed in conspicuous places in such areas, and shall also be served upon the owner, occupier and mortgagee, if any, of the property or any part thereof.</td>
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Explicit linking of living environment (beyond physical parameters) to insecure outcomes. Scope for state interventions (at state and municipal level – Maha-rashtra); but no role for non-state or civil society. Main focus shifts to slum improvement and in-situ upgrading.
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<th>Text</th>
<th>General Physical Conditions</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Quantifiables</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Maha- rashtra Act 28 of 1977</td>
<td>Maha- rashtra</td>
<td>Section 534 C empowers the Commissioner to carry out improvement schemes within the limits of Brihanmumbai, if he feels that the said building is unfit for human habitation and it is the dangerous or injurious to the health of the inhabitants of the building within the area of such limits, etc. then Commissioner by improvement scheme for the rearrangement and reconstruction of the streets and building proceed with the scheme.</td>
<td>unfit for human habitation</td>
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<td>Explicit linking of living environment (beyond physical parameters) to insecure outcomes. Extensive scope for state interventions (primarily at municipal level – Maha-rashtra); but no role for non-state or civil society. Main focus shifts back to relocation and away from slum improvement and in-situ upgrading.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991</td>
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Gov't body/Organisation:
- BMC/MCGM

Text:
(i) for this purpose, slums shall mean those censused, or declared and notified, in the past or hereafter under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971. Slums shall also mean areas / pavement stretches hereafter notified as Slum Rehabilitation Areas. (ii) If any area fulfills the conditions laid down in section 4 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 to qualify as slum area and has been censused or declared and notified shall be deemed to be and treated as Slum Rehabilitation Areas.

General:
censused, or declared and notified, in the past or hereafter under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971

Physical Conditions:

Services:

Health:

Quantifiables:

Impact on Violence Mitigation and Violence Prevention:
Census now the primary mode of delimitation of slum areas. Major focus on relocation and rehabilitation. Growing recognition for the role of civil society interventions for conflict resolution. Primary police interventions include aiding demolition/relocation efforts, policing transit camps.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2001 Census of India</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(i) All specified areas in a town or city notified as ‘Slum’ by State/Local Government and UT Administration under any Act including a ‘Slum Act’. (ii) All areas recognized as ‘Slum’ by State/Local Government and UT Administration, Housing and Slum Boards, which may have not been formally notified as slum under any act; (iii) A compact area of at least 300 population or about 60–70 households of poorly built congested tenements, in unhygienic environment usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water facilities.</td>
<td>notified as ‘slum’ by other gov’t body; recognised as ‘slum’ by other gov’t body</td>
<td>poorly built, congested; inadequate infrastructure</td>
<td>lacking drinking water facilities</td>
<td>unhygienic environment, lacking proper sanitary facilities</td>
<td>of at least 300 population or about 60–70 households</td>
<td>Census based mode of delimitation of slum areas. Major focus on relocation and rehabilitation. Growing recognition for the role of civil society interventions for conflict resolution. Primary police interventions include aiding demolition/relocation efforts, policing transit camps. Recognition of responsibility at the national, state and city levels – creation of a ‘safe city’ paradigm for economic development. Growing recognition for the role of civil society interventions for conflict resolution.</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Draft National Slum Policy</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(In addition to the 2001 Census Definition) a) In general, all under-serviced settlements, being unauthorised occupation of land, congested inner-city built-up areas, fringe area unauthorised developments, villages within urban areas and in the periphery, irrespective of tenure or ownership or land use shall be covered under the definition of a slum/informal settlement. b) The criteria for defining a slum/informal settlement shall take into consideration economic and social parameters (including health indicators) as well as physical conditions. Each State/Union Territory shall lay down the norms/criteria for categorising an area as underserviced and the local body of each town shall list all such areas as slums.</td>
<td>notified as 'slum' by other gov't body; recognised as 'slum' by other gov't body</td>
<td>poorly built, congested; inadequate infrastructure</td>
<td>lacking drinking water facilities</td>
<td>unhygienic environment, lacking proper sanitary facilities</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>National Sample Survey Organisation (2002)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.2 Slum: A slum is a compact settlement with a collection of poorly built tenements, mostly of temporary nature, crowded together usually with inadequate sanitary and drinking water facilities in unhygienic conditions. Such an area, for the purpose of this survey, was considered as 'nonnotified slum' if at least 20 households lived in that area. Areas notified as slums by the respective municipalities, corporations, local bodies or development authorities are treated as 'notified slums'. For the survey, slums in urban areas only were considered. The slum dwellings are commonly known as 'Jhopad Patti' in Bombay and 'Jhuggi Jhopri' in Delhi. It may be noted that the definition of 'slum' followed in the current survey conforms to the one adopted in the previous NSS survey.</td>
<td>compact; poorly built, temporary nature; crowded together</td>
<td>inadequate sanitary and drinking water facilities</td>
<td>unhygienic conditions</td>
<td>at least 20 households if not already 'notified' by other gov't bodies</td>
<td>Census now the primary mode of delimitation of slum areas. Major focus on relocation and rehabilitation. Growing recognition for the role of civil society interventions for conflict resolution. Primary police interventions include aiding demolition/relocation efforts, policing transit camps.</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>UN-HABITAT Global Report on Human Settlements 2003</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>an area that combines, to various extents, the following characteristics (restricted to the physical and legal characteristics of the settlement, and excluding the more difficult social dimensions): inadequate access to safe water; inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure; poor structural quality of housing; overcrowding; insecure residential status.</td>
<td>poor structural quality of housing; overcrowding</td>
<td>inadequate access to safe water and other infrastructure</td>
<td>inadequate access to sanitation</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Sundar Burra, Administrator of SPARC²</td>
<td>Sundar Burra, Administrator of SPARC²</td>
<td>dense, overcrowded, small quarters. Construction and materials primarily impermanent.</td>
<td>lack of basic services - water, sanitation, electric</td>
<td>lack of sanitation</td>
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2. From an interview with Sundar Burra, 10/07/09.

*Note: discrepancy of date. Government publication of act dates modification at 1913. Shruti Desai sets the year of the same modification at 1933.*
References


Government of India (2010b) National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs


